

Deciphering a (partial) market

The case of off-street residential parking in Zurich

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1 **DECIPHERING A (PARTIAL) MARKET: THE CASE OF OFF-STREET RESIDENTIAL**
2 **PARKING IN ZURICH**

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52 **ABSTRACT**

53 Off-street residential parking market can be viewed as a case where the market-clearing price is the
54 result of a set of characteristics, some of which have been the result of different policies. However,
55 modelling of the pricing mechanism that governs such partial markets has received very low attention
56 in the literature, mainly due to their unregulated nature. The current study aims to fill in that gap by
57 employing a spatial hedonic modelling approach to model off-street parking rental prices for the city of
58 Zurich. In addition, an overview of the various policies in place concerning the on- and off-street parking
59 provision in Zurich is presented. The results highlight the existence of local partial market clearing
60 conditions with rental prices being highly sensitive on the availability of on-street parking in the close
61 vicinity of residences, while the identification of the influence zones of the employed variables brings
62 forward interesting behavioral aspects concerning the decision to rent an off-street parking place. In
63 conclusion, the current study shows that modelling of private off-street parking markets has the potential
64 to shed some light on the underlying mechanisms and provide some useful quantified insights, and it
65 can constitute a useful supplementary tool for policy-making.

66

67 *Keywords:* Residential parking, Off-street parking, Parking policies, Hedonic modeling, Spatial
68 regression

69 INTRODUCTION

70 Undoubtedly one of the key elements of driving is the parking end of the trip that can end up adding
71 considerate costs both to the driver and to the society. Parking scarcity, particularly present in urban
72 cores, amplifies the overall implications of parking in various ways. Driven by this, different policies
73 have emerged over the years to mitigate these implications and regulate parking provision. Following
74 the categorization suggested by Barter (1), parking policies can be divided into three categories, the
75 conventional supply-focused policies, the parking management policies, and the market-based policies,
76 where regulation of parking is achieved in different ways. Conventional supply-focused policies aim at
77 providing the required parking space on the basis of different associated demand needs per land use,
78 through the enforcement of minimum and maximum requirements. In summary, parking management
79 policies focus mainly on the demand side by introducing restrictions such as restrains, time limitations,
80 and pricing. On the contrary, market-based policies assume that prices should be determined from the
81 market itself in order to accomplish the efficiency goals and they can constitute a second-best pricing
82 alternative after congestion pricing (2).

83 Shoup (3) has advocated extensively in favor of policies allowing the existence of market-based
84 parking fees as a way to eliminate cruising and its external costs. As Arnott (4) states “*the on-street*
85 *parking fee is set inefficiently low (in Boston, the rate is \$1.00 per hour), with the result that on-street*
86 *parking spaces are rationed not only through the fee but also through cruising for parking*”, pointing
87 out that the existence of pricing cannot be a panacea on its own if the on-street parking remains
88 underpriced. A thorough review of the economics of cruising and parking in general is provided by Inci
89 (5).

90 In the spirit of Shoup, Millard-Ball et al. (6) evaluated San Francisco’s parking pricing
91 experiment and concluded that market-based fees have helped reducing cruising by 50%. In the same
92 context, a study was conducted for the case of Zurich (7) where a simulation-based approach showed
93 that a policy as such would result to spatially differentiated pricing while city’s revenues would be
94 overall increased. Interestingly, market-based fees seem to be the rule in Japan where the existing
95 regulatory framework has enabled land owners to commercially exploit space in such a way, resulting
96 to the minimization of externalities (8).

97 98 Residential Parking

99 Residential parking constitutes a relatively understudied, but nevertheless important aspect of parking
100 provision. As residential parking we denote the provision of parking at the residence and it includes both
101 public on-street and private off-street parking spaces. The impact of residential parking supply on car
102 ownership has been examined (9, 10) and the main findings show that it has substantial influence on the
103 car ownership levels. Furthermore, another study (11) showed that the provision of residential off-street
104 parking affects the overall commuting behavior, in aspects such as car ownership, and mode choice.

105 In addition, provision of free residential parking can also have implications on the housing
106 market where as Shoup (12) argues: “*the cost of free parking is embedded in the prices of everything...
107 especially in the property prices and rents*”. Concerning the off-street parking case, in another study
108 (13) a hedonic model was estimated in order isolate the impact of off-street parking on housing prices
109 (when bundled together), and it was concluded that parking requirements can influence parking
110 affordability. In a similar context, Manville (14) summarizes how off-street parking requirements act in
111 the housing market.

112 In general, different policies are practiced concerning residential parking. For the case of on-
113 street parking, the most common policy is to provide residents the right to park in restricted public zones
114 through acquiring a residential parking permit (RPP), either freely available or for a nominal price (for
115 a very low and spatially undifferentiated fee). Normally, the use of these restricted zones is unlimited
116 for residents while non-residents can only park for a short time. However, this situation can give rise to
117 a competition both within and between the two groups.

118 In (15), the authors investigate the possibility of charging residents for on-street parking in New
119 York, a practice which is quite common in European countries. Their findings suggest that residents are

120 willing to pay for an average \$408 per year. In the same spirit, the welfare losses accruing from the
121 existence of an underpriced RPP were estimated in another study (16).

122 The economic aspects of this policy are discussed in (17) where they demonstrate that RPP
123 programs are “*unlikely to result in a first-best allocation of on-street parking spaces, if an efficient level*
124 *of economic vitality is to be ensured at the same time*”. Furthermore, in (18) the authors evaluate the
125 existing RPP program in Berkeley, concluding that imposing short-term limitations to non-residents can
126 be problematic and result to underused spaces.

127 However, the pricing mechanisms that govern the residential off-street parking has received
128 very little attention in the literature, mainly due to their unregulated nature. Nevertheless, we believe
129 that an analysis of the market of off-street parking has the prospect to offer some qualitative and
130 quantitative insights, useful both for evaluating and shaping policies. To the best of our knowledge,
131 there have been no studies of hedonic modelling of off-street residential parking. We select Zurich as a
132 case study to estimate a hedonic model of parking rental prices in order to understand how underpriced
133 the residential parking permits are. The results highlight the existence of local partial market clearing
134 conditions with rental prices being highly sensitive to the availability of on-street parking in the close
135 vicinity of residence, while the identification of the influence zones of the different employed variables
136 brings forward interesting behavioral aspects concerning the decision to rent an off-street residential
137 parking place. In addition, the results of the estimated spatial regression model provide further support
138 to the argument of local partial markets.

139

140 **ZURICH PARKING SCHEME**

141 The existing parking provision in Zurich is the result of a combination of supply-focused and parking
142 management policies put into practice over the last decades. As Garrick and McCahill state (19) “*Since*
143 *the late 1980s, Zurich has developed an alternative that's worth studying because it breaks all the rules*
144 *of conventional transportation planning, and yet has been vitally important to the success of that city*”.

145

146 **Provision of Public Parking Spaces**

147 Two are the main turning points of city’s overall parking policy concerning the provision of public
148 parking. At first, in 1989 the city council decided to implement a parking restraint policy regarding the
149 on-street parking in order to protect the residential areas from excessive traffic and emissions. In
150 particular, on-street parking was divided into two categories, namely the blue and white zones (marked
151 accordingly). Blue zones are designated on-street parking spaces reserved for residents who upon paying
152 a yearly fee of 300 Swiss francs (CHF) gain the right to park without any time limitations inside them,
153 whereas non-residents can remain parked at the same space for an hour during the day but without
154 paying a fee (using a parking disc to indicate their arrival time). Extending the stay during the day is
155 possible for a non-resident by acquiring a one day parking permit for the price of 15 CHF. From the
156 afternoon till the next morning (6pm till 9am), and during Sundays and holidays, there is no limitation
157 over the use of blue zones. This zone contains 70% of the total 50’000 (approximately 35’000) public
158 parking on-street spaces available in the city (20).

159 The white zone is aimed for shorter stays (up to 2-4 hours), normally upon a fee which is payed
160 at a parking meter adjacent to the location. The hourly price and the time limitation vary spatially, but
161 not temporally, and they are announced on signs. In general, the pricing period is coordinated with the
162 business opening hours, meaning that the majority of spaces are available for overnight parking free of
163 charge (20). Apart from the on-street parking, there is also a number of parking garages scattered across
164 the city (some owned and operated by the city) offering off-street parking possibilities. In total, their
165 capacity is of about 20’000 off-street parking places. They are more expensive than the nearby on-street
166 parking (1-5 CHF per hour) and the pricing is in force around the clock. In summary, pricing and time
167 limitation have been exploited as tools for parking management policy making, aiming at altering the
168 demand for parking, especially during the day.

169 The second turning point was in 1996, where the so-called historic compromise agreement was
170 made (21). This agreement entailed the preservation of the number of visitor- and customer-oriented
171 public parking spaces in the center of city (district 1) stable at the levels of 1990, on the basis of making

172 the city more pedestrian friendly and also to put an end to the long-standing dispute over the location
173 and the number of public parking spaces. Gradually, surface parking places were replaced by
174 underground parking garages, freeing up space that had an overall positive impact on city's landscape
175 and functionality (some interesting photos of the affected places before and after the agreement can be
176 found at (21) along with detailed maps showing the yearly on-street parking removal until 2009).

177

178 **Private Off-street Parking Spaces**

179 Apart from the garages, private off-street parking spaces exist, normally on-site, and they are exploited
180 commercially. Zurich's policy concerning the off-street parking can be summarized as rather
181 unconventional regarding the implementation date of the existing regulations. More specifically, the city
182 of Zurich has a supply-focused policy where a regulatory framework including zoning parking
183 ordinances where the minimum and maximum parking requirements per land-use are specified. In
184 particular, as Garrick and McCahill discuss (19), the particularity of Zurich lies on the fact that they
185 incorporated maximum parking regulation in their ordinances relatively early (1989) while in the
186 following ordinances (1996) and amendment (2010) both the maximum and minimum parking
187 requirements were decreased further. The existing regulations include zonal ordinances dividing the city
188 into 5 zone. More specifically, for each 120 square metres of residential floor area the minimum required
189 parking space varies from 0.1 (in the city centre) to 0.7 (in the suburbs) while the maximum from 0.1
190 to 1.15 (22). Essentially, the city council had decided to regulate the market in such a way to avoid
191 giving rise to excessive parking supply, and thus to restrain car ownership and usage.

192 According to the parking directory of the city where all parking spaces (both public and private)
193 are recorded, there are about 210'000 private off-street parking places. Moreover, there is no price
194 regulation in place for private parking places, the vast majority of which are commercially exploited by
195 the owners. It should be noted that in most of the cases in Zurich, off-street parking is not bundled with
196 housing. Observational data suggest that in average their rental price is of about 150 CHF per month. It
197 is worth pointing out the substantial price difference between the public and private public parking
198 spaces when it comes to the residential parking case.

199 According to the official data from the city of Zurich, approximately 43'000 annual residential
200 permits have been issued this year while at the same time about 140'000 vehicles in total are registered.
201 Taking into account the quantity of blue zone parking spaces (35'000), it becomes apparent that the
202 demand exceeds the on-street supply massively. The implication of this is that seeking for an on-street
203 parking becomes a tedious process, given that drivers have to compete not only with other drivers with
204 residential permit, but also with short-stayers during the day, and non-residents drivers after 6 pm.
205 Official data regarding the occupancy rates of the on-street spaces are not available to the authors,
206 however field observational data indicate high occupancy levels during the day (especially in areas close
207 to the center and areas with mixed land use), and overall saturation in the evenings.

208

209 **MODELLING OFF-STREET PARKING PRICES**

210 Modelling off-street parking prices has the merit that it can provide some quantified insights on the
211 impact of different determinants on market-clearing prices. The advantage of estimating such models
212 can be viewed as twofold. First, among the involved determinants, the impact of different policies will
213 be isolated and hence allow us to draw conclusions concerning their effectiveness. Secondly, to
214 comprehend better the pricing mechanism and acquire knowledge useful for determining future policies.
215 Essentially, the observed market price is the result of the interaction between two underlying
216 mechanisms that leads to a local equilibrium. The demand mechanism is responsible for specifying the
217 demand for parking at any given location while the supply mechanism specifies the available off-street
218 and on-street parking capacity along with the restraints concerning their use. The interaction between
219 the two mechanisms leads to market-clearing prices. Naturally, both mechanisms are of high interest
220 concerning policy making issues. For instance, the decision to offer underpriced, or even free, on-street
221 parking can be assumed to be giving drivers an incentive to cruise for an empty spot and can
222 consequently lead to lower market-clearing prices. On the contrary, deciding to decrease the number of

223 both on-street and off-street parking places through regulation is expected to have an uplifting impact
 224 on the market prices, given certain demand.

225

226 **Modelling approach**

227 Economic theory suggests that the determination of the price of a particular good relies heavily on its
 228 characteristics. Based on this insight, employing the hedonic pricing approach allows to model a good's
 229 price based on its characteristics bundle, making the assumption that the good itself is perceived from
 230 the market as a bundle of attributes, rather than a single commodity (23), each of which has an implicit
 231 market value that we want to estimate (24). Hedonic pricing as theory has been put forward by Lancaster
 232 (25) and Ridker and Henning (24), and ever since it has found wide application in the area of modelling
 233 housing prices (e.g. (26, 27)). Departing from the housing market case and in a similar vein, off-street
 234 parking market can be considered as a case where the market-clearing price is the result of a set of
 235 characteristics, some of which have been the result of different policies.

236 Following the categorization of characteristics as presented by Ridker and Henning (24), we
 237 distinguish the characteristics as specific to the property, to the location, and to the neighborhood. In
 238 general, the main amenity of off-street parking is that it provides a reserved place for parking. Given the
 239 problem at hand, in the first category amenities regarding the off-street parking space should be
 240 included. Garage parking is a characteristic of apparent value in comparison to the unsheltered option
 241 since it offers security, minimization of corrosion due to weather, and no exposure to acts of vandalism.
 242 Characteristics such as ease of access, sufficient lighting etc. can be considered as property
 243 characteristics as well, however obtaining such data is burdensome. Regarding the location
 244 characteristics, the accessibility of the location can be interpreted as such. Last, the majority of the
 245 characteristics correspond to neighborhood characteristics where the population density, the mixture of
 246 land uses, the availability of on-street parking alternatives, the income of the people living in the
 247 neighborhood (thus more or less willingness to pay) etc. are considered to belong to this category.

248 Ideally, a model formulation capable of accounting for the simultaneity and the interdependence
 249 of the two mechanisms determining the price should be employed (such as structural equation model).
 250 However, the choice of a simpler model has the advantage that it can incorporate directly supply-demand
 251 interaction variables in its specification, which in many cases is more meaningful from a policy making
 252 perspective. In addition, there is sufficient evidence in the literature that modelling of spatial variables,
 253 such as off-street parking, can involve spatial effects which need to be addressed accordingly. The
 254 incorporation of spatial effects into a structural equation system remains a methodological challenge
 255 which has not been addressed in the existing literature. Therefore, we consider the estimation of a single
 256 linear model, which we will extend accordingly to account for spatial effects and along the same line of
 257 thought as prevailing approaches for hedonic modeling (e.g.(26, 27)), as the preferred alternative for the
 258 purposes of our study.

259 On the modelling front, an ordinary least squares (OLS) model is estimated to serve as the
 260 benchmark for our analysis. More specifically, the hedonic pricing model takes the following form:

261

$$262 \quad P = \beta X + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

263

264 where P is the vector with the N off-street parking rent observations, X is a matrix with the bundle of k
 265 attributes per observation with dimensions $N \times k$, β the estimated parameters, and ε is a vector with N
 266 error terms.

267 However, a drawback of modelling data of spatial nature is the potential existence of spatial
 268 effects that need to be taken into account within the model specification and estimation procedure in
 269 order to avoid giving rise to statistical problems such as unreliable statistical tests and biased and
 270 inconsistent estimated parameters. In particular, spatial effects correspond to the cases of spatial
 271 dependence and heterogeneity. "As spatial dependence, it can be considered to be the existence of a
 272 functional relationship between what happens at one point in space and what happens elsewhere.
 273 Spatial heterogeneity is considered to be the lack of structural stability of the various phenomena over
 274 space, and also the lack of homogeneity of the spatial units of the observations"(28). More specifically,

275 spatial dependence pertains to the case of having spatially autocorrelated residuals, hence violating the
 276 assumption of independent and identically distributed (iid) error terms of the OLS model. Spatial
 277 simultaneous autoregressive (SAR) models constitute a modelling alternative that allows to account for
 278 the spatial dependence issues. The assumption of these models is that the response variable at each
 279 location is a combination of the explanatory variables at that location but also of the response of
 280 neighboring locations in different ways depending on the underlying process that gives rise to the
 281 autocorrelation issues. More specifically, in the case where a spatial variable has been omitted from the
 282 specification of the model, the error terms tend to be spatially autocorrelated and this should be
 283 accounted for in the error term (spatial error model). In the case where the price of neighboring locations
 284 has an indirect effect on the price of each location, then the inclusion of a spatially lagged price variable
 285 can resolve the spatial dependence issues and facilitates the estimation of explanatory variables' direct
 286 effects on the price (spatial lag model). Both models are estimated in terms of maximum likelihood
 287 estimation (more information can be found at (27, 28)). Their formulation is presented below.

288
 289 Spatial error model: $P = \beta X + u$, with $u = \lambda W + \varepsilon$ (2)

290
 291 where u is the error term, λ the spatial autoregressive coefficient, W the spatial weight matrix with
 292 dimensions $N \times N$, and ε a vector of iid error terms.

293
 294 Spatial lag model: $P = pWP + \beta X + u$ (3)

295
 296 where p is a spatial autocorrelation parameter.

297
 298 Spatial autocorrelation is normally measured in terms of the *Moran's I* measure which shows
 299 the degree of autocorrelation (0 value indicates no autocorrelation, while 1 or -1 perfect autocorrelation)
 300 (28). The spatial weight matrix W specifies the neighborhood of each location. Its determination takes
 301 place experimentally by identifying up to what spatial extent there is statistically significant
 302 autocorrelation (a detailed discussion and illustration can be found at (29)).

303 On the front of spatial heterogeneity, geographically weighted regression (GWR) constitutes a
 304 technique which allows different relationships to exist in space, instead of a global relationship, and
 305 provides localized estimates of the coefficients (more information can be found at (30)). The formulation
 306 of the model is presented below.


307
 308 $P_i = \beta_{i0} + \sum_{k=1}^N \beta_{ik} x_{ik} + \varepsilon_i$ (4)

309
 310 where P_i is the price at location i , β_{i0} is the local regression intercept, β_{ik} is the local regression
 311 coefficient for k th explanatory variable at location i , x_{ik} is the value of the k th explanatory variable at
 312 location i , and ε_i is the random error at location i . Essentially, GWR fits a localized regression model
 313 by taking into account the observations within a bandwidth and weighing them based on a kernel
 314 distance function.

315 316 OFF-STREET PARKING PRICES DATA

317 We utilize off-street parking advertisement rental data that we obtained from web resources for the
 318 period of 2010-2014, where information about the monthly price, the location of the parking place, the
 319 advertisement date, and whether or not it corresponds to a garage is included. Due to the nature of the
 320 data and their utilization as a byproduct for our purposes, a high risk of incorrectly registered information
 321 and non-market-clearing prices is entailed, thus a data cleaning process is designed to ensure their
 322 validity. At first, we take as indication that the market fails to clear the price if an advertisement for the
 323 same location is reposted within a short time. For such cases, we keep the latest observation per year,
 324 given that a sufficient time exists (at least three months) until it is reposted in the subsequent year.
 325 Observations for the same location with extreme price differential, are excluded unless the differential
 326 can be justified on the basis of different characteristics (garage or not). Cases with unusually low or high

327 prices, are checked individually to determine if they correspond to actual prices or they are the result of
 328 typing mistakes, by comparing them with neighboring locations rental prices. Last, only for a small
 329 subset of the locations we have more than one valid posting over the observation period, thus the
 330 alternative of panel data analysis is rejected. Instead, we choose to randomly pick an observation per
 331 location and hence perform pooled cross-sectional analysis with the subsequent inclusion of year
 332 dummy variables to capture structural changes over time. An overview of the rental prices along with
 333 their spatial distribution is given in Figure 1.
 334



335
 336 **FIGURE 1 Study sample of the off-street parking asked prices per month in the city of Zurich**
 337

338 In order to obtain the required location and neighborhood characteristics of the off-street parking
 339 places, additional data sources are utilized. In particular, detailed spatial data for on- and off-street places
 340 were provided from the city of Zurich (more information at (7)). Concerning the built environment,
 341 buildings data including total floor area, land uses, and spatial location are obtained from cadastral
 342 information and the federal register of buildings (more information at (31)). Socio-economic data such
 343 as aggregated population and household statistics on a hectare level are acquired from the Swiss federal
 344 office of statistics. Household data correspond to the year 2012 since data for previous years are
 345 unavailable. Finally, the accessibility values refer to the accessibility to employment opportunities and
 346 they were calculated at the institute for the purposes of a different project (31).

347 To make a proper distinction for the hedonic model, public on-street parking spaces are divided
 348 into unlimited and limited on the basis of the time limitations in place. The unlimited category includes
 349 all parking spaces in the blue zone, parking spaces in the white zone but without a time limitation, and
 350 also the uncategorised parking spaces. The limited category includes the remaining white zone parking
 351 spaces. It should be mentioned that information pertinent to the pricing of the white zone parking spaces
 352 is not available to the authors, however we assume that spaces without time limitations are free of charge
 353 since in the majority of cases this aligns with the actual situation in Zurich. In the following table a
 354 description of the variables employed in the regression models along with their summary statistics are
 355 presented.

356 **TABLE 1 Definition and summary statistics for variables**

357

Variable	Description	Mean	Std. dev.
RentalPrice	Market-clearing price for off-street parking space (PS) [CHF]	151.99	78.8
log(PuTacc)	Logsum of public transport accessibility to employment opportunities	12.38	0.17
UnlPublPS/TotalPublPS(500m)	Unlimited public PS/ total public PS in a 500m. radius	0.78	0.2
PrivPS/TotalPS(200m)	Private PP/ total PP in a 200m. radius	0.82	0.11
BuildingResidUse	Closest building's floor area with residential use / total floor area	0.38	0.24
PrivPS(200m)	Number of private PS in a 200m. radius	583.40	304.44
LimPublicPS(100m)	Number of limited public PS in a 100m. radius	8.96	16.89
Station(200m)	Dummy variable equals 1 if there is train station within 200m., else zero	0.05	-
HH12/100sqmRes(300)	Number of households with 1-2 members/ 100sqm. of residential floor area in a 300m. radius	0.98	0.23
ResidentialUse(100m)	Total floor area with residential use/ total floor area within 100m.	0.32	0.15
BuildingFloorSpace	Closest building's total floor space [sqm]	2654	7172
PublPS/100sqm.Floor(100m)	Number of public PS / 100sqm. of floor area in a 100m. radius	0.08	0.07
OnSitePrivPS/100sqmFloor	Number of on-site private PS / 100sqm. of floor area	1.04	2.84
OnSiteDummy	Dummy variable equals 1 if OnSitePrivPS/100sqmFloor <2, else zero	0.90	-
Slope	Closest building's slope [degrees]	3.64	3.35
Garage	Dummy variable equals 1 if off-street PS is garage, else zero	0.26	-
DistanceFromCBD	Distance from the main train station [km]	2.93	1.40
District 2-12	Dummy variables for districts 2 to 12	0.01- 0.16	-
Year 2011-2014	Dummy variables for advertisement years 2011-2014	0.11- 0.26	-

358

359 **RESULTS - DISCUSSION**

360 The employment of a semi-log specification as the functional form for our case is preferred for a number
361 of reasons, such as better compliance with linear model assumptions (mitigation of heteroscedasticity
362 issues), non-constant marginal effects, and lower sensitivity to extreme values (32). In addition, semi-
363 log specification offers appealing parameters' interpretation allowing for a constant elasticity and semi-
364 elasticity model.

365 Our qualitative hypothesis is that model results should be aligned with the empirical evidence
366 and intuition concerning the determinants of the off-street rental price. In particular, we expect that
367 parking supply variables should have a negative relation with price, reflecting the fact that as supply
368 lowers, parking alternatives decrease and thus off-street parking prices increase. However, in cases of
369 excessive on-site off-street supply a different relation is expected. On the demand side, we expect the
370 relevant variables to be positively related with the rental price, as the result of more competition for the
371 existing parking spaces. Public transport variables capture essentially patterns associated with higher
372 density of commercial use spaces (since commercial exploitation has developed around places with high
373 accessibility, and especially around train stations), or it can indicate lower car dependence on the course

374 of daily life, hence lower parking turnover. Smaller households are less likely to own a car and
375 subsequently we hypothesize the existence of a negative relation with rental price. Garage variable is
376 expected to have a positive association with price for apparent reasons. Location's slope is employed as
377 a proxy for land price, higher values indicating individuals with higher income and consequently higher
378 willingness to pay for comforts, such as reserved parking space. Last, district dummies are expected to
379 have negative sign, given that the excluded dummy corresponds to district 1 that is the city center where
380 the historical compromise is in force. Yearly dummies are expected to capture patterns related to the
381 overall economic growth, which translates into price increases in the observation period.

382

383 **Model Estimation**

384 At first, an OLS model is estimated to test our hypotheses and quantify the impact of the different
385 variables. Furthermore, a series of tests is applied to ensure that the estimates are unbiased and the
386 statistical hypothesis tests are accurate. Regarding the multicollinearity issue, the maximum correlation
387 among the employed variables is 0.60, which is not alarming. Moreover, a collinearity diagnostic is
388 estimated (variance inflation factors) where multicollinearity issues are found to occur among the
389 distance and district dummy variables (value higher than 4), however the inclusion of both variables is
390 considered not to be problematic, given their highly significant explanatory power (F-statistic=5.44, p-
391 value=0). A Breusch-Pagan test indicates homoscedastic error terms (p-value=0.975), while based on
392 Cook's distance (33) three highly influential observations are excluded from the data set.

393 The existence of spatial dependence issues on the OLS model is tested in terms of robust
394 Lagrange multiplier tests (34) for spatial error and spatial lag dependence, and in terms of spatial
395 autocorrelation existence on the OLS residuals (Moran's *I* measure). The spatial weight matrix is
396 identified experimentally based on the spatial extent of statistically significant autocorrelation. A spatial
397 weight matrix for a distance of 150 meters and a maximum number of 5 neighbors, with an inverse
398 distance-based and row standardized weighing scheme, is found to be the best one. Thereinafter, the
399 relevant tests (Table 2) point to a spatial error dependence case with statistically significant spatial
400 autocorrelation of 0.099. The estimation results for the OLS model and the spatial error model are
401 presented in Table 2.

402 Subsequently, the existence of spatial heterogeneity is tested through the estimation of a GWR
403 model. More specifically, GWR is estimated with an adaptive bandwidth which is identified on the basis
404 of minimizing the root mean square prediction error. The results show relatively small variance on the
405 estimated parameters while in terms of goodness of fit, OLS and spatial error model outweigh GWR.
406 Moreover, taking into consideration that GWR fails to resolve spatial dependence issues (Moran's
407 $I=0.11$) we conclude that for our study purposes its application can be ambiguous. Therefore, GWR
408 results are not reported but are available from the authors upon request.

409 **TABLE 2 Estimation results**

410

Dependent variable=log(RentalPrice)	OLS		Spatial Error Model	
Constant	3.261	*** (1.104)	3.245	*** (1.161)
log(PuTacc)	0.226	*** (0.086)	0.231	** (0.091)
UnPublPS/TotalPublPS(500m)	-0.299	*** (0.099)	-0.294	*** (0.103)
PrivPS/TotalPS(200m)	-0.437	*** (0.166)	-0.462	*** (0.171)
BuildingResidUse	-0.075	(0.053)	-0.065	(0.052)
PrivPS(200m)	0.0002	*** (0.00005)	0.0001	*** (0.00005)
LimPublicPS(100m)	0.004	*** (0.001)	0.004	*** (0.001)
Station(200m)	0.067	(0.056)	0.062	(0.058)
HH12/100sqmRes(300)	-0.226	*** (0.059)	-0.230	*** (0.061)
ResidentialUse(100m)	-0.250	** (0.117)	-0.272	** (0.120)
log(BuildingFloorSpace)	0.051	*** (0.013)	0.050	*** (0.013)
PublPS/100sqm.Floor(100m)	-0.423	* (0.217)	-0.409	* (0.218)
OnSitePrivPS/100sqmFloor*OnSiteDummy	-0.154	*** (0.043)	-0.152	*** (0.042)
Slope	0.005	(0.004)	0.005	(0.005)
Garage	0.439	*** (0.028)	0.427	*** (0.028)
DistanceFromCBD	-0.070	*** (0.017)	-0.069	*** (0.018)
District 2	-0.501	*** (0.116)	-0.509	*** (0.120)
District 3	-0.518	*** (0.117)	-0.527	*** (0.121)
District 4	-0.669	*** (0.116)	-0.671	*** (0.120)
District 5	-0.690	*** (0.127)	-0.710	*** (0.132)
District 6	-0.553	*** (0.117)	-0.565	*** (0.122)
District 7	-0.441	*** (0.119)	-0.449	*** (0.123)
District 8	-0.418	*** (0.114)	-0.427	*** (0.118)
District 9	-0.593	*** (0.125)	-0.596	*** (0.130)
District 10	-0.483	*** (0.125)	-0.491	*** (0.129)
District 11	-0.609	*** (0.121)	-0.611	*** (0.125)
District 12	-0.600	*** (0.131)	-0.610	*** (0.136)
Year 2011	0.041	(0.033)	0.037	(0.032)
Year 2012	-0.027	(0.035)	-0.023	(0.035)
Year 2013	0.087	** (0.035)	0.084	** (0.034)
Year 2014	0.205	*** (0.041)	0.194	*** (0.040)
Lambda			0.108	***
No. of obs.		1009		1009
adj. R-squared		0.468		-
Pseudo R-squared:		-		0.489
AIC		791		782
Moran's I measure	0.099	***	0.002	
Robust LM error	9.38	***	-	
Robust LM lag	1.125		-	

Significant at: 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *, () Standard error

411

412 **Discussion**

413 Both estimated models give similar results, however we focus on the spatial error model as the most
414 statistically accurate of the two. In addition, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values and the R-
415 squared values also confirm this, indicating an improvement in terms of goodness of fit. Overall, the
416 estimated parameters confirm our hypotheses and expectations. More specifically, the estimates are
417 interpreted as semi-elasticity and elasticity values. To calculate the percent change for the case of non-
418 transformed variables and avoid giving rise to approximation errors (32), the following formula is
419 applied:

420

$$421 \quad \% \Delta RP = 100(\exp(\beta * \Delta X) - 1) \quad (5)$$

422

423 For the case of *UnlPublPS/TotalPublPS(500m)*, if we take the extreme case of having only
 424 unlimited parking spaces and deciding to turn them into limited ones, the change in the rental price
 425 would be equal to 34.18%. If we assume that the number of limited on-street parking places is doubled
 426 from 20 to 40, the parameter of *LimPublicPS(100m)* implies an additional 8.33% increase on the rental
 427 prices, which highlights a substantial total demand response to the supply change related to the provision
 428 of limited on-street parking places. In the case where private parking accounts for the half of the parking
 429 capacity, and a 10% decrease on the private parking provision occurs, the corresponding parameter of
 430 *PrivPS/TotalPS(200m)* implies a 1.22% increase on the rental price. However, if we assume that the
 431 decrease corresponds to 10 parking spaces, according to the parameter of *PrivPS(200m)*, there will be a
 432 0.1% additional decrease on the prices, result which is not in line with our expectation of the response
 433 of the supply variables but given its low magnitude it is negligible and it might have arisen as a correction
 434 to the impact of the previous variable.

435 According to *Station(200m)* estimate, locations within 200 meters from a train station have in
 436 average 6.4% higher rental price, all else equal. *HH12/100sqmRes(300)*, *ResidentialUse(100m)*, and
 437 *DistanceFromCBD* parameters are found to be in line with our expectations, reflecting the impact of
 438 lower demand levels, while *log(BuildingFloorSpace)* and *Slope* reflect the opposite. Of particular
 439 interest is the parameter of *PublPS/100sqm.Floor(100m)* where the provision of on-street parking spaces
 440 in relationship to the floor area shows that a removal of on-street parking such as from 1.1 to 1 per 100
 441 sq.m. of floor area, will give rise to 4.17% increase on the rental prices, revealing particularly high
 442 sensitivity of the demand response to this supply change. In a similar vein, a 0.1 decrease of the on-site
 443 parking spaces (e.g. due to changes in parking ordinances) will lead to 1.53% increase on the rental
 444 price. District dummies coefficients affirm the excessive price differential between the rest of districts
 445 and the city center where, all else equal, the rental prices can be twice as high. Last, yearly dummies
 446 reveal an increase on the rental prices from 2010 to 2014 equal to 21.41%.

447 In addition to the above, the identified zones of influence of the variables can also be considered
 448 as a highly policy-relevant aspect. It should be noted that different radii values were tested before
 449 concluding on the chosen ones. Interestingly, different patterns are coming to the surface which can
 450 reveal some behavioral aspects concerning the decision to rent an off-street parking place. At first, the
 451 availability of off-street parking within a 200 meters radius can be interpreted as the maximum distance
 452 that somebody would consider to rent a space. Higher distance would imply higher walking times, and
 453 perhaps the total cost (rent and walking time) would be outweighed by the choice of cruising. The 500
 454 meters radius in the variable *UnlPublPS/TotalPublPS(500m)* can be considered that it includes an
 455 extremely big area to be taken into consideration for parking, nevertheless it can be associated to the
 456 overall perception of the wider area in terms of parking provision, and also it might be attributed to spill-
 457 over problems from neighboring locations.

458 A different pattern is exhibited when focusing on *PublPS/100sqm.Floor(100m)* and
 459 *LimPublicPS(100m)* where the shorter radius of 100 meters suggests that the parking decision is
 460 significantly affected by the provision of on-street parking space in the vicinity of residence. Towards
 461 the same direction points also the *ResidentialUse(100m)* radius, revealing that the demand, and in
 462 essence the competition for parking spaces, matters within a close vicinity. The superiority of the on-
 463 site parking space variable *OnSitePrivPS/100sqmFloor* over a short radius counterpart highlights that
 464 the decision to rent an off-street parking space essentially depends on local neighborhood characteristics,
 465 revealing a localized demand and supply interaction. Furthermore, it should also be noted that the
 466 finding of spatial error dependence up to an extent of 150 meters alludes to an unobserved spatial omitted
 467 variable, providing further support to the argument that off-street parking rental decision is subject to
 468 very local conditions. The identified patterns align with the findings of another study (35) for Zurich
 469 where it was found that the walking distance for blue zone residential parking is between 40-110 meters,
 470 while for private parking the distance was found to be close 200 meters.

471

472

473 **CONCLUSIONS**

474 The current study aims to fill in the gap in the literature about modelling off-street parking rental prices.
 475 In summary, the results confirm our initial hypotheses and intuition about the determinants of market-
 476 clearing prices, while the impact of the different policies in place is clearly reflected on the results.
 477 Notably, the provision of public on-street parking has a very high impact on the rental prices, reflecting
 478 that people are willing to potentially cruise on a daily basis in the search of underpriced parking rather
 479 than pay a considerate amount of money for rent. This finding can give rise to certain discussions about
 480 whether or not the current public parking provision scheme in Zurich offers underpriced parking. The
 481 positive relation of the limited time parking spaces and rental prices is also evidence in favor of the
 482 responsiveness of the estimated model to the different policies in place.

483 In addition, the identification of the influence zones of the different employed variables is
 484 considered to be of high interest since it reveals behavioral aspects about the residential parking case,
 485 aligned with previous research studies (35) which required time consuming on-site observation though.
 486 More specifically, it is found that drivers are willing to walk further (200 meters) if they know that they
 487 have a reserved parking space, while when they have to search for an on-street parking place the walking
 488 distance decreases to 100 meters, as a result of the additional cost of cruising. In summary, the results
 489 of the current study highlight the existence of local partial market clearing conditions, a finding which
 490 can point directions towards the application of policies with spatially varying conditions (such as RPP
 491 fees). In conclusion, the current study makes apparent that modelling of private off-street parking
 492 markets has the potential to shed some light on the underlying mechanisms and provide some useful
 493 quantified insights, and it can constitute useful supplementary tool for policy-making.

494

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