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IS Defeat in Sirte Leaves Tunisia Vulnerable

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Publication Date:
2016-11

Permanent Link:
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-010818389

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The imminent defeat of Islamic State (IS) in Sirte is being hailed as a major step towards downgrading IS presence in Libya. Yet, the liberation of Sirte will neither spell the end of IS in Libya nor its ambitions in North Africa. Its members will most likely regroup in smaller cells in Libya and neighboring states. Tunisia, whose fragile transition offers hope for democracy in the region, would be especially at risk as a result of this scattering. IS Libya has been focused on Tunisia and the bulk of its members are Tunisian. The Tunisian government fears that many IS militants fleeing Libya will return home, compounding the country’s already sizable problem with violent extremism. Tunisia could struggle to cope with the potential fallout from degrading IS capabilities in Libya. In the absence of a functioning government in Libya and sufficient regional cooperation, Tunisia will need sustained international assistance.

IS Libya after Sirte

Armed groups allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya, and assisted by US air-strikes, now stand poised to flush out several hundred remaining IS fighters from the central coastal city of Sirte. Since May 2015, Sirte had been the group’s base in Libya, conceived along the lines of a capital similar to Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq.

Establishing an enclave in Libya appears to have been a strategic move by IS; Libya is an ideal location from which to facilitate the group’s expansion in North and sub-Saharan Africa. In early 2014, members of the Battar Brigade, comprised of Libyans fighting in Syria, returned home and set up Majlis Shura Shabaab al-Islam (MSSI) in the eastern city of Derna. Senior militants from IS in Syria were sent to Libya to help them establish a Libyan IS governorate, which became a reality in October that year when MSSI declared itself “Wilayet Derna” of Islamic State.1

The group suffered an initial setback when it was driven out of Derna in June 2015 by the local Al-Qaeda-linked Mujahedeen Shura Council of Derna. It managed to rebound and move with relative ease into Muammar

Key Points

- The anticipated defeat of IS in Sirte will not spell the end of IS in Libya or its North African ambitions, as IS militants will likely regroup in smaller cells in Libya and neighboring countries.
- The marked Tunisian profile of IS Libya and the group’s focus thus far on Tunisia indicate that the country could be particularly at risk.
- Tunisian authorities are still struggling to develop a coherent response to burgeoning domestic extremism and its linkage to instability in Libya.
- In the absence of a functioning government in Libya and adequate regional cooperation, Tunisia will need sustained international support.
- International partners should not only focus on training and equipping, but also on improving security governance and regional cooperation in the Maghreb.

By Lisa Watanabe

Following Islamic State’s defeat in Sirte, the group’s militants will likely scatter within Libya, as well as to neighboring countries. Tunisia will be especially at risk.

Vol. 4/9, November 2016
Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte, just west of Libya’s “oil cres-
cent.” Before the recent offensive to recapture Sirte, IS
controlled over 200 kilometers of the coast east of Sirte
and had launched several attacks near key oil terminals,
raising the prospect of substantial parts of Libya’s oil infa-
structure falling to the group.

The defeat of IS in Sirte will undoubtedly be a blow
to the group. However, IS will not disappear from Libya. In
addition to holding territory, IS Libya has been operating
through a cellular structure. It has a presence in Benghazi,
the country’s second largest city, where it has formed alli-
cances of convenience with armed groups clashing with
Libya’s rogue General Haftar, who refuses to recognize the
GNA. A number of IS cells are also known to exist in oth-
er cities across the country, including Tripoli, Sabratha,
near the border with Tunisia, Bani Walid, in the northwest,
the Jufra district in centre of the country, as well as the Ku-
fra district in the southeast.2

IS militants fleeing Sirte appear to be moving south
to the region of Fezzan, where they will likely encounter
limited resistance and could exploit discontent among
tribes that were loyal to Qaddafi, in much the same way as
they did in Sirte. Though IS is not as well established as
other violent extremist groups in Fezzan, such as Al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), it has already estab-
lished working relationships with local militias in the Ku-
fra district to protect its convoys and supply lines from
Sudan and Egypt.

Besides dispersing within Libya, IS could also re-
group in Libya’s neighbors. Tunisia’s de-
defence minister, Farhat Hachani, stated in
September 2016 that IS militants are not
only fleeing south of Libya to join Boko
Haram; they are also moving west.3 Thus
far, Tunisia has been a privileged target of
IS in Libya. Additional high profile at-
tacks in Tunisia could boost the group’s
standing following its defeat in Sirte.

**IS Libya’s Tunisian Connection**
Tunisian foreign fighters form one of IS’
largest contingents in Libya. Some esti-
mates suggest that between 1,000 and
1,500 Tunisian foreign fighters have
joined IS Libya. The 2015 attacks on the
Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli and on Tripo-
li’s airport were carried out by Tunisian
IS militants.4 Tunisians have not only
served as suicide bombers; they have also
taken on command roles, including at the
helm of IS in Sirte.

IS Libya has not only had a
marked Tunisian profile, it has also had a
conspicuous Tunisian focus. Some of the
most serious attacks in Tunisia in 2015
and 2016 have either been linked to indi-
viduals who trained in Libya or Tunisian foreign fighters
operating out of Libya. The assailants involved in the Bar-
do Museum attack in Tunis on 18 March 2015, which
killed 20 people, and the beach resort attack in Sousse on
26 June 2015, which left 40 people dead, are believed to
have undergone training in Sabratha in northwestern Lib-
ya, near the Tunisian border.

An IS cell located near Sabratha is focused on car-
ying out attacks in Tunisia. On 7 March 2016, its mem-
bers attacked army and police posts in the town of Ben
Guerdane, on the southeastern edge of Tunisia, close to the
border with Libya, killing 50 people, including civilians.
The cell appears to have been overwhelmingly comprised
of Tunisian nationals, who are believed to have coordi-
ated the attack with sleeper cells in Ben Guerdane.

The assault on Ben Guerdane raised questions
about IS Libya’s aims with regards to Tunisia, as well as
Tunisia’s capacity to cope with a spillover of violent ex-
tremism from its troubled neighbour. Tunisian security
forces succeeded in defending the border town on this oc-
tasion. Yet, the attacks demonstrated that IS Libya can al-
ready call upon a number of sleeper cells in Tunisia to or-
chestrate high profile attacks.

**Tunisia’s Jihadi Threat**
An increased focus on Tunisia, facilitated by returning for-
ign fighters, would not only fan the flames of a steadily
mounting extremist challenge in Tunisia; it would also
augment its IS character. Following the fall of Ben Ali in

**Further Reading**

**Countering the Islamic State in Libya** Christopher S. Chivvis, *Survival*
58:4, 2016, pp.113–130

Since 2014, IS has been developing a presence in Libya. Christopher
Chivvis’ article provides a good overview of the rise of IS in Libya and
delineates what a successful campaign against it would entail.

**Defeating the Islamic State in Sirte: Secondary Effects and Remaining
Challenges** Andrew Engel, The Washington Institute of Near East Policy,
Policy Watch 2650, 8 July 2016

How IS in Libya may evolve following its defeat in Sirte is now a vital
policy concern. In this short piece, Andrew Engel outlines how the
group is likely to adapt to the loss of its Libyan capital.

**Jihadist Violence in Tunisia: The Urgent Need for a National Strategy**
International Crisis Group, Crisis Group Middle East and North Africa
Briefing No.50, 22 June 2016

Despite the growing jihadi threat in Tunisia, Tunisian authorities have
been slow to put in place measures to address it. In this report, the In-
nternational Crisis Group discusses the key impediments to developing
a coherent response.
2011, the sudden granting of religious freedoms, the release of Islamist extremists from prison, and a ground swell of frustrated youth contributed to the rise of predominantly non-violent Salafism in the country. The largest Salafist group created at that time was Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia (AST), which had initially refrained from calling for domestic jihad, focusing instead on proselytization.

Many Salafis who wished to engage in jihad travelled to Syria and later Iraq. By 2013, some 2,000 Tunisians were believed to have travelled to Syria, primarily to join IS. Just two years later, more than 3,000 foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq were believed to be Tunisian citizens, making Tunisians the largest group of foreign fighters in the region. Inevitably, some of these fighters made their way back home – 400 battle-hardened Tunisian foreign fighters were reported to have returned by late 2015 – raising fears that they could engage in terrorist activities on Tunisian soil. Some are believed to have joined IS in Libya.

Domestic jihad had also been embraced by AST by this time as a result of a government crackdown on the organization following the murder of two politicians in 2013, both of which the government blamed on AST. Since its outlawing, AST members have gone underground and the organization has fragmented. A number of AST militants have fled to other countries, including Libya, where some joined IS. Others have stayed in Tunisia and joined groups such as Uqba ibn Nafi, an AQIM-affiliated group that is engaged in an insurgency in the Mount Chaambi region, near the Algerian border. Others still may be susceptible to joining the IS affiliated group, Jund al-Khalifa, or IS cells in the country.

**Tunisia’s Preparedness**

Despite the growing challenge of violent extremism in the country, Tunisian authorities have been slow to develop and communicate a counter-terrorism strategy. A coordinated and coherent response has also been hampered by structural impediments such as a lack of inter-agency cooperation and a dearth of coordination between the security services and the civilian leadership. The security forces have been criticized for adopting a "dragnet" approach, involving mass arrests, often without sufficient evidence, which is likely to prove counterproductive. Measures to stem the flow of foreign fighters were slow to take effect and the authorities are still very much grappling with how to deal with returnees.

Following attacks in 2015, the Tunisian authorities constructed a 200-kilometer barrier made of sand berms and water trenches along part of the border. To help secure the barrier, Germany and the US have been assisting in installing an electronic monitoring system. The US has also provided additional military equipment to help monitor the border with Libya and US Special Operations Forces have been assisting Tunisian troops in counterterrorism operations in Tunisia. Reports of the establishment of a US drone base used to conduct surveillance operations over Libya have emerged as well. Mentoring and training of Tunisian forces responsible for preventing illegal cross-border movements from Libya is also being carried out by a small contingent of British troops. These measures may complicate the movement of militants across the land border with Libya. However, they are unlikely to be sufficient.

Part of the problem is that there is no effective partner on the Libyan side. In 2012, Tunisia signed an agreement on security cooperation with Libya, which included joint border patrols, the re-establishment of checkpoints, and exchange of information. However, this amounted to very little, due to the Libyan civil war. Before any similar cooperative arrangement can be re-established and translated into meaningful action, a Libyan government would need to be fully functional. It would need to re-establish its authority in the border region, as well as consolidate the country’s security institutions. This will not happen any time soon.

Regional cooperation to limit the growth of IS and violent extremism more generally in North Africa is also underdeveloped. In 2015, Tunisia intensified its cooperation on border security with Algeria, and the two countries also cooperate on counterterrorism, which includes military-to-military cooperation and information-sharing. This kind of bilateral cooperation is a step forward, but a regional approach to what is a regional problem is sorely needed.

Tunisia will, therefore, need sustained international assistance to cope with the knock-on effects of downgrading IS in Sirte and Libya more generally. Such support
should not only focus on training and equipping to improve counterterrorism and border security capacities; it should also be tied to enhancing security sector governance with regards to civilian oversight, accountability and respect for the rule of law. International partners should also work to facilitate regional cooperation on border security and countering violent extremism. The EU’s new Global Strategy emphasizes the importance of resilience, capacity building for security provision within the rule of law, and support for practical cooperation in the Maghreb. Tunisia’s fragile, but largely successful transition is a beacon of hope for democracy in the region. The EU should focus its resources on safeguarding this transition from the destabilizing effects of violent extremism, taking into account the regional dimension of the latter.

Selected sources


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