Modelling a new Afghan National Army
a study ... based on security policy and social factors

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Modelling a new Afghan National Army. Feasibility of the Swiss Army Model.

A study by Eraldo C. Brugnoli, based on security policy and social factors.
To the people of Afghanistan who seek a life of peace, wealth and freedom
Modelling a new Afghan National Army. Feasibility of the Swiss Army Model.  
A study based on security policy and social factors

6th semester  
(Spring 2006)

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Modelling a new Afghan National Army: Feasibility of the Swiss Army Model

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the feasibility of the Swiss Army Model in Afghanistan as a valuable alternative for the constitution of the Afghan National Army. After having illustrated how the Afghan National Army is currently being reconstructed, after having explained which role a national army could play in the nation-building process and after having illustrated the characteristics of the Swiss Army Model, the paper analyses and compares the security policy factors and the social realities of both Switzerland and Afghanistan. Here, empiric facts stand in the foreground, but they are always completed with sociological and political considerations.

The current form of the Swiss Army Model and the current social situation of Afghanistan today hinder the realisation of an Afghan National Army similar to the Swiss Army Model, which would be able to successfully face all threats Afghanistan has to face at the moment, as this paper demonstrates.
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ABBREVIATIONS

ANA  Afghan National Army
ASMZ  Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
DDR-...  Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration -...
DRA  Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
ETA  Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom)
EU  European Union
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
Hizb  Hizb-e Islami-e Afghanistan
IGOs  Inter-governmental Organisations
IRA  Irish Republican Army
ISAF  International Stabilisation Force
ISI  Inter Services Intelligence
Jamiat  Jamiat-e Islami-e Afghanistan
Jombesh  Jombesh-e Melli-je Islami-e Afghanistan
KhAD  Khedmat-e Ettela’at Dulati, the Afghan secret services (of the DRA)
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs  Non-governmental Organisations
NWFP  North-West-Frontier-Province (of Pakistan)
NZZ  Neue Zürcher Zeitung
PDPA  People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
RAF  Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction)
SIPOL B 2000  Sicherheitspolitischer Bericht 2000 of the Swiss Federal Government
UNO or UN  United Nations’ Organization
USA or US  United States of America
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Wahdat  Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-e Afghanistan
WTO  World Trade Organization
GLOSSARY OF AFGHAN OR ARABIC WORDS

Al-Qaida The Base, terrorist network of organisations founded by Saudi Osama bin Laden.

Badal Revenge, vendetta sanctioned by the Pashtoonwali.

Gund Temporary social relation.


Jihad Holy War against non-Muslim oppressors.

Lashkar Non-permanent tribal militia (mostly infantry).

Loya Jirga “Great Assembly” of all tribal notables, Ulema and other representatives, called by new kings and in case of national emergency.

Madrasa Islamic school.

Malik Village notable, local, non-religious person of authority.

Melmastia Unconditional hospitality sanctioned by the Pashtoonwali.

Meshrano Jirga The Afghan Senate.

Mujahiddin Combatant of the Faith, here: those who fought the Soviet occupation and the PDPA regime.

Mullah Member of the local Sunni clergy.

Nang Concept of honour sanctioned by the Pashtoonwali.

Pashtoonwali Code of honour of the Pashtoon tribes, including several rules of conduct, such as hospitality, honour, women segregation and revenge, a.o.t.

Qawn “Group of solidarity”, is the social entity to which Afghans are linked such as tribe, family clan or village of origin.

Shariah Islamic law and jurisdiction.

Shura Assembly (Dari word for the Pashtu Jirga).

Stera Mahkama The Afghan Supreme Court.


Ulema Islamic (Sunni) clergy.

Umma Mass of the Believers, the people of the whole Muslim world, usually, in the view of Sunni Muslims, excluding Shi’a Muslims.

Woleși Jirga The Afghan House of Representatives.

The transcription of Afghan words, from both Pashtu and Dari idioms, which are written with the Arabic alphabet, is a question of phonetic interpretation. In this paper I have applied, where possible, the most common transcription of English literature.
PRINCIPAL (CITED) POLITICAL ACTORS AND PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN

Amin, Hafizullah  
Pashtoon from Paghman, prime minister under Taraki, president of the DRA after 1979, killed by the Soviets the same year.

bin Laden, Osama  
Saudi billionaire, joined the Mujahiddin after the Soviet invasion and provided logistic help. Sponsor of the Taliban regime and (co-)founder of Al-Qaida, world’s most wanted terrorist.

Daud Khan, Muhammad  
Member of the royal family, cousin to King Zahir Shah, prime minister from 1953 to 1963; he seized power in 1973. President of Afghanistan until the communist coup of 1978.

Dostom, Abdur Rashid  
Uzbek, most important commander of Nadjibullah’s army, mutinied 1992, warlord of north-Afghanistan, allied with Massud. Today general-staff chief of the armed forces.

Durrani, Ahmad Shah  
Pashtoon leader, founder of the Durrani dynasty and conqueror of what later became the Emirate of Afghanistan; he reigned from 1747 to 1773.

Fahim Khan  
Tajik warlord and commander from north-Afghanistan, by turns rival and ally of Ahmad Shah Massud, member of the Northern Alliance, first defence minister of the Karzai government. Former communist, he was chief of the KhAD from 1986 to 1992.

Hikmatyar, Gulbuddin  
Pashtoon from Kunduz, fled to Pakistan, founder of Hizb-e Islami-e Afghanistan, received the largest part of US aid from the ISI, today he opposes the central government and is allied to the Taliban.

Ismael Khan  
Unclear ethnic identity, fully bilingual in Pashtu and Dari, commander of Herat, member of Jamiat-e Islami-e Afghanistan, prisoner of the Taliban, he fled from jail, governor of Herat after the fall of the Taliban, today minister for water and energy.

Karmal, Babrak  
Kabuli Dari-speaker, founder of the PDPA, prime minister of the DRA in 1978, exiled, returned with the soviet troops, secretary general of the PDPA from 1980 to 1986.

Karzai, Hamid  
Durrani-Pashtoon of the Popolzai tribe from Kandahar, Mujahiddin supporter, at the beginning minister of the Taliban regime, fled to Pakistan and the US, ad interim president after the fall of the Taliban, today’s elected president of Afghanistan.

Khalis, Yunus  
Khugiani Pashtoon from Nangarhar, co-founder of the Hizb-e Islami-e Afghanistan, was educated in the NWFP, fled to Pakistan. Became the leader of a splinter group of the Hizb after arguing with Hikmatyar about divergent religious opinions.

Massud, Ahmad Shah  
Panjshir Tajik, related to Rabbani by marriage, military leader of Jamiat-e Islami-e Afghanistan, held his stronghold against the Taliban, killed by Arab suicide bombers in 2001.

Mazari, Ali  
Hazara leader of Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-e Afghanistan, the union of Shi’a parties pushed through by Iran, fought against the PDPA and for equal rights for the Shi’a minorities. Murdered by the Taliban in 1995.

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<th>Name</th>
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<td><strong>Nadjibullah, Muhammad</strong></td>
<td>Ahmadzai-Pashtoon from Kabul, member of the PDPA, exiled in 1978, director of the KhAD from 1980 to 1985, president of the DRA from 1986 to 1992, overthrown by the Mujahiddin, murdered by the Taliban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Omar, Muhammad</strong></td>
<td>Pashtoon Mullah from Kandahar, leader of the Taliban movement, ally to Osama bin Laden, claimed the title of Amir-ul Momineen, Leader of the Faithful, chased by the US and the Northern Alliance in 2001.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rabbani, Burhanuddin</strong></td>
<td>Badakhshan Tajik, founder of the Shura Islamic movement in 1973, fled to Pakistan, political leader of Jamiat-e Islami-e Afghanistan, President of the Mujahiddin governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rahman, Abdur</strong></td>
<td>Pashtoon King of Afghanistan, he reigned between 1880 and 1901, he submitted the Hazaras in brutal way between 1888 and 1893. In 1893 he signed the Durrrand Treaty about the frontier with British India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taraki, Noor Muhammad</strong></td>
<td>Pashtoon from Ghazni, founder of the PDPA, president of the DRA in 1978, killed by Amin’s men in 1979.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zahir Shah, Muhammad</strong></td>
<td>Mohammadzai-Pashtoon (Durrani), King of Afghanistan (1933-1973), educated in France, exiled in Rome (IT), called several times for a reconciliatory Loya Jirga, returned to Afghanistan in 2002 to support national unification.</td>
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<td><strong>Hizb-e Islami-e Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>Radical Islamic movement founded by Hikmatyar, splintered out of Jamiat because of religious divergences, fought against the communists, active out of Pakistan, received the most US and Pakistani support and Saudi financial means. The party was multi-ethnic but dominated by radical Pashtoons. Pakistan abandoned the Hizb when the rise of the Taliban began. During the Jihad religious disputes divided the Hizb into two branches, one led by Hikmatyar, and one by Kahlis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-e Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>Principal party of the Shi’a and automatically of the Hazaras, it operated in central Afghanistan and out of Iran, it was founded by Mzari, who unified the different Shi’a groups and was largely influenced by the revolutionary guards of Teheran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jamiat-e Islami-e Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>Moderate Islamic movement, founded in the early 1970’s, fought against the Daud regime and the communists. Active out of Pakistan during the Soviet occupation, tolerated but not supported by Islamabad; after 1992 it moved into Afghanistan. Supported by India, Russia and Iran, was multi-ethnic but primarily composed of Tajiks. Its principal leaders were Rabbani and Massud.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jombesh-e Melli-je Islami-e Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>Principal party of the Turkic minorities, founded by the communist general Dostom after his mutiny against Nadjibullah, it was supported by Russia, Turkey and Uzbekistan. It is the party with the lesser Islamic connotations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan

Afghan communist party, it seized power with the Sawr coup in 1978 and ruled Afghanistan until 1992; between 1979 and 1989 it was backed by the Soviet invaders. It was divided in two branches, Parcham (moderate) and Khalq (radical).

Taliban

Pakistani-backed militia, created in the Madrasas of Pakistan and Afghanistan with consistent Pakistani military help. Extremely radical Islamic movement; it became the epitome of Pashtoon racism and religious intolerance. It mixed a distorted interpretation of the Koran and Pashtoonwali elements to an ideology imposed on the whole country, discriminating non-Pashtoons, especially Shi’a members and women. Created in 1994, it seized Kabul in 1996 and controlled 80% of Afghanistan in 1998, chased in 2001, it is still active with terrorist methods.
I INTRODUCTION

“… the American model is not practical for creating a functioning army which is anchored in the population. This model is oriented towards foreign offence operations, and not to national defence at home. The Swiss model should perhaps be examined for its practicality, in relation to armed neutrality…”2

With these words, Albert A. Stahel commented on the reconstruction of Afghan armed forces under the leadership of the USA at the Afghanistan symposium of the University of Zurich, which was held in November 2003.

Today, little more than two years later, the reconstruction of the ANA has still not been fully accomplished, but initial difficulties have been surmounted and initial operations have been successfully carried out. But the problems of Afghanistan are still huge and far from being solved. To grant peace and security for the country as a first step to possible wealth, the armed forces should not only be conceived to face the actual imminent threats, but also all the other possible and probable threats.

As an important element of the state apparatus, linking the army with the population is an important factor of nation-building. Without popular support and legitimacy the armed forces would not achieve the goal of pacifying the country and recruiting enough young men necessary to reach an acceptable strength.

The choice of the organisational model of the armed forces relevantly influences the capability of the army to defend the country and unify the society.

The analysis of the feasibility of the Swiss Army Model as a possible model for Afghanistan should contribute to helping Kabul to find the best way to organise its armed forces so that they are able to reach their security policy and social nation-building goals.

In a similar situation, the principal questions this paper tries to answer are the following:

Is the Swiss Army Model a valuable alternative for modelling the new Afghan National Army? Is the Swiss Army Model able to face the various threats Afghanistan faces? Is it compatible with the realities of Afghan society?

To answer these questions, the following two theses will be discussed:

1, The Swiss Army Model is not suitable to respond to the various threats Afghanistan faces.
2, The Swiss Army Model suits the characteristics of Afghan society.

The state of research can be subdivided into the following categories: American policy and intervention, current Afghan security situation, recent Afghan history, Afghan society, the link between army and society, Swiss security policy, Swiss history and society.

2 “… um eine funktionsfähige, in der Bevölkerung verankerte Armee aufzubauen, ist das amerikanische Vorbild nicht zweckmässig. Dieses ist auf Off enseinsätze im Ausland ausgerichtet und nicht auf die Verteidigung im Inland. Vielleicht müsste einmal das schweizerische Modell auf seine Zweckmässigkeit hin geprüft werden, so im Zusammenhang mit der bewaffneten Neutralität…”
American policy and intervention in Afghanistan is well documented in four American works and by two regional authors, as well as by the contributions of Albert A. Stahel to the Swiss journal “ASMZ”. In his work “Nation-building: beyond Afghanistan and Iraq” Francis Fukuyama describes very precisely the American interests in the region, the motivations of the intervention and the problems of nation-building. He analyses very critically the previous US actions in the country, as much as the short-sighted planning. The incomplete post-war strategy of the US and its practical consequences on the ground for both the US and the countries concerned are also analysed in detail in Robert C. Orr’s work “Winning the peace: an American strategy for post-conflict reconstruction”. Steve Coll analyses the history and development of US interests and interventions in the region in his book “Ghost wars: the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001”. Anthony H. Cordesman’s work “The lessons of Afghanistan: war fighting, intelligence and force transformation” focuses primarily on the consequences for the US armed forces, but analyses in a pointed way their operations in the country. The same can be said about Sultan Barakat’s articles in the special edition of “Third World Quarterly” titled “Reconstructing war-torn societies. Afghanistan”. Ahmed Rashid analyses in his work “Taliban: Islam, oil and the new great game in central Asia” very well and in detail the implications of US politics and economy in Afghanistan, from the fall of the Nadjibullah regime to the rise of the Taliban movement and its consolidation, up to the factors that led to the change in US policy with regard to the Taliban. Albert A. Stahel describes and evaluates the reconstruction process and its correlations in two special issues of “ASMZ” titled “Afghanistan quo vadis?” and “Nation-building Afghanistan”.

Beside the works cited above, the current Afghan security situation is well-documented in the following literature. Olivier Roy analyses in “Afghanistan, la difficile reconstruction d’un État” the security problems of the country, their various implications and the different consequences they have on the reconstruction process, Afghan politics and Afghan society. Jeffery J. Roberts’ “The origins of conflict in Afghanistan” focuses in detail on the developments that led to the current situation and on their background. Albert A. Stahel, on the other hand, focuses on the possible developments this situation could go through in the near future in “Afghanistan – ein Land am..."
Scheideweg: im Spiegel der aktuellen Ereignisse". Other authors however, focus mainly on a specific aspect of the current security situation in their publications. Amir Zada Asad and Robert Harris, for example, analyse the international implications of the huge opium production in "The politics and economics of drug production on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border". Conrad Schetter in "Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afghanistan" and Peter Marsden in "Afghanistan: minorities, conflict and the search for peace" analyse the implications and consequences of the ethnic realities and their influence on Afghan politics, as well as on the Afghanistan policies of the country’s neighbours. The dramatic consequences of foreign interference are well-documented in the two following works: Rizwan Hussain’s "Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic militancy in Afghanistan" and Rajeev Sharma’s “Pak proxy war: a story of ISI, bin Laden and Kargil".

Recent Afghan history is analysed in depth in the work of Ahmed Rashid cited above and in the following books. "The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan; mass mobilization, civil war and the future of the region" by Neamatollah Nojumi, who focuses primarily on the period between 1992 and 1998, “Afghanistan nach dem Abzug der sowjetischen Truppen” by the Russian general Mahmut A. Garejew, who analyses especially the behaviour of the Red Army in the country, the actions of the communist puppet regimes and the resistance of Nadjibullah between 1989 and 1992, and Amin Saikal’s "Modern Afghanistan: a history of struggle and survival" which especially analyses the consequences the population had to endure. Antonio Giustozzi in "War, politics and society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992" describes in a detailed and accurate way the various aspects of the communist regimes from the Sawr revolution to the fall of Nadjibullah. He focuses on the consequences of foreign intervention and on ethno-political implications.

Several works analyse the different aspects of Afghan society. Among them, the following are relevant for the considerations of my paper. The cited works of Antonio Giustozzi, Olivier Roy and Conrad Schetter, “The Afghans" by Willem Vogelsang, who especially analyses ethnic composition, cultural identity and socio-religious traditions, “Die politischen Eliten Afghani: 12 Silvia Berger, Dieter Kläy & Albert A. Stahel, editor, Afghanistan – ein Land am Scheideweg (Zürich: vdf Hochschulverlag an der ETH Zürich, 2002).
13 Amir Zada Asad & Robert Harris, The politics and economics of drug production on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (Burlington: Ashgate, 2003).
16 Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic militancy in Afghanistan (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005).
17 Rajeev Sharma, Pak proxy war, a story of ISI, bin Laden and Kargil (New Dehli: Kaveri Books, 1999).
18 Neamatollah Nojumi, The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan; mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
ihre Entstehungsgeschichte, ihre Bedeutung und ihr Versagen in der Gegenwart"23 by Sarajuddin Rasuly, who describes how the political elites shaped the governmental system and vice versa, and “Demokratieerziehung für Afghanistan: ein Konzept auf der Grundlage einer systemtheoretischen Gesellschaftsanalyse”24 by Nahid Khaki, who elaborates a concept of possible democratic education of Afghan society by analysing the different realities of Afghan society and its political traditions.

The link between army and society has been analysed by various sociologists, among them two prominent Swiss who focused on Swiss peculiarities as well: Karl W. Haltiner and Jürg Martin Gabriel. Especially Haltiner in “Milizarmee – Bürgerleitbild oder angeschlagenes Ideal?”25 and “Europas Armeen im Umbruch”26 focuses on the social factors that shape the army model of a country and, above all in the second one, on the consequences of the social and political changes within the armed forces analysed. The same, in minor way, can be said about Gabriel’s paper “Miliz wohin?”.27 Different points of view, focusing especially on the Swiss context are illustrated in the book edited by Albert A. Stahel “Arme 95 – Chance für die Milizarmee?”,28 which accurately illustrates the development of the social link of the armed forces during the decades following their creation, and makes various considerations about how this link could and should be kept up.

The principal source to analyse the Swiss security policy is the “Security Policy Report 2000 of the Swiss Federal Council”29 which analyses the different threats Switzerland faces and how the government plans to deal with them. On the other hand, especially considering the efficiency of the Swiss Army Model, the considerations in “Europas Armeen im Umbruch” by Karl W. Haltiner and “Arme 95 – Chance für die Milizarmee” by Albert A. Stahel cited above are a useful source of knowledge. Even the considerations of David Ben-Gurion, made in the book “Die Verteidigungsarmee Israels, 1948-1958”30 of Gershon Rivlin are interesting.

Swiss history and society are well-analysed in Albert A. Stahel’s “Arme 95 – Chance für die Milizarmee?”, especially regarding the military context, and in various historical anthologies published in Switzerland.

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25 Karl W. Haltiner, Milizarmee – Bürgerleitbild oder angeschlagenes Ideal? (Frauenfeld: Huber Verlag, 1985).
28 Albert A. Stahel et al., “Arme 95 – Chance für die Milizarmee?,” in Strategische Studien Band 7 (Zürich: vdf Hochschulverlag an der ETH Zürich, 1994).
This paper is structured in three parts:

- The first, introductory part illustrates and evaluates the current reconstruction of Afghanistan and its armed forces; the importance of the armed forces for the whole nation-building process is presented, especially focussing on the particular improvements the Swiss Army Model could provide; and the introducing peculiarities of the Swiss Army Model and its characteristics.

- The second part illustrates the threats the Swiss Army Model is shaped to face as well as those faced by Afghanistan, including a comparison of both security situations and an initial compatibility analysis.

- The third part explains the social factors that have shaped the Swiss Army Model and those constituting Afghan social reality including a comparison of both realities and a renewed compatibility analysis.
II MILITARY ASPECTS OF TODAY’S RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN
UNDER THE RULE OF THE US / UN

The general reconstruction of Afghanistan

After the tremendous terrorist attacks of 9/11 on the United States, words of solidarity were quickly spoken, and everyone agreed with Washington that those responsible had to be found and brought to justice. Soon it was commonly agreed that the mind behind the attacks was Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network, called Al-Qaida. He was assumed to live in Afghanistan, host of the Taliban regime.

In October 2001, the US-led coalition started the operation "Enduring Freedom", whose primary goal was to apprehend, dead or alive, Osama bin Laden, and to dismantle his organisation. The secondary goal was the overthrow of the dictatorial Taliban regime who hosted him. Although the anti-Taliban parties met in Bonn (DE) to discuss the political reconstruction of Afghanistan, the international coalition limited its planning to the military operation. The international community showed more reluctance than enthusiasm for the huge task of nation-building. The United States themselves, who led the operation, and who still maintain the largest troop contingent in the country, became nation-builders against their will in Afghanistan. In fact, the US have a propensity for fighting on the battleground, and letting the IGOs collect the potsherds; they are not prepared to win the peace after the war. Thus the after-conflict-theatre of “Desert Storm” or the Kosovo campaign was far better planned.

Despite the promised “Marshall Plan for the Afghans", reconstruction advances slowly and the international community and the western mass-media have lost interest in the country. Today a lot of IGOs and NGOs struggle in Afghanistan to get a share of international funding, without any coordination and for a long time bypassing the central government (at present, Finance Minister Ghani has succeed in forcing donors to channel their funds through the central government). As a result, the coalition and the ISAF have no common goals for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

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34 Orr, “The United States as nation-builders: facing the challenge of post-conflict reconstruction,” 7.
37 VAishnav, “Afghanistan: the chimera of the “light footprint”,” 244.
38 Roberts, The origins of conflict in Afghanistan, 234.
39 Ibid., 234.
40 Bakarat, “Setting the scene for Afghanistan’s reconstruction,” 808.
and the assistance to the war-torn country remains limited, the peace-keepers are active only in restricted areas of the country and the western response to the needs of the population is chaotic.

Also problematic is the fact that the political agenda of the donors determines who gets the money, and for what, more than the effective needs of the population do.

The reconstruction of the country is based on four pillars or key areas: security; governance and participation; social and economic well-being; and justice and reconciliation. These four pillars are all interdependent and interacting; one cannot be built up without taking care of the others. In 2002 the Afghan government itself formulated its own four key areas of reconstruction and nation-building: humanitarian and human & social capital; physical reconstruction and natural resources; private sector development; governance and security.

With regards to politics, most agree that only through the participation of the Afghan population will the nation-building process and the central government gain the necessary legitimacy and popular support. However, at the moment it is essential that the international community provides with external means a minimum of security to guarantee the starting of such a process and to permit the building up of local security means. Some argue for the return of the monarchy as a source of legitimacy.

While security in Afghanistan is still precarious, two schools of thought about reconstruction have to be considered: the first argues for the begin of reconstruction once peace has been established, the second says reconstruction needs to start at an appropriate time even before the conflict has completely ended to spread confidence in the population and guarantee long-term recovery. In such a case, public participation is vital to the process. The central government itself seems to stay extremely passive, sometimes even adverse, toward the reconstruction process.

But the administration of President Karzai has its strong points too: the monopoly of external aid; a state-apparatus that is light but linked with society; and an army who could roof the local militias. Vital but still problematic is extending of this sprouting central power over the whole country.

43 Ibid., 7.
50 Ibid., 41.
52 Bakarat, “Setting the scene for Afghanistan’s reconstruction,” 808.
In other words, the peace-process is still on the brink of failure, put in danger by constant insecurity, the social and personal traumas of the population and the annihilation of trust-spending social structures. The civil society itself, which is thought to rise from the ashes of war is still non-existent.

Facing this enormous task, some may ask why should we care about the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the implementation of a stable and legitimate democratic regime? The true answer is that without these achievements Afghanistan would soon fall to the point where it already was in 1992: in a new fratricide civil war. The consequences would concern far more than just Afghans. The whole region, from Central Asia to the Indian subcontinent, would be destabilised, endangering even global security. A new safe haven for worldwide terrorism would originate from the new struggle and several thousands would have to flee yet again.

*The current reconstruction of the Afghan National Army (ANA)*

Even if it ever was a weak and less centralised state, Afghanistan has had a National Army since the reign of Emir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901). To face the pressure of the two western empires (tsarist Russia from the North, British India from the South) threatening him, the monarch established a small but technical (artillery) central army, supported by tribal militias called *Lashkar*. During the soviet-backed communist regime, the Afghan National Army reached its “peak of strength”, although it mostly consisted of quantitative strength and equipment, not of real military skills. The troops were unprepared, undisciplined and lacked the will for combat, the cadres were corrupt, they abused of their position frequently and took no care for the welfare of their soldiers. Thus it came that during wartime, nearly 20,000 men deserted every year and the balance tilted more and more in favour of the *Mujahiddin*.

Today, the new Afghan National Army reconstructed under the leadership of the US is thought to count 70,000 men structured into 18 infantry battalions. It should be fit for action until 2008. The structure of the army consists of a Central Command, located in Kabul, and four Regional Commands with up to three brigades, located in Gardez, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif, each one with a strength up to three brigades. The instruction of both troops and cadres, led by the US Army, is dispensed in Kabul. Instruction focuses mainly on combating terrorism and securing-operations.
The reconstruction of the ANA currently faces various serious problems, the first and biggest one is the lack of recruits: although the 34 provinces were thought to send 20 conscripts each per year to guarantee enough manpower and ethnical diversity, this goal was never reached and the strength of the ANA long stagnated at 5,000 men.\textsuperscript{67} Distrust in the central government and the coalition, incorrect salary expectancies and the necessity to leave the peripheral home-region to join the recruitment centre in Kabul could have been the reasons for it.\textsuperscript{68} The decision of creating only one recruitment and instruction centre in such a vast country (Afghanistan covers a surface of 647,500 sq km, and is 15\% larger than France) with such a poor road infrastructure is highly questionable. One per Regional Command, at least for the troops, would be certainly more expensive, but probably more effective.

The second substantial hindrance is the mission of the ANA. It is in various points undefined\textsuperscript{69} and linked with the interests of the US and other donors,\textsuperscript{70} and it focuses only on terrorism prevention and combat.\textsuperscript{71} A similar lack of clarity with regard to missions makes every efficient form of planning of the ANA’s development nearly impossible. The struggle against terrorism might certainly be Washington’s first interest, but the ANA should become a reliable security instrument for government, country and population, not the simple accomplice of the United States in the worldwide fight against terrorism. To achieve this goal it must be prepared to manage all sorts of threats that the country could face.\textsuperscript{72}

The third big challenge are the local militias and warlords. Their estimated strength is larger than that which the ANA might reach. About 100,000 armed men are member of a militia or armed group in today’s Afghanistan, and although quantitative strength is inflated to gain influence, the number seems realistic. Of these 100,000 men, only 40,000 have at present completed a DDR-program, with uncertain results.\textsuperscript{73} These provincial militias threaten the existence of the ANA;\textsuperscript{74} they oppose more or less openly the ANA or the central government and deprive it of resources and local legitimacy.\textsuperscript{75} Their commanders and warlords, after having been wooed by the US to help them overthrow the Taliban regime, pretended to share the power and were abandoned in 2003,\textsuperscript{76} but are still linked with the government or in charge among the highest governmental ranks. Former Defence Minister Fahim Khan e.g. still commands a militia of 18,000 well and heavily armed men and opposes the build-up of the ANA,\textsuperscript{77} of which he formally was the second Commander in Chief, after President Karzai. Other militias have slowly begun reducing their

\textsuperscript{67} Stahel et al., “Afghanistan quo vadis?,” 11.
\textsuperscript{68} Cordesman, The lessons of Afghanistan, 50.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 52.
\textsuperscript{71} Stahel et al., “Nation building Afghanistan,” 21.
\textsuperscript{73} Stahel et al., “Nation building Afghanistan,” 23.
\textsuperscript{74} Cordesman, The lessons of Afghanistan, 53.
\textsuperscript{75} Vaishnav, “Afghanistan: the chimera of the "light footprint"," 245.
\textsuperscript{76} Roy, “Afghanistan: la difficile reconstruction d’un État,” 37.
strength, but none is dismantling its structure. All these factions must be disarmed and their troops reintegrated under the rule of the central government.

The fourth problem challenging ANA’s efficiency is closely related to the first. The ANA lacks modern equipment in sufficient quantities. Today the US provides most of the personnel equipment while the armaments usually originate in Eastern Europe, China or India, but come from a variety of countries, which tend to "cheaply dispose" of their surpluses. The link to the recruitment problem is made by the fact that with no man to equip or arm, even the most willing donor places its means elsewhere.

All these serious problems could, if not successfully tackled, endanger the achievement of ANA reconstruction and thus precipitate the country in chaos. But there are some rays of hope that need to be mentioned: initial difficulties have been surmounted, and, although under the leadership of the US Army, in 2004 the ANA successfully completed its first operations. Training programs for troops and cadres are making progress, but they are still too short (only 10 weeks), causing the US to evaluate the possibility of introducing “additional follow-on training courses” to widen the soldiers’ skills and maintain them at a suitable level. On positive side, the US Army, unlike Germany’s police training program, does not abandon trained units to their fate, but keeps on supporting them by integrating embedded trainers who can advise troops and cadres.

All in all ANA reconstruction is advancing step by step and is beginning to bear fruit, but a lot must still be done. The limited and unclear mission and tasks need to be enlarged, in order to transform the ANA from the rising anti-terror instrument it is now becoming into a reliable institution that can guarantee the security and sovereignty of Afghanistan in every situation.

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83 Ibid., 150.
84 Cordesman, *The lessons of Afghanistan*, 52.
III ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF A NATIONAL ARMY IN AND ON A NATION-BUILDING PROCESS

Improvements of the nation-building process provided independently of the army model

Although some do argue that a national army is not a prerogative for a successful nation-building process,\(^{86}\) and that this process itself is not at all only a military one,\(^{87}\) the vast majority of academia agrees that a national army can help restore the security necessary for taking off the nation- and state-building process and that it can become an important part of it,\(^{88}\) assuming that it fulfils basic democratic criteria.

Security is imperative for successful nation-building,\(^{89}\) and though the international community will have to support a country for years, maybe even for decades, it is obvious that the central government must itself rule on the means it uses to provide such security. These are, on one hand, the police force and the justice apparatus, and on the other the armed forces.\(^{90}\) The consequences are legitimacy for the central government that protects the population,\(^{91}\) and possibilities for action for the various NGOs active across the country.\(^{92}\)

Another important role of the national army is its integrative potential on two levels: the first, the coercive, gives the central government the means to resolve local disputes.\(^{93}\) The threat of military intervention should convince all parties of the necessity of resolving disputes politically. Although, if misused, such power could endanger the national cohesion. The second, the participative, links the various communities to the central state by integrating them as parts of the system, thus reducing factionalism.\(^{94}\)

Additional improvements provided by an all-conscripts militia armed force

More than any other model, an all-conscript militia links the single citizen and the various communities of a country to the central state.\(^{95}\) By assuring the participation of every able-bodied man in military service, no ethnic or religious community is excluded from sharing responsibility for the country’s independence and sovereignty. This role leads the participants to the right of sharing

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89 Roberts, The origins of conflict in Afghanistan, 235.
91 Ibid., 126-129.
93 Ibid., 126-129.
political representation. Thus, such an army model is particularly suitable for unifying a demographically heterogeneous country. Various multi-ethnic countries applied this model as an element of ethnic/national cohesion: Switzerland, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Although the two last examples show that cohesion succeeds only if it is created by society from the bottom up basing on a society-based state concept. If the model is the result of a top-down governmental decision founded on a government-based state concept, cohesion will remain poor and fictitious.

This social participation also influences the impact of the armed forces on society and the state. The participation of every citizen reduces the danger that the armed forces alienate themselves from society and become an elitist community able to influence the state despite the interests of the population. On the other hand, the close link of the soldier to the population prevents the government from indiscriminate use of force against the people themselves. Thus, this armed forces model strengthens democracy and civil governance as it weakens militarism and elitism. The overall picture shows that a national army under democratic control is a prerogative of a successful nation-building process. It also becomes an important part of it, providing the necessary and long-sought security, which is as important as the national cohesion and civic responsibility it can instil in the new-born civil society.

97 Haltiner, Milizarmee – Bürgerleitbild oder angeschlagenes Ideal?, 45.
99 Haltiner, Milizarmee – Bürgerleitbild oder angeschlagenes Ideal?, 40.
100 Klaus Pinkas, “Miliz und Frieden,” in Miliz, Frieden und Gewalt (Wien: Institut für Militärische Sicherheitspolitik an der Landesverteidigungsakademie Wien, 1987), 41.
IV DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SWISS ARMY MODEL

Before analysing the feasibility of the Swiss Army Model in Afghanistan, it is necessary to illustrate the characteristics that make it so unique.

Switzerland’s armed forces are all-conscripts, militia armed forces. Every able-bodied man must serve in the army and participate in the defence of the nation. In earlier times, this fact led some foreign strategists say that “Switzerland does not have an army, Switzerland is an army”. Its characteristics are: universal conscription; mostly volunteer cadres drafted out of the conscripted troops; non-permanent, scaled service; self-leading and self-instruction by non-professional cadres; low barracks-confinement.

Conscription, whose opposite is an all-volunteer force, can show different ratios. In some countries only a minor percentage of the possible recruits is conscripted, the rest is freed from military service. In other countries, those conscripted who will have to effectively serve in the army are drawn by lots. In Switzerland, although an alternative community service is now possible on a restricted basis, conscription is universal.101 Thus, every able-bodied male citizen is required to do military service.102

The cadres of a conscription army can be professionals engaged by the army on the basis of an employment contract, they can be volunteers who stay on duty for a longer, undefined period of time after their regular military service, or they are conscripts who accept more or less voluntarily to prolong their duty in order to reach another step in rank but return to civil life immediately after their promotion. In the Swiss Armed Forces this third type is the rule, and although military law foresees the possibility of requiring a soldier to do promotion service,103 the largest majority is chosen from the volunteers with the necessary skills. Since 1999, the Swiss Armed Forces have gradually introduced a limited number of cadres called Zeitmilitär, literally “temporary military servicemen”, whose type is very similar to the second described above, in order to increase the quality of leadership and instruction.104

The original Swiss constitution prohibited the creation and maintenance of permanent regular armed forces.105 An almost worldwide exception, this is the characteristic that makes the Swiss Armed Forces a militia. Even the current constitution dictates that the Swiss Armed Forces be organised as a militia.106 Although the academia argues about different definitions of “militia”, the

106 Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Bundesverfassung [BV], art. 58.
following seems limited but correct: “...a militia is a popular mobilisation without a fixed framework. Its opposite is the permanent regular army”.\textsuperscript{107} This definition shows that it is much easier to define a militia by what it is not than by what it actually is. In Switzerland young men serve for an initial short period of time (currently 18/21 weeks) as recruits to learn the basic skills of warfare and military life, then go back to their normal civilian life, family and profession, after which they are called back to the army every year during a longer period of their life (currently for 7-10 years, previously for 22 years) to serve in short (3-week) follow-up courses called “repetition courses”, where they refresh and expand their military skills.\textsuperscript{108} Of course, in order to maintain minimum readiness within the armed forces, the “repetition courses” of the various units and battalions are spread throughout the whole year.

As already illustrated, the cadres of the Swiss Armed Forces are drafted out of the conscripted troops of the militia. They lead the militia and dispense instruction to the troops. Becoming a cadre does not mean a statutory change, the cadre remain non-professional militia-men.\textsuperscript{109} Unlike other armies, where cadres are drafted out of the conscripts and become professionals as officers, in Switzerland the militia provides the manpower for its own leadership and training, and keeps it firmly in its own hands. Only a few thousand professionals are engaged by the Swiss Armed Forces: they are primarily responsible for officer training.\textsuperscript{110}

Low barracks-confinement is not a prerogative of an all-conscripts militia army, but it is an important characteristic of the Swiss Armed Forces. The lack of isolation in gated military areas far away from the civilian population has reinforced the close link of the population to its army, avoided elitism and militarism, and sometimes undermined discipline.\textsuperscript{111}

Last but not least, the Swiss Armed Forces do not have a Commander-in-Chief. There is a military head called “Chief of the Army”, a three-star general who reports to the political authorities, but a Commander-in-Chief, a four-star general, would only be elected by the Federal Assembly if the need arises.\textsuperscript{112}

Close to unique in their nature the Swiss Armed Forces, traditionally a non-permanent all-conscript militia, continue to maintain a structure that is closely related with the social realities of the country,\textsuperscript{113} as illustrated in chapter VIII.

\textsuperscript{107} Fernau, "Miliz – zur Klärung eines Begriffes,” 7.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{110} Schweizer Armee, Dienstreglement [DR 04] (Bern: BBL, 2004), art. 36.
\textsuperscript{111} Haltiner, "Die Demilitarisierung der europäischen Gesellschaften und die Remilitarisierung ihrer Streitkräfte,” 228.
\textsuperscript{112} Bundesversammlung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, Militärgesetz [MG], art. 85. Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Bundesverfassung [BV], art. 168.
\textsuperscript{113} Haltiner, "Bürgerbeteiligung und Militärorganisation,” 28.
V THE SWISS ARMY MODEL AND THE CURRENT MILITARY THREATS

Military threats are inconstant, and throughout history the changes they undergo are sometimes slow, sometimes dramatic. Today, the threats the Swiss Army Model is called to deal with are far different from those it faced at the time of its creation in 1848, and the Swiss Army Model has changed in its turn. This paper does not focus only on the threats of a determined period of time, nor does it focus on the response of only one of the development phases of the Swiss Army Model. It tries to show the whole range of possible military threats and to analyse how the Swiss Army Model has consistently responded, on a more generic level.

1. Terrorist threats, internal and from abroad

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare, all too often referred to as “new wars”, are not that new at all, but have undergone consistent changes. The political and ideological, mostly local terrorism Europe experienced in the second half of the 20th century (e.g. ETA, IRA, RAF, Red Brigades) rapidly and almost totally made way for a new, religiously motivated and globally active form of terrorism (e.g. Al-Qaida and partners).\(^{114}\)

*Homeland terrorism and violent political extremism*

Homeland terrorism is inexistent in Switzerland. On the other hand, political extremism does exist, but it is rarely violent. The activities of such tiny splinter groups are limited and, although injurious to social cohesion, can be dismissed as minor and local criminality.\(^{115}\)

*Terrorism and political extremism from abroad*

At the moment, Switzerland is not a primary target of international terrorism. However, such organisations could use (and they already have) Switzerland as a logistical base to supply their combat units, as a transit point for terrorists on their way from recruitment countries to targeted countries, and as a centre for laundering their finances. Attacks on diplomatic representatives of foreign countries and on one of the numerous international institutions located in Switzerland are always possible. Political extremism can be imported by refugees fleeing the increasing internal conflicts of the post Cold War era. The range of their activities could include assaults on embassies of the countries involved and riots between rival ethnic groups reunited in Switzerland (e.g. Turks and Kurds, Serbs and Croats). Both threats could even focus on international political, economic or sporting events held in Switzerland.\(^{116}\)

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\(^{116}\) Ibid., 15-16.
The response capability of the Swiss Army Model

Although the increased terrorist and asymmetric threats have shifted the priorities of the armed forces from territorial defence to the prevention of terrorism, the Swiss Army Model is overtaxed by this new menace. The necessity to adapt the skills of soldiers has led to a progressive augmentation of constabulary resources (both legal and technical), but the lack of information about such a slippery threat, due to the lack of necessary intelligence, makes it so unpredictable that the need for immediate prevention, intervention and response capabilities rises so high that only a professional unit could deal with it. Such capabilities can be found in completely constabulary military units like the French “gendarmerie”, the Spanish “guardia civil” or the Italian “carabinieri”. In Switzerland such units do not exist, therefore this task is handled by the police force, and the army is assigned with supporting them on special occasions and situations, when police resources are not sufficient. Even in such cases, the leadership is in the hands of the police and the army is engaged as a subsidiary resource.

2. Conventional military threats

In order to prevent invasions and foreign militaries from using Switzerland as a transit route, and to defend the independence, sovereignty and neutrality of the country, in 1848 the federal government unified the various cantonal militias within the Swiss Armed Forces. Their primary task was territorial defence against conventional threats.

The vanishing threat

A conventional military confrontation in Western Europe, involving Switzerland or not, is at the moment very improbable. Although since the end of the Cold War even in Europe internal state conflict became current in a brutal way, direct military influence remained regional. The escalation of such a conflict to an international level can not a priori be excluded, but it is at present not to be expected. The threat has neither disappeared nor has it become smaller, it is just not evident at the moment. However, because it is impossible to exclude, Switzerland maintains the military resources necessary to deal with such a threat and to have a credible deterrent for any possible enemies.

The response capability of the Swiss Army Model

The advantages of the Swiss Army Model in case of a conventional military attack are threefold: moral and motivation, enormous manpower, and the social link.

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118 Ibid., 90.
119 Ibid., 13.
120 Ibid., 93.
121 Schweizerische Bundesrat, SIPOL B 2000, 54-55.
122 Ibid., 46.
125 Schweizerische Bundesrat, SIPOL B 2000, 9-10.
Defending not only their country but also their houses, factories, schools and families, the citizens/soldiers of the Swiss Army Model have a higher level of motivation and combat-willingness, some say only once the war already has begun,\textsuperscript{127} than those in a professional army who fight a war just “because it is their job”. Their action has the moral highness of self-defence.\textsuperscript{128} A conventional military threat usually requires a huge manpower to be managed.\textsuperscript{129} Vast countries with hundreds of millions of inhabitants can afford to maintain an army of hundreds of thousands soldiers, but smaller nations cannot, without emptying social and economical life of all its younger men.\textsuperscript{130} The alternatives are a merely representative army of some thousand soldiers, or a huge army, where every male citizen is both at the same time a soldier skilled and prepared for war and a citizen working and nourishing his family. These soldiers are already equipped and regularly trained during civil life, so that in case of war they can be mobilised within 48 hours, which is more than enough time given the notice of such an attack.\textsuperscript{131} At the peak of the Cold War, Switzerland was able to mobilise 1.1 million soldiers within 48 hours.

The social link of the citizen/soldier gives him a definite advantage in war: knowledge of the country, its people and characteristics allows him to move on the battlefield like “a fish in friendly waters” as Mao Tse-Tung used to say.\textsuperscript{132} The increasing technological skills required by modern weapons systems are the greater disadvantage of the militia.\textsuperscript{134} A modern tank or howitzer can easily be employed by a recruit after four months of instruction, but after a year’s interruption, this knowledge has sunk to nearly nothing, and the refresher course has to be used to re-learn such skills, not to amplify them. Some scholars argue, a militia could fill this gap by its higher combat will, which is founded on the higher morality of its mission.\textsuperscript{135}

3. Other non-military threats of military relevance

Of all possible non-military threats which could affect Switzerland’s security, the following three are the most dangerous and probable: organised crime, including illicit drug trafficking, coercive prostitution and money-laundering; exceptional immigration waves due to regional conflicts at Europe’s periphery; and various natural hazards.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{126} Schweizerische Bundesrat, SIPOL B 2000, 33.
\textsuperscript{127} Gabriel, Miliz wohin? Zwischenbericht der Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitspolitik, 13.
\textsuperscript{128} Haltiner et al., “Europas Armeen im Umbruch,” 221.
\textsuperscript{129} Haltiner, “Die Demilitarisierung der europäischen Gesellschaften und die Remilitarisierung ihrer Streitkräfte,” 231.
\textsuperscript{130} David Ben-Gurion, foreword in Die Verteidigungsarmee Israels 1948-1958, by Gershon Rivlin (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1958), 3.
\textsuperscript{131} Schweizerische Bundesrat, SIPOL B 2000, 9.
\textsuperscript{132} Charles Ott, “Credo für die Miliz,” in Armee 95 – Chance für die Milizarmee?, ed. Albert A. Stahel (Zürich: vdf Hochschulverlag an der ETH Zürich, 1994), 179.
\textsuperscript{134} Heller, “Zwischen Reform und Beharren: Milizarmee mit Zukunft,” 123.
\textsuperscript{135} Pinkas, “Miliz und Frieden,” 42.
\textsuperscript{136} Schweizerische Bundesrat, SIPOL B 2000, 16-18.
**The response capability of the Swiss Army Model and its expertise**

Even more than international terrorism, organised crime and all its correlated activities can not be fought with a non-professional militia that is not on duty throughout the year. Fighting such illicit activities requires constant information research with embedded elements and a constant readiness, in order to bring such criminals to justice. Therefore, fighting crime and its prevention is a task for professionals, and in Switzerland it is the task of the local police departments, coordinated by the federal police.

The thousands of refugees fleeing regional conflicts are a significant destabilisation factor for the hosting society. An important task is the channelling refugees into collection centres and medical care. If the civilian resources are overtaxed by an exceptional wave of refugees the army is called upon to help out. In such a case, the biggest advantage of the Swiss Army Model is its biggest disadvantage: the militia soldier brings civil knowledge with him, which is very useful if applied in assisting medical units, but most of the troops who have to guard such centres and assist the refugees when needed, are not trained for and are not used to dealing with such delicate situations. Therefore, the Swiss Army Model is only partially suitable for support missions in refugee emergencies.

Natural hazards such as floods, landslides, avalanches, forest fires and so on are not a military threat and are usually handled by civilian forces such as fire fighters, police and civil defence. The army is called in only for exceptional events which overtax civilian resources. In such a situation, the Swiss Army Model has two decisive advantages: the soldiers are particularly motivated as part of the society concerned and often posses civil skills that help to deal with such situations on the technical and organisational side – these skills are not to handling a rifle or leading a combat unit, even if the units employed are not engineering units.

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139 Ibid., 17.
140 Ott, “Credo für die Miliz,” 179.
142 Ott, “Credo für die Miliz,” 179.
VI THE MILITARY THREATS IN AFGHANISTAN

After three decades of war, peace is still a distant dream for Afghanistan. Various threats menace the security of the country and its population. Terrorism, military and political interference, drug production, criminality and banditry, poverty and social unrest are only the most evident threats the Afghan society could face and the ANA could be called to deal with.

1. Terrorist threats, internal and from abroad

Homeland terrorism: the heritage of the Taliban…

Taliban, plural for Talib, literally means “religious scholar”. But the noun is known worldwide as the name of the Islamic movement which seized power in Kabul 1996 and was overthrown by the US and the Northern Alliance in 2001.

The Taliban were not founded as a terrorist group. After the fall of the government of President Nadjibullah 1992, the Mujahiddin were not able to install a stable government, primarily because of the continuous struggle for power between the factions, especially the Jamiat-e Islami-e Afghanistan of Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massud versus the Hizb-e Islami-e Afghanistan of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who was backed by Pakistan and its intelligence services ISI. Due to Hikmatyar’s incapability to seize complete power and stabilise the country, permitting Pakistani interests to unfold, Islamabad let him fall and began to support a new movement of younger, radical Pashtoon Mullahs with poor (religious) instruction, born in refugee camps and instructed in Pakistani Madrasas, with the tacit consent of the United States. In 1994 the Taliban came onto the Afghan stage with their conquest of the city of Kandahar, which later became their capital and stronghold. After the conquest of Kabul 1996 and Mazar-i-Sharif 1998 the Taliban controlled about 90% of the country. Not at all a terrorist movement, the Taliban used medieval and feudal strategies to conquer and rule the country. They fought under the leadership of Pakistani army officers and ISI agents where needed, corrupt local commanders with Saudi petrol-dollars to surrender where possible, and after gaining power they did not care much about politics and policy, except for the sadly famous department for the promotion of virtue.

Nojumi, The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan; mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region, 183.
Rasuly, "Die politischen Eliten Afghanistans," 199.
Berger et al., Afghanistan – ein Land am Scheideweg, 47.

\[144\] Nojumi, The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan; mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region, 185.
Coll, Ghost wars, 510.

\[145\] Schetter, Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afghanistan, 543.
Nojumi, The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan; mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region, 122.

\[147\] Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: a history of struggle and survival, 220.

\[150\] Berger et al., Afghanistan – ein Land am Scheideweg, 101.
and the prevention of vice, their religious police.\textsuperscript{151} Their extremist interpretation of the Koran, merged with unwritten rules of the *Pashtoonwali*, was based on the indoctrination received in the *Madrasas*, mostly led by the Pakistani *Jamiat-e Ulema e-Islamiya*, a Pashtoon-dominated extremist movement. This Pashtoon-based militia, after having been overthrown by the international coalition, dismantled itself and its members returned home to the Pashtoon areas of both Afghanistan and the Pakistani North-West-Frontier-Province (NWFP), waiting for better times.\textsuperscript{152}

Today, those scattered *Taliban* elements still fighting against the US-led coalition and the government of President Karzai have been forced by the US presence, the loss of major Pakistani support and the increasing control of the country by the central government to use terrorist methods to continue their struggle.\textsuperscript{153} To terrorize the population, they bomb meeting and market places, murder political personalities and burn down schools.\textsuperscript{154} Such rough methods of warfare are not a prerogative of the *Taliban*, as the struggle between the *Mujahiddin* groups has shown, and other groups disagreeing with the central government could fall back on them to impose their own interests.

\textit{...and the ever-present militias}

With the PDPA seizing power, armed opposition to the communist regime began to organise itself into armed groups, known today as *Mujahiddin*, which suited the scheme of popular militias. These remained active from the beginning of the *Jihad* until the *Taliban* were dispersed.

Today, the militias do not oppose the central state, which has until now managed to control them through the involvement of their leaders in the government: they ignore it.\textsuperscript{155} In fact, the government does not have the resources necessary to keep these groups in check, so they act more or less freely going about various criminal activities. The fact that they are stronger than the government, which must count on US support, heavily threatens its legitimacy and means there is a danger the militias could resume the fight using terrorist methods like the *Taliban*, for the same reasons illustrated above.\textsuperscript{156}

\textit{Terrorism from abroad: the Arab-Afghan and Islamic extremists of Al-Qaida}

With the outbreak of the *Jihad* against the USSR and its puppet regimes of Presidents Taraki, Amin, Karmal and Nadjibullah, thousands of willing young Muslims from the entire *Umma* streamed into Afghanistan to support the struggle of the local *Mujahiddin* against the unbelievers from the north.\textsuperscript{157} After the fall of Nadjibullah, some left and went back home, where they have exported the
Jihad,\textsuperscript{158} while others remained and still support the most radical Islamic movements of the Pashtoons, alienating all other Afghans.\textsuperscript{159} With the rise of the Taliban, the leaders of these foreign fighters, who meanwhile had founded Al-Qaida, a network of various terrorist movements,\textsuperscript{160} began to support them and became guests and financiers of the Taliban movement.

After the US operation “Enduring Freedom”, those elements have lost their mean refuge in Afghanistan, but they are still anchored and active in the remote areas of “Pashtoonistan”, on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border.\textsuperscript{161} Their bases are usually on the Pakistani side, out of the reach of the ANA and of the US Armed Forces, and they drop down into Afghanistan for sporadic but continuous terrorist and guerrilla attacks.\textsuperscript{162} They also profit from the support they enjoy in the lower and exploited classes of Muslim societies and from their ability to integrate themselves relatively easy into such structures.

The world’s most wanted terrorist, Osama bin Laden, is suspected of still living in the region, probably somewhere in the rugged mountains of the NWFP, covered by Pashtoon tribes and by the ISI.\textsuperscript{163}

Their methods of warfare are very similar to those of the domestic Taliban and their re-found ally Gulbuddin Hikmatyar,\textsuperscript{164} although some argue that these foreign fighters are the real terrorists, not the scattered Taliban.\textsuperscript{165} A novelty they have brought into Afghanistan are suicide-bombers. A phenomenon unknown to the Afghan Mujahiddin and Taliban, in 2004 the first kamikazes blew themselves up in Kabul.\textsuperscript{166}

2. \textbf{Conventional military threats}

A conventional military invasion of Afghanistan is today less probable than previously, although, the biggest deterrent is not the economical, political or geo-strategic situation as in the West. The biggest deterrent is the presence of the US Armed Forces in the country and in the region. But what will happen when Washington draws its troops back? The Afghan neighbourhood is by far not as peaceful as the European is.\textsuperscript{167} The mobilisation of 100,000 Iranian soldiers along the Iranian-Afghan border in 1998, after the murder by the Taliban of nine Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif, shows how rapidly these countries tend to engage military means to impose their policies.\textsuperscript{168}

The different countries neighbouring Afghanistan follow different interests in the country and are always worried about the increase of their influence in Kabul and/or in the provinces linked to them

\textsuperscript{158} Berger et al., Afghanistan – ein Land am Scheideweg, 50.
\textsuperscript{159} Rashid, Taliban, The story of the Afghan warlords, 132.
\textsuperscript{161} Sharma, Pak proxy war. a story of ISI, bin Laden and Kargil, 83.
\textsuperscript{162} Roy, “Afghanistan: la difficile reconstruction d’un État,” 43.
\textsuperscript{163} Stahel et al., “Afghanistan quo vadis?,” 11.
\textsuperscript{164} Roy, “Afghanistan: la difficile reconstruction d’un État,” 44.
\textsuperscript{165} Roberts, The origins of conflict in Afghanistan, 236.
\textsuperscript{166} Berger et al., Afghanistan – ein Land am Scheideweg, 111.
\textsuperscript{167} Stahel et al., “Nation building Afghanistan,” 44.
\textsuperscript{168} Weinbaum, “Rebuilding Afghanistan: impediments, lessons, and prospects,” 134.
\textsuperscript{169} Nojumi, The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan; mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region, 187.
by common border or ethnic/religious affinities,\textsuperscript{169} having disastrous effects on the Afghan polity.\textsuperscript{170} Their armed forces are of different strength and technical modernity. None of these is on the same technical level as a high-tech army like the US Armed Forces, but some have a huge manpower (China, India, Russia in decreasing rank). The interests of the different countries of the region in Afghanistan are illustrated below.

\textbf{Pakistan}

Pakistan follows four different interests in Afghanistan: strategic depth versus India, advantageous access to the natural resources of Central Asia, the constitution of an anti-Iranian Sunni bloc from the Arabian Sea to the plains of Kazakhstan\textsuperscript{171} and a definitive regulation of the Pashtoonistan question along with the recognition of the Durrand-Line frontier. The ancient tactic of \textit{divide et impera} is the favourite one in Islamabad,\textsuperscript{172} who supports Afghan centrifugal forces to weaken and destabilise the Afghan central state.\textsuperscript{173} Will Islamabad re-enter Afghanistan after US departure?\textsuperscript{174}

The conflict with the much larger India has always represented a central point of Pakistani strategic politics since the independence in 1947. Bordered by the Hindukush Range in the west and lying in valley of the Indus River, the armed forces were always worried about keeping their back clear of possible threats and maintaining the possibility of go-round manoeuvres beyond the Afghan border.\textsuperscript{175}

Since the dissolution of the USSR, the natural resources of former Soviet Central Asia are accessible to every interested market player. The introduction of such landlocked resources onto world markets is based on a Soviet infrastructure that passes goods through the Russian Federation. The construction of alternative pipelines is one of the interests of various countries, especially of Pakistan (backed by the US), whose projects go across Afghanistan and lead to the major Pakistani port of Karachi.\textsuperscript{176}

Linked with the interest above is the formation of a Sunni bloc that avoids influence of Shi’a Iran in the region and imposes Pakistan as the moral Islamic leader eastwards of its ally Saudi Arabia,\textsuperscript{177} which uses Pakistani influence to impose its own fundamentalist Wahabi interests.\textsuperscript{178}

The Pashtoonistan conflict with Afghanistan originated with the British colonisation of India and the subsequent division of Pashtoon tribal areas by the Durrand Line. After the independence of the sub-continent from Great Britain and the separation of India and Pakistan, Afghanistan refused to

\textsuperscript{169} Hussain, \textit{Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic militancy in Afghanistan}, 201.
\textsuperscript{171} Magnus, \textit{Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid}, 69.
\textsuperscript{172} Sharma, \textit{Pak proxy war, a story of ISI, bin Laden and Kargil}, 173.
\textsuperscript{173} Rashid, \textit{Taliban, The story of the Afghan warlords}, 96.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., 62.
\textsuperscript{176} Nojumi, \textit{The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan; mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region}, 184.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 184.
\textsuperscript{178} Saikal, \textit{Modern Afghanistan: a history of struggle and survival}, 222.
recognise the border and re-claimed the territories of Pashtoonistan and Beluchistan. Islamabad of course opposes such plans and is interested in having only docile and less nationalistic governments in charge in Kabul, to avoid further confrontation on this topic.\textsuperscript{179}

\textbf{Iran}

In Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic principally follows three interests: the control over alternative access to Central Asian natural resources, the political-religious influence on western Afghanistan, the city of Herat and the Hazara Shi‘a minority, and the containment of US influence in Kabul, especially after the operation “Iraqi Freedom” which has practically encircled Teheran with US bases and allies.\textsuperscript{180}

The only pipeline channelling Turkmen gas out of Central Asia without crossing Russia crosses Iran. The building of pipelines through Afghanistan and Pakistan contradicts Iranian interests and its willingness to become a regional power and a moral Islamic reference.\textsuperscript{181} Iran strongly needs the financial revenue of these gas transports to finance its isolated economy, its huge military program (including the much discussed nuclear issue) and its external engagements supporting various Islamic groups across the wider Middle East (e.g. the Hezbollah).

The most important pillars of Iranian influence are of course the local Shi‘a communities, of which Teheran expects to become the spiritual leader (Iran is the only Islamic country dominated by Shi‘a Muslims).\textsuperscript{182} In Afghanistan, the major Shi‘a community is that of the Hazara. Iran always supported Shi‘a Mujahiddin parties loyal to its ideology such as Sazeman-e-Nasr or later Hizb-e Wahdat\textsuperscript{183} during the Afghan war and helped to suppress those with political views not conform with the Iranian credo.\textsuperscript{184} Traditional cultural and economical relations, as much as supposed natural resources, have extended the expected area of influence from the traditional Hazara provinces (the Hazarajat) to the city of Herat (the Persian entrance to India in ancient times) and West Afghanistan.

The rivalry between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America is a well-known fact. Washington’s constantly increasing influence in the region is viewed as a serious threat in Teheran. With the operations “Enduring Freedom” and “Iraqi Freedom”, the US could for the first time dramatically raise the number and location of their bases in the region, in addition to traditional allies like Israel, Turkey, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. With the military presence of US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, with bases on the Arabian Peninsula, and with newly-leased bases

\textsuperscript{179} Hussain, Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic militancy in Afghanistan, 240. Marsden, “Afghanistan: minorities, conflict and the search for peace,” 11.

\textsuperscript{180} Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: a history of struggle and survival, 174-175.

\textsuperscript{181} Nojumi, The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan; mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region, 186-188.

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 187.

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 188.

\textsuperscript{184} Rashid, Taliban, The story of the Afghan warlords, 197.
in Central Asia, Iran has been practically encircled. Iran has, of course, in such a situation strong interests in avoiding or reducing such an encirclement.

**India, Russia, China**

These three regional powers have similar but competing interests in Afghanistan. They are all interested in access to Afghan natural resources, as a possible source of financial means (Russia),\textsuperscript{185} or to help satisfy the growing needs of their booming economies (China and India).\textsuperscript{186} Confronted with internal conflicts involving Islamic minorities (Kashmir, Chechnya, the Uygurs of Xinjiang), all three are interested in the containment of Islamic pressure groups at their peripheries and want to avoid a new sanctuary of Islamic terrorism in their neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{187}

As regional powers, these three countries argue for political, economical and military influence in the own, often overlapping spheres of interest. The presence in the region of the sole remaining military superpower, which still possesses one of the most powerful economies, is a not at all welcome occurrence that these three countries are unable to avoid, but that they would prefer to contain.\textsuperscript{188}

**Central Asian Republics (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan)**

The Central Asian Republics have two principal concerns with Afghanistan. The first one is the creation of secure ways to export their own natural resources independently from the Russian infrastructure. The second is the containment of Islamic movements that could destabilise the political dominance of the local dictators, all heirs of the Soviet system and former secretary generals of the local Politburo.\textsuperscript{189}

Those countries having or expecting natural resources (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan), want to avoid export dependency on Russia, in order to make maximal profits with the rising demand on fossil fuels. Having various safe and reliable alternatives would permit them to bargain for more advantageous conditions and prices.\textsuperscript{190}

The rising opposition to dictatorial regimes is often backed by Islamic ideologies, without being necessarily fundamentalist. The local elites use to brand every opposition as “Islamic terrorism”, and are interested in avoiding such influences from their southern border.\textsuperscript{191} Afghan support of Islamic insurgents was in fact a reality during the Mujahiddin and the Taliban era. Tajik guerrillas for example, were easily able to operate out of the Kunduz and Badakhshan provinces in 1993.\textsuperscript{192}

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\textsuperscript{185} Nojumi, *The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan; mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region*, 196.

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 192.

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., 192, 193.

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 195.

\textsuperscript{189} Schetter, *Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afghanistan*, 507.

\textsuperscript{190} Nojumi, *The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan; mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region*, 190.

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 190.

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 190.
3. **Other non-military threats of military relevance**

Of the various realities threatening the security and integrity of Afghanistan the following four are the most dangerous and immediate: drug production and trade, Islamic radicalism, social unrest and natural hazards leading to humanitarian emergencies. In addition there is a threat to national integrity that is more present in the western media than in Afghan reality: ethno-separatism.

**Drug production**

Since the fall of the Nadjibullah regime, the cultivation of the opium poppy has dramatically increased and today Afghanistan is the world’s leading opium producer; a large part of it is already transformed into heroin within the country. The opium poppy, initially cultivated to finance the various armed militias of the *Mujahiddin*, and later to finance the *Taliban* regime, is today cultivated by the commanders of the various militias as a reliable and lucrative financial source. The lack of alternatives, the protection offered by the drug mafia that the central state should provide, the acute need of resources to feed the large families, and the higher income offered by poppy cultivation in comparison with other crops all tend to push poor peasants into the arms of the wire-pullers of drug production.

The large drug production threatens Afghanistan in two ways: it weakens the state and endangers its relations with the rest of the world. Those groups cultivating poppies and dealing with drugs have huge financial means, enough arms to concur or corrupt the central state and to struggle for the control of the provinces where the opium poppy is cultivated. By impeding the local development of the nation-building process, they deprive the central state of needed legitimacy in the region, they cause increased banditry and as a result the population is segregated from access to the state infrastructure or international development aid and is threatened by constant insecurity.

The continuous flood of drugs from Afghanistan poses a serious problem to those countries were the drugs are eventually sold and consumed. Although no one at present day accuses the Afghan government of promoting drug production, if Kabul in the near future does not take effective steps to prevent such activities, the country could become a narcotics state, a pariah of the international community and the countries concerned could consider the alternative of applying sanctions or cutting financial aid.

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194 Stahel et al., “Nation building Afghanistan,” 11.
195 The revenues of opium-poppy are 10 times higher than those of wheat and 3 times higher than those of onions. Asad et al., *The politics and economics of drug production on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border*, 79-81.
196 Ibid., 86.
Reborn Islamic radicalism

Islam has always been an important factor in shaping Afghanistan’s society. As illustrated in Chapter IX, Afghan society is particularly conservative and pious; the principles of the Koran, the laws of the Shariah, together with tribal traditions have shaped it over the centuries. Since the colonisation of India by the British Empire, Afghan society has come in contact with western societies. Because of the remote location of the country, the vast majority of the population remained isolated from western influence until the 1950’s. The first steps into modernity were taken by the urban elites, while the rural population and the conservative clergy became more and more alienated by such developments. However, shaped by Sufism, Afghan Islam has always been a tolerant one, and the paradox is that Islamism was, like communism, an urban phenomenon, not one emerging from the alienated rural masses. The regime of the PDPA tried to impose a massive modernisation of the country and to revolutionise social structures. This led to opposition from the population, which went back to the traditions of Islam. The interpretation of Islamic laws became more and more radical during the Jihad against the Soviets.

Today, the presence of foreign troops and the social engineering of some NGOs tend to alienate the feelings of the Afghan population and could cause resentment which could lead to violent reaction in the name of Islam. The Afghan population has never accepted foreign occupation; the principle of freedom and independence is anchored in the various tribal traditions, especially in the Pashtoonwali, as the British and the Soviets painfully experienced. Today, the people of Afghanistan know and understand that the US and the ISAF have come to help, not to occupy the country. But if the arrogant behaviour of some military elements toward the population does not change, it could lead to a different view by the locals, who could start seeing the foreigner as occupier and begin to rebel.

The same could happen if the construction of an Afghan civil society takes place without the participation of the population. Social engineering that is disrespectful of local traditions, e.g. with regard to the social role of women, imposed by NGOs or IGOs in a top-down process, supported by corruptive methods of conviction (e.g. construction of irrigation facilities only if the construction of a girls’ school is accepted) could cause serious resentment.

Such a religiously motivated popular uprising could lead to a new civil war and the fractionalisation of Afghanistan, development aid would be stopped by the lack of security and the country would become prey to interested regional players. Islamism is a threat to the entire region.

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201 Rashid, Taliban, The story of the Afghan warlords, 82.
202 Rashid, Taliban, The story of the Afghan warlords, 82-83.
204 Cordesman, The lessons of Afghanistan, 1.
208 Magnus, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid, 171.
**Social unrest**

The consequences cited above could take place even if living conditions of the major part of the population do not improve visibly in the near future.\(^{209}\) Lack of security, lack of economical perspectives, famine and starvation are factors that paralyse social development and drive the population to despair. Rebellion against those who are seen as responsible is sooner or later the consequence, along with new significant waves of refugees.\(^{210}\)

**Natural hazards**

Afghanistan is a rugged, semiarid country lying on the tectonic junction of two continental plates. Drought, earthquakes (especially in the Hindukush Range) and floods are the most common natural hazards.\(^{211}\) Although some areas are sparsely populated, the poor infrastructure immediately causes catastrophic situations in such emergencies. Rapid relief by the government is expected by the people concerned.\(^{212}\) In Third World countries, a natural catastrophe often leads to lasting deterioration of already poor living conditions. If the government is unable to provide help and satisfy the relief-expectancies of the people, social discontent and unrest could grow, threatening the legitimacy and stability of the central government.

**Ethno-separatism**

A quick look at an ethnographic map of Afghanistan shows a complex mosaic of cultural/lingual-religious entities. Most of the major entities (the sole exception are the Hazaras of central Afghanistan) are not limited to Afghanistan but extend beyond the borders into the neighbouring countries.

In such a situation, especially after a long-lasting war, some would expect uprisings of separatist movements seeking the creation of new independent states or re-attachment to another country.\(^{213}\) In the case of Afghanistan, this danger is more common to the western media than to local reality.\(^{214}\)

Although Afghan society is splintered into dozens of small and smaller local realities, the link to central government is a weak but accepted constant.\(^{215}\) The main reasons for this are twofold: the state has always been seen as a source of support in exchange for loyalty,\(^{216}\) and the fact that, as illustrated in Chapter IX, the reference identity in Afghan society is not the ethnic group but the

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\(^{209}\) Stahel et al., “Afghanistan quo vadis?,” 8.


\(^{212}\) Stahel et al., “Afghanistan quo vadis?,” 8.

\(^{213}\) Cordesman, *The lessons of Afghanistan*, 52.


\(^{216}\) Ibid., 47-48.
The Qawn is a “group of solidarity” and always has different characteristics: in tribal ethnic groups the tribe, or a confederation of tribes is the Qawn, in non-tribal ethnic groups identification is provided by the place of origin (often limited to the people’s own valley), elsewhere it is the family clan, in urban areas it can even be a professional category (e.g. barbers). In addition, ethno-separatism is hindered by the all-Islamic concept of the *Umma*, and by an elusive nostalgia for the times when Afghanistan lived in relative peace and unity.\(^{216}\)

With a similar lack of ethnic identification, ethno-separatism is unthinkable.\(^{219}\) The Qawn itself is of course not an entity capable of constituting the foundation of a new state. But the long war has started dividing the ethnic groups, and resentment against other ethnic group has become more noticeable.\(^{220}\) The Hazara e.g., have always been the underdogs of Afghan society, but today they will definitely not accept this role again.\(^{221}\) This new ethnic conscience was not the cause for the war, it is its effect.\(^{222}\)

Another ethnic issue is the conflict about Pashtoonistan, but it is not a question of ethno-separatism. The goal of the Pashtoons is not the creation of an independent Pashtoonistan, because this would lead to the loss of all non-Pashtoon territories in Afghanistan. It must be remembered that Pashtoons have always been the dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan. The real goal Kabul seeks to achieve is the re-attachment of those territories of Pakistan that belonged to Afghanistan before the drawing of the Durrand Line.\(^{223}\) The neighbours of Afghanistan use, as the graphs below show, the growing divisions to impose their interests and spheres of influence.\(^{224}\)

The ethno-based foreign influence by Conrad Schetter (left) and the spheres of interest that divide Afghanistan by Albert A. Stahel (right).\(^{225}\)

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\(^{217}\) Berger et al., *Afghanistan – ein Land am Scheideweg*, 42.

\(^{218}\) Schetter, *Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afghanistan*, 543.


\(^{220}\) Berger et al., *Afghanistan – ein Land am Scheideweg*, 46.

\(^{221}\) Coll, *Ghost wars*, 569.

\(^{222}\) Schetter, *Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afghanistan*, 476.


\(^{225}\) Hussain, *Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic militancy in Afghanistan*, 240.


Unpublished graph by Albert A. Stahel.
The common pejorative factor

In Afghanistan, all these non-military threats have a common point making them extremely serious: the infinite quantity of weapons available across the country. Considering every man armed makes clear how quickly simple popular discontent could turn into violent uprising. On the other hand, criminal activities are, because of these weapons, not a common police target. Unlike drug dealers, Mafiosi or bandits and robbers in the rest of the world, those in Afghanistan are not (only) armed with guns and rifles, but also with tanks, howitzers and multiple-rocket launchers. Therefore preventing and fighting crime becomes, aside from small-time urban criminality, a military task of national relevance.

VII SUMMARY: THREAT COMPATIBILITY

After having analysed the response capability of the Swiss Army Model with regard to the current military threats and the various threats Afghanistan faces, the first thesis of this paper is answered as follows:

"The Swiss Army Model is not suitable to respond to the various threats Afghanistan faces."

This thesis can be only partly confirmed. Unlike the threats faced by most western countries, Afghanistan faces both terrorist threats and conventional military threats, in addition to possible social unrest supported by heavy arms.

The Swiss Army Model is in fact probably the best way to face the second and maybe even the third threat. It can provide enough manpower necessary to repel a military attack by one of its neighbours and their low/medium-tech armies without drying up society of the young manpower much needed for reconstruction. In addition, the fact that all ethnic groups will be represented in the national armed forces reduces the chances for the aggressor to divide the multi-ethnic Afghan society to his military advantage. In Afghanistan, the social link of the Swiss Army Model could lead to increased legitimacy for the government and its apparatus (including the armed forces). Thus, armed violence caused by social discontent could drop, because the people would tend to prefer not to raise their weapons against soldiers they consider their own.

On the other hand, Afghanistan faces heavy terrorist and criminal threats only a professional force with a high level of police components can deal with. A similar force must have the skills and equipment of both the army and the police. It must be organised in a military, nation-wide structure and consist of professional, well-trained specialists. The professional police component is necessary in order to provide the needed rapid prevention and response capability, and the military character should assure that this unit will be able to intervene throughout country, with the appropriate heavy means if necessary.

In fact, Afghanistan needs an all-conscripted militia army, composed of all classic military branches: infantry, armoured troops, artillery, air defence units, engineering, medical and logistics units and so on, flanked by a (professional) air force with both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircrafts, and a professional military police unit like, for example, the Italian "carabinieri."
VIII THE SWISS ARMY MODEL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES

1. Demographic structure

The principal characteristics of the Swiss demographic structure are fourfold: its limited size, an urn-shaped population diagram due to the low birth rate, its lingual multiculturalism and its religious balance.

A small, densely populated nation

Switzerland is a small (41,293 sq km) but densely populated country of 7.41 million people. The major part of the population is concentrated in the plains of the “Mittelland” between the Alps and the hills of the Jura, or in the lower valleys. With a birth rate of 9.77 births per 1,000 inhabitants and a life expectancy at birth of about 80 years, the population diagram of Switzerland has switched from a natural pyramid shape to an urn-shaped age distribution. Thus, today the Swiss population is growing primarily because of the influx of an immigration work force from the EU or its periphery. With such a small manpower reserve, the logical consequence was to create synergies between the army and civil society by transforming the citizen into a soldier when needed and sending him home to work and family when not. The militia fulfils this principle.

Multi-linguistic society

Four national languages are spoken in Switzerland, German, French, Italian and Reto-Rumansch, of which German with 65% makes up the large majority. The other languages are spoken by following population rates: 18% French, 9% Italian and less than 1% Romansh. The rest are foreigners speaking other, non-national languages. The Swiss Confederation recognises all four languages and promotes those of the minorities, although members of the minorities harbour latent resentment of the perceived disproportional dominance of the German-speaking community. The Swiss Army Model as an all-conscription militia army unites the multi-linguistic society and the scaled service guarantees a continuous joint identification of all individuals with members of other language communities over a long period of their life.

Religious balance

The Swiss population is primarily Christian, in nearly equal parts Protestant and Roman-Catholic (although foreign workers from Southern Europe have balanced out the practiced faiths, as the...
Protestants in the Swiss population usually had a slight majority). Religious minorities in Switzerland have traditionally been Jews and, since a few decades, Christian-Orthodox, Muslims, Hindus and others. The Federal Constitution prohibits discrimination of religious communities and sanctions the separation of state and religion. Today, the earlier distinct borders of Protestant and Catholic communities are becoming increasingly blurred by the growing mobility of the population, and religion is increasingly seen as an individual matter, which is practiced less in the community, e.g. in churches. This growing individualism is not a phenomenon unique to religion, but well-known in every voluntary social activity and structure, and in its nature it is a threat to the future of the militia, because this bases on the will to participate in a common cause, even if supported by universal conscription.

**National identification**

In a way typical for a federal and multicultural nation, the Swiss identify themselves strongly with their local reality – not instead of national identification, but together, as a complement to national identity. This has not always been so. Before the French Revolution and the subsequent Helvetic Republic, Switzerland was a loose alliance of independent states with few common institutions or relations. The people identified themselves by their own canton, as opposed to with the Swiss Confederation. With the creation of a more centralised federal state in 1848, the state began to be a source of national identity, especially by creating national institutions, such as the Swiss Army, the Swiss Federal Railroads and so on, and by promoting national events, like gymnastics, riflemen, music and alpine festivals and expositions. This young and artificial national identity did not preclude, even before it was created, intercantonal solidarity, not only in military belonging and where political interests were involved, as the nation-wide support for the Ticinese liberals expelled in hundreds from Austrian-dominated Lombardy has shown.

### 2. State organisation

The state organisation of Switzerland and its politics are based on 6 pillars: federalism, direct democracy, armed neutrality, triple power division, a bicameral semi-parliamentary republic with a co-directorial government and the separation of religion and state.

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235 Burri, Schweiz, Suisse, Svizzera, Svizra; Geographische Betrachtungen, 83.
236 Ibid., 83.
237 Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Bundesverfassung [BV], art. 15, 72.
238 Burri, Schweiz, Suisse, Svizzera, Svizra; Geographische Betrachtungen, 83.
241 Niklaus Flüeler, Sebastian Speich, Roland Stiefel, Margrit Wettstein, Marina Berta, Giovanni Croci, Generoso Romano & Rosmarie Widmer, La Svizzera (Zürich: Ex Libris Verlag, 1975), 73.
242 Haltiner, Milizarmee – Bürgerleitbild oder angeschlagenes Ideal?, 45.
244 Raffaello Ceschi, Ottocento ticinese (Locarno: Armando Dadò Editore, 1986), 42.
Highly federalised state

Switzerland is subdivided into 23 cantons, three of which consist of two semi-cantons, for a total of 26 sub-national political entities.\textsuperscript{244} It was not the nation which created the cantons by edicts, but rather the cantons which created the nation by free association.\textsuperscript{245} The Swiss cantons are fully functioning, partly independent states with their own parliaments and governments elected by and from the people, constitutions and responsibilities, and fiscal authority to provide the necessary means to fulfil their tasks. The Swiss Federal Constitution sanctions the political branches which are exclusively a federal matter (e.g. national defence), those which are shared between federal state and the cantons (e.g. road construction) and those which are exclusively the responsibility of the cantons (e.g. schools and public instruction). Each Swiss canton is represented in the Swiss bicameral parliament, in the House of Representatives (National Council) in proportion to their population strength,\textsuperscript{246} and in the Senate (Council of States) with two senators each, those subdivided in two semi-cantons with one senator for each half.\textsuperscript{247}

Popular participation and politics

Political participation has a long tradition in Switzerland and is correlated with the participation in national defence.\textsuperscript{248} In earlier times, young men reaching the age of 21 received a sword which symbolised their readiness to defend home and herds, and allowed them to actively participate in the local political assemblies (in reality they participated in national defence much earlier, usually from the age of 15).\textsuperscript{249} This tradition of political participation of those who defend the country has led to the Swiss phenomenon of direct democracy, where the people not only elect their representatives in communal, cantonal and national parliaments by free and secret elections, they also participate in the concrete decision process with referendums and initiatives. These two political instruments are not at all a Swiss exclusivity, but only in Switzerland (and in the Principality of Liechtenstein) is their use so accessible and appreciated, by both the people and the political institutions.\textsuperscript{250} In fact, direct democracy is a very efficient mean of controlling the armed forces by civilian society, which could even vote to abolish the army (in Switzerland this has happened two times). This desire for civil control, the fear the state elite could use a regular army to repress the people’s freedom and the general suspicion of aristocracy led to the consequent creation of the militia, the Swiss Army Model.\textsuperscript{251}

\textsuperscript{244} Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, \textit{Bundesverfassung [BV]}, art. 1.
\textsuperscript{245} Stephen P. Halbrook, \textit{La Svizzera nel mirino, la neutralità armata della Svizzera nella seconda guerra mondiale} (Locarno: Pedrazzini Edizioni, 2000), 32.
\textsuperscript{246} Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, \textit{Bundesverfassung [BV]}, art. 149.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid., art. 150.
\textsuperscript{248} Haltiner, \textit{Milizarmee – Bürgerleitbild oder angeschlagenes Ideal?}, 41-42.
\textsuperscript{249} Haltiner, “Bürgerbeteiligung und Militärorganisation,” 28.
\textsuperscript{250} Andreas Gross & Bruno Kaufmann, \textit{IRI Europe country index on citizenlawmaking 2002} (Amsterdam & Berlin: IRI Europe, 2002), 14-16.

Pinkas, \textit{Miliz und Frieden}, 40.
Armed, everlasting neutrality
Sanctioned by the constitution and recognised by European powers since the Vienna Congress of 1815, Swiss neutrality has become a source of national identification. The readiness to defend this neutrality was the main condition for its recognition, and with time, after two World Wars and the division of the world in two blocs, neutrality became a political maxim in war-spared and wealthy Switzerland, which led to the search for the highest possible military autonomy on one side, and growing political isolation from the European integration process on the other. In fact, Switzerland’s neutrality prohibits it only taking sides in a conflict, and from becoming a member of permanent military alliances (e.g. NATO), but not from supporting parties in a conflict in equal parts (today in any case a political taboo; the export of war materials to countries fighting a war is regulated by law and requires a special permit from the Federal Council or the participation in a military alliance if Switzerland itself is militarily threatened.

Power division and governmental structure
The three different powers of the state are divided in three independent branches: the executive, the legislative and the judicative. This and the following principles are valid for both the federal and the cantonal governments. The legislative comprises the already-mentioned bicameral parliament (Federal Assembly, consisting of National Council and Council of States). Its members are elected by and among the people, it legislates on its own initiative or by popular or governmental proposal. The parliaments of the cantons (Great Councils), however, are unicameral. The executive comprises the Federal Council. The Federal Council consists of 7 councillors (ministers), each with equal authority; every year one of the 7 is named Federal President, who is then both Head of State and Head of Government. The Federal President is primus inter pares within the Federal Council. The Federal Council is elected by the Federal Assembly. The four major parties are represented in order of their elector strength, and the language communities should also be proportionally represented. The Federal Assembly does not have the power to dismiss the Federal Council, which could, conversely, dismiss the Assembly. The governments of the cantons (Councils of State) are, however, elected by the people. The judicative branch is represented by independent federal and cantonal tribunals, whose judges are appointed by the corresponding parliaments.

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253 Halbrook, La Svizzera nel mirino, la neutralità armata della Svizzera nella seconda guerra mondiale, 46.
255 Schweizerische Bundesrat et al., Abkommen betreffend die Rechte und Pflichten der neutralen Mächte und Personen im Falle eines Landkrieges [V. Haager Abkommen] (Den Haag & Bern: EDMZ, 1907), art. 5-10.
256 Schweizerische Bundesrat, SIPOL B 2000, 35.
259 Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Bundesverfassung [BV], art. 143.
260 Ibid., art. 138-141, 160.
261 Ibid., art. 174-177.
262 Ibid., art. 168.
The laicism of the state
Two of the fundament of the liberal revolution of 1848 were the separation of religion and government, which precluded political influence of the church on the state, and the supremacy of secular government and law. 262 Although conservative Catholic regions in 1847 opposed this process and tried to achieve secession or restoration (Sonderbundskrieg), 263 this principle was passed, but the state does not oppose religion and recognises the Christian values as its own. 264 The separation of state and religion was in those times a way to avoid influence from the Holy See, as the federal legislation on diocese boundaries showed. 265 Today, it is a way to guarantee religious neutrality and avoid discrimination.

3. Public infrastructure
Based on the principle of “public service” public infrastructure in Switzerland is characterised by its nation-wide capillarity. Before the introduction of private economy principles in the national enterprises (railroads, postal services, etc.) the Confederation covered possible financial losses and every village had its own post office and could be reached by train or bus. Today, some of these services have been made more efficient, but the whole population still enjoys nation-wide public transportation, postal services, public broadcasting services, access to drinkable water and electric power and a capillary network of public, nearly toll-free paved roads. Access to education is universal and free up to the optional institutes for higher education. Public and private hospitals guarantee a capillary health system, 266 whose costs on the other hand rise yearly about 3%. 267 The importance of an efficient and well-run public infrastructure for the efficiency of an army is a common fact that does not need to be discussed again here, but for a militia army like the Swiss Army Model, which in the worst case needs to mobilise its entire manpower within 48 hours, a capillary transportation infrastructure is vital, or the troops would never be able to join their units. Even in peacetime, the soldiers join the annual “repetition courses” on their own, using public or private transportation. Thus, without an efficient infrastructure, the whole instruction system would collapse.

4. Economic structure
In the middle of the 19th century, when the federal state was founded, Switzerland was on the way to becoming Europe’s second-most industrialised nation, thanks to its large amounts of cheap hydropower. Before that, Switzerland was for centuries the poorhouse of Europe. Today, the post-

262 Flüeler et al., La Svizzera, 81-83.
263 Ceschi, Ottocento ticinese, 49.
264 Flüeler et al., La Svizzera, 81-83.
265 Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Bundesverfassung [BV], preamble.
266 Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Bundesverfassung [BV], art. 72, par. 3, abrogated 06.10.2001.
modern Swiss economy has changed from industries to services and the country is one of the wealthiest of the world.268

Economic sectors and transformation

Switzerland lacks most natural resources and its geographical characteristics hamper extensive agricultural development.269 For many centuries, the Swiss economy was based on subsistence agriculture and cattle breeding,270 some artisan manufacturers and mercenary services for various European powers (the Pontifical Swiss Guard is the last remaining from those times).271 The favourable conditions at the beginning of industrialisation brought Switzerland to greater wealth and development. Hydropower was a cheap and renewable source of energy for the new-born industry and the liberal and innovative political climate (Switzerland was the sole country in which the 1848 revolution succeeded) attracted various industrials and merchants from those empires where liberal movements were brutally repressed (e.g. the German Reich). In this way, Switzerland became a highly industrialised nation, second in Europe only to the United Kingdom. After the Second World War, Switzerland switched increasingly from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. Services, banks, administration and tourism are today’s principal activities.272 Currently, the primary sector (agriculture, mining) generates 1.5% of the GDP, the secondary sector (industry) 34% and the tertiary sector (services) 64.5%.273

Economic integration

Not only highly developed and post-industrial, the Swiss economy is highly integrated into the global and especially the European economy. With a GDP of 251.9 billion US$, 130.7 billion are generated by exports, and imports amount to 121.1 billion. The EU, the US and the countries of the Far East are Switzerland’s principal economic partners. Even if not a member of the EU, Switzerland has adapted its economical structure and legislation to that of the European Union.274 On the other hand, Switzerland maintains low-level protectionism where permitted by WTO agreement, to protect its highly subsidised agriculture from cheap imports.275

268 Burri, Schweiz, Suisse, Swizzera, Svizra; Geographische Betrachtungen, 143.
270 Burri, Schweiz, Suisse, Swizzera, Svizra; Geographische Betrachtungen, 123-124.
272 Burri, Schweiz, Suisse, Swizzera, Svizra; Geographische Betrachtungen, 143-158.
274 Ibid.
275 Burri, Schweiz, Suisse, Swizzera, Svizra; Geographische Betrachtungen, 128.
IX AFGHAN SOCIAL STRUCTURES

1. Demographic structure

Nothing is more complex than the demographic structure of Afghanistan: western media and public opinion characterise it as ethnically heterogeneous, Islamic conservative and tribal. There is no bigger and more irresponsible simplification of this reality. The Afghan demographic structure is characterised by an extremely young population, ethnic heterogeneity, a complex structure of local links to tribe, clan and village, conservative Islam and religious division between Sunni and Shi’a, a lack of national identification and the consequences of 30 years war: death, injuries, refugees and internally displaced person. Even the strength of the population is a sources of discussions, lacking valuable sources, and considering the consequences of the long of war. Today’s population of Afghanistan is estimated between 15 and 30 million.

An extremely young population

The average age of the Afghan population is 17.5 years, slightly less than half of the population (44.7%) is 14 years old or younger, with 42 years being the average life expectancy at birth one of the lowest in the world. Guaranteeing a future of wealth, security and education to these masses of children is one of the biggest challenges for Afghanistan and its government, on the other hand the youth is the country’s chance of a new beginning.

A heterogeneous ethnic mosaic

Various ethnic identities comprise the Afghan population. Six of them are major ones: the Pashtoons, the Tajiks, the Uzbeks, the Hazaras, the Turkmen, and the Baluchis. The ethnic carpet is completed by minor entities like the Nuristanis, the Brahis, the Ismailis, the Kyrgyz, the Wakhan, the Aimaq, the Qizilbash and some smallest groups of Arabs, Mongols, Sikhs and Jews. Apart from the last two, all of them are Muslim, most of them Sunni, and use Pashtu or Dari as their lingua franca. The similarities end here. In Afghanistan, membership to a specific ethnic group determines the social class to which an individual belongs, as the graph below shows.

The representation of Afghan ethnic groups in the social classes by Conrad Schetter.

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277 Berger et al., *Afghanistan – ein Land am Scheideweg*, 41.
The various people are introduced below. Their variety demonstrates that Afghan democracy will succeed only if the central state achieves the enormous task of integrating all these groups peacefully into its apparatus. The armed forces could play an essential role, bringing young men of all ethnic entities together and helping to legitimise the central government in all communities.

The Pashtoons
The major ethnic group of Afghanistan is the Pashtoons. Today, their strength is estimated at between 35% and 45% of the population, depending on the source. The Pashtoons traditionally live in the mountainous areas of south-eastern Afghanistan, and in the Pakistani regions along the border (e.g. the NWFP). Some Pashtoon tribes are nomadic and moved to central and western Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, where, backed by the central government, they drove out the local Hazaras of the most fertile pastures. Others moved from their home valleys to Kabul and north Afghanistan during the reign of Emir Abdur Rahman. Today, they live in a belt that spans from Herat to Kandahar and to Kabul. Almost completely Sunni Muslims, the Pashtoons do not use Dari as a lingua franca (apart of the national elite), but speak Pashtu, an indo-Arian language. The Pashtoon society is highly tribal and complex. The identification source of the Pashtoon individual is multiple. First of all comes the family clan, then the tribe, a conglomerate of families (e.g. the Popolzai), which is followed by the tribal confederation (e.g. the Durrans and the Ghajis). These confederations count up to one or two million individuals. They are the top identification source of the Pashtoons within their ethnic group, outside of which they identify themselves as Pashtoons, defining every Sunni non-Pashtoon as a Tajik and often inferior. The daily life of the Pashtoons is regulated by the tribal code of the Pashtoonwali, a code of conduct regulating social behaviour and structure, as much as tribal jurisprudence. Its most important principles are honour (nang), vengeance (badal), independence and hospitality (melmastia). Their uses have often influenced and shaped Afghan society. Even the segregation of women, practiced for centuries and exacerbated by the Taliban, is based either on the Pashtoonwali than on the Koran. The Pashtoons, earlier sometimes referred to as Pathans, Pakhtoons or Afghans, identify themselves as the “true Afghans” and traditionally set up the national political elite of Afghanistan – Ahmad Shah Durrani of the Durrani tribal confederation having founded 1747 the Emirate of Afghanistan, as a counterweight to the Shi’a Kingdom of Persia. Since then, only three (short) phases of
Afghan history have seen a non-Passhtoon at the top of Afghan politics: 1826-1863, the often-
interrupted reign of Dost Mohammad, a Pashtoon whose father was a Qizilbash; 1929 Bacha-i
Saqqao, a Tajik adventurer; and between 1992 and 1996 the Tajik Burhanuddin Rabbani. The
leaders of the DRA, and those of the Taliban, were Pashtoons, as much as the current president
Hamid Karzai is one. Before the war, the Pashtoons lived from their crops and livestock as
peasants; agricultural resources were managed at village level by local notables called Malik.290

The Tajiks

The second major group are the Tajiks, who make up 25%-30% of the total population. The Tajiks
are almost all Sunni Muslim and speak Dari, a Persian dialect,291 which is a lingua franca in
Afghanistan.292 The Tajiks traditionally lived in the river plains of north Afghanistan and in the
rugged valleys of the northern Hindukush; outside of Afghanistan their homeland is the former
Soviet Republic of Tajikistan.293 Tajik society is not tribal; instead of tribalism the Tajiks identify
themselves by their geographical origin. They therefore tend to define themselves as Panjshiris,
Badakhshanis and so on, for example, in relation to the valley or province where they come
from.294 Speaking the national lingua franca, the Tajiks have, since the beginnings of the Afghan
state, made up the urban middle class and the administrative apparatus in Kabul. On the
countryside, the Tajiks are peasants, merchants and artisans.295

The Uzbeks

The major group of Turkic-speakers are the Uzbeks. The Uzbeks live in north-western Afghanistan
and in the former Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan. The majority of Uzbeks are Sunni Muslims;296
most of them came into Afghanistan in two waves, the first after the Russian conquest of the
Central Asian Emirates (e.g. Bukhara, Kokand), the second in the 1920’s, after the October
Revolution and the communist victory in the subsequent civil war.297 Neither tribal nor
geographically linked, the Uzbek are semi-nomadic herdsmen who identify themselves by their
ethnicity.298

The Hazaras

The major Shi’a community of Afghanistan is that of the Hazaras. The Hazaras live in the
provinces of central Afghanistan in the region called Hazarajat. The Hazara are sedentary
peasants and herdsmen. They identify themselves by their tribal origin like the Pashtoons, but, due
to their religious peculiarity, their ethno-religious identification is much more pronounced. 299 The Hazaras have long been discriminated against because of their membership in the Shi’a current of Islam, and often discrimination has turned into persecution, massacre and deportation. The peaks of this persecution were the conquest of the Hazarajat by Emir Abdur Rahman between 1888 and 1893 and the siege and bolt of the Hazarajat by the Taliban 1997. 300 The Hazaras are the sole major ethnic group living only within the borders of Afghanistan. They are of supposed Mongolic origins and believe to be descendant of the troops of Genghis Khan. 301

**The Turkmen**

The Turkmen are the second group of Turkic-speakers living in Afghanistan. 302 Like the Uzbek they are Sunni Muslims, and most of them came into Afghanistan with the Russian conquest of Central Asia. 303 The Turkmen live in north Afghanistan and in the former Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan. Semi-nomadic peasants and herdsmen, they are organised into tribes like the Pashtoons but not into tribal confederations. 304

**The Baluchis**

The Baluchis live scattered in the desert plains of southern Afghanistan. They are organised in clans around the oasis where they live from subsistence agriculture. The most Baluchis are Sunni Muslims, speakers of an indo-Arian language similar to Pashtu. The Baluchis live in equal parts in Afghanistan and in the neighbouring regions of Iran and Pakistan. 305

**The minor ethnic groups**

The Nuristanis live in the mountains north of Kabul; their ancestors were supposedly pagans descendent from the troops of Alexander the Great, who were converted to Sunni Islam in the 19th century. 306 The Brahis live together with the Baluchis in southern Afghanistan and speak an indo-Drawidian language related to Tamil; they are often sharecroppers of the Baluchis. 307 The Ismailis are Shi’a Dari-speakers from the northern Hindukush, who are sometimes referred to as Mountain-Tajiks. 308 The Kyrgyz and the Wakhan are Turkic-Mongolic minorities living in the extreme northeast of the country and the Wakhan corridor. The Aimaq and the Quizilbash are smaller minorities living in Afghanistan. The Aimaq are Sunni Muslim nomads living east of Herat, the Quizilbash are Shi’a Muslim and primarily urbanised; they are the sole Shi’a Muslims represented in the Afghan

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301 Musharraf, *The Afghan egalitarian*.
302 Ibid., 28-29.
304 Musharraf, *The Afghan egalitarian*.
306 Ibid., 35-36.
middle-class. The Sikhs, and some Hindus, are the sole religious minorities of the country. The first Jews came into Afghanistan with the Macedonian troops of Alexander the Great, and have therefore been present since historic times in Afghanistan.\(^{309}\) After the creation of Israel, they increasingly emigrated to the Holy Land, and with the outbreak of the war they nearly all left the country, like the other non-Muslims, because they feared the consequences of the religious radicalisation.\(^{310}\)

Map of the Afghan ethnic groups basing on a map by Conrad Schetter.\(^{311}\) Note: the white areas are not uninhabited, but inhabited by peoples not present in Afghanistan. The war and the subsequent refugee movements have mixed up the ethnic structure even more, so that this map may refer to an ante-bellum situation.

**The importance of Islam**

Islam has always been an important factor of social shaping in Afghanistan,\(^{312}\) even more important than ethnic origins.\(^{313}\) The clergy, as the sole literate social group in the rural areas,
played an influential role in the shaping of society.\textsuperscript{314} Until the 1960’s, the clergy was educated not only in Afghan and Pakistani Madrasas,\textsuperscript{315} but even at the Egyptian Al-Azhar University, where they became influenced by the local Muslim Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{316} As illustrated in the preceding paragraphs, most Afghans are Sunni Muslims, about 20% are Shi’a Muslims, 1% (or less) are members of other religions.\textsuperscript{317} Islam in Afghanistan has been very tolerant for centuries, shaped by the philosophy of the Sufi orders.\textsuperscript{318} Proof of this tolerance was the early common legend which said that Pashtoons were descendants of a lost tribe from Israel, the Bani Isra’il.\textsuperscript{319} Although modernisation attempts have encountered resistance primarily in the rural areas of the country, Islamism was born as an urban student’s movement, especially after the fall of the monarchy. It was not organised in political parties but in loose movements and think-tanks.\textsuperscript{320} With the Jihad against the Soviet Union, Islam became radicalised in Afghanistan. On the one hand, the resistance against the occupation was led by Islamic movements, on the other Islam was used and misused to motivate the fight against the invaders.\textsuperscript{321} A third factor of radicalisation were the foreign influences during the war: fighters from the rest of the Islamic world brought radical visions of Islam into the country; Pakistan and Saudi Arabia supported the most radical movements, as did Iran.\textsuperscript{322} The Taliban reached a new level of radicalism by applying the Koran literally and ending a centuries-old tradition of interpretation.\textsuperscript{323} But the radical Islam of Osama bin Laden had no support in the Afghan population.\textsuperscript{324} Today, the Taliban and the Hizb-e Islami-e Afghanistan of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar have discredited themselves with their unprecedented brutality,\textsuperscript{325} but a possible end of Islamism does not mean a secularisation of the society.\textsuperscript{326} The central government in Kabul will nonetheless have to take Islam into consideration if it wants to stay in charge, and the armed forces, as part of the government, should analyse carefully how their daily organisation should respect Islamic traditions. The priority of Islam over every state law and action, however, is today already sanctioned by the new Afghan constitution.\textsuperscript{327}

**Poor national identity**

Although never contested,\textsuperscript{328} the weak central Afghan state, which was not born out of a national concept,\textsuperscript{329} has never achieved an Afghan national identity.\textsuperscript{330} The reasons for this are principally

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{314} Emadi, Repression, resistance, and women in Afghanistan, 6-7.
\bibitem{316} Rasuly, "Die politischen Eliten Afghanistans," 164.
\bibitem{318} Rashid, Taliban, The story of the Afghan warlords, 82-83.
\bibitem{319} Vogelsang, The Afghans, 21.
\bibitem{320} Schetter, Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afghanistan, 324.
\bibitem{321} Rashid, Taliban, The story of the Afghan warlords, 82-83.
\bibitem{322} Nojumi, The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan; mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region, 184-187.
\bibitem{323} Gregory, The colonial present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq, 40.
\bibitem{324} Rashid, Taliban, The story of the Afghan warlords, 132.
\bibitem{326} Ibid., 55.
\end{thebibliography}
Modelling a new Afghan National Army. Feasibility of the Swiss Army Model

twofold: the identification of individuals refers to the concept of Qawn, and the fact that the Afghan monarchy never cared about the representation of the various ethnic groups, therefore non-Pashtoons viewed it as an instrument of Pashtoon dominance.

The concept of the Qawn, which has been largely introduced by Olivier Roy, refers to a “group of solidarity”. The Qawn is not a precise entity. The Qawn is the entity the Afghans use to return to when they are in need and from which they expect support. The Qawn can be their own extended family clan, the tribe, the village or valley of origin – or in the cities even a borough or a professional association (e.g. barbers, shoemakers, etc.).

On the other hand, the Pashtoon monarchy has never introduced measures necessary to integrate the other ethnic groups into state responsibility. On the contrary, discrimination has often been the rule, especially in case of the Hazaras, and the continuous burden of common Afghan history with Pashtoon legends did not help making non-Pashtoons feel like Afghans. So although the state became accepted, it was viewed as just an external element that collects taxes and conscripts recruits for the army, and that should only be tolerated as long as it supports the individual needs of the Qawn without interfering too much.

The consequences of 30 years of war

During the nearly 30 years of war since the Soviet invasion, the demographic and social structures of Afghanistan have been upset and destroyed. The death toll amounts to one to two million, the injured are estimated at up to three million. Clans and tribes have been torn into pieces, 5 million Afghans have fled the country, of which only a minor part has returned. The number of internally displaced is unknown, but estimated at from one million to as high as the number of refugees.

Before the war, the state used the social structures of the Qawn and the Malik to control and influence the various communities, to collect taxes and to impose conscription. Today the lack of these structures makes such state tasks very difficult, and the ANA has serious trouble finding enough recruits. Should Afghanistan in future have a conscripted army like the Swiss Army Model, this problem will be worth more than light consideration.

329 Hussain, *Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic militancy in Afghanistan*, 239.
337 Ibid., 85-87.
339 Ibid., 25.
In addition, war has reinforced the ethnic conscience of the Afghans and regional autonomy, initiating a dangerous process that has created small ethnic pockets of power and that could lead to growing division if not stopped with true and egalitarian political participation.

2. State organisation

The central state in Afghanistan has never been a strong player. Its presence throughout the country was always weak, mostly imperceptible. But this weak state has always been accepted by the locals as the ideal form of government, which would (and should) provide help, support and protection when needed but interfere as little as possible with the local realities when not, letting the people live and do their business alone. In fact, it was the precursor of modern neo-liberal ideology, and until 1973 the monarchy did enjoy increasing legitimacy. Today, the new Afghan government is said to have no power outside of Kabul, and some member of the western media call president Karzai “the major of Kabul”, when in fact he seems to be continuing this tradition of light footprint governance. In any case, the provinces accept the central government and no opposition arises when president Karzai announces a new turn-over of the local governors, which should prevent them from establishing local networks of interest. The structures the state previously used to control and manage local societies developed out of century-long traditions and uses, and were based on the local social networks of the Qawns and the leadership of the Maliks. These weak but tested structures were greatly susceptible to corruption and favouritism, but they were also concerned with maintaining a minimum of equilibrium and stability, to avoid confrontation due to unilateral support. Another principle well applied by centuries of Afghan rulers was the ancient and efficient principle of divide et impera. The rise of the PDPA endangered these structures; the subsequent war, and the emigrational movements caused by it nearly completely destroyed them. Today, Afghanistan is an Islamic state subdivided into 34 provinces with a presidential, republican governmental system. Before that it was a monarchy for centuries, after which it became a republic and later it came under the thumb of the USSR. After the Mujahiddin victory, it became an Islamic state with unclear structures, and after the Taliban conquests an Islamic emirate and theocracy. In any case Afghanistan has always

341 Coll, Ghost wars, 569.
343 Schetter, Etnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afghanistan, 476.
347 Magnus, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid, 161.
349 Stahel et al., “Nation building Afghanistan,” 3.
354 Bakarat, “Setting the scene for Afghanistan’s reconstruction,” 803.
355 Ibid., 805.
suffered under despots and absolutist rulers. From its history as a buffer state between two rival empires, Afghanistan has developed, since it regained full independence, a tradition of staunch neutrality, which both superpowers would have preferred to see abandoned in favour of a clear alliance with them.

The ever-changing history of Afghan governments

In 1747, the Pashtoon Emir Ahmad Shah Durrani unified under his rule a vast empire reaching from Dehli in India to eastern Persia, from Karachi on the shores of the Arabian Sea to central Asia. In doing so, he founded the Durrani dynasty on one hand, and what later became Afghanistan on the other. Although multi-ethnic, the country was dominated by Pashtoon elites, which assigned the Persian dialect Dari as the country’s lingua franca, in order to control the various, mostly Persian-speaking dominated people. Pressure and conquests from the north by Russia, from the west by Persia and especially from the southeast by Great Britain reduced the country’s surface to what is now known as Afghanistan. Afghanistan remained a monarchy even as a British protectorate and the rule of the Durranis continued after 1919, when full independence was regained. In 1973, as King Zahir Shah was on a diplomatic journey through Europe, his cousin and former prime minister Muhammad Daud Khan seized power and proclaimed the Republic of Afghanistan. After several US refusals to increase economic support, Daud tied Afghanistan closer to the more “generous” Soviet Union. The difficult economic situation let tensions in the country grow, fomented by those young officers “educated” in the Soviet Union in military support programmes. Daud’s repressive rule did not help to quieten the situation. In 1978, the communist PDPA seized power, killed Daud and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Its rulers followed one after another, seizing power with violent means, trying to outdo each other in brutality and repression. From this time on at the latest, governance in Afghanistan no longer meant serving country and people, but increasing absolute power at any cost. The unsustainable political situation and the increasing armed resistance led the Soviet Union to the invasion of 1979. After the Soviets were defeated 1989 and their puppet Nadjibullah overthrown in 1992, the various Mujahiddin factions tried to install an Islamic state, without being able to agree on how to share the power. From this chaos, the Taliban emerged and founded an Islamic emirate with a theocratic rule system and with a lack of any necessary state apparatus. They were defeated in 2001 by the Northern Alliance and the US-led coalition.

354 Nahid Khaki, Demokratieerziehung für Afghanistan, 80.
355 Magnus, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid, 62.
356 Ibid., 25-32.
357 Nahid Khaki, Demokratieerziehung für Afghanistan, 67.
358 Magnus, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid, 32-40.
359 Nahid Khaki, Demokratieerziehung für Afghanistan, 76-78.
360 Ibid., 78.
363 Federal Research Division, Afghanistan, a country study, XVII-XVIII.
365 Federal Research Division, Afghanistan, a country study, XIX-XXI.
The weak but accepted state apparatus, the Qawn and the Maliks
Since the rise of the Durrani dynasty in 1747, the control of the vast and heterogeneous empire, which lacked real infrastructure, was very weak and based on the loyalty of the subdued regions. To achieve some kind of control, in time the central government created an efficient system of interdependence between itself and the local communities. The government collected taxes and it imposed conscription. In exchange, it offered protection from external threats, gave support or mediation in case of struggle with other tribes or communities, and it expected the corresponding loyalty. Contact with the individual Qawns of the country was maintained through local authorities that were part of the corresponding Qawn. The most representative system was that of the Maliks, the village notables of the Pashtoon tribal system, whose system was adopted even by (most) other groups in order to achieve similar governmental support. The Malik, for example, granted sufficient conscripts for the armed forces, by deciding who in the village or tribe would have to do military service. He also distributed the received resources (e.g. for crops irrigation) to various members of the Qawn in a way that the Qawn expected to be correct. In this way, the state gained local loyalty in the interests of both the government and the locals without the necessity of a huge control and administration apparatus. The system functions as long as the social authority of the Malik is not questioned and everybody respects his decisions. In Afghanistan, the Malik legitimised his authority through decisions of the local Shura, a consensus assembly of the elders of the Qawn (which usually included the Malik, the local Mullah, the family chiefs and the so-called “white beards”, wise elders of the community). The decisions of the Shura were transmitted to the government and applied by the Malik. Every member of the Qawn respected them, otherwise the consequence would have been social exclusion – for every Afghan an unthinkable punishment and his sure ruin. The Afghan will always be loyal to his Qawn, but the things are different when relations are loose and temporary, based on need and opportunity. These relations, called Gund, are always unstable and change constantly because of the constant insecurity.

The PDPA’s revolution from above, the subsequent war and the destruction of the Afghan state
As the PDPA seized power, the party attempted to push through comprehensive modernisation throughout the country, which did not spare the centuries-old links between state and Qawn. This led to increased resistance from the population, which saw its traditional lifestyle, traditions and laws endangered. To break down resistance, the PDPA let hundreds of Mullahs and Maliks be murdered; some were replaced with elements pliant to the party doctrine, the majority were not. This was a planned step to prepare the path for the dramatic changes the party had intended to

363 Roberts, The origins of conflict in Afghanistan, 211.
365 Ibid., 25.
366 Ibid., 24.
368 Ibid., 901.
By the time the war came, many members of this traditional hierarchy had been killed or had to flee the country, and the social networks had been ripped apart because their members fled and were spread around the world. In this way, the weak but functioning Afghan state was destroyed and since then, every attempt to restore it has failed, due to the lack of necessary socio-political base. The restoration of such a base is one of the challenges Kabul will have to face to restore legitimate state power. Another political class has been born from this destruction: that of warlords and commanders. Commanders are the military leaders of the Qawn, while the warlords have surmounted this level and command various Qawns. The power of the warlords is a serious threat to the state, but the warlords themselves are dependent on their foreign patrons. In times of conflict, the warlord provides protection and international aid to the people of his territory, but in times of peace he becomes a robber and sponger that hinders development, so that the warlords’ legitimacy is today only little more than a vanishing relic of the Jihad.

The current governmental structure of Afghanistan

Today, Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic, with the Islamic jurisprudence of the Shariah in force throughout the country, Islam is the state religion and no law or political action of the government is allowed to contradict Islam. Politically, Afghanistan is a presidential republic with a bicameral parliament, comprised of the Wolesi Jirga or House of the People, with 249 members elected for a 5-year term, and the Meshrano Jirga or House of the Elders, whose 102 members are elected from the provincial councils for a 4-year term, from the district councils for a 3-year term, or appointed by the president for a 5-year term. Each of these categories constitutes one third of the members of the Meshrano Jirga. Half of those appointed by the president must be women. A government of 25 ministers, headed by the president, represents the national executive. Election suffrage is universal from the age of 18. The new constitution of Afghanistan, ratified on 16 January 2004, does not provide initiative or referendum rights for the population, only for the president. This is regrettable, because exactly such participation could consolidate state legitimacy and increase the social link to the population. This democratic gap could be reminiscent of the fear the early elites had of popular emancipation. Elections, although

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370 Berger et al., *Afghanistan – ein Land am Scheideweg*, 89.
372 Ibid., 34.
374 Ibid., 39.
376 Ibid., art. 2.
377 Ibid., art. 3.
378 Ibid., art. 60, 61, 64, 71.
379 Ibid., art. 82.
380 Ibid., art. 83.
381 Ibid., art. 84.
382 Ibid., art. 61, 64, 71.
383 Ibid., art. 33.
384 Ibid., art. 65.
385 Nahid Khaki, *Demokratieerziehung für Afghanistan*, 81.
welcomed by most Afghans, are not the way to chose political elites, but the way to confirm them. The choice is made before, in the consensual local *Shuras*.\(^{386}\) Democracy, to which the Afghans do aspire, is viewed as a way to lobby for the interests of the *Qawn*.\(^{387}\) At the national level, the judicial branch is represented by the nine-member *Sterá Mahkama*, the Afghan supreme court,\(^{388}\) whose members are appointed by the president for a 10-year term with the approval of the *Wolesí Jirga*.\(^{389}\)

3. **Public infrastructure**

Afghanistan’s infrastructure has never have been efficient, or capable of responding to the needs of the country. Already before the war, it was poor and insufficient. Several regions, remote from the principal axes of communication, were in the 1970’s little more developed than during the Middle Ages.\(^{390}\) The Afghan governments have profited from their position as a courted neutral state and let the superpowers (and their allies) finance various development projects such as roads, bridges, irrigation systems, power plants, schools, hospitals, industries and facilities to exploit local natural resources.\(^{391}\) Generally, the western projects were badly coordinated and slowed by bureaucracy; those sponsored by the USSR were much more efficient and their actualisation much more rapid: these were the first steps in preparation for the imminent invasion.\(^{392}\)

After 30 years of war, all these facilities have been seriously damaged or destroyed, as private buildings throughout the country have been. Today, the public infrastructure in Afghanistan is among the poorest in the world. Reconstruction is proceeding slowly, but a start has been made; mostly based on private initiative. Of the transportation system, little has been repaired; only a few roads are paved,\(^{393}\) and a large part of the country can only be reached on foot or horseback. 80% of the Afghan population lives without drinking water, electric power or gas.\(^{394}\) Qualified personnel are extremely rare\(^{395}\) and locals often do not posses the resources or skills necessary for reconstruction. An entire generation is threatened by illiteracy because the *Taliban* destroyed the school system by prohibiting the female teachers to work.\(^{396}\) Development indexes are catastrophic.\(^{397}\)

\(^{389}\) Ibid., art. 117.
\(^{391}\) Bakarat, “Setting the scene for Afghanistan’s reconstruction,” 807.
\(^{393}\) Ibid., 170-172.
\(^{394}\) Vogelsang, *The Afghans*, 292.
\(^{395}\) Stahel et al., “Nation building Afghanistan,” 15.
\(^{396}\) Stahel et al., “Mögliche Ansätze für die Evaluation von ACSF,” 37.
\(^{397}\) Dannecker, *The CIA World Factbook 2005*. 48

In future, even the ANA could be affected in its operation and deployment capability by the lack of infrastructure, so that rapid reconstruction is in the interest of the army too, not only to avoid possible social unrest and discontent.

4. Economic structure

Like the public infrastructure, the Afghan economy was fully underdeveloped until the middle of the 20th century and had a feudal organisation and was nearly totally isolated from the world markets. The local economy consisted of subsistence agriculture, a small artisan industry to satisfy the primary needs of the locals, some carpet manufactures, with the trade of furs (bears, wildcats, snow leopards) and coats (Kashmir goats and Karakul sheep) as the two sole export oriented branches of economy, and the smuggling of all imaginable goods across the borders of Iran and Pakistan as the sole import oriented one. Since the modernisation attempts of the 1950’s, a small number of industrial facilities were created. Afghanistan tried hard to link its economy with both the West and the communist world, but the first goal was not achieved for two reasons: western products were too expensive for Afghans and the cheaper Soviet products, even if qualitatively inferior, were far more than good enough for the underdeveloped country. On the other hand, unlike the Soviet Union, the West rejected Afghan products because of their “poor” quality standards (obviously a good excuse to justify protectionism, especially in the agricultural branch). So a small industry of food manufactures were created, but Afghan economy became more and more dependent on the Soviet Union.

With the turmoil of the late 1970’s and the following war, everything was destroyed and Afghan economy was thrown back into the Stone Age. Today, the Afghan economy is slowly reviving, but the only really functioning branch is the production and trafficking of opium and derivate drugs. Nearly one third of the Afghan GDP is related to drug activities, a GDP which amounts to only 21.5 billions US$ in total. The Afghan economy today is unable to satisfy even the primary needs of the population. On one hand, the lack of even minimal infrastructure hinders economic development and the trade of produced goods, while on the other, valuable fertile crops are misused for the illicit production of drugs. Afghanistan is today the world’s major producer of opium and heroin.

80% of the Afghan population is employed in the primary sector, most of them in archaic agriculture, which produces, in addition to opium, fruits, vegetables, nuts, wheat, millet, maize, rice and barley. Livestock breeding is almost nomadic and the bred stocks consist of sheep, goats, camels, donkeys, some cows and horses. Few people work in mines and in the exploitation of

401 Federal Research Division, Afghanistan, a country study, XXIV-XXV.
403 Stahel et al., “Nation building Afghanistan,” 12.
natural resources because the exploitation infrastructure is nearly inexistent. Not so are the natural resources themselves: the Afghan soil holds oil and gas, as well as industrial minerals such as uranium, coal, copper, iron-ore, lead and zinc, and precious and semi-precious gems and stones, such as aquamarines and lapis lazuli. 10% of the population work in the few industries of the secondary sector and 10% in the tertiary sector, mostly in the public administration. Despite its natural beauties and millenary cultural heritage, tourism is inexistent after the long war, and the lack of infrastructure will not help change things.405
Finally, the legal part of the Afghan economy is barely linked with international trade markets, as no legal export industry exists and the local economy does not have the means to import needed goods. The principal (and nearly unique) exports of Afghanistan are products which derive from opium poppy cultivation, and the principal way of importing goods into Afghanistan is today once again smuggling, primarily from Pakistan and Iran.406
With such a desolate economic situation, even the armed forces must deal with limited budgets, despite the high need for security – the synergies of the Swiss Army Model are ideal for providing the necessary manpower by keeping costs relatively low.

405 Stahel et al., “Nation building Afghanistan,” 16-17.
X SUMMARY: SOCIAL COMPATIBILITY

After having analysed the different factors comprising the social realities of both Afghanistan and Switzerland, the second thesis of this paper is answered as follows:

The Swiss Army Model suits the characteristics of Afghan society.

This thesis can be only partly confirmed. On one hand, the Afghan and Swiss societies have several common points: multi-ethnicity, regionalism, neutrality and independence. On the other, the differences cannot be ignored: the lack of national identification, the discrimination of ethnic minorities, the religious influence.

The Swiss Army Model is the ideal model to integrate the various communities and to grant representation of all regions, communities and social classes in the armed forces. The common duty of members of the various ethnic entities would help to build up the confidence necessary to stabilise the country. The importance of neutrality and independence in the Afghan conscience would be an important factor to guarantee motivated troops in case of military threat.

But the first necessity of the Swiss Army Model is, despite conscription, the readiness of the people to participate and assume responsibility for the _Res Publica_, not only once in life, but every year again and again, for a long period of life. Without this necessary readiness to participate by a large majority of the population, even conscription would collapse. The lack of national identification makes a similar readiness impossible, because without national identification no responsibility for the nation can be assumed. On the other hand, the equal rights of those who participate in national defence is a prerogative to cohesion within the armed forces and the country itself. The discrimination of minorities and the ethnic stratification of society are intolerable in such a model.

The destruction of the social structures the Afghan state used to set through conscription before the war (_Qawns_ and _Maliks_) does not make recruiting the future soldiers of the ANA easier, and the problem will not be resolved by universal conscription.

Last but not least, the development gap between Afghanistan and Switzerland is irrelevant for the Swiss Army Model. On one hand, Switzerland was, during the mid-19th century, not as highly developed as today, but it was able to build up a national army. On the other hand, the development situation in Afghanistan calls for an army like the Swiss Army Model, which grants enough manpower for military defence without drying out the human resources necessary to rebuild the nation.

In fact, Afghanistan will be able to build up a national army similar to the Swiss Army Model only once a minimal common national conscience has been established, the various communities are ready to collaborate in the creation of a national army as part of a bottom-up process as the Swiss cantons did (not imposed by the central government like, for example, in Yugoslavia), and all communities are integrated into the state structure as equal elements.
XI CONCLUSION

After having analysed the illustrated facts, the principal questions asked in the beginning of this paper, “Is the Swiss Army Model a valuable alternative for modelling the new Afghan National Army? Is the Swiss Army Model able to face the various threats Afghanistan faces? Is it compatible with the realities of Afghan society?” can be answered as follows:

No, it is not. It is in its current form neither a valuable alternative, nor able to face the various threats Afghanistan faces nor compatible with Afghan social reality.

As already illustrated in Chapter VII, the Swiss Army Model would be very able to deal with conventional military threats like those which Afghanistan faces even today, by providing enough motivated manpower without depleting society’s precious labour force, but it is not suitable against the growing terrorist threat and the criminal internal security threats. These threats need to be faced with professional forces who are able to act in both the civilian and the military context like the “carabinieri” or the “gendarmerie”. The internal social threats could probably be faced with more comfort by the Swiss Army Model because of its higher popular legitimacy.

The conventional military threat, represented in Afghanistan by the interests of aggressive neighbours, has today not be banished, but rather merely been suspended by the almighty presence of the US armed forces in the region. But what will happen after a US withdrawal? In face of the low-tech mass armies of the Afghan neighbourhoods, such a threat must be countered with high-level resources and strength. Afghanistan is currently not able to maintain such an army at a professional level. In addition, a national army which integrates all ethnic elements in an equal and fair way makes it much more difficult for the enemy to divide the country along ethnic lines and achieve easy victory. In an army like the Swiss Army Model, the moral motivation of the citizens defending their homeland is compensation for any minor technical skills and resources against a professional army.

The terrorist and criminal threats need to be faced with highly professional measures that are ready to react with most effective military or civilian resources immediately and throughout the whole country. This threat cannot be faced with an army of unprepared soldiers who first need to be mobilised and made fit for action, because this threat strikes without notice in individual actions, followed by apparent disappearance.

Internal social unrest is, technically speaking, an internal police problem. But the Afghan situation, with thousands of firearms scattered throughout the country, calls for stronger means. On the one hand, militia soldiers do not have the social skills necessary to deal with social unrest, which could, in case of emergency, lead to a reaction similar to that during the universal strike in Switzerland in 1919, or at the worst, that at Tiananmen Square in 1989. On the other hand, the close social link of the Swiss Army Model could help to prevent the escalation of similar events. The population might have more inhibition with regard to the use of armed violence against its own soldiers and the
troops might prefer other, non-violent solutions over opening fire on their own fellow citizens, to whom they might be related in civilian life.

Secondly, as explained in Chapter X, the Swiss Army Model could be an important factor for the national integration of Afghan society, but the lack of national identification and conscience in the current social reality, paired with the lack of necessary social structures to impose conscription and the centuries-old discrimination of religious and ethnic minorities make putting together an efficient army comprised of conscripts unrealistic.

A common army experience could help integrate the various ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The people could achieve conscience and responsibility for the cause of the Res Publica, prejudices against other ethnic groups could be slowly overcome. But this conscience cannot be imposed by the government, it must rise out of the population and the various communities. Only once voluntarism is achieved, will the armed forces be able to act as a national adhesive.

The Swiss Army Model needs an efficient structure which grants the enlistment of the conscripts, for which the Afghan state used local social and decision-making structures before the war. The government transmitted to the Maliks the amount of recruits necessary from each Qawn, and within the local Shura the Malik decided who would be sent to the army. Today, this archaic but efficient structure lies destroyed by war and still needs to be replaced.

Finally, a condition for the legitimacy and acceptance of the central state and of the armed forces is the equality of all citizens of the country. The current Afghan constitution grants it, but the reality after centuries of persecutions against the Shi’a minorities, especially the Hazaras, is quite different. Only after a longer period of effective equal rights, will the confidence of these minorities be gained and will they be able to be integrated into the state apparatus.

In conclusion, the feasibility of the Swiss Army Model in Afghanistan could be described with the following two theses:

1. The Swiss Army Model will be able to face Afghan threats only if complemented with a professional unit able to act in both the military and the civilian context.
2. The Swiss Army Model will suit Afghan society once a sound minimum of national identification and conscience is achieved, the necessary social structures are rebuilt and ethnic discrimination has permanently disappeared.
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TABLE OF SOURCES


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