Doctoral Thesis

Newcomer Behaviour in the World Trade Organization - Activity, Cooperation & Strategies in the Doha Round Negotiations

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Newcomer Behaviour in the World Trade Organization

- Activity, Cooperation & Strategies in the Doha Round Negotiations -

A thesis submitted to attain the degree of

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(Dr. sc. ETH Zurich)

presented by

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### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific WTO members with preferences in the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDA</td>
<td>Doha Development Agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERGM</td>
<td>Exponential random graph model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercosur</td>
<td>Common Market of the Southern Cone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMA</td>
<td>Non-Agricultural Market Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMs</td>
<td>Recently Acceded Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US(A)</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Summary

Do newcomers behave differently? To ask more precisely, do new members of international organisations show different patterns of behaviour than their long-time counterparts due to the newcomers’ lack of experience in and expertise with an organisation? In order to answer this question, the dissertation at hand analyses member behaviour in the World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular, the three studies focus on WTO members’ level of activity, their degree of cooperation among each other as well as their use of certain strategies and tactics in the multilateral trade negotiations of the so-called Doha Round. These multilateral talks are supposed to produce an agreement that further liberalises world trade. The specific arrangements of this final agreement will concern the entire WTO membership. Therefore, the eventual outcome of the Doha Round negotiations is thought to be crucial to all WTO members. Thus, all WTO members are expected to try their best in influencing the details of this outcome according to their interests. Considering WTO members as rational actors, they are assumed to choose particular negotiation behaviour appropriate to maximise their individual benefits from the final agreement of the Doha Round.

One kind of such negotiation behaviour is active participation in the groups, councils and committees that deal with the multitude of issues that are debated, from Agriculture over Services to Trade Facilitation. WTO members may submit different sorts of negotiation documents to these assemblies and/or make statements during their official meetings. Such individual negotiation activity shown by WTO members is analysed in Chapter 2.

A second kind of negotiation behaviour – for many WTO members a complement to, for many others a substitute for their individual negotiation activity – is cooperation. Building coalitions with other members is essential in the multilateral negotiations of the Doha Round since decisions in the WTO require consensus. Hence, contrary to other international organisations, where decision making is based on (some specific) majority rule, every WTO member has de facto veto power. Accordingly, bringing merely a certain portion of the membership behind one’s position is not enough; every WTO member needs to consent to the final agreement. This requirement makes WTO members’ cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations, studied in Chapter 3, particular.

Finally, a third kind of negotiation behaviour is related to WTO members’ negotiation activity as well. In order to influence the final agreement in their favour and reach maximum benefits, WTO members may decide to use specific negotiation tactics in the Doha Round. Examples of such tactics include overtly criticising other members’ positions or proposing an exchange of concessions for mutual benefit. These tactics are classified as hard and soft; in their entirety, they form WTO members’ negotiation strategies. Based on existing classifications in the respective research literature, I develop an own concept of hard and soft – and mixed – negotiation strategies. I make
use of this concept to investigate WTO members’ application of negotiation strategies and tactics in the Doha Round in Chapter 4.

Examining these three kinds of WTO members’ negotiation behaviour in the Doha Round required extensive data collection. Minutes of official meetings and negotiation documents submitted by WTO members were screened and coded; this partly involved computer-assisted text analysis. The exploitation of these two kinds of WTO documentation as sources of quantitative information led to the accumulation of original data on WTO members’ negotiation activity and cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round. Furthermore, I conducted interviews with WTO diplomats which primarily constitute the data basis for studying WTO members’ choice of negotiation strategies and tactics.

The major findings generally confirm the theoretical expectations. Most important, the existence of a newcomer effect receives support from both the results of diverse regression analyses and comprehensive interview evidence. Such evaluation of empirical data allows the conclusion that new WTO members behave systematically differently than their long-time counterparts in the Doha Round negotiations. This can probably be explained by the particular situation newcomers face in an unfamiliar environment that comes with a shortage of experience and expertise compared to long-standing members. Newcomers, for instance, tend to make fewer statements than long-time members during the official meetings of the groups, councils and committees in which the different Doha Round issues are negotiated. The findings regarding WTO members’ choice of negotiation strategies and tactics go in the same direction. They suggest that long-standing members are more likely to use soft tactics while newcomers appear rather inactive in the multilateral talks. Finally, newcomers tend to cooperate with other newcomers; in general, WTO members are inclined to build coalitions with their peers of similar membership experience.
Zusammenfassung


Eine dritte mögliche Verhaltensweise ist schliesslich ebenfalls mit der individuellen Verhandlungsaktivität von WTO-Mitgliedern verknüpft. Um das angestrebte Abkommen zu ihren Gunsten zu beeinflussen und maximalen Nutzen zu erreichen, entscheiden sich WTO-Mitglieder


The preceding decades have witnessed a growth in international organisations. They have grown in number, size and importance. Figure 1.1 illustrates how some of the most important international organisations have grown in membership within the last three decades: the Council of Europe, the European Union (EU), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, more commonly referred to as the World Bank), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Governments all over the world have decided to join international organisations in order to benefit from cooperation with other states. Over the course of this development, international organisations have also been established as political actors in their own right. Political scientists have analysed why states cooperate, why international organisations are founded and why states join (e.g. Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Simmons & Martin, 2001; Boehmer et al., 2004; Barrett, 2007). A considerable part of the literature on international organisations has concentrated on the question which effects they have on their members (e.g. Russett et al., 1998a; Boehmer et al., 2004; Ahne & Brunsson, 2012). Besides, there is also more knowledge on the design and form of international organisations by now (e.g. Abbott et al., 2000; Koremenos et al., 2001b, 2001a; Rosendorff & Milner, 2001).

Thus, relatively profound research has been conducted on the creation and the role of international organisations. However, there is still a lack of knowledge on the kinds of behaviour that member states, in particular newly acceded ones, choose in order to achieve their goals after they have joined international organisations. After newcomers have been admitted to an international organisation, they may opt for certain behaviour within this organisation; they can behave more or...
less constructively, more or less cooperatively, more or less conflict-free. An exception to this lack of knowledge mentioned is the European Union that has been studied quite extensively.

Figure 1.1: Growth in membership in some of the most important international organisations

From the other perspective, so far, there has been some research on the question how international organisations react to the influx of new member states. In particular for the case of the European Union, scholars analysed which effect Eastern enlargement had on the functioning of this organisation. Curiously, not a lot seems to have changed in the EU (for an overview of this literature see Bailer et al., 2009) since this organisation was obviously well prepared for the huge influx of states. Furthermore, those states which joined the EU mostly adapted very well to the new environment and did not show conflictual behaviour. In contrast to the EU, there is a lack of such studies on member behaviour in other international organisations, e.g. in the World Trade Organization’s current round of multilateral negotiations. Hence, this dissertation contributes to the attempt of filling this gap by investigating why members of the World Trade Organization, inter alia newcomers, vary in their negotiation behaviour.
Before examining the specific questions related to the negotiation behaviour of WTO members in the current Doha Round, however, this chapter presents in a first step the results of an exploratory analysis of newcomer behaviour in three international organisations: the World Trade Organization (WTO), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Council of Europe. As the anecdotal evidence of this exploratory analysis shows, behaviour varies among newly acceded member states. Some newcomers decide to exploit international organisations directly to their advantage disregarding commonly accepted rules of behaviour. For instance, Russia did not seem to comply very much with the human rights standards of the Council of Europe as a new member of this organisation. Other states, in contrast, choose to integrate smoothly into the new environment and comply well with the – mostly unwritten – rules of the international organisation, e.g. Eastern European member states in NATO. It is not yet clear why this is the case. Is it a simple matter of size and economic power as realist explanations of international relations would suggest – and the rather obstructionist behaviour of Russia in the Council of Europe, e.g., would empirically confirm? Yet, there is also variance in behaviour among smaller newcomers: Compare, e.g., Bulgaria, a very compliant new NATO member, to the not so compliant behaviour of Azerbaijan in the Council of Europe. Is it a function of the utility which the new member states derive from membership in the organisation in the sense that the more they benefit from the membership, the more cooperatively they behave? However, all member states benefit from membership, otherwise they would not have joined (Sandler & Tschirhart, 1980). Then the question arises whether such variance in membership benefits (which are difficult to measure) is indeed sufficiently large to explain the variance in newcomer behaviour.

In addition to these characteristics and calculations of new member states, changes in the organisational conditions which newcomers’ accessions may provoke need to be considered as further explanatory factors. First, the membership impact of the new member state in the international organisation. This refers to the power shift which the new state causes in the organisation (e.g. by changing voting majorities to a larger or lesser extent or by altering the actual balance of power). Second, the previous relationship between a newcomer and an international organisation may be relevant. From the compliance literature (e.g. Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Downs et al., 1996; Simmons, 1998; Checkel, 2001), the idea could be derived that more elaborate and careful accession negotiations help to smoothen the role a newcomer plays in the international organisation after its entry – or the opposite, when “disgruntled newcomers” consider their accession deals “unfair impositions” they try to renegotiate once acceded (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 684). Finally, it might well be crucial to look at the domestic interest of a newcomer – as defined by the role of interest groups at the domestic level.
1 Introduction: Newcomers in International Organisations

1.1 Newcomer behaviour in international organisations: An exploratory study

The early international relations literature influenced by the realist school of thought has been slow to accept the increasing role of international organisations. Nevertheless, it has come to admit that the power of international organisations has been increasing despite the dominant role of nation states (Krasner, 1983; Martin & Simmons, 1998). Within this area, scholars believe that nations delegated power to international organisations in order to solve coordination problems that they could not hope to solve by themselves (Koremenos et al., 2001a). International organisations are recognized as a means to overcome market failures, collective action dilemmas and problems associated with interdependent social choice (Keohane, 1984; Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). In this sense, both neorealist and neoliberal approaches emphasize the notion that international organisations can help states to further their interests. In contrast, realists underestimated the utility which states derive from international organisations (Abbott & Snidal, 1998). They highlight the idea that national governments hope to reduce criticism and opposition from the national constituents since the common action of members within international organisations makes it impossible for voters to compare alternative policies. In this way, international organisations help to blur the division of responsibilities between the national and international level (Vauber, 1994; Frey, 1997). Similar thoughts have been put forth by the intergovernmental research thread of the EU integration literature (Moravcsik, 1993). In the liberal intergovernmentalist view, international organisations in general, e.g. the EU, and their structural entities in particular, such as the European Commission, serve as useful tools to increase efficiency and provide information. The European Commission, for instance, is a practical arena for the member states to realise their policies and reduce their transaction costs (Doleys, 2000). Thus, international organisations are considered to be marginal policy intermediaries – actors that lower the costs of implementing, monitoring and enforcing intergovernmental decisions (Pollack, 1997; Doleys, 2000), especially in cases where member states share goals but are not able to foresee all the future contingencies involved in the realisation of these goals (Moravcsik, 1993).

One important requirement of international organisations is to ensure compliance with their rules. Noncompliance with the rules can result from ambiguity in agreement, changing circumstances but also a lack of willingness to comply (Abbott & Snidal, 1998). Generally, member states’ compliance with the rules of international organisations is quite high; also, states only enter organisations from which they expect to benefit or where they can negotiate beneficial conditions beforehand (Downs et al., 1998). However, not only the extent to which new member states comply with the treaty obligations is interesting and scientifically relevant but also how they use all possibilities of action in the international organisations (e.g. voting, negotiation behaviour, statements in the plenary etc.). A certain strand of the international organisations literature has dealt


1 Introduction: Newcomers in International Organisations

with the effect which international organisations have on their member states; in particular, socialization processes are of interest (Checkel, 2001; Johnston, 2001a). However, as socialization research in legislative studies has shown, finding true socialization processes leading actors to change and behave differently is rare to impossible (Scully, 2005). In contrast to several of these approaches, some specific kind of behaviour is considered here a more rational choice of a member.

Still, sociological group theories and sociological institutionalism, but also organisation theory and social psychology provide possible explanations for member behaviour in international organisations as well. Taking into consideration that new members in international organisations ultimately mean new delegations of diplomatic staff in an unfamiliar environment, it is not far-fetched to consult theories and findings from the sociology and social psychology literature referring to individual conduct when thinking about newcomer behaviour in international organisations. Based on such theories and findings, the following paragraphs present two possible scenarios, distinguishing in a simplified way between adaptive and disruptive newcomer behaviour in international organisations.

1.1.1 Adaptation

Integrating newcomers into groups is difficult. A number of studies provide evidence of this claim. Following Simmel’s (1950) seminal work (on) “The Stranger”, various sociologists have focused on the positive as well as the negative aspects of being new in a group. As newcomers in a group are not familiar with the basic knowledge and assumptions of this group, it has been reasoned that they are more objective, on the one hand, but considered as potentially disloyal, on the other (e.g. Schütz, 1944). According to Park (1928), this different perception on the new member who is not (yet) assimilated into the group may induce change – either in the shape of progress or in the form of disruption. As distinguished from the theoretical considerations highlighting both positive and negative facets of being a newcomer, the bulk of the actual sociological research concludes that new members in groups are usually anxious and conformity-prone (e.g. Nash & Wolfe, 1957; Nash & Heiss, 1967; cp. also Crandall, 1978).

According to Cini (2001: 5), “group members are usually fearful that the new member will disrupt the group’s identity, interpersonal relationships, or ways of accomplishing tasks.” However, evidence suggests that, by and large, newcomers behave in ways which are mostly non-disruptive to the group (although some new members in some groups may bring about disruption) (Cini, 2001). Strong conformity pressures exerted by the group majority actually constrain the newcomer’s opportunity to behave in a disruptive manner. At the same time, the new members themselves are worried about being accepted by the group (Nash & Wolfe, 1957; Heiss & Nash, 1967) and perceive the pressure to conform to the group’s norms (Nemeth & Staw, 1989). Feldbaum et al. (1980), for
instance, discover that newcomers are hesitant and non-assertive in their early interactions within the group. The authors argue that newcomers lack knowledge about which behaviour is acceptable and, hence, tend to act tentatively in order to learn acceptable behaviour either through observation or by trial and error (cp. also Cini, 2001).

Finally, specific behaviour of the newcomer may create a higher or lower level of influence in a group. The findings of Merei’s (1949) field study suggest that new members are able to induce some degree of change if they initially ingratiating themselves with the group. Phillips et al. (1951) arrive at similar results: Newcomers who mimic the behaviour of the group’s leader(s) are more able to initiate and head activities at later meetings than those who fail to do so. Several other studies suggest that newcomer characteristics – dominance behaviour and knowledge – may as well affect the degree of influence newcomers can exert (cp. Cini, 2001).

Research in (social) psychology and organisation theory has examined the positive and negative aspects of being new as well (e.g. Ziller, 1965). In general, it corroborates the notion that new members can use help when being integrated into established groups. A number of studies exemplify the difficulties newcomers may experience in many types of groups: For instance, children new in school and social groups are found to be inhibited in their actions (Washburn, 1932) as well as exposed to dislike and hostility from other children (Ziller & Behringer, 1961; Feshbach & Sones, 1971). Personnel changes can cause stress for the organisation as well as for the newcomer (e.g. Kahn et al., 1964). Newcomers among temporary judges in a court show more conformity and work more on routine and less important tasks than experienced judges (Walker, 1973).

Besides, a set of other factors are likely to influence the assimilation of newcomers into groups. Inter alia, it may make a difference how many newcomers enter a group at the same time. Other factors worth considering are how a group behaves towards the newcomer (Zander & Cohen, 1955), whether a group is accustomed to change in its membership (e.g. Ziller, 1965) or how much a group is in need of new members (e.g. Wicker & Mehler, 1971; cp. also Crandall, 1978).

Sociological institutionalism and organisation theory consider adaptation as pivotal for group sustainability (cp. Bailer et al., 2009). As mentioned above, adaptation refers to the behaviour of the newcomers. More specifically, it claims that new members in a group copy the long-standing members’ behaviour and adjust to existing norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; March & Olsen, 1989). Adaptation is likely to occur under conditions similar in many respects to those favouring socialization developed by Checkel (Checkel & Moravcsik, 2001: 222). He specifies five scope conditions under which socialization – considered as argumentative persuasion – is likely to take place. First, the one to be persuaded should be in a “novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyse new information”. Second, the persuadee also should have only few opposing priors. Third, the one who persuades should be an “authoritative member of the in-group
to which the persuadee belongs or wants to belong”. Fourth, the persuader also should not lecture or demand but rather comply with the principles of serious deliberative argument. Finally, ideally, the interactions between persuader and persuadee should take place in less politicized and more segregate settings.  

Thus, adaptation theory posits that newcomers adopt established rules of conduct and behaviour. In spite of potentially existing structural economic differences, newcomers are supposed to adapt to old decision-making practices. Yet, newcomer behaviour may also be influenced by other factors such as scepticism towards membership in an organisation among citizens in domestic politics. Such scepticism might lead, e.g., to more abstentions or no-votes in decision-making processes or to “loud and proud” behaviour exhibited by political actors in different arenas of the international organisation (for such behaviour in the EU cp. Szczepanik, 2006). Thus, if adaptation occurs, only few (observable) changes are generally expected. Since this constitutes a “non-finding”, it raises the question of how to empirically investigate enlargement effects (for similar challenges concerning the EU, cp. Bailer et al., 2009).

Ultimately, however, adaptation could also be a more rational strategy: Newcomers decide to initially abide by the rules of a new and, therefore, unfamiliar political environment until they have identified their own ideal way in the organisation (cp. Bailer et al., 2009).

1.1.2 Disruption

Organisational research as well has found that newcomers affect their respective organisation and its employees in a number of ways: newcomers to an organisation frequently seek to alter work demands and goals, rather than adjust to the status quo (Schein, 1971; Nicholson, 1984). The mere presence of newcomers changes the composition of the group; for instance, newcomers may deflect a part of the energy which long-time members in the group devote to its activities; furthermore, if newcomers have enough motivation to alter the group (perhaps since they feel misled concerning the meaning of group membership), they may disrupt the group’s activities (Levine & Russo, 1985). Another study discovers that every recruitment or socialization activity (e.g. examining resumes of prospective employees or training new employees) affects the current employees’ thoughts, feelings

1 Investigating these scope conditions for socialization for the case of the WTO is complicated by the question whether such shared norms and rules actually exist among the (long-standing) WTO membership as the community into which the newcomers are inducted. This question can rather be answered in the affirmative with regard to other organisations like the European Union, the Council of Europe and NATO (Beyers, 2005; Gheciu, 2005; Hooghe, 2005; Lewis, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2005). Not only are the memberships of these institutions regionally limited (and, hence, smaller) than the globally spread (and, thus, larger) group of WTO members. More importantly, norms and prior beliefs of EU, Council of Europe and NATO newcomers are likely to be consistent with the organisations’ respective ideals as this has been (to varying degrees) a precondition for acceding to the particular institution. Hence, such a selection mechanism (if existent) must probably be taken into account when considering the behaviour of new members.
1 Introduction: Newcomers in International Organisations

and behaviours (Sutton & Louis, 1987). Finally, it has been argued that the group adapts to the newcomer by recycling through the stages of group development (Tuckman & Jensen, 1977; Gadon, 1988; cp. also Cini, 2001).

To sum up, these observational accounts indicate that newcomers can influence groups in a variety of ways: by eliciting reactions from single group members, disturbing relationships between members, affecting others’ expectations of them or even make the group return to a previous stage of group development (Wanous et al., 1984). Yet, this qualitative work tends to highlight the disruptive impact of newcomers on groups (perhaps due to the potential negative effects which disruption can cause, e.g. decreased productivity). The possibly positive influence of newcomers on groups, by contrast, has largely been neglected in empirical research – although most groups explicitly announce their desire for newcomers, seeking “new blood” and “fresh ideas”. This ambivalence of groups towards newcomers – needing new members but taking fright at the disruption they may bring about – might be the reason why groups tend to exert conformity pressures on the newcomer. According to this reality, social psychologists have primarily focused on group attempts to alter (inter alia) a newcomer’s behaviour in order to make the new member more similar to long-time members (i.e. assimilation; cp. above). In this connection, however, they have mostly neglected those changes which the newcomer may induce in the structure, dynamics or performance of the group (i.e. accommodation) (Moreland, 1985; cp. also Cini, 2001).2

Historically, social psychology has focused on a group’s power to control the individual, even when (this majority of) the group is clearly wrong (Asch, 1956). These research efforts are referred to as “majority influence” and seek to discover the main situational and individual variables which stimulate it. Festinger (1950), for instance, finds large pressure on group members to act uniformly (cp. also Cini, 2001).3

Interestingly, group members, in turn, tend to respond to such pressures exerted by the majority with their own will to fit in. According to Deutsch and Gerard (1955), members adopt the views of the group’s majority for two reasons: first, to obtain information about reality (informational influence) and / or, second, to gain approval (normative influence). New members who still figure out their new environment (Louis, 1980) may be more prone to majority influence, in

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2 Lofland and Lejeune (1960) may be named as one example of such research ignoring newcomer influence. Their study examines how long-time members of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) (attempted to) socialize newcomers at meetings. Focussing on the group’s impact on the newcomers, the authors failed to analyse the new members’ influence on the group.

3 Festinger (1950) argues that there are two reasons why group members – the majority – exert pressure on other members to align to the group’s goals: social reality and / or group locomotion. The former denotes the group members’ need to validate their notions by having others agree with them. The latter denotes the group’s desire to approach the completion of a goal. Hence, group members frequently experience strong conformity pressures to agree with the majority of the group and to act in such ways that are conceived as ensuring progress toward the group’s goal (cp. also Cini, 2001).
particular if they strongly desire to remain in the group. Ziller and Behringer (1960), e.g., discover that the popularity ratings of newcomers fell distinctly shortly after the “newness” faded. The popularity of the newcomer increased only after accepting the group’s norms and behaving more like its majority. Accordingly, newcomers that wish to obtain acceptance of the group are expected to show behaviour which is consistent with group norms in order to be perceived as potentially “good” group members (cp. Cini, 2001).

Yet, majority influence on the new member constitutes only one part of group life – newcomers are, on the other hand, at times welcomed as being able to contribute to the group’s success. For instance, in a situation where a group is failing at a certain task, new members may be attracted by the opportunity to provide input based on their former experience and expertise; long-standing members, in turn, may welcome this input to improve the group’s viability. Besides, there are situations where the group and the newcomer influence each other mutually. For example, a new member to a long-time group may adopt some of the latter’s norms while also providing new ideas. Consequently, newcomers may be an extensive source of fresh ideas for a group which wants to become more creative or productive (cp. Cini, 2001).

**Oligarchization as part of disruptive behaviour**

Michels (1962: 351), in his study on party development, presents his “iron law of oligarchy” which claims that “the few always dominate”. He argues that, when groups increase, leadership structures evolve and some group members gain more power than others. Thus, his explanation is functional: As political groups become larger, they simply develop a need for leadership. At the individual level, leaders provide expertise, thereby compensating the “immovability of the masses” (Michels, 1962: 370). Yet, the group runs the risk of its leaders’, once installed, pursuing their own interests rather than those of the group. Although Michels (1962) initially assigned his law to groups encompassing 1,000 to 10,000 members (Cassinelli, 1953), Mayhew and Levinger (1976) demonstrate that it holds for groups comprising even fewer than five members as well. However, these scholars are also more critical as to applying the theory to collective actors (Mayhew & Levinger, 1976). In fact, one might have to consider if those organisations under examination here (Council of Europe, WTO, NATO) are not too regulated and bureaucratised to fall victim to increased oligarchic tendencies after enlargement (for similar concerns regarding the EU cp. Bail et al., 2009).

However, in any case, the theory of oligarchization highlights the issue of power. The accession of new member states generates new opportunity structures exceeding formal voting rights. Long-standing members most probably seek to defend their positions towards the new ones by exploiting their informational and network resources. This asymmetry of power between candidate countries and incumbents has been stressed by many observers (see, e.g., Sedelmeier &
Young, 2007). Then again, other long-time member states might attempt to use the entry of newcomers to improve their standing and form new leadership coalitions. Hence, generally understood, the theory of oligarchization concentrates on power politics after enlargement (cp. Bailer et al., 2009).

1.1.3 Anecdotal evidence of newcomer behaviour in international organisations

A first useful research step was to conduct an analysis of newspaper reports, research papers and grey literature papers to find out how large the variation between newcomer behaviour of all kinds in international organisations is. For this exploratory analysis, the three international organisations WTO, NATO and the Council of Europe were chosen since they are the most important in their respective policy field. This selection was, hence, related to the hope to gather sufficient information. The World Bank or the United Nations were not included because the most recent newcomers in these international organisations are (extremely) small states – Tuvalu (accession in 2000), Montenegro (2007) and Kosovo (2009) in the World Bank; Serbia, Tuvalu (both 2000), Switzerland, Timor-Leste (both 2002) and Montenegro (2006) in the UN – which makes an analysis difficult since they do not receive sufficient media attention; for instance, there are hardly any newspaper reports about them. Also, the European Union was not included as this organisation has already been analysed to some extent by other research projects in this regard. Moreover, this organisation might have quite different integration mechanisms since it is far more integrated than the other international organisations. The exploratory analysis reveals that the largest variation probably exists in the WTO, followed by the Council of Europe and NATO.

**Perfect Adaptation – Bulgaria & the Eastern Europeans in NATO**

Between 1999 and 2009, twelve states acceded to NATO: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999; Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004; Albania and Croatia in 2009 (NATO, 2010). Examining policy papers (LexisNexis articles) on the behaviour of these recent newcomers in NATO, it appears that there is some variation in it. One gets the impression that some states used to behave more confident than others; however, overall, newcomers in NATO adapt well.

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4 See, e.g., Bailer et al. (2009), Bechtel and Leuffen (2010) and Leuffen and Hertz (2010).
5 Hence, from a comparative perspective, NATO grew by 75% between 1996 and 2009 (NATO, 2010).
6 Compared to other international organisations like the Council of Europe or the WTO, it stands out that the range of member behaviour is smaller. This may be due to the fact that – as stated above – the overall difference between the member states is smaller as well – or, formulated conversely, NATO members (including the newcomers) seem to be more similar to each other than those forming the Council of Europe or the WTO, with NATO members’ adherence to norms and values of the Western culture as a prime reason (which is, again, not surprising since it constitutes one of the most important entry terms).
Bulgaria’s behaviour as a NATO newcomer, e.g., may be described as very pro-active and cooperative. For instance, Sofia still backed the United States despite doubts about the war in Iraq. However, experts like the Romanian political analyst Cornel Codita trace Bulgaria’s supportive behaviour towards Washington back to pure political calculation, arguing that the pro-Americanism of Bulgaria and Romania was the logical reaction of two states that had suffered for several decades from geographical isolation in Eastern Europe and Europe’s division in East and West. Accordingly, Codita points out that it is wrong to describe Bulgaria and Romania as “faithful” allies because the use of this term of affection is not justified when such behaviour is actually pure political calculation. He adds that “Bulgaria and Romania feel that they owe their invitation to join NATO to the United States” and appreciated this, especially after being refused at NATO’s summit in 1997.7

Also, Bulgaria announced not to flinch from its commitment to keep troops in Iraq8 and declared furthermore to be “eager to welcome US bases if Washington decides to re-align its force structure in Europe.”9 As to this issue, one might almost describe Bulgaria’s behaviour as submissive (although, as mentioned above, it might have been based on strategic calculation), e.g., when Sofia accepted that the locations of these military bases would be determined by NATO and decisions would be made without Bulgarian politicians being involved.10

Bulgaria also proved to be pro-active and dedicated to the community both in making own proposals (and seeking support for them) and in promoting proposals made by other member states or the NATO Secretary-General. For instance, Sofia urged consensus for direct NATO participation in the Iraq stabilisation mission and supported the adoption of a set of measures against terror. Furthermore, the Bulgarian government encouraged the coordination of measures for transforming and adapting NATO military capacity.11 Bulgaria also supported a proposal of the NATO Secretary-General concerning the correct working strategy for the funding of operations and a NATO agreement to provide assistance in the training of security forces in Iraq.12 During its first years in the organisation, the Bulgarian government also seems to have pro-actively sought cooperation with its fellow members in the alliance; for example, in June 2009, the Bulgarian president announced that the country “should consider once again not its presence but the commitments and tasks it will assume further. This is something which will happen in dialogue with our partners.”13

Estonia joined NATO together with Bulgaria, yet, showed visibly different behaviour, most of all being less pro-active and consenting than the Bulgarian government. Unlike Bulgaria, Estonia had

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7 Agence France Press (via LexisNexis), March 30, 2004
8 Agence France Press (via LexisNexis), March 30, 2004
9 Agence France Press (via LexisNexis), March 30, 2004
10 PARI Daily (via LexisNexis), August 18, 2004
11 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (via LexisNexis), May 26, 2004
12 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (via LexisNexis), June 28, 2004
13 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (via LexisNexis), June 28, 2004
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no plans to host any NATO military bases on its territory, arguing that this was not necessary and that Tallinn was perfectly able to ensure domestic security relying on their own forces.\textsuperscript{14} The impression that Estonia was certainly not as pro-active in its behaviour as Bulgaria but rather following a wait-and-see strategy could probably most clearly be interpreted from a (lengthy) statement of the Estonian prime minister concerning Tallinn’s preparedness to train Iraqi forces (in the scope of NATO activities). The statement basically expresses the Estonian government’s capacity and willingness to provide such training only if need be.\textsuperscript{15}

Like Bulgaria and Estonia, Lithuania joined NATO in March 2004. The government in Vilnius showed a similar pro-active but more confident behaviour than Bulgaria in its first year of membership. An example for such less servile behaviour was Lithuania’s vacillating willingness to provide additional troops to NATO missions: Immediately after Lithuania’s admission to NATO, the Lithuanian government promised to continue to contribute to NATO peacekeeping missions in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{16} One month later, in April 2004, the government announced that Lithuania would not increase its contingents in Iraq and Afghanistan; yet, there were discussions about the possibility of enlarging its unit in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{17} However, another two months later, in June 2004, Lithuania declared to intend “to increase its presence in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan”.\textsuperscript{18}

With regard to the impression of pro-active behaviour, Vilnius repeatedly made proposals (or even demands of a strategic nature). For instance, from the perspective of the Lithuanian government, NATO “had to revise the formation and planning of armed forces so that the alliance was able to continue with what it could do best - ensure security where and when it is most needed - and Lithuania, in its turn, was improving its defense capacities to be able to contribute to the strengthening of the whole alliance.”\textsuperscript{19}

Finally, Croatia and Albania showed similar, conflict-free behaviour. The Croatian government explicitly pledged to assume its duties in the alliance and promised to help in Afghanistan, “fully committed to the values, interests and principles of all our allies.” Zagreb emphasised that its determination to assume its share of responsibility for peace and stability was not limited to Afghanistan. Pointing out that NATO was not only a military alliance but also a

\textsuperscript{14} BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (via LexisNexis), April 2, 2004
\textsuperscript{15} “[N]aturally we have to be prepared for this. Our entire logic as far as development assistance is concerned has always been that, first and foremost, we can share our experience, provide a few individuals and be very open should there be an interest on the part of the Iraqi government or should things indeed develop so that the facilities available in Estonia can be used for training or there are lessons to be learnt from our experience.” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (via LexisNexis), June 28, 2004
\textsuperscript{16} Baltic News Service (via LexisNexis), March 30, 2004
\textsuperscript{17} TASS (via LexisNexis), April 20, 2004
\textsuperscript{18} Baltic News Service (via LexisNexis), June 25, 2004
\textsuperscript{19} Baltic News Service (via LexisNexis), June 28, 2004
protector of democratic values, the Croatian government underlined that by joining the alliance it confirmed Croatia’s adoption and defence of high democratic standards. In this same spirit, the then Croatian President Stjepan Mesić emphasised that, as a NATO newcomer, Croatia did not intend to only benefit from its accession; it would also seek to contribute to the organisation's goals and missions, to the alliance’s political dimension as well as to NATO’s continuing efforts of transitioning from its Cold War profile to an institution equipped with instruments for keeping peace. Like Albania, Croatia stated that “[j]oining NATO should be considered the beginning rather than the end of the process.”

**Disruption by the Big in the Council of Europe (and the WTO)**


Studying policy papers (mainly LexisNexis articles), there seems to be substantial variation in the behaviour of these states during their years of being newcomers in the Council of Europe. For instance, some states, like the Russian Federation, appear to have been highly (if not even over-) confident while other newly acceded states like Georgia or Armenia seem to have been more willing to adapt themselves to the common way of behaviour shown by the majority of the long-standing member states. Finally, of course, there are newcomers which may be situated somewhere in between the two poles of this continuum of behaviour; e.g. Azerbaijan.

Showing a high level of confidence in its behaviour, the newcomer Russia explicitly intended to use the Council of Europe for its own purpose: In mid-March 1996, one month after the Russian Federation had joined the institution, Russian President Boris Yeltsin told Russian deputies to the Council of Europe to make use of the organisation as a forum to prevent foreign interference in Russia’s domestic affairs. Yeltsin instructed lawmakers representing Moscow in the body to stop any attempts “to put pressure on us, interfere with internal affairs or apply double standards.” The reason for this approach appeared to be the previous critique of Russia by the Council, Europe’s main human rights body, which in 1995 had postponed acceptance of the country into the organisation due to alleged human rights violations in the war Moscow had started on the renegade region of Chechnya in late 1994. Yeltsin furthermore demanded the representatives should use the Council for

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20 Agence France Press (via LexisNexis), April 1, 2009
21 BBC Worldwide Monitoring (via LexisNexis), April 4, 2009
22 Agence France Press (via LexisNexis), April 7, 2009
23 Thus, from a comparative perspective, the Council of Europe grew by nine members or almost 25% between 1996 and 2009 (Council of Europe, 2010).
defending the rights of ethnic Russian minorities living in the Baltic states and the Commonwealth of Independent States, as those are frequently supposed to be treated as second-class citizens.  

Besides, Russia as a newcomer in the Council of Europe resorted to boycotts of Council sessions or to noncooperation with Council committees; protests (e.g. due to alleged disrespect of Council resolutions), accusations of double standards and threats. Moreover, Moscow clearly refused demands of the organisation (e.g. in March 1996 regarding the abolition of the death penalty). In addition, Russia exerted strong influence within the Council of Europe from the beginning; as observers have remarked, during short time, Russia has evolved into an influential member of the Council, having quickly filled leadership positions in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Moscow used this influence inter alia in order to limit the Council of Europe’s options for action; for example, Russia undertook “efforts specifically designed to minimize the Council’s ability to promote normative socialization within the country.” Furthermore, from the outset, Russia advocated the soonest admission of Serbia and Montenegro to the Council and contributed strongly to overcoming related difficulties.

Looking at another international organisation, when the WTO was founded in 1995, 128 states were members of this institution from the beginning. Between 1996 and 2008, 25 newcomers acceded to the WTO: Bulgaria and Ecuador in 1996; Mongolia and Panama in 1997; the Kyrgyz Republic in 1998; Latvia and Estonia in 1999; Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan and Oman in 2000; Lithuania, Moldova and China in 2001; Taiwan (in WTO terms Chinese Taipei) in 2002; Armenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2003; Nepal and Cambodia in 2004; Saudi Arabia in 2005; Vietnam and Tonga in 2007; Ukraine and Cape Verde in 2008.

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24 United Press International (via LexisNexis), March 12, 1996
25 Izvestia (via Russian Press Digest, LexisNexis), September 13, 1996; Neue Zuercher Zeitung, September, 26, 1996
26 AFX News (via LexisNexis), September 20, 1996; Neue Zuercher Zeitung, September, 26, 1996
27 Baltic News Service (via LexisNexis), February 4, 1997
29 Neue Zuercher Zeitung, May 18, 1996
32 Economic News (via LexisNexis), April 7, 2003; News Bulletin (via LexisNexis), April 7, 2003; RIA Novosti (via LexisNexis), April 7, 2003; TASS (via LexisNexis), April 7, 2003
33 Due to conflicts with China. The complete WTO term is “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” (WTO, 2015g).
34 Accordingly, from a comparative perspective, the WTO grew by about 20% between 1996 and 2009 (WTO, 2016a).
Both policy papers (LexisNexis articles) and data on negotiation documents submitted during the WTO’s Doha Round (cp. below) from a larger group of members that acceded to the WTO as of 1997 create the impression of substantially different conduct among newcomers. In fact, some new members, e.g. China or Taiwan, seem to have behaved very confident in taking action aimed at achieving their goals. Other newcomers (e.g. Cambodia or Panama), in turn, appear to have been less keen to pursue their objectives. A third group of new members may ultimately be situated somewhere in the middle of this continuum of behaviour (e.g. Lithuania).

Based on the WTO newcomers’ documents to the Doha Round, submitted on any negotiation issue by the new member within five years from its date of accession, three groups of newcomers may be roughly distinguished: First, there are those newly acceded members which have not been active at all, indicated by zero negotiation documents submitted (Cambodia, Cape Verde, Mongolia, Nepal, Panama). The second (and biggest) group may comprise those newcomers having shown some activity in generating negotiation documents, namely one to 20 papers (Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Estonia, Macedonia, Georgia, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tonga, Ukraine, Vietnam). Finally, the third group contains those two new members that displayed remarkable activity in submitting negotiation documents: Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) with 127 and China with more than 200 papers.

Based on the material studied, China’s behaviour as a newcomer in the WTO seems ambiguous and, overall, not easy to evaluate without further analysis. According to US Trade Representative (USTR) Susan Schwab, China has displayed a capacity to be an influential and constructive player in the multilateral trading system depending on its particular interests. Yet, as a newcomer, China also had to assess its role in the WTO and in the Doha Round. In fact, despite its enormous trading power, in its first years in the organisation, China’s strategy appears to have favoured a passive role in the (more or less) informal groups or coalitions it joined (and in the WTO in general), including the G-20, a forum on international financial concerns for pivotal industrial and emerging market countries, and the G-33, a group of developing countries demanding continued protection for subsistence farmers within WTO negotiations. In both groups, the leading role was assumed by states with trade interests considerably different from China’s.\footnote{Krause, S. (2006): “China Has Major Stake in Global Trade Talks, U.S. Official Says”; available online at http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=file2006_08/alia/a6082901.htm; accessed September 01, 2010.}

In 2003, two years after its accession to the WTO, China’s frictions with trade partners had increased, despite the low profile the newcomer had kept. China did not change its currency’s peg to the US dollar, providing Chinese exports with a substantial price advantage in the global marketplace. In addition, China has faced scores of complaints about its sluggish pace of complying with commitments undertaken in the scope of its accession agreement to the WTO. China was repeatedly
criticised for its selective approach in liberalising the Chinese economy concerning goods from cars to agricultural products. According to global trading companies, even with the legal framework in force, China only slowly strengthened enforcement of such rules, e.g. protection of intellectual property rights. In other areas, like agriculture, China resorted to bureaucratic methods to constrain, in this case, the amount of agricultural products which can be imported. Such requirements for administrative permits and opaque food safety standards have been used to protract and discourage foreign competitors from entering the Chinese market too quickly.36

Less than five years after its accession, China was a significant beneficiary of the protections and discipline provided under WTO rules. In 2006, among then 149 WTO members, China was the most frequent complainant as well as the most frequent respondent concerning anti-dumping investigations.37

Disruption by the Small in the Council of Europe & the WTO

On a continuum of behaviour ranging from conflict-free adaptation to disruption, Azerbaijan in the Council of Europe might be ranked somewhere in the middle (with a tendency to disruptive behaviour, though): Like Russia, Baku expressed discontent and protested38 and even declared a Council’s rapporteur persona non grata, an act related to a campaign of defamation lasting for weeks.39 Furthermore, Azerbaijan did explicitly not comply with requests of the Council when it repeatedly refused to let his adherence to those commitments undertaken when becoming a member of the organisation come under scrutiny.40 However, in comparison, it seems that the extent of non-adaptation – or the degree of conflictual behaviour – was smaller than in Russia’s case.

Armenia’s behaviour, in contrast, could be described as more conflict-free and characterised by a greater willingness to adapt well. Being a newcomer in the Council of Europe, Yerevan tried to build coalitions and maintain good relations with Romania and Georgia. For instance, the Armenian government declared that its admission to the organisation opened new opportunities for cooperation with Romania which “enriched multifaceted relations” between the two states.41 With respect to Georgia, Yerevan considered its position “constructive and friendly”.42

38 BBC Worldwide Monitoring, January 11, 2002
39 Neue Zuercher Zeitung, July 12, 2002
40 Neue Zuercher Zeitung, July 12, 2002
41 BBC Worldwide Monitoring, January 28, 2001
42 BBC Worldwide Monitoring, September 20, 2001
Considering the WTO, Latvia behaved quite confident during its first years as a member, using the organisation’s opportunities in its interest from the outset: In a trade dispute with Lithuania in 1999, Latvia threatened to approach the WTO if the joint committee of the Baltic free trade agreement (BAFTA) was unable to come to a solution with Lithuania – a clever move since Lithuania was in the middle of accession negotiations with the WTO at that point in time and, thus, certainly not interested in the organisation getting such negative information.43

On the other hand, shortly later, Latvia itself was in a defensive position against claims of violating WTO rules brought forward by Estonia and Lithuania. Riga argued that the imposition of additional customs tax on pork imports did not constitute a violation of the Baltic free trade agreement (BAFTA) but was indeed in compliance with WTO rules about the protection of internal markets. Hence, the Latvian government asked Tallinn and Vilnius to not consider the act as an infringement since its intention behind it was actually to strengthen the performance of BAFTA. The Latvian government seems to have felt confident in this situation, promising that it would pay damages to producers from neighbouring states if the WTO decided that Latvia’s behaviour was breaching WTO rules.44

Similarly confident, Riga announced in November 1999 – nine months after it had joined the WTO – that accession negotiations with the WTO candidate Russia would take place before Russia’s admission to the organisation. During these talks, Latvia would also question the legality of Russian trade restrictions.45 One month later, the Latvian government even gave Russia an ultimatum: Latvia would not (be able to) support Russian intentions to join the WTO if Moscow did not change its attitude towards Latvia.46 In the course of time, however, the relations between the two countries improved as, in April 2004, Latvia announced that it was interested in Russia acceding to the WTO as quickly as possible. Riga reasoned that Russia’s entry would help to form trade and economic relations, and expressed hopes that it would also contribute to a political dialogue.47

In different situations while being a WTO newcomer, the Latvian government showed its confidence in expressing its opinion freely, for instance to support “the beginning of new talks that would expand the obligations of member states as regards market access” in 1999.48 As such a Latvian position was close to the one taken by the European Union, it simultaneously points to Latvia’s hopes of being admitted into the EU.49
Finally, Latvia displayed confident behaviour when making demands pursuing its self-interest as to WTO obligations and assuming the role of the spokesperson of its group of like-minded members: In January 2001, the Latvian government announced that in the new round of WTO negotiations about agriculture it would speak up for specific state support opportunities to countries in transition.50

Estonia, likewise, apparently belongs to those newcomers which have been very active and tried to exploit all promising options available to WTO members. Indeed, on the day of its accession, Tallinn explicitly announced intentions to play an active role in the work of the organisation.51 Accordingly, some days after this statement and in view of a new round of trade talks, Estonia supported the perspective (which it shared with the EU – see this issue below) that the number of issues to be dealt with should be larger.52 Besides, adding to the “opportunities to protect Estonia’s interests and promote the country abroad”, an attaché of agricultural affairs was posted to the WTO headquarters in Geneva in December 1999, few weeks after Estonia’s entry.53

Similar to many newcomers that link accession to one international organisation to hopes of being admitted to other organisations as well, Estonia hoped that WTO membership would further accession negotiations with the European Union, arguing that both Estonia and the EU base their economic policies on WTO principles.54 In accordance with Tallinn’s desire to accede to the EU, the Estonian government was aware of whom to back in issues discussed between the United States and the European Union: “In view of Estonia’s intent to join the [U]nion, Estonia’s support would be given to [the] EU”.55 Furthermore, Estonia did not refrain from immediately using the possibilities available to WTO members with regard to trade disputes: In December 1999, i.e. not even one month after its entry, Tallinn threatened to file a complaint with the WTO if there was sufficient suspicion that Latvia’s actions of impeding pork import was infringing WTO rules. If this was the case, the Estonian government announced to take steps within the dispute settlement framework of the WTO; more specifically, economic losses to Estonia caused by Latvia’s behaviour would have to be compensated.56 Consultations between Estonia and Latvia followed.57

Finally, Estonia used the WTO to a certain degree for its own purpose; inter alia, Tallinn pursued its interests in bilateral talks with Russia in the scope of Moscow’s WTO accession
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negotiations. More specifically, it did so quite confidently, giving Moscow the ultimatum that Estonia is “ready to start these talks immediately, but first Russia has to introduce a preferential treatment regime in trade with Estonia as well”.

1.2 Member behaviour in the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations: Activity, cooperation & strategies

The anecdotal evidence presented in the previous section clearly shows that there is actually variation in newcomer behaviour in international organisations: Even relatively similar countries such as the Baltic States choose to behave quite differently. Also, large newcomers like Russia may opt for very disruptive behaviour, quite bluntly showing their interests without respecting the internal rules and norms of the organisation too much. Yet, does size alone matter? Or which factors may cause this variance in the behaviour of new members?

However, when investigating the factors that influence newcomer behaviour in international organisations (more) systematically, it seems to be mandatory to extend the analysis to the whole membership of the organisations in order to draw valid conclusions and generalisations. Do newcomers behave differently than long-time members at all? Hence, is there a newcomer effect?

Extending the intended research to member behaviour in international organisations, independent of membership duration, raises the next question: Which particular kind of behaviour is supposed to be analysed? Ultimately, there is a multitude of functions that international organisations fulfil, ranging from those of a more general character like the exchange of information to tasks that are more specific to the individual mission of an organisation such as negotiations and dispute settlement in the case of the WTO, for example. In all of these spheres, IO members’ behaviour probably varies to a certain extent. In some of these spheres, member behaviour has been studied; there is extensive literature on litigation in the World Trade Organization, for instance (Busch & Reinhardt, 2002, 2003; Simmons & Guzman, 2005; Davis & Blodgett Bermeo, 2009; Sattler & Bernauer, 2010). There is substantially less knowledge, however, on IO members’ behaviour in negotiations (with research on the EU being, again, an exception). This is puzzling given that negotiation behaviour constitutes an essential component of member states’ overall foreign policy (Bailer, 2012). In order to increase their chances of success in international negotiations, IO members are assumed to carefully decide on the behaviour they use in trying to affect the negotiation process and especially its outcome according to their interests. While considerable research has been conducted on actors’ behaviour in international negotiations, it is not completely clear which factors influence members’ negotiation behaviour in international organisations. Among those international

58 Baltic News Service (via LexisNexis), January 30, 2001
59 BBC Worldwide Monitoring (via LexisNexis), November 12, 2001
organisations in which negotiations take place, the World Trade Organization seems to be one of the most appropriate to study members’ negotiation behaviour. Negotiations are at the core of the WTO; the WTO might be more than any other international organisation “a negotiating forum (…) The WTO was born out of negotiations, and everything the WTO does is the result of negotiations” (WTO, 2009). Another round of multilateral negotiations has started in November 2001 and has not yet been concluded. The goal of this Doha Round is a new agreement which further liberalises world trade. In addition, membership growth (in absolute numbers) between 1996 and 2008 has been the biggest (cp. Figure 1.1). Therefore, this work aims at identifying the factors that influence WTO members’ negotiation behaviour in the current Doha Round.

**Background: The Doha Round**

At the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, WTO members agreed to start a new round of multilateral trade negotiations – the so-called Doha Round. Its goal is to produce a new agreement which further removes trade barriers and liberalises world trade even more. In order to emphasise that one particular objective of this Round is to improve the trading conditions of developing and least developed countries, it bears the semi-official name “Doha Development Agenda” (DDA). The talks concern about 20 areas of trade; nine of them are the main negotiation issues: Agriculture, Trade and Development, Trade and Environment, Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), Services, Trade Facilitation, WTO Rules and Dispute Settlement (WTO, 2015b). The negotiations take place in the Trade Negotiations Committee as well as specific negotiating groups, councils and other committees: the Committee on Agriculture, the Committee on Trade and Development, the Committee on Trade and Environment, the TRIPS Council, the Negotiating Group on Market Access, the Council for Trade in Services, the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation and the Negotiating Group on Rules (with the Committees and Councils meeting in “special sessions” for Doha Round matters) (WTO, 2009).

The most important negotiation principle – stipulated in the Ministerial Declaration at the Doha Conference – refers to the fact that practically every negotiation issue forms part of a whole, namely the indivisible package of the intended trade agreement. Therefore, the negotiation issues cannot be agreed separately. This is called the “single undertaking”: “Nothing is agreed until

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60 Although the city where the negotiations were launched led to the term Doha Round, the talks mainly take place in Geneva, at the WTO’s headquarters (WTO, 2015c).

61 The second reason for the Doha Round’s semi-official name is the reference to the other half of the DDA’s work programme besides the negotiations: trying to find solutions for developing countries’ problems in the implementation of already existing WTO agreements (WTO, 2015c).

62 In the following also called merely Development.

63 In the following also called merely Environment.

64 In the following also called merely Intellectual Property.
1 Introduction: Newcomers in International Organisations

everything is agreed” (WTO, 2015a).65 The second principle concerns participation: The Doha Round negotiations are open to all WTO members as well as to observer governments conducting or intending to conduct accession negotiations. Decisions on the outcomes, however, are only taken by WTO members. The third principle of transparency demands that the negotiations take place in a transparent manner. The improvement of developing countries’ trading prospects, as mentioned, is connected to the fourth principle of the negotiations: special and differential treatment (“S&D”) for developing and least-developed countries (WTO, 2015a).

Another key characteristic that distinguishes the World Trade Organization from other international organisations is the fact that decisions are taken by consensus rule.66 Hence, every WTO member has de facto veto power. The total number of WTO members grew over the course of the negotiations from 142 in November 2001 to 162 members today.67 Last but not least, in contrast to many other international organisations, WTO members are not necessarily countries: Any state or customs territory which has full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies may become a WTO member (WTO, 2009). WTO members that are not sovereign states are Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.68

Activity, cooperation & strategies in the Doha Round negotiations

The final agreement that is supposed to conclude the Doha Round negotiations will presumably entail extensive provisions concerning international trade and will, hence, probably be crucial to all WTO members. Due to its importance, one would expect that during the negotiations all WTO members try their best to influence this final agreement in their favour. Since WTO members are assumed to be rational actors, they are supposed to behave in a way that maximises their individual benefits.

WTO members – i.e., of course, their delegations – may try to influence the final agreement in their favour by getting active in the respective negotiating groups, councils and committees of the Doha Round that deal with the specific issues. They may do so in (at least) two basic ways: by

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65 While the negotiations on Dispute Settlement are formally outside the single undertaking, they are expected to be concluded about the same time as the rest of the Doha Round.
66 “Even though the WTO Agreement provides for the possibility of majority voting, and for specific majorities in specific situations, these provisions have almost never been utilized. The practice of consensus decision has been the norm, both in the WTO and in GATT” (Reich, 2005: 21).
67 As at January 2016. Negotiations in the areas of Services and Agriculture, however, already began in January and March 2000 and were integrated into the Doha Round agenda. Hence, over the research period of the three studies in this dissertation, the number of WTO members grew from 135 in January 2000 to 153 members in July 2008. Between 2009 and 2011, there were no accessions. Table A1.1 in the Appendix following this chapter gives an overview of the WTO membership, more precisely the founding members and the newcomers that have acceded to the organisation until the end of the research period of this work.
68 In WTO terms, the latter is called “Chinese Taipei” due to conflicts with China.
submitting negotiation documents and by making statements during the meetings. Another attempt at reaching an individually beneficial outcome may be coalition building. Coalitions among members can be considered essential in the WTO. Due to consensus rule, the phenomenon of cooperation in the WTO is probably different from cooperative behaviour in organisations or bodies using majority rule. The fact that it is not sufficient to bring a majority of members behind one’s position but, rather, every member – as every member has de facto veto power – gives cooperative behaviour in the WTO a particular nature. The question who cooperates with whom and why is studied in Chapter 3.

Finally, in order to achieve their objectives in the Doha Round, WTO members may choose to apply a particular negotiation strategy consisting of certain tactics, e.g. proposing new solutions which are in the common interest of all or at least many parties or declaring to not change one’s position under any circumstances. Based on different classifications of negotiation strategies that exist in the literature, I develop an own concept of soft and hard – and mixed – negotiation strategies. The factors influencing WTO members’ strategy choice in the Doha Round negotiations are examined in Chapter 4.

1.2.1 Theoretical framework: Membership experience, economic power & regime type

When studying the behaviour of both new and long-standing members in international organisations in general and in the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations in particular, it seems to be insufficient to only look at the individual characteristics of these members – be it their size, their wealth or their domestic set-up including potential interest group influence. Rather, when thinking about possible conditions affecting their behaviour, it appears to be necessary to also consider the different situations the members face in the organisation, most of all whether the member acceded only recently and has, accordingly, little to no experience with the institution. In addition, the member’s relative degree of power within the organisation, the presence of like-minded members and how difficult it was to join the organisation may be relevant to investigate as well. Thus, factors influencing member behaviour can basically be located in two domains: the member itself and the relationship between each individual member and the organisation, i.e. the entirety of other members.

With this twofold focus regarding the factors that potentially impact member behaviour in the WTO’s Doha Round, the dissertation is theoretically embedded in and contributes to the contemporary debate in international relations between the metatheories of rationalism and

69 Negotiation documents may be all kinds of written contributions, e.g. compromise proposals, authored by the delegations and distributed among the membership via the WTO Secretariat.
constructivism (Katzenstein et al., 1999; cf. also Schimmelfennig, 2003). Rationalist (or utilitarian) approaches, including neorealist and neoliberal theories, consider states as basically atomistic, self-interested, goal-seeking and utility-maximising actors whose preferences (over outcomes) are fairly stable over time.70 Those preferences (utility functions) affect states’ cost-benefit-calculations that form the basis of their foreign policies in a material environment, referring mainly to the distribution of power and wealth in the international system. Furthermore, in rationalist models, states’ preferences are not influenced by interaction among states (including cooperation); i.e. preferences affect interaction but not vice versa (Hasenclever et al., 1997; cf. also Schimmelfennig, 2003).

Constructivist (or, in general, cognitivist) approaches, on the other hand, emphasise ideas and knowledge as crucial elements in explanations of international politics. Thus, these (more) dynamic approaches stress learning (at the unit level) and states’ knowledge dependence in their international behaviour: New knowledge at least influences states’ (perceptions of their) interests, according to weak cognitivist theories, if not even constituting and allowing states to pursue both power games and cooperative endeavours, following strong cognitivist (i.e. constructivist) argumentation. From such a constructivist perspective, states – the key actors in international relations – are not only in possession of a specific amount of knowledge (e.g. scientific expertise) that affects their choices in certain situations (Hasenclever et al., 1997). Rather, “they are states (and states of a particular kind) only by virtue of a shared knowledge which spans international relations as a social space” (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 138; emphasis in original). Hence, constructivism represents sociological approaches in the study of international relations, highlighting also the importance of cognitive entities like states’ mutual expectations or beliefs about (in)appropriate behaviour (Hasenclever et al., 1997; cf. also Schimmelfennig, 2003).

As foreshadowed in the theoretical considerations on newcomer behaviour in international organisations above, the two research paradigms are not intended to be tested against each other in this work on WTO members’ negotiation behaviour. Rather, although partially competing, they are considered (to a large degree) complementary sources of hypothesis construction if states are considered rational utility-maximisers whose perception of utility, however, depends on knowledge;

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70 However, not even rationalist accounts of international relations are based on the assumption of actors’ full (substantive or objective) rationality (Keohane, 1984; Hasenclever et al., 1997; Schimmelfennig, 2003). In contrast to this unrealistic premise, most models rather assume some kind of “bounded” (or subjective) rationality. Thus, actors are not necessarily strict utility maximisers, they may not have complete information on the options available and the consequences related to them and they are thought to have limited information-processing capacities (Keohane, 1984; Simon, 1997; Schimmelfennig, 2003). Hence, actors’ decisions in (trade) negotiations may be based on such incomplete information (e.g. with regard to other actors’ alternative options to the negotiations, true issue priorities, domestic politics etc.) which might (at least partially) result from other actors’ strategic incentives to misrepresent some information. Accordingly, under bounded rationality, actors cannot determine optimal negotiation behaviour directly from material interests. In other words, actors lack the ability to calculate optimization strategies (Odell, 2006).
and if that knowledge may not be reduced to material structures, it must be regarded as an independent variable (Hasenclever et al., 1997).

More specifically, this dissertation on the negotiation behaviour of WTO members in the Doha Round contributes to the literature on international negotiation processes. In a similar vein as the complementary relationship between the metatheories of rationalism and constructivism (and their respective roots), the political science’s negotiation analysis literature benefits from combining ideas from different disciplines of the social and behavioural sciences for the purpose of studying and understanding negotiations and predicting their outcomes (Kremenyuk, 2002): While (rationalist) game theory contributes parsimonious models of actors, their goals as well as their capabilities (Thomson et al. (2006), e.g., apply such models in EU negotiations), the behavioural sciences, like psychology e.g., provide additional insights by emphasising (constructivist) aspects which appear important but are ignored by such parsimonious game-theoretical models, for instance a negotiator’s personality and perception of the specific situation as well as other individual factors (Jönsson, 2002b; Rubin, 2002b).

One particular concept of states’ negotiation behaviour that combines aspects from both rationalist and constructivist approaches is Young’s (1989, 1991, 1994) model of institutional bargaining. On the one hand, this model is based on the rationalist assumption of self-interested actors who face incentives and constraints related to the effective coordination of their behaviour, i.e. the potential benefits of realising joint gains and the (preceding) costs of agreeing on a certain set of rules (cf. also Hasenclever et al., 1997). On the other hand, Young (1989: 356) criticises rationalist approaches of negotiation processes as unjustifiably faithful regarding “the ability of rational utility maximizers to realize feasible joint gains.” Even if negotiating parties do not dispute the existence and the features of a zone of agreement (encompassing potential negotiated outcomes that are Pareto-superior to the pre-negotiation situation), rationalist models fail to consider a set of serious hurdles that frequently complicate efforts of reaching mutual agreement (Young, 1989; Hasenclever et al., 1997). Young (1989) highlights negotiating parties’ strategic behaviour, intra-party bargaining (two-level games), linkages of issue-areas and potential concerns about precedents as well as lacking trust, i.e. considerations of non-compliance, in this regard (cf. also Hasenclever et al., 1997). Furthermore, identifying a second set of weaknesses of rationalist accounts of negotiation processes, Young (1989) points out a number of questionable assumptions: The identity of the negotiating parties is known from the beginning and does not change during the process; alternatives or strategies at the parties’ disposal are clear; the outcomes for all of the parties’ possible combinations of choices is known; and the parties’ preferences over these outcomes can be identified and do not change. Thus, Young (1989: 358) concludes that rationalist models “abstract away a great many considerations that are major preoccupations of negotiators under real-world circumstances.”
Among the defining characteristics of his own model of institutional bargaining, Young (1989) emphasises the number of actors and the decision rule. He points out that international negotiations usually include multiple autonomous parties, ranging from a handful or a modest number to extreme cases that involve over 150 states – as, for instance, in the WTO’s Doha Round. And, although surely preferable for analytic efforts, it is rarely possible to merge the negotiating parties into two coalitions or blocs. Consequently, analytic concepts that may be highly useful for understanding two-sided negotiation processes provide little help in the study of international negotiations which convene a large number of independent parties. With respect to the second feature, the decision rule, efforts to come to an international agreement usually aim at arrangements which all negotiating parties can accept. Hence, unanimity generally constitutes the decision rule in such settings (Young, 1989) – or consensus, as in the case of the Doha Round negotiations.

In addition to Young’s (1989) considerations about the number of actors and the decision rule, Sebenius (1995) identifies the number of negotiation issues and the nature of the intended agreement as two further parameters in international negotiation settings of the kind of the WTO’s Doha Round: “(1) virtually universal participation, combined with (2) a powerful set of rules and understandings aimed at taking all decisions by consensus (if at all possible), (3) a comprehensive agenda, plus (4) the agreement to seek a single convention that would constitute a “package deal”” (Sebenius, 1995: 159).

After having looked at these parameters that form the background of the Doha Round negotiations, I present subsequently the theoretical considerations underlying several factors that are assumed to have an effect on all of those three kinds of member behaviour in the WTO’s Doha Round studied here – members’ level of negotiation activity (Chapter 2), cooperation among members (Chapter 3) and members’ choice of negotiation strategies (Chapter 4). These factors include members’ experience in and with the organisation, their economic power – and related political weight – as well as their regime type or democracy level.

**Membership experience – the newcomer effect**

Thinking about the first factor that may have an influence on WTO members’ negotiation behaviour in the Doha Round – and on different kinds of member behaviour in international organisations more generally –, why should newcomers behave differently than long-term members? Rationalist approaches would hold that WTO members choose their behaviour in negotiations – including level of activity, cooperation with other members and choice of negotiation strategies – according to the utility they anticipate from such behaviour (Morrow, 1994). In general, if members expect that they

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can maximise their gains by some specific behaviour, they will choose this behaviour, whether they are a newcomer or not.

However, according to sociological theories and the findings of different studies in this field presented above, there is reason to assume that newcomers in the WTO – and in international organisations in general – are in a particular position at the beginning of their membership since they are faced with a new environment in which they have to learn its – especially unwritten – rules and norms (Cini, 2001). From this perspective, experience in and expertise on the WTO and its multilateral trade negotiations can certainly be considered crucial in influencing members’ level of activity, their cooperative behaviour and their choice of specific negotiation strategies and tactics. A WTO diplomat reported in one of the interviews the following on the newcomer phase:72

“For our negotiators, like myself, who had not done any multilateral negotiations before and who had some knowledge on the multilateral trading system, not much, to understand how the system works and how members interact and how you even – to be frank – pick up the floor and say something ... It is kind of a cultural issue. Before you really get involved and get familiar with how the system works and what culture there is, you can never feel comfortable to be a negotiator. And the lack of experience, lack of enough knowledge – those were quite big challenges for [us] (...) So, we were kind of working on two fronts: On one front, immediately, as a new member, jumped into the Doha negotiations, trying to formulate new rules, while on the other hand, we had [the] task to own our commitments on various fronts; tariffs, non-tariff measures – all kinds of things. So, it was quite a challenge.”73

According to the interviewee, this learning period is basically the same for all newcomers. Furthermore, having observer status during the stage of accession negotiations contributes to the learning process only to a limited extent, as pointed out by the same diplomat:

“Being an observer, you do not have the same chances of getting involved in how the system works as the existing members then. As observer, you never get substantially involved in negotiations or discussions of any issues. And also, at that moment, for accession negotiating reasons, there was only a very small group of about ten persons who were dealing with accession negotiations. They knew – better than we did at that moment – how the system works but they were only ten. And when we established the WTO department, our number of people in the department was supposed to be something around 60. So, you have 50 persons who did not know – like myself – much

72 Detailed information on the interviews conducted follows below.
73 Interview conducted in Geneva, March 20, 2012 (interview ID 39).
Given the Doha Round’s goal of producing a final agreement that covers quite a number of different negotiation issues within a package deal (“single undertaking”) and that requires the consent of the entire membership, those members that possess large amounts of experience and expertise are thought to be more able to influence the intended outcome in their favour by using this knowledge. In other words, coming up with potential compromises that reconcile the interests of about 140 to 160 members (at best) and that are, ideally, most beneficial to the proponent at the same time needs a high level of information which WTO members usually acquire in negotiations over the course of their membership.

Yet, the decision for some specific behaviour in an international organisation in general and in the Doha Round negotiations in particular may also be influenced by the original decision to join the organisation and the respective accession negotiations between the candidate and the organisation before the candidate’s entry. The actual process of applying and being admitted to the WTO, for instance, can vary from rather uncomplicated and (thus) fast procedures, as in the case of Latvia, with less than five years, to very tedious processes, like the 15 year long negotiations with China. In general, international organisations in their entirety or individual members that are already part of the organisation have a strong interest in designing strict membership criteria in order to filter out candidates that do not intend to cooperate (Kydd, 2001). Hence, the degree to which disagreements that could lead to problems and conflicts in the future can be solved during the accession process may determine the actual later behaviour of members once admitted to the organisation. On the other hand, though, the nature of the accession negotiations and the specific accession conditions agreed may also create the potential for future problems and conflicts that, in turn, have an effect on member behaviour within the organisation.

Following these thoughts, there is another aspect besides membership experience that distinguishes newcomers and long-standing members in the WTO. Thus, this difference may have an impact on their respective behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations. In contrast to the founding members of the WTO, newcomers are obliged to negotiate their accession to the organisation. In these accession negotiations, a plurality of aspects of the candidate’s trade and legal regimes are examined. Afterwards, the substantive component of the multilateral negotiations determines one part of the candidate’s specific accession conditions: the commitments to observe WTO rules and disciplines after joining the organisation. Simultaneously, the candidate conducts bilateral negotiations with interested WTO members on the other part of its specific accession conditions: concessions and commitments on market access for goods and services. If newcomers had to make a

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74 Interview conducted in Geneva, March 20, 2012 (interview ID 39).
multitude of concessions as candidates in the scope of the accession negotiations, they may not have any or only few “bargaining chips” (Pelc, 2011) left which they can use in the Doha Round negotiations to make compromises.

Hence, besides varying degrees of membership experience, the consequences of such encompassing accession negotiations may also be responsible for or contribute to a potential newcomer effect in WTO members’ negotiation behaviour in the Doha Round. The two mechanisms referring to membership experience and demanding accession negotiations identify two kinds of disadvantages for newcomers compared to long-standing members: a first drawback from a lack of experience and expertise and a second one due to costly accession negotiations (and their limiting implications). Accordingly, these two mechanisms centring on membership experience and accession negotiations are not mutually exclusive but could be at work at the same time, possibly reinforcing each other. Hence, their individual effects on newcomer behaviour are difficult to distinguish, even if a systematic difference between new and long-time members can be found with respect to their level of negotiation activity (Chapter 2), their cooperative behaviour (Chapter 3) and their use of negotiation strategies and tactics in the Doha Round (Chapter 4).

**Economic power – & political weight**

A WTO member’s economic power and – related – political weight is probably an important second determinant of its behaviour in multilateral trade negotiations. According to the realist school of thought of the international relations literature, power allows a country to influence the outcome of international negotiations (Morgenthau, 1948). This view on power assumes that states behave like “billiard balls” in an international system and that the preferences of states result from their positions in this system. However, developing this approach further, neorealists agree that not only military resources but especially economic interdependencies and domestic politics determine the power of a state (Keohane & Nye, 1989). The liberal paradigm clearly asserts that domestic variables are the defining elements of a state’s preference. In his liberal institutionalist approach, Moravcsik (1997) defines states’ interests as being an aggregate of individual interests: A state’s fundamental preferences are determined by structural interests, defined by its economic situation and its “social interests” defined by domestic desires (Moravcsik, 1997: 518). The government, thus, functions as an agent at the international level representing the interests of the principals at the domestic level (Moravcsik, 1997).

Considering the specific situation of economic and political power in the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations, all members should be equal due to consensus rule for taking decisions and the de facto right to veto that follows from it. However, in fact, power dynamics are crucial in WTO negotiations. In terms of power relations, the Doha Round is quite similar to European Council
negotiations where large members can rely on their aggregate structural resources and capabilities while small and medium-sized members need to exploit other sources of bargaining power, such as issue-specific power, institutional sources of power like the veto or individual sources of power like negotiators’ personal authority and expertise (Tallberg, 2008).

Steinberg (2002: 365) uncovers the “organized hypocrisy of consensus decision making” in the WTO and already during the era of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which preceded the World Trade Organization. Contrasting law-based and power-based bargaining in the GATT / WTO, he finds that when GATT / WTO bargaining is law-based, “states take procedural rules seriously, attempting to build a consensus that is Pareto-improving (...) When GATT / WTO bargaining is power-based, states bring to bear instruments of power that are extrinsic to rules (instruments based primarily on market size), invisibly weighting the decision-making process and generating outcomes that (...) may not be Pareto-improving” (Steinberg, 2002: 341).

One of the WTO ambassadors among my interviewees emphasised:

“The countries have a weight, of course. And this weight – in the eyes of the man on the street is not that definite – but the ones that are involved with this mechanism would know it. So, of course, when you say something, when you ask for something, you always put your political weight behind it.”

Another interviewee testified to the impact of the large WTO members:

“If the European Union plus the US plus Canada plus ... – the big countries, the big economies – are in a certain position, the likelihood that that will be the solution or the final outcome is very high.”

Examining decision making in the WTO as well, Jones (2009) focuses on so-called Green Room meetings, small gatherings of diplomats from up to 30 members, supposed to prepare the basis for a consensus on critical issues among the WTO membership as a whole. Although such a procedure may seem to be a necessary feature of consensus building in a large organisation, it has been criticised as favouring representation from large and wealthy members (Jones, 2009).

A third WTO ambassador among my interviewees described exactly this situation that not every WTO member has equal impact: If there are controversial issues, the Director-General invites select members to the Green Room in order to discuss those issues. In case the members involved find a tentative agreement, it is presented in the plenary – at times without any information towards the other WTO members in advance. Hence, the latter are not able to prepare their reaction, inter alia by conferring with their capitals. According to the Ambassador, when the tentative agreement is presented in the plenary, the representatives of (some) small members (often) do not dare – without

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75 Interview conducted in Geneva, December 7, 2011 (interview ID 34).
76 Interview conducted in Geneva, November 9, 2011 (interview ID 11).
the backing of their respective minister – to veto the agreement. The reason for this is the fear that, in case a small or medium-sized member’s ambassador indeed objects to the agreement proposed, the representative of a “big player” might contact the national minister of this small or medium-sized member bilaterally in order to complain about the ambassador’s behaviour which might have negative consequences for the ambassador concerned. The interviewee highlighted that it is two kinds of WTO members that are invited to Green Room meetings: “big players” on the one hand, small and medium-sized members that may be described as “troublemakers” (e.g. Cuba) on the other. Those (small and medium-sized) members that try to be “good” or cooperative, however, are not invited to such meetings, the Ambassador concluded in the interview.  

Thus, there are good reasons why WTO members’ economic power and their political weight following from it can be considered essential in influencing members’ negotiation activity (Chapter 2), their cooperative behaviour (Chapter 3) and their choice of negotiation strategies in the Doha Round (Chapter 4).

**Regime type**

Realist approaches in international relations deny any effect of a state’s regime type on its behaviour when interacting with other states. However, there are reasons to assume that a WTO member’s democracy level does have an impact on its negotiation behaviour in the Doha Round. In general, more democratic regimes are supposed to be more bound to their voters’ overall well-being than less democratic ones. According to Mansfield et al. (2002: 504), “[t]he greater accountability of leaders to voters in democracies makes [the] difference”. In democratic states, international cooperation can generate domestic political benefits for leaders which makes them more likely to strive for cooperative agreements (Mansfield et al., 2002).

More democratic governments are thought to try to maximise general welfare whereas less democratic governments are more inclined to favour specific interests (Moravcsik, 1997; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). From an economic perspective, free trade is argued to maximise national welfare while protectionist trade policies rather produce benefits for particular interest groups (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009). Hence, more democratic regimes are more likely to support free(r) trade whereas less democratic governments are more likely to favour protectionist trade policies.

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77 Interview conducted in Geneva, November 4, 2011 (interview ID 8).
78 This is due to the different sizes of the winning coalition and the selectorate in democracies vs. autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).
79 At least under the condition that a country is sufficiently small to not be able to influence the world price via international trading (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009).
80 This is not to say that free trade creates benefits for everybody. Rather, of course, there are losers from free trade among the population as well. These (groups of) people, hence, prefer protectionist policies. Still, in democracies, those voters in favour of protectionism are assumed to be the minority whereas the majority is thought to support trade liberalisation.
Garrett and Lange (1986), e.g., confirm this expectation. They conclude that more democratic regimes are less likely to apply protectionist measures, shielding domestic industries from foreign competition, if such measures have negative effects for the general public (Garrett & Lange, 1986). From a theoretical perspective, Hinich and Munger (1997) argue that the median voter’s position – expected to favouring free trade – should prevail in democracies. Finally, the finding that democracy has a positive influence on trade openness is one of the most robust in international political economy (Kono, 2006).

Based on these considerations, it is reasonable to assume that a WTO member’s regime type is linked to all three kinds of negotiation behaviour in the Doha Round: negotiation activity, coalition building and strategy choice. The reasons for this assumption are twofold: First, more democratic WTO members are expected to be more interested in a new agreement liberalising international trade even more than is the current situation founded in existing agreements, i.e. the status quo. This interest may, of course, not encompass the entirety of negotiation issues but may be limited to several specific areas of the talks where WTO members – according to the respective influence of their domestic industries – have “offensive interests”, as they are called in WTO jargon. On the other hand, less democratic WTO members are thought to prefer the (more protectionist) status quo. Again, this preference may be restricted to some particular negotiation issues where WTO members have “defensive interests”. The second reason for the assumed relationship between a WTO member’s regime type and its negotiation behaviour in the Doha Round is the fact that decision making in the WTO requires consensus.

Hence, the goal of reaching a new trade agreement requires more than assembling a majority of like-minded WTO members interested in trade liberalisation: Every member needs to consent to the final package deal of the single undertaking. In addition, again, more democratic WTO members are assumed to be (more) interested in a final agreement which further liberalises global trade. These more democratic WTO members are, therefore, thought to behave differently than less democratic and, thus, more conservative members preferring the status quo: More democratic WTO members need to convince those WTO members that are sceptical of increased trade liberalisation of commonly acceptable compromises to come to the intended agreement. Accordingly, more democratic WTO members are expected to be more active (Chapter 2), to cooperate more (especially with other democracies; Chapter 3) and to use rather soft than hard tactics within their negotiation strategies (Chapter 4).

1.2.2 Methodological aspects: Research period & data collection

Investigating WTO members’ negotiation activity, their cooperative behaviour and their choice of negotiation strategies and tactics in the Doha Round does not only involve above independent
variables that are assumed to affect all of these three kinds of negotiation behaviour examined in this dissertation. In addition, the studies on these three dependent variables also partly overlap with regard to their research periods as well as the way the data were collected and analysed. Therefore, this section gives details on these methodological aspects of the dissertation at hand.

**Research period**

Since this work analyses three kinds of WTO members’ negotiation behaviour in the Doha Round, the research period roughly covers the time frame of the latter. Yet, the beginning of the research period results from the fact that the Agriculture and Services talks started already in 2000 while the negotiations in the majority of issues began in 2001; and the talks in Trade Facilitation started only in 2004 (WTO, 2009). Depending on the data collection technique and data availability, the endpoints of the slightly different research periods vary between 2011 and 2012.

**Data collection: Text analysis & interviews**

The examination of WTO members’ activity, coalition building behaviour and strategy use in the Doha Round negotiations required comprehensive data collection work. This data collection approach consisted of two main parts. First, minutes of official negotiation meetings and negotiation documents were screened and examined partly involving computer-assisted text analysis. These two kinds of WTO documentation have not been studied as sources of quantitative information before.81 This approach, thus, led to the accumulation of original data on WTO members’ negotiation activity and cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round. The second part of the data collection approach comprised interviews with WTO diplomats. Quantitative information from these interviews primarily constitutes the data basis for the investigation of WTO members’ choice of negotiation strategies and tactics in the Doha Round.

**Text analysis of minutes of meetings & negotiation documents**

The data for both WTO members’ negotiation activity and cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round were collected by a larger coding effort which partly included automatic text analysis. This coding effort involved two different groups of WTO documentation. On the one hand, there are the minutes of the official meetings of the specific groups, councils and committees which are dealing with the different negotiation issues of the Doha Round. On the other hand, there are all kinds of contributions (e.g. proposals) which individual or groups of WTO delegations had authored and distributed among the membership via the WTO Secretariat as official negotiation documents. Both

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81 An exception is Apecu (2013) who analyses the level of individual and collective engagement of African WTO members in the Doha Round, regular committee work and dispute settlement from 1995 to 2010.
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groups of documents cover those minutes and contributions that are publicly available via the WTO’s online database of official documentation (WTO, 2015f). 82

184 minutes of the official meetings of the negotiating groups, councils or committees were analysed quantitatively, making use of computer-assisted coding. More specifically, those minutes were searched for statements (remarks, comments etc.) made by individual or groups of WTO members. With regard to groups of WTO members that had made statements in the meetings together, such joint statements are typically indicated by the phrase “on behalf of” (e.g. “On behalf of CARICOM, the representative of Grenada supported Brazil in its comments on …”). Thus, an algorithm developed for this purpose used this phrase to distinguish between individual and groups of WTO members making statements. In addition, by means of a list of 184 verbs (potentially) appearing in the minutes, the algorithm identified WTO members as the subjects making a statement and ignored WTO members merely mentioned as objects in a statement. 83 That way, individual and groups of WTO members were registered each time they had made a statement in the meetings. These data cover all WTO members during the period of 2000 to 2011 and the negotiation issues Agriculture, Trade and Development, Trade and Environment, Intellectual Property Rights, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and Services. 84 Figure 1.2 shows, over time and negotiation issues, the number of minutes from which members’ individual and joint statements were

82. These two groups of documents differ, however, in their completeness: While there is good reason to assume that all existing minutes are available from the WTO’s online database, the negotiation contributions found there might not include all documents submitted by WTO members over the course of the negotiations. With regard to the latter, it must also be noted that besides those official submissions available from the online database, other proposals, contributions etc. have been distributed by WTO members as informal negotiation documents, so-called “jobs”, whose content is not (fully) accessible to the public (merely some information from the catalogue record is obtainable, such as the document’s symbol, date and title as well as key word entries in different categories like “contents”, “topics” and “bodies”). With regard to the minutes of the meetings, in spite of their public nature, there are no records of members’ statements if the deliberations took place partly or completely in informal mode.

83. A list of these 184 verbs which the algorithm used to identify WTO members each time they had made a statement in the meetings can be found in the Appendix to Chapter 2. The performance of the algorithm was assessed based on the number of cases misclassified. About 20 per cent of the cases were concerned by misclassification (in Agriculture talks in 2000 about 19 per cent, in 2001 about 14 per cent); yet, on average, not to a large extent. Therefore, the performance of the algorithm was evaluated as acceptable.

84. From the minutes of the meetings in the fields Trade Facilitation and WTO Rules, it is either not possible to extract members’ statements or such extraction could be biased. In the minutes of the meetings negotiating WTO Rules, members are not mentioned individually but only as “participants” (e.g. “A number of participants indicated that …”) or “(co-)sponsors” of papers (e.g. “One of the co-sponsors responded to some of these questions and comments.”). The meetings dealing with Trade Facilitation, on the other hand, often took place partly, mainly or completely in informal mode (31 times out of 47 meetings in total). As mentioned before, in informal mode, minutes are not taken except when statements are requested to be placed on record. One example is the meeting on 19 and 20 September 2005 when the minutes read “The meeting would begin in formal mode to allow delegations to officially introduce new submissions and make any other comments they may wish for the record”. 10 more minutes do not contain relevant information. Only six out of 47 minutes of the Trade Facilitation talks would be appropriate for data extraction. Because those data may create a biased picture, the minutes of the Trade Facilitation negotiations were not included as data sources.
extracted.\textsuperscript{85} The data on individual WTO members’ statements constitute one of two indicators for members’ negotiation activity in the Doha Round in Chapter 2.\textsuperscript{86}

![Figure 1.2: Number of minutes from which WTO members' individual and joint statements were extracted](image)

The other group of WTO documentation, the written contributions (e.g. proposals) which individual or groups of delegations had produced and submitted as official negotiation documents, was analysed quantitatively as well. In the case of those 1,026 documents which had been created by individual WTO members, not only the number of documents was recorded but also their length (in number of words). From the 541 documents which had been generated by groups of WTO members, the number of cases of dyadic cooperation was coded. In any case, these written contributions by WTO members cover the period of 2000 to 2011 (2012 for Trade Facilitation), and all the main negotiation issues of the single undertaking (i.e. Agriculture, Trade and Development, Trade and Environment, Intellectual Property Rights, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), Services, Trade

\textsuperscript{85} Table A1.2 in the Appendix following this introduction displays the numbers behind the graph.

\textsuperscript{86} The data on WTO members’ joint statements were extracted from the minutes, too, as described, but they are not used in the study on coalition building in the Doha Round negotiations in Chapter 3. The analysis focuses on one indicator measuring cooperative behaviour. Analysing these data, however, may constitute interesting and valuable future research as described below in the concluding Chapter 5.
Facilitation and WTO Rules). If the same documents had been submitted in multiple negotiation areas (e.g. Environment and NAMA), they were considered only once. Figure 1.3 displays the number of analysed documents which had been submitted by individual or groups of WTO members over time in different negotiation issues of the Doha Round.\(^{87}\)

![Figure 1.3: Number of analysed negotiation documents submitted by individual or groups of WTO members](image)

The data on individual members’ contributions constitute the second indicator for members’ negotiation activity in the Doha Round (Chapter 2), besides the data on individual WTO members’ statements extracted from the minutes. The data on members’ joint contributions, on the other hand, provide the basis for the study on cooperative behaviour among WTO members in the Doha Round negotiations (Chapter 3). In summary, the extensive document analysis compiled data for each member’s – or group of members’ – number of statements and number or length of negotiation contributions submitted, the year of the statement or written contribution and in which particular negotiation issue (e.g. Agriculture) the statement had been made or the contribution had been submitted.

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\(^{87}\) Table A1.3 in the Appendix shows the numbers behind the graph.
Interviews

Primarily for the study on WTO members’ choice of negotiation strategies and tactics in the Doha Round (Chapter 4) but also involving other aspects of member behaviour in the DDA, I conducted prearranged, semi-structured expert interviews with diplomats of 39 WTO members in November and December 2011 as well as in March 2012 in Geneva. These WTO members are: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, the EU, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi-Arabia, Switzerland, Taiwan (Chinese Taipei), Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and Uganda. Those WTO members are not a random sample of the entire membership. Instead, the interviewees, i.e. the diplomats from those WTO members, volunteered by (eventually) agreeing to be interviewed after I had sent requests for interviews to all WTO members. Generally, I aimed at interviewing the members’ permanent representatives (ambassadors), due to their higher level of personal experience as well as comprehensive knowledge and insight into all of the negotiation issues. However, as these top diplomats are almost always extremely busy, I conducted some of the interviews with delegation members holding a lower position.

The interview questions concern negotiation experience in particular and diplomatic experience in general, the size of the WTO delegation, challenges in the WTO, negotiation tactics used by the delegation, participation in negotiating groups (coalitions), domestic and international factors influencing the negotiation positions, the importance of individual negotiation issues and accession negotiations (if applicable). Hence, the interview responses constitute the data basis for the analysis of determinants affecting WTO members’ use of negotiation tactics in the Doha Round (Chapter 4). Besides, the interviews provide additional information on members’ levels of negotiation activity (Chapter 2) and their cooperation with other members in the DDA (Chapter 3). Needless to say, personal communication with WTO diplomats has offered unique insights into these multilateral trade negotiations as well. Since the interviewees were assured complete anonymity, however, statements or responses to particular interview questions cannot be attributed to specific WTO members.
1 Introduction: Newcomers in International Organisations

1.3 Appendix

Table A1.1: WTO Membership: Founding members and accessions (WTO, 2016a)

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2 WTO Members’ Negotiation Activity in the Doha Round

2.1 Introduction

Negotiations constitute an essential part of the international system. Multilateral trade negotiations among governments shape the global political economy and, thus, influence people’s lives worldwide. Such negotiations came into existence with the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. Since then, these negotiations have become increasingly complex and important as, on the one hand, trade between countries is more and more laid down in negotiated agreements and, on the other hand, these negotiations have deepened, covering now inter alia new kinds of transaction (e.g. services, patents and copyright, product and regulatory standards). However, political science does not yet sufficiently understand the process of negotiation. This study is situated at the border between the literatures of international political economy and negotiation analysis and aims at contributing to mutual stimulation.

So far, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the GATT, have seen the conclusion of eight negotiation rounds which succeeded in liberalising world trade more and more. Members participate in WTO decision making in order to design the rules in each trade round. Thus, negotiations in the scope of these trade rounds are of utmost importance and a new agreement –
2 WTO Members’ Negotiation Activity in the Doha Round

concluding the Doha Round or the “Doha Development Agenda” (DDA), as it is called semi-officially – will stipulate extensive trade-liberalising provisions and, hence, will probably be crucial to all WTO members. Due to its importance, one would assume that during the negotiations all WTO members try to influence the final agreement in their favour. However, not all members of the organisation take part in these negotiations to the same extent. This variance in negotiation activity is puzzling since a high level of participation in negotiations can be considered a major factor for negotiation success. While there is literature on the successful influence of WTO members on agreements negotiated in past trade rounds, e.g. the importance of the so-called Quad (i.e. the United States (US), the European Union (EU), Japan and Australia) in the Uruguay Round, when smaller and developing countries were rather followers (Schott & Watal, 2000a), there is little knowledge on such activity which precedes success in negotiations and the factors that have an impact on it.

Thus, this chapter examines the differences in frequency with which WTO members become active in order to influence the negotiations in their favour, seeking to explain why some members participate more often and are, hence, more actively involved in designing trade rules. Why are members like Bolivia or Brazil more active and members like Lithuania or the Philippines quite passive? Are newcomers indeed rather passive as one may assume since they do not have experience in WTO negotiations? And are economically powerful members, especially the “big players”, more active because they not only have the necessary financial means but also the political weight to expect a reward for their negotiation input? In addition, a set of further explanations may be important when studying WTO members’ negotiation activity: regime type, the salience of international trade in general or specific negotiation issues in particular and, finally, economic wealth. All of these explanations focus on the capacity or motivation of WTO members to become active in the DDA negotiations. The capacity of a WTO member refers to its ability to quickly generate national positions and easily adapt instructions in the course of the negotiations. The motivation of WTO members to become active in trade rounds, on the other hand, alludes to the members’ willingness to mobilise their limited resources in order to take part in the negotiations and try to influence them (cp. Panke, 2011).

This chapter continues as follows: The next section answers the question what is considered negotiation activity before the literature review points out what we already know about it. The theory part then introduces those factors which may influence WTO members’ negotiation activity in the Doha Round. Subsequently, the methodology section contains more details on the operationalisation of the dependent and independent variables of this study as well as the specific method of analysis chosen for this chapter’s research question and the data structure at hand. The following part presents the results before the conclusion finally highlights the major findings and (potential) further research questions raised in the scope of this study.

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2 WTO Members’ Negotiation Activity in the Doha Round

2.2 What is negotiation activity & what do we already know about it?

Already the first round of trade negotiations among the 23 original GATT founders in 1947 led to “a package of trade rules and 45,000 tariff concessions affecting $10 billion of trade, about one fifth of the world’s total” (WTO, 2009: 15). Members participate in WTO decision making in order to design the rules in each trade round. The current mandate of the WTO is even broader than the one of the GATT has been: it provides for a reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods as well as in services. The rules made by the membership affect most trade flows, not only among members, but also among members and non-members (Cattaneo & Primo Braga, 2009). In their research on the effects of the GATT and the WTO on world trade, Goldstein et al. (2007) conclude that participation in the trade regime had the largest impact on trade during the early years of the GATT when it increased bilateral trade between participants by 136% within the first two years of the agreement. Thus, negotiations in the scope of these trade rounds are of utmost importance. A new agreement – concluding the current Doha Round or (semi-officially) “Doha Development Agenda” (DDA) – will stipulate extensive trade-liberalising provisions and, hence, will probably be crucial to all WTO members.

For this agreement to come into existence, every WTO member needs to consent. The WTO’s rule of consensus decision making, hence, gives every member de facto veto power. The topmost decision-making body of the organisation is the Ministerial Conference which convenes all WTO members and usually takes place every two years. Over the course of the current Doha Round that was launched during the Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001, six of these meetings occurred so far (Cancún, September 2003; Hong Kong, December 2005; Geneva, November/December 2009 as well as December 2011; Bali, December 2013; Nairobi, December 2015).

Still, not only the bigger part of the work takes place in the everyday negotiations involving ambassadors and other diplomatic staff of the WTO members. This day-to-day business of negotiating essentially leads to the progress in the talks, often providing the vital basis for important steps in the process, celebrated as milestones at Ministerial Conferences. Such everyday work of the Doha Round negotiations occurs in specific groups, councils and committees some of which deal with those eight negotiation issues connected with each other in the package of the single undertaking. These groups, councils and committees are the Committee on Agriculture, the Committee on Trade and Development, the Committee on Trade and Environment, the TRIPS Council (dealing with Intellectual Property Rights), the Negotiating Group on Market Access, the Council for Trade in Services, the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation and the Negotiating Group on Rules (with the Committees and Councils meeting in “special sessions” for Doha Round matters) (WTO, 2009).

WTO members (i.e. their delegations, of course) may try to influence the final agreement in their favour by getting active in these groups, councils and committees. They may do so in (at least)
two basic ways: by submitting negotiation documents and by making statements during the meetings. Negotiation documents may be all kinds of written contributions, e.g. compromise proposals, authored by the delegations and distributed among the membership via the WTO Secretariat.

These two kinds of negotiation activity considered here can be regarded in two ways, respectively: their general occurrence (i.e. whether submitting negotiation documents or making statements takes place or not) and their intensity. In this study, the focus is on quantitative intensity. For statements during the meetings, the intuitive notion of quantitative intensity holds: the frequency of making statements. In the case of negotiation documents, though, looking at their mere number seems to be inappropriate when taking into account the effort related to producing such papers. The effort to create more extensive documents is presumably higher than what it takes for less extensive written contributions. Therefore, it appears more reasonable to focus on the (aggregate) length of negotiation documents submitted (instead of their number).

However, two drawbacks come with considering document length as quantitative intensity of negotiation activity: the difficulty to theorise about this concept and, accordingly, the problem to interpret the results. These drawbacks are essentially based on doubts whether the content of those documents submitted is comparable between WTO members. It is questionable to what extent the documents contain actual substance in contrast to, inter alia, repetitions (from previous submissions) or lengthy explanations (which may, e.g., be attributed to diplomatic language and / or the authors’ cultural background – in which conciseness may be regarded as rude – or simply the individual author’s personal style).

Hence, in this particular regard, the overall occurrence of (not) submitting negotiation documents seems to be the more instructive indicator of this kind of negotiation activity compared to document length. In general, although more conservative and less fine-grained, the dichotomous concepts of (not) handing in written contributions and (not) making statements during negotiating meetings, respectively, clearly appear to be less problematic than their more ambitious counterparts that try to grasp the intensity level of WTO members’ negotiation activity. Thus, the focus should rather be on the more basic concepts which are less ambiguous and disputable in theorising and interpreting.

*What we already know*

Due to its importance, one would assume that during the negotiations all WTO members try everything they can to influence the final agreement in their favour. However, not all members of the organisation take part in these negotiations to the same extent. Some members are clearly more active while others remain quite passive. How can WTO members’ inactivity in the negotiations on a
new agreement be explained? Given the importance of a high level of participation in negotiations as a major factor for later negotiation success, why does this variance in activity exist? Research on past trade rounds sheds light on the successful influence of WTO members on agreements negotiated, inter alia the active role of the Quad in the Uruguay Round, when smaller and developing countries were rather passive (Schott & Watal, 2000a).

In contrast to this previous passiveness, Odell (2006: 4) points out that developing countries’ participation in multilateral trade negotiations “exploded” after 1990. This exploding participation can be attributed to smaller and developing countries that had not been active or not even signatories before. Such increased activity became manifest in a set of developments. For example, after its creation in 1995, more members established or enlarged their missions to the WTO. Also, already during the preparation phase of the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, developing countries submitted a large number of formal proposals for consideration in the later negotiation process. Finally, the delegations of many members made use of training in international trade negotiations offered by UNCTAD, the WTO and regional organisations (Odell, 2006).

Focusing on a specific group of developing countries in the WTO, Apecu (2013) studies (inter alia) the level of individual participation of African WTO members in the Doha Round up to 2010. The analysis reveals that, although African delegations expressed concerns and pointed out their problems better than in the past, such participation was nominal and minimal even in areas of priority and in comparison with participation of members from other regions.

Is active participation in negotiations – in the form of submitting proposals and potentially involving large missions in Geneva and supported by capacity building measures – important for negotiation success? There are different answers in the literature. Schneider (2005: 666), for example, states that “[i]n some cases, an actor just has to be present at the negotiation table to receive what it wants.” However, Panke (2011) underlines the active use of different kinds of negotiation strategies as an important factor for negotiation success. As an EU diplomat emphasises, a delegation cannot hope that other negotiating parties approve this delegation’s proposal if this delegation is just present at the negotiation table and does not do anything. Similarly, an EU official points out that a delegation that does not pipe up is usually overruled by the other parties (Panke, 2011). Muthoo (1999), finally, stresses as well that procedure and format of negotiations are relevant: Especially the initiative of making offers (rather than reactions to those) provides bargaining power.

Although the existing literature has already provided some indications on the negotiation activity of members of the WTO and other international organisations, there remains a knowledge gap on WTO members’ participation in the Doha Round negotiations which precedes the outcome and the factors that have an impact on such negotiation activity.
2.3 Theory & Hypotheses

In the following, I present those characteristics which may affect WTO members’ negotiation activity in the current Doha Round. As already mentioned, these factors are related to either the capacity or the motivation of WTO members to become active in the negotiations. The capacity of a WTO member refers to its ability to quickly generate national positions and easily adapt instructions in the course of the negotiations. Without national positions, WTO delegations could not participate in the negotiations in order to influence the outcome in their interests, and their activity would decrease. However, since such capacities to develop national positions and to actively participate in negotiations are limited (due to finite resources), the motivation of WTO members to become active in trade rounds must be taken into account as well. The latter, therefore, alludes to the members’ willingness to mobilise their limited resources in order to take part in the negotiations and try to influence them (Panke, 2011).

2.3.1 Membership experience

There are several reasons to assume that membership experience affects WTO members’ negotiation activity, via more or less direct mechanisms. First, the results of my study on WTO members’ choice of negotiation strategies in the Doha Round (Chapter 4) suggest that long-standing members behave systematically different than newcomers: Long-time members tend to use soft negotiation tactics more often than members which have acceded to the WTO at a later point. The explanation for this finding may have to do with a member’s experience in and expertise on the organisation (compare also Dür and Mateo’s (2010) study on the EU). Such experience and expertise may also be an important factor for members’ negotiation activity. Panke (2011) finds a positive impact of newcomers’ learning effect on EU member states’ participation in negotiations within working groups and the Committee of Permanent Representatives. With regard to the WTO and, more specifically, the two kinds of negotiation activity considered, especially the generation of compromise proposals which need to reconcile the interests of more than 150 members (at best), e.g., requires a high level of information and knowledge which WTO members usually acquire in negotiations over time. Hence, insufficient experience and expertise may impair WTO members’ capacity to participate in the negotiations in general and in terms of submitting negotiation documents in particular.

Yet, second, newcomers’ low negotiation activity could also be a rational choice and, thus, motivation-related: Newcomers may decide to participate little initially in order to identify their ideal level of activity which best suits their interests (cp. Bailer et al., 2009).
Finally, in contrast to the founding members of the WTO, newcomers are obliged to negotiate their accession to the organisation.¹ In these accession negotiations, a plurality of aspects of the candidate’s trade regime are considered and stipulated. If new WTO members had to make a multitude of commitments as candidates in the scope of the accession negotiations, they may have no or only little “bargaining chips” (Pelc, 2011) left which they could use in the negotiations, inter alia to make compromises. Hence, the more encompassing and demanding the accession negotiations of a WTO candidate have been, the less capacity for activity this later WTO member may have in the Doha Round negotiations.

On the other hand, however, these new members may be more motivated to get active, as the literature on the enlargement of the European Union suggests. With regard to such negotiation behaviour displayed particularly by the United Kingdom and Spain, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) point out that “accession deals that are considered unfair impositions lead to disgruntled newcomers who spend much of their early accession years trying to renegotiate perceived wrongs.”

Coming from these theoretical considerations to interview statements from different WTO diplomats, especially those explanations receive support that refer to the sociological aspects of experience and expertise.² Interview partners from WTO members that once acceded to the organisation pointed to the challenge of being confronted with an unfamiliar environment whose rules and behavioural norms one has to learn in the first years of WTO membership. The importance of institutional memory was emphasised as a weakness of newcomers and an advantage of long-standing members. Equally, knowledge on the history and processes of negotiations from the past was emphasised as essential for today. New members’ reserve in early interactions within the WTO was described as another commonality: As newcomers lack knowledge concerning the conventions in the organisation, they try to learn them through observation, according to several interviewees. Hence, this would suggest that newcomers tend to adopt a wait and see behaviour also in negotiations – being rather hesitant in general, e.g. making statements in meetings, and too inexperienced for a kind of activity like generating compromise proposals. In addition, I found evidence in my interviews for the argumentation concerning newcomers’ rather exhaustive accession negotiations that led to a lack of “bargaining chips”.³

² Section 1.2.1 in the introductory Chapter 1 elaborates on the importance of experience in and expertise with the organisation for WTO members’ negotiation behaviour in the Doha Round, citing also interview statements.
³ One of the WTO diplomats, for instance, compared the challenges her country faced in the negotiations on founding GATT with “the sort of challenges that are being experienced by acceding members currently, for
Thus, the prediction is that newcomers have participated less in the Doha Round negotiations than long-standing members due to a set of possible reasons, including a lack of experience and expertise but also strategic calculations as well as a shortage of potential concessions to offer. This holds both for WTO members’ probability of submitting negotiation documents and making statements, though for the former presumably to a somewhat larger extent when considering the challenge of devising possibilities for compromise.\(^4\)

**Hypothesis 1**: The more experience WTO members have in the organisation, the more active they are likely to be in the negotiations (*capacity and / or motivation effect*).

### 2.3.2 Economic power

The strongest expectation linking economic power to WTO members’ activity in the Doha Round negotiations is that large members are likely to be more active than small and medium-sized members: When more powerful WTO members get active in the negotiations, i.e. lobby for their specific interests, their chances of being rewarded for their effort by succeeding in their attempt to influence the potential final agreement in their favour tend to be high, due to their economic strength – and the political weight that follows from it.

On the other hand, the already existing WTO agreements include specific provisions which grant developing countries special rights and allow developed countries to treat developing and least-developed countries more favourably than other WTO members. These provisions are called “special and differential treatment” (S&D) provisions. They contain, for example, the concession of longer time periods for the implementation of WTO agreements and commitments and particular measures aimed at increasing the trading opportunities for developing and least-developed countries (WTO, 2015d). As the Doha Round’s fundamental objective is to improve the trading prospects of its developing and least-developed members, it is semi-officially called the “Doha Development Agenda” (WTO, 2015b). More specifically, the DDA emphasizes special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed countries in three ways: First, it confirms the integral nature of S&D for the existing WTO agreements. Second, the S&D principle must be thoroughly respected in all aspects of the Doha Round’s work programme (i.e. beyond the negotiations). Finally, a review of all

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\(^4\)When it comes to the intensity of WTO members’ negotiation activity, however, a higher degree of experience and expertise does not need to be related to longer negotiation documents; it may, yet, be related to a bigger number of statements.
S&D provisions during special sessions of the WTO’s Trade and Development Committee is supposed to make them more precise, effective and operational (WTO, 2015a).

Hence, considering the issue of WTO members’ negotiation activity in the DDA against this background, it is conceivable that developing and least-developed members conclude that even a low level of negotiation activity might be sufficient for them to reach their goals. Developing and least-developed countries among the WTO membership may expect benefits from a final agreement favouring their trade interests without having to put much effort in the negotiations. Apecu (2013) concludes that one explaining factor for the nominal and minimal level of individual participation of African WTO members in the Doha Round up to 2010 seems to be “the continuing inertia of a “special and differential exemption orientation”” (Apecu, 2013: 29).

Based on these two possible mechanisms at work, the prediction is that economically more powerful members have participated more in the Doha Round negotiations than weaker members due to the formers’ political weight and the latters’ potential assumption of successful inactivity. Again, this holds both for WTO members’ probability of submitting negotiation documents and making statements.5

Hypothesis 2: The more economically powerful WTO members are, the more active they are likely to be in the negotiations (motivation effect).

2.3.3 Regime type

In contrast to the realist paradigm that considers a state’s regime type as unable to affect its behaviour, it may be argued that a WTO member’s regime type has an influence on its level of negotiation activity. This impact may be based on two conceivable causal mechanisms – one of them indicating a capacity effect, the other one a motivation effect – leading to different predictions on the kind of influence on negotiation activity.

The first causal mechanism concerns the domestic decision process on the development of negotiation positions: One may expect less democratic members to have a higher capacity for generating and adapting these positions since less veto players that may cause delays are involved in these processes (Tsebelis, 2002). Members with more democratic political systems, in contrast, may be less active as they are less able to prepare and adjust negotiation positions quickly.

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5 However, it could also be possible that the length of negotiation documents decreases with increasing economic (and political) power. The idea is that such powerful WTO members may not need to write long documents in order to persuade other WTO members of their suggestions. In this power perspective, their economic (and political) clout outweighs extensive elaborations of economically – and politically – weaker WTO members. On the other hand, only very few states among the membership have such an amount of power at their disposal. And, as mentioned before, every WTO member – even the least powerful – can make use of its de facto existing right to veto, in turn.
Hypothesis 3a: The more democratic WTO members are, the less active they are likely to be in the negotiations (capacity effect).

On the other hand, it can be argued that more democratic leaders may feel a higher obligation towards their voters than less democratic ones. More democratic governments tend to be more prone to maximise general welfare while less democratic governments are more likely to favour particular interests (Moravcsik, 1997; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Also, free trade maximises national welfare whereas trade protectionism creates benefits for special interest groups (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009). In their study, Garrett and Lange (1986) show that more democratic governments are less likely to protect domestic industries from foreign competition if such protectionism means a disadvantage to the general public. Finally, Hinich and Munger (1997) conclude that in democracies the median voter’s position – which should be in favour of free trade – is expected to prevail. With regard to WTO members’ negotiation activity in the Doha Round, it is reasonable to assume that pushing for freer trade is linked to a higher level of activity than maintaining the status quo. In other words, those WTO members that wish to achieve a final agreement which further liberalises global trade are thought to be more active than more conservative members. The reason for this assumption is primarily based on the fact that decisions in the WTO are taken by consensus rule. Hence, it is not sufficient to assemble a majority of like-minded WTO members, i.e. proponents of freer trade in this case. Rather, the latter need to get active and convince those WTO members sceptical of more trade liberalisation to find common compromises in order to come to an agreement.

Thus, assuming that free trade is (almost) always in the general public’s interest, the prediction is that more democratic WTO members have participated more in the Doha Round negotiations than less democratic members.

Hypothesis 3b: The more democratic WTO members are, the more active they are likely to be in the negotiations (motivation effect).

2.3.4 Salience
Salience needs to be taken into consideration when studying negotiation behaviour. However, there are different understandings of salience and the concept is often not properly defined in the literature (Leuffen et al., 2014). Wlezien (2005: 557) points out that there is “little consensus about

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6 This follows from the varying sizes of the winning coalition and the selectorate in democracies vs. autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).
7 At least as long as a country is not large enough to affect the world price through trading (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009).
what the word means: It means different things to different people and nothing in particular at all to others.” Warntjen (2012) gives a good overview on the meanings of salience which he considers “a defining feature of a broad class of bargaining models” (Warntjen, 2012: 180).

In general, the concept of salience refers to the importance an actor attaches to an issue (Hinich & Munger, 1997; Laver, 2001; MacLean & MacMillan, 2009). Thus, actors are supposed to behave differently depending on the importance of specific issues. Among other things, this importance may result from an issue’s (expected) policy impact, its political sensitivity or its attention from core constituencies. Furthermore, salience can be considered from an actor-specific and an issue-specific perspective: While some issues may be more important than others, actors may not agree concerning the relative salience of issues. In addition, the assessment of importance may take place at different levels: An entire issue area, a sub-issue or a particular stipulation may be regarded as especially important (Warntjen, 2012).

Following the general meaning of the concept mentioned above, I consider salience the degree of importance WTO members attach to, first, international trade in general and, second, the eight main negotiation issues covered in the Doha Round in particular. With regard to the former, WTO members with higher levels of international trade may attach greater importance to (the detailed regulations in) a final agreement than those members that trade less. This may create a larger motivation to become active in the negotiations for those WTO members that trade more in order to influence the outcome in their interest. This idea receives support from Apecu’s (2013) finding that one of the reasons for the nominal and minimal level of individual participation of African WTO members in the Doha Round up to 2010 was apparently their small trade share. As suggested by this finding, a greater importance of favourable trade regulations in general may result in higher negotiation activity to get the particular details into the intended agreement.

Hypothesis 4a: The more WTO members trade internationally, the more active they are likely to be in the negotiations (motivation effect).

With regard to the negotiation issues covered in the Doha Round, a more salient issue is one WTO members are willing to put more resources into. WTO members with low levels of salience regarding an issue, on the other hand, are expected to put less effort, if any, into this issue because resources are limited and are spent on issues deemed more important. Needless to say, given the actor-specific and the issue-specific perspective of relative salience, different actors may have different levels of salience concerning the same issue, while one and the same actor may have different levels of salience concerning different issues.

Because decisions are taken by consensus rule, this should require more compromises among WTO members than among members of other international organisations where decisions
are taken by majority rule. Thus, even if WTO members disagree on their positions concerning an issue, if their salience levels for this negotiation issue are similarly high, they may put much effort into the issue in order to find and convince others of a possible compromise.\(^8\)

Thus, the prediction is that the more salient or important one or several of the negotiation issues have been for WTO members, the more they participated in those negotiations concerning these individual issues.

**Hypothesis 4b:** The more salient specific negotiation issues are for WTO members, the more active these members are likely to be in those negotiations concerning the specific issues (*motivation effect*).

### 2.3.5 Economic wealth

Finally, some WTO members’ inactivity in the negotiations on a new agreement may be explained by a potential free rider problem – because the collection of non-discriminatory trading rules contained in hitherto existing WTO agreements can be considered a global public good (Cattaneo & Primo Braga, 2009). Hence, inactive members may shift the costs of negotiating a new agreement onto others but may benefit later from the agreement’s profitable and non-discriminatory trading rules nevertheless. In this regard, economically weaker WTO members – i.e. developing and least developed countries – are more likely to resort to such a free riding strategy. However, no single member can assume that its specific trade interests are implemented without this member’s efforts in the negotiations.

Another aspect that is related to WTO members’ economic wealth has to do with their negotiating delegations: Wealthier members can afford to have bigger and often better trained negotiating teams; hence, on average, they have a higher number of more skilful staff that attends more meetings and elaborates on more detailed issues. Thus, prosperous members have a higher capacity to quickly generate national positions and to easily adapt instructions in the course of the negotiations. Accordingly, they should be more active in the negotiations. Economically weaker members, in contrast, are expected to be less active as they do not dispose of the necessary financial means for a high degree of participation in the negotiations; they tend to have smaller negotiating delegations whose work load is, accordingly, high and it takes, therefore, longer for WTO members that are developing or least developed countries to prepare negotiation positions. Apecu (2013), for

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\(^8\) On the other hand, if WTO members have different positions in terms of different negotiation issues, but they also attach different saliences to these issues, then compromises are possible – gains may be collected “by exchanging differently-valued concessions on market access” (Odell 2003: 7). Hence, such mutual concessions can make all members better off.
instance, analysing the level of participation of African WTO members in the Doha Round, points to capacity constraints and limitations of human resources in both capitals and missions in Geneva.

_Hypothesis 5:_ The more wealthy WTO members are, the more active they are likely to be in the negotiations (capacity effect).

### 2.4 Methodology

This section first introduces the dependent variable of the analysis. Related to these descriptions, the research period of this study and the unit of analysis are presented. The sub-section thereafter highlights the independent variables that are used in this study. The final paragraphs go into the specific method of analysis chosen for the research question of this chapter and the data structure at hand.

#### 2.4.1 Dependent variable: Negotiation activity

The dependent variable in this study, negotiation activity of WTO members in the Doha Round, refers to the frequency of activity of WTO members during the negotiations. WTO members’ negotiation activity is considered here as WTO members having either authored and submitted negotiation documents like proposals or made statements in the meetings during the Doha Round.

Based on this idea of activity, two different indicators were coded: first, the number of WTO members’ statements during the meetings and, second, the length of WTO members’ written submissions. These data on WTO members’ negotiation activity in the Doha Round were collected by a larger coding effort covering all WTO members during the period of 2000, when the negotiations in the fields of Agriculture and Services began, up to 2011 or 2012 depending on the documents analysed. The data for this study are based on two different groups of documents: first, the minutes of the meetings of the specific negotiating groups, councils and committees; second, all kinds of contributions (e.g. proposals) authored by the delegations and distributed among the membership via the WTO Secretariat as official negotiation documents. Both groups of documents analysed cover those papers made publicly available via the WTO’s online database of official documentation.

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9As already pointed out in the introductory Chapter 1, these two groups of documents vary in their completeness: The minutes to negotiation meetings are probably available in their entirety from the WTO’s online database. With regard to members’ negotiation contributions, on the other hand, some official documents submitted during the negotiations may be missing. Also, in addition to those official submissions, WTO members distributed other communication as informal negotiation documents, so-called “jobs”, whose content is not (fully) publicly accessible (the catalogue record provides some information, e.g. the document’s symbol, date, title and key word entries in several categories like “contents”, “topics” and “bodies”). The drawback of the minutes for the meetings, in turn, concerns the fact that members’ statements are not recorded if the talks took place partly or completely in informal mode.
184 minutes of the meetings of the negotiating groups, councils or committees were analysed quantitatively, making use of computer-assisted coding. The minutes in this study cover the period of 2000 to 2011, and the negotiation issues Agriculture, Trade and Development, Trade and Environment, Intellectual Property Rights, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and Services. Those minutes were searched for individual members’ statements (remarks, comments etc.). With the help of a list of verbs used in the minutes, the algorithm developed for this purpose identified WTO members as the subjects making a statement and ignores WTO members merely mentioned as objects in a statement. For every year and negotiation issue included in this study, the aggregate number of statements made by every WTO member was counted.

This indicator is clearly based on the idea that a larger number of statements mean higher negotiation activity since a larger number of statements probably require more capacity (in preparing them, e.g.) and / or more willingness to become active in the negotiations. However, it may be countered that some diplomats are more inclined to talk than others. Another point of criticism may be that the meeting’s chairman or the Secretariat – the authors of the minutes – might summarise members’ statements to different degrees. Yet, as there is no information on this issue, these thoughts are merely speculation.

The written contributions by WTO members cover the period of 2000 to 2012, and all the main negotiation issues of the single undertaking (i.e. Agriculture, Trade and Development, Trade and Environment, Intellectual Property Rights, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), Services, Trade Facilitation and WTO Rules). For every year and negotiation issue, the aggregate number of words of all negotiation documents submitted by a WTO member was recorded. This indicator, too, is based on the idea that longer contributions mean higher negotiation activity because longer documents – similar to a larger number of statements – probably require more capacity (in preparing them, e.g.) and a greater ambition for activity than shorter submissions.

In summary, the document analysis generated data for each member’s number of statements (recorded in the minutes) and length of written negotiation contributions submitted, the
year of the statement or contribution and in which particular negotiation issue (e.g. Agriculture) the statement had been made or the contribution had been submitted.\textsuperscript{12}

\subsection*{2.4.2 Research period}
Since this study analyses WTO members’ negotiation activity in the Doha Round, the research period covers the time frame of the latter. Yet, the beginning of the research period results from the fact that the negotiations in the fields of Agriculture and Services started already in 2000 while the negotiations in the majority of issues began in 2001 (and the negotiations in Trade Facilitation started only in 2004). As regards WTO members’ statements in the meetings, the research period ends in 2011. As respects WTO members’ written submissions, the research period ends in 2012. Both endpoints are due to the start of handling the dependent variable data.

\subsection*{2.4.3 Unit of analysis}
The dataset on WTO members’ activity in the Doha Round negotiations contains a subset of WTO members during the years between 2000 and 2011 or 2012. Those WTO members that were holding full membership in the organisation during at least part of the research periods of this study and that can be considered independently negotiating parties (this refers to member states of the European Union, see below) are included. These are 138 individual WTO members. Due to the research period of twelve or 13 years, the analysis includes 1,656 or 1,794 member-years, respectively. If a WTO member has not been an independently negotiating WTO member in a certain year during the research period, a missing was assigned to the dependent variable for this member in the respective year.

Although the member states of the European Union (EU) are WTO members in their own right, the EU is a “single customs union with a single trade policy and tariff” (WTO, 2015e). Hence, EU member states discuss and agree on common positions for the WTO negotiations in advance and speak with one voice in the Doha Round.\textsuperscript{13} Therefore, EU members are not considered independently negotiating WTO members for the purpose of this study. The EU member states Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,

\textsuperscript{12} Joint statements, typically indicated by the phrase “on behalf of” (e.g. “On behalf of CARICOM the representative of Grenada supported Brazil in its comments on …”), were coded from the minutes as well. Likewise, data on joint negotiation contributions (e.g. proposals authored by a group of WTO members) were compiled. However, since the focus in this chapter is on individual members’ negotiation activity, joint statements or submissions are not included in this analysis. They, rather, constitute the data basis for a different study on WTO members’ cooperation behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations.

\textsuperscript{13} “The European Commission - the EU’s executive arm - speaks for all EU member States [sic] at almost all WTO meetings” (WTO, 2015e).
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom are, thus, not among those 138 WTO members whose activity in the Doha Round negotiations is analysed.14

During the research period of this study, twelve WTO members acceded to the EU, ten among them (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) in 2004, the remaining two (Bulgaria and Romania) in 2007. From the years of their EU accession, they are no longer considered independently negotiating WTO members in this study. Thus, the dependent variable for all those new EU members shows missing values from their years of accession to the end of the research period.

Furthermore, 18 states and customs territories with full autonomy in the conduct of their trade policies acceded to the WTO during the research period of this study: Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan and Oman in 2000; China, Lithuania and Moldova in 2001; Taiwan (in WTO terms “Chinese Taipei”) in 2002; Armenia and Macedonia in 2003; Cambodia and Nepal in 2004; Saudi Arabia in 2005; Tonga and Vietnam in 2007; as well as Cape Verde and Ukraine in 2008. Some of these newcomers used their observer status during their accession negotiations for already getting active in the Doha Round. Nevertheless, these new members are considered as holding full membership of the organisation in this study only from the year of their actual accession to the organisation. Hence, the dependent variable for these 18 new WTO members before their accession years shows missing values.

2.4.4 Independent variables

Membership experience is measured as the log of the number of months of WTO membership, calculating from a WTO member’s accession date (taken from the WTO homepage) – or 1 January 1995 for founding members of the WTO – to the beginning of the negotiations. For those WTO

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14 These 138 independently negotiating WTO members included in this study are the following states and customs territories: Albania, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia (from 2003), Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria (until 2006), Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia (from 2004), Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde (from 2008), Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China (from 2001), Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus (until 2003), Czech Republic (until 2003), Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia (until 2003), EU, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary (until 2003), Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania (from 2001 until 2003), Macao, Macedonia (from 2003), Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta (until 2003), Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova (from 2001), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal (from 2004), New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland (until 2003), Qatar, Romania (until 2006), Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia (from 2005), Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic (until 2003), Slovenia (until 2003), Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Switzerland, Taiwan (from 2002), Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga (from 2007), Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine (from 2008), United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, United States of America (USA), Venezuela, Vietnam (from 2007), Zambia, Zimbabwe.
members that acceded to the organisation after the negotiations had already started, membership duration is calculated as the number of months between accession date and yearly (twelve-monthly) time periods after the beginning of the negotiations. The log is used to simulate a learning curve, i.e. learning effects are larger in the beginning while smaller after some time of WTO membership.

For economic power, the log of gross domestic product (GDP) data (based on purchasing power parity (PPP) and in billions of current international dollar from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2014) from the years 2000 to 2012 are used.\(^{15}\)

Regime type is measured based on the Freedom House Index (Freedom House, 2013), a popular indicator of this concept. More specifically, data from both the “Freedom in the World Country Ratings” (for 136 WTO members in this study) and from the “Freedom in the World Territory Ratings” (for Hong Kong and Macao) are used.\(^{16}\) The Freedom House Index reflects evaluations about political rights and civil liberties in 195 countries and 14 related and disputed territories worldwide.\(^{17}\) These evaluations constitute the basis for a country’s or territory’s “freedom status” – “free”, “partly free”, “not free”. Political rights and civil liberties are measured on a scale from one to seven, where one represents the highest and seven the lowest degree of freedom. For this study, a country’s or territory’s combined average ratings for political rights and civil liberties are used and the reverse value of this average is calculated (i.e. an original value of seven is recoded into one, e.g.).\(^{18}\) Thus, higher values on this indicator reflect a higher degree of democracy.

For salience, two different indicators are used: First, global trade integration is measured using WTO members’ foreign trade-to-GDP ratio. This is the ratio of the foreign trade value (sum of exports and imports) to a country’s or territory’s GDP. It is also called trade openness ratio and is often used for measuring a country’s or territory’s economic openness.\(^{19}\) Data for the foreign trade-to-GDP ratio come from the World Bank (2015).\(^{20}\)

\(^{15}\) Because the IMF dataset does not contain data on Cuba, Liechtenstein and Macao, those are based on information from CIA World Factbooks (CIA, 2013) of different years (for Liechtenstein and Macao, there are no data for some years). Logged GDP data are used for the common reason of controlling outlier cases.

\(^{16}\) The Freedom House data for Macao cover only the years from 2000 to 2003.

\(^{17}\) The Freedom House Index has, however, also attracted criticism for a number of issues, e.g. its supposedly inadequate level of transparency (Giannone, 2010).

\(^{18}\) The regime type values for the EU over the duration of the research period are calculated as the (unweighted) average of the values of its single member states.

\(^{19}\) However, some scholars criticise that “it is nothing of the kind” (Birdsall & Hamoudi, 2002: 1); a clear definition of “trade openness” is lacking, though (Yannikaya, 2003). Yanikkaya (2003) points out that this difficulty in measuring openness has led to the creation of many different indicators of trade openness, while the meaning of “openness” has approached the notion of “free trade”, i.e. a trade system without any trade distortions (Yannikaya, 2003).

\(^{20}\) There are no data for Liechtenstein and Taiwan, however. The foreign trade-to-GDP ratio is preferred over absolute trade flows due to the latter’s high correlation with GDP, measuring WTO members’ economic power.
The second measure of salience uses data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2014). More specifically, data on *value added* (in per cent of GDP) in WTO members’ economic sectors of agriculture, industry and services are taken to create three variables on WTO members’ saliences in the respective negotiation issues of Agriculture, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and Services. Thus, small (large) values on these variables indicate a low (high) level of salience as to the sectors in any given year.

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21 Value added is “the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs” (World Bank, 2014). These data on value added are not available for six (industry) or seven (agriculture,
For economic wealth, the log of GDP per capita data (based on PPP and in current international dollar from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2014) from the years 2000 to 2012 are used.\textsuperscript{22} Table 2.1 summarises the descriptive statistics for all dependent, independent and control variables included in this study.

2.4.5 Analysis
As presented above, the dependent variable of this study, WTO members’ negotiation activity in the Doha Round, refers to the (continuous) frequency of participation of WTO members during the negotiations. The two indicators for this dependent variable are, first, the length (in words) of negotiation documents like proposals and, second, the number of statements in the meetings during the Doha Round, each over the years of the research period.

Within the member-year structure, activity is a rare occurrence: out of the 1,638 observations on the activity indicator “documents”, 1,339 observations are zeros; out of the 1,512 observations on the activity indicator “statements”, 769 observations are zeros. Table 2.2 shows the ten most active WTO members, measured by the total length (in number of words) of negotiation documents submitted in all main negotiation issues within the single undertaking (Agriculture, Trade and Development, Trade and Environment, Intellectual Property Rights, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), Services, Trade Facilitation and WTO Rules). With this indicator, the most active WTO member was the United States in 2005 with an aggregate word count of 105,604 – representing its total cursive activity in the negotiation areas of Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), Services, Trade Facilitation and WTO Rules as well as one document submitted in multiple issues, namely Trade and Environment and Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) in this case.\textsuperscript{23}

Table 2.3, on the other hand, shows the ten most active WTO members, measured by their yearly frequency of statements during meetings in the different negotiating groups, councils and committees dealing with the respective negotiation issues.\textsuperscript{24} With this indicator, the most active WTO member was the EU in 2005 with a total of 229 statements.
### Table 2.2: The ten most active WTO members, measured by total number of words of negotiation documents submitted in the main negotiation issues per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WTO member</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Intellectual Property</th>
<th>NAMA</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Trade Facilitation</th>
<th>WTO Rules</th>
<th>Multiple issues</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12,571</td>
<td>1,808</td>
<td>72,639</td>
<td>13,394</td>
<td>5,192</td>
<td>105,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,711</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80,798</td>
<td>7,970</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>93,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13,929</td>
<td>6,257</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11,269</td>
<td>10,231</td>
<td>10,181</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,091</td>
<td>2,193</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,123</td>
<td>4,514</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26,218</td>
<td>3,173</td>
<td>45,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>14,324</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>22,263</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36,587</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,688</td>
<td>12,175</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,547</td>
<td>2,955</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,959</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,017</td>
<td>3,283</td>
<td>1,601</td>
<td>5,140</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16,957</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,617</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23,460</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28,077</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7,081</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>20,988</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28,069</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20,873</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,937</td>
<td>3,844</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26,654</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2.3: The ten most active WTO members, measured by total number of statements made in meetings dealing with the main negotiation issues per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WTO member</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Intellectual Property</th>
<th>NAMA</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>WTO Rules</th>
<th>Multiple issues</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>229</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>214</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>187</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>156</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>146</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>130</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These 229 statements represent the EU’s aggregate oral activity in all of the areas analysed (i.e. Agriculture, Trade and Development, Trade and Environment, Intellectual Property Rights, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and Services). It does not come as a big surprise that these rankings of the most active WTO members in the Doha Round negotiations are dominated by the biggest “players” in the organisation: the United States and the European Union – both unambiguously characterised by an equally high level of motivation and capacity necessary to get active in the DDA in order to influence the final agreement in their (respective) favour. In addition, Tables 2.2 and 2.3 may already create the impression that WTO members were most active during the first years of the Doha Round negotiations. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 below, depicting WTO members’ activity regarding documents submitted and statements made over the years of the research period, confirm this suggestion. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 also allow for comparisons of WTO members’ aggregate level of activity between the different negotiation areas.

Considering different methodologies for analysing the data on WTO members’ activity in the Doha Round negotiations, quantitative methods are used to test the hypotheses pointing out the potential impact of different factors on the variance of WTO members’ activity in the DDA. As explained, one important requirement is a technique’s ability to handle a large number of zeros on the dependent variable because many WTO members do not show any activity at all. Thus, a model is required that is able to deal with the event count nature of the dependent variable and the very high number of zero values on the dependent variable. A hurdle model seems to be appropriate for analysing these data on WTO members’ level of activity in the Doha Round negotiations.

A hurdle model is a special kind of count model in which two different data generating processes may operate: a binomial probability model and a zero-truncated count data model. The binomial probability model determines the binary outcome of a count variable: zero or positive realisation. In case of the latter, the “hurdle is crossed” and the conditional distribution of the positive values is determined by a zero-truncated count data model. Hence, hurdle models can be understood as the sum of two independent models: a binomial probability model and a zero-truncated count data model (Mullahy, 1986; Cameron & Trivedi, 1998; McDowell, 2003).25

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25 McDowell (2003) shows that the parameters of a hurdle model can be estimated by fitting the two component models separately and explains that this characteristic of hurdle models “sets them apart from popular extensions to hurdle models such as the zero-inflated Poisson (zip) and the zero-inflated negative binomial (zinb) models. The zip and zinb models allow for a mixing process for the zeros, so the likelihoods are not separable with respect to the parameters to be estimated.” However, Neumayer (2003) points out that one of the problems with this two-stage model is that “it assumes that errors in both stages are uncorrelated”, i.e. it assumes that decisions at the two stages are taken independently – which might be unrealistic in many cases.
2 WTO Members’ Negotiation Activity in the Doha Round

Figure 2.1: WTO members’ yearly total activity – in aggregate word counts of negotiation documents submitted – in and over all main negotiation issues

Figure 2.2: WTO members’ yearly total activity – in aggregate number of statements made in meetings – in and over all main negotiation issues
For estimating WTO members’ level of activity in the Doha Round negotiations, I use hurdle models that consist of a logistic regression on the binary level – i.e. activity vs. inactivity – and a zero-truncated negative binomial regression on the count level – i.e. for the intensity of activity. I run a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression because the distribution of both indicators for the dependent variable, negotiation activity, show signs of over-dispersion. I include the same independent variables presented above – i.e. membership experience, economic power, regime type, salience (global trade integration and / or value added in three specific models) and economic wealth – in both levels of the hurdle models as I assume that they affect both the overall probability of negotiation activity and the intensity of such activity. In addition, as control variables, I include both a continuous variable for year and dummy variables for all years over the duration of the research period.

2.5 Results

Table 2.4 below provides the results of the two hurdle models estimating WTO members’ negotiation activity in the Doha Round in an aggregate analysis that does not distinguish between the single negotiation issues. With regard to the two different indicators for negotiation activity, Model I contains the aggregate word counts of negotiation documents submitted by the WTO members in all main negotiation issues, while Model II covers the total number of statements made by WTO members in meetings. In addition, more specific models were calculated that include either the aggregate word counts of negotiation documents or the total number of statements in the different negotiation areas. The results of these additional tests are shown in Tables A2.2 and A2.3 in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.26

In both models of the aggregate analysis, the regression coefficients of some of the independent variables examined in this study – i.e. membership experience, economic power, regime type, salience (global trade integration) and economic wealth – display the expected sign and are statistically significant at conventional levels. Still, the results vary between Model I and Model II, indicating that different factors influence WTO members’ submission of negotiation documents and their decision to make statements in DDA meetings.

With regard to membership experience, Hypothesis 1 suggests a positive impact on WTO members’ negotiation activity. In other words, Hypothesis 1 postulates that, with increasing membership experience, negotiation activity becomes both more likely and (if existent) more intensive. This expectation is mainly based on the assumption that new WTO members lack the capacity for getting active in the talks due to a shortage of experience in and expertise on WTO

26 The calculations on WTO members’ submitted documents in the negotiation issue Intellectual Property come to no result, though.
negotiations. The results provide a mixed picture: Those from the model in which statements made in meetings indicate negotiation activity support Hypothesis 1. In this model, both on the binary and the count level of the hurdle model, the coefficients for membership experience are positive and statistically highly significant. This suggests that both the overall probability of making statements and the number of statements made increase the longer WTO members have been in the organisation. This finding indicates that more established WTO members tend to speak more often than newcomers. This may corroborate the idea of a learning process that takes place after the accession of states and customs territories to the organisation. In this process, WTO members acquire experience and expertise necessary for statements during meetings that may be prepared in advance but are still more spontaneous than negotiation documents submitted and distributed among the membership. Also, a lack of experience and expertise and potentially related uncertainty may lead to a preference of writing out statements instead of speaking out in meetings.

Looking at the results for the latter, i.e. WTO members’ submitted documents, the coefficients for membership experience are positive but not statistically significant at an acceptable level, neither in the logistic regression nor in the zero-truncated negative binomial (ZTNB) regression. This suggests that WTO members’ time passed within the organisation does not have an effect on their general likeliness of submitting negotiation documents nor the aggregate length of documents submitted. In other words, newcomers are not different from long-standing members with regard to handing in proposals and other kinds of negotiation documents. This may well have to do with the fact that certainly not all contributions are compromise proposals.

A closer look at the individual negotiation issues in Tables A2.2 and A2.3 in the Appendix to this chapter reveals more details, though. These more specific models of the separate negotiation areas display partly different results for the impact of membership experience on WTO members’ negotiation activity. First, with regard to the overall probability of submitting negotiation documents (upper part of Table A2.2), the results for the individual issues (i.e. Agriculture, Development, Environment, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), Services, Trade Facilitation and WTO Rules) do not deviate from the finding when those different fields are not distinguished: There is no effect of membership experience on WTO members’ general probability of distributing papers.

Second, considering the aggregate length of negotiation documents submitted (lower part of Table A2.2), most results for membership experience from the individual analysis of negotiation issues are similar to that of the aggregate analysis: In Agriculture, Development, Environment and Services, membership experience does not have an effect on the aggregate length of negotiation documents submitted by WTO members in the Doha Round. Only in the Trade Facilitation negotiations, newcomers tend to submit longer papers in total than long-standing members, while the result is reversed for those talks dealing with Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and WTO
Rules. These findings may be explained by the fact that the majority of newcomers are developing countries for which Trade Facilitation is a more important matter than for long-time members. On the other hand, especially Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), i.e. practically negotiations on industrial products, and (to a lesser extent) WTO Rules tend to be less important issues to newcomers in the WTO that can be characterised as developing countries.

Third, in terms of the overall probability of making statements in meetings (upper part of Table A2.3), almost all of the single negotiation areas display the same – positive – result as expected and found in the aggregate analysis. Thus, in the fields of Development, Environment, Intellectual Property, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and Services, long-time members are more likely to make statements during negotiation meetings than newcomers. The only exception here is Agriculture where the analysis does not detect a difference between new and long-standing members. A possible explanation for this finding may be that Agriculture is an important issue for all members, no matter their position on the time bar of WTO membership.

Finally, regarding the number of statements made by WTO members in meetings (lower part of Table A2.3), membership experience does not play a role in Intellectual Property and Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA). The remaining areas (i.e. Agriculture, Development, Environment and Services), though, corroborate the expected positive relationship between membership experience and WTO members’ negotiation activity, here the number of statements during meetings in particular.

As for WTO members’ economic (and political) power, Hypothesis 2 expects powerful WTO members to be more active in the Doha Round negotiations, based on two possible mechanisms at work. First, more powerful states are thought to be more likely to be rewarded for their input, namely by succeeding to influence the potential agreement in their favour due to their greater economic (and political) weight. Second, developing and least-developed WTO members may consider the Doha Round “their” Round and, therefore, conclude that a low level of negotiation activity should be sufficient to reach their goals.

Looking at the results for economic (and political) power in the aggregate analysis (Table 2.4), they do provide support for this hypothesis: With both indicators measuring negotiation activity – documents submitted and statements made – and both on the binary and the count level of the hurdle models, the coefficients for economic (and political) power are positive and statistically highly significant. This indicates an increase in both the general probability of getting active and the intensity of negotiation activity when WTO members’ economic power increases. Hence, more powerful WTO members appear to be more active in the Doha Round negotiations.
Table 2.4: Hurdle model estimations for two indicators of negotiation activity of WTO members in the DDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model I: Documents</th>
<th>Model II: Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Binary level – Logistic regression:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Overall probability of submitting negotiation documents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership experience (log)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic power (log)</td>
<td>0.86*** (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime type</td>
<td>0.21*** (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience: Global trade integration</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic wealth (log)</td>
<td>0.36*** (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year (continuous)</td>
<td>-0.39*** (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>1.38*** (0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2002</td>
<td>0.33 (0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2003</td>
<td>0.59 (0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>-0.65 (0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2005</td>
<td>1.24*** (0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2006</td>
<td>1.04** (0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2007</td>
<td>0.98** (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2008</td>
<td>0.31 (0.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2009</td>
<td>0.39 (0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2010</td>
<td>2.41*** (0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2011</td>
<td>0.99 (0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>771.93*** (121.71)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Count level – Zero-truncated negative binomial regression:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model I: Documents</th>
<th>Model II: Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership experience</strong>&lt;br&gt;(log)</td>
<td><strong>Length of documents submitted</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.10 (0.16)</td>
<td>0.78*** (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic power</strong>&lt;br&gt;(log)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.29*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.41*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regime type</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.08** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.08*** (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salience:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.00** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global trade integration</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic wealth</strong>&lt;br&gt;(log)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.22*** (0.07)</td>
<td>0.17*** (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong>&lt;br&gt;(continuous)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.07 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.25*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>0.14 (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2002</td>
<td>0.31 (0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2003</td>
<td>0.45* (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>-0.35 (0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2005</td>
<td>0.73*** (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2006</td>
<td>0.32 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2007</td>
<td>0.20 (0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2008</td>
<td>-0.31 (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2009</td>
<td>-0.29 (0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2010</td>
<td>-0.36 (0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2011</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>138.03 (86.09)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This conclusion does not offer a hint on the causal mechanism relating economic (and political) power to WTO members’ negotiation activity, though. Hence, it is not clear whether the results support the idea focusing on the weight of the more powerful WTO members or the thought highlighting the expectations of developing and least-developed countries in the organisation – or both. However, the WTO (2009: 12) pointed out that “developing countries and transition economies were much more active and influential in the Uruguay Round negotiations than in any previous round, and they are even more so in the current Doha Development Agenda.” Thus, the positive effect of WTO members’ GDP on their negotiation activity in the Doha Round might be rather attributable to the economic (and political) weight mechanism.

The regression results from testing the impact of economic (and political) weight in the individual negotiation areas (Tables A2.2 and A2.3) by and large correspond to the findings of the aggregate analysis over all the issues. The only results that diverge from these findings concern the total document length in the fields of Development and Environment: They suggest that economic (and political) power does not affect total document length in these negotiation areas. This may be explained again by the levels of importance that WTO members attach to these two issues. Since the WTO deals with international trade (liberalisation) and because there are other international regimes and organisations focusing on environmental protection, the topic of Trade and Environment is considered incidental by many WTO members, both more and less powerful. On the other hand, within the “Doha Development Agenda”, the Trade and Development talks are crucial, no matter a WTO member’s GDP.

The results for regime type in both models of the aggregate analysis (Table 2.4) clearly support Hypothesis 3b that WTO members with higher levels of democracy are more likely to get active in the talks: Both on the binary and the count level of the hurdle models, the coefficients for regime type are positive and statistically (highly) significant. Thus, more democratic WTO members are more likely to generate and distribute negotiation documents and to make statements in DDA meetings. Furthermore, if they get active in these ways, more democratic WTO members also tend to submit longer negotiation documents (in total) and to make more statements in meetings, respectively. These findings may corroborate the idea about democratic leaders’ obligation towards their voters’ welfare, i.e. basically general welfare due to the size of the winning coalition and the
(even larger) selectorate in democracies: Democratic governments are thought to be interested in
maximising general welfare, free trade is supposed to maximise general welfare and the WTO’s Doha
Round is aimed at achieving freer trade. In order to reach this goal and because decisions are taken
by consensus, all WTO members need to agree to the final outcome, even those preferring the status
quo. Therefore, a high level of negotiation activity is assumed to be required from those WTO
members favouring an agreement on freer trade.

In contrast to the aggregate analysis of WTO members’ negotiation activity, the results for
regime type differ when those negotiation issues of the Doha Round constituting the single
undertaking are examined individually (Tables A2.2 and A2.3). Looking at the overall probability of
submitting negotiation documents in the areas Development, Environment, Services and Trade
Facilitation, regime type does not have an impact. The results for the negotiations concerning
Agriculture and WTO Rules correspond to the finding of the aggregate analysis: More democratic
WTO members appear to be more likely to produce negotiation documents. However, the opposite
seems to be true for the Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) talks: Here, more democratic WTO
members are less likely to produce negotiation documents.

Considering the length of the negotiation documents submitted, the only area that displays
the same – positive – relationship between regime type and negotiation activity as in the aggregate
analysis is Environment. This indicates that only within the negotiation issue of Trade and
Environment more democratic WTO members tend to produce longer documents. All of the other
areas studied, i.e. Agriculture, Development, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), Services,
Trade Facilitation and WTO Rules, do not corroborate this positive finding.

Furthermore, with regard to the second indicator of negotiation activity, making statements
during meetings, the results for regime type diverge as well when the DDA’s negotiation issues are
analysed separately. In terms of the general probability of making statements in negotiation
meetings, WTO members’ regime type does not play a role in the areas of Environment and Non-
Agricultural Market Access (NAMA). The other issues, i.e. Agriculture, Development, Intellectual
Property and Services support the expected positive finding from the aggregate analysis.

Finally, as to the number of statements, the areas Development, Environment and Services
deviate from the positive result detected in the aggregate analysis. The results indicate that in the
fields of Development and Environment (and possibly in Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and
Services, too) WTO members’ regime type does not influence their intensity of activity, i.e. the
number of statements made during meetings.

A potential explanation why these results from the separate analysis of the Doha Round’s
individual negotiation issues (e.g. Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA)) deviate from the ones of
the aggregate analysis could have to do with the influence of domestic lobby groups on their
governments: Public choice theory suggests that, independent of regime type, the political process features an inherent tendency to support protectionist measures favoured by well-organised special interest groups rather than trade liberalisation that would arguably provide benefits to society as a whole (Arrow, 1951; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Olson, 1965).

Finally, neither the results of the aggregate analysis nor the findings from studying the Doha Round’s negotiation issues individually provide support for Hypothesis 3b. Hence, the idea that less democratic WTO members may be more active in the DDA due to a smaller number of institutional veto players involved in the domestic decision process concerning negotiation positions is not corroborated by the results of this study.

Looking at the regression results for WTO members’ salience regarding international trade in the models of the aggregate analysis (Table 2.4), three out of the four regression coefficients of the two hurdle models are not statistically significant at any common level. This suggests that, contrary to the expectation, WTO members’ integration into global trade neither affects their overall probability of submitting documents or making statements nor the number of statements made. In addition, the only regression coefficient that is statistically significant at the five per cent level is negative – indicating that a higher level of global trade integration is related to shorter (aggregate) negotiation documents submitted. A plausible explanation for this counterintuitive result seems to be difficult to come up with. Also, if the individual negotiation issues are analysed separately, none of the results supports this counterintuitive finding. In any case, there is no support for Hypothesis 4a that WTO members with higher levels of international trade are more likely to get active in the negotiations, due to the greater salience of free trade in general.

The results from those regressions that test the salience effect in the different negotiation areas individually (Tables A2.2 and A2.3) show a mixed picture – with results not necessarily even being consistent across the two levels of the hurdle models. In terms of WTO members’ general probability of submitting negotiation documents, neither of the issues studied (i.e. Development, Environment, Trade Facilitation and WTO Rules) entails a different finding than the results from the aggregate analysis: There is no support for the expected positive relationship between WTO members’ salience of international trade and their inclination to create and distribute documents in these negotiation areas. Again, the same holds for the length of WTO members’ submissions.

With regard to WTO members’ overall probability of making statements during meetings, the regression results in most areas of the Doha Round negotiations covered here – i.e. Development,

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27 The respective results for the areas Agriculture, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and Services are not displayed in Table A2.2 in the Appendix to this chapter. Those three regression coefficients for global trade integration are negative but not statistically significant at any common level.

28 For Agriculture, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and Services, a different indicator for salience is used in these more specific analyses. Details are given below.
Environment, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and Services – do not deviate from the statistically non-significant ones of the aggregate analysis. Hence, WTO members with higher levels of international trade do not seem to be more likely to speak out in these particular parts of the talks. Yet, for the Agriculture and the Intellectual Property negotiations, the results suggest that the importance of international trade does affect WTO members’ decision to make statements concerning these issues. More specifically, the relationship is negative for Agriculture while positive for Intellectual Property. In other words, those WTO members that are integrated into global trade to a higher degree are less likely to make statements during the Special Sessions of the Committee on Agriculture but more likely to speak out in the meetings of the TRIPS Council than WTO members that trade less.

Finally, the results for the number of statements made when studying the single issues individually are not too different from those of the aggregate analysis: In most fields, here Agriculture, Intellectual Property, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and Services, there is no support for an expected impact of WTO members’ involvement in international trade and their number of statements in the respective talks. However, WTO members that trade more tend to make fewer statements during the Special Sessions of the Committee on Trade and Development and the Committee on Trade and Environment, respectively, compared to WTO members that trade less.

In addition, the more specific models of the individual negotiation issues provide the results for the second measure of salience, value added in WTO members’ economic sectors of agriculture, industry and services (Tables A2.2 and A2.3). Considering WTO members’ general probability of submitting negotiation documents, the results suggest that, first, a higher value added in the agricultural sector makes the submission of documents in the Agriculture negotiations less likely. This finding is again rather counterintuitive. Second, a higher value added in the industrial sector does not influence WTO members’ inclination to create and distribute papers in the Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) talks. Finally, though, a higher value added in the services sector increases WTO members’ overall probability of submitting documents in this part of the negotiations – as expected according to Hypothesis 4a.

Furthermore, an effect of value added on document length cannot be detected for the fields of Agriculture and Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA). However, a higher value added in the services sector tends to decrease the total length of negotiation documents submitted by WTO members in the Services talks. This constitutes once more a rather counterintuitive finding.

With regard to WTO members’ general probability of making statements during meetings in these three areas of the negotiations, the results are again mixed: First, a higher value added in the agricultural sector makes statements in the Agriculture negotiations less likely. Second, a higher
value added in the industrial sector does not influence WTO members’ inclination to make statements in the Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) talks. Finally, a higher value added in the services sector increases WTO members’ overall probability of making statements in the Services negotiation, as would be expected. All of these – partly counterintuitive (Agriculture) – findings correspond to those for the other indicator of negotiation activity, i.e. WTO members’ general probability of submitting documents.

Eventually, the results do not provide support for any kind of influence of value added (in the respective economic sectors) on the number of statements made in the Agriculture and Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) talks. Yet, a higher value added in the services sector tends to increase the number of statements made by WTO members in the Services talks. Again, the results concerning Agriculture and Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) agree with those for the other indicator of intensity of negotiation activity, document length. Still, in general, the expected positive relationship between a negotiation issue’s salience for WTO members and their activity in this area of the Doha Round is only slightly corroborated, e.g. by some of the findings concerning the Services talks. Thus, the results provide merely partly support for Hypothesis 4b.

Insights from interviews conducted with WTO diplomats reveals, however, that members do not only focus on their particular interests in the negotiations but also take into account the importance of the multilateral trading system:

“We have tabled an extensive number of contributions and proposals to the Doha Round, and, I think, we have been most active – as you would expect – in those areas where we have the specific offensive interests that we are trying to move forward, but we have also tabled proposals and co-sponsored proposals in areas where we do not necessarily have an offensive interest ourselves but we see value from a systemic perspective in the negotiations moving forward. So, we have been quite active.”

Finally, looking at the last potential factor of negotiation activity in this study, WTO members’ economic wealth, Hypothesis 5 expects a positive impact on both kinds of WTO members’ negotiation activity because wealthier members tend to have bigger and more skilful negotiating teams that can attend more meetings and author more detailed papers. Hence, more prosperous members are assumed to have a higher capacity to get active in the negotiations in general. These expectations are supported in the aggregate analysis (Table 2.4) by the results concerning the overall probability of submitting negotiation documents and the length of these documents as well as the number of statements made in meetings. Yet, WTO members’ economic wealth does not seem to

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29 Interview conducted in Geneva, November 2, 2011 (interview ID 3). Another diplomat emphasised: “Our interest is mainly systemic, to have a good outcome that liberalises trade in agriculture and reduces market distortions like subsidies and so forth” (interview conducted in Geneva, November 3, 2011; interview ID 7).
have an influence on the overall probability of making statements during meetings since the respective regression coefficient is not statistically significant at an acceptable level.\textsuperscript{30}

With regard to the issue-specific analyses (Tables A2.2 and A2.3), the results for economic wealth are mixed for each kind of indicator of WTO members’ negotiation activity. Considering the overall probability of handing in negotiation documents first, wealthier WTO members are more likely to generate and distribute papers than those characterised by a smaller GDP per capita in the three areas Environment, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and WTO Rules. Hence, these results are in accordance with the positive finding of the aggregate analysis. For the Development, Services and Trade Facilitation talks, such an impact cannot be detected. In the Agriculture negotiations, there may even be the reverse effect: Wealthier WTO members are less likely to submit negotiation documents than their poorer counterparts.\textsuperscript{31}

Second, for document length, the issue-specific analyses cannot detect a systematic effect of economic wealth for most negotiation issues, i.e. Agriculture, Development, Environment, Non-
Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), Trade Facilitation and WTO Rules. Interestingly, the Services talks are the only area that corroborates the finding from the aggregate analysis: More prosperous WTO members tend to produce longer negotiation documents (in total) than their counterparts with smaller GDPs per capita.

Third, looking at WTO members’ general probability of making statements during meetings, the results show the whole variety: In half of the fields analysed – Intellectual Property, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), Services –, the findings agree with the result of the aggregate analysis. Thus, WTO members’ economic wealth does not seem to affect their inclination to speak out during negotiation meetings concerning these issues. The result for the Environment talks shows a different picture again: Wealthier WTO members appear to be more likely to make a statement compared to less wealthy members. Eventually, the reverse effect is detected in both the Agriculture and Development negotiations: Here, more prosperous WTO members are less likely to make a statement than members with smaller GDPs per capita. In other words, poor WTO members are more likely to speak out during the Special Sessions of the Committee on Agriculture and the Committee on Trade and Development, respectively. Especially the latter finding is straightforward, given the interests of developing and least-developed countries in the Doha Round negotiations. On the other hand, as to the result concerning the negative influence of economic wealth on negotiation activity in the Agriculture talks, the WTO (2009: 14) already noticed that “[r]icher governments are more likely to yield to the siren call of protectionism, for short term political gain – through subsidies, complicated red tape, and hiding behind legitimate policy objectives such as environmental preservation or consumer protection as an excuse to protect producers”.

Finally, in terms of WTO members’ frequency of statements in negotiation meetings, the positive effect of economic wealth detected in the aggregate analysis appears for the individual issues of Environment and Intellectual Property as well, but not for the other areas (i.e. Agriculture, Development, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and Services). Hence, wealthier WTO members tend to make more statements during the Special Sessions of the Committee on Trade and Environment and in the meetings of the TRIPS Council than their less wealthy counterparts. For the remaining fields, such a positive effect – nor a negative one – does not seem to exist.

In addition, Figures 2.3 to 2.6 below as well as Figures A2.1 to A2.4 in the Appendix following this chapter display the effect sizes of those independent variables which prove influential as to WTO members’ negotiation activity, according to the results of the aggregate regression analyses above.

32 Again, the coefficient is statistically only slightly significant.
33 Because the effect sizes of regime type and economic wealth are in general rather small compared to those of membership duration and economic power and, hence, in order to concentrate on the essential findings, the graphs displaying the effect sizes of regime type and economic wealth are presented in the Appendix to this chapter.
The graphs in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 as well as Figures A2.1 and A2.2 present the effect sizes of such influential factors on WTO members’ probability of submitting negotiation documents and the length of negotiation documents submitted. The graphs in Figures 2.5 and 2.6 as well as Figures A2.3 and A2.4, in turn, show the effect sizes concerning WTO members’ probability of making statements...
and the number of statements made. All of the graphs in Figures 2.3 to 2.6 as well as Figures A2.1 to A2.4 in the Appendix display the predicted values for the respective indicator of negotiation activity when the independent variables’ values increase from their minimum to their maximum. Regarding these predicted values more specifically, the graphs present the associated uncertainty by showing the 95 per cent confidence intervals around the estimated probability or intensity of activity, while holding all other variables at their means.

Figure 2.5: Effect sizes of membership duration and economic power on WTO members’ probability of making statements
Looking at the predicted probability of submitting negotiation documents in Figure 2.3, the positive effect of economic power (and political weight) is considerably stronger than for regime type or economic wealth (displayed in Figure A2.1 in the Appendix at the end of this chapter). Here, it is also important to remember what the descriptive statistics in Table 2.1 above indicate: Values for economic power, measured in GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP), larger than about 760 billion current international dollar (the GDP of Egypt and Taiwan in 2009, e.g.) are already rare (90th percentile), larger than 1,500 (as Brazil had in 2000 or Mexico in 2005) very rare (95th percentile); the median value is merely 36 (Jordan in 2003). Still, taking this into account, the effect of economic power is stronger than the one for regime type or economic wealth.

![Figure 2.6: Effect sizes of membership duration and economic power on the number of statements made by WTO members](image-url)
Similar to WTO members’ economic power, increasing economic wealth (measured in GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP)) makes the submission of documents more likely. Figure A2.1 in the Appendix shows the effect size. Yet, it must be considered that the median is only about 7,400 current international dollar (Mongolia in 2011) and values higher than 35,000 (the GDP per capita of Bahrain in 2000 and Japan in 2011, e.g.) rarely exist in the data. Accordingly, both graphs for economic power and economic wealth display that the degree of uncertainty associated with the expected values rises with increasing values of the independent variables: The 95 per cent confidence intervals are larger for higher values of WTO members’ GDPS and GDPS per capita.

The effect sizes for membership duration regarding the probability of making statements (Figure 2.5) and the frequency of speaking out in meetings (Figure 2.6) are comparably large. Especially the latter graph concerning the number of statements shows again the varying uncertainty associated with increasing values of membership duration: Uncertainty first slightly decreases before considerably increasing. The impact of economic wealth (shown in Figure A2.4 in the Appendix), on the other hand, appears to be relatively small in general, especially when taking into account, again, that most WTO members feature per-capita GDPS of less than 35,000 current international dollar.

The effect sizes for regime type (presented in Figures A2.1 to A2.4 in the Appendix) regarding the probability of handing in negotiation documents and document length as well as the frequency of speaking up in meetings are relatively small. Merely the impact of WTO members’ regime type on their probability of making statements is quite considerable. In contrast, the effect of economic power appears comparably large in general, with steep increases in the respective indicators of WTO members’ negotiation activity even for small values of their GDPS (that constitute the majority of the data anyway). Figure 2.4 illustrates this as well, displaying the effect size of economic power on the length of negotiation documents submitted by WTO members.

Ultimately, with regard to the control variables, first for the continuously measured year, almost all of the regression coefficients are negative and statistically significant. This holds for both levels of the hurdle model in which negotiation activity is measured by statements in meetings as well as for the binary level of the model in which WTO members’ activity is indicated by submitting negotiation documents. This suggests that the overall probability of submitting documents or making statements and the number of statements made tend to decrease over the course of the negotiations, while the aggregate length of documents submitted does not appear to be affected by the duration of the negotiations. Still, all of these findings seem to be plausibly explained by negotiation fatigue, not only the ones clearly pointing to a negative relationship between time and negotiation activity. It might be reasonable to assume that with time elapsing, WTO members would refrain from submitting negotiation documents completely, not necessarily to create shorter ones.
The results for the dummy variables for each year of the research period display a mixed picture, both for the model in which WTO members’ activity is measured by the distribution of negotiation documents and the model in which activity is indicated by statements in meetings. In the former, year 2012 constitutes the base year the others are estimated against; in the latter, this holds for year 2011. In a nutshell, there is no systematic pattern in the results for these yearly dummy variables, and their meaningful interpretation is further complicated by dummies which are dropped from the model because of collinearity or which are omitted during the analysis.

2.6 Conclusion

A new WTO agreement – concluding the Doha Round or (semi-officially) the “Doha Development Agenda” (DDA) – will stipulate extensive trade-liberalising provisions and, hence, will probably be crucial to all WTO members. Accordingly, during the negotiations, all WTO members are expected to try their best to influence the intended agreement in their favour. WTO members, though, do not participate in these negotiations to the same extent. Because a high level of participation in negotiations is often regarded as a major factor for negotiation success, this variance in negotiation activity is puzzling. In contrast to existing literature on WTO members’ successful influence on trade agreements concluding past negotiation rounds, negotiation activity that precedes such success and the drivers of participation in negotiations are less well researched. Therefore, this chapter studies the differences in WTO members’ participation in the Doha Round, analysing why some members are more actively involved in designing trade rules than others. The factors examined refer to WTO members’ capacity or motivation to become active in the DDA negotiations.

One of the factors thought to have a positive impact on WTO members’ levels of negotiation activity in the Doha Round is membership experience. More specifically, members’ negotiation activity is expected to become both more likely and more intensive with increasing membership experience because newcomers have initially little experience in and expertise on WTO negotiations and are, hence, assumed to lack the capacity for getting active. The findings are mixed. The expectation is supported when members’ negotiation activity is measured by their statements during the meetings of the different negotiation groups, councils and committees of the Doha Round: Statements are both more likely and more numerous the longer WTO members have been in the organisation. This finding corroborates the idea of a learning process. Although statements may be prepared in advance, they are arguably more spontaneous than the creation and distribution of negotiation documents. With respect to this second indicator of members’ negotiation activity, membership experience does not seem to have an effect. Hence, newcomers are apparently not different from long-standing members in terms of handing in proposals and other kinds of
negotiation documents. This may have to do with the fact that not all negotiation contributions are compromise proposals.

Further theoretical considerations suggest that WTO members’ economic power and related political weight are positively linked with their level of negotiation activity in the Doha Round. The results corroborate this expectation for both indicators of negotiation activity: documents submitted and statements made. More powerful members tend to be more active in the DDA. From this finding, though, it is not clear whether the results support the idea focusing on the political weight of the economically more powerful members or the thought highlighting the expectations of developing and least-developed countries in the organisation – or both. Yet, as the WTO (2009: 12) describes developing countries’ and transition economies’ negotiation activity in the Doha Round as relatively high, the positive effect of WTO members’ economic strength appears to be more related to their political weight.

With regard to WTO members’ regime type, the findings in the aggregate analysis clearly corroborate the expectation that more democratic members tend to be more active: More democratic members are both more likely to submit negotiation documents and to make statements in meetings. Also, more democratic members tend to produce longer negotiation documents (in total) and to speak more frequently in DDA meetings. These results provide support for the assumed causal mechanism relating WTO members’ democracy level, their leaders’ obligation towards their voters’ and, potentially, general welfare (given the sizes of the winning coalition and the selectorate in democracies), members’ preferences for free(r) trade and their level of negotiation activity in the Doha Round. In the analysis of individual negotiation issues, the findings differ slightly. In some areas of the Doha Round (e.g. Trade Facilitation), WTO members’ regime type does not affect their participation; whether it is their probability to submit negotiation documents or to make statements or whether it concerns the length of documents or the frequency of statements. In one field, the result is negative: More democratic members are less likely to submit negotiation documents in the Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) talks. A potential explanation especially for this finding, but also for other ones inconsistent in the aggregate vs. individual analyses, could be ascribed to the impact of domestic lobby groups on their governments. Finally, there is no support at all for the idea about less democratic WTO members’ more active participation due to their smaller number of institutional veto players.

The findings on WTO members’ integration into global trade are mixed. In the aggregate analysis, there is no support for the expected positive relationship between members’ salience of international trade and their negotiation activity: Higher global trade integration does not make members more likely to submit documents or to make statements. It neither affects members’ frequency of statements. The only statistically significant effect is negative, suggesting that a higher
degree of global trade integration is linked to (in total) shorter negotiation documents submitted. However, if the negotiation issues are analysed individually, none of the results corroborates this counterintuitive finding. Some results of the individual analysis deviate from those of the aggregate analysis. For instance, members that trade more are less likely to make statements during the Special Sessions of the Committee on Agriculture but more likely to speak in the meetings of the TRIPS Council than members that trade less. On the other hand, members that trade more tend to make fewer statements during the Special Sessions of the Committee on Trade and Development and the Committee on Trade and Environment, respectively, compared to members that trade less. Additional results on the second measure of salience, value added in WTO members’ economic sectors of agriculture, industry and services, show a mixed picture as well.

Finally, WTO members’ negotiation activity is expected to increase with higher levels of economic wealth since richer members tend to have larger and better educated negotiating delegations able to attend more meetings and to write more detailed papers. Accordingly, more prosperous members are thought to have a higher capacity for active participation in the negotiations in general. These expectations find support in the aggregate analysis: Richer members are more likely to submit negotiation documents. Such members also tend to generate longer negotiation documents (in total) and speak more often in DDA meetings. However, economic wealth does not seem to make members more likely to issue statements during meetings. The complementary issue-specific analyses entail mixed findings about the effect of members’ economic wealth on (the different forms of) their negotiation activity.

Regarding these different forms of WTO members’ negotiation activity, handing in written contributions and making statements during meetings, a slight modification of the analyses could concern the respective indicators for measuring members’ participation. Due to the drawbacks that come with the application of aggregate document length, testing members’ intensity of negotiation activity using the actual number of documents submitted may constitute a reasonable robustness check of the results found here.
## 2.7 Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A2.1: Verbs used in the automatic text analysis of minutes of Doha Round negotiation meetings</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>begged</td>
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<td>called</td>
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<td>came</td>
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<td>cautioned</td>
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<td>stood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic power</td>
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<td>(log)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regime type</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Year 2002</td>
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<td>Year 2004</td>
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<td>Year 2005</td>
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<td>Year 2009</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Count level – Zero-truncated negative binomial regression: Length of negotiation documents submitted**

<p>| Membership experience (log) | 0.03 | 12.53 | -0.27 | 0.49** | -0.02 | -1.25** | 1.10*** |
|                            | (0.24)| (11.54)| (0.44)| (0.24)| (0.20)| (0.56)| (0.31) |
| Economic power (log)       | 0.12**| 0.08 | -0.01 | 0.24***| 0.16**| 0.37***| 0.23*** |
|                            | (0.05)| (0.12)| (0.06)| (0.05)| (0.07)| (0.09)| (0.05) |
| Regime type                | 0.09 | -0.05 | 0.23***| 0.02 | -0.13 | 0.12 | -0.05 |
|                            | (0.09)| (0.28)| (0.07)| (0.06)| (0.09)| (0.09)| (0.08) |
| Salience: Global trade integration | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00 | 0.00 |
| Salience: Value added      | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.04**| -0.04**| -0.04**| -0.04**| -0.04** |
|                            | (0.02)| (0.01)| (0.02)| (0.02)| (0.02)| (0.02)| (0.02) |
| Economic wealth (log)      | 0.15 | 0.25 | -0.04 | -0.06 | 0.82***| 0.14 | 0.17 |
|                            | (0.21)| (0.45)| (0.14)| (0.09)| (0.25)| (0.19)| (0.12) |
| Year (continuous)          | 0.17 | -2.20 | -1.14*| -1.94***| -1.15 | 0.67**| 0.18 |
|                            | (0.37)| (1.86)| (0.67)| (0.65)| (0.81)| (0.32)| (0.40) |
| Year 2000                  | 2.89 | -5.18 | -5.18 | -5.18 | -5.18 | -5.18 | -5.18 |
|                            | (2.94)| (4.11)| (4.11)| (4.11)| (4.11)| (4.11)| (4.11) |</p>
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<th>Services</th>
<th>Trade Facilitation</th>
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<td>4362.08</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; † omitted during regression calculations
Table A2.3: Hurdle model estimations for WTO members’ statements in meetings of the different negotiation areas of the Doha Round

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<th>Intellectual Property</th>
<th>NAMA</th>
<th>Services</th>
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<td><strong>Binary level – Logistic regression: Overall probability of making statements during meetings</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership experience (log)</td>
<td>0.27 (0.21)</td>
<td>1.24*** (0.40)</td>
<td>0.76** (0.38)</td>
<td>0.75** (0.33)</td>
<td>1.28*** (0.45)</td>
<td>0.82*** (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic power (log)</td>
<td>0.61*** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.81*** (0.07)</td>
<td>1.11*** (0.09)</td>
<td>0.77*** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.67*** (0.08)</td>
<td>1.06*** (0.07)</td>
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<td>Regime type</td>
<td>0.29*** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.19*** (0.07)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.56*** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.10)</td>
<td>0.15** (0.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salience: Global trade integration</td>
<td>-0.01*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.01*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience: Value added</td>
<td>-0.03*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.07*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.07*** (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic wealth (log)</td>
<td>-0.33** (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.30*** (0.11)</td>
<td>0.22* (0.12)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.15)</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; † omitted during regression calculations
Figure A2.1: Effect sizes of regime type and economic wealth on WTO members’ probability of submitting negotiation documents.
Figure A2.2: Effect sizes of regime type, global trade integration (salience) and economic wealth on the length of negotiation documents submitted by WTO members
Figure A2.3: Effect size of regime type on WTO members’ probability of making statements
Figure A2.4: Effect sizes of regime type and economic wealth on the number of statements made by WTO members
3 Cooperation among WTO Members in the Doha Round

3.1 Introduction
So far, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), have seen the conclusion of eight negotiation rounds which succeeded in liberalizing world trade more and more. A new agreement – concluding the Doha Round, also known semi-officially as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) – would entail extensive trade provisions and, hence, be crucial to all WTO members. Because decisions are taken by consensus, WTO members need to convince all other members of their proposals in order to design the rules in each trade round. The WTO’s advanced enlargement over the last years to now 161 members has led to many and substantially different negotiation positions within the organisation. Such a heightened degree of heterogeneity may, in turn, entail increased propensities for cooperation. Yet, both role and character of coalitions in WTO negotiations are still unclear. Hence, the two key research questions in this chapter are: Which coalition patterns are observable in the WTO and what explains coalition building in the organisation?
This study is the first to examine whether membership experience in the WTO affects cooperation efforts in the Doha Round. China, for example, acceded to the organisation in December 2001 – shortly after the start of the new negotiation round. Other newcomers joined the WTO between 1996 and over the course of the negotiations – while the majority of members have been part of the organisation since its establishment in 1995. Does this difference in membership experience have an impact on coalition building in the Doha Round? It can be argued that newcomers in the WTO – just as new members in other international organisations in general – are faced with an unknown environment and try to cooperate with long-standing members in order to balance their inexperience and benefit from the long-standing members’ expertise. This potential effect of membership experience in WTO negotiations has not yet been studied. In addition, several other characteristics of WTO members may influence their cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations: economic wealth, regime type, trade flows, trade interdependence as well as geographic and cultural proximity. The possibly self-reinforcing impact of an already existing membership in well-established coalitions is taken into account, too.

As yet, there is only limited knowledge as to coalition building in WTO negotiations. This study is the first which systematically investigates which WTO members cooperate with each other in the WTO negotiations and why, using quantitative indicators. For this purpose, a novel dataset has been compiled, based on negotiation documents which WTO members have jointly submitted to the Doha Round. Member dyad-years are the unit of analysis in this study.

The chapter is structured as follows: The next section focuses on the dependent variable, cooperation among WTO members in the Doha Round negotiations. Then, I elaborate on the factors that are likely to influence coalition building of WTO members. The methodology section presents in detail the data used to empirically examine my hypotheses before the results are shown. The chapter concludes with a summary of the major findings.

3.2 What do we know about cooperation in negotiations?
Most theoretical work on international negotiations – both formal (Powell, 2002) and non-formal (Jönsson, 2002a) – has focussed on bilateral interactions. Hopmann (1996) and Hinich and Munger (1997) emphasise similar preferences, creating a narrow bargaining space, as enhancing cooperation among actors since then possible solutions are sufficiently near to the preferred outcome of either actor. However, bilateral interactions are significantly different from the far more complex multilateral negotiations (Young, 1994; Zartman, 1994). One of the inherent characteristics of the latter is that negotiating delegations may and indeed tend to form coalitions, i.e. to cooperate (in a more general sense), in order to decrease complexity, push their preferences and learn from the ongoing negotiation process (Dupont, 1994, 1996).
Based on their sheer number (cp. below), coalitions can be considered crucial in the WTO. Because the membership takes decisions by consensus rule, the phenomenon of cooperation in the WTO is probably different from cooperative behaviour in organisations or bodies using majority rule. The fact that it is not sufficient to bring a majority of members behind one’s position but, rather, every member – as every member has de facto veto power – gives cooperative behaviour in the WTO a particular nature. For instance, the only winning coalition possible would have to include all members. Still, coalitions are able to influence the negotiation process leading to the final decision (Odell, 2006). Thus, they may be termed “process coalitions”, as in the literature on the European Union (EU) (Elgström et al., 2001).

One may define a coalition as “a set of governments that defend a common position in a negotiation by explicit coordination;” hence, a group of delegations “that happen to act in parallel without explicit coordination, or (...) exchange information and meet to seek compromises but do not defend a common position” is not considered a coalition” (Odell, 2006: 13). Accordingly, coalitions in the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations may be based on common trade interests (i.e. national interests) or a shared perception regarding the importance of the WTO as a system. Coalitions may be rather informal, ad hoc and short-lived or quite well-established over a longer period of time, bearing a relatively formal name and meeting regularly on schedule (Odell, 2006). While the (numerous) existence of the former (e.g. the “Breakfast Club” in which the EU is a member) has been confirmed in the interviews I conducted with diplomats of 39 WTO members,¹ the latter would describe what the WTO calls the 25 “groups in the negotiations”, e.g. the Cairns Group (in Agriculture) or the Recently Acceded Members (RAMs) (WTO, 2014). I include both well-established and ad hoc coalitions in this study, considering the latter as cooperation and mutual support between WTO members outside of more established coalitions. If two or more WTO members share interests only regarding particular sub-issues (and perhaps only temporarily), sporadic cooperation may still be highly desirable for various reasons (e.g. exchange of information). Hence, for each member, in order to influence the outcome of the negotiations, it may be reasonable to build coalitions, defend them against disrupting attempts by other members and, in turn, try to break adverse coalitions (Sebenius, 1995; Dupont, 1996; Sebenius, 1996).

The literature on coalitions in WTO negotiations primarily deals with developing country members and mainly uses qualitative case studies (e.g. Luke, 2000; Bjornskov & Lind, 2002; Drahos,

¹ These interviews took place in November and December 2011 as well as in March 2012 in Geneva and involved diplomats from the following WTO members: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, EU, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Taiwan (Chinese Taipei), Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and Uganda.
Cooperation among WTO Members in the Doha Round

2003; Page, 2003; Bernal et al., 2004). Especially Narlikar (2005) extensively analyses developing country coalitions in the WTO. Inter alia, she disagrees with the hypothesis that coalitions based on specific (sub-)issues are likely to perform better than those seizing different issue areas – as argued by Singh (2006), e.g. –, suggesting that many issue-defined coalitions are short-dated, hence, new ones must be built often, but the transaction costs for such frequent negotiations are too high for many developing countries. Odell (2006: 4), in turn, indicates that the “exploding” participation of developing countries in multilateral trade negotiations after 1990 was partly due to cooperation efforts: Many delegations built new or joined already existing coalitions, choosing direct coordination as the means to support their common negotiation positions. Apecu (2013), however, studying (inter alia) the level of collective participation of African WTO members in the Doha Round over the period from 1995 to 2010, concludes that such participation was “nominal, minimal and largely ineffectual in relation to the group’s significant membership share, in areas identified as priority, and compared to members’ participation from other regions” (Apecu, 2013: 29).

Looking at cooperative behaviour among members of other international organisations, Elgström et al. (2001), in their study on the EU, show that consensus norms decrease the likelihood of forming coalitions and that coalitions are more frequent under majority voting than under unanimity. Yet, coalition behaviour appears still important in the latter case. In terms of coalition patterns, coalitions based on common policy interests and/or cultural affinity prevail. Finally, contrary to conventional wisdom, there seem to be consistent and durable coalition patterns with the north-south divide being one of it.

In addition, the literature on international organisations has concentrated on the question which effect(s) these organisations have on their member states (Checkel, 2001; Johnston, 2001b). Mansfield et al. (2002), e.g., are able to confirm in their study on the GATT the notion of neoliberal institutionalists that international institutions may raise the ability of states to cooperate. McLaughlin (2006) examines in which way international organisations can increase cooperation among states, studying socialization (constraining and constitutive) effects of international organisations on member state behaviour.

International relations theory, like neorealism and liberalism, considers the attributes of actors the basis for the common interests of these actors. Such common interests may lead to cooperation. This study examines WTO members’ characteristics as possible factors on their cooperative behaviour: membership experience, economic power, regime type, trade flows, trade interdependence as well as geographic and cultural proximity. In addition, the analysis controls for the potentially self-fortifying effect of membership in established coalitions.
3 Cooperation among WTO Members in the Doha Round

3.3 Theory & Hypotheses
In the following, those attributes of WTO members that are assumed to have an impact on their cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations are presented in greater detail. In which ways are (two) WTO members’ experiences in the organisation, their amount of power, their democracy levels, their trade characteristics and their proximity thought to affect their (dyadic) inclination to cooperate?

3.3.1 Membership experience
Sociological theories hold that newcomers in international organisations are in a particular position at the beginning of their membership since they are challenged by a new environment in which they have to learn its (mostly unwritten) rules and norms (Cini, 2001). Hence, the length of membership may affect the behaviour of WTO members in several ways. As the results of my study on WTO members’ choice of negotiation strategies (Chapter 4) suggest, long-standing members behave systematically different than newcomers in that they tend to use soft negotiation tactics more frequently than members which have acceded to the WTO at a later point. The explanation for this finding may at least partly have to do with a WTO member’s experience in and expertise on the organisation (Dür & Mateo, 2010). Such experience and expertise may also be an important factor for members’ cooperative behaviour.

The statements of different WTO diplomats in my interviews support those explanations referring to sociological aspects as well as to experience and expertise: Interviewees from members that once acceded to the WTO said that in the first years of WTO membership, they had been confronted with an unfamiliar setting and needed to learn its (especially unwritten) rules and behavioural norms. One of the interviewees emphasised what he considered a weakness of newcomers and an important advantage of long-standing members: institutional memory. He underlined that knowledge on the history and processes of negotiations from the past was crucial for ongoing negotiations today.

Based on these considerations, two mechanisms behind the potential effect of membership experience on WTO members’ cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations are conceivable. First, insufficient experience in and expertise on the WTO’s negotiations may bring newcomers to seek coalitions with long-standing members, based on considerations to counterbalance adverse effects of such a lack of knowledge and to benefit from the accumulation of each member’s expertise concerning different negotiation issues. Long-standing members, in turn, may gain support for their negotiation positions from such cooperation with (inexperienced) newcomers. Hence, the first prediction in terms of WTO members’ coalition building in the Doha Round negotiations is that newcomers have cooperated more with long-standing members in order
to countervail their insufficient knowledge with the rich experience and expertise of long-standing members while the latter have cooperated less with other long-standing members.

*Hypothesis 1a*: Newcomers are more likely to cooperate with long-standing members in the negotiations.

On the other hand, both theoretical reasons and empirical findings may lead to a second prediction which assumes that WTO members have rather cooperated with their peers of similar membership duration, i.e. newcomers with other newcomers and long-standing members with other long-standing members. As the analysis of WTO members’ negotiation strategies and tactics in the Doha Round (Chapter 4) strongly indicates, a high level of membership experience in the organisation makes the application of soft negotiation tactics – thus, cooperative behaviour in a general sense – more likely. The theoretical reasons behind the prediction that WTO members have rather cooperated with their peers of similar membership duration refer to, first, actual differences in substantial interests in the negotiations between newcomers and long-standing members as well as, second, a potential history of cooperation among long-standing members.

With regard to differences in substantial interests, WTO newcomers had to go through (more or less) encompassing and demanding accession negotiations in which a plurality of aspects of these candidates’ trade regimes are considered and stipulated. If WTO members had to make a multitude of commitments as candidates in the scope of the accession negotiations, they may have no or only little “bargaining chips” (Pelc, 2011) left which they could use in the negotiations, inter alia to make compromises. I found evidence in my interviews for this argumentation. Those WTO members with little bargaining chips left due to challenging accession negotiations may be more willing to cooperate among each other, considering such a coalition as an important chance to influence the final agreement in their favour and achieve still some of their goals, by pursuing their interests in the negotiations together. The “RAMs” (Recently Acceded Members) are an empirical example in the WTO, one of the more established coalitions, consisting of members “that negotiated and joined the WTO after 1995, seeking lesser commitments in the negotiations because of the liberalization they have undertaken as part of their membership agreements” (WTO, 2014).

In addition, the simple idea behind a potential history of cooperation among long-standing WTO members is that the longer countries have been members of the organisation, the more time and, thus, opportunities they might have had to cooperate with each other. Such cooperation in the past could have resulted in the establishment of trustful relations from which the cooperating members benefit today. Hence, these considerations about different substantial interests in the negotiations between newcomers and long-standing members as well as a potential history of cooperation among long-standing members lead to the second hypothesis:
3 Cooperation among WTO Members in the Doha Round

**Hypothesis 1b**: WTO members with similar levels of membership experience are more likely to cooperate with each other in the negotiations.

### 3.3.2 Economic power

With regard to cooperation in networks – and the WTO may without any doubt be considered a network –, the resource dependency theory holds that actors in networks that are (at least perceived as) more influential tend to be better connected, with more ties, than less influential actors (Weible, 2005; Henry, 2011). Hence, economically powerful members and especially the WTO’s “big players” (e.g. the United States or the EU) are expected to be more attractive to all potential partners, whether wealthy as well or not, due to their political clout. By coalition building with such powerful members, weaker ones may gain access to important information or may exploit the cooperation by free riding on the efforts of the stronger members (Jones, 2007). In addition, since decisions are taken by consensus rule, political power – based on economic strength – is not as (directly) crucial as in other international organisations. Thus, even the economically powerful states have to convince others – also small WTO members – of their positions and form coalitions in order to achieve their goals.

**Hypothesis 2a**: Powerful WTO members are more likely to cooperate with economically weaker members in the negotiations.

On the other hand, shared economic – or, more specifically, trade – interests based on similar economic structures may lead to a higher likelihood for cooperation. This holds both for developed industrial nations and for developing countries since all members, whether economically powerful or not, are interested in preventing a new agreement that is too costly for them. Although even the interests of the “big players” may be substantially different – one of the reasons for the Doha Round’s deadlock(s) in the past –, economically stronger members may (prefer to) cooperate with each other in order to prevent too ambitious and, thus, costly outcomes. In the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations, such outcomes could materialise, for instance, if the developing country members of the organisation prevailed with their emphasis on the development aspect of the Doha Development Agenda.

Weaker members, in turn, may cooperate with each other in order to counterbalance such a coalition of the economically strong and their political power and to influence the final agreement in their favour (e.g. within the least developed countries (LDCs) group). By forming coalitions, even weak actors can become effective negotiating parties in the process of reaching common objectives (Dupont, 1996). This aspect has been emphasised repeatedly in the interviews:
3 Cooperation among WTO Members in the Doha Round

“If we have some concerns, we probably will try to see with others like-minded if they have the same problem or difficulties in order to have a composition. Because being a small economy member, if we go alone, they will probably not even listen to us.”

_Hypothesis 2b:_ WTO members of similar economic power are more likely to cooperate with each other in the negotiations.

### 3.3.3 Regime type

Mansfield et al. (2002) emphasise that the regime type of states affects their leaders’ propensity to cooperate on economic issues: In democracies, leaders have a greater incentive to strive for international cooperation in trade than in non-democratic states. Also Morrow et al. (1998) suggest that democracies cooperate more closely than non-democracies in international trade. According to the theory of democratic peace (e.g. Maoz & Russett, 1993), democracy may stimulate cooperation. One reason for such increased cooperative behaviour shown by democracies in negotiations may be the habituation of democratic leaders to the process of negotiating compromises (e.g. Dixon, 1994). Furthermore, within the strand of the so-called “democratic difference”, emerging from the literature on democratic peace, Bliss and Russett (1998) find that shared democracy cannot only be a direct fundament for peace but also an indirect one when it leads to more trade between these states. Finally, more generally, democracies tend to collaborate to a higher degree than non-democracies on the establishment of international organisations (Russett et al., 1998b) and the formation of alliances (Bennett, 1997; Thompson & Tucker, 1997).

On the other hand, in turn, it is also conceivable that WTO members characterised by authoritarian regimes cooperate more with each other than with democracies since such autocratic states are highly unlikely to demand democratic reforms from other authoritarian regimes as preconditions for economic cooperation as it may be the case for potential democratic trading partners.

_Hypothesis 3:_ WTO members with similar regime types are more likely to cooperate with each other in the negotiations.

### 3.3.4 Trade flow

Another influence on WTO members’ propensity to cooperate with each other in the Doha Round negotiations may have to do with the bilateral trade flows between them: Those WTO members that cooperate with each other in the form of bilateral trade may be more prone to cooperation in the Doha Round negotiations as well. Especially extensive trade between countries may highlight still

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2 Interview conducted in Geneva, November 4, 2011 (interview ID 8).
existing trade barriers for which the trading partners may try to find a solution by working together in the multilateral negotiations of the WTO. By preparing proposals to specific problems – which are often perceived by other countries as well – and rallying for support for those suggestions, WTO members can benefit from the multilateral platform the WTO provides. Besides, a common history of bilateral trade between two WTO members might also have increased trust and fostered good relations more generally between them, which is certainly conducive to all kinds of cooperation.

Hypothesis 4: WTO members with high levels of bilateral trade are more likely to cooperate with each other in the negotiations.

3.3.5 Trade interdependence

Of course, it may not be sufficient to consider the amount of trade flowing between WTO members in absolute numbers only. Rather, it might be relevant to take into account the level of trade interdependence among WTO members when cooperative behaviour is supposed to be explained. In absolute terms, bilateral trade between two WTO members, e.g. some African countries, may be a small number (compared to the “big players” in the WTO). Yet, when considering the economic exchange with another WTO member in relative terms, i.e. as a portion of overall trade with all WTO members, the importance of the trade partner may come to light. With regard to WTO members’ cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations, it stands to reason that WTO members that share a mutually high level of trade interdependence may be more prone to cooperate with each other in the Doha Round negotiations.

Hypothesis 5: WTO members with mutually high levels of trade interdependence are more likely to cooperate with each other in the negotiations.

3.3.6 (Geographic & cultural) Proximity

In the WTO, several of the more established “groups in the negotiations” are based on geographic characteristics, e.g. the African Group or the Asian developing members are coalitions of regional nature (WTO, 2014). Also, geographically proximal countries tend to show similar cultures. It is easy to see that cultural and geographic proximity are closely related and their effects are difficult to distinguish. Both kinds of proximity may facilitate (economic) cooperation, both in the WTO and in general. Bliss and Russett (1998), e.g., examine whether cultural similarities are able to facilitate trade, focusing (inter alia) on the ease of communication. They conclude that “[c]ommon [l]anguage between dyadic members is strongly and positively related to trade” (Bliss & Russett, 1998: 1137).

More specifically, culture affects negotiation behaviour via three crucial factors, according to Adair and Brett (2004): believes, goals and norms. Hence, a common culture among WTO members
should make them more likely to cooperate on the basis of such shared believes, goals and norms. In addition, WTO members from the same geographic region may (due to similar factors of production, e.g.) develop similar economic orientations, potentially comparable trade interests in general and similar positions in the Doha Round negotiations in particular. Finally, cultural and geographic proximity may also result in extensive bilateral and regional cooperation of both economic and political nature. This may increase trust and lead to stronger relations between countries which may contribute to cooperative behaviour in Doha Round negotiations.

**Hypothesis 6:** Geographically and culturally proximal WTO members are more likely to cooperate with each other in the negotiations.

### 3.3.7 Membership in established coalitions

As described above, cooperation in the WTO may occur within long-standing and more established coalitions bearing a relatively formal name and meeting regularly on schedule (Odell, 2006). The WTO lists 25 “groups in the WTO” which “often speak with one voice using a single coordinator or negotiating team” (WTO, 2014). Some of these coalitions are limited in focus to one specific negotiation issue while others are active in all of them. An example for the former is the Cairns Group, a coalition of agricultural exporting states, therefore in favour of the liberalization of agricultural trade in the negotiations. An example for a group that is active in all the negotiation issues are the so-called RAMs, mentioned before as well. These recently acceded WTO members that negotiated their entry and joined the organization after 1995 already pledged themselves to a high degree of trade liberalization in their accession protocols, i.e. membership agreements. Therefore, the coalition feels entitled to lesser commitments in the current negotiations.

It is straightforward to expect members of these more established “groups in the WTO” to cooperate to a greater extent with each other than with other members. Not only may they share similar interests based on different factors elaborated above, their diplomats are also supposed to interact (more) regularly, enhancing personal relations over time and, thus, facilitating cooperation (Rubin & Swap, 1994). Thus, increased levels of cooperation should exist between members with shared characteristics even after taking into account long-time cooperation within well-established coalitions.

**Hypothesis 7:** WTO members of established coalitions are more likely to cooperate with each other in the negotiations.
3.4 Methodology

The hypotheses which account for the variance in WTO members’ cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations are tested in a quantitative (regression) analysis in order to come to generalizable results that add knowledge to already existing single or comparative case studies on coalition building in the WTO. In addition, I make use of unique material from the interviews with WTO diplomats described above which is highly valuable to underline empirical findings and support underlying causal mechanisms for WTO members’ cooperation in the Doha Round negotiations. By this, the study benefits from the plus of information and insight based on personal communication with WTO diplomats.

3.4.1 Research period

Since this study analyses cooperative behaviour of WTO members in the Doha Round negotiations, the research period covers the time frame of the latter until 2011. Yet, the beginning of the research period results from the fact that the negotiations in the fields of Agriculture and Services started already in 2000 while the negotiations in most issues began in 2001 (and the Trade Facilitation talks started only in 2004). The research period ends in 2011 since preparations for this study and data handling for the dependent variable started in the following year.

3.4.2 Unit of analysis

The dataset on cooperation among WTO members during the Doha Round negotiations is built around undirected dyads for a subset of WTO members during the years between 2000 and 2011. Because cooperative behaviour refers – in operationalised terms – to the frequency of interactions between pairs of WTO members without focusing on the initiator of such cooperation, non-directional dyads are used.

Those WTO members that were holding full membership in the organisation during at least part of the research period of this study and that can be considered independently negotiating parties (this refers to member states of the European Union, see below and Chapter 2) form non-directional dyads. These 138 individual WTO members constitute 9,453 undirected dyads. Due to the research period of twelve years, the analysis includes 113,436 dyad-years. If one member of such a dyad (or both) has not been an independently negotiating WTO member in a certain year during the research period, a missing was assigned to the dependent variable for this dyad in the respective year.

As described in detail in Chapter 2, the EU member states Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom are not considered independently negotiating WTO members as
the EU is a “single customs union with a single trade policy and tariff” (WTO, 2015e) that speaks with one voice in the Doha Round. Hence, the EU member states are not among those 138 WTO members whose cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations is analysed.3

Related to this issue, the twelve WTO members that acceded to the EU during the research period of this study (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania in 2007) are no longer considered independently negotiating WTO members from the years of their EU accession.

Finally, as pointed out in Chapter 2 as well, those 18 states and customs territories that acceded to the WTO during the research period of this study (Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan and Oman in 2000; China, Lithuania and Moldova in 2001; Taiwan in 2002; Armenia and Macedonia in 2003; Cambodia and Nepal in 2004; Saudi Arabia in 2005; Tonga and Vietnam in 2007; Cape Verde and Ukraine in 2008) are considered full WTO members only from the year of their actual accession to the organisation. Similar to the early activity that some of these newcomers showed in the Doha Round, several used their observer status during their accession negotiations to already participate in coalitions. However, such early cooperative behaviour is excluded from the analysis.

3.4.3 Dependent variable: Cooperation

The dependent variable in this study, WTO members’ cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations, refers to the frequency of cooperation within groups of WTO members. Cooperation among WTO members is operationalised here as WTO members having authored and submitted joint proposals, statements or other kinds of negotiation documents in the Doha Round.

The data for WTO members’ cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations were generated by a larger coding effort on joint proposals and other written submissions. Here, data on

3 These 138 independently negotiating WTO members included in this study are the same states and customs territories included in the study on members’ level of participation in Chapter 2: Albania, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia (from 2003), Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria (until 2006), Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia (from 2004), Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde (from 2008), Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China (from 2001), Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus (until 2003), Czech Republic (until 2003), Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia (until 2003), EU, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary (until 2003), Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania (from 2001 until 2003), Macao, Macedonia (from 2003), Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta (until 2003), Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova (from 2001), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal (from 2004), New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland (until 2003), Qatar, Romania (until 2006), Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia (from 2005), Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic (until 2003), Slovenia (until 2003), Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Switzerland, Taiwan (from 2002), Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga (from 2007), Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine (from 2008), United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, United States of America, Venezuela, Vietnam (from 2007), Zambia, Zimbabwe.
3 Cooperation among WTO Members in the Doha Round

the document’s authors (i.e. WTO members) as well as on when and in which negotiation issue the
document was created were collected. In contrast to the meetings which are not public, these
documents are available on the Internet, from the WTO’s online database of official documentation.

Based on these data, cooperation within groups of WTO members was recoded into
cooporation between every single undirected pair of those WTO members forming the groups.
Hence, the dependent variable of this study is the (continuous) frequency of cooperation between
non-directional dyads of WTO members in given years.

Within the undirected dyad-year structure, cooperation is a rare occurrence: Two thirds (i.e.
63,048) of the 94,530 observations on the dependent variable are zeros, indicating the nonexistence
of cooperation among WTO members in the Doha Round negotiations. The maximum value of
cooperation in one year, on the other hand, is 34 – representing the total frequency of cooperation
between two Asian WTO members: Japan and Taiwan (Chinese Taipei). This maximum value
occurred in 2005 and is composed of 18 cases of cooperation in the negotiations covering WTO
Rules, 9 times of cooperation in the Services talks, 4 in NAMA and 3 in Trade Facilitation. Table 3.1
shows the 21 most cooperative WTO member dyads, measured by their yearly frequency of total
cooperation over those main negotiation issues of the Doha Round which are connected through the
single undertaking: Agriculture, Trade and Development, Trade and Environment, Intellectual
Property Rights, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), Services, Trade Facilitation as well as WTO
Rules.

Also the second to fifth position in this ranking of the most cooperative WTO member dyads
(per year) are taken by Asian dyads: Japan and South Korea cooperated 28 times; Japan and Hong
Kong 27 times; Hong Kong and Taiwan 27 and Taiwan and South Korea 26 (all of them in 2005).

Maybe surprisingly – as a rather small player in international relations –, the most
cooeration non-Asian dyad member (per year) is Chile, indicated by 25 submissions with South
Korea (in 2005) and 24 with Taiwan (in 2005). The second most cooperative non-Asian dyad member
(per year) is Norway, with each 24 documents drafted and submitted with Hong Kong and Taiwan
(both in 2005). Finally, the third most cooperative non-Asian dyad member (per year) is Switzerland
that worked with Japan in creating 23 documents in 2005.

Table 3.1 may create the impression that 2005 was the year in which most cooperation
among WTO members in the Doha Round took place. However, Figure 3.1 shows that most
cooeration actually occurred in 2007, and that 2005 only ranks fifth in this regard. Figure 3.1 also
allows for comparisons of WTO member dyads’ cooperative behaviour between the different
negotiation areas.
Table 3.1: The 21 most cooperative WTO member dyads, measured by their frequency of total cooperation over the individual negotiation issues per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member A</th>
<th>Member B</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Multiple issues</th>
<th>Intellectual Property</th>
<th>NAMA</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Trade Facilitation</th>
<th>WTO Rules</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</table>
3.4.4 Independent variables

Membership experience is measured again as the duration of WTO membership in number of months, calculating from a WTO member’s accession date (taken from the WTO homepage) – or 1 January 1995 for founding members of the WTO – to the beginning of the negotiations. As before, for members that joined the WTO after the talks had already started, their membership duration is calculated as the number of months between their accession date and yearly (twelve-monthly) time periods after the beginning of the talks.

Given the dyadic structure of the dataset, a relational variable is required. Hence, the absolute value of the difference of a pair’s membership durations is calculated. Thus, a dyad’s value on this variable is zero (or small) if the members acceded to the WTO at the same (or slightly different) point(s) in time, while it is large if there has been a considerable time gap (of several years, e.g.) between the two accessions or establishment of the WTO and a member’s entry.
For economic power, gross domestic product (GDP) data (in purchasing power parity (PPP)), from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2014) from the years 2000 to 2011 are used. Similar to the relational variable for membership duration, the absolute value of the difference of a dyad’s GDP data for any year of the research period is calculated. Again, a pair’s value on this variable is small if the two members were only slightly different in terms of economic power in any given year, while it is large if one member’s GDP exceeded the other by far.

Regime type is measured again on the basis of data from the Freedom House Index (Freedom House, 2013), more precisely its “Freedom in the World Country Ratings” (for 136 WTO members in this study) and its “Freedom in the World Territory Ratings” (for Hong Kong and Macao). The Freedom House Index is based on evaluations about political rights and civil liberties in 195 countries and 14 related and disputed territories worldwide. These political rights and civil liberties are evaluated on a scale from one to seven, with one indicating the highest and seven the lowest amount of freedom. For the analysis, a country’s or territory’s combined average ratings for political rights and civil liberties are taken and the reverse value of this average is calculated (i.e. an original value of seven is recoded into one, e.g.). Hence, higher values on this indicator reflect a higher degree of democracy.

A relational variable is created, as before, by calculating the absolute value of the difference of a pair’s values on this indicator for any year of the research period. A dyad’s value on this variable is small if the two members were only slightly different in terms of regime type, while it is large if the democracy levels of the two members varied considerably between each other.

Data for bilateral trade flows between WTO members (in current US millions of dollars) come from the Correlates of War project (Barbieri et al., 2009; Barbieri & Keshk, 2012). The two trade flows within each dyad, i.e. (respective) exports and imports, are added to create a measure that represents the strength of trade relations among dyads of WTO members.

The same data – from the Correlates of War project (Barbieri et al., 2009; Barbieri & Keshk, 2012) – constitute the foundation for measuring trade interdependence. The importance of the dyad partner as a trade partner is based on the dyad partner’s portion of trade (i.e. exports and imports) in relation to total trade with all WTO members. As for other variables, in order to reflect potential

---

4 Again, because the IMF dataset does not contain data on Cuba, Liechtenstein and Macao, those are based on information from CIA World Factbooks (CIA, 2013) of different years (for Liechtenstein and Macao, there are no data for some years).
5 The Freedom House data for Macao cover only the years from 2000 to 2003.
6 As pointed out before, the Freedom House Index is not free from criticism (Giannone, 2010).
7 The regime type values for the EU over the duration of the research period are again calculated as the average of the values of its single member states.
8 The trade flow values for the EU are calculated as the sum of the trade flow values of its single member states for those years within the research period. The Correlates of War project does not contain data on Hong Kong, Macao and Liechtenstein, which results in missing trade flow values for those dyads consisting of one of these WTO members.
asymmetry in the relationship between the two dyad members, the absolute value of the difference of a pair’s values on this indicator is calculated for any year of the research period. Thus, a dyad’s value on this variable is small if the two members were dependent on each other to a similar extent regarding their mutual trade, while it is large if one dyad member’s trade dependence exceeded the other’s by far. In other words, the variable is designed in a way that higher values indicate higher asymmetry in trade interdependence between the dyad members.

For (geographic and cultural) proximity, three different indicators may be appropriate: the first one expresses whether the same official language is spoken in both WTO members constituting a dyad (0 if not); the second one measures the distance (in km) between a dyad’s capitals; and the third one, contiguity, displays whether the dyad members are immediate neighbours (0 if not). The data for all three indicators come from Mayer and Zignago (2011).9

Membership in established coalitions is measured by several dummy variables that indicate whether the two WTO members forming a dyad have both been members in one of the more established groups in the negotiations (WTO, 2014). Table 3.2 below provides a short overview over these established coalitions (for more information on which WTO members included in this study constitute the coalitions, see Table A3.1 in the Appendix at the end of this chapter). Table 3.3 summarises the descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent and control variables of this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific WTO members with preferences in the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Group</td>
<td>All African WTO members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-90</td>
<td>ACP + African Group + LDCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least developed countries, the world’s poorest countries according to the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercosur</td>
<td>Common Market of the Southern Cone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMs</td>
<td>Recently acceded members (excluding LDCs which are exempt from new commitments)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 For dyads containing the EU, the language indicator reflects whether the same official language is spoken in one of the EU’s member states and the other dyad member. Values for the EU on the distance indicator are calculated as the average distance between the capitals of its single member states and the capital of the other dyad member.
### Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyadic cooperation</td>
<td>94,530</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership experience</td>
<td>92,674</td>
<td>21.29</td>
<td>32.62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(intra-dyadic difference)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic power</td>
<td>100,405</td>
<td>767.86</td>
<td>2,360.74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15,691.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(intra-dyadic difference)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime type</td>
<td>100,565</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(intra-dyadic difference)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade flow</td>
<td>85,988</td>
<td>836.38</td>
<td>11,016.23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>575,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(intra-dyadic difference)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade interdependence</td>
<td>85,977</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>87.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common official language</td>
<td>111,702</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance between capitals</td>
<td>111,702</td>
<td>8254.64</td>
<td>4492.50</td>
<td>10.48</td>
<td>19951.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>111,702</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific WTO members)</td>
<td>113,436</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Group</td>
<td>113,436</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum)</td>
<td>113,436</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)</td>
<td>113,436</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCs (Least developed countries)</td>
<td>113,436</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercosur (Common Market of the Southern Cone)</td>
<td>113,436</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMs (Recently acceded members)</td>
<td>113,436</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year (continuous)</td>
<td>113,436</td>
<td>2005.5</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2000 – Year 2011</td>
<td>113,436</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 Cooperation among WTO Members in the Doha Round

3.4.5 Analysis

Considering different methodologies for analysing the data on WTO members’ cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations, exponential random graph models (ERGMs), from the field of network analysis, seemed to be the most appropriate option initially, for several reasons.10

The major drawback of ERGMs regarding this study, however, is their inability to handle changes in the network structure over time. These models require that the network under examination remains stable. Because this analysis focuses heavily on the cooperative behaviour of WTO newcomers, though, it needs a methodology which is able to incorporate the dynamic component of adding actors to the model.

Another requirement is based on the fact that not only do dyads of WTO members cooperate with each other to different degrees, but many dyads of WTO members do not cooperate with each other at all. This leads to a large number of zeros on the dependent variable.

Therefore, a data analysis technique is required that is not only able to deal with changes in the data structure over time, but also takes into consideration the event count nature of the dependent variable and the very high number of zero values on the dependent variable. A hurdle model, thus, seems to be appropriate for analysing the data on WTO members’ cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations.11

A hurdle model is a special kind of count model in which two different data generating processes may operate: a binomial probability model and a zero-truncated count data model. The binomial probability model determines the binary outcome of a count variable: zero or positive realisation. In case of the latter, the “hurdle is crossed” and the conditional distribution of the positive values is determined by a zero-truncated count data model. Hence, hurdle models can be

10 These models combine two different methods of studying international relations and cooperation to explain how various actors in a network are linked to each other: conventional approaches, like neorealism and liberalism, which focus on actors’ attributes, and traditional network analysis which emphasises relational data, i.e. ties, connections and structures created by actors within a policy network (Jönsson et al., 1998; Hafner-Burton et al., 2009). Because ERGMs make it possible to test hypotheses based on actors’ characteristics on a policy network, they appeared to be promising to find out which factors enhance members’ probabilities to form such cooperative ties (main effects) as well as whether common characteristics increase the likelihood of cooperation among member dyads (homophily effects). Hence, one important advantage of ERGMs is their appropriate use in multilateral contexts because they are able to recognise the interdependence of state behaviour. Further strengths of ERGMs useful for this analysis would be their application in time series analyses of networks (temporal ERGMs) as well as “valued graphs” measuring not only cooperation / no cooperation in a binary form but the extent of cooperation in a more fine-grained way (Krivitsky & Goodreau, 2012; Leslie-Cook et al., 2012).

11 This approach may be criticisable as well since it suffers from the problem of treating multilateralism as bilateralism by disaggregating multilateral behaviour into dyadic units (and, hence, also from the inability to deal with strategic behaviour). It is more than reasonable to expect third-party actors – here WTO members – to play a role in a multilateral context like the WTO despite being outside the primary dyad of interest. Hence, it cannot be excluded that the dyad-year approach does not capture the data generating process accurately (Croco & Teo, 2005). Still, considering the benefits and drawbacks of hurdle models and other approaches in terms of their application in this analysis, it seems that a hurdle model is the most appropriate choice. In addition, it has also already been used by other researchers for similar data analyses (e.g. Rüegger, 2013).
understood as the sum of two independent models: a binomial probability model and a zero-truncated count data model (Mullahy, 1986; Cameron & Trivedi, 1998; McDowell, 2003).  

For estimating dyadic cooperation among WTO members in the Doha Round negotiations, I use hurdle models that consist of a logistic regression on the binary level – i.e. cooperation vs. no cooperation – and a zero-truncated negative binomial regression on the count level – i.e. for the intensity of cooperation. I run a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression because the distribution of the dependent variable, dyadic cooperation among WTO members, shows signs of over-dispersion. In two different hurdle models, I include the same independent variables presented above – i.e. membership experience, economic power, regime type, trade flow, trade interdependence and (geographic and cultural) proximity (as well as membership in established coalitions in Model II) – in both levels of the two hurdle models as I assume that these independent variables affect both the overall probability of dyadic cooperation among WTO members and the intensity of such cooperation. In addition, as control variables, I include both a continuous variable for year and dummy variables for all years over the duration of the research period. Finally, the trade flow and trade interdependence variables are included in the analyses with a one-year lag in order to model the assumed temporal sequence of cause and effect.

3.5 Results

Table 3.4 below provides the results of the two hurdle models estimating dyadic cooperation among WTO members in the Doha Round negotiations. Model I contains all of the independent variables that are thought to have an effect on the cooperative behaviour of WTO members, except for membership in the established coalitions. Hence, the assumption behind this first model is that there is no difference between ad hoc coalitions and the more established groups in the negotiations. In this first model, the regression coefficients of some independent variables – i.e. membership experience, economic power, regime type, trade flow and (geographic and cultural) proximity – display the expected sign and are statistically significant at conventional levels.

---

12 McDowell (2003) shows that the parameters of a hurdle model can be estimated by fitting the two component models separately and explains that this characteristic of hurdle models “sets them apart from popular extensions to hurdle models such as the zero-inflated Poisson (zip) and the zero-inflated negative binomial (zinb) models. The zip and zinb models allow for a mixing process for the zeros, so the likelihoods are not separable with respect to the parameters to be estimated.” However, Neumayer (2003) points out that one of the problems with this two-stage model is that “it assumes that errors in both stages are uncorrelated”, i.e. it assumes that decisions at the two stages are taken independently – which might be unrealistic in many cases.
Table 3.4: Hurdle model estimations for dyadic cooperation in the Doha Round negotiations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Binary level – Logistic regression: Overall probability of dyadic cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership experience</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(intra-dyadic difference)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic power</td>
<td>-0.00***</td>
<td>-0.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(intra-dyadic difference)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime type</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(intra-dyadic difference)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade flow</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade interdependence</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity: Common official language</td>
<td>1.23***</td>
<td>0.54***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>1.79***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(African, Caribbean &amp; Pacific countries)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Group</td>
<td>3.43***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>1.22***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>1.21***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Association of Southeast Asian Nations)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>2.37***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Least developed countries)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercosur</td>
<td>1.80***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Common Market of the Southern Cone)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMs</td>
<td>-0.16*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Recently acceded members)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(continuous)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>-0.54***</td>
<td>-0.91***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2002</td>
<td>-0.55***</td>
<td>-0.82***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2003</td>
<td>-0.12***</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>-0.19***</td>
<td>-0.30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2005</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3 Cooperation among WTO Members in the Doha Round

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year 2006</strong></td>
<td>0.77*** (0.03)</td>
<td>1.02*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year 2007</strong></td>
<td>1.11*** (0.04)</td>
<td>1.37*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year 2008</strong></td>
<td>0.55*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.71*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year 2009</strong></td>
<td>0.44*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.56*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-185.57*** (8.48)</td>
<td>-229.05*** (10.41)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Count level – Zero-truncated negative binomial regression: Intensity of dyadic cooperation**

| **Membership experience** | -0.00** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| **Economic power**        | -0.00*** (0.00)| 0.00 (0.00)  |
| **Regime type**           | -0.11*** (0.01)| -0.08*** (0.01)|
| **Trade flow**            | 0.00*** (0.00)| 0.00*** (0.00)|
| **Trade interdependence** | 0.00 (0.00)    | -0.00** (0.00)|
| **Proximity: Common official language** | 0.20*** (0.02) | 0.08*** (0.01) |
| **ACP**                   | 0.22*** (0.02) | 0.83*** (0.03) |
| **African Group**         | 0.42*** (0.02) |               |
| **APEC**                  |                 | 0.83*** (0.03) |
| **ASEAN**                 | -0.28*** (0.08) |               |
| **LDCs**                  | 0.51*** (0.02)  |               |
| **Mercosur**              | 1.39*** (0.13)  |               |
| **RAMs**                  | 0.27*** (0.07)  |               |
| **Year (continuous)**     | -0.04*** (0.01) | -0.05*** (0.00)|

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### Model I vs. Model II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>-1.36***</td>
<td>-1.47***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2002</td>
<td>1.37***</td>
<td>1.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2003</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2005</td>
<td>1.13***</td>
<td>1.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2006</td>
<td>1.09***</td>
<td>0.99***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2007</td>
<td>0.86***</td>
<td>0.95***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2008</td>
<td>0.77***</td>
<td>0.83***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2009</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
<td>0.43***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>74.68***</td>
<td>97.79***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.13)</td>
<td>(8.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>68,706</td>
<td>68,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-zero observations</td>
<td>23,570</td>
<td>23,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; yearly dummies 2000 and 2010 dropped in both regressions because of collinearity.

Some of these results of Model I change when membership in established coalitions is integrated in the picture – as can be seen in Model II. This indicates that there are different reasons for cooperation in ad hoc coalitions and the more established groups in the negotiations. In this second model, again, the regression coefficients of some independent variables – i.e. regime type, trade flow and (geographic and cultural) proximity – show the expected sign and are statistically significant at conventional levels. The same holds for the majority of the dummy variables supposed to control for the influence of those established coalitions that are active in all of the negotiation issues: ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries), African Group, APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum), ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), LDCs (least developed
countries), Mercosur (Common Market of the Southern Cone) and RAMs (recently acceded members)\(^{13}\).

With regard to membership experience, Hypothesis 1a suggests a positive, while Hypothesis 1b postulates a negative relationship between the intra-dyadic difference in membership experience or duration and cooperation among WTO members in the Doha Round negotiations. In other words, when the difference in membership duration between two dyad members increases (due to different times of accession), Hypothesis 1a expects both the overall probability of cooperation and the intensity of cooperation to increase. Hypothesis 1b, on the other hand, assumes both the overall probability of cooperation and the intensity of cooperation to decrease. Hypothesis 1a is based on the assumption that new WTO members have an incentive to cooperate with long-standing members in the negotiations in order to benefit from their greater experience in and expertise on the WTO negotiations. The results, however, rather support Hypothesis 1b: In Model I, both on the binary and the count level of the hurdle model, the coefficients for membership experience are negative and (highly) statistically significant. This suggests that both the overall probability of cooperation and the intensity of cooperation decrease when the difference in membership duration between two dyad members increases. This finding indicates that new WTO members rather cooperate with other newcomers while long-standing members tend to cooperate with their peers in turn. This corroborates the idea of a potential history of cooperation among WTO members that have been in the organisation for a long time. For the expected impact of different substantial interests in the negotiations between newcomers and long-standing members, however, it is necessary to focus on Model II which contains the (potential) influence of the more established coalitions as independent variables.

Thus, looking at the results for membership experience in Model II, which takes into account the possibly self-reinforcing effect of membership in well-established groups in the negotiations, the coefficient is negative and highly statistically significant in the logistic regression – as in Model I. This suggests that the overall probability of cooperation decreases when the difference in membership duration between two dyad members increases. Again, this finding provides support for Hypothesis 1b by indicating that new WTO members rather cooperate with other newcomers while long-standing members tend to cooperate with their peers. Because this model controls for the (possible) impact of established coalitions in the negotiations, especially the potential influence of membership in the RAMs, it is appropriate to conclude that this finding may not only have to do with a potential history of cooperation among long-standing members. Rather, cooperation with WTO members of similar membership duration seems to be related to substantial differences in the Doha Round

\(^{13}\) The G-90 is not included in the model as its membership is composed of ACP, the African Group and the LDCs.
negotiations, especially with regard to the newcomers. In this context, it is necessary to anticipate the results for the more established groups in the negotiations: For all these coalitions, the coefficients on the binary level of the hurdle model are positive and highly statistically significant – except for the RAMs, the recently acceded members. That coefficient is negative but not statistically significant at an acceptable level. This suggests that dyadic membership in the RAMs does not affect the overall probability of cooperation. However, it is conceivable that a potential effect of RAM membership does not come to light due to the impact of intra-dyadic difference in membership duration in the logistic regression. Indeed, when the regression analysis is run without the membership experience variable, the coefficient for the RAM variable is negative and highly statistically significant. This result does not, of course, support the expectation that the probability of cooperation increases when the two WTO members forming a dyad are members in the RAM group. However, it might corroborate the mechanism that newcomers – RAMs – may seek to cooperate with long-standing members in the negotiations in order to countervail insufficient knowledge and to benefit from the higher level of experience and expertise among those countries that have been part of the organisation for a long time. Yet, due to substantial differences in positions (and other possible reasons), long-standing members seem to decide against such cooperation with newcomers – that are little in number and (except for China) also weak in economic terms. Hence, WTO members appear to cooperate with their peers of similar membership duration: Newcomers with other newcomers and long-standing members with other long-standing members. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 1b regarding the overall probability of cooperation among WTO members in the Doha Round negotiations.

Looking at the results for the intensity of cooperation, however, the picture is basically reversed: In the zero-truncated negative binomial regression of Model II, the coefficient for membership experience is negative but not statistically significant at a common level, whereas the coefficient for membership in the RAM coalition is positive and highly statistically significant. This would suggest that the difference in membership experience between two dyad members does not affect their intensity of cooperation in the negotiations. If the two dyad members belong to the RAMs, though, they cooperate more intensively with each other than non-RAM dyads. Thus, the unexpected result for the relationship between membership experience and intensity of cooperative behaviour of WTO members in Model II may be explained with the integration of the more established coalitions in this model. Once the (potential) effects of these coalitions are controlled for, membership experience does not seem to have a negative influence on the intensity of cooperation among WTO members, as the result from Model I indicates. Still, this finding would provide indirect and partial support for Hypothesis 1b regarding the intensity of cooperation among WTO members in

14 Coefficient -0.37, standard error 0.08, p < 0.01.
the Doha Round negotiations: Newcomers – organised in the RAM group – cooperate with each other more intensively than long-standing WTO members do with their peers.15

Similar to membership experience or duration, the expectations relating WTO members’ economic power to their cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations move in both directions. Hypothesis 2a connects powerful WTO members with economically weaker members in the negotiations because powerful states are thought to be attractive to the smaller ones due to their potential access to important information or a possible exploitation of those stronger members’ efforts. Yet, looking at the results for economic power in the analyses, they rather provide support for Hypothesis 2b: In Model I, both in the logistic and the zero-truncated negative binomial regression, the coefficients for economic power are negative and highly statistically significant. This indicates a decrease in both the overall probability of cooperation and the intensity of cooperation when the difference in economic power between two dyad members increases. Hence, it is rather WTO members of similar power that seem to cooperate with each other in the negotiations.

Looking at the results for economic power in Model II, the coefficient is negative and highly statistically significant in the logistic regression – as in Model I. This would suggest that the overall probability of cooperation decreases when the difference in economic power between two dyad members increases. Again, this finding would provide support for Hypothesis 2b by indicating that WTO members cooperate with other members of similar economic power.

However, here, it is necessary again to anticipate some results for the independent variable geographic and cultural proximity and a comparison of its three indicators common official language, distance between dyad members’ capitals and contiguity.16 The findings for economic power discussed above are based on model specifications in which common official language measures proximity. Yet, when distance between dyads’ capitals and contiguity are used in the regression analyses, both coefficients for economic power in the logistic regressions deviate from the one when common official language is the indicator for proximity. The two coefficients for economic power in the respective Models II are negative (distance between dyad members’ capitals) or positive (contiguity) but not statistically significant at a conventional level. This suggests that economic power does not have an effect on the overall probability of dyadic cooperation when membership in

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15 The results are the same when for the independent variable geographic and cultural proximity the two other indicators are used: Distance between a dyad’s capitals and contiguity, a dummy variable whether the dyad members are immediate neighbours or not. The results for these additional tests are shown in Table A3.2 in the Appendix following this chapter. The findings for membership experience discussed above are based on model specifications in which common official language measures proximity. When distance between dyad members’ capitals and contiguity are used in the regression analyses instead, the results do not deviate from those when common official language is the indicator for proximity. Also, the results for the RAM variable are not substantially affected when proximity is measured by either dyadic distance between capitals or contiguity of WTO members; merely significance levels are higher (cp. Table A3.2 in the Appendix).

16 The results for these additional tests are shown in Table A3.2 in the Appendix.
established coalitions is controlled for and when geographic and cultural proximity is measured by either dyadic distance between capitals or contiguity of WTO members. These results further underline the finding that integrating the impact of the established groups into the model affects the influence of economic power on the overall probability of cooperation. The negative effect of economic power on the overall probability of cooperation that appears when not controlling for the more established groups in the negotiations and when measuring proximity with common official language disappears under two circumstances: Cooperation within the established groups is taken into account and proximity is measured with either dyadic distance between capitals or contiguity of WTO members. The (most) plausible explanation for this disappearing impact of economic power on the overall probability of cooperation is the differentiation of this apparent impact in the particular effects of membership in the established coalitions. In other words, when these specific effects are not taken into consideration – as in all three Models I in Table A3.2 –, they seem to be absorbed by the variable measuring the difference of economic power between two dyad members. The possible reason for this materialisation in the economic power variable is the fact that the established coalitions constitute quite homogeneous groups in terms of members’ economic power: The members of ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific WTO members with preferences in the EU), the African Group, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the LDCs (least developed countries) are characterised by a relatively similar level of economic power, while members of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum) seem to be the most heterogeneous coalition among those included in this study, involving countries like Papua New Guinea, the Philippines and Vietnam but also the United States.

As concluded before, it is rather WTO members of similar economic power that seem to cooperate with each other in the negotiations, especially the economically weaker members, perceiving the Doha Round – or Doha Development Agenda – as committed to the developing countries’ goals. With the power of a big group of developing countries – each of them by its own not influential at all – they constitute an effective negotiating party trying to influence the final agreement in their favour. There is evidence for the Doha Round’s commitment to the improvement of developing countries’ economic situations from the interviews conducted with diplomats from different WTO members. The delegation member of an African country, e.g., stated the following:

"[W]e are the ones seeking the conclusion of the Round. African Group, ACP, G-33 – almost, let me say, the developing countries are asking for the conclusion of the Round. Because the conclusion of the Round, that is the one when we are thinking of the development component. And then other countries like the G-20 now, not the G-20 in the

17 These three Models I only differ with regard to the indicator used for measuring geographic and cultural proximity: common official language, distance between dyads’ capitals and contiguity.
WTO, the major economies, they do not care about this Doha Round now. They realise that the Doha Round does not take them anywhere. They do not care about the Doha Round, they do not care about the development component of the Doha Round, they do not care about the mandate of the Doha Round. What they want is just “if we want to do the Round, why don’t we ...” - they even came with fresh and incredible approaches. They just want new approaches. That maybe will put them in a position for what. But not going to drive this development component or the mandate. They want just something new because they realise that this thing will not go anywhere. But for us, we want to conclude the Round, we want the mandate to be respected. The development component to be the centre of the negotiations.”

And with regard to the power of a big coalition vis-à-vis an individual WTO member:

“For us, we always want to at least be larger. Because we know that developing countries are the majority of the WTO members. At least, our voice will be heard if we are many. So, [my country] alone is not good. African Group, ACP, LDCs, G-90 – that is already more than half.”

Regarding the results for the intensity of cooperation in Model II, the coefficient for economic power in the zero-truncated negative binomial regression is not statistically significant at a common level. This suggests that economic power does not have an effect on the intensity of dyadic cooperation once membership in established coalitions is controlled for. To summarise, integrating the impact of these coalitions into the model seems to affect the influence of economic power on both the overall probability of dyadic cooperation and the intensity of dyadic cooperation among WTO members. As for the former, the negative effect of economic power on the intensity of cooperation that appears when not controlling for the more established groups in the negotiations disappears when cooperation within these groups is taken into account. This makes it necessary again to anticipate the results for the established coalitions: For all these groups, the coefficients on the count level of the hurdle model are positive and highly statistically significant – except for the members of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). That coefficient is negative but statistically significant at a high level, too. These results suggest that dyadic membership in ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries), the African Group, APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum), the LDCs (Least Developed Countries), Mercosur (Common Market of the Southern Cone) and the RAMs (Recently Acceded Members) leads to more intensive cooperation with the dyad partner in the negotiations.

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18 Interview conducted in Geneva, November 15, 2011 (interview ID 18).
19 Interview conducted in Geneva, November 15, 2011 (interview ID 18).
20 Here, it does not make a difference whether geographic and cultural proximity is measured by common official language, distance between dyads’ capitals or contiguity (cp. Table A3.2 in the Appendix to this chapter).
while members of ASEAN seem to cooperate less intensively with each other. Therefore, the (most) plausible explanation for the disappearing impact of economic power on the intensity of dyadic cooperation – described above for the overall probability of cooperation – seems to hold here as well: the differentiation of this apparent impact in the particular effects of membership in the established coalitions. In other words, again, when these specific effects are not taken into consideration – as in Model I –, they seem to be absorbed by the variable measuring the difference of economic power between two dyad members. The possible reason for this materialisation in the economic power variable is the homogeneous nature of the established coalitions in terms of their members’ economic power, as argued above. To conclude again, WTO members of similar power tend to cooperate with each other in the negotiations. In particular, this seems to hold for the less (and least) wealthy members that appear to work together not on an ad hoc basis but rather in well-established, organised, long-term coalitions in order to influence the final agreement in their favour. There is evidence for this from the interviews as well. The same embassy staff member of the African country referred to above said the following:

“You find that ACP is mostly interested in preference erosion. And then you find that the African Group is on general issues. And then you find that the G-33 is interested only in SSM and special rights. Mostly these two. SSM is special safeguard mechanism. So, that differs. That is why we say we work together. Anything dealing with the special safeguard mechanism, African Group and ACP mostly will be supporting G-33. Most will be saying “we are supporting G-33 position”. They will not have their own position, mostly. Because most of the members are again members of the G-33. When it comes to special products, they support G-33. And anything that deals with preference erosion, the African Group will say “no, we support ACP”.”

The results for regime type in both Model I and Model II clearly support Hypothesis 3 that WTO members with similar levels of democracy are more likely to cooperate with each other in the negotiations: Both in the logistic and the zero-truncated negative binomial regression, the coefficients for regime type are negative and highly statistically significant. Thus, when two dyad members increasingly differ in their levels of democracy, both the overall probability of cooperation and the intensity of cooperation decrease. This finding may corroborate the thoughts about democratic leaders’ habituation of negotiating compromises and authoritarian regimes’ unwillingness to agree with demands for democratic reforms as preconditions for economic cooperation.

Looking at the regression results for trade flow in Models I and II, the coefficients are positive and highly statistically significant on both levels of the hurdle model. This suggests that both the

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21 Interview conducted in Geneva, November 15, 2011 (interview ID 18).
overall probability of cooperation and the intensity of cooperation increase with rising trade flows between two dyad members. Hence, this finding provides support for Hypothesis 4 that WTO members with high levels of bilateral trade are more likely to cooperate with each other in the negotiations, possibly due to a common history of bilateral trade that has fostered trust and good relations between them.

The results for trade interdependence show a more mixed picture which partly provides support for Hypothesis 5 that WTO members with mutually high levels of trade interdependence are more likely to cooperate with each other in the negotiations. In the logistic regressions in both Model I and Model II, the coefficients are positive and highly statistically significant. Remember that the variable is designed in a way that higher values indicate higher asymmetry in trade interdependence between the dyad members. Then the results of the logistic regressions must be interpreted as an increase in the overall probability of cooperation when intra-dyadic asymmetry in trade interdependence increases. At least two imaginable explanations for this finding come into consideration: First, the dyad member that is more dependent on the other may have an incentive to seek cooperation in WTO negotiations in an attempt to further intensify trade relations; possibly by suggesting solutions to potential trade obstacles (that probably affect other WTO members as well). Second, in turn, if the dyad member that is less dependent on the other seeks cooperation with the more dependent one, the latter’s option to refuse may be perceived as limited, considering the potential negative consequences of damaged trade relations.

In this context, it is relevant again to look at the results for the comparison of proximity’s three indicators common official language, distance between dyad members’ capitals and contiguity. The findings for trade interdependence described above are based on model specifications in which common official language measures proximity. Yet, when distance between dyads’ capitals is used in the regression analyses, the coefficient for dyadic trade interdependence in the logistic regression deviates from the one when common official language is the indicator for proximity: The coefficient is positive but not statistically significant at an acceptable level. However, it must be considered that this result is based on a model that does not control for cooperation in established coalitions. Once these effects are taken into account, it does not make a difference whether proximity is measured by common official language, distance between dyads’ capitals or contiguity: All three coefficients for trade interdependence are positive and highly statistically significant. These results suggest an increase in the overall probability of cooperation when intra-dyadic asymmetry in trade interdependence increases. Two explanations for this finding, outlined above, are imaginable. These results also highlight again the importance of integrating the impact of the established groups into the model.

22 The results for these additional tests are shown in Table A3.2 in the Appendix.
Regarding the intensity of dyadic cooperation, on the other hand, the coefficient for trade interdependence in Model I is not statistically significant at a common level in the zero-truncated negative binomial regressions. This would suggest that trade interdependence among WTO members does not play a role for the intensity of their cooperation. However, in the more comprehensive Model II, the coefficient for trade interdependence is negative and statistically significant. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 5 by indicating that increasing intra-dyadic asymmetry in trade interdependence leads to less cooperation once membership in established coalitions is integrated in the model. As for the previous results concerning membership experience and economic power, this difference between Model I and Model II highlights the importance of controlling for the impact of the more established groups in the Doha Round negotiations.

Here, too, the results for the comparison of proximity’s three indicators should be considered. As pointed out before, the findings for trade interdependence above are based on model specifications in which common official language measures proximity. However, when distance between dyads’ capitals and contiguity are used in the regression analyses, both coefficients for trade interdependence in the zero-truncated negative binomial regressions in Model I deviate from the one when common official language is the indicator for proximity: When proximity is measured by distance between dyad members’ capitals and contiguity, the coefficients for trade interdependence are negative and (highly) statistically significant. These results indicate a decrease in the intensity of dyadic cooperation when the asymmetry in trade interdependence between two dyad members increases. This finding is in accordance with the theoretical expectation formulated in Hypothesis 5 which assumes that WTO members with mutually high levels of trade interdependence are more likely to cooperate with each other in the negotiations. Yet, it must also be considered that these results are based on models that do not control for cooperation in established coalitions (Model I). Once these effects are taken into account (in Model II), it does not make a difference whether proximity is measured by common official language, distance between dyads’ capitals or contiguity: All three coefficients for trade interdependence are negative and (highly) statistically significant – as expected. These results show once more that integrating the influence of the more established coalitions into the model is crucial.

Looking at a further effect, the results of Models I and II provide support for Hypothesis 6 relating geographic and cultural proximity to WTO members’ cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations: The coefficients are positive and highly statistically significant both in the logistic and the zero-truncated negative binomial regression. This indicates that both the overall probability of cooperation and the intensity of cooperation increase when dyad members share a common official language. Thus, this finding corroborates the idea that a common culture among WTO members makes them more likely to cooperate on the basis of shared believes, goals and norms, as
well as potentially similar economic orientations and a possible history of political and economic cooperation.

In addition to common official language, the two other indicators for geographic and cultural proximity presented above are used in further regression analyses: distance between a dyad’s capitals and contiguity, a dummy variable whether the dyad members are immediate neighbours or not. The results for these additional tests are shown in Table A3.2 in the Appendix to this chapter. To summarise these additional results for geographic and cultural proximity, using distance between dyads’ capitals and contiguity as indicators, the findings for most variables are not affected. This holds, inter alia, for geographic and cultural proximity: The coefficients for dyadic distance between capitals are – as expected – negative and highly statistically significant both in the logistic and the zero-truncated negative binomial regression in both Models I and II. The coefficients for dyadic contiguity are – as expected – positive and highly statistically significant both in the logistic and the zero-truncated negative binomial regression in both Models I and II. These findings provide further support for Hypothesis 6 by indicating, first, that both the overall probability of cooperation and the intensity of cooperation decrease when geographic distance between WTO members increases. Second, both the overall probability of cooperation and the intensity of cooperation increase when WTO members share a common border. Hence, these findings further corroborate the idea that a common culture among WTO members makes them more likely to cooperate with each other. The most notable changes in other independent variables – compared to the results when common official language is the indicator for proximity – concern membership experience, economic power and trade interdependence, as already presented above.

Results that were already anticipated as well, in the interpretation of the effects of membership experience and economic power, relate to the dummy variables for membership in the more established coalitions ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific WTO members with preferences in the EU), African Group, APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum), LDCs (Least Developed Countries) and Mercosur (Common Market of the Southern Cone). These display the expected positive (and statistically significant) coefficients for both overall probability of cooperation and intensity of cooperation. Unexpectedly, however, the coefficient measuring the impact of membership in the RAMs (Recently Acceded Members) is negative and slightly statistically significant in the logistic regression. As argued in the context of a probable connection between the two variables membership experience and RAM membership, it is conceivable that a potential effect of membership in the RAMs does not come to light due to the impact of dyadic difference in membership duration in the logistic regression. When the regression is run without the membership experience variable, the coefficient for the RAM variable is negative and highly statistically
significant, though. On the other hand, the coefficient for membership in the RAMs is positive and highly statistically significant on the count level of the hurdle model. Hence, although – unexpectedly – dyadic membership in the RAMs seems to make cooperation among new WTO members less likely, it appears to increase the intensity of their cooperation – as expected.

Similar to the unexpected result for the RAMs, the coefficient for the influence of membership in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) is negative and highly statistically significant in the zero-truncated negative binomial regression. Thus, dyadic cooperation among ASEAN members appears to be less intensive than among non-ASEAN members. Yet, the coefficient for ASEAN membership on the binary level is positive and highly statistically significant. Thus, dyadic membership in ASEAN seems to make cooperation among new WTO members more likely but apparently decreases the intensity of such cooperation.

With regard to the control variables, first for the continuously measured year, there is no difference between Model I and Model II: positive and highly statistically significant coefficients in the logistic regression on the first step of the hurdle model, and negative and highly statistically significant coefficients in the zero-truncated negative binomial regression on the second step of the hurdle model. This suggests that the overall probability of cooperation increases, while the intensity of dyadic cooperation decreases over the course of time.

The results for the dummy variables for each year of the research period, the second part of the control variables, display a mixed picture; yet, the same for Models I and II. Year 2011 constitutes the base year the others are estimated against. On the binary level of the hurdle model, the regression coefficients for the years 2001 to 2004 are negative and (highly) statistically significant while those for 2005 to 2009 are positive and highly statistically significant. The only exception is the coefficient for the year 2003 which is not statistically significant at an acceptable level in Model II, i.e. once the effects of the more established groups in the negotiations are controlled for. Thus, the overall probability of cooperation between 2001 and 2004 (with the exception of 2003) was lower than in 2011, but higher between 2005 and 2009. On the count level of the hurdle model, on the other hand, only the regression coefficient for 2001 is negative and strongly statistically significant whereas those for the remaining years (from 2002 to 2009) are positive and strongly statistically significant. Hence, the intensity of cooperation in 2001 was lower than in 2011, but higher in the other years (from 2002 to 2009).

Finally, as already highlighted several times in discussing the results of this analysis, it becomes clear that integrating the effects of membership in the more established coalitions in the model that explains cooperative behaviour of WTO members in the Doha Round negotiations is

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23 Coefficient -0.37, standard error 0.08, p < 0.01.
24 The two years 2000 and 2010 are dropped in both regression analyses because of collinearity.
crucial. This is also indicated by the lower AIC value for Model II compared to the one for Model I. The lower AIC value suggests a higher goodness of fit.

In addition, the graphs in Figure 3.2 (I and II) and Figure 3.3 below present the effect sizes of the independent variables on members’ overall probability and the intensity of their cooperation, respectively, when the effects of membership in the well-established groups are taken into account (i.e. those from Model II). The graphs in Figure 3.2 (I and II) show the predicted values for WTO members’ general probability of cooperation when the independent variables’ values increase from their minimum to their maximum. The graphs in Figure 3.3 display the same for the intensity of cooperation among members, indicated by the number of negotiation documents jointly authored and submitted. Both Figures 3.2 and 3.3 include graphs for only those independent variables whose effects on either the overall probability of cooperation or the intensity of cooperation are statistically significant, according to the results of the regression analyses above. Thus, Figure 3.2 (I and II) shows the effect sizes for membership experience, economic power, regime type, trade flow, trade interdependence, geographic and cultural proximity (measured by common official language) as well as membership in established coalitions (without the RAMs). Figure 3.3, on the other hand, displays the effect sizes for regime type, trade flow, trade interdependence, geographic and cultural proximity (measured by common official language) as well as membership in established coalitions. Most graphs in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 present the effect sizes of the independent variables individually. Yet, the predictive values of the bivariate factors, i.e. members’ geographic and cultural proximity (indicated by common official language) and membership in the different established coalitions, are combined in one graph. Here, the value on the left shows members’ predicted probability of dyadic cooperation (Figure 3.2) or the intensity of their cooperation (Figure 3.3) when the value of the respective variable equals 0 (i.e. when dyad members do not have the same official language or do not belong to one of the established coalitions). The value (range) on the right displays members’ predicted probability or intensity of dyadic cooperation when the value of the respective variable equals 1 (i.e. when dyad members share a common official language or belong to one of the established coalitions). The graphs also present the uncertainty associated with these predicted values by showing the 95 per cent confidence intervals around the estimated probability or intensity of cooperation, while holding all other variables at their means. In the graphs of the continuous variables, the confidence intervals are displayed as dashed lines; in the graphical presentation of the bivariate factors, the confidence intervals are shown as ranges around the predicted values.
Figure 3.2 (I): Effect sizes of membership duration, economic power, regime type and trade flow on members’ probability of dyadic cooperation.
Looking at the predicted probability of dyadic cooperation in the graphs of Figure 3.2, an increasing difference in membership duration between two WTO members appears to make cooperation between them less likely. This negative effect is stronger than for members’ difference in economic power or regime type when the entire range of values of those independent variables is considered. The trade flow of a WTO member dyad, on the other hand, has a relatively strong positive effect on the overall probability of cooperation across its complete value range. However, as the descriptive statistics in Table 3.3 above highlight, intra-dyadic trade flow values larger than 1 current US billion of dollars are already rare. The trade volume between Brazil and South Africa in 2004 and the one between Australia and Mexico in 2005 was about this size, for example.
Figure 3.3: Effect sizes of regime type, trade flow, trade interdependence, proximity and membership in established coalitions on members' intensity of dyadic cooperation
Intra-dyadic trade flow values larger than 15 current US billions of dollars (as between China and Turkey in 2008, e.g.) are very rare; the median is merely 1.24 current US millions of dollars (Chile and Mauritius in 2004). Taking this into account, the effect of membership experience on members’ probability of dyadic cooperation is stronger than the impact of their trade flows.

An increasing asymmetry of trade interdependence between dyad members makes cooperation more likely as well, as displayed in Figure 3.2. Yet, as for trade flow, it must be considered that the median is only 0.03 (Angola and Morocco in 2004), and values higher than 6 rarely exist in the data (such as for Niger and Uruguay in 2002). Accordingly, both graphs for trade flow and trade interdependence display furthermore that the degree of uncertainty associated with the expected value rises with increasing values of the independent variables: The 95 per cent confidence intervals are larger for higher values of intra-dyadic trade flow and trade interdependence.

Finally, geographic and cultural proximity (measured by common official language) as well as membership in established coalitions reveal their positive effect on members’ overall probability of cooperation indicated already by their positive coefficients in the regression analyses above. As the graphical presentation for the more established groups in Figure 3.2 shows, dyadic membership in these coalitions makes cooperation among WTO members in the Doha Round negotiations substantially more likely, with the largest effect size for members of the African Group.

Because effect sizes are, again, calculated only for those independent variables which show a statistically significant effect in the regression analysis for members’ intensity of cooperation, the graphs in Figure 3.3 do not include membership experience and economic power. The effect sizes for intra-dyadic differences in regime type and asymmetry in trade interdependence are relatively small. The graph for dyadic trade flow, on the other hand, suggests a steep increase in the intensity of cooperation the more two WTO members trade with each other. However, as mentioned concerning members’ overall probability of cooperation, intra-dyadic trade flow values larger than 15,000 are rather outliers. Furthermore, the effect of geographic and cultural proximity (measured by common official language) on members’ intensity of cooperation is very weak. In contrast, dyadic membership in established coalitions (including the RAMs here) has a very strong effect. Especially Mercosur members tend to cooperate very intensively in the Doha Round negotiations.

3.6 Conclusion

WTO members have had many (and) substantially different positions during the Doha Round negotiations. Yet, such a high level of heterogeneity may raise the chances for cooperation, especially under consensus decision making. Still, role and character of coalitions in WTO negotiations are not clear yet. Therefore, this study is the first to systematically investigate which
WTO members cooperate with each other in the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations and why, using quantitative indicators. For this purpose, a novel dataset has been compiled, based on negotiation documents which WTO members have jointly submitted to the Doha Round.

One key research question in this endeavour asks whether newcomers in the organisation differ from long-standing members with regard to their cooperative behaviour. This makes the study the first to examine potential effects of membership experience in WTO negotiations. China is a prominent example of a newcomer, having entered the organisation in December 2001 – shortly after the (official) start of the most recent negotiation round. The results of this analysis corroborate the idea that membership experience indeed affects cooperation among WTO members in the Doha Round. More specifically, the results suggest that both members’ general probability of cooperation and the intensity of their cooperation decrease when the difference in membership duration between two WTO members increases. The findings – considered in connection with those from further variables – provide support for the mechanism that newcomers may seek to cooperate with long-standing members in the negotiations in order to countervail insufficient knowledge and to benefit from the higher level of experience and expertise among those countries that have been part of the organisation for a long time. Yet, due to substantial differences in positions (and other possible reasons), long-standing members seem to decide against such cooperation with newcomers – that are little in number and (except for China) also weak in economic terms. In addition, long-standing members may also already look back on a history of cooperation in the past. Hence, WTO members appear to cooperate with their peers of similar membership experience.

The results for several other factors included in the analysis of cooperative behaviour of WTO members in the Doha Round negotiations are mixed. Economic power, e.g., seems to neither have an effect on the overall probability of dyadic cooperation nor the intensity of cooperation when membership in established coalitions is taken into account and when certain indicators measure the independent variable geographic and cultural proximity. Still, from the very results for membership in established coalitions, it can be concluded that it is rather WTO members of similar power that seem to cooperate with each other in the negotiations, especially the economically weaker members, perceiving the Doha Round – or Doha Development Agenda – as committed to the developing countries’ goals. With the power of a big group of developing countries – each of them by its own not influential at all – they constitute an effective negotiating party trying to influence the final agreement in their favour. These less (and least) powerful members appear to work together not on an ad hoc basis but rather in well-established, organised, long-term coalitions in order to push their positions in the Doha Round negotiations to success. Hence, the question whether all forms of cooperation should be treated equally can be denied: The results underline the importance of integrating the impact of the established coalitions into the model.
Furthermore, the finding for regime type may support the thought about democratic leaders’ incentives for international cooperation in trade based on their accountability towards their voters’ welfare. It may also corroborate the idea on democratic leaders’ habituation of negotiating compromises and/or authoritarian regimes’ unwillingness to agree with demands for democratic reforms as preconditions for economic cooperation: When two WTO members increasingly differ in their levels of democracy, both overall probability of cooperation and intensity of cooperation decrease.

Similarly, the results clearly indicate that both the overall probability of cooperation and the intensity of cooperation increase with rising bilateral trade flows between two WTO members. The effect sizes for both regime type and trade flow are rather small, though. The same holds for trade interdependence; besides, the results for this variable show a mixed picture: While the findings concerning the intensity of cooperation provide support for the idea that mutually high levels of trade interdependence between WTO members favour cooperative behaviour in the negotiations, the results for overall probability of cooperation show the opposite. There are at least two conceivable explanations for the latter finding that cooperation gets more likely when trade interdependence between two WTO members turns more asymmetric: First, the dyad member that is more dependent on the other may have an incentive to seek cooperation in WTO negotiations in an attempt to further intensify trade relations; possibly by suggesting solutions to potential trade obstacles (that probably affect other WTO members as well). Second, in turn, if the dyad member that is less dependent on the other seeks cooperation with the more dependent one, the latter’s option to refuse may be perceived as limited, considering the potential negative consequences of damaged trade relations.

Finally, the results provide support for the expectation relating geographic and cultural proximity to WTO members’ cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations: Both the overall probability of cooperation and the intensity of cooperation increase when WTO members share a common official language or a common border and both decrease when geographic distance between WTO members increases. Thus, this finding corroborates the idea that a common culture among WTO members makes them more likely to cooperate on the basis of shared believes, goals and norms, as well as potentially similar economic orientations and a possible history of political and economic cooperation.
### 3.7 Appendix

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Members of the coalition included in the study</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific WTO members with preferences in the EU</td>
<td>Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe; 60 in total</td>
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<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-90</td>
<td>ACP + African Group + Least developed countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>RAMs</td>
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<td>Economic power (intra-dyadic difference)</td>
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**Notes:**
- **Binary/level - Logistic regression:** Overall probability of dyadic cooperation.
- **Proximity:**
  - Common official language
  - Distance between capitals
  - Contiguity
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<th>Model “Distance” I</th>
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### Count level – Zero-truncated negative binomial regression: Intensity of dyadic cooperation

<p>| Membership experience (intra-dyadic difference) | -0.00** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Economic power (intra-dyadic difference) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Regime type (intra-dyadic difference) | -0.11*** (0.01) | -0.08*** (0.01) | -0.10*** (0.01) | -0.08*** (0.01) | -0.11*** (0.01) | -0.08*** (0.01) |
| Trade flow | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) |
| Trade interdependence | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00** (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) | -0.00** (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) |
| Proximity: Common official language | 0.20*** (0.02) | 0.08*** (0.01) | 0.20*** (0.02) | 0.08*** (0.01) | 0.20*** (0.02) | 0.08*** (0.01) |
| Proximity: Distance between capitals | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) |
| Proximity: Contiguity | 0.47*** (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.47*** (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.47*** (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.03) |
| ACP (African, Caribbean &amp; Pacific countries) | 0.22*** (0.02) | 0.24*** (0.02) | 0.22*** (0.02) | 0.24*** (0.02) | 0.22*** (0.02) | 0.24*** (0.02) |</p>
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Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.1 Introduction

In order to increase their chances of success in multilateral negotiations, members of international organisations (IO), such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), may select among different negotiation strategies and tactics. Within the negotiation analysis literature, several classifications for such strategies (and respective tactics) have been created, from integrative vs. distributive (Walton & McKersie, 1965) to soft vs. hard (Dür & Mateo, 2010) to cooperative vs. noncooperative (Mckibben, 2013). Despite some research on the use of strategies in international negotiations in general and within international organisations in particular, it is still unclear which factors influence states’ or IO members’ choice of negotiation strategies and tactics. This is puzzling given that such strategies constitute a key component of a government’s foreign policy (Bailer, 2012) which is supposed to affect the negotiation process – and especially its outcome – in the actor’s favour. This study aims at identifying the factors that influence WTO members’ use of negotiation strategies and tactics in the current Doha Round.
This study is the first to examine whether membership experience in the WTO affects strategy choice in the Doha Round. China, for instance, became a member of the organisation in December 2001 – shortly after the new trade round began. Other newcomers acceded to the WTO between 1996 and over the course of the negotiations – while the majority of members have been part of the organisation since its establishment in 1995. Does this difference in membership experience have an influence on strategy choice in the Doha Round? Do newcomers use different negotiation tactics than long-standing members? Newcomers in the WTO – just as new members in other international organisations in general – are faced with an unfamiliar environment whose rules and norms they need to learn. This potential effect of membership experience in WTO negotiations has not yet been studied.

Furthermore, a member’s power in these multilateral trade negotiations, based on its economic strength, may influence its use of a specific negotiation strategy. There is evidence from negotiations in the European Union (EU) that more powerful states are more likely to use hard (i.e. conflictual and aggressive) tactics (Dür & Mateo, 2010). Less powerful countries, in contrast, may rather refrain from doing so as such behaviour would not appear credible (Pruitt, 1983).

As a third potential factor, WTO members’ regime type may play a role. This study analyses whether more democratic WTO members are more likely to use soft (i.e. friendly and cooperative) negotiation tactics. The democratic peace literature points to democratic norms, and democratic WTO members are assumed to transfer their habit of applying compromising means in their domestic political competition to the international sphere.

Besides the conceivable newcomer effect, the potential influence of economic power and the imaginable impact of regime type, the trade performance of WTO members may affect their choice of a particular negotiation strategy as the WTO’s mission is to seek a higher level of trade liberalisation. Other possible factors that need to be taken into consideration when thinking about WTO members’ strategy choice may include domestic influences like interest groups and the negotiation skills of members’ delegation leaders.

Until now, there is only limited knowledge as to the use of strategies and tactics in WTO negotiations. This study is the first which systematically investigates how and why particular negotiation strategies and tactics are chosen in the current Doha Round, using quantitative indicators. For this purpose, a novel dataset has been compiled, based on 39 semi-structured expert interviews with WTO diplomats, on the choice of negotiation tactics by their particular delegations in the Doha Round negotiations from 2001 to 2011. Interview evidence additionally points to the importance of coalition building in the WTO (especially for small and medium-sized members; cp. Chapter 3), the variation in strategy use across time and issue areas as well as the difference between bilateral vs. multilateral negotiations.
The chapter is structured as follows: The next section focuses on the dependent variable. Based on existing classifications in the literature, I develop an own concept of soft and hard – and mixed – negotiation strategies consisting of certain tactics that are available to negotiators. I then elaborate on the factors that are likely to influence strategy choice of WTO members in the Doha Round negotiations. The methodology section shows in detail the interview data mentioned above that are used to empirically examine the hypotheses, before the results are presented. The chapter concludes with a summary of the major findings and promising questions for future research.

4.2 Negotiation Strategies & Tactics

This section centres the dependent variable of this study. Building on existing classifications of negotiation strategies, I develop an own concept of soft and hard – and mixed – negotiation strategies. The subsequent literature review presents what we already know about strategy choice in international negotiations.

4.2.1 Definitions & Classifications

The negotiation process can be defined, according to Iklé (1964: 3-4), as “a sequence of actions in which two or more parties address demands, arguments and proposals to each other for the ostensible purposes of reaching an agreement and changing the behavior of at least one actor”. The term “negotiation strategy” usually refers to an overall behavioural pattern or plan shown by single negotiators or negotiating delegations (Odell, 2000; Elms, 2006). “Negotiation tactics”, in turn, encompass different actions in the scope of such an overall negotiation strategy. This distinction between strategy and tactic is, though, not well-defined and the terms are used with various meanings in the negotiation analysis literature. In this study, I work with above definitions of negotiation strategy and negotiation tactic.

For negotiation strategies, there are various classifications in the literature, emphasising the characteristics of these (more or less) differently defined strategies. These distinctions classify a negotiation (strategy) as

- “integrative” vs. “distributive” (Walton & McKersie, 1965; Da Conceição-Heldt, 2006),
- “soft” vs. “hard” (Fisher & Ury, 1981),
- “value-creating” vs. “value-claiming” (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Odell, 2000; Elms, 2006),
- “problem-solving” vs. “bargaining” (or “contending”) (Hopmann, 1995; Elgström & Jönsson, 2000; Pruitt, 2002),
- “communicative action” vs. “strategic action” (Niemann, 2004),

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1 Studying international economic negotiations, Odell (2000, 2010) uses this definition as well.
“arguing” vs. “bargaining” (Müller, 2004; Kotzian, 2007),
“soft” vs. “hard” (Dür & Mateo, 2010), and, finally,
“cooperative” vs. “noncooperative” (McKibben, 2013).

These terms are sometimes used synonymously which may not be unproblematic since they do not refer to exactly the same difference (Elgström & Jönsson, 2000; Kersten, 2001). What some of them have in common, however, is their focus on the negotiator’s motivation: An integrative or value-creating strategy refers to the intention to achieve own negotiation objectives which are not radically opposed to those of the other party (Walton & McKersie, 1965) or to realise such a negotiation outcome that all parties are better off (Odell, 2000); i.e. negotiating in the common interest or finding the ‘best’ solution for all (communicative action). A distributive or value-claiming strategy, in contrast, describes the negotiator’s motivation to insist on own gains at the expense of the other parties; i.e. negotiating in the private interest or finding the ‘best’ solution for oneself (strategic action). Such behaviour is also called “win-lose, zero-sum, pure conflict, and competitive” in negotiations where goals are mutually exclusive and negotiators only concerned with unilateral gains, rejecting compromises not efficient for them (Kersten, 2001: 500). This is not to say that the opposite – a value-creating strategy – is based on altruistic motives, as Odell (2000) points out.

However, the focus of those established distinctions of negotiation strategies on the negotiator’s motivation is problematic for different reasons. First, these classifications involve both observable behaviour and unobservable intention behind. Yet, in a specific situation, a value-claiming tactic (e.g. a threat) may be helpful to ‘increase the pie’, i.e. to create value. In addition, a tactic can be integrative (as it creates value) and distributive (as it divides scarce resources) at the same time (Dür & Mateo, 2010). Hence, the discrimination between visible behaviour and hidden motive is not always clear. Odell (2000) addresses this issue, presenting an offensive and a defensive variant of the value-claiming strategy. An offensive value-claiming strategy includes as tactics the demand of concessions and the threat of punitive consequences. A defensive value-claiming strategy comprises threats of countersanctions, for instance, and generally subsumes reactions to the offensive value-claiming strategy of another negotiating party (Odell, 2000).

Second, bringing to light the true motivation of an actor is always extremely difficult, if not completely impossible. Therefore, in this study, the distinction developed by Dür and Mateo (2010) is used who differentiate between “soft” and “hard” negotiation strategies depending only on how conflictive the parties’ observed behaviour is, not on negotiators’ intention.

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2 The difference between Fisher and Ury’s (1981) and Dür and Mateo’s (2010) “soft” vs. “hard” typologies is the former’s conception of soft bargaining which includes taking one-sided losses, revealing bottom lines and smoothly changing one’s negotiation position(s).
According to this distinction, a soft strategy embraces cooperative or friendly tactics such as the following: publicly signalling flexibility; conciliatory statements (e.g. praising other parties); seeking partners for compromise (e.g. making compromise proposals and meeting with parties that need to accept them); developing compromise proposals including new offers; and the willingness to add further issues to or remove some from the negotiation agenda (Dür & Mateo, 2010).

A hard negotiation strategy, according to Dür and Mateo’s (2010) distinction, combines conflictual or aggressive tactics such as the following: strong and public commitments of not giving in, which may include the refusal to agree to the addition of issues to the negotiation agenda that are important to other parties or starting the negotiations with a clearly unrealistic opening demand; public criticism of other parties – ‘shaming’, which may include demands for first concessions by other parties; building defensive coalitions aimed at blocking compromises; or using threats.³

The soft and hard negotiation tactics selected for inclusion in this study on WTO members’ strategy choice in the Doha Round – and the respective questions in my interviews (see below) – are based on Odell’s (2002: 49-50) “Operational Definitions of Strategy Types”.⁴ They are in line with Dür and Mateo’s (2010) classification and were chosen as the most applicable and meaningful in the context of WTO negotiations,⁵ especially the following three soft negotiation tactics:

- expressing understanding for other parties’ interests that are contrary to one’s own interests;
- proposing new solutions which are in the common interest of all or at least many parties; and
- proposing exchanges of concessions for mutual benefit.

By expressing understanding for other parties’ interests which are contrary to one’s own interests, a negotiator makes a conciliatory statement that is supposed to smooth the negotiation process. Such a statement is supposed to emphasise the common goal of coming to a negotiated agreement, even though different interests in terms of specific issues exist. A statement that expresses understanding for other parties’ interests may also include (or be understood as) praising these other parties. Such an act may bolster these other parties towards their domestic constituencies, by helping them to save face, for example. This so-called “cost cutting” tactic makes it possible for other parties to cut the costs of agreeing to concessions (Pruitt, 1983: 168; Odell, 2000; Dür & Mateo, 2010).

³ Hence, disregarding a negotiator’s intention or motivation, both variants of the value-claiming strategy developed by Odell (2000) can be classified as hard strategies in this sense.
⁴ See also Odell (2000: 224-226).
⁵ Furthermore, the criterion of comparability played a role as well: The idea was to generate the opportunity to contrast negotiation strategies in the Doha Round’s trade talks and climate change negotiations.
Proposing new solutions which are in the common interest of all or at least many parties clearly aims at finding a compromise. This tactic, which demonstrates flexibility in the proposing delegation’s position, involves creating new proposals (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Kersten, 2001), hoping that (at least) one finds favour with the other parties and leads to a final agreement.

While the third tactic is related to the second one, in finding possible compromises, it focuses more narrowly on exchanging concessions between several parties that will lead to mutual benefits for all parties involved in such an exchange. Again, exchanging concessions requires and signals flexibility (Odell, 2000; Dür & Mateo, 2010).

The hard negotiation tactics, on the other hand, used in this study cover:

- declaring to not change one’s position under any circumstances;
- overtly criticising other members’ positions;
- rejecting or ignoring demands of concessions by other members;
- hiding one’s actual objectives;
- demanding concessions for one’s own benefit;
- using threats (concerning sanctions, trade restrictions, leaving the negotiations etc.);
- making promises (concerning concessions, aid etc.);
- trying to slow down the negotiations; and
- trying to exclude from the agenda issues on which one would probably have to make concessions.

By declaring to not change the delegation’s position, for instance, possibly even more so under any circumstances, a negotiator emphasises the delegation’s (pretended) reluctance to compromise, signalling an (allegedly) immutable stance instead of a flexible attitude. Hence, this is clearly a conflictive tactic. In international negotiations, such behaviour may be justified by referring to the domestic audience and the national interest. In any case, reneging on such a public commitment would mean to lose face, which increases the potential costs of making concessions later and, thus, makes them less probable (Odell, 2000; Dür & Mateo, 2010).

Overtly criticising other members’ positions, moreover, constitutes a ‘naming and shaming’ tactic that may be used for blaming other parties for a deadlock of the negotiations, for example. It may be even more aggressive in combination with demands for (substantive and / or immediate) concessions by the other parties to the negotiations (Odell, 2000; Dür & Mateo, 2010).

A threat, finally, is generally considered a statement by one party to another that the former will harm the latter if the latter does not do what the former wants. Such a statement may be more or less explicit. In the WTO, where decisions are taken by consensus, openly announcing the use of one’s veto in the negotiations, for instance, would be a more explicit threat than subtly alluding to one’s potential capacity to block the intended agreement. Either way, using a threat in a negotiation
is a clearly aggressive move and, thus, a hard negotiation tactic according to this classification (Odell, 2000; Dürr & Mateo, 2010).

In accordance with Hopmann’s (1995) argumentation, promises can be added to Dürr and Mateo’s (2010) classification as hard negotiation tactics for two reasons: First, Hopmann’s (1995) notion that (using his terminology) bargaining behaviour is intended to influence the behaviour of others and, second, the definition of promises as statements by a sender to bring about positive consequences for a target if this target acts in a specific way.\(^6\) Also the game-theoretical literature suggests considering both threats and promises as hard negotiation tactics (Matthews, 1989; Hovi, 1998).

As indicated above, McKibben (2013) differentiates between cooperative and noncooperative negotiation strategies. Like the one developed by Dürr and Mateo (2010), her distinction does not focus on the negotiators’ intentions; yet, her conception of (non)cooperative negotiation tactics includes only those that do not change the bargaining structure in order to avoid an endogeneity problem in her study. Furthermore, McKibben’s (2013) typology of negotiation strategies is based on the extent to which a negotiating delegation offers concessions to another party. Hence, cooperative tactics are concession-offering while noncooperative tactics are concession-extracting ones.

However, this study on WTO members’ strategy choice in the Doha Round does not require separating negotiation tactics that do or do not change the structure of the negotiations. Rather, Dürr and Mateo’s (2010) distinction between hard and soft negotiation strategies has certain strengths which are the reason for choosing it as classification in this study. First and foremost, assessing the intention of a negotiator is not necessary. In addition, when considering how conflictive certain negotiation tactics are, the parties’ honesty in the negotiations is evaluated as well. This aspect is emphasised also in the distinction between problem-solving and bargaining (or contending) strategies (Pruitt, 2002): A negotiator who deceives other parties does not contribute to problem solving but, in fact, exacerbates conflict while negotiators interested in a solution rather put their

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\(^6\) Schneider (2005), studying bargaining power in multilateral negotiations, calls promises the functional equivalent of (explicit) threats. The Ambassador of one of the largest economies in the WTO elaborated on the (in his opinion marginal) difference between threats and promises in the Doha Round negotiations: “When I say to you “ok, if you do that for me, I will do that for you” – see, that is the idea of the negotiation: where they want something from you and that is what they can give you elsewhere. Is it a threat or is it paying something else or …? It is part of the negotiation. The real linkages and the real balances in the WTO at least are, I would say, 80 / 90 per cent within the negotiating agenda itself. (…) So, you can define. “If you don’t give me what I want, I will not give you what you want” – it is a threat. It is also a question of giving you something so that you give me something. And that is every day’s life. If you define threat in the extreme form, as we did – sanctions or punitive actions, identifiable outside WTO: we do not do that. We might do some on the positive side, e.g. like with the LDCs. But in between there is a very strong reality. And you can present it under this heading of threats or pressure or payment. The payment is in everyday world – if I do that, what do I get. That’s part of the everyday negotiations” (interview conducted in Geneva, November 4, 2011; interview ID 9).
cards on the table. Hence, hard and soft strategies incorporate as tactics also hiding or unfolding actual objectives – therefore the respective item among the hard negotiation tactics included in this work.

For those reasons, the adoption of the classification of hard and soft negotiation strategies and the respective tactics associated with them shall facilitate this empirical research on the question why WTO members choose particular negotiation tactics and a specific strategy in the Doha Round. As devised by Dür and Mateo (2010), their typology subdivides the highly intangible concept of negotiation behaviour into single observable actions without any assumptions concerning actors’ intentions.

However, my theoretical conception of negotiation strategies in multilateral international negotiations such as the WTO’s Doha Round deviates from Dür and Mateo’s (2010) classification in one major aspect. In contrast to their distinction, I do not consider WTO members’ negotiation strategies as varying on a continuum between the two poles of hard and soft but rather as two different dimensions, often constituting a hard component and a soft component of a mixed negotiation strategy. The continuum assumes that all negotiation tactics that are not classified as soft constitute hard tactics and vice versa. Thus, the absence of a soft negotiation tactic is assumed to be a hard negotiation tactic (and vice versa again).

Furthermore, related to this assumption is a second one which is based on two ideas: First, negotiation strategies are considered aggregate negotiation tactics (as defined above) and, second, all parties to a negotiation have a specific strategy which may have been prepared in advance and may be adapted to the negotiation process depending on the course of the negotiations. Then, the second assumption postulates that all of these negotiation strategies are appropriate for being classified as soft or hard according to Dür and Mateo’s (2010) typology above. However, while this may be the case in bilateral and some multilateral international negotiations (e.g. in the EU), for other multilateral ones like the WTO’s Doha Round, it does not completely reflect the empirical picture.

The reason for this is the issue of parties’ inaction during the negotiation process (cp. Chapter 2). The literature on negotiation strategies generally considers inactiveness of a negotiating party a conflictive – hence, in Dür and Mateo’s (2010) classification, hard – tactic. Obviously, in bilateral international negotiations, inaction by one of the two parties makes it more difficult to arrive at a negotiated agreement and, thus, inactiveness is seen as a conflictual tactic used by one side of the negotiations. Some classifications of negotiation strategies in the literature have clearly been developed with a focus on bilateral negotiations. However, when such classifications have been applied to multilateral negotiations in different studies, two questions have apparently been overlooked: Does inaction by one of the negotiating parties make it indeed more or, yet, less difficult
to come to a negotiated agreement? And, thus, does inactiveness really constitute a conflictive or rather a cooperative tactic? In multilateral international negotiations like the Doha Round, it is definitely conceivable that inaction of parties to the negotiations, here WTO members, is conducive to the negotiation process: The proceedings are at least not additionally complicated by evidently more aggressive negotiation tactics used by a party that tries to increase its own benefits.

Hence, in multilateral international negotiations in general, such as the Doha Round in particular, negotiating delegations may be inactive at some points during the negotiation process and behave like free riders, potentially benefitting from the negotiation tactics used by other delegations. It is also possible for parties to such multilateral negotiations to pursue an individual negotiation strategy that primarily consists of one major tactic: acting in (one or several) coalitions with other parties – without a clear indication whether these coalitions are defensive or willing to compromise (cp. Chapter 3).

For these reasons, I doubt the two assumptions described above. I argue that the absence of a soft negotiation tactic does not constitute a hard negotiation tactic and vice versa. Rather, the absence of either kind of negotiation tactic in a specific situation is neither hard nor soft, but “0”. Inactiveness constitutes a negotiation tactic as well. With this conception, temporary inaction due to a free-rider incentive (and, to a lesser extent, primarily individual inactiveness based on a coalition approach) is not necessarily considered a hard negotiation tactic (or strategy). Support for the idea of soft and hard negotiation strategies as not constituting a continuum also comes from the results of empirical studies which suggest that “integrative and distributive bargaining may be distinct dimensions rather than polar opposites” (Metcalf et al., 2007).

As introduced already above, the conception of soft and hard negotiation tactics as two different dimensions leads to the notion of a soft and a hard component of mixed negotiation strategies. Such mixed or combined strategies are also described by Odell (2000), elaborating on the value-creating vs. value-claiming distinction of negotiation strategies: A “mixed or combined strategy” is pursued if “claiming and creating tactics are mixed in some proportion, either simultaneously, or in a sequence dominated by claiming in one phase and creating in another” (Odell, 2000: 226). WTO members are likely to combine both types of negotiation tactics in order to achieve their objectives in the Doha Round. As Odell (2006) points out for his classification, a purely soft negotiation strategy is rarely used in international negotiations because the risk that other
parties take advantage of such a behaviour is simply too high. Applying a purely hard negotiation strategy, on the other hand, is unlikely to lead to an agreement.

I argue that, in multilateral international negotiations, delegations can choose not only between soft and hard tactics but also (temporary) inaction. Whenever a negotiating party decides on its next move within the negotiation process, this party may select a soft tactic, a hard tactic or to pass. The latter move might benefit a party for (at least) two reasons: First, other parties are expected to behave in a way that probably leads to positive consequences for the inactive party. For instance, it may be possible to exploit the results of a hard negotiation tactic used by another delegation without dirtying one’s own hands. Or, second, a party might simply wait and see which consequences the tactics of other delegations may entail and only then decide, at the next move, whether it is necessary to take a hand in the negotiations again in order to influence the intended outcome in one’s favour. One of the WTO Ambassadors who I interviewed for this study (see below) emphasised this:

“[T]he beauty of multilateral trading negotiations is that it is like a chess game but the chess game is multidimensional. (…) You play many times and what you do is, for instance, you just shut up because someone else is defending your own position without knowing that he or she is defending your own position – so you just keep quiet and pray for the best.”

4.2.2 What do we already know?

Research on international relations and, more specifically, international negotiations has focused on the factors influencing the choice of negotiation strategies in bilateral or multilateral negotiations (e.g. Habeeb, 1988; Odell, 2000; Dür & Mateo, 2010; McKibben, 2013). The bigger part of the work on strategies in international negotiations has been done in the form of qualitative case studies. Trade negotiations have been examined in this manner by, inter alia, Odell (2000), Elms (2006), Odell and Sell (2006), Narlikar and Odell (2006), Agius (2012) as well as Ahnlid (2012). Odell (2000) analyses and evaluates the strategies used by diplomats in several major bilateral and multilateral economic negotiations in the latter half of the last century involving the United States. He concludes that three factors are crucial in explaining strategy choice and negotiation outcomes: market conditions, negotiators’ beliefs and domestic politics. Elms (2006) identifies changes in strategy choice by diplomats in bilateral trade negotiations (more precisely those between the United States and Japan or South Korea, respectively, concerning automobiles and auto parts in the 1990s). She concludes that the use of integrative, or value-creating, strategies (avoiding threats) leads to the most durable agreements while highly distributive, or value-claiming, strategies (including threats) rather entail

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9 Interview conducted in Geneva, November 1, 2011 (interview ID 1).
deadlocked negotiations. However, she also emphasizes that strategy selection often takes place unconsciously, as perceived losses make trade officials choose risky tactics in the negotiations. Odell and Sell (2006) examine through a single case study the WTO coalition on intellectual property and public health which reframed intellectual property protection as a public health issue prior to and during the organisation’s Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001. This tactic formed part of a larger mixed distributive negotiation strategy (that is dominated by distributive tactics but mixes in integrative ones as well), aimed at achieving negotiation gains at the expense of the United States and other property owners. The coalition began with a distributive strategy based on an ethical principle that related the issue of intellectual property protection to the emotionally loaded concerns on the AIDS pandemic. Once this principle met approval, however, the coalition agreed to compromises, i.e. used integrative tactics to give other negotiating parties some gains to present to their constituents. Finally, Narlikar and Odell (2006), also through a single case study, examine the Like Minded Group’s (LMG) use of a strict distributive strategy in WTO negotiations taking place from mid-1998 through the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001. The LMG made several proposals intended to shift value from developed to developing countries while not granting developed countries any benefit as long as they had not first agreed to the coalition's demands. The authors point to the identity and membership of the coalition, especially its high degree of heterogeneity, in explaining the LMG’s strategy choice.10

(Further) Case studies on the Doha Round negotiations have been conducted, e.g., by Agius (2012) and Ahnlid (2012). Agius (2012) examines negotiation strategies in the Doha Round as well, focusing on poor and inexperienced members. Based on several cases brought by developing member countries to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), she develops a typology of links which may connect the two processes of negotiation and litigation and finds some empirical evidence that such disadvantaged members are able to increase their bargaining power by strategic linkages between negotiation and litigation. Based on the author’s personal experience as a trade diplomat, Ahnlid (2012) describes the “concentric circles” procedure that was used in the WTO ministerial meeting in 2008 and brought the Doha Round closer to a breakthrough than any previous attempt aimed at a successful conclusion. This concentric circles procedure refers to a small group of members, reflecting the different interests and views of the membership at large, which solve basic problems; the proposals generated this way are then given to increasingly bigger groups.

10 The coalition’s identity focused on a common principle – the dissatisfaction with the unfavourable Uruguay Round agreements – in contrast to common trade interests. Furthermore, the LMG’s economic and policy heterogeneity prevented prioritization of negotiation issues within the coalition and exchanges of concessions with other WTO members outside of the coalition. For instance, in 2001, LMG members did not even attempt to find common fallback positions – once they had agreed on a position, they would stick to it without yielding (thereby, however, increasing coalition members’ incentives to defect in order to achieve smaller but more certain gains) (Narlikar & Odell, 2006).
Despite the inherent shortcomings of such qualitative case studies, there are only few quantitative empirical studies on strategies in IO negotiations – and all of them investigate the EU (e.g. Dür & Mateo, 2010; McKibben, 2013). This lack of research on negotiation strategies in the WTO is perplexing as negotiations are at the core of the WTO in general and especially constitute the WTO members’ activity within the Doha Round whose goal is to arrive at a new trade agreement.\textsuperscript{11} The selection of a particular negotiation strategy is likely to affect this negotiation outcome, more precisely the probability of coming to such a negotiated agreement as well as its details regulating future world trade (Elms, 2006). Hence, this study contributes to research filling the gap in the WTO and negotiation analysis literature that is of more than merely academic relevance. In addition, the number of international organisations and, thus, the frequency – and importance – of multilateral negotiations within them has increased. This development has strengthened scientific interest in the question which IO members apply which strategy in these international negotiations and why.

4.3 Theory & Hypotheses
Which determinants affect WTO members’ selection of a specific negotiation strategy in the current negotiations of a new trade agreement? I argue that the three most important ones are membership experience in the WTO, WTO members’ economic power and their regime type. Additional explanations focus on members’ global trade integration, the influence of domestic interest groups and their delegations’ negotiation skills.

4.3.1 Membership experience
Similar to WTO members’ negotiation activity and their cooperation with other members examined in the two previous chapters, membership experience in the WTO is assumed to be an important factor for the choice of a particular negotiation strategy in the Doha Round as well. Such experience may make long-standing members use a different strategy than newcomers. As described in detail in the introductory Chapter 1, newcomers in international organisations in general and in the WTO in particular are thought to be in a distinct situation at the beginning of their membership when they are confronted with a new environment in which they need to understand its rules and norms. Sociological research emphasises newcomers’ unfamiliarity with the basic knowledge that long-standing members have acquired in the course of time; knowledge on acceptable behaviour, for instance. Based on this literature, new WTO members are expected to behave in a rather hesitant and non-assertive way in their early interactions within the organisation: They may act rather tentatively in order to learn acceptable behaviour through observation or by trial and error. On the

\textsuperscript{11} Put differently: The WTO is “a negotiating forum (…) The WTO was born out of negotiations, and everything the WTO does is the result of negotiations” (WTO, 2009).
other hand, new WTO members may deliberately decide to initially back off in a new political environment until they have determined their ideal way in the organisation (Bailer et al., 2009).

Based on these considerations, the main theoretical expectation is that newcomers are likely to stay inactive. If they do decide to get active in the negotiations, they are expected to rather use soft negotiation tactics since such behaviour is thought to be less damaging – as concerns their relations to other WTO members (Lax & Sebenius, 1986) – than hard negotiation tactics.

**Hypothesis 1a: The less membership experience WTO members have in the organisation, the less likely they are to use hard negotiation tactics.**

It is, however, also conceivable that long-standing members choose soft tactics more frequently since sufficient experience and according expertise may be necessary to design compromise proposals (Dür & Mateo, 2010). To reconcile the interests of about 150 WTO members quite obviously requires a high level of information and knowledge which has to be acquired in negotiations over the years. Hence, this perspective would suggest that long-time members have applied more soft tactics than the newcomers.

**Hypothesis 1b: The more membership experience WTO members have in the organisation, the more likely they are to use soft negotiation tactics.**

### 4.3.2 Economic power

Based on the realist theory, the strongest expectation related to economic power and the choice of a negotiation strategy is that powerful WTO members are likely to select hard tactics. Such behaviour is obviously more credible for large members since they basically do not have to fear retaliation and are able to execute the consequences of a threat, e.g., they made if necessary (Pruitt, 1983; Dür & Mateo, 2010). Small and medium-sized WTO members, in contrast, are generally assumed to choose hard negotiation tactics less frequently than large ones (Odell, 2000). For several reasons, they are rather supposed to select soft tactics. First, making use of hard tactics would not appear credible (possibly with negative effects even at the domestic level; Dür & Mateo, 2010) or might be retaliated – with especially serious consequences for those weak entities (Habeeb, 1988). In addition, taking into account the shadow of the future (Axelrod, 1984) – considering negotiations an iterated game – and the risk that the use of hard negotiation tactics may deteriorate relations with other parties (Lax & Sebenius, 1986), small and medium-sized WTO members are thought to be particularly anxious to maintain good relationships with other, and in particular stronger, members (Bailer, 2012). Furthermore, because small and medium-sized members are assumed to need a negotiated
agreement more than the large ones, they may refrain from hard tactics since the more parties use such tactics, the less likely is an agreement (Dür & Mateo, 2010).\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{Hypothesis 2a: The more economically powerful WTO members are, the more likely they are to use hard negotiation tactics.}

Yet, powerful WTO members may not need to resort to hard tactics (possibly perceiving that they are able to achieve their goals also by applying soft ones). Strong WTO members may not consider it necessary to explicitly use hard tactics like threats to make other – weaker – members comply with their demands. Large members can expect economically weaker members to go along with these demands even if they are not accompanied by the use of hard tactics in the WTO negotiations as small members may prefer to show some kind of anticipatory obedience and not risk the deterioration of bilateral relations. As the Ambassador of a medium-sized WTO member pointed out during the interview: “For small countries, maybe you do not want to be at loggerheads.”\textsuperscript{13} Quite the contrary, the Ambassador of one of the largest economies in the WTO highlighted: “We are quite frank in our everyday work: If we disagree with something, everybody notices.”\textsuperscript{14}

On the other hand, small WTO members may make use of hard negotiation tactics as well, especially in situations when they feel the need to apply all tactics available to pursue their interests (Dür & Mateo, 2010). A number of hard tactics, such as delays or refusals, are also at the weaker members’ disposal. In contrast to GATT times, smaller – developing – members nowadays have “a greater stake in the world trading system and a greater claim on participation in the WTO’s decision-making process” (Schott & Watal, 2000b: 284). Another difference is that weaker members are required to undertake considerably greater reforms of their trade regulations and practices compared to the GATT era. Hence, they have to be better informed about negotiation issues (Schott & Watal, 2000b). From this perspective, one may conclude that less powerful WTO members are characterised by (a) larger (need for) self-determination in the presence of a higher level of information.

\textit{Hypothesis 2b: The more economically powerful WTO members are, the less likely they are to use hard negotiation tactics.}

\textsuperscript{12} For a more general overview on the effects of power in international negotiations, such as in the EU, see Bailer (2004, 2010).
\textsuperscript{13} Interview conducted in Geneva, December 7, 2011 (interview ID 34). Compare also the description of feared consequences for “misbehaviour” in the context of Green Room meetings in Chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{14} Interview conducted in Geneva, November 4, 2011 (interview ID 9).
4.3.3 Regime type

In contrast to the realist assumption that a state’s regime type does not affect its behaviour, it may be argued that a WTO member’s democracy level has an impact on its choice of a particular negotiation strategy as well. The democratic peace literature, for instance, emphasises democratic norms. Maoz and Russett (1993: 625) point out that “[s]tates, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions.” Democratic regimes’ foundation are political – democratic – norms that stress regulated political competition through peaceful, cooperative means and apply in international behaviour as well (Doyle, 1986; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Dixon, 1994). Especially against the background of consensual decision making in the WTO, more democratic WTO members are thought to be more used to and more trained in trying to find compromises in general (Dixon, 1994). More specifically, this should also entail an increased familiarity with expressing understanding for the interests of other actors that are contrary to one’s own or, in case of such conflicts, proposing new solutions which are in the common interest of all or at least many actors, among other things.

Another strand of literature that is important with regard to the relationship between WTO member’s regime type and their strategy choice is called “democratic difference” and emerges from the democratic peace literature (Dai, 2002). Bliss and Russett (1998), e.g., find that shared democracy can constitute a basis for peace not only directly but also indirectly via increased trade between states. And Mansfield et al. (2002) highlight the relationship between states’ regime type and their leaders’ inclination to cooperate in economic terms: Democratic governments have a bigger incentive to seek international trade cooperation than non-democratic regimes.

Based on these considerations, one would expect more democratic WTO members to choose soft negotiation tactics more frequently than less democratic WTO members.

Hypothesis 3: The more democratic WTO members are, the more likely they are to use soft negotiation tactics.

4.3.4 Global trade integration

Similar to the earlier considerations on economic power, WTO members with higher levels of international trade may be more vulnerable and may rather choose soft tactics in WTO negotiations to not risk a deterioration of trade relations with other members. Bayard and Elliott (1994), e.g., find that threats by the US have been the more effective the bigger the trade volume of the targeted countries. Furthermore, higher levels of international trade are assumed to lead to a higher importance concerning the negotiation outcome, i.e. the potential agreement. Such an increased importance of the conclusion of an agreement due to the larger benefits of more liberalized trade for
WTO members with higher levels of trade may also result in using soft tactics in order to push the negotiations and achieve the desired agreement (faster).

_Hypothesis 4a: The more WTO members trade internationally, the more likely such WTO members are to use soft negotiation tactics._

On the other hand, however, WTO members with higher levels of international trade may also attach greater importance to the detailed regulations in the final agreement than those members that trade less. This may create a larger willingness and propensity to insist on the crucial details for those WTO members that trade more and a decreased willingness of giving in to possible compromise proposals that do not include the desired clauses. In this way, a greater importance of specific trade regulations may result in resorting to hard tactics to get the particular details into the negotiated agreement.

_Hypothesis 4b: The more WTO members trade internationally, the more likely such WTO members are to use hard negotiation tactics._

### 4.3.5 Domestic interest groups

The liberal approach of the broader international relations theory emphasises domestic variables as key factors of a state’s interests – the latter being, according to Moravcsik (1997), aggregate individual interests. Pluralism also ascribes societal actors, especially certain interest groups, an influence on negotiation behaviour (De Bièvre & Dür, 2005). Schelling (1960) denotes the impact of such domestic actors on international negotiations as “the paradox of weakness”, referring to negotiators who justify their behaviour (e.g. demands or refusals) as due to the attitude or expectations of their domestic constituencies. Especially Putnam (1988), taking up and deepening this idea as “two-level games”, underlines that an adequate account of the domestic factors of foreign policy and international relations must consider interest groups (both economic and non-economic), pursuing their goals by pressuring the government at the national level to adopt favourable policies. At the international level then, governments seek to satisfy these domestic pressures. Hence, both liberal theory and the theory of two-level games suggest that governments play two different games with one single move (Iida, 1993; cp. Bailer, 2012).

In addition, the political-economic literature and comparative politics approaches also suggest that the positions and behaviour of states at the international stage are influenced by interest groups. The seminal works of Katzenstein (1976, 1978) and Krasner (1978b, 1978a), for instance, emphasise the importance of domestic determinants in international economic policy. As Katzenstein (1978: 4) expresses the essence of this issue: “The main purpose of all strategies of
foreign economic policy is to make domestic policies compatible with the international political economy.” For both scholars, the crucial point is that central decision-makers (“the state”) must deal simultaneously with domestic and international pressures.

However, while Putnam’s (1988) two-level game theory convincingly argues that domestic groups have an effect on IO members’ positioning decision in international negotiations, different societal actors pursue different, often competing interests in national and international affairs. In which way such competing notions are aggregated and transformed into a specific policy position of one member depends on this entity’s political system (its form of representations), its franchise (the weightiness different groups are able to assert) as well as its decision rules (Rogowski, 1999).

Interest groups aim their activities at the power points in a political system (Thomas, 1993). The influence of interest groups on their government’s positions and negotiation behaviour is studied in detail in the spatial two-level game (e.g. Mo, 1995; Milner & Rosendorff, 1996; Tarar, 2001) and the political-economic literature. Milner and Rosendorff (1997), for instance, argue that the pressure exerted by interest groups may result in a breakdown of the negotiations if it is too high; if it is too low, on the other hand, and governments have insufficient knowledge about the preferences of such interest groups, they may fail in using the interest groups’ potential effectively. Grossman and Helpman (2001) stress both this information aspect and Rogowski’s (1999) thought of competing interest groups: First, as governments are supposed to be unable to evaluate the true state of the world, including the effect of a specific policy on industries etc., they need information provided by interest groups for this purpose; second, governments experience pressure from competing groups whose interests they need to balance in order to obtain or maintain their support. Accordingly, certain interest groups are able to influence governmental decisions on negotiation positions at the international level more than others, because they are better organised or have a higher money spending capacity (Olson, 1965). This resource aspect is emphasised by Hanegraaff et al. (2015) for the presence of domestic interest groups at WTO Ministerial Conferences between 1995 and 2011. They find that overall wealth and considerable access to domestic resources are key explanatory factors for national interest groups’ attendance – for groups from democratic WTO members since a democratic political regime is the most important condition (Hanegraaff et al., 2015).

In terms of interest groups’ ability to influence the positions of their governments in international negotiations, the groups are especially successful if the constituency associated with a particular interest group is likely to be strongly affected by legislation implementing the negotiation outcome (Bailer, 2012). It is well known, for instance, that especially producers possess a disproportionate influence in EU decision making (e.g. Schneider & Baltz, 2003) as they can organise themselves to a considerably higher degree than the much broader consumer interests. The US
Congress voting literature, too, shows that representatives frequently pursue their constituencies’ economic interests (Peltzman, 1984; Magee et al., 1989). The WTO (2009: 106) confirms that “[t]rade policies and negotiating positions are prepared in capitals, usually taking into account advice from private firms, business organizations, farmers, consumers and other interest groups” although “[g]overnments need to be armed against pressure from narrow interest groups, and the WTO system can help” with that (WTO, 2011). Also McGinnis and Movsesian (2001: 7-8) state that “protectionist interest groups within a country can often use the political process to pursue policies that profit members of the group at the expense of the nation as a whole (…) The WTO and the trade agreements it administers act to restrain protectionist interest groups, thereby promoting both free trade and democracy.”

With regard to the preferences of domestic interest groups and WTO members’ strategy choice in the Doha Round negotiations, one may expect that pushing for freer trade is linked to a higher probability of using soft tactics, while maintaining the status quo is connected to a higher probability of either using hard tactics or inactivity. Domestic free trade lobby groups are interested in a negotiated agreement that further liberalises global trade. If such lobby groups are able to influence their respective governments in their favour, those governments are thought to be more inclined to select soft negotiation tactics because decisions in the WTO are taken by consensus rule. Therefore, WTO members that represent (at least partly) such offensive interests need to convince all the other members of a common position. This requirement is assumed to make WTO members more open to compromises and, thus, to (rather) involve the use of soft negotiation tactics like expressing understanding for the interests of other WTO members that are contrary to one’s own, proposing new solutions which are in the common interest of all or at least many members and proposing exchanges of concessions for mutual benefit. On the other hand, domestic protectionist lobby groups are interested in keeping the status quo. If such lobby groups are successful in affecting their respective governments’ positions, those governments are assumed to be more inclined to select hard negotiation tactics or be inactive. WTO members that represent (at least partly) such defensive interests may, e.g., declare that they will not change their position under any circumstances or reject demands of concessions by other members. Due to consensus decision rule, they would not even need to get active in order to influence the final agreement in their favour.

In terms of WTO members’ expected negotiation behaviour in this context, the relative influence of domestic free trade vs. protectionist interest groups on their respective governments’ positions in the Doha Round needs to be considered. Depending on the specific configuration, the results may be, e.g., a mixed negotiation strategy with soft tactics dominating (in case offensive interests are prevailing) or a mixed strategy with about the same amount of soft and hard
negotiation tactics used (if the influence of free trade and protectionist interest groups is basically equal).

_Hypothesis 5a: The higher the pressure exerted by domestic free trade interest groups on WTO members, the more likely those members are to use soft negotiation tactics._

_Hypothesis 5b: The higher the pressure exerted by domestic protectionist interest groups on WTO members, the more likely those members are to use hard negotiation tactics._

### 4.3.6 Negotiation skills

Careful preparation and a high information level are generally thought to positively affect the prospects of success in negotiations (Murnighan, 1992; Druckman, 1994; Barry & Friedman, 1998). However, there is still insufficient knowledge as to how governments attempt to improve such preparation and acquisition of information. One possibility may be to increase the quality, i.e. desired characteristics like skills, of the negotiating delegation. The more skilled delegation members are, the more information regarding all aspects of the negotiations (e.g. key issues and “red lines” of other parties in general or the positions of potential coalition partners in particular) can be evaluated and processed and the better a delegation is able to react to new proposals (Bailer, 2012).

While the theoretical foundations of negotiation strategies are relatively strong, there is still little knowledge on the relationship between negotiation resources, such as skills, and the use of negotiation tactics. Experimental studies show that experience in previous negotiations affects the outcome of subsequent ones (Druckman, 1968). In addition, the political science negotiation literature stresses the influence of negotiators’ personalities (Jönsson, 2002b; Rubin, 2002b, 2002a). Yet, the context in which the latter are active plays a crucial role. It is conceivable that WTO members with more skilled negotiators in their delegations are more likely to use hard negotiation tactics since such diplomats may recognize situations in which they find the use of hard tactics appropriate and may have the necessary degree of self-confidence to dare to make use of hard tactics (Bailer, 2012).

_Hypothesis 6: The more negotiation skills diplomats of WTO members have, the more likely they are to use hard negotiation tactics._

### 4.4 Methodology

The hypotheses which account for the variance in WTO members’ use of negotiation tactics in the Doha Round are tested with the help of quantitative methods in order to generate valid explanations and generalizations by concentrating on a limited set of variables in contrast to already existing single
or comparative case studies on similar subjects. In addition, I make use of qualitative information from my interviews with WTO diplomats.

4.4.1 Research period
Since this study analyses WTO members’ use of negotiation strategies and tactics in the Doha Round, the research period covers the time frame of the latter up to 2012. Negotiations in the fields of Agriculture and Services started already in 2000, the negotiations in the majority of issues began in 2001 and the negotiations in Trade Facilitation started only in 2004. Hence, the period of this study is from 2000, when the first negotiations began, to 2011 when the bigger part of the interviews took place.

4.4.2 Dependent variable: Negotiation strategies & tactics
In order to measure a set of variables presented above, most importantly the use of tactics in WTO negotiations, I conducted prearranged, semi-structured expert interviews with diplomats of 39 WTO members in November and December 2011 as well as in March 2012 in Geneva. Generally, I aimed at interviewing the members’ permanent representatives, due to their higher level of experience as well as their comprehensive knowledge and insight into all of the negotiation issues. However, as these top diplomats are almost always extremely busy, I conducted some of the interviews with delegation members holding a lower position. The decision to collect these data in face-to-face interviews was based mainly on one specific advantage of this method. I decided against other approaches like document analysis or a survey with which the gathering of such information seems to be more difficult. Further options would have been to analyse negotiation protocols (coding categories that refer to specific strategies, e.g. “problem solving”, as Wagner (1999) does) or to send questionnaires to WTO diplomats (containing possibly not only closed but also open questions) as in Elgström and Jönsson’s (2000) study. Yet, the crucial factor was the plus of information and insight by personally communicating with these diplomats. In this way, I received answers to both closed questions, for which interviewees could select a category from several alternatives, and open ones which they could answer in their own words. Of course, it has to be taken into account that

15 These WTO members include Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, the EU, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and Uganda as founding members of the organisation. In addition, I conducted interviews with six members that have acceded to the WTO in or after 2001: Cambodia, China, Lithuania, Nepal, Saudi Arabia and Taiwan. For Lithuania, all variable values refer to the period between 2001 and 2003 when the country has not yet been an EU member. The total number of WTO members grew over the course of the negotiations from 135 when the Services talks started in January 2000 to 153 in November 2011 when I conducted most of the interviews for this study. As mentioned before, WTO members are not necessarily countries: Two members that are not sovereign states but customs territories with full autonomy in the conduct of their trade policies (WTO, 2009) are included in this study, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
interviewees could be tempted to appear in a favourable light, resulting possibly in an underestimation bias as to the use of hard negotiation tactics (cp. Bailer, 2012). However, the repeated assurance of complete anonymity may have induced the diplomats to answer honestly. This anonymity clause entails that I do not attribute answers or statements to particular WTO members in this study.\textsuperscript{16}

The interview questions concerned negotiation experience in particular and diplomatic experience in general, size of the WTO delegation, challenges in the WTO, negotiation tactics used by the delegation, participation in negotiating groups (coalitions), domestic and international (f)actors influencing the negotiation positions, importance of negotiation issues and accession negotiations (if applicable).\textsuperscript{17}

In terms of negotiation strategies, nine questions referred to hard tactics, three to soft ones. All of these questions asked “how often” a particular tactic was used in the current Doha Round negotiations. In answering, the interviewees could select from the five different categories “very often”, “often”, “rarely”, “very rarely” and “never” plus the four options in between (e.g. “between rarely and often”, which meant “sometimes” for many interviewees). Finally, they could indicate “don’t know” or “no answer” (cp. Elgström & Jönsson, 2000; Bailer, 2012).

The questions targeting the hard negotiation tactics were:

Q1: How often does your delegation declare that it will not change its position under any circumstances?
Q2: How often does your delegation overtly criticise other members’ positions?
Q3: If other parties demand concessions from your delegation, how often does your delegation reject or ignore such demands?
Q4: How often does your delegation hide its actual objectives to reach a stronger negotiation position?
Q5: How often does your delegation demand concessions for its own benefit?
Q6: In order to reach its objectives, how often does your delegation use threats (concerning sanctions, trade restrictions, leaving the negotiations etc.) to influence other parties’ positions?
Q7: In order to reach its objectives, how often does your delegation use promises (concerning concessions, aid etc.) to change other negotiating parties’ positions?
Q8: How often does your delegation try to slow down the negotiations in order to reach a stronger negotiation position?

\textsuperscript{16} Those WTO members that are included in this study are not a random sample of all WTO members. Instead, the interviewees, i.e. the diplomats from those WTO members covered by this study, volunteered by (eventually) agreeing to be interviewed after I had sent requests for interviews to all WTO members. Accordingly, this study might suffer from a sampling bias as one of the consequences of volunteer sampling.

\textsuperscript{17} The questionnaire used for conducting the interviews can be found in the Appendix following this chapter.
Q9: How often does your delegation try to exclude from the agenda issues on which it would probably have to make concessions?

The questions concerning the soft negotiation tactics were:

Qa: If the interests of other parties are contrary to those of your delegation, how often does your delegation express understanding for this?

Qb: How often does your delegation propose new solutions which are in the common interest of all or at least many parties?

Qc: How often does your delegation propose an exchange of concessions for mutual benefit?  

The answer categories from “very often” to “never” were transferred into an ordinal scale from 1 = “never” to 9 = “very often”, taking into account the options in between. Based on these values, a ‘hard strategy index’ and a ‘soft strategy index’ were created for each interviewee, i.e. WTO member. For the former, the values for the nine questions targeting hard tactics were added and divided by the number of questions actually answered to correct for missing data; for the latter, the values for the three questions concerning soft tactics were totalled and also divided by the number of questions indeed answered for the same reason. Hence, the lowest possible value for each of these two indices is 1 and the highest possible value is 9. For the hard (soft) strategy index, a value of 1 means that a WTO member has never applied any hard (soft) negotiation tactic in the Doha Round. On the other hand, a value of 9 on the hard (soft) strategy index means that a WTO member has applied either a mixed negotiation strategy involving a hard (soft) component or a purely hard (soft) strategy.  

The values on the two indices for the WTO members included in this study indicate that there is indeed variation in the negotiation strategies adopted. As Table 4.1 below shows, no WTO member is on the extreme ends of the continuum of the hard strategy index; on the other hand, one member scored the maximum value of 9 on the soft strategy index. It is evident that WTO members combine both types of negotiation tactics in mixed strategies in order to achieve their goals. As the correlation coefficient of the two indices is only 0.34, this confirms my conception of hard and soft

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18 As mentioned above, these questions are based on Odell’s (2002: 49-50) “Operational Definitions of Strategy Types” and were chosen as the most applicable and meaningful in the context of WTO negotiations (especially the three questions on soft tactics) as well as due to reasons of comparability with (research on) climate change negotiations. Furthermore, since I expected interviewees to be more hesitant to acknowledge the application of hard negotiation tactics and more willing to provide information on the use of soft tactics, nine questions referred to hard tactics and merely three to soft ones in the interviews.

19 According to common practice, I treat these data as if measured on an interval scale, i.e. assuming equal distances between the different tick marks (cp. Dür & Mateo, 2010).

20 A combination of a value = 1 on the hard strategy index and a value > 1 on the soft strategy index would indicate a purely soft negotiation strategy. Equally, a combination of a value = 1 on the soft strategy index and a value > 1 on the hard strategy index would indicate a purely hard negotiation strategy. Furthermore, a combination of a value = 1 on the hard strategy index and a value = 1 on the soft strategy index would mean permanent inactiveness. None of these three theoretical scenarios exist for the WTO members included in this study. Hence, all of them use mixed negotiation strategies.
negotiation strategies as two different dimensions. I use both indices in my analyses below as well as the non-aggregate responses to the interview questions, i.e. the individual tactics.21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variables</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard strategy index (Q1 – Q9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1: How often does your delegation declare that it will not change its position under any circumstances?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2: How often does your delegation overtly criticise other members’ positions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3: If other parties demand concessions from your delegation, how often does your delegation reject or ignore such demands?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4: How often does your delegation hide its actual objectives to reach a stronger negotiation position?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5: How often does your delegation demand concessions for its own benefit?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6: In order to reach its objectives, how often does your delegation use threats (concerning sanctions, trade restrictions, leaving the negotiations etc.) to influence other parties’ positions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q7: In order to reach its objectives, how often does your delegation use promises (concerning concessions, aid etc.) to change other negotiating parties’ positions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q8: How often does your delegation try to slow down the negotiations in order to reach a stronger negotiation position?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 In addition, I used factor analysis to examine the hard and soft negotiation tactics asked about in the interviews. I conducted confirmatory factor analyses to determine whether these nine hard and three soft tactics load on two different latent variables (factors) interpretable as hard and soft negotiation strategies. Since especially the question “If other parties demand concessions from your delegation, how often does your delegation reject or ignore such demands?” (Q3) is characterised by many missing values (only 25 out of 39 interviewees responded to this question in a quantifiable manner), I used data imputation to alleviate this problem. Confirmatory factor analysis then gives for these two factors eigenvalues larger than 2; yet, the rotated factor loadings in this analysis do not provide a convincing picture as – although all of the soft tactics load on the same factor – also at least one hard tactic loads on this very factor as well. Hence, these results do not support the expected existence of two dimensions that can be considered hard and soft negotiation strategies. Equally, however, they do not confirm the idea of negotiation strategies constituting one dimension, with the poles of hard and soft at the ends of a continuum. Thus, I combined the questions to create the two indices described above based on theoretical considerations and taking into account that the single items of the respective indices do not necessarily measure the same dimension.
4.4.3 Independent variables

*Membership experience* is measured as the log of the number of months of WTO membership duration with information (accession dates) from the WTO homepage. The log is used to account for the idea of a learning curve, i.e. learning effects are larger in the beginning while smaller after some time of WTO membership.

For *economic power*, the natural log of averaged GDP data (gross domestic product in purchasing power parity, from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2014) from the years 2000 to 2011 is calculated. The reason for averaged GDP data (as well as for other independent variables below) is the consideration that the indicators for the dependent variables are also based on (answers about) the average use of different negotiation tactics during the period from 2000 to 2011.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q9: How often does your delegation try to exclude from the agenda issues on which it would probably have to make concessions?</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft strategy index</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qa: If the interests of other parties are contrary to those of your delegation, how often does your delegation express understanding for this?</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qb: How often does your delegation propose new solutions which are in the common interest of all or at least many parties?</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qc: How often does your delegation propose an exchange of concessions for mutual benefit?</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership experience: Membership duration in months (log)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>5.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic power: GDP (PPP, current intl. dollar; log)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25.47</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>21.02</td>
<td>30.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime type</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>-1.61</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global trade integration: Foreign trade-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>66.49</td>
<td>50.60</td>
<td>21.39</td>
<td>318.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of domestic free trade interest groups on their government’s negotiation positions</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of domestic protectionist interest groups on their government’s negotiation positions</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation skills: Delegation leaders’ diplomatic experience in years</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19.01</td>
<td>11.56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(or, in one case, 2012) (i.e. from the start of the first negotiations of the Doha Round to the time of my interviews).\textsuperscript{22}

As to regime type, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), capturing six crucial dimensions of governance (Kaufmann et al., 2010), possess the attribute that the mean (state) is (ascribed a score of) 0 and the standard deviation (over all states) is 1. Thus, 20 individual country scores are related to each other and states can be compared directly. In addition, since the units of measurement are continuous, the WGI contain a higher degree of variability than, e.g., the Freedom House Index (Freedom House, 2013) which — although an often used measurement of regime type — assigns the same value to practically all Western democracies. The WGI’s dimension “Voice and Accountability” appears appropriate for the purpose of measuring the level of democracy of a WTO member here.\textsuperscript{23}

Global trade integration is indicated by WTO members’ foreign trade-to-GDP ratio. This is the ratio of the foreign trade value (sum of exports and imports) to a country’s or territory’s GDP. It is also called trade openness ratio and reflects a country’s or territory’s integration in the world economy.\textsuperscript{24} As for GDP, the trade integration variable included in the analysis is the average over the years 2000 to 2011; the data are from the WTO’s Statistics Database (WTO, 2012).\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{22} Logged GDP data are used again for the common reason of controlling outlier cases. For Lithuania, the natural log of averaged GDP data from the years 2001 to 2003 is used (i.e. before Lithuania became an EU member).

\textsuperscript{23} As an alternative indicator for democracy level, Freedom House’s (2013) “Freedom in the World Country Ratings” were used in OLS regressions on the choice of hard or soft negotiation tactics. This measurement does not focus on accountability but on political rights and civil liberties — which are highly correlated with accountability, though (see below). The Freedom House Index indicating democracy at the national level is frequently used; in this work for measuring regime type affecting WTO members’ negotiation activity and cooperative behaviour in Chapters 2 and 3, for instance. It is one of the individual indicators selected to construct the “Voice and Accountability” dimension of the WGI. It is, however, also criticised for a number of issues, e.g. inadequate level of transparency (Giannone, 2010). The Freedom House Ratings were recoded so that a higher value indicates a higher level of democracy. The value for the EU was calculated as the average of the values of its single member states and over the years 2001 to 2011. The two different indicators for democracy level correlate to 0.97. (Probably) Accordingly, in OLS regressions in which the Freedom House indicator is used to measure democracy level, the analysis basically comes to the same results as for the WGI indicator.

\textsuperscript{24} As pointed out in Chapter 2, the foreign trade-to-GDP ratio is often used for measuring a country’s or territory’s economic openness even though several researchers argue that “it is nothing of the kind” (Birdsall & Hamoudi, 2002: 1). Yet, a clear definition of “trade openness” is lacking according to Yanikkaya (2003). This difficulty in measuring openness has led to the creation of many different indicators of trade openness, while the meaning of “openness” has approached the notion of “free trade”, i.e. a trade system without any trade distortions (Yannikaya, 2003).

\textsuperscript{25} In contrast to the World Bank data (World Bank, 2015) used for measuring WTO members’ global trade integration in the study on their negotiation activity in Chapter 2, I chose WTO data here as they include Taiwan. Given the small number of WTO members involved in this analysis, I decided against using the World Bank data as indicator for members’ global trade integration since they do not include Taiwan. Yet, the use of WTO data here comes at the price of disregarding the services portion of members’ trade as the WTO data merely comprise merchandise trade, while the World Bank data take into account both goods and services.
As stated above, the interviews also included questions to evaluate the impact of different domestic actors, inter alia domestic interest groups, on the negotiation positions of the respective WTO member. The complete question was: “What level of influence do the following actors have on your delegation’s negotiation position before and during the negotiations?” Here, the actors were “domestic interest groups with free trade interests” and “domestic interest groups with anti-free trade, protectionist interests”. The categories to choose from were “very high”, “high”, “moderate”, “low” and “very low”; as for the negotiation tactics, interviewees could also indicate “in between” (e.g. “between low and moderate”) and “don’t know” or “no answer”). The answers given were again coded as values on an ordinal scale from 1 = “very low” to 9 = “very high”.

The indicator for negotiation skills, finally, is based on a question in the interview as well: the delegation leader’s years of general diplomatic experience. Table 4.1 provides the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analyses.

4.5 Results

Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses and ordered logistic regression analyses on WTO members’ use of hard and soft negotiation tactics. These results provide support for some of the hypotheses presented above and, most importantly, for the existence of a newcomer effect in WTO members’ choice of negotiation tactics in the Doha Round.

Using the hard strategy index as an indicator for WTO members’ use of hard negotiation tactics in the Doha Round (Table 4.2), this aggregate measure does not corroborate Hypothesis 1a that long-standing members are more likely to use hard tactics. More generally, from this aggregate perspective, there is no support for the expected difference between long-time WTO members and newcomers. Yet, the coefficients concerning the individual questions about not changing positions under any circumstances (Q1) and on demanding concessions for one’s own benefit (Q5) are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that there is an effect of membership experience on the use of some hard negotiation tactics. These specific findings indicate that long-standing WTO members declare less often that they will not change their positions under any circumstances (Q1) and that they demand less often concessions for their own benefit than newcomers (Q5). In other

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26 Domestic interest groups may be defined, in line with Thomas (1993), as associations of individuals or organisations, usually but not always formally organised, which attempt to influence public policy.

27 Of course, there are negotiators with striking negotiation skills which are not reflected in the mere number of years of experience. For an example from climate negotiations, see Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2011).

28 OLS regression analyses are appropriate for the data at hand since the indices for the two different dependent variables, the hard strategy index and the soft strategy index, comprise – although based on categorical values from interview responses – continuous data (Gehring & Weins, 2004). Ordered logistic regression analyses were conducted on WTO members’ use of individual tactics because generalized ordered logistic regression analyses – the methodologically more appropriate procedure (due to its relaxed assumption concerning the effect size on the categories of a dependent variable) – did not provide results for complete models including all independent variables because of convergence problems.
words – from the reverse perspective –, newcomers demand more frequently concessions for their own benefit (Q5) and declare more frequently that they will not change their positions under any circumstances (Q1). Figure 4.1 shows the data’s scatter plot on the correlation between membership duration in the WTO and the interview responses to Q5: “How often does your delegation demand concessions for its own benefit?”. These findings do not support the idea that newcomers rather stay inactive in the negotiations due to a lack of experience but they can be explained by demands from recently acceded WTO members for substantive concessions on the part of the founding members of the organisation. While the latter did not have to undergo costly accession negotiations, many newcomers had to make great concessions in their respective accession negotiations already and, hence, demand what they regard as justice now.

![Figure 4.1: Scatter plot on the correlation between membership duration and responses to interview question Q5 (demanding concessions for own benefit)](image)

Considering the soft strategy index as an aggregate indicator for WTO members’ application of soft negotiation tactics (Table 4.3), the results clearly suggest that there is a newcomer effect according to Hypothesis 1b, i.e. an influence of membership experience in the WTO on the use of soft negotiation tactics: The regression coefficient is positive and statistically highly significant, suggesting that the longer WTO members have been inside the organisation, the more often they use soft tactics in the Doha Round negotiations. This finding is contrary to that of Dür and Mateo (2010) who cannot detect a newcomer effect in EU negotiations. This statistically significant effect as to the application of soft tactics is not limited to measuring the dependent variable using the soft
strategy index; it is also robust for all three individual soft tactics. These findings suggest that longstanding WTO members tend to express understanding for contrary interests of other parties more often than newcomers (Qa). Long-time WTO members also propose new solutions which are in the common interest of all or at least many parties more frequently (Qb). And they propose exchanges of concessions for mutual benefit more often, too (Qc). These results strongly indicate that a high level of experience in the organisation makes the use of soft negotiation tactics more probable.29

What do the results bring to light about the second potential explanation for strategy choice in the Doha Round? In contrast to other studies which find that (economic) power exerts a positive effect on the use of hard tactics in international negotiations, e.g. in EU (Dür & Mateo, 2010) or in climate change negotiations (Bailer, 2012), the results here do not support a similar conclusion. The findings in Table 4.2 on WTO members’ use of hard tactics cannot corroborate the strong expectation that more economic power should result in a more frequent use of such hard negotiation tactics. There is, however, interview evidence on this relationship, for instance with regard to the purposeful use of promises:

“If we can achieve our interest, we do such kind of way; sometimes we use. For example, for the developing member, we say we will increase the aid or assistance to accept or to make easier to accept our proposal or idea.”30

The results for the effect of economic power on WTO members’ choice of soft negotiation tactics are somewhat less conclusive than for members’ experience in the organisation: When the use of tactics is measured in the aggregate form of the soft strategy index, economic power has a positive and statistically significant effect on the application of soft negotiation tactics (Table 4.3). This would mean that larger WTO members tend to choose soft negotiation tactics more often than smaller members. Yet, only one of the respective regression coefficients is statistically significant when the individual tactics are examined: More powerful WTO members seem to express their understanding for the conflictive interests of other parties more often than economically weaker members. Such conciliatory behaviour may be opposed to (many) developing country members’ lack of understanding for the economic interests of the industrial nations. Numerous small and medium-sized economies opine that the developed countries benefited a lot (more) from the outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations and, thus, consider the “Doha Development Agenda” now as committed

29 The same effects can be detected if a dummy variable is used as a (non-)newcomer indicator that is coded 0 for those six WTO members included in the study which have acceded to the organisation in or after 2001 (Cambodia, China, Lithuania, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan) and coded 1 otherwise. The regression analysis with the hard strategy index measuring the dependent variable results in a statistically non-significant effect for this dummy variable while in a regression model with the soft strategy index measuring the dependent variable the coefficient of the newcomer dummy is positive and statistically highly significant.

30 Interview conducted in Geneva, November 3, 2011 (interview ID 6).
to their interests.\textsuperscript{31} The result for this specific tactic may be responsible for the positive effect of economic power on the use of soft negotiation tactics found via the index.

Interviewees’ statements provide ambivalent evidence on the relationship between economic strength and negotiation behaviour as well. Representatives from small and medium-sized WTO members typically emphasised that they were not able to use hard negotiation tactics like threats or political pressure due to their economic situation, but that large members definitely applied such moves. An experienced WTO Ambassador testified:

“We do not have that capacity, usually. But in general terms, yes, people do it. (...) The big ones – the US, European Union, Brazil, China – all of them. It is a question of power, it is a reality. So, the small countries, we cannot exercise power against others. Our tools are, basically, credibility, rationality, professionalism, seriousness in general.”\textsuperscript{32}

However, responding to my question whether this is correct, diplomats from large WTO members usually replied that it was not: The use of such hard tactics was repeatedly described as bad negotiation style; trying to convince other parties by argumentation and facts as well as coalition building (cp. Chapter 3) were said to be the preferred means to change other members’ positions and to achieve the own goals in the negotiations. The smaller members’ impression concerning the application of hard tactics by more powerful ones in the negotiations was reported to be merely an issue of perception. Yet, according to the same experienced WTO Ambassador from above:

“They lie, they do. The point is that not all political pressure is so direct, so blunt. If you have a tiny country having a dialogue with, let’s say, the US, you know that the dialogue is not balanced, by definition. It is loaded in many ways – psychologically ... But I have been in thousands of cases where the political pressure has been totally direct and transparent. ‘If you do that, I will do x.’ It is very often. Or: connections. For instance, if you do something here [in Geneva], but there is a dialogue on another issue, somewhere in the world, and they say ‘your guy over there is saying xyz’ and you know that this is not good, it is not proper. So you receive later on a comment from your people saying ‘What did you say on such occasion?’ And you know that this will happen, even if it does not happen, you know that it is part of the rules of the game, and therefore you are, I would say, not always very open in your position, having in mind what might happen.”\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31} The Uruguay Round (1986 - 1994) preceded the Doha Round as negotiations within the multilateral trading system, then assembling the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (WTO, 2016b).

\textsuperscript{32} Interview conducted in Geneva, November 9, 2011 (interview ID 11).

\textsuperscript{33} Interview conducted in Geneva, November 9, 2011 (interview ID 11).
Table 4.2: Results of regression analyses of WTO members’ use of hard negotiation tactics measured as aggregate (index) and individually (Q1 – Q9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q1 – Q9: Hard strategy index</th>
<th>Q1: Declaring to not change position under any circumstances</th>
<th>Q2: Overly criticizing other members’ positions</th>
<th>Q3: Rejecting or ignoring demands for concessions</th>
<th>Q4: Hiding actual objectives</th>
<th>Q5: Demanding concessions for own benefit</th>
<th>Q6: Threats</th>
<th>Q7: Promises</th>
<th>Q8: Trying to slow down the negotiations</th>
<th>Q9: Trying to exclude issues from the agenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership experience (log)</td>
<td>-0.12 (0.40)</td>
<td>-2.58** (1.22)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.85)</td>
<td>-1.92 (1.36)</td>
<td>1.05 (0.99)</td>
<td>-4.11** (1.80)</td>
<td>1.75 (1.78)</td>
<td>1.64 (1.02)</td>
<td>1.59 (1.24)</td>
<td>-1.23 (1.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic power (log)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.16)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.18)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.31)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.19)</td>
<td>-0.20 (0.19)</td>
<td>-0.29 (0.17)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.17)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.20)</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime type</td>
<td>0.18 (0.19)</td>
<td>0.98** (0.50)</td>
<td>0.50 (0.42)</td>
<td>1.02*** (0.69)</td>
<td>0.38 (0.45)</td>
<td>0.40 (0.51)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.56)</td>
<td>-1.52** (0.46)</td>
<td>0.63 (0.50)</td>
<td>0.85* (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global trade integration</td>
<td>-0.68** (0.31)</td>
<td>-0.37 (0.62)</td>
<td>-0.58 (0.60)</td>
<td>-0.71 (0.70)</td>
<td>-0.78 (0.58)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.63)</td>
<td>-3.41 (2.32)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.59)</td>
<td>-1.58 (1.06)</td>
<td>-0.64 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic free trade interest group influence</td>
<td>0.05 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.37* (0.22)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.17)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.41)</td>
<td>-0.18 (0.19)</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.22 (0.18)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.20)</td>
<td>0.20 (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic protectionist interest group influence</td>
<td>0.07 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.49** (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.28** (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation skills</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.07* (0.04)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.42 (2.66)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses, *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Qa – Qc: Soft strategy index</th>
<th>Qa: Expressing understanding for interests of other parties contrary to own interests</th>
<th>Qb: Proposing new solutions in the common interest of all or at least many parties</th>
<th>Qc: Proposing an exchange of concessions for mutual benefit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership experience</td>
<td>2.46*** (0.48)</td>
<td>4.16*** (1.57)</td>
<td>2.81** (1.09)</td>
<td>2.92*** (1.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic power (log)</td>
<td>0.21** (0.09)</td>
<td>0.47** (0.21)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.17)</td>
<td>0.27 (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime type</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.23)</td>
<td>-0.36 (0.45)</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.42)</td>
<td>-0.58 (0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global trade integration</td>
<td>-0.41 (0.35)</td>
<td>-2.31*** (0.84)</td>
<td>0.83 (0.77)</td>
<td>-0.59 (0.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic free trade interest group influence</td>
<td>-0.27** (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.50** (0.22)</td>
<td>0.24 (0.20)</td>
<td>0.39* (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic protectionist interest group influence</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation skills</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-9.61*** (3.17)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01
In addition, interviewees from WTO members of all sizes confirmed that power in WTO negotiations does not only stem from economic resources: consensus decision rule provides small and medium-sized WTO members with the same veto opportunity (although surely not the same veto weight) as the large economies. Hence, economically weaker members are as able to use hard tactics in the Doha Round negotiations as their economically more powerful counterparts – and they actually make use of this ability, as was repeatedly confirmed in the interviews.

The results concerning WTO members’ regime type do not suggest that their democracy levels affect members’ choice of particular negotiation tactics, neither hard nor soft ones, when the hard strategy index and the soft strategy index are used, respectively. However, when the raw interview data are used as dependent variables in ordered logistic regression analyses, four resulting coefficients show a statistically significant effect of regime type on the choice of hard negotiation tactics: The higher the democracy level of WTO members is, first, the more often they declare that they will not change their position under any circumstances (Q1); second, the more often they reject or ignore demands for concessions from other parties (Q3); third, the more often they try to exclude issues from the agenda (Q9). On the other hand, fourth, the higher the democracy level of WTO members is, the less often they make promises (Q7). In addition, none of the results for the individual soft tactics shows a statistically significant effect. These findings completely contradict Hypothesis 3 that more democratic WTO members are more likely to use soft negotiation tactics. Especially the three results suggesting a positive relationship between members’ regime type and their choice of (these specific) hard negotiation tactics are difficult to explain as they are highly counterintuitive. Merely the negative effect of WTO members’ democracy level on their frequency of making promises fits the assumed picture of friendly and cooperative behaviour among more democratic members to some extent.

Mixed findings appear for the global trade integration variable as well: Considering the results for the hard strategy index (Table 4.2), the respective regression coefficient is negative and statistically significant which would suggest that more trade integration makes WTO members less willing to use hard tactics in the Doha Round negotiations. Although running contrary to Hypotheses 4b, this finding is not counterintuitive. Greater importance of – or even dependency on – international trade, as indicated by WTO members’ trade openness ratios, might result in a greater incentive to come to an agreement as the benefits from freer international trade are bigger than for WTO members that trade less. Hence, such members with higher levels of trade (in relation to their overall GDP) would tend to choose hard tactics less often in order to not block the negotiations and reach an agreement faster. WTO members that trade less might, in contrast, be willing to accept a delay in the negotiations as they are less dependent on trade and do not benefit from freer international trade as much as members which trade more. However, the respective coefficients for
the individual tactics are not statistically significant and, thus, do not provide support for these explanations.

Looking at the soft tactics (Table 4.3), on the other hand, there is almost the reverse picture with regard to the results for index vs. individual items: When the dependent variable is measured in the aggregate index form, there is no support for the idea formulated in Hypothesis 4a that WTO members with higher levels of international trade tend to use soft negotiation tactics more often. The individual tactics of proposing new solutions which are in the common interest of all or at least many parties (Qb) and proposing exchanges of concessions for mutual benefit (Qc) do not suggest an effect of members’ global trade integration on their use of soft negotiation tactics either. Merely the coefficient for the question about expressing understanding for other parties’ conflictive interests (Qa) is statistically significant – yet, negative. This indicates that WTO members with higher levels of international trade tend to express understanding for contrary interests of other parties less often than WTO members with lower trade ratios.34

The influence of domestic free trade interest groups on their governments’ negotiation positions does not have a statistically significant effect on those WTO members’ use of hard negotiation tactics. There seems to be one exception (Q1) when the tactics are analysed individually. The result suggests that a higher capacity of domestic free trade interest groups to influence their governments’ negotiation positions makes these governments declare more often that they will not change their positions under any circumstances. The respective regression coefficient is only slightly statistically significant, though.

With regard to the use of soft negotiation tactics, the coefficient for the influence of domestic free trade lobby groups is negative and statistically significant when the index is applied. This suggests that successful lobbying by domestic interest groups in favour of free trade makes their governments use soft tactics less often in the negotiations. However, this result is corroborated by merely one of the individual tactics (Qa): Higher influence of domestic free trade lobby groups seems to make their governments express their understanding for contrary interests of other WTO members less frequently. On the other hand, the result for another individual tactic (Qc) indicates that more free trade lobbying makes governments propose exchanges of concessions for mutual benefit more often. This particular finding supports Hypothesis 5a. Yet, again, the respective regression coefficient is only slightly statistically significant. Thus, the results do not provide a clear

34 As implicated in Hypotheses 4a and 4b in this study and as explicitly pointed out in Chapter 2, WTO members that trade more are expected to show a higher level of activity in the Doha Round negotiations. This expectation is based on the thought that such members benefit more from free trade and, hence, from a new trade liberalising agreement than members that trade less. However, neither the findings on members’ negotiation activity nor those discussed here on their choice of negotiation tactics support this expectation.
picture that would confirm the expectation that higher pressure exerted by domestic free trade interest groups makes WTO members more likely to use soft negotiation tactics in the Doha Round.

The results for the effect of influential protectionist lobbying by domestic interest groups on their governments’ use of hard tactics are very similar to those concerning their liberal counterparts: When the index measures the dependent variable, an effect of such lobby efforts on WTO members’ use of hard negotiation tactics cannot be detected. Yet, the respective coefficients related to two of the individual tactics, Q3 and Q9, are positive and statistically significant. This means that successful protectionist lobbying makes these governments reject or ignore demands for concessions by other parties more often (Q3). Also, under pressure from domestic protectionist interest, WTO members try more frequently to exclude from the agenda issues on which they would probably have to make concessions (Q9). Thus, if any general conclusion could be drawn, the use of hard negotiation tactics seems to be more likely, the more pressure is exerted by domestic interest groups favouring protectionist policies. This finding would confirm the expectation formulated in Hypothesis 5b. Analysing the use of soft negotiation tactics, on the other hand, an effect for domestic protectionist interest groups is not found, neither when the aggregate index is used nor the individual interview responses.

Finally, regarding the relationship between the negotiation skills of WTO diplomats and their choice of specific negotiation tactics, the findings do not support the expectation: None of the results suggests that more skilled diplomats make more use of hard negotiation tactics. On the contrary, one result indicates that delegation leaders with more diplomatic experience declare less frequently to not change their negotiation positions under any circumstances (Q1). Yet, the respective coefficient is merely slightly statistically significant.

In contrast, several interviewees testified that the personality of a negotiator does affect which negotiation tactics he or she chooses to apply in the Doha Round since, for instance, not every negotiator dares to use hard negotiation tactics, and more experienced WTO diplomats are better able to assess when to use soft and when to resort to hard negotiation tactics. One of the WTO diplomats elaborated on the relationship between negotiators’ personality and strategy choice, pointing also to the economic power of the negotiators’ homelands:

“I think, in the past, there probably had been a few more instances than we have now of us saying no and being openly rejectionist (if I can use that word). It is probably, again, a function of the personalities because my former ambassador was not as extreme as the one before him, for example. So, I have noticed that, especially for developing countries, personalities also matter a lot in terms of negotiating strategies, rightly or wrongly. – Well, you noticed that in developing countries, for example, on the same issue, one ambassador can be passionate about it and the next ambassador just cannot be
bothered about it. But that does not happen to developed countries. For example, if the United States has an issue with this, regardless of who is there as ambassador, they are going to have an issue with that. (…) [The capital] can only provide so much guidance on a particular issue. The implementation of any policy from [the capital] relies 80 per cent on who is going to implement it in Geneva. So, that is what I meant when I said that sometimes personalities change, the ambassadors change. And even at the level of the negotiators, for example. You can see discernable differences, both in terms of how a policy is implemented as well as in terms of how a negotiating strategy is adopted, for example. So, as I said, the [last but one] ambassador was really a trade man, he was a career person before he became an ambassador here, and so he could really take hard line positions on certain things. But then when Ambassador D. came, that changed a little bit. He was more of a political creature rather than a technical trade person. (…) Of course, some of the fundamental policy underpinnings remained constant over the years because the broader framework of strategy and policy were all being cleared with [the capital] but in terms of how they were being implemented here, in terms of how open you were to moving to your bottom line, whether you go fast or you go slow, really depends on how the negotiators implement it.”

In addition, the graphs in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 present the effect sizes of those factors that prove influential for WTO members’ choice of negotiation tactics in the Doha Round, most prominently their experience indicated by membership duration (Figure 4.2). The effect sizes are calculated based on the regression results for hard and soft tactics measured in the aggregate form of the respective index. All of the graphs show the predicted values for the application of soft (Figure 4.2) and hard (Figure 4.3) negotiation tactics when the values of those independent variables analysed increase from their minimum to their maximum. Besides, the graphs display the statistical uncertainty associated with the predicted values, including the 95 per cent confidence intervals around the estimated frequency of using particular negotiation tactics, while holding all other variables at their means.

As Figure 4.2 shows, the effect size of WTO members’ experience in the organisation for their frequency of using soft negotiation tactics in the Doha Round is remarkable: Newcomers such as China or Lithuania in their initial years in the WTO tend to use soft tactics (very) rarely. Yet, with increasing experience, members apply soft tactics at least sometimes, if not even often. The impact of WTO members’ economic power, on the other hand, is smaller, especially when taking into account that most members are developing (or even least developed) countries that would be located in the leftmost position of the graph in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2: Effect sizes of membership duration, economic power and interest group influence on WTO members’ use of soft negotiation tactics
Still, the frequency of applying soft tactics in the Doha Round seems to also vary between the poorest members, like Cambodia, and those that are slightly better off, such as Botswana: The use of soft tactics tends to increase from sometimes to often very quickly with increasing economic strength. The biggest players like the EU or Japan seem to choose soft tactics even more often. The other way around, looking at the capacity of domestic free trade interest groups to influence their government’s negotiation positions in Figure 4.2, such successful lobbying decreases members’ frequency to use soft tactics to a similar extent: When interest groups favouring free trade can exert only little pressure on their government’s negotiation positions, such members tend to use soft tactics (very) often. If those interest groups are able, however, to influence their government’s positions to a large degree, WTO members apply soft tactics only sometimes or even more rarely.

Finally, WTO members’ integration into global trade affects their choice of hard negotiation tactics in the Doha Round. As Figure 4.3 displays, WTO members that trade less compared to their GDP, like Brazil or Colombia, tend to use hard tactics rarely. On the other hand, members that trade more, such as Malaysia or Hong Kong, apparently choose hard tactics almost never.

The most important explanation for the partly inconclusive results concerning WTO members’ use of negotiation tactics in the Doha Round is provided by interview evidence. It seems that, basically, only large WTO members are able to apply different (hard and soft) negotiation tactics individually, i.e. single-handedly. In contrast, the most meaningful negotiation tactic of small and medium-sized WTO members appears to be coalition building (cp. Chapter 3). Large members do need to find coalitions in the negotiations as well, in order to influence the final agreement in their favour, because an agreement only materialises in the presence of consensus. However, those
economically powerful countries can (usually) rely on their political weight while small and medium-sized members feel the necessity to form pressure groups in order to balance the big players’ (and their coalitions’) impact. Hence, small and medium-sized WTO members act almost exclusively within and through their different groups, not individually.

Several among the interviewees from small and medium-sized WTO members (both from long-standing members and newcomers) made statements in this regard:

“Actually, I have to mention something: Our position in the WTO is not linked, but we are working on many issues under the umbrella of groups to which we belong, especially the African Group. We are a member of the African Group, we are a member of the Arab Group and we are a member, of course, of the informal Developing Countries group. There are a lot of groups, and it depends on the issues, and depends on the negotiations and depends on the political chapeau of the negotiations, and we take position. We take position, of course, especially when the group is more important to have an answer to your request. If you go by yourself as a country, as a member, it is a little bit difficult to face, of course, other developed countries or the powerful countries, let’s use this word.”

“Let me say regarding the process – [we are] an LDC, least developed country. So, the negotiations, normally, we have our group, we call LDC consultative group. Normally, the position, we discuss among our group, and then we submit as the members in the group, not as an individual delegate. When we receive a proposal from member countries, sometimes we can support, sometimes we cannot, sometimes it is contradictory to our position. So, normally, we discuss, and sometimes we have to make a counteroffer to that proposal, sometimes we express our difficulty in accepting the proposal and sometimes we provide a middle ground position to that proposal. So, at least with the group, not as an individual member. And yes, sometimes, we submit the proposal to the capital for comment, and based on that comment we can contribute to and respond to any particular issue of that proposal, submitted by the members through the group, not as an individual delegate.”

Even though the interview partners were asked to answer the questions having in mind only their delegations’ individual use of negotiation tactics in the Doha Round, it cannot be excluded that interviewees – especially those from small and medium-sized WTO members – might rather have thought about the negotiation behaviour of their coalitions when responding. This may have affected their answers to the interview questions and, thus, the results of this study.

36 Interview conducted in Geneva, December 1, 2011 (interview ID 27).
37 Interview conducted in Geneva, December 7, 2011 (interview ID 33).
In addition, this study presents a general picture of WTO members’ use of negotiation tactics and strategies in the Doha Round and does not go into the variation across time and issue areas. Both aspects have been pointed out repeatedly by the interview partners: the impact of the course of the negotiations over time on the one hand and the (relative) salience of the different issue areas for each member on the other. Both affect delegations’ decision which tactics to apply in the negotiations:

“This, you would do at the final stage, we are not at the final stage yet. So, in the final stage, still the negotiations are continuing and we do not know where we are ending up. Of course, we know in general where we are but we do not think we are at the last stage, and give and take does not take place. This is true for all delegations. (…) If you are not in a final round, if you are not in a concluding round, then you do not put forward the same things as when worse comes to worst.”

Another aspect that is relevant when considering the results of this study is the difference between bilateral vs. multilateral negotiations in general (as outlined in the discussion on the concept of hard and soft negotiation strategies above) and the use of negotiation tactics in both in particular. According to reiterate statements from interviewees, negotiation tactics used in bilateral negotiations may not be applicable or appropriate (to the same extent) in multilateral ones:

“In the multilateral system, this question is very rare. You do not have one counterpart. You have so many. You can say no to one counterpart but you can be very flexible to another counterpart.”

4.6 Conclusion

In order to raise their chances of success in the current Doha Round negotiations, WTO members may choose a particular negotiation strategy or combine tactics from different strategies into a mixed one. Several factors that may be crucial in selecting a certain negotiation strategy are examined in this study. One of it is WTO membership experience. This analysis is the first to investigate whether newcomers in the WTO use a different negotiation strategy than long-standing members. The data indeed support a newcomer effect: Membership experience in the organisation is important for selecting a specific strategy in WTO negotiations. The results suggest that long-time members use soft (i.e. cooperative or friendly) negotiation tactics more often than members that have acceded to the WTO at a later point. An important explanation for this finding is thought to be related to a member’s expertise in all fields concerning the organisation. For the creation of compromise proposals which could find the agreement of many (if not all) other members, for
instance, a high level of information and knowledge is needed which WTO members usually collect over time. The statements of different WTO diplomats interviewed for this study support this explanation. Interview partners from those members that have acceded to the organisation confirmed that the new setting forced them to learn about acceptable behaviour in the WTO during their first years of membership. Institutional memory, knowledge of the history and processes of negotiations, was emphasised as a serious gap of expertise for newcomers and substantially benefiting long-standing members. Another mode of behaviour described as typical for newcomers concerns their reserve in early interactions within the WTO: As newcomers lack knowledge concerning the conventions in the organisation, they try to learn them through observation and by trial and error, according to several interviewees. Hence, such behaviour would suggest that newcomers tend to adopt a wait and see strategy also in negotiations – being too hesitant to use hard tactics like threats and too inexperienced for soft tactics like compromise proposals.

Another aspect considered important not only in this analysis, but in many negotiation studies is power, based on different sources. Although more economic power is expected to increase the probability of applying hard (i.e. conflictual or aggressive) negotiation tactics, the study at hand cannot confirm this by using GDP data. On the contrary, the results suggest that large WTO members tend to use soft negotiation tactics more often than smaller members. Interview evidence on the relationship between economic strength and negotiation behaviour is somewhat ambiguous as well. Diplomats from small and medium-sized WTO members typically emphasised that only large countries were able to use hard negotiation tactics like threats or political pressure due to their economic advantage, and indeed applied such moves in the Doha Round. Diplomats from large WTO members, however, usually responded that this was not correct: Using hard tactics was repeatedly described as a bad negotiation style; convincing other parties by argumentation and facts as well as coalition building were said to be preferred instead. The small and medium-sized members’ perception that large countries used hard tactics was reported to be a false impression. There was agreement among interviewees from small, medium-sized and large WTO members, though, that power in WTO negotiations is not only based on economic resources: Consensus decision rule provides small and medium-sized WTO members (at least) with the same veto opportunity (even though not necessarily with the same veto weight) as the large economies. This enables economically weaker members to use hard tactics in the Doha Round negotiations just like their economically more powerful counterparts, as was repeatedly confirmed in the interviews.

The results concerning WTO members’ regime type contradict the theoretical expectation that more democratic WTO members are more likely to use soft negotiation tactics. The findings are rather counterintuitive, suggesting that more democratic WTO members actually tend to choose hard tactics more often. Hence, the potential impact of democratic norms as emphasised by the
democratic peace literature is not supported. There is no evidence that democratic WTO members’ habit of using friendly, cooperative means in their domestic political competition transfers to the international sphere.

Similarly, the results for WTO members’ global trade integration do not provide a clear picture supporting a robust effect of trade openness on strategy choice in WTO negotiations. The findings partly suggest that WTO members with higher levels of international trade use hard tactics in the Doha Round negotiations less often. The reason for such behaviour may be related to the greater importance of or dependency on trade which may lead to strong ambitions to reach an agreement and to not block the negotiations supposed to agree on one. However, related results do not provide sufficient support for these explanations. The results concerning soft negotiation tactics are mixed as well: One finding indicates that WTO members that trade more tend to express their understanding for the contrary interests of other parties less often than WTO members that trade less. Yet, further results of the analysis do not corroborate an effect of global trade integration on the use of soft negotiation tactics.

If any general conclusion can be drawn for the effect of domestic interest groups, then that the use of hard negotiation tactics appears to be more frequent, the more pressure is exerted by interest groups in favour of protectionist trade policies. As expected, higher influence by such lobby groups on their governments’ negotiation positions in the Doha Round seems to make these governments choose hard tactics more often. On the other hand, higher influence by domestic lobby groups favouring free trade apparently makes governments use soft tactics less often in the negotiations.

Eventually, the results regarding the negotiation skills of WTO diplomats do not provide a convincing picture that supports the theoretical expectation. Yet, several interview partners stated that negotiators’ personalities affect their choice of negotiation tactics in the Doha Round. For instance, more experienced WTO diplomats are supposed to be more able to judge when to apply soft and when hard tactics.

As the first quantitative analysis of WTO members’ use of negotiation tactics and strategies in the current Doha Round, this study contributes to research on negotiations in international organisations in general and on WTO members’ negotiation behaviour more particularly. Yet, some important issues remain unaffected which should be addressed in future research. First, this study provides a general view on WTO members’ use of negotiation strategies and tactics in the Doha Round and does not elaborate on the variation across time and issue areas. Hence, future research should focus both on the course of the negotiations over time and the differences between issue areas. Second, because this study focuses on WTO delegations’ individual use of negotiation tactics,
it cannot shed light on the negotiation strategies of coalitions in the organisation. This may be a question for future research as well.

Finally, this analysis of WTO member’s use of negotiation strategies and tactics in the Doha Round is clearly connected to the two other kinds of member behaviour in these multilateral trade negotiations: their level of participation and their cooperation with other members. Information from this study suggests that not all WTO members are equally active in the negotiations, whether individually or in coalitions. Especially under the assumption that WTO members try to influence the potential outcome in their favour, why are some WTO members individually more active in the Doha Round negotiations than others? This question is studied in Chapter 2. And what are the reasons, on the other hand, for the varying degrees of cooperation among WTO members? Chapter 3 looks into this matter.
4.7 Appendix

Questionnaire used for conducting the interviews

Part 1: Information about you and your delegation

Question 1a: When and in which position did you become a member of the negotiating delegation of ...?

Question 1b: If not immediately as delegation leader: When did you become the delegation leader? / Do you perhaps know since when your delegation leader has been active in WTO negotiations?

Question 1c: And how many years of diplomatic experience do you have in general? / And do you know how many years of diplomatic experience the delegation leader has in general?

Question 2: How many people are currently working in your delegation?

- 1-2
- 3-5
- 6-10
- 11-20
- 21-50
- More than 50

Question 3: Does your delegation include representatives from the following realms?

- Industry
- Research (Institutes, Academia etc.)
- Media
- NGOs

Part 2: General Behaviour

Question 4: In the first years of membership in the WTO, what were the biggest challenges for your delegation?
Part 3: Negotiation Tactics

Now I would like to ask you some questions about the negotiation tactics which your delegation may use. These tactics were derived by negotiation experts who have observed them in various international bargaining situations. I would appreciate it if you gave me an estimate of how often your delegation applies these tactics in the current Doha Round.

Question 5a: If the interests of other parties are contrary to those of your delegation, how often does your delegation express understanding for this?

- very often
- often
- rarely
- very rarely
- never
- don’t know
- no answer

Question 5b: Which characteristics of such other parties determine whether your delegation expresses understanding for their interests? (former allies, similar interests)

Question 6: How often does your delegation propose new solutions in the common interest of all or at least many parties?

- very often
- often
- rarely
- very rarely
- never
- don’t know
- no answer

Question 7: How often does your delegation propose an exchange of concessions for mutual benefit?

- very often
- often
- rarely
- very rarely
- never
- don’t know
- no answer

Question 8: How often does your delegation declare that it will not change its position (under any circumstances)?

- very often
- often
- rarely
- very rarely
- never
- don’t know
- no answer

Question 9: How often does your delegation overtly criticise other members’ positions?

- very often
- often
- rarely
- very rarely
- never
- don’t know
- no answer

Question 10: If other parties demand concessions from your delegation, how often does your delegation reject or ignore such demands?

- very often
- often
- rarely
- very rarely
- never
- don’t know
- no answer
Question 11: How often does your delegation hide its actual objectives to reach a stronger negotiation position?
- very often
- often
- rarely
- very rarely
- never
- don’t know
- no answer

Question 12: How often does your delegation demand concessions for its own benefit?
- very often
- often
- rarely
- very rarely
- never
- don’t know
- no answer

Question 13: In order to reach its objectives, how often does your delegation use threats (sanctions, trade restrictions, leaving the negotiations etc.) to influence other parties’ positions?
- very often
- often
- rarely
- very rarely
- never
- don’t know
- no answer

Question 14: In order to reach its objectives, how often does your delegation use promises (concessions, aid etc.) to change other negotiating parties’ positions?
- very often
- often
- rarely
- very rarely
- never
- don’t know
- no answer

Question 15: With which means does your delegation and/or your negotiating group / coalition try to affect the negotiation position of other delegations?
   a) By exerting political pressure? Can you give an example?
   b) By exerting economic pressure? Can you also give an example?
   c) By rhetorical pressure in the negotiations, e.g. blaming other delegations openly?
   d) By which other means?

Question 16: How often does your delegation try to slow down the negotiations in order to reach a stronger negotiation position?
- very often
- often
- rarely
- very rarely
- never
- don’t know
- no answer

Question 17: How often does your delegation try to exclude from the agenda issues on which it would probably have to make concessions?
- very often
- often
- rarely
- very rarely
- never
- don’t know
- no answer
Question 18: Are there any other negotiation tactics / measures which I did not mention but which your delegation or other negotiating parties use?

Question 19: To which extent do the negotiation strategies which your delegation uses vary from those which your negotiating group/coalition applies?

In case of sufficient experience (Question 1; otherwise continue with Question 21a):

Question 20: You said that you joined your negotiating delegation in ... – To which extent have the negotiation tactics of your delegation changed during the negotiations (from the accession of your country to today)?

Question 21a: Has the negotiation strategy of your delegation changed during the ongoing negotiations?

- Yes ➔ continue with Question 21b
- No ➔ continue with Question 22a
- Don’t know ➔ continue with Question 22a
- No answer ➔ continue with Question 22a

Question 21b: Please explain how and why the negotiation strategy of your delegation changed during the ongoing negotiations!

Participation in negotiating groups / coalitions:

Question 22a: From information on the WTO homepage, I know that your country is a member of certain groups in the negotiations. Are there, in addition, any further negotiating groups / coalitions which your delegation is closely associated with?

- known:

- furthermore:
Question 22b: Which role does your delegation assume in these negotiating groups / coalitions?

- Single leadership role
- Shared leadership role
- Group / coalition member without leadership ambitions
- Another role:
  
  [ ] Don’t know
  [ ] No answer

Question 22c: Which of these negotiating groups / coalitions is the most important to your delegation?

**Part 4: Negotiation Positions**

The positions that WTO members take in the Doha Round negotiations are partly shaped by different (domestic) actors. Please let me know what level of influence the following actors have on your delegation’s negotiation position before and during the negotiations.

Question 23: Economics ministry

- very high
- high
- moderate
- low
- very low
- don’t know
- no answer

Question 24a: Finance ministry

- very high
- high
- moderate
- low
- very low
- don’t know
- no answer

Question 24b: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

- very high
- high
- moderate
- low
- very low
- don’t know
- no answer

Question 24c: Ministry of Agriculture

- very high
- high
- moderate
- low
- very low
- don’t know
- no answer

Question 25: Environment ministry

- very high
- high
- moderate
- low
- very low
- don’t know
- no answer
Question 26: National parliament

[ ] very high  [ ] high  [ ] moderate  [ ] low  [ ] very low  [ ] don’t know  [ ] no answer

Question 27: Domestic interest groups with free trade interests – Could you please name them? ____

[ ] very high  [ ] high  [ ] moderate  [ ] low  [ ] very low  [ ] don’t know  [ ] no answer

Question 28: Domestic interest groups with anti-free trade, protectionist interests – Could you please name them?

________________________________________________________________________

[ ] very high  [ ] high  [ ] moderate  [ ] low  [ ] very low  [ ] don’t know  [ ] no answer

Question 29: International interest groups with free trade interests – Could you please name them? __

[ ] very high  [ ] high  [ ] moderate  [ ] low  [ ] very low  [ ] don’t know  [ ] no answer

Question 30: International interest groups with anti-free trade, protectionist interests – Could you please name them? ______________________________________________________________________

[ ] very high  [ ] high  [ ] moderate  [ ] low  [ ] very low  [ ] don’t know  [ ] no answer

Question 31: Domestic public opinion

[ ] very high  [ ] high  [ ] moderate  [ ] low  [ ] very low  [ ] don’t know  [ ] no answer

Question 32: National media

[ ] very high  [ ] high  [ ] moderate  [ ] low  [ ] very low  [ ] don’t know  [ ] no answer

Question 33: Research (Institutes, Academia etc.)

[ ] very high  [ ] high  [ ] moderate  [ ] low  [ ] very low  [ ] don’t know  [ ] no answer

Question 34: Your negotiating groups / coalitions

[ ] very high  [ ] high  [ ] moderate  [ ] low  [ ] very low  [ ] don’t know  [ ] no answer
Question 35: Are there any other actors that I did not mention but that influence your negotiation position and strategy? And if yes, to what extent?

Part 5: Salience / Importance
Surely, some of the Doha Round negotiation issues are more important for your country than others. Here, I propose a scale of possible positions of salience / importance. You can choose any of the options mentioned explicitly, but you can also provide an own position in between these options by using values between 0 and 100 which are not listed on the graph if that better describes the salience level.

Question 36: How important is the issue of Agriculture for your country?
Please choose from the following options:

- Not salient/important
- Little salient/important
- Medium salient/important
- Highly salient/important
- Extremely salient/important

0--------------------------------25-----------------------------50-----------------------------75----------------------------100

Question 37: How important is the issue of Trade & Development for your country?
Please choose from the following options:

- Not salient/important
- Little salient/important
- Medium salient/important
- Highly salient/important
- Extremely salient/important

0--------------------------------25-----------------------------50-----------------------------75----------------------------100
Question 38: How important is the issue of Trade & Environment for your country?
Please choose from the following options:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not salient/important</th>
<th>Little salient/important</th>
<th>Medium salient/important</th>
<th>Highly salient/important</th>
<th>Extremely salient/important</th>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
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Question 39: How important is the issue of Intellectual Property Rights for your country?
Please choose from the following options:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Not salient/important</th>
<th>Little salient/important</th>
<th>Medium salient/important</th>
<th>Highly salient/important</th>
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<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
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Question 40: How important is the issue of Non-Agricultural Market Access for your country?
Please choose from the following options:

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<th>Not salient/important</th>
<th>Little salient/important</th>
<th>Medium salient/important</th>
<th>Highly salient/important</th>
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<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
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</table>
Question 41: How important is the issue of *Rules* for your country? Please choose from the following options:

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<th>Not salient/important</th>
<th>Little salient/important</th>
<th>Medium salient/important</th>
<th>Highly salient/important</th>
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Question 42: How important is the issue of *Services* for your country? Please choose from the following options:

<table>
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<th>Not salient/important</th>
<th>Little salient/important</th>
<th>Medium salient/important</th>
<th>Highly salient/important</th>
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Question 43: How important is the issue of *Trade Facilitation* for your country? Please choose from the following options:

<table>
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<th>Not salient/important</th>
<th>Little salient/important</th>
<th>Medium salient/important</th>
<th>Highly salient/important</th>
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Part 6: Accession negotiations

In this last part of the interview, I am interested in the accession negotiations of your country with the WTO and their members then.

Question 44: Compared to the accession negotiations of other WTO candidates, how difficult have the accession negotiations been for your country?

Please choose from the following options:

- Not difficult at all
- Little difficult
- Medium difficult
- Highly difficult
- Extremely difficult


Question 45: Which particular conflict issues have existed in the accession negotiations?

Question 46: To which extent has it been possible to find solutions / compromises to these conflict issues?

Question 47: Have you had the feeling that the demands / accession conditions have been unjustified / harder than for other GATT / WTO candidates? If yes, why?

The last question concerns accession negotiations with other candidates in which your delegation took part as a WTO member.

Question 48a: With regard to such accession negotiations, has your delegation ever been in opposition to any admission of a candidate?

- Yes → continue with Question 48b
- No → continue with final questions
- Don’t know → continue with final questions
- No answer → continue with final questions

Question 48b: Why?
5 Conclusion

5.1 Theoretical contribution: The main findings

5.1.1 Membership experience – the newcomer effect

5.1.2 Economic power – & political weight

5.1.3 Regime type

5.2 Data contribution

5.3 Future research

5.4 Policy implications

The studies at hand on the behaviour of WTO members in the current Doha Round analyse the level of members’ activity, their degrees of cooperation among each other as well as their choices of certain strategies and tactics in these multilateral trade negotiations. International organisations, the negotiations taking place within them, member states’ behaviour in those negotiations and the agreements resulting from them are usually too abstract and remote from most people’s everyday lives to attract public attention. The consequences of these negotiated agreements, though, and often especially their unintended effects, rather obtain public awareness. A current example of such undesired implications of international economic agreements that substantially affect many people in Europe and Africa both directly and indirectly is partly based on trade negotiations between the European Union (EU) and different African states: the migration of especially young men from their African countries to the European continent. ¹ Although the EU has repeatedly promised efforts to address the root causes of such migration, critics rather see the EU’s responsibility in creating or at least contributing to these very root causes. ² The reasons for such criticism also concern the EU’s behaviour in negotiations with several African states in the recent past: Some African countries are reported to have been well-nigh pressured to conclude trade agreements with the EU. A case in point seems to be the negotiations on the “Economic Partnership Agreement” (EPA) between the EU and the East African Community, comprising Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.

¹ Over the last years, hundreds of thousands of African migrants, mostly from Sub-Saharan countries, are estimated to have left their homelands. Estimations suggest that between 65,000 and 120,000 Sub-Saharan Africans arrive in the Maghreb states every year; several tens of thousands among them try to make it to Europe (de Haas, 2008).

² Critics make the EU and European companies responsible for having directly or indirectly deprived many Africans of their livelihoods during the last decades. European companies, for instance, have purchased for years fishing licences from West African states at a low price – and with their mega trawlers caught and sold fish worth billions, leaving little if anything to the local population. Also, exports of agricultural goods (meat, vegetables, grains) from the EU to Africa have been increasing for years – although they destroy employment and related incomes in entire economic sectors as locally grown African food is not capable of competing against the industrially produced and heavily subsidised agricultural goods from Europe.
According to provisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the EU was bound to negotiate a new trade agreement with the East African states. After ten years, the negotiations drew to a close in October 2014 – and Kenya, the biggest economic actor within the East African Community, finally decided against it. The EU immediately imposed significant tariffs on Kenyan goods. Given the EU’s enormous market and its corresponding importance to Kenya’s export economy, this kind of “blackmail” – as it is called in Kenya – quickly produced the desired effect: Within three months, the Kenyan government signed the “Economic Partnership Agreement”. Many observers criticised this way of conducting negotiations (Moulds, 2015; Pollmeier et al., 2015; Zierhut, 2015).

With regard to the way powerful members (such as the EU) have been conducting the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations, more specifically have been employing negotiation strategies and tactics, the respective analysis in Chapter 4 cannot support the expected positive relationship between economic strength and the use of a hard (i.e. conflictual or aggressive) negotiation strategy. Considering particularly the application of threats (or “blackmail”, as critics call the events in Kenya) in order to pressure other members into agreement, the bigger players do not seem to employ this hard negotiation tactic more frequently than smaller WTO members. One may conclude, however, that the economically powerful members with both their large markets and political weight do not need to use explicit threats when the small and developing countries describe their awareness of the reality of political and economic power structures in the Doha Round negotiations. This and other findings regarding the relationship between WTO members’ economic strength and their use of particular negotiation strategies and tactics are discussed in more detail below. In addition, the multilateral negotiations of the Doha Round, in contrast to those on the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the East African Community, provide less developed countries with a larger extent of bargaining power by enabling them to build (bigger) coalitions; see Chapter 3 and below.

5.1 Theoretical contribution: The main findings

The chapters of this dissertation focus on WTO members’ participation, their cooperative behaviour as well as their use of certain strategies and tactics in the Doha Round negotiations. The intended outcome of these talks will be an agreement that is supposed to further liberalise world trade. Accordingly, the provisions of this agreement will directly or indirectly affect the entire WTO membership. Hence, this agreement is assumed to be of utmost importance to all WTO members; even though different parts of the negotiated package deal may be more important to some members than to others. Due to its importance, all WTO members are expected to influence the

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3 Several economic analysts, working for the United Nations, e.g., do not perceive the agreement as a chance for the East African states but in the long term rather even as a danger for these economies.
content of this agreement as much as possible in their favour. As supposedly rational actors, WTO members are assumed to behave in a way that aims at maximising their individual benefits during the Doha Round negotiations.

One such way to influence the final agreement in order to reach maximum benefits is active participation in the different negotiation groups, councils and committees of the Doha Round which are in charge of the respective negotiation issues. WTO members’ individual negotiation activity may take the form of submitting negotiation documents and / or making statements during official meetings as analysed in Chapter 2.

Another way – for many WTO members an additional way – used to try to arrive at an individually beneficial outcome is coalition building. Cooperation with other members is crucial in the Doha Round negotiations because the WTO’s consensus rule for making decisions gives every member de facto veto power. Hence, in contrast to other international organisations, where decisions are taken by majority rule, it is not sufficient to bring the bigger part of the membership behind one’s position. This makes WTO members’ cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round, studied in Chapter 3, particular.

A third kind of WTO members’ behaviour in the Doha Round is related to the parties’ negotiation activity. In order to influence the intended agreement in their favour and achieve their objectives, WTO members may select a certain negotiation strategy consisting of specific tactics, e.g. proposing new solutions which are in the common interest of all or at least many parties or declaring to not change one’s position under any circumstances. Based on existing classifications in the literature, I develop an own concept of soft and hard – and mixed – negotiation strategies to examine WTO members’ choice of strategies and tactics in the Doha Round in Chapter 4.

The analysis of WTO members’ negotiation behaviour in the Doha Round – i.e. their level of activity, their cooperation among each other and their choice of negotiation strategies and tactics – involves several factors that are considered to affect all three kinds of such behaviour. The most important variable in this regard is WTO members’ experience in and expertise with the organisation because the main research question is whether newcomers display different behavioural patterns in the Doha Round negotiations than their long-time counterparts due to new members’ lack of such experience and expertise. Besides members’ experience, their economic power – and associated political weight – and their regime type are thought to be relevant for their negotiation behaviour. In the following, the empirical findings as to these (assumed) impacts are summarised and evaluated against the theoretical expectations about their suspected relationships with WTO members’ negotiation behaviour. Table 5.1 at the end of this section provides a concise overview of these expectations and main findings as well as the novel data used for measuring member behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations.
5 Conclusion

5.1.1 Membership experience – the newcomer effect

Members’ experience in and with an international organisation may affect their behaviour in this institution; this holds for WTO members’ level of activity, cooperation with other members and choice of strategies and tactics in the Doha Round negotiations more specifically. Consulting rationalist approaches, newcomers would not be assumed to behave differently than long-standing members as all WTO members determine their negotiation behaviour depending on the utility they expect from such behaviour (Morrow, 1994). Obviously, though, those rational expectations concerning utility-maximising options of action are (at least partly) based on the level of experience and expertise a WTO member has already acquired. In addition, sociological literature suggests that newcomers behave differently because they are challenged by a new environment in which it is necessary to understand certain rules and norms of behaviour (Cini, 2001). According to this approach, there is reason to consider experience in and expertise on the WTO – including its multilateral trade rounds in particular – as a crucial factor in influencing members’ level of activity, their cooperative behaviour and their choice of specific negotiation strategies and tactics. The intended outcome of the Doha Round is a trade-liberalising agreement on an extensive list of issues negotiated to form a package deal (“single undertaking”) whose conclusion requires the consent of the entire membership. Therefore, members that can resort to high levels of experience and expertise are assumed to be more able to influence the intended outcome in their favour by making use of such knowledge.

A different mechanism that could explain a potential newcomer effect in negotiation behaviour revolves around the accession procedure between a candidate and an international organisation, specifically the WTO. In WTO accession negotiations, candidate’s trade and legal regimes are carefully examined. In the scope of the multilateral negotiations, one half of the candidate’s specific accession conditions are stipulated: the commitments to comply with WTO rules and disciplines upon accession. Simultaneously, in bilateral negotiations with interested WTO members, the other half of the candidate’s specific accession conditions are determined: concessions and commitments on market access for goods and services. Consequently, a candidate’s accession negotiations with the WTO membership (or interested WTO members in particular) can be relatively uncomplicated and (thus) fast; Latvia’s accession process, for example, took less than five years. In contrast, China’s accession negotiations with the WTO protracted over 15 years. The nature of these negotiations may affect later member behaviour once candidates have been admitted to the organisation. On the one hand, disagreements that could provide the basis for conflicts in the future may be smoothed out during the accession negotiations. On the other hand, the specific accession conditions agreed may create the potential for future quarrel. In particular, if newcomers had to
make extensive concessions as candidates while negotiating accession, they may only have few (if any) “bargaining chips” (Pelc, 2011) left which they can use in the DDA to make compromises.

Hence, such encompassing accession negotiations constitute another difference between newcomers and long-time (or even founding) members in the WTO. Besides their varying degrees of membership experience, this difference may also be related to a potential newcomer effect in WTO members’ behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations. Both mechanisms illustrate drawbacks for newcomers compared to long-time members: a first disadvantage from less experience and expertise and a second one from demanding accession negotiations. Thus, these two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary, possibly even reinforcing each other. Accordingly, even if a newcomer effect can be detected in the DDA, untangling the individual impacts of the two mechanisms on newcomer behaviour is difficult. This could be the focus of future research as elaborated on below. What are the findings on WTO members’ negotiation behaviour studied here, however?

With respect to WTO members’ levels of individual activity in the Doha Round negotiations, membership experience is expected to have a positive impact. More specifically, with increasing membership duration, negotiation activity is thought to become both more likely and (if existent) more intensive. Behind this expectation is the assumption that WTO newcomers have little experience in and expertise on WTO negotiations. Hence, new WTO members probably lack the capacity for getting active in the talks. The findings are mixed. The expectation is corroborated when WTO members’ negotiation activity is indicated by their statements made in meetings: Statements are both more likely and more numerous the more time has passed since WTO members have acceded to the organisation. Thus, more established WTO members tend to speak more often than newcomers. This finding corroborates the idea of a learning process that takes place after states and customs territories have joined the organisation. Over the course of this process, WTO members apparently acquire experience and expertise necessary for making statements during the meetings of the different negotiation groups, councils and committees of the Doha Round. Even though such statements may be prepared in advance, they are arguably still more spontaneous than the formulation and dissemination of negotiation documents. A lack of experience and expertise, in contrast, may potentially be related to uncertainty and, accordingly, a preference for writing down statements instead of speaking out in meetings. On the other hand, when WTO members’ negotiation activity is indicated by their submitted documents, membership experience does not appear to have an effect. Thus, newcomers do not seem to be different from long-time members with respect to submitting proposals and other kinds of negotiation documents. This can be explained by the fact that compromise proposals constitute only part of all negotiation contributions.
5 Conclusion

With regard to cooperation among WTO members in the Doha Round negotiations, the theoretical expectations about the potential effect of membership experience go in both directions. On the one hand, it seems plausible to suspect newcomers to cooperate with long-time members because new WTO members have an incentive to benefit from their greater experience in and expertise on the WTO negotiations. On the other hand, there are reasons to assume newcomers to cooperate with fellow newcomers (e.g. within the established coalition of the RAMs, the Recently Acceded Members) and more established WTO members with the likes of them, i.e. cooperation among peers. The results rather support this latter relationship: Cooperation appears more likely (and to some degree more intensive) between WTO members that have been in the organisation for about the same time. This finding may be explained by a potential history of cooperation among long-standing WTO members and, yet, substantial differences in positions in the Doha Round negotiations, especially with regard to the newcomers.

Finally, analysing WTO members’ choice of negotiation strategies and tactics in the Doha Round, the results support the existence of an experience effect: Long-time members appear more likely to use soft (i.e. cooperative or friendly) negotiation tactics than newcomers. This finding points again to the higher level of experience and expertise among established WTO members. Making use of a soft tactic like the proposition of new solutions that are in the common interest of all or at least many parties, e.g., requires a high level of information and knowledge which WTO members usually acquire over time. In other words, the formulation of potential compromises which ideally satisfy the interests of all 140 to 160 members and simultaneously benefit the proposing party most needs a good amount of expertise which WTO members generally obtain in negotiations over the course of their membership.

WTO diplomats interviewed for this work confirm the relationship linking membership experience to strategy choice in particular and to negotiation behaviour more generally. Interviewees from newcomer delegations described their confrontation with an unfamiliar environment in the first years of WTO membership; an environment whose – especially unwritten – rules and norms they had to understand. One WTO diplomat explicitly emphasised the lack of institutional memory as a major drawback for newcomers and an important advantage for long-standing members, respectively. He stressed extensive knowledge of the previous course of negotiations as crucial – members that are able to resort to such experience from the past benefit from this expertise today, according to the interviewee. In addition, newcomers’ initial behaviour in the WTO, including the Doha Round negotiations, seems to be characterised by reserve. Several interviewees described newcomers’ attempts of learning through observation and by trial and error as typical to cope with their lacking knowledge of WTO conventions and accepted behaviour. Thus, such a wait and see approach is not only visible in newcomers’ negotiation strategies in the Doha
Conclusion

Round where they seem to be too hesitant to use hard tactics like threats and too inexperienced for soft tactics like compromise proposals. This kind of behavioural approach is also reflected in newcomers’ low levels of individual negotiation activity (if existent at all). On the other hand, newcomers’ lack of experience and expertise in the Doha Round negotiations and their related uncertainty in terms of appropriate and productive behaviour apparently leads to cooperation with other newcomers.

5.1.2 Economic power – & political weight

The connection between actors’ economic power – and associated political weight – and their behaviour in (international) negotiations is one of the most researched relationships in negotiation analysis and political science more generally. The main theoretical approaches within the international relations literature agree that power – not only based on military resources but also on economic interdependencies – enables states to affect the outcome of international negotiations (Morgenthau, 1948; Keohane & Nye, 1989; Moravcsik, 1997). The WTO’s consensus rule for taking decisions and the consequential right to veto should provide all members with equal bargaining power. Yet, economic and political power looms large in the Doha Round negotiations: Large members can count on their aggregate structural resources and capabilities. Small and medium-sized members, however, need to make use of other sources of bargaining power, such as the development mandate of the “Doha Development Agenda”, their right to veto and their diplomats’ individual expertise and authority (cp. Tallberg, 2008). The importance of power dynamics in the WTO has also been proven by Steinberg (2002: 365), pointing to the “organized hypocrisy of consensus decision making” and power-based bargaining in the WTO, and Jones (2009), focusing on the so-called Green Room meetings that are criticised for over-representing large and wealthy members. Hence, there are good reasons to expect WTO members’ economic strength – and related political weight – to affect their negotiation behaviour. Are these expectations supported by the findings on WTO members’ negotiation activity, their cooperative behaviour and their choice of negotiation strategies and tactics in the Doha Round?

Theoretical considerations suggest that WTO members’ economic power and associated political weight are positively related to their level of activity in the Doha Round negotiations. The findings support this expected relationship for both measures of negotiation activity: documents submitted and statements made. With increasing economic strength, WTO members’ negotiation activity tends to be more intensive. Overall, more powerful WTO members appear to be more active in the Doha Round negotiations. This finding does not indicate, however, which causal mechanism relates economic (and political) power to WTO members’ negotiation activity. Two mechanisms may be at work: First, more powerful members may be more likely to be rewarded for their effort, namely
by succeeding to impact the outcome in their favour at less cost due to their greater economic and political weight. Second, developing and least-developed WTO members may perceive the DDA “their” Round and, hence, decide that a low level of negotiation activity might be enough to reach their goals. These two mechanisms may be at work individually or in combination. However, with the WTO (2009: 12) stressing developing countries’ and transition economies’ relatively high level of negotiation activity in the Doha Round, the positive effect of WTO members’ economic power seems to be more attributable to their economic and political weight.

The expectations linking WTO members’ economic strength to their cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations move in both directions: On the one hand, powerful members may be attractive to economically weaker members due to their stock of information or the opportunity to exploit those large members’ efforts in the negotiations. However, the results show that it is rather WTO members of similar economic strength that cooperate with each other. Similar to the finding on membership experience, WTO members tend to cooperate with their peers, in this case other members of similar economic power. The (apparent) reasons for this behaviour will be further discussed in connection with the following findings on WTO members’ use of negotiation strategies and tactics.

With regard to such strategies and tactics, powerful WTO members are expected to apply hard (i.e. conflictual or aggressive) negotiation tactics in the Doha Round more often than economically weaker members. Yet, as pointed out above, in contrast to the EPA negotiations between the EU and several African states, the results do not support this relationship in the Doha Round. On the contrary: Analysing WTO members’ use of soft negotiation tactics in the aggregate form of a soft strategy index, the finding suggests that large economies tend to apply soft negotiation tactics more frequently than small and medium-sized ones. This finding is not entirely compelling, however, as the individual analysis of these soft negotiation tactics does not come to the same conclusion. On the other hand, the finding that powerful WTO members are more likely to use soft negotiation tactics does not mean in reverse that the negotiation strategies of economically weaker members involve more hard tactics as some concepts in the literature argue. According to my concept of hard and soft negotiation strategies developed in Chapter 4, the actual reverse of powerful members’ higher probability of using soft negotiation tactics is weaker members’ greater likelihood of inactivity. This thought is empirically supported both by the results of members’ economic (and political) power affecting their levels of negotiation activity and by interview evidence: Small and medium-sized members tend to be less active individually and rather cooperate with each other in the Doha Round negotiations.

Similar to the results of the regression analyses, interview evidence on the relation of economic strength and strategy choice is ambiguous, too. Diplomats from small and medium-sized
WTO members repeatedly stressed that they were not in a position to make use of hard negotiation tactics; only large members were able to – and indeed do – threat or exert political pressure due to their economic advantage. Yet, diplomats from large members generally disclaimed such accusations, calling the use of hard tactics bad negotiation style. Soft tactics like persuading other members by means of arguments and facts or coalition building were reported to be preferable ways of acting. The small and medium-sized members’ perception as to any application of hard tactics by the large economies was rejected as incorrect. However, interview partners from small, medium-sized and large members agreed that economic resources are not the only source of power in WTO negotiations: Consensual decision making gives small and medium-sized economies the same veto power as large ones. Accordingly, developing countries could exploit this framework aspect of the negotiations to make use of hard negotiation tactics just as industrial nations and emerging economies. Still, the same veto opportunity does not necessarily mean the same veto weight, as pointed out in the interviews, too. Again, given undeniable economic (inter)dependencies among WTO members, the powerful do probably not need to resort to hard negotiation tactics in the Doha Round negotiations.

In addition, interview evidence provides another important explanation for the inconclusive results on WTO members’ use of negotiation strategies and tactics but also their cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round, as mentioned above. Essentially, only (medium-sized and) large WTO members are apparently able to make use of any (hard or soft) negotiation tactics individually. The most important piece of small and medium-sized WTO members’ negotiation behaviour, by contrast, seems to be coalition building. Large economies do need to form groups in the negotiations as well since an agreement requires consensus. Still, members possessing great economic strength can generally count on their political weight in their efforts of influencing the final agreement in their favour. Small and medium-sized members, though, consider their coalitions with other economically weak peers an effective instrument to counter the clout of the big players (and their alliances). Thus, weaker members tend to act within and through their groups, only rarely individually. The existence of important well-established coalitions (e.g. the African Group, ACP\(^4\), LDCs\(^5\)) illustrates this behaviour, too.

### 5.1.3 Regime type

Although the realist paradigm claims that a state’s regime type does not influence its actions in the international sphere, there is reason to expect WTO members’ democracy level to affect their negotiation behaviour in the Doha Round. This expectation is mainly based on the thought that more

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\(^4\) African, Caribbean and Pacific WTO members with preferences in the EU.

\(^5\) Least developed countries, the world’s poorest countries according to the United Nations.
democratic governments attach greater importance to their voters’ overall well-being than less democratic regimes due to democratic leaders’ greater accountability towards their voters (Mansfield et al., 2002).

In short, the causal mechanism could be described as follows: More democratic governments are assumed to aim at national welfare maximisation (Moravcsik, 1997; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Free trade is supposed to maximise national welfare (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009). More democratic governments are expected to be proponents of freer trade (Garrett & Lange, 1986; Hinich & Munger, 1997; Kono, 2006). Thus, a new agreement exceeding the current level of free trade should be more relevant to more democratic WTO members (at least within certain areas of trade where these WTO members have “offensive interests”). From the inverse perspective, less democratic regimes rather favour particular interests. Protectionism tends to benefit specific interest groups. Less democratic regimes are expected to prefer protectionist trade policies. Hence, less democratic WTO members should be more inclined to maintain the status quo (again, equivalently, at least within those areas of trade where “defensive interests” prevail).

Due to consensus decision making, the conclusion of a new WTO agreement requires more than a majority of like-minded members supporting trade liberalisation; in fact, every member needs to consent. As more democratic WTO members are thought to be more interested in a trade-liberalising agreement, they are expected to behave differently than less democratic members preferring the status quo: More democratic members would need to convince their counterparts sceptical of growing trade liberalisation of commonly acceptable compromises to arrive at the intended agreement. Therefore, more democratic WTO members are expected to be more active in the negotiations, to cooperate more (primarily with other democracies) and to choose rather soft than hard negotiation tactics. Do the findings provide support to these expectations?

With regard to the relationship between WTO members’ regime type and their negotiation activity in the Doha Round, the overall findings support the expected higher level of participation on the part of more democratic members. Such members are more likely to submit negotiation documents and more likely to make statements in meetings. In addition, if they do make use of these two kinds of negotiation activity to influence the final agreement in their favour, more democratic members tend to write longer documents (in total) and tend to speak more often in meetings. These findings corroborate the assumed causal mechanism which links WTO members’ democracy level, their governments’ accountability towards their voters’ and, more generally, national welfare, members’ preferences for freer trade and, here, their degree of participation in the Doha Round. If

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6 At least if a country is not large enough to have an effect on the world price through international trade (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009).

7 This refers to the sizes of the winning coalition and the selectorate which differ in democracies and autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).
the negotiation issues are analysed individually, though, the findings differ slightly from the aggregate study. These differences and possible explanations for them are discussed in connection with members’ choice of negotiation strategies and tactics below.

The results for WTO members’ cooperative behaviour show once more coalition building among peers in the negotiations: Members with similar levels of democracy are more likely to cooperate with each other in the Doha Round. Inversely, members with increasingly different levels of democracy are less likely to work together; if they still do, their cooperation tends to be less intensive. Hence, this finding as well may support the assumed causal mechanism that connects members’ regime type, their governments’ obligation towards their voters’ (and general) welfare, members’ stance on free(r) trade and, in this case, their level of cooperation in the Doha Round. It may, yet, also corroborate the thought about democratic leaders’ habituation of negotiating compromises. Finally, this result may underline the idea that authoritarian regimes are rather unwilling to agree to democratic reforms demanded as preconditions for economic cooperation.

In contrast to the findings on WTO members’ negotiation activity and cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round, the results concerning WTO members’ strategy choice do not support the theoretical expectation: When several soft negotiation tactics are combined into a soft strategy index, the respective result does not suggest that more democratic members use soft negotiation tactics more often than their less democratic counterparts. The finding for hard negotiation tactics forming a hard strategy index is similar: Members’ regime type does not seem to affect their choice of particular negotiation tactics in general. However, when the single negotiation tactics are analysed, four of them point to a relationship between members’ democracy level and their use of hard negotiation tactics: More democratic members, first, declare more often that they will not change their position under any circumstances (Q1); second, reject or ignore more often demands for concessions from other parties (Q3); third, make promises less often (Q7); and fourth, try more often to exclude issues from the agenda (Q9). Again, these results clearly contradict the expectation that more democratic WTO members are more likely to use soft negotiation tactics. Since these findings appear highly counterintuitive, they are also difficult to explain.

However, possible explanations for these results may be connected to those for the inconsistent findings regarding WTO members’ negotiation activity in the aggregate vs. individual analyses of the specific areas of the Doha Round. In some of these areas (e.g. Trade Facilitation), WTO members’ democracy level does not influence their participation; whether it concerns submitting negotiation documents or making statements. For one negotiation issue, the result is even negative, suggesting that more democratic members are less likely to hand in documents in the Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiations. A potential explanation why this and other findings differ between the analyses of the individual negotiation issues (e.g. NAMA) and those of the
aggregate analysis could be related to the impact of domestic lobby groups on their respective governments. According to public choice theory, regime type does not matter: The political process is inherently inclined to favour protectionist measures desired by well-organised special interest groups rather than trade-liberalising policies that are supposed to benefit the entire society (Arrow, 1951; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Olson, 1965).

Examining WTO members’ negotiation activity in the Doha Round, it seems difficult to include the potential influence of domestic lobby groups. The study on members’ choice of negotiation strategies and tactics, though, provides some hints on the impact of domestic interest groups. When the hard strategy index measures the use of hard negotiation tactics, an effect of protectionist lobbying cannot be found. However, the results as to two of the individual tactics are relevant in this regard, among them Q3 again: A bigger impact of protectionist interest groups on their governments’ positions in the DDA makes these governments more likely to reject or ignore demands for concessions by other parties (Q3). The findings are similar for the liberal counterparts: Using the hard strategy index, an effect of free trade lobbying is not detectable. Yet, the result concerning tactic Q3 suggests that a higher influence of domestic free trade interest groups on their governments’ negotiation positions in the Doha Round makes these governments more likely to reject or ignore demands for concessions by other WTO members. Hence, the application of this hard negotiation tactic appears to be more likely, the more influence interest groups of any kind bring to bear on their governments’ positions. This holds even for highly democratic governments as, again, more democratic members reject or ignore demands for concessions from other parties more often.

5.2 Data contribution

Besides its concise comparison of the theoretical expectations and the empirical findings for the major variables in this work, Table 5.1 below gives a brief summary of the novel data used for measuring WTO members’ negotiation behaviour in the Doha Round. Investigating WTO members’ negotiation activity, their cooperative behaviour and their choice of negotiation strategies and tactics included comprehensive data collection.

For WTO members’ negotiation activity, 184 minutes of official negotiation meetings and 1,026 negotiation documents written by individual WTO members were examined. From those 184 minutes of the official meetings of the groups, councils and committees that are dealing with the particular negotiation issues of the Doha Round, the number of statements that individual WTO members had made was extracted.8 This involved computer-assisted text analysis.

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8 As pointed out before, the data on WTO members’ joint statements were extracted from the minutes as well. They are not analysed as indicating members’ cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations, though, since the study focuses on joint documents submitted by groups of WTO members. Yet, analysing these data may be interesting and valuable as described below in the section on potential future research.
### Table 5.1: Overview of the main findings and novel data used for measuring WTO members’ negotiation behaviour in the Doha Round

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership experience – the newcomer effect</th>
<th>Economic power</th>
<th>Regime type</th>
<th>Novel data for measuring the dependent variable</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiation Activity (Chapter 2)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Expectation: activity more likely &amp; more intensive with increasing membership experience</td>
<td>Expectation: activity more likely &amp; more intensive with increasing economic power</td>
<td>Expectation: activity more likely &amp; more intensive with increasing level of democracy</td>
<td>Data sources: 184 minutes of official meetings, 1,026 negotiation documents of individual WTO members; processed data used in the analyses: number of statements extracted from the minutes using computer-assisted text analysis, length (number of words) of negotiation documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findings: mixed: expectation confirmed for statements made, not for documents submitted</td>
<td>Finding: expectation confirmed for both statements &amp; documents</td>
<td>Finding: expectation confirmed for both statements &amp; documents</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cooperation (Chapter 3)</strong></td>
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<td>Expectation: both directions: cooperation among peers or non-peers</td>
<td>Expectation: both directions: cooperation among peers or non-peers</td>
<td>Expectation: cooperation among peers</td>
<td>Data sources: 541 negotiation documents of groups of WTO members; processed data used in the analyses: number of cases of dyadic cooperation extracted from negotiation documents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Findings: cooperation among peers</td>
<td>Finding: cooperation among peers</td>
<td>Finding: cooperation among peers</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiation Strategies &amp; Tactics (Chapter 4)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Expectation: use of soft &amp; hard tactics more likely with increasing membership experience</td>
<td>Expectation: use of hard tactics more / less likely with increasing economic power</td>
<td>Expectation: use of soft tactics more likely with increasing democracy level</td>
<td>Data sources: 39 semi-structured expert interviews with WTO diplomats (delegation members); primary processed data used in the analyses: quantified data on the frequency of negotiation tactics used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findings: mixed: expectation confirmed for soft negotiation tactics</td>
<td>Finding: use of soft tactics more likely with increasing economic power</td>
<td>Finding: expectation not confirmed: use of hard tactics more likely with increasing democracy level</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
These data cover all WTO members during the period of 2000 to 2011 and the negotiation issues Agriculture, Trade and Development, Trade and Environment, Intellectual Property Rights, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and Services. In terms of the negotiation documents, both their number and their length (in number of words) were recorded. These data cover all WTO members during the period of 2000 to 2011 (2012 for Trade Facilitation), and all the main negotiation issues of the single undertaking. 9

For WTO members’ cooperative behaviour, 541 negotiation documents authored by groups of WTO members were studied. From those documents, the number of cases of dyadic cooperation was coded. Again, the data cover all WTO members during the period of 2000 to 2011 (2012 for Trade Facilitation), and all the main negotiation issues of the single undertaking.

Both minutes and negotiation documents are publicly available via the WTO’s online database of official documentation (WTO, 2015f). Exploiting these two kinds of WTO documentation as rich and reliable sources of quantitative information led to the accumulation of original data on WTO members’ level of negotiation activity and their cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round. As described extensively in the introductory Chapter 1, yet, these data sources have some limitations as well. For instance, some minutes do not individually identify WTO members but merely name them “participants” or “(co-)sponsors” of papers. Hence, it is not possible to extract members’ statements from such minutes. This concerns the meetings that negotiate WTO Rules. This indicator for WTO members’ negotiation activity is therefore missing for the talks on WTO Rules. In addition, members’ statements are not recorded if (parts of) the meetings take place in informal mode, except when statements are explicitly wished to be included in the minutes. Thus, the extraction of members’ statements from such minutes may lead to a biased picture. This is the case for the meetings that debate Trade Facilitation. WTO members’ number of statements indicating their level of participation is accordingly missing for the Trade Facilitation talks as well. With respect to WTO members’ negotiation documents, on the other hand, those available from the online database of the organisation may not include all contributions from WTO members over the course of the negotiations. In other words, official negotiation documents may not be complete – and informal negotiation documents are not publicly accessible at all: Contributions that have been distributed by WTO members as informal negotiation documents, so-called “jobs”, are not available to the public. These limitations need to be considered when drawing conclusions about WTO members’ level of negotiation activity and their cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round indicated by their production of (joint) negotiation documents.

9 I.e. Agriculture, Trade and Development, Trade and Environment, Intellectual Property Rights, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), Services, Trade Facilitation and WTO Rules. If the same documents had been submitted in multiple negotiation areas (e.g. Environment and NAMA), they were counted only once.
5 Conclusion

Finally, 39 prearranged, semi-structured expert interviews with WTO diplomats (i.e. staff of members’ delegations) constitute the data source for WTO members’ choice of negotiation strategies and tactics. The primary information derived from these interviews is quantified data on how often WTO members have been using different negotiation tactics in the Doha Round. In addition, the interviews provided quantified data on the influence of domestic interest groups on members’ negotiation positions and the number of years of negotiation experience of the respective delegation leader – two independent variables in the study on WTO members’ choice of negotiation strategies and tactics. Furthermore, qualitative information from the interviews concerns members’ accession negotiations (if applicable), their initial challenges in the WTO and their cooperative behaviour. In this way, the interviews provide not only first-hand data on WTO members’ use of negotiation tactics but also additional insight on members’ levels of negotiation activity and their cooperation with other members in the DDA. Beyond that, personal communication with WTO diplomats allowed seeing behind the curtain of the Doha Round negotiations that take place in secrecy. Besides such benefits, the limitations of these interviews refer to the diplomats’ self-selection and the assurance of anonymity: Because the interview partners volunteered to participate, those WTO members whose use of negotiation tactics is studied are not a random sample of the membership. Finally, it is not possible to attribute statements or responses regarding particular interview questions to specific WTO members since the interviewees were assured complete anonymity.

5.3 Future research

This dissertation examines WTO members’ negotiation behaviour in the Doha Round, more precisely members’ participation, their cooperative behaviour and their use of specific strategies and tactics. Its findings answer the initial research questions in large part – and raise new ones which may be relevant to study in future work. Also, the inherent limitations of the studies at hand may provide the starting points for further research that builds upon data material and insights from this project. In the following, some considerations on valuable future progress are presented.

First, as described above, the disentanglement of the individual impacts of two probably interacting mechanisms on newcomer behaviour – one referring to experience and expertise and one to accession negotiations – is difficult. Examining the potential influence of disagreements resolved during the accession negotiations would require a different research design than those used here for

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10 These WTO members are: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, the EU, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi-Arabia, Switzerland, Taiwan (Chinese Taipei), Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and Uganda.
analysing members’ level of negotiation activity, their cooperative behaviour and their use of negotiation strategies and tactics.

Furthermore, the studies analyse both WTO members’ experience in the organisation and their economic power as potentially affecting all of these three kinds of members’ negotiation behaviour in the Doha Round. A valuable next research step would be to examine the interaction of these two variables. It is conceivable that the newcomer effect and the impact of members’ economic power collude: WTO members may differ in their negotiation behaviour depending on the combined influence of their membership experience and their economic strength. Focusing on those members with little experience, economically and politically weak newcomers like Cape Verde or Tonga may behave differently than powerful newcomers, the most notable one clearly being China, due to its immense economic size one of the big players in the organisation since its accession.

Another possible interaction effect may exist between membership experience and economic wealth, a variable investigated as to its impact on WTO members’ negotiation activity in the Doha Round in Chapter 2.\textsuperscript{11} Future research may examine as well whether WTO members vary in their level of participation in the DDA based on the interaction of their membership experience and their economic wealth. Considering WTO members with little experience again, poor newcomers like Cambodia or Nepal may show a different level of negotiation activity than rich newcomers like Saudi Arabia. One reason may be related to the affordability of external sources of experience: Rich newcomers are able to employ consulting services of the private economy, engaging well-versed former WTO diplomats who are experts in the trade negotiations of the organisation. Like this, knowledge may be purchased. The same holds for economically powerful newcomers, though: They, too, have the (aggregate) financial resources to be able to afford such professional support to compensate their lack of experience and expertise. On the other hand, many WTO newcomers are (or have been) least developed and developing countries that do not have the means for expensive consultancy. These newcomers are entitled, however, to technical assistance and capacity building measures provided by the WTO Secretariat (this issue is taken up below in the policy implications).

With regard to WTO members’ cooperative behaviour, it may be interesting to analyse joint statements made on behalf of several members in order to investigate whether the results are congruent with those found for negotiation documents authored by groups of members. These joint contributions constitute the data basis for WTO members’ cooperation in the Doha Round negotiations (Chapter 3). Examining members’ joint statements may deliver further insight on coalitions in the DDA, additional to the findings relying on members’ joint proposals and other kinds of negotiation documents. The data for such a study are available due to the larger coding effort that

\textsuperscript{11} It may be useful to commemorate at this point that members’ economic power refers to their economic performance, operationalised as gross domestic product (GDP). Members’ economic wealth, on the other hand, refers to the material prosperity of their populations, measured as GDP per capita.
has been conducted in the scope of this research project. This coding process has involved the quantitative analysis of the minutes recorded during the official meetings of the different negotiating groups, councils or committees that deal with the separate negotiation issues of the Doha Round. When analysing the minutes by means of computer-assisted coding, statements (i.e. remarks, comments etc.) made by both individual and groups of WTO members have been registered. In terms of statements made by groups of members, such joint statements are typically introduced by the phrase “on behalf of” (e.g. “On behalf of Mercosur, the representative of Paraguay pointed out that ...”). Accordingly, the algorithm developed for the coding effort has used this phrase to distinguish between statements made by individual and groups of WTO members. That way, groups of members have been recorded each time they had made a joint statement during a meeting. These data on WTO members’ joint statements could constitute another indicator for members’ cooperative behaviour in the Doha Round negotiations. As mentioned, although the data on WTO members’ joint statements have been extracted from the minutes, they are not analysed in the study on cooperation among members in the Doha Round in Chapter 3. This study focuses on joint negotiation documents submitted by groups of members. Hence, it may be valuable research to also examine WTO members’ cooperation in the Doha Round indicated by joint statements of coalitions.

Besides, further research on WTO members’ cooperative behaviour and their use of negotiation strategies and tactics in the Doha Round should focus on the individual areas of the talks (e.g. Agriculture). Studying members’ levels of negotiation activity in the DDA (Chapter 2), their participation in the different fields is analysed. Similar work seems to be important for WTO members’ coalition building and their choice of negotiation strategies and tactics. With regard to cooperation among members, the data for such research are available as well. The extensive document analysis described has coded for each group of members data on the number of joint statements, number and length of joint contributions submitted as well as when and in which negotiation issue the statement had been made or the contribution had been submitted. Such more fine-grained work would be appropriate to verify whether any findings from individual analyses of the single areas deviate from the findings of the aggregate analysis of WTO members’ cooperative behaviour. In addition, such more fine-grained work on WTO members’ coalition building in the different negotiation issues would also make it possible to take into account the impact of more established coalitions in the Doha Round negotiations whose efforts are limited to specific fields (e.g. the Cairns Group in the Agriculture talks).

With respect to WTO members’ use of certain negotiation strategies and tactics in the Doha Round, Chapter 4 provides a general view and does not elaborate on the potential variation across both issue areas and time. Therefore, future research should not only focus on potential differences between the individual areas but also on the course of the negotiations over time. For collecting data
on both aspects, additional interviews would need to be conducted. In the case of least developed and developing countries with their often small delegations in which, thus, the same diplomat is frequently in charge of multiple issues, answering such specific questions may be difficult, though.

Moreover, at the interface between WTO members’ negotiation activity and their cooperative behaviour, it may be interesting to research which member of a coalition speaks on behalf of the group. Is it the most experienced member, the most powerful one or a member that is rather determined by another factor? Or is the function of the speaker merely based on a rotating system among the group’s members? Given their assumed objective of influencing the final agreement in their preferred direction, speakers may need to balance different ways of proceeding in the negotiations: their individual and their collective efforts. In addition to their individual activity, speakers are responsible for their coalition’s collective participation as well. Hence, they are supposed to maximise both their own benefits and those of the group. This twofold mission may be worth investigating.

Finally, valuable future work may consist in studying the negotiation behaviour of member states of other international organisations. Such research may yield insight whether the findings from the studies on WTO members’ negotiation activity, their cooperation among each other and their application of particular strategies and tactics in the Doha Round hold for the same and other actors in different environments. A limitation may be given in this regard by the relatively special background of the World Trade Organization in general and the framework of the Doha Round more specifically.

5.4 Policy implications

What do the findings from studying WTO members’ participation, their coalition building and their choice of certain strategies and tactics in the Doha Round suggest for improving newcomers’ negotiation behaviour – especially when they are least developed and developing countries? First of all, in order to be better able to affect the intended agreement in their favour, it seems that newcomers need to be more active in the negotiations. As the results concerning WTO members’ participation in the Doha Round have shown, though, newcomers’ lack of experience and expertise apparently preclude them from getting as active in the DDA as long-time members. Hence, it seems important that newcomers acquire a comparably high level of expertise relatively fast. One possibility to achieve this objective may be the utilisation of consulting services offered by the private market. Making use of such professional counselling, for example by former diplomats who possess rich experience in WTO negotiations, may contribute to the acquirement of the knowledge required.
For many WTO newcomers, however, such a purchase of expertise is not a viable option: Most newcomers are (or have been) least developed and developing countries that cannot afford expensive consultancy. These newcomers should therefore draw on the technical assistance and capacity building measures provided by the WTO Secretariat. In this regard, it may also be crucial to decide on which diplomats of the delegations should be selected for receiving training and their deployment afterwards. More specifically, the rotating system for diplomats abroad – inter alia for WTO negotiators – applied by many members may not be ideal for newcomers’ needs. Longer tenures may lead to increased specialisation and expertise, more familiarity with procedures, higher peer recognition, more stable networks and greater effectiveness in total (Apecu, 2013). This could be reviewed depending on the precise circumstances. Another issue that may be challenging for WTO newcomers concerns the coordination of processes and the transfer of information between their delegations in Geneva and their capitals where essential decisions are taken.

In addition, WTO newcomers may consider focusing even more on the benefits of cooperation: Working together with other newcomers creates a pool of useful knowledge and saves resources by making use of synergy effects. Such collaboration may, thus, be a possibility to compensate missing experience.

Finally, from a more general perspective on the negotiation behaviour of WTO members that are least developed and developing countries, they should exploit their collective power to a larger extent. The multilateral negotiations of the Doha Round lend themselves to coalition building and, hence, to form a critical mass against the economic power and associated political weight of the big players. That way, small and medium-sized members can avoid the negative consequences of asymmetrical bilateral negotiations as depicted at the beginning of this conclusion.
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