The crisis of crisis management

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Crisis management remains in high demand in 2009/10. Yet it suffers from three crises. First, there is insufficient political will to formulate a strategic vision of how to address violent conflicts in an increasingly multipolar world. Second, there is a lack of institutional coordination among the principal providers of crisis management. Third, due to capability shortages, many operations struggle to deliver in today’s complex conflict environments. These flaws must be fixed as crisis management remains an indispensable tool to secure peace and stability.
The crisis of crisis management is not a new trend. Rather, it is a continuous development that has encountered new pressing challenges in 2009. The crisis has a political, an institutional, and an operational dimension. It reflects the difficulties and failures to adapt to the geopolitical shifts and the changing nature of conflict since the end of the Cold War.

In the bipolar international system prior to 1989, peace operations carried out by the UN were typically aimed at monitoring borders and patrolling buffer zones after ceasefire agreements in inter-state conflicts. The missions usually consisted of lightly armed peacekeepers and were based on three guiding principles: consent of the conflict parties, the impartiality of the peacekeepers, and non-use of force except in self-defence. This traditional kind of peacekeeping was relatively uncontroversial, but it froze conflicts rather than resolving them.

After the Cold War, the context of peacekeeping changed. The opportunities and the need for international peacekeeping increased, resulting in a sharp rise in peace operations. Major powers were now less likely to regard conflicts in distant locations as part of their geostrategic rivalry. Hence they became more willing than before to see a crisis response emerge from within a UN framework. A series of regional peace agreements on Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, Cambodia, and Central America became feasible, requiring international assistance. At the same time, new crises erupted as two Communist federations, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, collapsed.

With intra-state conflicts moving to the fore after 1989, the concept of peacekeeping evolved. UN peacekeeping forces in both ex-Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and Somalia (UNOSOM II) were set up in the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and without relying on the consent of the parties to the conflict to the same extent as earlier cases. This marked a watershed in peacekeeping, gradually eroding the principle of consent and introducing more robust mandates to enforce peace. However, the UN failures in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda illustrated that the available tools and response mechanisms were deficient. Reflecting the changing conflict scenarios, NATO was increasingly geared towards out-of-area deployments and, in 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (renamed Common Security and Defence Policy, or CSDP, in the Lisbon Treaty) was created. Although there seemed to be a basic consensus that capacities for intervention should be increased, it soon became clear that there was
little agreement on when force should be used, and by which organisation.

Against the backdrop of the US ‘war on terror’ that became a central feature of the security agenda in the first decade of the 21st century, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency were added to the repertoire of crisis management tasks. As the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan reveal, this led to a further blurring of the boundaries between peace operations and war-fighting and increasing tensions both among Western actors and between them and local parties. Peace operations have also become more intrusive in the past decade in the sense of a shift from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, involving the transformation of political and socio-economic structures and institutions in weak states to secure more lasting peace. Yet, democracy promotion and liberal market reforms are controversial and do not always enjoy local support. Democratisation efforts can prove premature and lead to renewed de-stabilisation, as happened in the cases of Liberia and Angola. Western actors also differ on the extent to which they believe that such concepts can be externally imposed.

Crisis management deployments have also seen a marked geographical shift over the last decade. In the late 1990s, more than 60 per cent of personnel deployments were in Europe. Most of these were troops deployed in NATO’s SFOR (approx. 25,000 troops in 1999) and KFOR (approx. 42,500 troops in 1999) missions in the former Yugoslavia. As SFOR was terminated in 2005 and KFOR was reduced by some 70 per cent by the end of 2008, most operations in Europe today are smaller, civilian in character, and carried out by regional organisations rather than the UN. Deployments in Africa, by contrast, have increased by 400 per cent over the past decade. UN missions alone have increased tenfold. With five large operations of more than 9,000 personnel, Africa accounts for the largest number of deployments by far. In Asia, over 90 per cent of mission personnel are deployed through ISAF in Afghanistan, which continues to be the biggest crisis management operation worldwide. If the shift away from Europe reflects the growing stabilisation of the Balkans, it also creates new problems for Western governments, who are struggling to convince their citizens that threats emanating from far-away conflicts can undermine security at home.

The complexity of crisis management has starkly increased in view of all these developments. Conceptually, crisis management has
come to include not only the initial phase of conflict prevention and the phase of actual crisis management, but also the phase of post-conflict reconstruction. It thus comprises an ever broader set of civilian and military measures and instruments. The range of actors involved is also widening. Apart from international organisations such as the UN, NATO, EU, OSCE, the African Union (AU), and UN-authorised multinational coalitions, there is considerable involvement on the part of local authorities and governments, private security companies, militias, the media, NGOs and other civil-society actors. The engagement of such a large number of players can increase the legitimacy of the peacebuilding process, but it also increases the challenges of coordination.

The result is that while the demand for peace operations continues to rise, crisis management faces a growing crisis itself. Political will is dwindling, effective international cooperation is increasingly difficult, and resources and capabilities are stretched to the limit. The effects of the financial crisis and the difficult situation in Afghanistan are aggravating these problems. There is an urgent need to address the political, institutional, and operational challenges of crisis management.

The political crisis of crisis management
At the heart of the crisis of crisis management lies the political dimension. There are several aspects to this. To start with, there is a growing need to engage rising powers in crisis management. The rise of regional powers since the end of the Cold War and the shifts in economic power towards the East (see Chapter 2) mean that actors such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, or South Africa will have to define their political and operational role in international crisis management. Rendering peace and stability a shared global responsibility is, however, a difficult endeavour.

China as a rising global power has recently become more engaged in UN peacekeeping. It is now the largest troop contributor among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5). Beijing currently sends civilian police, military observers, staff officers, and non-combat troops to UN operations. The largest numbers are deployed in Sudan as part of UNMIS and the AU-UN hybrid mission in Darfur, UNAMID. Large numbers of Chinese troops are also deployed with MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), UNMIL in Liberia, and UNIFIL in Lebanon. Chinese civilian police units are mostly deployed with
MINUSTAH in Haiti. The Chinese contribution provides an important boost to UN operations at a time of critical shortage of troops and equipment. For China, greater involvement in multilateral crisis management can help it revamp its international image and increase its sway in the Security Council. However, the Chinese principles of non-interference and unconditional aid remain problematic, as they tend to clash with Western peacebuilding practices. Democratisation and liberal market reform are obviously not on China’s agenda.

With regard to rising regional powers, the political trade-off is even more complex. Involving them in political decisions is bound to make the process more cumbersome. While their claims to greater political representation are legitimate, the challenge will be to involve them not just for the sake of inclusiveness, but also to gain real added value in terms of effectiveness and much-needed capabilities.

**Legitimacy**

It is often suggested that bringing in more powers – and especially

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### Key military data for selected actors

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Source: IISS Military Balance 2009
Rising ones—would help to enhance the legitimacy of crisis management operations. This is because of the waning legitimacy of Western powers in certain parts of the world. However, the case is not quite so simple. Any constellation of external actors with contending interests potentially jeopardises local support. The example of the Broader Horn of Africa illustrates this. The region, stretching from the Central African Republic and Chad through Sudan to Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, is one of the most volatile and conflict-ridden in the world and, as such, hosts one of the biggest concentrations of peacekeepers worldwide. A multitude of external powers with competing political and business agendas have infinitely complicated the already strenuous search for regional peace. China’s natural resource stakes, France’s influence in its former colonies, and US counterterrorism policies have all meddled with the region’s politics. Difficult relations between P5 members and powerful actors in the AU have further confounded the conduct of peace operations in the region.

Legitimacy in complex conflict environments is, above all, about securing local consent. This has become more difficult, however, as conflict scenarios and the role of international forces have become much more multifaceted in the past two decades. With post-conflict reconstruction now considered an integral part of crisis management, some state actors believe that swift and fair implementation of post-conflict reconstruction can generate local consent and thus serve as an alternative, ex-post source of operational legitimacy in cases where ex-ante consent for an intervention could not be secured. This is a line that has most notably been taken by US and UK troops, for example in their interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. But this approach can easily run into difficulties. The question arises of what happens if the reconstruction phase proves lengthy and burdensome or if the efforts are unsuccessful. The cooperation of local parties is an essential condition for, rather than the result of, a successful reconstruction process. Yet, the question is whose consent should be sought in a failed state.

This poses an operational dilemma: On the one hand, local support must be sought as early as possible and ‘ownership’ passed on to the local community to avoid a situation where the international presence is seen as an occupation. On the other hand, a premature handover of authority to undemocratic local actors can lead to a quick relapse into instability. Declining local consent is, however, only one aspect of the legitimacy problem confronting interven-
ing states. The other is waning public support at home.

Waning public support
In European states especially, public support for military operations in far-away places is plummeting. The experience in Afghanistan in particular has put public support to the test. The question of when force should be used and how long the international community should stay in a war-torn country to ensure stability is currently being hotly debated in that context. According to the German Marshall Fund’s annual Transatlantic Trends survey of summer 2009, only around one in three Europeans feel optimistic about the prospects of stabilising Afghanistan. There is a clear transatlantic divide here, as the US public perceives Afghanistan more optimistically, and the majority (56 per cent) feel positive about the future of the country. Concerning the deployment of troops, the prevailing view among Europeans, largely independent of their political leaning, is to prefer for their forces to be reduced or totally withdrawn. More than half of West Europeans (55 per cent) and two-thirds of East Europeans (69 per cent) want to reduce or remove their soldiers from Afghanistan. As for the US, the Afghanistan troop deployment is a partisan issue. 46 per cent of Democrats and 43 per cent of Independents, but only 22 per cent of Republicans want to reduce or withdraw US forces from Afghanistan.

Fading public support for international crisis management has been exacerbated by the global economic crisis. As recent opinion polls show, stabilising Afghanistan is not a priority for either US or European respondents under the current economic conditions. Only 7 per cent in the US and 4 per cent in Europe think that Afghanistan should be the top priority for the US president and European leaders. Again, this raises the question of how much support there will be for future operations. The global economic crisis will put additional strains on states’ defence budgets for years to come. In an era of tight resources, political priorities tend to shift towards policy issues enjoying greater domestic salience. The big political question is what strategic role Western states are willing and able to play in the future and how much commitment to international crisis management can be expected from them.

All of these indicators point to an urgent need to involve the public in a serious debate about the future of security policy and crisis management, in which political leaders assume the task of spelling out in clear and intelligible terms what the national security interests and responsibilities
actually are. There is, however, insufficient public communication on security policy in most Western states. The German government, for example, has long refused to speak of a ‘war’ in Afghanistan. At the end of 2009, a political scandal revealed that the defence ministry had withheld information on civilian casualties in an air strike ordered by the Germans in Kunduz in September 2009. Similarly, the ongoing public inquiry into the decision of the British government to participate in the Iraq intervention in 2003 is likely to have a further detrimental effect on public trust in the government.

The institutional crisis of crisis management

The political crisis of crisis management also reflects on international institutions as the key providers of crisis management. They are not only stretched for resources, but also suffer from strategic and political dissonance among the member states. It is the task of state actors to formulate a common strategic vision for the respective institution. When confronted with an unfolding crisis, they have to arrive at a common decision about what the appropriate response is – and they have to provide that institution with the resources needed to implement that decision effectively. The intricacy of crisis management, therefore, lies to a large extent in the inter-governmental nature of the institutions providing conflict assistance.

The UN, NATO, and the EU are illustrative of this. As the three crucial providers of crisis management alongside a range of regional organisations, they have all seen a massive increase in operational deployments. In 2009, there have been 16 parallel UN peacekeeping operations; NATO’s presence of currently about 70,000 troops in Afghanistan is the largest operational deployment in the organisation’s 60-year history; the EU for its part has conducted more than 20 operations since its CSDP became operational in 2003. All these institutions are struggling with the requirements of effective crisis management today.

The United Nations

The UN is the principal global provider of peace operations and enjoys unrivalled international legitimacy in this role. It accounts for over half of the personnel deployments in peace operations worldwide. But with currently almost 83,000 personnel (military and civilian) deployed, UN peacekeeping continues to suffer from overstretched. The current UN peacekeeping budget amounts to approximately US$7 billion. This means that it accounts for a mere 0.5 per cent of global military spending, making UN
peacekeeping a uniquely cost-effective tool of international crisis management. Nonetheless, the world body is struggling to receive sufficient funds from its members.

Several initiatives have been launched over the past decade to overhaul the UN peacekeeping system. As the most important document in this reform process, the 2000 Brahimi Report on Peacekeeping emphasised the need for more resources, clear and realistic mandates, and general strategic planning of operations. The report also provided the backdrop for the creation in late 2005 of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which is an intergovernmental advisory body aiming to devise integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. But ten years on, reform along the lines of the Brahimi Report remains limited. The UN is still struggling to integrate more effectively the military, political, and humanitarian components of peace operations.

There is also a problematic division of UN member states into three different categories: First, there are those states that provide the bulk of peacekeeping forces, yet have little political clout (South Asia and Africa). Second, there are the states that supply the bulk of funding (the EU, the US, and Japan). Finally, there are those states where large-scale operations are deployed (mainly in Africa). This division leads to political tensions in the Security Council and a discrepancy between troop contributions and political influence.

Another issue for the UN is to get more and better soldiers. UN operations may not involve high-intensity war-fighting, but they require peacekeepers with a wide range of technical, political, and intercultural skills. Nevertheless, European and North American countries send less than 20 per cent of their deployed military personnel to UN operations. There is not a single P5 member among the top ten troop contributors to UN peacekeeping. Many European countries now argue that they are so heavily committed in Afghanistan that they cannot make big new commitments to the UN. Many also view the UN as too bureaucratic to provide effective crisis management. There is thus a serious concern as to whether it will be possible to find sufficient troops for future UN operations and whether there is any prospect of Western states contributing not only financially, but also sending troops. The UN will
Top contributors to UN peacekeeping budget 2008/9

Source: UN DPKO

Top contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping 2008/9

Source: UN DPKO
continue to be in demand for deployments in various new conflict zones. But it cannot and should not engage when it does not have sufficient capabilities at its disposal. The key challenge, therefore, is balancing mandates and military resources.

**NATO at 60**

NATO is militarily the most powerful actor and, unlike the UN and the EU, engages in high-intensity conflict. 2009 has been a difficult year for the Alliance due to the ongoing problems in stabilising Afghanistan (see Chapter 3). Fatalities among the coalition forces rose to the highest level since the beginning of the military campaign in 2001. The political situation has deteriorated, and instability spilled over into the Pakistani border region. Moreover, NATO forces made little progress in helping to extend the authority of the Afghan government beyond Kabul.

The massive engagement in Afghanistan precludes other large-scale NATO interventions for the moment. But the worst-case scenario of a NATO failure in Afghanistan could also call into question any state-building operations in the foreseeable future. Failure in Afghanistan would certainly result in major soul-searching as to NATO’s purpose and in even greater reluctance on the part of the US ‘to turn to the Alliance in a crisis’. Afghanistan can therefore be described as a ‘reality check’ of what NATO can and cannot achieve outside of the Euro-Atlantic area.

NATO, furthermore, is often perceived as a military organisation promoting Western interests. There are some parts of the world where the Alliance may struggle to get the support of local and regional actors and act as an effective conflict manager. Also, as a military alliance lacking substantial civilian instruments, NATO has recognised that it needs to develop better ties with other international organisations and actors in order to remain effective. The EU in particular is an important partner in this respect. Coordination between the two institutions has been difficult, however, both at the institutional and at the operational level, as the case of Afghanistan illustrates.

In addition to its operational challenges, NATO has been struggling to define a new strategic sense of purpose over the past decade. At the 60th anniversary summit of the Alliance in Strasbourg and Kehl in April 2009, NATO leaders launched a new strategic concept review process. The changes in the security environment following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the evolution of transatlantic relations, and the operational chal-
provide the EU with an operational crisis management capacity drawing on its unique combination of civilian and military assets. The operational scope of CSDP covers the so-called Petersberg tasks, including humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management operations, and more recently also joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, and the fight against terrorism.

CSDP has so far seen an overall deployment of some 70,000 personnel in more than 20 operations, 12 of which are ongoing at the beginning of 2010. All these operations have been small-scale and low-intensity, suggesting a rather modest level of ambition for the time being. Also, the geographical focus has been regional rather than global. Besides its deployments in the Balkans, CSDP’s main area of operations is increasingly shifting towards Africa. This realignment, however, is controversial among EU member states. Repeated advocacy by France and Belgium for missions to former colonies such as Chad and the DRC unsettles countries with weaker African commitments, such as Germany.

The key institutional challenge for the EU has long been to assure coherence and overcome the discrepancies in EU external relations between the
Commission in the first pillar and the second pillar’s CFSP and CSDP. The pillar structure has not been conducive to developing an effective integrated approach to crisis management. With the Lisbon Treaty in force since 1 December 2009, the hope is that some of the previous inconsistencies will be fixed. Under the treaty, the pillar architecture is abolished, and the new high representative for foreign policy combines the previous offices of the high representative for CFSP and the commissioner for external relations. The new European External Action Service (EEAS) is intended to support the High Representative, but its specific functions and capacities have yet to be defined. It remains to be seen whether the institutional innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty will really streamline decisionmaking, strengthen the EU’s capacity to act, and facilitate an integrated approach – or whether old institutional rivalries and duplications are simply replaced by new ones.

Furthermore, CSDP continues to suffer from a lack of strategic vision. The ultimate degree of defence integration that the member states want to achieve remains undefined. The Lisbon concept of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSCoop), which allows for a group of willing member states to progress faster and deeper in the field of defence, remains disputed, as several member states are opposed to the idea of a so-called multi-speed Europe. While PSCoop has the potential to improve output for CSDP and to provide more resources for EU crisis management, the Europeans have yet to prove that they are willing and able to make a step forward in defence cooperation now that the Lisbon Treaty has been ratified.

The need for better inter-institutional cooperation

Beyond the need to improve the crisis management performance of individual international institutions, another pressing task is that of integrating and rationalising the joint efforts of the international community. This means avoiding institutional duplication and mission overlap and enhancing inter-institutional cooperation. For instance, anti-piracy operations by the EU, NATO, and individual countries such as the US off the coast of Somalia could have been better co-ordinated to save money and resources. Similarly, the lack of cooperation between the police training missions of the EU and the US/NATO in Afghanistan remains an unresolved problem.

EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management is a thorny issue, even though 2009 has also seen some posi-
tive developments. While there is still no strategic consensus on a division of labour between the two organisations, France’s decision on its military reintegration into NATO in 2009 was widely welcomed. It has eased tensions with the US and thus opened new possibilities to strengthen both CSDP itself and transatlantic security cooperation. By contrast, Turkey, a key disruptor of closer institutional ties, is unlikely to join the EU anytime soon and will likely continue to impede formal NATO-EU cooperation. There is also much scope for increased efficiency and coherence in the delivery of military capabilities under the CSDP Capability Development and the NATO Defence Planning Process. While the EU has recourse to NATO assets under the Berlin Plus agreement, the overlapping capability shortfalls that emerge from the two distinct processes in the EU and NATO should be addressed in a coherent manner.

With regard to EU-UN relations, both organisations have repeatedly emphasised the importance of improving cooperation between them. Both actors are engaged in parallel in operational theatres in Kosovo, Afghanistan, the DRC, Guinea Bissau, Somalia, and Georgia. EUFOR Chad handed over to MINUCRAT in March 2009. Still, while institutional contacts have been intensified, operational output must be improved further. A particularly important element is to enhance joint mission planning. If, during the strategic planning of an operation, the two institutions can agree on a clear distribution of tasks, that mission’s chances of success would significantly increase. Independently of any specific operation, the EU and UN could also engage in joint contingency planning. This would foster the development of a more coordinated planning culture and enhance mutual understanding of their respective ‘ways of doing things’.

For all three organisations, it would be sensible to create a pool of civilian staff to be cross-posted among them. This pool of staff would facilitate inter-institutional and intergovernmental contacts, which would help engender mutual understanding and trust and thus make cooperation more effective.

**The operational crisis of crisis management**

Effective crisis management in today’s complex conflict scenarios requires mobile, robust, and highly developed capabilities. The UN, NATO, and the EU all face significant capability shortages affecting operational output. The UN has had massive problems in deploying the 3,000 addition-
Global deployment of uniformed personnel

Regional distribution of deployments (uniformed personnel: includes troops, military observers, and police)

- Americas: 37.6%
- Middle East: 9.3%
- Europe: 8%
- Asia/Pacific: 40.5%
- Africa: 4.6%

Sources: UN DPKO, EU, NATO, SIPRI
operation in terms of capabilities are also due to the member states’ desire to retain their sovereignty in the realm of defence. The Lisbon Treaty provides no remedies to address the persistent capability shortfalls and entice member states to carry out much-needed military reforms.

The EU Battle Groups (EUBG) and the NATO Response Force initiatives have been aimed at enhancing military transformation in the respective member states. The two schemes share some problems. While a major rationale behind them is the reform of European armed forces, the question arises how to sustain member states’ commitment to these formations if they are not actually being used. There is no strategic consensus on the conditions when they should be deployed. Regarding the tasks of force transformation and enhancing deployability, success has been modest at best. Some countries that are both members of NATO and the EU double-hat contingents earmarked for EUBG and the NRF.

When it comes to military capability shortfalls, an obvious and effective remedy would be to create more joint resources. For example, a UN pool of helicopters and other specialised assets for long-range missions in
places like Darfur and Afghanistan could be set up. Within the EU, the pooling of military assets could go even further. A first step in this direction has been taken, for example, by the European Defence Agency’s Helicopter Tactics Programme, which will be operational in 2010. An initial training exercise has already been carried out in France in March 2009. The aim of this initiative is to train helicopter crews from different member states who are not used to fly in more demanding environments. Such exercises enhance interoperability through the understanding of procedures, language and tactical skills, and best practices. Another example is the European Air Transport Lift (EATF) programme, which aims to tackle critical airlift shortfalls in CSDP. The initiative encourages the pooling of airlift assets. Pooling permits bi-national or multinational ownership of military equipment. This in turn gives small member states access to these aircraft, which normally would not be the case due to budgetary constraints. In addition, the EATF allows member states with airlift equipment to make their capabilities available to other member states through the purchase of flying hours. More initiatives along these lines can help to boost capabilities and enhance interoperability among armed forces.

**Civilian capabilities**
The nature of contemporary conflicts requires not only military responses, but also sustained civilian efforts at post-conflict reconstruction, civilian protection, and state-building efforts. Enhancing civil-military cooperation has therefore been a major concern of actors involved in international crisis management. Reflecting the increased emphasis on conflict transformation and state-building evident in many current mission mandates, deployments of civilian personnel have more than doubled over the last five years. They have now reached a record level of approximately 20,000. Nevertheless, civilians only make up about 12 per cent of international peace operation personnel. Many UN missions currently have only two-thirds of the civilian staff they need, and they are experiencing widespread difficulties in finding qualified personnel.

The EU is struggling with similar shortcomings. It has no standing civilian forces and so relies on member states to provide personnel for its missions. Many member state governments are failing in this task. The so-called Civilian Headline Goal (CHG), approved in 2004, was designed to get member states to commit civilians for potential deployment scenarios. Each member state pledged a certain number of civilians, and yet,
and eventually leave Afghanistan. EU member states have thus been strongly criticised for their alleged lack of political will to provide the capabilities for the EU to do the job properly. While the need to enhance the civilian component of crisis management is widely recognised, more steps remain to be taken to ensure that sufficient personnel numbers are on stand-by and be able to deploy them rapidly when the need arises. Moreover, it would be a vast improvement to set up common standards and a training regime for civilian personnel to be deployed in international missions.

**Outlook**

Big challenges lie ahead for 2010. Besides continuing difficulties in

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**Civilian vs. military personnel in UN and CSDP missions 2000-09**

Sources: SIPRI; EU

- UN military
- UN civilians
- CSDP military
- CSDP civilians
Afghanistan, there is also an increasing danger of profound destabilisation in Pakistan. Failing or weak states such as Somalia, Yemen, or Guinea will pose further problems and may require resolute action. The future of Sudan after the referendum, expected in early 2011, is uncertain. The need may arise, moreover, to respond rapidly to unfolding crises that cannot currently be anticipated.

Such alarming conflict scenarios make clear that the need for effective crisis management will not go away. Yet, the problems remain formidable. Geopolitical shifts and the rise of new powers require a readjustment of the politics and institutional dynamics of crisis management. The growing complexity of conflicts has led to an expansion of crisis management tasks ranging from civilian measures to counterterrorism. This blurs the lines between peace-making and war-fighting and is contributing to the waning of public support. Institutions as the main providers of crisis management continue to suffer from the lack of strategic consensus among their member states. The effects of the economic crunch are likely to affect crisis management capabilities adversely for years to come.

Much political determination would therefore be required to address the current political, institutional, and operational limitations of crisis management. As sweeping reforms are unlikely at this stage, the focus should be on a step-by-step approach and important practical measures. It is crucial to have an open and critical public debate to reinstate trust in government and restore the legitimacy of military force where its use cannot be avoided. It would also be essential to think constructively about new institutional arrangements that facilitate cooperation and avoid duplication between the key providers of crisis management. This is likely to involve a significant pooling of capabilities, in terms of both personnel and equipment. Such measures would at least go some way towards addressing the current crisis of crisis management and help to improve an indispensable tool for securing peace and stability in a globalised world.
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