Democratization as integration
Exile, return and changing conflict lines in Burundi’s democratic post-war transition

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Democratization as Integration: Exile, return and changing conflict lines in Burundi’s democratic post-war transition

A dissertation submitted to
ETH ZURICH
for the degree of
Doctor of Sciences

presented by
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2010
TO MY PARENTS
Democratization as Integration:
Exile, return and changing conflict lines in Burundi’s
democratic post-war transition

Judith Vorrath
ETH Zurich

2010
Acknowledgements

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Abstract

Countries emerging from ethnic civil wars almost naturally lack the commonly known preconditions for successful democratization. Yet peace agreements since the 1990s have normally comprised different measures to not only build peace, but also introduce a more democratic mode of governance. The driving forces and dynamics of such processes, however, remain poorly understood. The literature on democratization and democratic transitions as well as parts of the peacebuilding literature tend to assume that ethnic civil wars mainly deepen the ethnic division. Furthermore, internal and external actors have normally been seen as rather static categories.

This study argues that in order to better understand post-war democratic transitions, a more continuous analysis on the war and post-war period as well as a consideration for transnational dynamics is necessary. First, ethnic civil war does not only enforce the main conflict line, but it also leads to new affiliations and the emergence of new actor groups. Second, these actors can move across international borders and change from the internal to the external sphere and back.

This study focuses on changes in conflict lines due to ethnic civil war. More specifically, it investigates the role of mobilized exile groups in bringing about such change when they return. Refugees have often been identified as a crucial actor group during civil war, but their political influence in post-war transitions has hardly been acknowledged. This is particularly true for the level of political elites who often leave into exile, but keep seeking an active role in the political process of their home country and finally return when political change takes place during a transition.

Thus, this study examines the effect of the return of mobilized exile elites during democratic post-war transitions. The central expectation is that due to a return of such groups, a fragmentation of political conflict lines occurs. Such a fragmentation and the emergence of new political conflicts that seem to contradict the nature of the civil war have frequently been observed in post-war periods. Yet, their underlying divisions have rarely been systematically identified. By looking into exile return as a potential factor leading to fragmentation this study also tries to better link the different stages of the origin of flight, the role of exile groups during civil
war and their impact after return.

In order to assess the influence of returning exile elites on political conflict lines, a qualitative case study is conducted. Burundi’s post-war democratic transition after 2001 has been chosen as a most-likely case. The study is based on a content analysis of news sources and elite interviews carried out during field research in Burundi in 2007 and 2009. The content analysis has provided clear evidence that a fragmentation of political conflict lines took place in Burundi at the time of peace negotiations and remained relevant for almost the whole period of the transition. The most surprising finding was that the inter-ethnic conflict line has clearly lost in importance during the transition in Burundi while intra-ethnic conflicts increasingly occurred and became prevalent with the end of the transition. The results of a deeper examination of the content analysis data show a relevant influence of the return of mobilized exile elites on conflict lines. The emergence of numerous new conflicts between those elites who had left the country and those who stayed have also been found based on the analysis of elite interviews. Furthermore, the analysis of elite interviews shows that exile also led to a process of group formation. There was a clear perception of social and political differences between exile and non-exile elites and grievances because of perceived advantages for one or the other group.

The results demonstrate that political fragmentation after ethnic civil war is far from coincidental or negligible. Nor can it be fully explained with incentives provided by an inclusive peace process. Rather, fragmentation is based on certain group affiliations that have developed during the civil war. Newly emerging conflict lines based on exile, but also on the rebellion can best be understood as an expression of a larger political integration process. Thus, conflict lines are much more diverse than only displaying a deepening of the main cleavage or moderate versus extremist divisions within ethnic groups. One implication of this result is that solutions for post-war transitions should be based on an assessment not only of the conflict outbreak but also of the process of the civil war itself.
Deutsche Zusammenfassung


Diese Studie befasst sich mit der Veränderung von Konfliktlinien durch ethnische Bürgerkriege. Genauer untersucht sie die Rolle von mobilisierten Exilgruppen bei der Verursachung solcher Veränderungen, wenn sie zurückkehren. Flüchtlinge wurden oft als zentrale Akteursgruppe in Bürgerkriegen identifiziert, aber ihr politischer Einfluss in Nachkriegssituationen wurde bislang wenig beachtet. Dies ist besonders der Fall für die Ebene der politischen Eliten, die oftmals ins Exil gehen, aber weiterhin eine aktive Rolle in der Politik ihres Heimatlandes suchen und letztlich zurückkehren, wenn ein politischer Wandel in der Übergangsphase einsetzt.

häufiger in Nachkriegsländern beobachtet. Die ihnen zugrundeliegenden Trennlinien wurden aber selten systematisch erfasst. Durch die Analyse von Exilrückkehr als Faktor, der potenziell zu Fragmentierung führt, versucht diese Studie auch, die verschiedenen Stadien von Flucht, Mobilisierung während des Krieges und Rückkehr besser zu verbinden.


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List of Abbreviations

ABP: Burundian News Agency
AFDL: Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Zaire
AFP: Agence France-Presse
ANC: African National Congress
CNDD: Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – National Council for the Defence of Democracy
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo
EU: European Union
FDD: Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces for the Defence of Democracy
FNL: Forces Nationales de Libération – National Liberation Front
Frodebu: Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi – Front for Democracy in Burundi
Frolina: Front pour la Libération Nationale – National Liberation Front
GAM: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – Free Aceh Movement
IDP: Internally Displaced Person
MRC: Mouvement pour la Réhabilitation du Citoyen – Movement for the Rehabilitation of Citizens
Palipehutu: Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu – Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
Parena: Parti pour le Redressement National – Party for National Recovery
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RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front
SACP: South African Communist Party
UN: United Nations
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Uprona: Union pour le Progrès National – Union for National Progress
Chapter 1

Introduction

Since the 1990s, negotiated peace settlements have normally been accompanied by some kind of democratization process. Previously, United Nations peacekeepers tended to stay out of domestic politics, but between 1989 and 1999 peacebuilding operations in Liberia, Rwanda, Bosnia, East Timor and other places were implicitly based on the notion that promoting democratization “would help to create the conditions for a stable and lasting peace” (Paris 2004, p. 5). This combination of peacebuilding and democratization is based on the assumption that democracies are not only more accountable, legitimate, and transparent, but that they also tend to be more peaceful. While the democratic peace theory that underlies this argument has partly been supported by empirical analysis, the road to a stable and functioning democracy is a difficult one.

In general, democratization is a highly conflictive and potentially destabilizing process (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2005; Cederman et al. 2010). For multi-ethnic environments, democratizing regimes have been found to be more likely to commit mass violence and ethnic cleansing than stable authoritarian or democratic regimes, because in such transitions demos and ethnos become easily entangled (Mann 2005, pp. 2-4). In addition, countries emerging from civil war are, by their very nature, likely to fall short of fulfilling commonly identified conditions for successful democratization, for example the settlement of the national and state questions (Rustow 1970; Bunce 2003), strong political institutions (Huntington 1968), a functioning state bureaucracy (Linz and Stepan 1996), or the rule of law (Bratton and Chang 2006). Even more severe is the lack of values and beliefs that pluralist or liberal theorists commonly stress as crucial for stable democracy, including tolerance for opposing parties and preferences, moderation in political positions, a minimum of trust in political cooperation, or civility of political discourse (Diamond et al. 1990, pp. 16-17). In societies with recent experiences of intense violence for political ends, these values and beliefs are likely to be in very short supply.
Thus, scholars have repeatedly argued that democracy is almost doomed to fail in deeply divided societies (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985). This might be one reason why much of the literature on democratization has paid relatively little attention to these settings. In the course of the last wave(s) of democratization, many studies have focused on Latin America, Southern and Southeastern Europe. Although civil war has not been absent from these regions, there is a lack of systematic reference to war and its aftermath, especially in works of comparative politics dealing with democratization (Call and Cook 2003, p. 239; Cederman et al. 2008, p. 514). Therefore, it is worth taking a closer look at the driving forces of these processes. To what extent is democratization after violent conflict different? This is the overarching research question of this study.

Democratization after civil wars is not only a conceptually but also an empirically relevant phenomenon. First, despite difficult fundamental conditions, about half of today’s existing democracies founded after 1945 have emerged directly after a war or as a means for ending ongoing war, in many cases meaning internal war (Bermeo 2003b, pp. 159-160). Second, international actors like the United States and the European Union developed ambitious democracy promotion agendas after the end of the Cold War. These agendas strongly influence negotiation processes, and peace agreements without at least some elements of democratization seem almost without alternative today.\footnote{However, claiming that a phenomenon is conceptually and empirically relevant is different from considering it to be desirable by all means. This study does not make the normative argument that the attempt to democratize countries is the most adequate approach after civil wars; nor does it assume that democratic consolidation can be expected as the political outcome of such attempts. Backlashes or stalled transitions might, in fact, be a more common result.}

In exploring the specific course of democratic transitions after civil war, this study focuses on ethnic civil wars. The necessity and even the feasibility of distinguishing between ethnic and non-ethnic or ideological civil wars are disputed. This dissertation does not assume that ethnic civil wars are generally more protracted or based on deeper divisions, but important parts of the relevant literature do. First, ethnic divisions are often seen as particularly salient and persistent (Posen 1993; Kaufmann 1996). Ethnicity is sometimes depicted as emotionally rooted while other divisions, such as class, are categorized as materialistic (Connor 1994). Second, the most commonly expected effect of a civil war running along ethnic lines is a clear deepening of the ethnic cleavage (for a discussion see Kalyvas 2008, pp. 1044 + 1046; Walter 2002, p. 12). From this perspective, countries emerging from ethnic civil wars should be particularly problematical cases for democratization, because the deep ethnic division lends itself easily to polarization in a context of political change.

Focusing on ethnic civil wars is also empirically relevant. Among all
240 armed conflicts between 1945 and 2005, there were 122 ethnic ones. Furthermore, this kind of internal warfare has become more frequent since the end of the Cold War because 48 armed conflicts that started after 1990 have been ethnic while only 28 were non-ethnic (Cederman et al. 2008). Moreover, the number of war-related deaths in ethnic conflicts strongly increased in the 20th century to allegedly over 70 million (Mann 2005, p. 2).

This dissertation argues that far from only being a rupture or a period of extremes, ethnic civil war can be seen as a process of political transformation that influences the course of later democratic transitions. Such post-war transitions are periods not only of institutional change but also of the political integration of different groups and organizations that have developed or changed over the course of war. This study particularly investigates the role of a previously neglected group in this process: mobilized exile communities. The central expectation is that due to a return of such groups, a fragmentation of political conflict lines occurs in post-war transitions.

1.1 State of research and empirical puzzle

The scientific literature has increasingly paid attention to the attempts to move towards more democratic governance in post-war situations. Beyond insights from the general democratization literature, a central part of the debate has centered around the issue of the best institutional set-up for divided societies. Power-sharing has been proposed as the most viable solution by representatives of the consociational approach, particularly by Lijphart (Lijphart 2004). Supposedly, power-sharing based on proportionality, inclusive government, cultural autonomy and possibly minority veto does not only enhance the chances of democracy surviving in divided societies, but also makes countries more peaceful (Lijphart 2008). However, these institutional arrangements have also been highly controversial on exactly these grounds. On the one hand, power-sharing has been criticized as undemocratic because it limits the openness and competitiveness of the system (Gates and Strom 2008, p. 2; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, p. 151). On the other hand, its peacemaking effect is disputed for the medium and long term because it gives issues that divide groups a central place in politics and thus tends to freeze or harden the main conflict line (Rothchild and Roeder 2005a, p. 6; Rothchild and Roeder 2005b, p. 37). Several institutional alternatives for ethnically divided societies have been proposed, mainly power-division (Rothchild and Roeder 2005a) and the

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2The term “conflict line” is used instead of the more common expression “cleavage” because the latter is strongly linked to studies of Western party systems and usually describes very enduring structural divisions. “Conflict line” is employed as a more neutral term. It refers to a social division systematically transferred to the political sphere.
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integrative approach (Horowitz 1985). Like the power-sharing approach, these designs assume a deepening of the main (ethnic) conflict line over the course of communal violence, but instead of accommodating this line they are based on the conviction that it can be transcended. Both alternative approaches can allegedly lead to multidimensional or crosscutting identities at the political level (Rothchild and Roeder 2005a; Horowitz 1985). Yet power-sharing is still the most commonly adopted institutional approach in societies divided by ethnic civil war, partly because it has also become Western actors’ preferred instrument for peacemaking in places like Africa (Tull and Mehler 2005, p. 376).

Beyond the issue of an adequate institutional design, the literature dealing with post-war democratic transitions from a peacebuilding perspective focuses on ways to engage armed groups in these processes. The assessment of power-sharing has been rather critical because it can lead to a proliferation of armed groups and a marginalization of more moderate forces (Tull and Mehler 2005, pp. 390-393; Jarstad 2008b, p. 107). The transformation of armed movements into political parties can raise additional problems due to the sectarian and internally undemocratic nature of many of these groups (Söderberg Kovacs 2008, pp. 135-136). Generally, the “spoiler” potential of armed groups and their militant logic are seen as stumbling blocks for a transition aiming at democratization and peacebuilding simultaneously. Apart from the inclusion of armed groups in negotiated settlements and political institutions, most dilemmas discussed by this strand of the literature, such as trade-offs between elite and mass politics or local versus international ownership (Jarstad 2008a), are present in any kind of democratic transition and are therefore not specific to post-war situations. Thus, the inclusion of armed groups remains the most fundamental challenge for post-war democratization from this strand of the literature. Otherwise, many authors would probably subscribe to the conclusion that “war tends to exacerbate regional, ethnic, and religious cleavages and tensions” (Kumar and de Zeeuw 2006, p. 8).

Despite a deepening of the main division assumed to take place during ethnic civil wars, a clear political fragmentation has occurred in post-war countries. In Burundi, for example, the situation at the outbreak of civil war was characterized by an increasing polarization in a bipolar system opposing two ethnically dominated parties, while the political landscape during the democratic transition after the war was much more fragmented and multi-polar (Lemarchand 2009, p. 162; Reyntjens 2005, p. 120). This means that more political parties exist, but also that lines of affiliation emerge that seem to contradict the nature of the armed conflict. This development has also been described for other countries emerging from civil war, including such diverse cases as the Democratic Republic of Congo (Bwenge 2005), Afghanistan (Rubin 2004) and Indonesia (Dudouet 2009).

Most authors still presume that the only systematic development of
conflict lines during civil war is the hardening or deepening of the main ethnic cleavages. From this point of view, an occurrence of political fragmentation in countries emerging from civil war like Burundi is startling and difficult to explain, particularly in the context of power-sharing arrangements that cannot be expected to have any effect on conflict lines despite a further freezing of the ethnic division. Splits have sometimes been attributed to sudden and selfish moves by political leaders, for example due to the incentives provided by an inclusive negotiation process (Tull and Mehler 2005). However, there are hardly any systematic insights into underlying group affiliations of political conflicts more generally.

1.2 Argument, focus and alternative explanations

This study argues that a political fragmentation after civil war is most likely based on changes in underlying conflict lines during the civil war. In order to understand the puzzle described, these lines need to be assessed beyond the insights from existing studies, based on a continuous analysis of the civil war and the post-war period as well as a transnational focus on actor groups. First, linking conflict and post-conflict research in a more profound way is important to take into account changes in group formation and political affiliations during ethnic civil war. This is because – contrary to the literature on post-war contexts – authors dealing with mechanisms in civil wars stress that identity has been a consequence as much as a cause of civil war (Kalyvas 2008). Second, the transnational dimension of civil wars is equally crucial to understand post-war transitions since previously neglected actor groups come into the picture. While the literature on democratization and democracy promotion still tends to make a fairly strict separation between internal and external actors (Burnell and Schlumberger 2010, p. 8), conflict research has demonstrated the added value of looking at actors like transnational rebel movements (Salehyan 2009).

One group that has attracted much attention in this regard are refugees moving across borders in the context of civil war and often providing an important basis for mobilization in exile (Muggah 2006; Lischer 2005; Stedman and Tanner 2003). Studies on refugees have shown that a process of identity and group formation takes place among refugees, and that these groups often tend to become politically and/or militarily engaged. However, they also provide evidence that refugees remain a distinct group after their return to the country of origin (Stefansson 2004a; Essed et al. 2004; Kibreab 2004). Research on post-war situations has also started to pay attention to diaspora groups and their role as promoters of peace or armed conflict (Smith and Stares 2007; Adamson 2004; Collier et al. 2008). The political role of homecoming exile groups has largely been neglected, however, because refugees have been established as a relevant social category
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in the analysis of causes and dynamics of war, but hardly ever in post-war periods.

In order to understand the specific characteristics of post-war democratization, this study builds on the analysis of transnational dynamics during civil war. Based on the insights from conflict and refugee literature the more specific research question explored in a case study is: how do political conflict lines change in post-war transitions, and can the return of mobilized exile groups explain this change? The aim is to shed light on what was previously a little-studied factor in democratic transitions after ethnic civil war, which may have the potential to explain the fragmentation of conflict lines observed in countries like Burundi. The assumption is that if a significant group of people fled into exile because of the civil war and if this group or parts of it engage in political and/or military activities in exile, their return is likely to introduce a new conflict line between (former) exile and resident groups. Such conflicts have been analyzed mainly with regard to the socio-economic realm and the mass level in post-war transitions. However, this study focuses on the political field and on the elite level. The main reason for this focus is that the return of exile elites seeking an active role in the political process of their home country has largely been neglected. Furthermore, elites are normally seen as the crucial actors in democratic transitions, particularly when these are based on an elite pact. Since most democratization processes after ethnic civil war take place in the framework of a negotiated peace settlement, such elite pacts are of fundamental importance in this context. Beyond the political and the elite focus, this study also attempts to better link the different stages of the origin of flight, the role of exile groups during civil war and their impact after return.

The reason why a change in conflict lines by returning exile elites is relevant to the transition more generally is that it is expected to take its course via the mechanism of political integration. Political integration here means the incorporation of different politically relevant groups into the transition process after civil war. Such integration can imply a change of political conflict lines during the transition for two reasons. On the one hand, new actors emerge or existing groups change over the course of the civil war, so that the spectrum of political actors at the end of the civil war is essentially different from the one that existed at the outbreak of war. On the other hand, these actors have often been separated to a certain degree because of different fields of action or different locations. Therefore, diverging interests and identities due to the process of group formation during civil war are likely to show at the end or after the civil war when actors need to integrate into one political system. Political integration as a mechanism should also make newly emerging conflict lines relevant beyond the immediate period of return from exile.

In assessing the role of returning exile elites, it is, however, crucial to
take alternative explanations for conflict line changes into account. The larger concept of political integration already implies that other groups might have emerged during civil war as well and thus need to be incorporated into the analysis. Most obviously, armed groups as central actors in the war have often been integrated and transformed in post-war settings. Their inclusion might, equally, lead to a newly emerging conflict line along a political-military division. However, other factors might also lead to a fragmentation of conflict lines in post-war settings: First, the re-occurrence of older conflict lines that were relevant before the war, but ceased to occur due to group cohesion during the civil war. Second, a division between more or less cooperative actors leading to a new conflict line when peace negotiations become an option. And third, changes in political institutions at the beginning or over the course of the transition. These different alternative explanations need to be taken into account in the analysis of changing conflict lines.

1.3 Methodology, case selection and results

The impact of the main independent variable – the return of mobilized exile elites – on political conflict lines, controlling for the alternative explanations, are examined by a qualitative case study of Burundi’s recent transition after 2001. The overall aim is to establish a causal relation and clarify the main mechanism in a single most-likely case study. The study applies the congruence method in combination with process-tracing. The congruence method helps to rule out alternative explanations and can determine whether the general consistency of the main independent and dependent variable implies a causal link. Process-tracing is applied to substantiate and extend the findings based on the congruence method. Beyond this methodological triangulation, process-tracing also has the function of providing additional insights on the causal path and the main mechanism.

The case of Burundi’s recent post-war transition after 2001 has been chosen based on several criteria. First, the theoretical framework of this study implies certain core elements that need to be present in the case. The democratic transition generally needed to follow an ethnic civil war and a negotiated peace settlement in order to ensure that the process was inclusive as well as strongly elite-driven. Second, this study relies on selecting a most-likely case with regard to the value of the independent variable. Therefore, a large exile community due to the civil war, militarization as the most visible and extreme form of mobilization in exile and a relevant return at the end or after the civil war have been used as criteria. These factors make the case most likely with regard to conflict line fragmentation by exile return. This setting has been chosen because if the newly proposed causal relationship cannot be found in this case, it cannot be expected to
be present in other cases. Additional reasons for selecting Burundi include the fact that it underwent a democratization process with power-sharing arrangements before the conflict outbreak. The advantage here is that it is possible to control for the political context when looking into an alleged change of conflict lines from polarization before to fragmentation after the civil war. Second, Burundi has only two politically relevant ethnic groups. This simplifies the identification of political conflict lines over time. No other country fulfilled all these criteria.

The case study was conducted based on a content analysis of news sources and elite interviews carried out during field research in Burundi in 2007 and 2009. The content analysis has provided clear evidence that a fragmentation of political conflict lines took place in Burundi at the time of peace negotiations and remained relevant for almost the whole period of the transition. While inter-ethnic conflicts became visibly less relevant towards the end of the transition period, intra-ethnic conflicts became most prominent, particularly on one side of the main ethnic divide.

The empirical analysis based on the congruence method demonstrated that a new conflict line between elites from exile and those who stayed inside Burundi during civil war can account for the highest number of the political conflict events identified by the content analysis. Obviously this is only the case within the one ethnic group that had significant components in exile and provided the basis for the rebellion as well. While institutional change had no impact in general, the other alternative explanations were of only minor importance within this ethnic group. One exception was the political-military division that also showed in a high number of conflict events. Furthermore, the exile- and the rebellion-related conflict lines overlapped to a very large degree, because all Burundian rebel movements had strong bases in exile while many political actors remained inside the country. The exile-related conflict line still has an independent effect, but in order to clarify the role of exile for fragmentation and also to substantiate the causal mechanism of political integration, the whole process was traced by analyzing elite interviews. This was also necessary because a relevant number of conflict events could not be explained by any conflict line based on the congruence method.

The process tracing was conducted on the basis of information from 53 interviews with Burundian political elites. Most assignments of conflict lines to specific events by the congruence method were supported. Furthermore, many conflict events that remained unexplained before could now be linked to one or several conflict line(s). Most importantly, the internal-external conflict line between (former) exile and resident elites had even a stronger influence than previously assumed. This is partly due to the fact that the political-military divide ran along different organizational affiliations than assumed in the earlier analysis. An overlap between the internal-external and the political-military conflict line remains, but turned
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out to be much less pronounced. Furthermore, this empirical part showed that exile also led to a process of group formation. There was a clear perception of social and political differences between exile and non-exile elites and grievances because of perceived advantages for one or the other group. Overall, the link between return by mobilized exile elites and fragmentation can best be made via the mechanism of political integration that also takes other war-related conflict lines into account.

In general, the return of exile elites had a traceable impact on the democratic transition in Burundi after 2001, and it continued to be relevant after the official end of the transition period. This finding provides strong evidence that political fragmentation after ethnic civil war is far from coincidental or negligible. Nor can it be fully explained with incentives provided by an inclusive peace process. Rather, it is based on certain group affiliations that have developed during the civil war. The most surprising finding that the inter-ethnic conflict line has clearly lost importance during the transition in Burundi is most likely linked to the occurrence of other lines as well. While this aspect makes a polarization along the ethnic division much less likely for the post-transition period, another confrontation along the new lines is possible and could lead to serious tensions. These might be harmful for the further democratization of the country and therefore need to be taken into account. Overall, the case of Burundi provides strong indications that democratic transition after ethnic civil war is a social AND a political integration process. Thus, conflict lines are much more diverse than only displaying a deepening of the main cleavage or moderate versus extremist divisions within ethnic groups. A specific feature of post-war democratization is a possible change in conflict lines due to exile and rebellion. Therefore, solutions for post-war contexts should be based on an assessment not only of the conflict outbreak but also of the process of the civil war itself.

1.4 Roadmap of dissertation

This dissertation comprises the following main chapters: Chapter 2 starts by giving a detailed overview of the relevant literature in the fields of democratization and peacebuilding as well as conflict and refugee research. The second part of this chapter presents the theoretical argument on political integration and different approaches to conflict line changes. It also outlines the core hypothesis as well as alternative explanations. Chapter 3 illustrates the research design, including the methodological approach, with a combination of congruence method and process-tracing, the operationalization of the central concepts, the explanation of the case selection and, finally, the process of data collection and analysis. The case study of Burundi’s democratic post-war transition is conducted in Chapter 4.
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It comprises four main empirical parts. First, the background to the case study is introduced, including one section on Burundian exile groups that lays out the independent variable for the case. Second, the fragmentation of political conflict lines is measured by a content analysis of news sources. Third, the conflict event data from the content analysis are used in order to assess the specific impact of the independent variable. Finally, the whole process from the outbreak of the civil war in Burundi to the immediate post-transition period is traced on the basis of information from elite interviews from field research in Burundi. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings and presents evidence from other country cases. It also discusses theoretical and policy implications and starting points for further research.
Chapter 2

Democratization after Civil War

Civil war is not merely a period of violence and rupture, but a process of change that influences the course of later democratic transitions. Such post-war transitions are characterized by the political integration of different groups and organizations that have developed or changed over the course of war.

This study examines the implications of the integration of a previously neglected group: returning exile communities. Since the post-war literature focuses primarily on solutions for, not on the dynamics of, war, changes at the actor level are rarely explored systematically. Yet the return of mobilized exile groups is likely to have an impact in a transition following ethnic civil war. Until now, research concerning such groups has either focused on the actual phase of exile or on the social, psychological and economic consequences of return. Few works have suggested more indirect effects of refugee return on the political process without proposing a direct shift in politics.

This study argues that such direct political implications of exile group return need to be examined in order to better understand post-war democratic transitions. Ultimately, the political integration process in such transitions is a matter of putting the pieces of a polity fragmented by the war together again. Failure to do so might have severe consequences and contribute to a stalled transition process. But even if political integration is successful in the end, in its initial stage during the transition it is likely to involve a fragmentation of political conflict lines. This fragmentation does not correspond to common expectations on the part of important in-

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1I use the term “integration” rather than the term reintegration more commonly found in the peacebuilding literature, because the prefix “re-” implies that people return to an earlier status. This is usually not the case, because civil wars change actors and influence their social, economic, and political contexts. For the exact definition of the concept of political integration, see subsection 2.2.1
ternational actors and academic circles dealing with democratization and peacebuilding. Neither does it necessarily match the institutional framework chosen for a democratic transition.

As a basis for assessing the overall argument, the following literature review deals with three complexes that have been prominent in the research on democracy and democratization: elite bargain, power-sharing, and the more recently studied conjunction of peacebuilding and democratization. These aspects have been selected because they are directly relevant to the contexts this study is interested in and provide a good starting point to explore special features of post-war transitions. The following subsection then turns to conflict and refugee research for identifying aspects that have largely remained blind spots in the study of post-war democratization. By combining the literature on democratization and the transnational nature of civil wars, this study contributes to merging insights from comparative politics and international relations. In the second section of this chapter, the theoretical framework and the core hypothesis as well as alternative explanations are outlined based on the literature discussed.

2.1 Literature Review

There are specific aspects and strands of the democratization literature that provide helpful insights for countries emerging from civil war. First, elite pacts have been highlighted as a central element of or even as a precondition for success of transitions from authoritarian to more democratic regimes, especially by authors from the liberal tradition. Elite bargaining is particularly crucial in post-war transitions because these are normally based on a negotiated settlement among elites. Thus, insights into the establishment and function of elite pacts as described by the democratization literature can help us better understand negotiations that are directed at bringing about not only peace but also a more democratic mode of government. Second, in studies on consociationalism and the debate of this concept, more attention has been paid to divided societies. While such societies have not necessarily experienced armed violence, their deep divisions (often along ethnic or religious lines) render democratization a particularly difficult process. Power-sharing has commonly been proposed as the most adequate solution for these difficult contexts and, indeed, has become the preferred approach to peacemaking after civil wars since the 1990s. Therefore, a closer look at this concept and the findings on its implications is crucial for understanding post-war democratization. Third, in the more recent literature, the assessment of power-sharing solutions for countries emerging from civil war has been much more critical. Different studies dealing with the interaction of peacebuilding and democratization after armed conflict have given increasing attention to the specific chal-
lenges and dilemmas distinguishing these settings from others. For this third category of literature the relevance is self-evident since the context of prior internal war to transitions is the main common starting point. The categorization of these three subsections referring to democratization is not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, the three fields build on each other and overlap. Thus, certain strands of literature or even single authors can appear in more than one category. Moreover, the studies presented in the different subsections naturally include many other aspects and explanations. For example, no author would state that elite pacts are the only relevant factor in democratic transitions: most provide a fairly extensive list of conditions. Yet the aspects at the core of the following subsections feature very prominently in the studies discussed.

The three aspects discussed leave out certain parts of the literature on democracy and democratization. Particularly before the end of the Cold War with the implosion of the Soviet Union and the far-reaching political changes in Eastern Europe, studies tended to focus on more structural factors as preconditions for a stable and functioning democracy. Some authors stressed socio-economic development (Lipset 1959; Dahl 1971; Lipset et al. 1993; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994) while others applied a class sociological approach (Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Political culture is another core condition examined in some classic studies (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993), and more recently the distribution of power resources was added (Vanhanen 1997). Despite their fundamental contribution to the understanding of democracy, these theoretical works are not at the core of the following literature review. In fact, structural explanations are left aside because of their scant attention to the influence of actors and institutions. Furthermore, they provide very few insights for post-war settings since, by their very nature, countries emerging from war generally lack the preconditions in terms of development, political culture or other structural factors.

The transition literature of the 1990s and studies focusing on the third wave of democratization examined the path to a more democratic system and pursued more actor-centered explanations (Schmitter and Karl 1992; Linz and Stepan 1996; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Merkel and Puhle 1999; Huntington 1991). Within this branch of literature, authors also started to deal with intermediate outcomes of democratization, namely with what has been called “pseudodemocracies” (Diamond et al. 1990, p. 8), “defective democracies” (Merkel 2004), or “illiberal democracies” (Za-
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Kariya 1997). These cases of stalled democratization comprised an important number of countries with a history of conflict, though civil war never featured very prominently in the analyses and explanations. For all these reasons, works in the field of transitology are included in the following discussion, mainly with regard to elite bargaining. The other studies included refer more or less directly to conflict and violence by dealing with (deeply) divided societies or explicitly with post-war situations.

The fourth subsection introduces some crucial insights from conflict research. This strand of literature is included because in contrast to the three preceding aspects, the focus is on civil war dynamics and its implications rather than on (post-war) transitions. The underlying assumption is that the impact of factors that have been identified as highly relevant during civil war should be assessed with regard to the development after a negotiated agreement. Yet even studies clearly focusing on peacebuilding and democratization rarely examine civil war dynamics in greater detail, thus leaving some blind spots that can be illuminated by insights from conflict research. The fourth section also introduces the rationale that identity may not only be the cause of civil war, but that it can also change in important ways during the war. Such shifts in identity can provide a basis for changes in the structure of conflicts. In addition, the argument is made that transnational factors identified as crucial during the civil war by conflict research should have an influence after its settlement. Refugees are highlighted here as a transnational factor whose importance during war has repeatedly been detected. Furthermore, the refugee-related literature has demonstrated important implications of exile for identity and mobilization that are relevant for the period after the return of refugee groups. This literature is discussed in greater detail as well.

2.1.1 Democratization as elite bargain

Civil wars certainly lower the prospects for democratization. But peace settlements based on negotiations could provide an opportunity for a transition from authoritarian to more democratic rule, because they resemble elite pacts. Such pacts have been highlighted as a crucial factor in many works on democratization, particularly with the increasing attention to the role of elites and their strategic choices since the beginning of the 1980s (Weingast 1997, p. 245). Earlier, Rustow had pointed out that in what he calls the second phase of a transition – when elites seek to institutionalize democratic elements and to channel diversity – a small circle of leaders is likely to play an exceptional role (Rustow 1970, p. 356). Later on, political determinants relating to the behavior of powerful actors and elites had

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3Not all elite pacts are automatically a bargain. At least in some studies, pacts include more indirect arrangements among elites.
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become of major interest to scholars dealing with democratic transitions (Przeworski 1986; Higley and Burton 1989), though this is mainly true of authors dealing with liberal democracy, in contrast for example to Marxist theorists (Etzioni-Halevy 1993, pp. 2-4).

Elite behavior has been identified as decisive in different contexts, for example for the persistence of democracy in inter-war Europe (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 1994) as well as for later waves of democratization. In fact, the centrality of elites for democratization seems to be substantiated for all three waves of democratization (Bunce 2000, p. 707-708). Most interestingly, the essential role of elites has even been confirmed by studies explicitly focusing on mass politics, not on elites. In her study of the role of regular citizens, Bermeo finds that for nearly all her cases elites were to blame for democratic breakdowns, making them “stories of leadership failure” (Bermeo 2003a, p. 6). Additionally, elite actions have been found to be highly relevant for triggering liberalization (Przeworski 1986, p. 56), for the stability of democratic regimes in general (Huntington 1991, pp. 36 + 259), and for the consolidation of democracy (Higley and Gunther 1992). Though they are constrained by structural circumstances, the choices of elites strongly influence political structures and institutions (Diamond et al. 1990, p. 15). By now hardly anybody would challenge the view that “negotiations and compromise among political elites were at the heart of the democratization processes” (Huntington 1991, p. 165). For some authors, the importance of elite bargaining even goes as far as probably being the only direct and fast route to stable democracy today (Burton et al. 1992, p. 24).

However, the question remains: what exactly is so relevant about pacts or settlements based on elite bargaining? A rather strong statement stresses that, depending on elite pacts, a system develops more into “politics-as-bargaining” than “politics-as-war” (Sartori 1987, pp. 224-226). Transitions normally see elite pacts as highly unstable, but still capable of producing a relatively solid system that directs the following regime (Schneider and Schmitter 2004; Schmitter and Karl 1992). In the central scheme of negotiations between regime reformers and opposition moderates, elite pacts are important to ensure that opponents of change within the regime do not feel too threatened (Gill 2000, p. 45). Yet there are different scenarios of elite bargaining. Generally, there can be regime-controlled transfers or interim governments after uprisings, revolutions, coups or general breakdowns (Linz and Stepan 1996, pp. 66-72). Particularly for the first type, elite bargains between “old” and “new” elites are a frequent mode of transition. Transitions are assumed to be longer and more problematic where they originate in negotiated agreements with the old regime (Przeworski 1986, p. 94), but these arrangements also have important advantages. Pacts are seen as favorable to change by mass protest, for example, because opposition forces as well as leaders of the old regime have the incentives and
capacity to cooperate. More generally speaking, such an arrangement “increases the certainty in a situation that is inherently uncertain, elicits the cooperation of authoritarians and thereby gives them a stake in the emerging political order, and enhances the prospects for political stability, thereby calming the fears of authoritarians that democratization (as in the past) would be destabilizing” (Bunce 2000, p. 716). Bunce states that for Africa, pacting appears to be no more desirable than transitions brought about by a sudden collapse of the regime or by mass protest. Yet this is certainly different for civil war contexts where democratization seems hardly possible without a peace settlement since otherwise the central issue of “who owns the state” (Wimmer 1997) remains disputed.

Elite pacts as depicted in the literature cited above are comparable to settlements reached by peace negotiations for three reasons. First, the common definition of pacts as being based on “a negotiated compromise under which actors agree to forgo or underutilize their capacity to harm each other by extending guarantees not to threaten each other’s corporate autonomies or vital interests” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p. 38) is certainly compatible with peace agreements, though after violence has already occurred, guarantees will have to be much more explicit and extensive. Second, the literature dealing with elite bargains even directly refers to settlements among warring elites. Higley and Gunther name them as one way of facilitating a transformation from disunity to consensual unity among elites4 (Higley and Gunther 1992, p. xi). In their view, elite settlements are brought about either by the prior occurrence of conflict in which all factions suffered heavy losses or by a major crisis that threatened the resumption of widespread violence (Burton et al. 1992, p. 14).5 The special difficulty of such a context of war is that there is only minimal structural integration and consensus among elites. Communication and networks hardly cross factional lines and elites disagree on the rules of political conduct, bringing about deep distrust and violent struggles for dominance (Burton et al. 1992, p. 10). All these features can be found in the literature on peace negotiations and settlements.6 A third point is that the general conditions for the conclusion of elite pacts also apply to peace settlements. An agreement can just take place if no group is in a position to achieve its goals without compromising, when leaders can ensure that their followers will accept the agreement and abide by the rules, and when assurances are given to the old regime that their interests will not essentially be affected by the

4 Besides elite settlement, they describe the more gradual and long-term process of elite convergence.
5 Such settlements are similar to elite pacts, but a more specific form that also normally has a broader basis.
6 Highley and Burton do not necessarily classify peace agreements as elite settlements, amongst other things because of the often very strong external influence in negotiating such agreements.
transition (Gill 2000, pp. 55-57). In the transition literature, pacts between moderates (opposition) and reformers (government) are seen as particularly promising. Here lies an important difference to peace negotiations which can normally not exclude the so-called maximalist elements because these are likely to be armed actors with a high spoiler potential. Yet civil war and violence might also make settlements more likely. Colomer identifies three conditions for a transition by agreement. The second and most interesting one is linked to “the existence of subjective attitudes favorable to cooperation or compromise, possibly the result of having learned the lessons of historical experiences of civil wars, the failure of authoritarian regimes, and the suffering caused by repression and violence” (Colomer 1991, p. 1300). Thus, learning from the experiences of war and something like combat fatigue can actually render an agreement possible. Overall, peace agreements at the end of civil war can be seen as elite pacts, and they are actually seen as such in the literature on post-war democratization (Jarstad 2008b, p. 110).

Therefore, findings on elite pacts can provide helpful insights for post-war situations that are based on negotiated settlements. First, it makes sense to look particularly at the elite level when studying democratic transitions. Second, elite pacts as depicted by the democratization literature are generally possible in civil war situations; the experience of violence and war might even contribute to bringing about an agreement. Third, even if civil war primarily worsens the prospects for democratization, elite settlements at the end of war should improve the chances. In contrast to structural approaches, the literature stressing elite pacts considers democratization to be generally possible even after wars, though pacts are only a starting point and need to fulfil certain conditions to be successful (Weingast 1997, p. 262).

Elites are of course not the only variable in the literature explaining democratization and its success or failure. Stressing their importance for a functioning democracy also tends to be tautological – if elites choose democratic politics, then democratic politics will be practiced (Higley and Burton 2006, p. 3). Furthermore, it is important to examine how elite decisions affect politics in the medium and long term. The more permanent influence of pacts shows in the institutional design of a transition since these always emerge from negotiations (Przeworski 1991, p. xi).

2.1.2 Democratization as power-sharing

Consociational democracies are especially dependent on the cooperation of elites from the different segments of society, in their development as well as in their maintenance (Schmidt 2000, p. 331). This sub-category of consensus democracy always includes power-sharing arrangements, so that power-sharing can even be used as a synonym for consociational democ-
racy (Lijphart 2008, p. 6). Elite settlements can be purely procedural and are important beyond divided societies (Burton et al. 1992, p. 32). But power-sharing always needs to be based on cooperation among elites and normally on some kind of pact-making among them (Rothchild and Roeder 2005a, p. 8). This is an undisputed fact, and therefore the analysis of consociational democracy pays relatively little attention to elite bargaining and instead focuses on patterns of governance and adequate institutional designs for divided societies. These societies are characterized by deep ethnic or other cleavages that make the introduction of democracy especially risky. Yet they have not necessarily experienced civil war or other forms of intense violent conflict.

Power-sharing can be defined as “participation of representatives of all significant communal groups in political decision making, especially at the executive level” (Lijphart 2004, p. 97). In the earlier, classic studies it normally comprises four core features: proportionality, inclusive government or grand coalition, cultural autonomy and possibly minority veto (Lijphart 1996; Nordlinger 1972). But even in the refined version of “liberal consociationalism” these features of power-sharing are maintained, yet in a more nuanced and flexible form (Wolff 2010, p. 135).

While Lijphart as one of the core representatives of the consociational approach highlights power-sharing as the only viable option to accommodate demands in deeply divided countries, he has pointed out that not all power-sharing provisions work equally well. Independent of the respective context, he lists several core features that are supposed to make power-sharing work best, amongst others a PR electoral system, a parliamentary government, collegial cabinets and ethnic quotas in civil service, judiciary, police and military or at least a general provision relying on a power-sharing cabinet and parliament. Lijphart is also a supporter of federal systems with relatively homogeneous units and of autonomy on a non-territorial basis (Lijphart 2004, pp. 99-106). Whether in exactly this form or not, the positive influence of power-sharing in divided societies has been confirmed by several studies. Bächtiger and Linder, for example, have analyzed democratization in 62 African and Asian countries and find that power-sharing, especially horizontal power-sharing (grand coalition, proportionality, minority veto), is one of the strongest predictors for democratization (Bächtiger and Linder 2005, p. 875). More recently, power-sharing institutions have been evaluated as advantageous for deeply divided societies because they increase the probability of successful democratic governance, but also because they are a promising peacebuilding strategy (Norris 2008, pp. 214+220).

But why is power-sharing supposedly working better than other institutional designs in divided societies? In one of his earlier works, Linz states that consociational democracies are generally more stable than majoritarian systems because of their high integration (Linz 1978). Later studies
stress the accommodative nature of power-sharing that “can reconcile principles of self-determination and democracy in multiethnic states, principles that are often perceived to be at odds” (Sisk 1996, p. vii). Reynal-Querol (Reynal-Querol 2002), who found the level of representation of the population, and thus the degree of inclusiveness, to be most crucial recommends consociational systems in divided societies, because they provide adequate procedures for channeling participation.

For post-war situations, even those authors who are not generally supportive of power-sharing have acknowledged that these transitions have a greater need for inclusiveness and are not ready for fully competitive politics, especially in the context of elections (Reilly 2002, p. 133). This raises the question what significance and implications power-sharing has for peace. In a refinement of the democratic peace theory, Lijphart proposes that the world would become not only more democratic, but actually more peaceful if democratizing countries adopted forms of consensus democracy instead of majoritarian systems (Lijphart 2008, p. 19). But looking at the fact that the power-sharing strategy originates from analyses of societies that were not multiethnic and had not experienced ethnic civil war (Rothchild and Roeder 2005b, p. 29), the question which arises is in what way power-sharing is the most viable and promising option for making peace after (ethnic) civil war. Indeed, there has been a gradual shift in studies of power-sharing from democracy or democratization as dependent variable to (enduring) peace.

The model of consociational democracy was originally linked to cases like Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands or Switzerland, but power-sharing has increasingly been seen as a conflict management mechanism in divided societies more generally. The term “deeply divided” that is prominent in the literature usually refers to societies that have already experienced violent group struggle (Sisk 1996, p. 3). Particularly for societies facing ethnic conflict, power-sharing has been seen as a way of settling these conflicts (Gurr 1993a). One reason for this proposition is that far-reaching power-sharing seems to lead to a more successful implementation of peace agreements (Walter 2002). Institutional provisions have been found to not only solve grievances of groups involved in the war, but also to deal with the unique set of commitment problems in such contexts. Therefore, it is crucial to consider how the institutional design foreseen for a democratic transition shapes the expectations of groups about their future security and, thus, their decisions to fight or cooperate (Walter 1999, p. 155).

The positive influence of power-sharing has not only been emphasized for the implementation of peace agreements, but for enduring peace more
The overall assumption is that in situations of civil war – whether it originated in ideological or ethnic divisions – institutions designed to address the issue of control over state power as the central concern to warring parties are essential to secure enduring peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, p. 3). Hartzell and Hoddie argue in line with Walter that institutions matter because they can enhance the credibility of the commitment and address the concern of adversaries about the exercise of power, but also because they provide new rules for managing conflict in the future (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, pp. 3-5). Indeed, based on statistical analysis, the authors have found that the more dimensions of power-sharing are specified in a peace agreement, the more likely it is that peace will endure (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, p. 318). However, this and their later study complement the focus on power-sharing by also including power-dividing institutions as proposed by Rothchild and Roeder. Thus, in their analysis it is not power-sharing alone that enhances the likelihood of lasting peace.

Despite some positive results, the debate on power-sharing and its impact on democracy and peace remains essentially controversial. The main line of dissent runs between those who assess power-sharing as the best institutional option for deeply divided societies and those who underline its pitfalls, particularly negative medium- and long-term effects. First, power-sharing has been condemned as essentially undemocratic and bringing about inefficient decision-making (Schmidt 2000, p. 334-335). These shortcomings are rooted in the elite bargaining that brought about such arrangements, because despite power-sharing’s largely positive record in conflict resolution, “it does have a cost in the form of constraining further democratization, marginalizing those seeking greater change [. . .], and demobilizing the populace” (Gill 2000, p. 57). Indeed, in its extended versions, power-sharing renders elections more or less meaningless and lowers the accountability of leaders. More generally it limits the openness and competitiveness of the system (Gates and Strom 2008, p. 2; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, p. 151). Thus, consociational systems have been labeled as “constrained democracy” (Rothchild and Roeder 2005a, p. 7). Second, other critics have considered power-sharing as inherently dangerous, because it tends to freeze conflict lines that have been at the core of armed violence (Horowitz 1985, pp. 601-652; Rothchild and Roeder 2005a, p. 6; Jarstad 2008b, p. 107; Simonsen 2005, p. 311). By giving issues that divide ethnic groups a central place in politics, power-sharing arrangements are expected to sustain inter-ethnic conflict at high levels. The accommodation of ethnic divisions in a negotiated arrangement might help to end conflict in ethnically divided societies, but it can become an obstacle to consolidation of peace and democracy in the longer term (Rothchild and Roeder 2005a, pp. 15-16).
2005a, p. 6; Rothchild and Roeder 2005b, p. 37), amongst other things because power-sharing institutions can also be used by ethnic leaders to challenge the power-sharing agreement itself (Rothchild and Roeder 2005b, p. 37). Under certain conditions, power-sharing arrangements have also been found to be inherently risky, because they imply a non-proportional distribution of power and positive incentives for spoilers (Gates and Strom 2008).

Several alternatives for settling (ethnic) civil war have been proposed in opposition to power-sharing. Apart from military victory, which is not considered here because of a focus on negotiated solutions, these alternatives are partition as proposed most prominently by Chaim D. Kaufmann (Kaufmann 1998), power-division as included in the study by Hartzell and Hoddie (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007), and the integrative approach developed by Horowitz (Horowitz 1985). The latter two approaches, which are linked to democratization, focus on institutional arrangements as well, but they prefer overcoming divisions rather than accommodating them. The approach of power-division is primarily directed at limiting ethnic identities to specific issues and preventing majorities from sustaining political hegemony over the range of different policy areas, while the integrative approach with its strong focus on electoral mechanisms such as the “alternative vote” focuses on incentives for moderation and alliances transcending ethnic divisions. Yet power-division arrangements can equally lead to multidimensional, issue-specific or crosscutting identities (Rothchild and Roeder 2005a, p. 15-17).

The importance of the “right” institutional design for settling violent conflict and making peace has been investigated with regard to many different cases and settings (Noel 2005; Bastian and Luckham 2003). However, the question whether deep divisions in countries emerging from civil war should be incorporated or can actually be overcome is unresolved, partly due to the relatively limited application of power-sharing alternatives. Proponents of power-sharing do not deny the shortcoming of hardening conflict lines by accommodating them, and they also see that power-sharing trades competitiveness for broader representation 9, but they simply state that there is no workable alternative. According to this view, power-sharing is far from perfect, but is the lesser evil. Moreover, it has been the preferred choice of policy makers around the world (Lijphart 2008, pp. 269 + 278-279).

Despite a general lack of agreement on the most adequate institutional design for societies emerging from civil war, what all three main approaches have in common is that they stress a deepening of the main

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9The power-sharing debate increasingly has addressed the negative medium- and long-term consequences of consociational institutions; for a comprehensive list of contributions to this debate see (Wolff 2010, p. 131).
(ethnic) conflict line over the course of violence and the necessity to deal with this main division, either by accommodating or by transcending it. In addition, they assume that political institutions have the potential to influence and shape conflict lines. Because of the central role of the institutional debate for post-war transitions, any study on such contexts needs to take institutions and their implications into account. Power-sharing is still seen as the central approach for divided societies, partly because it is the approach most frequently adopted (Lijphart 2004, p. 99; Schmidt 2000, p. 331). In fact, it has emerged as the preferred instrument of Western actors for peace-making in places like Africa (Tull and Mehler 2005, p. 376).

2.1.3 Democratization as peacebuilding

A third category of studies dealing with democratization after civil wars has developed in recent years, originating in the peacebuilding debate. This literature strand only very recently started to connect to and converge with the literature on (post-war) democratization, so recently that Call and Cook still stated in 2003:

“The peacebuilding literature is rife with conceptual frameworks prescribing a host of measures that will ensure popular support for new government structures, be they new rights protections, electoral schemes, disarmament plans, refugee repatriation, or police and justice reforms. It is remarkable how little attention is given to contradictions likely to emerge from this array of reforms to state and society.” (Call and Cook 2003, pp. 236-237)

Such contradictions have come to the fore in the research on negotiated post-war settings which are now labeled “war-to-democracy transitions” rather than “war-to-peace transitions” (Jarstad 2008a). Naturally, in contrast to the power-sharing or wider institutional debate, these studies exclusively focus on situations after internal armed conflicts and their special characteristics. Authors tend to emphasize the need for wider social and political reconstruction in order to try to avoid the re-occurrence of widespread violence or war and focus on medium- and long-term processes as opposed to mere peacemaking. More or less clearly, they subscribe to the definition of peacebuilding laid out in the Agenda for Peace by Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992 and are, therefore, discussed under this label below. The focus here is on the prescriptive part of the peacebuilding literature, not on the critical works questioning current peacebuilding approaches more

10 More precisely, the report defines the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Ghali 1992).
fundamentally (Chandler 2006; Goetschel and Hagmann 2009). Though even the rather prescriptive literature is very diverse, authors mostly start from the assumption that two aspects are decisive in order to construct a stable democracy after war: 1) lowering the costs of electoral competition by elite pacts and a proper design of political institutions, and 2) raising the costs of violent competition through the reform of the military, the neutralization of violent groups by political elites, international peacekeeping, etc. (Bermeo 2003b, pp. 163-168). The first point refers to the debates presented in the last two subsections; the second is the main focus of the following discussion.

What is generally characteristic for works in this field is a rather cautious position with regard to the application of power-sharing, though it is rarely completely rejected. The main reason for this standpoint lies in the second aspect outlined by Bermeo, the raising of costs of violent competition, or the question of how to engage armed groups more generally. While the institutional literature surrounding the consociational debate focuses on handling conflicts running along the main (ethnic) line, authors with a peacebuilding background are more preoccupied with warring parties and the inclusion of military actors in post-war politics. Therefore, the latter group tends to address problems that power-sharing creates with regard to these actors, especially referring to “spoilers” in peace processes. No special attention is given to the inter-ethnic divide, but rather to what has been called “hidden costs of power-sharing” (Tull and Mehler 2005).

From this point of view, giving armed movements access to state power by including them in such arrangements creates incentives for other leaders to apply violent means. Hence, power-sharing can reproduce rebellions instead of enhancing peace. With regard to Africa, some severe potential consequences have been identified: 1) a demonstration effect by power-sharing making the outbreak of insurgent violence in other places more likely, 2) a risk of generating even more armed groups by defections or the creation of new groups where inclusive negotiations take place, and 3) a marginalization of moderate forces (Tull and Mehler 2005, pp. 390-393; Jarstad 2008b, p. 107). For all these reasons, power-sharing arrangements might actually be less adequate for deeply divided societies and as an instrument of peacebuilding than commonly assumed. Indeed, it can be argued that “compensating parties with a higher marginal utility for fighting by giving them a bigger share of the political pie only encourages spoilers” (Gates and Strom 2008, p. 4). Here, the imbalance of power-sharing when parties are not evenly matched and the problem of defection when weaker parties cannot prevent factions from breaking off are named as conditions

11Stedman, in a key article on this phenomenon, defines spoilers as “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman 1997, p. 5).
that make power-sharing rather hazardous. In another study, the inclusion of armed groups, intra-group contestation referring to violent splinter groups and the leveling of power relations are assessed as problematic aspects of power-sharing for peace as well (Jarstad 2008b, p. 107).  

The inclusion of armed movements and rebel groups into politics is a contradictory and risky undertaking. Rebel movements have been included in settlements because their grievances that led to the civil war are seen as legitimate or to give them incentives for peace by securing them a role in the new order (Söderberg Kovacs 2008, pp. 135-136). Such a broad inclusion in line with power-sharing can make agreements more lasting since an exclusion of spoiler groups makes a return to violence more likely (Jarstad 2008a, pp. 21-23). But ultimately, it creates a strong dilemma because giving rebel movements a stake in the new order can have negative effects on democratization and can be seen as a reward for violence, providing incentives for other groups to use violence, as argued by Tull and Mehler. In addition, the transformation of armed movements into political parties that has become a common feature of post-war transitions can raise additional problems due to the rather militant, sectarian and internally undemocratic nature of many armed groups and the fact that their transformation might hinder the emergence of other actors (Söderberg Kovacs 2008, pp. 135-136). In the increasingly extensive literature on armed movements, some studies almost try to take an “inside view” in order to identify specific features and challenges of rebel group transformations. Yet they come to relatively similar conclusions. Common problems for the groups themselves lie in adopting a new political culture, installing organizational structures as a party, recruiting cadres, formulating a program and other requirements for becoming a legally recognized political party. In addition, there are often problems with factionalism threatening the cohesion of the movement and a lack of experience in institutional processes (Dudouet 2009, pp. 38-43).

Some authors bringing in a specific peacebuilding perspective basically reject power-sharing as a viable way of peacebuilding (Tull and Mehler 2005; Paris 2004), others at least include some power-sharing elements in their propositions (Bermeo 2003b, pp. 163-168), while there is also the pragmatic assumption that in many cases alternatives to power-sharing are worse (Jarstad 2008b, p. 132). But what all authors have in common is a certain alertness to the pitfalls of accommodation and inclusiveness. There is also quite a high degree of agreement on the specific features in post-war societies making democratization particularly challenging and dangerous. Three commonly named characteristics are a difficult security situation with arms circulating and continuing violence, a lack of functioning government structures and – in line with the literature of the last section

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12Jarstad names international dependence as an additional problem.
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– deep social divisions and polarization (Paris 2004, pp. 168-175; Kumar and de Zeeuw 2006, p. 8; Jarstad 2008a, pp. 19 + 31-32). Many authors in this field would most likely agree with the evaluation that “war tends to exacerbate regional, ethnic, and religious cleavages and tensions” (Kumar and de Zeeuw 2006, p. 8).

The second aspect – weakness of government institutions – has become prominent in the debate. A whole branch of literature deals with state-building, but investigations are not limited to post-war countries (though these are often the most severe cases of “state failure”) and democratization is not a main preoccupation. But there is reference to this field in the literature discussed here, for example in the study by Paris on democratization and marketization as strategies of peacebuilding (Paris 2004). Mainly because of the pitfalls of increased competition by liberalization in post-war contexts, he demands the installation of relatively capable governmental institutions before the introduction of democratic and market-oriented reforms, calling this approach “Institutionalization before Liberalization” (Paris 2004, p. 7). After a fundamental institutionalization process, competition should only be introduced step by step, which is in line with propositions of sequencing democratic change. Sequencing reforms and the focus on minimum standards have been proposed in order to deal with the pitfalls of what Ottaway calls the “democratic reconstruction model” (Ottaway 2003, p. 321) favored by the international community.\(^\text{13}\) From this point of view, not everything that the model includes as desirable is actually feasible, because of the complexity and high costs. Beyond mere practicability, Jarstad proposes that simultaneous processes of democratization and peacebuilding naturally produce dilemmas. In her view, it is normally the failure to deal with these dilemmas that can lead to re-occurrence of war (Jarstad 2008a, p. 18). Therefore, balancing potential adverse effects is of central importance.

Jarstad outlines four types of dilemmas in “war-to-democracy transitions”. The horizontal dilemma refers to the relationship of elites of the warring parties and those of democratic political parties that depends on balancing the inclusion or exclusion of certain groups. This dilemma is strongly linked to the wider debate on how to deal with armed groups discussed above and, basically, is the only one that really refers to the peculiarities of post-war transitions. The other three dilemmas – the vertical dilemma, the systemic dilemma and even the temporal dilemma – are all key to democratic transitions without prior war as well. They refer to the problem of local versus international ownership, bottom-up versus top-down approaches signifying a trade-off between elite and mass politics and

\(^{13}\)Other authors have criticized the approach of sequencing on the ground that “persuading people to defer their ambition to vote in a free election is most often not an option” (Carothers 2007, p. 23).
long-term versus short-term effects, for example with regard to the timing of elections (Jarstad 2008a, pp. 23-25). In fact, in the literature more generally, supposedly unique challenges of post-war societies are not always so distinctive, but rather more intense in their occurrence after civil war, for example the weakness of government structures or the lack of democratic experiences (Kumar and de Zeeuw 2006, p. 8). Similarly, the assumption of a deepening of the main (ethnic) cleavage from civil war resulting in strong tensions and polarization is mainly a matter of intensity, not of fundamental change. Jarstad also stresses the domination of exclusive group-based interests, referring to inter-ethnic divisions, but also to moderate-extremist conflicts within one ethnic group after civil war (Jarstad 2008a, p. 31). What remains as truly characteristic of post-war transitions from this literature is the inclusion of rebel movements into government for the sake of peace that might undermine democratic change and stability later on (Jarstad 2008a, p. 19).

While proponents and opponents of power-sharing focus on institutional arrangements, authors from the field of peacebuilding lay more emphasis on conditions peculiar to post-war contexts. First, many challenges occur in a more intense way: for example, divisions have been reinforced and state institutions have become weaker over the course of the war; second, the relationship of military and political actors raises specific questions and problems, such as a proliferation of armed groups or a militarization of politics. Though often critical of power-sharing as an approach to peacebuilding, not all authors completely reject it, but tend to demand that possible negative consequences be balanced out.

After a closer look at the literature in the last three subsections, the question arises as to how far these different strands provide sufficient insights to understand and explain the course and outcome of post-war democratic transitions. Certainly all three aspects discussed are directly relevant to these settings. Since democratic transitions after civil war are normally linked to negotiated settlements rather than military victory, they tend to be based on an elite pact and often contain power-sharing elements. This means that the progression of the transition depends very much on the stability of the underlying elite pact. The fact that negotiated settlements involve at least the most important forces and elites of the old regime as well as opposition groups, potentially including rebel movements, should enhance the prospects for a more or less stable transition. But this is merely a facilitating factor, not a necessary or sufficient condition, and basically any transition will be difficult to sustain without some kind of elite pact.

According to the literature on consociationalism, power-sharing arrangements designed during peace negotiations can be a stabilizing factor, making the survival of democracy in divided societies more likely. Yet critics stress the danger of negative medium- and long-term consequences, because of its constraints on democracy and a hardening of the main (eth-
nic) conflict line by their institutionalization. While this is not an exclusive problem of post-war societies, the outcome could be more severe when elites use the system for a continuation of war by other means (Rothchild and Roeder 2005a, p. 9). But most insights into consociational arrangements are not specific to post-war situations since elite pacts as well as power-sharing occur with or without prior armed conflict. The relevance of this part of the literature rather stems from the fact that the majority of negotiated settlements over the last two decades have included at least some power-sharing elements.

Yet the general assumptions of important parts of the consociational literature do not differ in a significant way for societies divided or deeply divided along ethnic or other lines. As already mentioned, Lijphart, for example, differentiates between plural, semi-plural and non-plural societies, but he normally subsumes the first two in the category destined for consociational arrangements (Lijphart 2008). Proponents and opponents of power-sharing alike assess post-war situations as different because of a deepening or hardening of divisions along the main cleavage during the civil war. But it is the consociational approach that focuses on accommodating the central conflict line in the institutional setting. It, however, is questionable if this common approach really is so adequate for post-war transitions. Not only can its impact on democratization and peacebuilding be at least ambiguous, as many critics have shown. But the core assumption on which power-sharing arrangements rest might be disputed. The approach of accommodating the central underlying cleavage of a civil war is based on a rather static understanding of conflict lines and can be misleading in the context of changing actor constellations. Thus, the impact of power-sharing in democratic transitions after civil war needs a more profound assessment.

A central dilemma of power-sharing in post-war contexts has also been pointed out by authors from a peacebuilding background, namely the creation of incentives for actors who perceive the situation of the settlement as a chance to get their share by either creating a new armed group or by splitting off from an existing group. This proliferation of violent actors is a specific problem in countries emerging from civil war and has an immediate impact on the ground, rendering power-sharing a mixed blessing in the view of some authors. Beyond a demonstration effect, negotiations or new arrangements adopted provide a direct incentive for change in actor constellations. The third category of literature discussed above directly refers to specific characteristics of simultaneous peacebuilding and democratization after civil wars, or armed conflicts more generally. The implicit assumption is that these two-fold transitions have distinct features and require answers different from those applied in societies that have not (yet) faced an escalation of violence.
Some of the recently published works stress the interaction of the two goals of democratization and peacebuilding and the difficulty of balancing them. But surprisingly, those challenges mentioned in this part of the literature are not necessarily peculiar to post-war situations either. Even the temporal dilemma introduced by Jarstad that directly refers to peacebuilding is not only bound to post-conflict situations. It is basically another version of the critique of medium- and long-term effects of power-sharing, such as its inflexible and self-perpetuating nature outrivaling its short-term benefits. More generally, it is an extension of the debate on sequencing democratic change. Even though they do not necessarily refer directly to peacebuilding, stability certainly is a major concern for the authors of this sequencing debate. Overall, the last category of literature on “democratization as peacebuilding” provides insights into what factors might pose especially severe challenges in post-war transitions rather than outlining problems or dilemmas that are truly unique to such contexts.

There is one factor peculiar to post-war situations which, however, is addressed in great detail by the peacebuilding literature: the role of armed groups and the problematic implications of their inclusion, but also of their exclusion in (post-)war politics. A multitude of studies in recent years has also investigated the transformation of rebel groups into political parties and the interaction between political and (former) military actors in transitions. Many authors see this process as highly important for building a stable democracy, such as Bermeo, who stresses the necessity of “raising the costs of violent competition”, meaning amongst other things the neutralization of violent groups by political actors (Bermeo 2003b). Apart from that, there seems to be the tendency to rely heavily on the literature on (elite) bargaining and institutional solutions.

What is most striking about studies from all three fields discussed is the lack of a systematic assessment of civil war dynamics in the analysis. Even those authors who directly address post-war situations tend to assume that the civil war has mainly deepened the main (ethnic) conflict line with the exception of changes linked to military actors who are mainly seen as “spoilers” or extremist forces. This might partly be due to the largely prescriptive nature of much of the peacebuilding literature and to its preoccupation with examining and improving outside interventions of whatever kind. In any case, the result is that it is still unclear where exactly the peculiar challenge and features of post-war democratization lie. The following section argues that this is mainly due to two blind spots in the literature discussed.
2.1.4 Is post-war democratization different? Bringing in conflict and refugee research

Introducing insights from conflict research is one way of dealing with two central deficiencies in the literature presented. First, studies often do not provide an analysis of the civil war and the post-war period as a continuous process. Second, the transnational dimension that has come to the fore in conflict research is still rather neglected in explaining transitions after civil wars, or democratization more generally.

Surprisingly, the assessments of conflict and post-conflict research are relatively unconnected. Though causes for the outbreak of war are taken into account, aspects of relevance during civil wars are not necessarily included in post-conflict studies. The literature discussed above rather provides snapshots of the conflict situation at the time when transitions start. More or less explicitly, conflict lines are mainly expected to become deepened over the course of the civil war. Therefore, solutions often focus on the constellation that led to the outbreak of widespread violence, not necessarily on its development over time. This is all the more surprising since authors like Colomer have stressed the importance of the structure of political conflict as well as the relative strength and chances for coalitions as crucial for successful democratization, even if these are necessary, not sufficient determinants (Schmidt 2000, p. 482). The literature on mechanisms in civil war in particular has provided more specific insights (Checkel 2009). Here identities have increasingly been seen as a consequence as much as a cause of civil war. Kalyvas, as an exponent of this research agenda, stresses that civil war:

“destroys existing structures, networks, and loyalties; it creates new opportunities for political losers, alters the size of optimal coalitions, gives rise to new entrepreneurs, and generally reshuffles politics. Therefore, it has the potential to alter the structure of cleavages and generate realignment in identity affiliations.” (Kalyvas 2008, p. 6)

When examining adequate institutional and other responses in post-war periods, this change needs to be taken into account. According to Kalyvas’ statement, it is not only a matter of identity shifts within the existing structure of cleavages: the very structure itself can be altered. Therefore, potential changes in political conflicts and their underlying lines of affiliation over the course of the civil war need to be considered. Saying this does not mean that the literature on post-war transitions or democratization more generally has a primordialist view on identity. Most authors would probably agree with Linz and Stepan’s proposition that political identities are not fixed, but socially constructed (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 35). Some
state very clearly that ethnic identities are dynamic in their nature and intensity and therefore, a de-ethnicization of politics after civil war is possible (Simonsen 2005). Yet even in these cases, real changes in identities by civil war are not systematically assessed, either because of the strong focus on the post-war period or due to the assumption that wars tend to deepen the main conflict line. This study aims to achieve a more thorough analysis of changes in conflict lines brought about by civil war, because political affiliations after war are likely to not be the same as at the time of the original outbreak. This is likely to have important effects on the political process after civil war.

Similarly, the transnational dimension of post-war transitions has largely been neglected, partly due to the discontinuity of conflict and post-conflict analyses as well. Research on democratization has increasingly included the international dimension since Whitehead’s famous article (Whitehead 1996), but it has not really substantiated transnational mechanisms. The literature on democratization by diffusion (Starr 1991; Schmitter and Brouwer 1999; Gleditsch and Ward 2006) has discovered that this unintended process indeed exists and that neighborhood matters in the sense that the nature of the regime in one country is influenced by the regime type in surrounding countries. The problem is that the mechanisms through which geographical proximity works are largely unknown. Possibilities commonly named are linked to transnational interaction like “means of mass communication and media that can be received on either side of mutual borders, through migration, repatriated elites after having received foreign education, academic exchange, social networks and transnational social movements or other factors” (Burnell and Schlumberger 2010, p. 5). Some of these factors could be particularly interesting in post-war contexts, but they have not really been investigated in greater detail.\footnote{There are a few exceptions, such as a recent study on international migrants as agents of democratic diffusion to Mexico (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010).} The introduction of “linkage” and “leverage” for explaining why one country can successfully influence another country’s system has not really filled this gap (Levitsky and Way 2005).

Turning to the very recent literature on democracy promotion or, as it has frequently been called, democracy assistance, does not make up for the rather unspecific reference to transnational mechanisms. Certainly, a multitude of studies (Carothers 1999; Burnell 2000; Schraeder 2003) has contributed to a much better understanding of the role of external actors and the impact of assistance policies in democratization. But there is a deficiency that has already been identified by researchers in this field, namely the rather strict separation between internal and external actors (Burnell and Schlumberger 2010, p. 8). Despite the fact that the more recent literature on democratization deals substantially with international factors and
dynamics, transnational mechanisms remain underspecified. Furthermore, it does not specifically deal with post-conflict situations, but with diffusion, linkages and external promotion more generally.

In the light of the lack of connection between violent conflict and post-war periods and insufficient insights into transnational mechanisms based on the democratization literature, it makes sense to look at transnational dynamics commonly identified in conflict research. Similar to the field of democratization, there are various statistical analyses on the issue of spread or diffusion (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2005). These studies have demonstrated that there are verifiable neighborhood and contagion effects. In addition, internal conflicts tend to turn into internationalized warfare (Gleditsch et al. 2008). Lake and Rothchild (Lake and Rothchild 1998) have introduced diffusion and escalation as the two main forms of the spread of ethnic conflict. Diffusion means that conflict in one location alters the likelihood of conflict in another area, while escalation refers to spread by the involvement of new actors. Because of the trans-border nature of civil wars and intervention by neighbors Sisk refers to “regionalized internal conflicts” which are much more difficult to end as isolation and containment are very limited strategies because of trans-border linkages of combatants (Sisk 2004, p. 250). In fact, such trans-border rebel activities are a commonly examined transnational mechanism in civil wars alongside with refugee flows (Salehyan 2009; Weiner 1996; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006).

Conflict research has drawn attention to endogenous change and to transnational dynamics during civil war. Refugees are a central aspect in both respects, but the potential relevance of exile groups for post-war transitions can be substantiated beyond conflict research. On the one hand, there are hints at this factor in the democratization literature, for example when migration and repatriated elites are stated as possible mechanisms for the diffusion of democracy. More explicitly, Whitehead pointed out back in 1996 that “at the start of many transitions to democracy it can be artificial and misleading to classify all the new strategic actors as ready-made strictly domestic political entities” (Whitehead 1996, p. 20). Here he explicitly refers to exile clusters as a substantial external component of emerging opposition forces. On the other hand, the more specific literature on refugees has shown that exile is relevant for different reasons: 1) because

15These two factors also overlap since external bases and mobilization processes of rebel groups are often linked to refugee and diaspora communities. At the micro-level, conflict linked to refugee flows can be explained with a) resources and fighters linked to the refugees, or more generally processes of mobilization among refugees, b) changes in the ethnic balance of the receiving state depending on refugees’ ethnicity and c) increased competition over local resources, such as jobs, land or housing (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, p. 338). For this study, the first proposed micro-mechanism is of greatest interest because of its strong link to transnational rebel activities and, therefore, to armed conflict in the country of origin. The other two factors are more likely to lead to conflict in areas or states receiving refugees.
refugees form a community in exile with specific interests and identities; 2) because persecuted refugee groups are likely to become mobilized in exile; 3) because (former) refugees remain a distinct group after their return. A large number of theoretical and empirical studies deal with refugee flows, their mobilization and return. Though these different branches of the literature are not always linked, they provide important insights for this study and are therefore discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs.

A first group of studies investigates the development of grievances and group formation among refugees in exile. They have provided clear evidence that most refugee populations have a common interest and display community-building since their loss of former bases of livelihood and of former social ties in home communities makes new formations almost inevitable. In addition, the “otherness” of refugees in their host country and possible threats against them reinforce their identity as refugees. Agyeman assumes that deprivation in the country of asylum can lead to initially very diverse refugee populations developing into a coherent group that maintains itself as a separate group in exile. Here, the idea of nationalism plays a crucial role and “increases the likelihood of their secondary ethnic-group formation. To this end, separate institutions are created and upheld that exercise partial control over the group members” (Agyeman 2005, p. 57). Even if refugees achieve some local integration, the risk of becoming a target of scapegoating in the future always remains and can strengthen community-building over longer time periods, as in the case of Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda over 35 years (van der Meeren 1996, p. 265).

There are numerous studies on the development of a distinct refugee identity in exile (Malkki 1995; Bisharat 1997; Cornish et al. 1999; Kibreab 2004; Stefansson 2004b). One of the most interesting findings is that civilians and combatants among refugees can form a common group identity that “unites the two in the belief of furthering a common interest in a return under inclusive conditions in the home country” (Gerdes 2006, p. 36). This underlines that the common interest formation of refugees is most strongly defined by the goal of returning home, which might explain the amazing longevity of this goal even among generations that have never known their country of origin as home (van der Meeren 1996, p. 258). Generally, grievances are inherent to the situation of refugees, because flight “represents the exclusion of certain groups from political, economic and symbolic systems of reproduction in the home country” (Gerdes 2006, abstract).

Studies focusing on refugee return also indirectly analyze the differences between those who were in exile and those who stayed. They
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generally find that returnees not only bring home new habits, skills and resources, they also display a distinct identity and new social relations established in exile. Most importantly, former social networks, institutions and organizations are not reconstructed by refugees but replaced with new ones (Stefansson 2004a, p. 4; Essed et al. 2004, p. 9; Kibreab 2004, p. 25, Adelman 1997, p. 4). This leads us to the issue of political and/or military mobilization of refugees in exile.

Recently conducted research on the militarization of refugee populations (Muggah 2006; Lischer 2005; Stedman and Tanner 2003) and diaspora nationalism (Skrbis 1999; Radtke 2005) sheds light on mobilization patterns among refugees and migrants. The factor seems to be of general relevance since most refugee camps around the world “are highly politicized” (International Crisis Group 1999, p. 15) and an estimated 15% of refugee crises worldwide foment militarization (Stedman and Tanner 2003, p. 3). These numbers suggest that a meaningful part of refugee populations worldwide has been or is mobilized. One precondition for mobilization that was already mentioned in the preceding section are grievances. Thus, refugees who fled because of group persecution – normally including elites or educated middle classes – are more likely to militarize in exile than so-called situational refugees who “merely” escape the direct threat to their personal security (Lischer 2005, p. 10). The nature of ethnic civil wars makes the existence of such persecuted refugee groups very likely.

But the refugee situation does not only signify a situation of loss and suffering; it also “offers a new set of resources in a new situation which can be used by innovative political entrepreneurs to establish themselves” (Zolberg et al. 1989, p. 166). These new resources are mainly defined by the policy of the receiving state towards the refugees and the availability of humanitarian aid (Gerdes 2006; Lischer 2005). Naturally, the “state characteristics that shape the costs and benefits of political action” (Gurr 1993b, p. 168) are different for groups living on foreign territory. The latter factor – humanitarian aid – often makes refugee camps a basis for collective action and military activities (Terry 2002). Apart from opportunities mainly linked to camp life, some authors add other factors influencing mobilization such as prior organizational experience (Pritchard 1996, p. 114). This factor, which basically refers to the leadership component of mobilization, is most obvious in so-called “state-in-exile” groups, such as the Rwandan Hutu refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo after the 1994 genocide. In this case, communal political structures from the home country were re-established in the refugee camps (Murray 2002, p. 226). But persecuted groups normally also comprise elites or even political leaders since people are threatened on account of their ethnic group membership. Elites can even be targeted more directly. Generally, mobilization among refugees does not necessarily take the form of militarization, but can be purely political, as demonstrated by some case studies (Krznaric 1997; Pritchard 1996).
However, in the African context, the phenomenon of “refugee warriors” has attracted most academic attention and is the most visible expression of mobilization.

Research on post-war situations has also started to pay attention to diaspora groups and their role as promoters of peace or armed conflict (Smith and Stares 2007; Adamson 2004; Collier et al. 2008). However, the effects of the homecoming of (mobilized) exile groups are not part of these investigations. While refugees have been established as a relevant social category in the analysis of causes and dynamics of war, there is much less systematic reference to returning refugees as actors in post-war periods. Until the 1980s there was either a common assumption that losing the refugee status upon return meant the end of the refugee cycle, or difficulties in studying returnees prevented the development of a more coherent research agenda (Allen and Morsink 1994, p. 2). Later on, academics as well as practitioners became more concerned about the situation of refugees after return. The general literature on refugee repatriation and (re)integration has detected differences in terms of socio-economic development and identity as well as network formation between returnees and residents. These findings show that return is not the end of the refugee cycle.

Some authors stress that there is no return to the “status quo ex ante” for refugees as social and political conditions at home have changed significantly in their absence (Essed et al. 2004, p. 5). A mismatch between imagined and experienced homecoming can be observed when refugees return and are confronted with rejection or even outright hostility on the part of stayees (Stefansson 2004a, p. 8). The social distance between the groups can be based on a distorted image that stayees have of the reasons for flight and of the life of refugees abroad. The mentioned mismatch and the antagonism between the two groups might lead to the development of a distinct “returnee identity” (Cornish et al. 1999, p. 275) and – as in the case of Bosnia – to the development of separate returnee communities (Stefansson 2004b, p. 65). In some instances, returnees are also associated with certain rebel groups by stayees and, therefore, have to deal with social discrimination or exclusion (Rogge 1994, p. 40). These findings confirm that refugee populations have developed into a distinct social group and that differences remain visible and relevant after return when returnees and stayees directly interact again.

Beyond the socio-economic and identity aspects of return, there are few insights into political consequences. It has frequently been argued that the return of refugees might have destabilizing consequences for ongoing

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17 This is a common expression for those who have not been in exile. Sometimes it also refers to all those who have not been displaced. The difference is that the first definition comprises internally displaced people while the second does not. Since the argument here is about refugees who have crossed international borders, I will use the term in the first sense.
peace processes (Adelman 1997, pp. 9-10; Crisp 1998, p. 12). However, the exact relationship between the return of exile groups and the course of peace processes has rarely been specified. One exception are studies conducted in the context of a project focusing on refugee return and violence at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (Berg Harpviken 2008). However, the project concentrates on returning refugees who are actual fighters or are mobilized as fighters upon return and become a threat to the peace process because they engage in violence. The present study, in contrast, deals with exile groups as a specific category of actors that is possibly but not necessarily linked to armed violence.

The analysis of post-war transitions needs to take into account transnational actors such as exile communities because “[n]either democratization nor conflict respects state borders” (Cederman et al. 2008, p. 520). Such an investigation must take account of the central insights from the democratization literature discussed at the beginning of this section: 1) transitions as an outcome of elite bargaining in peace negotiations, 2) the role of political institutions, particularly power-sharing, and 3) the incorporation of armed actors, especially rebel movements, into the political process. But how countries can make an effective transition from war to democracy remains, by and large, a puzzle despite the intense discussions in the literature presented. One critical theoretical and empirical aspect of all of these transitions is the (re)integration of the various political elements that splintered off during the war into a unified state and society. This trajectory fundamentally concerns exile groups, and exile is expected to have an influence in its own right on post-war transitions when mobilized people return. The following chapter will outline the theoretical argument in greater detail and introduce the concept of “democratization as integration”.

2.2 Theoretical Framework: Integration and changing conflict lines in post-war transitions

Democratic transition after ethnic civil war is the process of overriding interest in this study, based on the general research question which considers to what extent post-war democratization is different. The concept of democratization is very generally defined as a process of transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy in the following. Defining such a process of transition, however, is more difficult. In very general terms the start of a transitional period can be identified by the completion of peace negotiations while first competitive elections can be seen as an indication of the end of the transition (Bunce 2003, p. 170). However, a popular vote is no guarantee that in between these two points in time concrete attempts to move towards more democratic governance have been undertaken. Therefore, the peace settlement at the beginning of the process clearly needs to
include elements aiming at and providing the basis for democratization. Finally, the new executive, legislative and judicial power installed at the end of the transition should not be forced to share power with other bodies (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 3). If these conditions are fulfilled, it makes sense to define the start of a transition by the conclusion of a peace settlement and the official end by first post-war elections. The focus on negotiated settlements is also important because such processes most likely include all relevant groups in contrast to a settlement of the war by military victory. In addition, one could argue that negotiated settlements are of prime importance since they are less costly (in terms of human lives), can lead to an enduring peace and they have become the main way to end civil wars in the 1990s (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, p. 8-11). Such arrangements resemble elite pacts since they are negotiated by contenting elites and “define the rules of governance on the basis of mutual guarantees for the vital interests’ of those involved” (Karl and Schmitter 1995, p. 165).

Obviously, the whole idea of the term “transition” can be questioned more fundamentally as it implies problematic assumptions (Carothers 2002). But in the absence of a viable alternative, the term is used in this study without presuming that the theoretical sequence of opening, breakthrough, and consolidation will necessarily unfold empirically (Carothers 2002, p. 7). In fact, many countries have faced a stalled democratization process leading to what has been called hybrid regimes or defective democracies. But that does not render studies on democratic transitions after civil wars less relevant; on the contrary, it is crucial to understand the different paths those processes take.

For the definition of the concept of ethnic civil war, this study follows the general characterization that ethnic civil war is fought between ethnic communities and ethnically biased states over their power relationship (Sambanis 2001, p. 261; Kalyvas 2008, p. 1044). A more problematic term is the expression “post-war” since civil wars often do not end clear-cut and settlements are followed by periods of continuing violence. However, using this expression is at least more adequate than relying on the more common term “post-conflict” to refer to the phase after a peace agreement. The term “post-war” at least clearly refers to situations where major warfare has ceased, but some issues may remain unresolved and some violence might continue (Jarstad 2008a, p. 20).

This study argues that democratization after ethnic civil war can essentially be understood as a political integration process bringing together actors who have not necessarily existed (in the same way) before civil war. Political integration refers to the incorporation of different mobilized segments in order to (re)build the political landscape. The relevance of integration for democratic transitions stems from the fact that it can involve the
change of political conflict lines\textsuperscript{18} in such a way that fragmentation rather than polarization occurs. A political conflict line refers to the underlying line of affiliation of political conflicts, meaning a social division consistently transferred to the political sphere (Schmidt 2000, pp. 238-239).\textsuperscript{19}

While authors cited in the literature review would either not expect such a change or explain it with the new institutional setting or the inclusion and transformation of armed groups, I focus on the return of exile groups as a possible source of new conflict lines. Post-war periods after a peace settlement are normally characterized by the return of large groups of refugees and a difficult process of integration. In the context of mobilized refugee populations, there is the additional challenge of incorporating groups that have been politically and/or militarily active from abroad. Though the academic debate in the field of conflict and civil war has increasingly focused on the role of diaspora and exile groups during civil war, there is very little reference to the political impact of those who actually return after the end of violent conflict. In particular, the return of exile elites seeking an active role in the political process of their home country has largely been neglected. This study concentrates on the role of such elites, here mainly political leaders, for several reasons that are specified in the second subsection. Thus, the more concrete research question addressed in this study is: how do political conflict lines change in post-war transitions, and can the return of mobilized exile elites explain this change?

The first part of this section presents the argument of democratization as a political integration process in greater detail and outlines the main mechanism proposed by this study. The second section specifies the concept of fragmentation and different approaches to explain conflict lines. Overall, the following two subsections specify the main independent (return of mobilized exile elites) and the dependent (change in conflict lines) variable before a third subsection introduces the core hypothesis and alternative explanations.

\subsection*{2.2.1 Democratization as integration}

Processes of democratization in post-war settings have often been linked to elite bargains, institutional designs, mostly power-sharing arrangements or the interaction with peacebuilding. This dissertation argues that post-war transitions towards democracy can be assessed as a wider political integration process involving a new conflict structure that significantly differs from the one at the beginning of the civil war. Political integration here

\textsuperscript{18}Political conflict here can include violent as well as non-violent events.

\textsuperscript{19}This is very close to the meaning of “cleavages”. However, this expression has most commonly been used in studies of Western democratic systems and refers to very enduring social divisions. Therefore, the more neutral expression “conflict line” has been chosen here.
Chapter 2. Democratization after Civil War

means the incorporation of different mobilized groups into the political process after civil war. Such integration can imply a change of political conflict lines during the transition, for two reasons. On the one hand, new actors emerge or existing groups change over the course of the civil war, so that the spectrum of political actors at the end of the civil war is essentially different from the one that existed at the outbreak of war. On the other hand, these different actors have often not interacted very directly during civil war, even if they developed on the same side of the ethnic divide, partly because they have been active in different spheres (political versus military), partly because they have been spatially separated (exile versus resident).

The political versus military aspect has attracted much attention, inter alia with regard to the “generals-to-politicians transformation” taking place after civil war (Reilly 2002, p. 121). Returning exile groups are an altogether disregarded and little-studied aspect of post-war settings. Yet exile communities that have been mobilized and active during civil war are likely to play a distinct role after their return due to the mechanisms that are set in motion by the refugee experience. Thus, the second political division and its implications as well as its interaction with the first division are at the core of this study.

Integration in general can be defined as “a complex and long-term process of coalescing groups with different backgrounds, experiences, norms, expectations, and capacities” (Collier et al. 2003, p. 160). Political integration highlighted in this study signifies the incorporation of different mobilized groups and organizations that have developed or changed over the course of the civil war into the political process. In the medium and long term, it also means the alignment of identities and interests. But much in the same way as democratization processes can end in very different outcomes, political integration can ultimately fail or succeed, or even become stalled at an intermediary stage.

The argument that post-war transitions follow the path of “democratization by integration” is derived from two observations: First, (re)integration has been acknowledged as a key element of peacebuilding, but it can also have important consequences for democratization. This has not systematically been taken into account. One reason is that in the field of peacebuilding, integration is often seen as having socio-economic rather than direct political significance. There is the exception of studies focusing on the inclusion of armed groups that emphasize their influence on the course of transitions. But this has normally not been interpreted as the expression of a larger integration process among political actors. Another reason is that insights from the peacebuilding and democratization literature have only systematically been linked quite recently. Otherwise, integration might have come to the fore earlier as a political factor, because it has occasionally been discussed in the debate on institutional solutions.
for divided societies, as the following paragraph shows.

Second, changes in actor constellations due to integration can strongly influence the factors outlined in the literature review section. Elite bargaining processes certainly differ when actors who have newly emerged due to the civil war, such as exile groups, are included. Thus, pacts by peace negotiations are not only a matter of bringing together government and opposition forces or two warring parties, but of putting together the different segments of a much more fragmented political landscape. The institutional design as an outcome of elite bargaining might also differ in such settings.

Yet an even more fundamental question is which effects in post-war transitions can really be attributed to institutions, and which might rather have occurred due to earlier changes at the level of actors. This question is directly addressed by this study. Furthermore, integration is a core field where democratization and peacebuilding overlap significantly or even converge. Integration is also of immediate concern during and after peace settlements, because combatants are disarmed and demobilized in the first stage of the process and displaced people often return quickly after agreements. Furthermore, the process of incorporating these groups directly changes actor constellations on the ground. Both aspects make integration a very pressing as well as a highly challenging process.

Both the peacebuilding and the democratization literature have frequently referred to (re)integration, yet in very different ways. Authors dealing with institutional designs and democratic change in divided societies tend to see integration as a goal that is very difficult to achieve. The reason for this assessment is that this strand of the literature tends to focus on the main ethnic conflict line that is supposedly dominating the political arena at the end of an ethnic civil war and on institutional arrangements to accommodate rather than integrate this conflict line. For example Lijphart paints a bleak picture of the prospects of integrative strategies:

“Integration – creating greater trust and mutual understanding among people in ethnically and religiously divided societies and making these societies less plural and more homogeneous – is a long-term effort and cannot serve as an immediate solution to potential or actual civil strife.” (Lijphart 2008, p. 279)

Other authors prefer transcending existing differences instead of accommodating them, for example by designing federalism and electoral systems to bring together members of different groups within the same political unit and to disperse members of the same group across different units (Choudhry 2008). Horowitz’s idea of creating incentives for moderation and trans-ethnic alliances has, therefore, often been called the “integrative approach” (Sisk 1996). From this point of view, integration is possible if

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The approach has also been called centripetalist (Wolff 2010, p. 132).
the right political institutions are in place. But the process of integration is not discussed in greater detail; the expression is rather used with regard to a desirable end-status. It also mainly refers to bridging or mitigating the inter-ethnic divide without taking other possible group affiliations of political relevance into account.

Authors with a peacebuilding focus tend to see (re)integration as a necessary and almost inevitable process in post-war contexts. Normally it is depicted as the only viable option when displaced people return and ex-combatants are demobilized after civil war. In order to prevent negative consequences of the reinsertion of these groups, integration of some kind seems to be without alternative. One could argue that some aspects of the integration of rebel movements into the political system actually have an accommodating function (like amnesty provisions for war crimes or quotas for the inclusion of fighters from specific movements into the national army). But the ultimate goal is to demilitarize these groups and, thus, fully integrate them into society and civilian politics. The peacebuilding debate on (re)integration focuses less on the inter-ethnic division and much more on the inclusion of combatants and displaced people into peace processes. Studies in this field often tend to see (re)integration as important in terms of socio-economic, psychological or security considerations. This is less true for authors dealing with rebel movements who pay significant attention to the political role of these groups.

Institutional solutions have been proposed in order to build confidence between civilian and former military actors as well as to demilitarize politics in general (Lyons 2004), and transforming armed groups are directly addressed as political actors in transitions (Söderberg Kovacs 2008). With regard to refugees, (re)integration is commonly seen as a crucial or necessary condition for peace- or even state-building (Adelman 1997; Helling 2007). If (re)integration is ineffective or unsustainable, stability and peace can be at risk (Crisp 1998). But relatively few studies refer to returning refugees as political actors. This is partly due to the fact that in line with the official UNHCR position, refugees are not supposed to be mobilized because political activities in refugee camps are prohibited and armed people do not fall into the official refugee definition.

There are essentially three differences in how the institutional and the peacebuilding debates interpret (re)integration: The first debate concentrates on how to deal with the inter-ethnic divide, while the second refers to the difficult integration of former combatants, displaced people and sometimes political prisoners. Moreover, the first debate primarily deals with the political process while the second still tends to focus on security and socio-economic concerns, especially with regard to refugees. Possibly this is one reason why the first strand of literature is also much more skeptical about integration’s prospects of success, because a “relative inclusiveness of formal and informal networks of communication and influence among
the persons and factions making up a political elite” (Higley and Burton 2006, p. 9) is even more difficult to achieve than non-political integration. It needs to be stressed, however, that studies on armed groups in the peacebuilding realm have increasingly underlined their political role in post-war transitions. Finally, the first debate rather refers to the desirable final state of integration while the second mainly deals with the process itself. Again, this is partly due to the critical viewpoint of authors in the first category who assume that there is the alternative or even necessity of accommodating differences.

This study combines the different focal points of the two debates. On the one hand, relevant actors need to be taken into account beyond ethnic groups or warring parties. On the other hand, integration is interpreted as an essentially political process. This implies that groups like exile communities also need to be understood as political actors, because “mass exodus is a reflection of conflict, but it must also be seen as a catalyst for political change” (Pritchard 1996, p. 103). Thus, refugee return can be expected to affect not only stability and peace but also the course of the democratic transition. In line with the peacebuilding literature, this study applies a process-oriented focus assuming that political integration is almost inevitable after civil war. Though Lijphart might be right with his assessment that integration is a long-term aim and no immediate solution to civil war, a process with the final aim of integration nonetheless takes place after civil war – in a socio-economic and in a political sense. The underlying assumption is that war has fragmented society in many different ways and that these different fragments need to be put together in order to reduce post-conflict risks and sustain the democratic transition. Although the ultimate goal of integration is a high degree of mutual trust and understanding, the start of such a process is very likely to be a difficult and potentially disruptive one.

The discussion of different strands of the refugee literature has provided evidence that refugees can become a distinct and politically relevant group. It also contributed to the argument that exile can be the basis for divisions and have a political impact after return. However, most studies on refugees have focused on either the period of exile or the period of return. This study is a first step in better linking the different stages of the origin of flight, the role of exile groups during civil war and their impact after return.

Occasionally, it has been claimed that the differentiation between diaspora and homeland is meaningless, because in the era of globalization there is only one transnational community of all a nation’s members (Hockenos 2003, p. 263). This dissertation does not deny the transnational links and communication between exile communities and residents. However, it also stresses that borders and distance (in geographic and social terms) still matter. First, people would generally not flee across international borders if these demarcations were meaningless for their security. Second, those who
have been forced into exile during civil wars are normally driven by the wish to return home and might display different forms of mobilization as well as long-distance nationalism. Thirdly, despite transnational links the geographic distance is most likely to lead to social or even political distance.

The fact that spatial categories matter for mobilization is underlined by the urban-rural conflict line that constitutes one of four classic cleavages underlying Western party politics. Nobody would honestly argue that urban and rural areas are completely separated entities. But what matters are underlying social characteristics and preferences and their reinforcement by an environment with a similar disposition. Exile and resident communities are certainly further away from each other than urban and rural communities – in a spatial as well as a social sense.

Exile is not unique to ethnic civil war. Nevertheless, group persecution usually occurs in such a context, and refugee flows tend to be much larger as a result. These two points are critical, because larger refugee populations provide a broader base for mobilization, and militarization in exile is more likely among persecuted or state-in-exile refugee groups (Lischer 2005). In such cases, the challenge of post-war integration will also be more acute than in transitions without prior armed conflict. Moreover, the best way to observe mobilization in exile is to focus on persecuted refugee groups, because state-in-exile groups are already mobilized and may even be militarized when they depart their home country. Persecuted groups, in contrast, leave the country because they feel threatened as members of an ethnic group; although some components among the refugees might have already been politically active before exile, broader mobilization and militarization take place abroad.

The term “exile” comprises the status quo of refugees who have fled across at least one international border and afterwards remain abroad. The underlying refugee definition focuses on conflict-related refugees, meaning those who left their home country “to escape the perceived threat of violence from a conflict under way” (Adelman 2002, p. 296). Those taking up arms in exile are not per se excluded from the category of “refugee”, in contrast to provisions in international law which determine that those resorting to violence no longer qualify for refugee status (UNHCR 2006, p. 13). On the one hand, in the real world the distinction between armed elements and “proper” refugees is almost impossible to make, a fact which is even acknowledged by international actors. On the other hand, an exclusion of armed elements from the definition per se would make the examination of the so-called “refugee warrior” phenomenon unworkable.

While situational refugees are primarily interested in the stabilization of the security situation, persecuted and state-in-exile groups might get involved in the struggle over state resources and for regime change, as their reason for flight has been political.
Finally, there is the issue of the context for the return of exile groups. Certainly, refugee return and integration take place in all kinds of post-war setting, but comprehensive integration is most likely under a negotiated democratic transition, because broad-based return is enabled by the regime change accompanied by the opening of the political system. Especially those among the refugees associated with political or military parties have a strong incentive to return quickly after regime change in their home country when it benefits their party. Military victory in an ethnic civil war, in contrast, normally produces new outflows of people (when an opposition movement wins) or leads to a protracted refugee situation without any major return waves (when the government side wins). Thus, the mechanism of integration in the change of conflict structures is rather peculiar to the context of post-war democratization.

The overall expectation of this study is that the return of politically relevant groups in democratic transitions after ethnic civil war makes the occurrence of new conflict lines based on exile likely. Certainly, the return of mobilized exile groups cannot explain post-war democratization in all its facets, but it adds a factor that has previously been neglected and has the potential to lead to the fragmentation of conflict lines underlying political struggles.

2.2.2 Changing conflict lines: Linking exile return and fragmentation

Fragmentation of political conflict lines is a common occurrence in post-war situations. It is partly, but not exclusively, displayed in a fragmented political party organization (Jarstad 2008a, p. 32). Conflicts between different factions inside parties and movements and short-term alliances are another feature of this phenomenon. In a very general sense, fragmentation occurs when there is a competition for control on one side of a boundary, at least until one competing force eliminates the other. Polarization, in contrast, becomes likely when there is a connection of factions on each side of a boundary without establishing new connections across the boundary (Tilly 2003, p. 21). In the empirical literature, fragmentation refers to multiple and potentially crosscutting cleavages, such as religious, linguistic and regional identities combined with case and class formations (study on India by quoted by (Diamond et al. 1990, p. 29)). Whether it only takes place on one side of a division or even displays crosscutting lines of affiliation, fragmentation very generally refers to a diversification of conflict lines.

In an ethnic party system, fragmentation does not necessarily enhance polarization as proposed for Western party systems. Normally, authors investigating these systems consider two-party systems as the ones that are most likely to be moderating and accommodating because of the broad political appeals by parties. But Diamond et al. stress that such two-party
systems require crosscutting cleavages and “if the two-party cleavage co-
incides with other accumulated cleavages (such as ethnicity or religion), it
might further polarize conflict as to produce democratic breakdown and
civil strife” (Diamond et al. 1990, p. 25-26). This qualification underlines
that in an ethnic system, a two-party constellation might be especially po-
larizing while the existence of several actors on one or both sides of the
ethnic divide might have the potential to dilute the ethnic conflict line.

The question is where such conflict lines within or across ethnic groups
come from if the ethnic line should be “the only real game in town” after
an ethnic civil war. There are different approaches for explaining conflict
lines and potential sources of change in a context where ethnic identity is
of great importance.

The primordialist approach cannot explain any changes despite a hard-
ening of the main ethnic conflict line. It interprets an ethnic identity as basi-
cally fixed, at least once it has become salient. Thus, no structural changes
in conflict lines after civil war can be expected (Brubaker 1998; Chandra
2001; van Evera 2001). From this perspective, fragmentation cannot be ex-
plained since it must necessarily be based on certain changes when newly
occurring conflicts do not (merely) take place between ethnic groups. In
this case, it clearly is not a simple intensification of leadership struggles
along the main ethnic conflict line, but a diversification of political conflict
lines. Only dynamic approaches taking account of the possibility of conflict
line changes can explain their fragmentation.

Some essentialists subscribe to a similar assumption. Generally, they see political iden-
tities as more or less directly based on cultural background variables that are articulated by
nationalist entrepreneurs (Cederman 2001, p. 10).

Figure 2.1: Different Approaches to Conflict Lines

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tities as more or less directly based on cultural background variables that are articulated by
nationalist entrepreneurs (Cederman 2001, p. 10).
What potential sources does change in the form of a fragmentation of conflict lines have? The second approach to conflict lines refers to institutions as a variable that can explain changes in conflict lines. The literature review section has already presented the debate on the most adequate institutional design for divided societies. The central controversy is between those who prefer power-sharing arrangements in negotiated settings and those who promote other institutional formulas such as preferential voting systems. Both sides of the debate tend to assume that civil war has deepened the main ethnic conflict line and institutions need to be designed in order to deal with it; authors simply disagree on how this should be done. Since the institutional framework in a post-war setting based on a negotiated settlement is endogenous to the conflict, power-sharing is often stressed as the more likely solution to civil war. Yet both its proponents and its opponents agree that power-sharing cannot normally lead to a change in conflict lines. In fact, change under such arrangements cannot be expected at all when institutions are seen as the central source for change. This is in contradiction with what the third approach on changes in conflict lines proposes.

This third approach originates in conflict research and stresses civil war as a potential source for change. The more constructivist literature on mechanisms in civil war focuses on changes in identity and group formation. The significance of identity construction has been studied for the outbreak of ethnic violence (Fearon and Laitin 2000) and for dynamics over the course of the civil war (Kalyvas 2006). The latter literature is of particular interest here. As has been pointed out in the literature review section, the core assumption is that identities are as much a consequence as a cause of civil war. Kalyvas normally refers to newly emerging divisions within ethnic groups or a change in ethnic group boundaries. For reasons of simplicity, the diagram displays newly occurring lines on one side of the ethnic divide, but they can surely occur on both sides. Most importantly, these new lines also make the main ethnic conflict line more permeable. Changes can lead to new affiliations and networks that alter the structure of conflict lines (Kalyvas 2008, p. 6). This approach is important, because it might help to solve an empirical puzzle: the occurrence of fragmentation under power-sharing arrangements. Yet conflict research naturally concentrates on the outbreak and course of civil war, not on its aftermath. Thus, this approach does not provide a comprehensive assessment of the effects of changes that developed over the course of the war for post-war transitions.

In contrast to primordialism, which cannot explain change in conflict lines, the assumption that identities are multidimensional and not fixed is widely accepted. According to the constructivist approach, identities cannot only be seen as changeable, but as socially constructed and based on a process of identity formation (Cederman 2001, p. 10). Rationalist ap-
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proaches are also compatible with a dynamic view on conflict lines. For example, Downs, as a proponent of an economic approach to democracy, names very similar conditions for fragmentation – here meaning the creation of new parties – as the last two rationales displayed in the diagram. Besides election laws, he mentions a sudden change in preferences of the electorate (normally due to important events such as wars or revolutions) or a party split between moderates and extremists within one party in a two-party system (Schmidt 2000, pp. 216-217). Thus, change could occur due to incentives and opportunities provided by the political transition, or by the start of negotiations as proposed by the thesis on the hidden costs of power-sharing. This interpretation conforms to accounts of the rise of the first democracies in northwest Europe. There it has been argued that “many elites in new democracies are less committed to democracy than interested in using this regime for other purposes – for example, to neutralize conflict, co-opt opposition forces, stabilize the system, and thereby maximize their political power” (Bunce 2000, p. 726). Group formation and identity hardly play a role in this interpretation and as in rational choice within International Relations more generally, “the actual dynamic process and time path are not described, but bracketed under the assumption that actors adjust to a new equilibrium as it emerges.” (Snidal 2002, p. 83). Therefore, rationalist explanations are not very much in line with the process-oriented argumentation of this study, as it focuses on behavior at the group rather than the individual level and much interaction between structure and agent is proposed. Certainly, changes in incentives can cause or contribute to fragmentation, but the underlying group affiliations ultimately remain unclear. Thus, this study rather follows a constructivist rationale. Yet it is moderately constructivist as it investigates the role of exile groups for political conflict lines as a causal rather than as a constitutive explanation (Fearon and Wendt 2002, p. 58).

2.2.3 The relevance of exile return and alternative explanations

The approach of this study is an extended version of the third line of argument stressing civil war as a source of conflict line change. The argument here is that changes taking place during civil war can finally become manifest in the integration process during post-war transitions. Thus, the civil war itself can be the source of changes in conflict lines during the following democratic transition based on the transformation of armed rebels and the return of mobilized exile groups. The first aspect has already been investigated, sometimes by labeling it a moderate-extremist division. The second aspect has practically been ignored and, therefore, is analyzed in this study. The following diagram specifies the possible effect of mobilized exile groups that return after civil war with regard to political conflicts. It shows that due to different group formation over the course of the civil war and
to return later on conflicts between exile and resident groups might occur.

When flight because of group persecution mainly takes place on one side of the ethnic divide, which is a very likely scenario, these conflicts are intra-ethnic as displayed in the diagram. If there are exile groups on both sides of the ethnic divide, the conflict line can even take on a trans-ethnic character. In both cases, the newly emerging line has the potential to also change the ethnic conflict line. First, when conflicting interests within an ethnic group come to the fore, this can be a step in making the ethnic line less intense (Simonsen 2005, p. 206). Second, because there are practically no cases where a complete ethnic group leaves a country, the group of “stayees” comprises people from both sides of the ethnic divide. Therefore, even intra-ethnic conflicts might affect ethnic group relations directly and make an alliance crossing ethnic boundaries at least possible when “stayees” cooperate to keep exile people out of the political game. Such a new conflict line can be based on divergent interests and identities of exile and non-exile groups.

Certainly, if exile communities have been politically and/or militarily active over the course of the civil war, it is highly unlikely that they will not try to stay involved after their return. Rather, networks and organizations developed in exile might persist after the return to the country of origin, serving as a basis for further activities. In line with Deutsch, one
could argue that the density of transactions declines with distance, here meaning spatial as well as social distance. If there is more interaction again at some point, an identity’s thickness will reduce (Cederman 2001, p. 5). Thus, the return and integration of exile groups during post-war transitions might diminish or even resolve conflicts between exile and resident people. However, the first part of the process is particularly likely to be conflictive. In addition, there is a kind of path-dependency with regard to political organizations. Once they have been established and sustained for a certain time, it seems relatively likely that they will persist – even if the underlying grievances and group interests disappear or become less relevant. Gurr, for example, has states that grievances are crucial in the early stages of mobilization, but become less significant once organized political action has started and factors such as group organization, leadership, and state response become more important (Gurr 1993b, p. 189).

In applying a moderate version of the constructivist approach this study acknowledges that incentives and opportunities are relevant. But in line with sociological approaches it also stresses the importance of grievances and group formation that constitute the “affective dimension” of mobilization (Nedelmann 1987, p. 181). Based on specific grievances and identity formations, the exile component can remain politically salient even when the common interest of return and the particular opportunities provided by exile are removed.

When it is acknowledged that people usually have multiple and potentially complementary identities, the dominance of one political identity layer over another is often attributed to the influence of leaders who might force polarization (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 35). Whether the mechanism here really is elite manipulation, the role of leadership in mobilization is certainly crucial. As discussed in the literature review, the importance of elites is further enhanced in democratic transitions, particularly in a post-war setting based on a negotiated peace agreement among leaders. Therefore, this study focuses on the elite level in investigating the role of exile groups for political conflicts in post-war transition. The fact that conflict line changes are also easier to trace by the analysis of elite interaction over time is of secondary importance, but an additional argument for this focus.

Elites can be defined as “persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially.” (Burton et al. 1992, p. 8). This means they must at least have an acknowledged authority for an organized sector of society. Therefore, I include state actors as well as “those who endeavor to change it” in this definition (Etzioni-Halevy 1993, p. 3). Generally, political elites are at the core of this study, meaning that other spheres, namely the judiciary, the military, civil society and the economy, are excluded. Representatives from these sphere are only included if they have or had a political function at some point during the process.
Based on these qualifications, the following core hypothesis is explored in a qualitative case study:

**H1: The return of mobilized exile elites is likely to cause a fragmentation of conflict lines in post-war transitions.**

The independent variable implies that elites in exile are politically and/or militarily active and retain the goal to return to their home country. Return here refers to the intention of return, and return becoming a realistic prospect. At the elite level, mobilized exile people are involved in negotiating their own and other refugees’ return. Thus, the occurrence of conflicts between exile and non-exile elite can be expected even before the physical return. So, the intention of return and a concrete option of return for mobilized exile elites are the minimal characteristics that need to be present in order for this factor to have an influence on conflict lines.

When fragmentation occurs based on the return of mobilized exile groups, it should run along the “internal-external” conflict line, meaning between those who have been or are in exile and those who staid inside the country of origin during the civil war. Such a newly emerging conflict line in post-war transitions can take place both within and between different organizations, for example rebel movements or political parties.

Four alternative explanations can be derived from the central aspects outlined in the literature review and the different approaches to conflict lines. First, the start of elite bargaining in peace negotiations might be the root of a new division. A new conflict line could emerge between those who decide to cooperate and those who stay outside of the process and continue fighting. Such conflicts have commonly been interpreted in terms of a division between moderate and extremist forces. In a study over time, the moderate-extremist label is a moving target and not conflict-specific; thus, this division is rather called “pro-negotiation versus anti-negotiation line”. The first central challenge is to analyze whether newly occurring conflicts at the time of negotiations can be due to this division that also is a function of the civil war.

Second, the role of institutions in the development of conflict lines needs to be considered. The central assumption that power-sharing arrangements do not have the capacity to change conflict lines because they

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23The moderate-extremist label is generally problematic. On the one hand, authors often use these labels without specifying whether they generally refer to the claims or the behavior of groups. Sometimes any armed movement is seen as a rather extremist force, because it employs violent means to achieve certain goals. In terms of ideology and rhetoric, however, non-armed groups can be equally or even more extremist. (Non-)participation in negotiations can provide evidence of which groups are more or less cooperative at this point in time. However, this classification is bound to the issue of negotiations and not constant over time. For these reasons it is preferable not to use “moderate” and “extremist” as fixed labels, but rather to refer to the underlying characteristics and issues of a conflict.
tend to mirror and freeze the main ethnic division has already been discussed with regard to the three general approaches to conflict lines. Indeed, proponents and opponents of these arrangements support this view. They state for example that: “[p]ower-sharing and power-dividing institutions can reinforce wartime identities. In the immediate aftermath of conflict, …, anticipating that new identities and sources of cleavages would emerge in the short term seems premature” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, p. 150). Contrary to Hartzell and Hoddie, this study assumes that changes might still occur because of the political integration process, but that these are not based on the institutional setting. But institutions might not only change based on a peace settlement, but can be adapted or even fundamentally changed later on. Furthermore, even arrangements based on power-sharing might have unintended consequences going beyond a freezing of the main conflict line. Therefore, changes in conflict lines have to be set in relation to change in institutions over time to make sure that there is really no relevant causal relation.

Third, the incorporation of armed groups as the most important factor stemming from the literature on peacebuilding and democratization is of relevance for exploring the hypothesis outlined above. It is included in the political integration approach as the underlying division of a possibly occurring political-military conflict line has also developed due to the civil war. This alternative explanation implies that military actors have a political agenda and transform into political actors at some point which normally happens by negotiations at the elite level or after a military victory.

Finally, beyond these three alternative explanations for newly occurring conflict lines derived from the literature review, there is an additional possibility. This study would not really live up to the claim of being process-oriented if it did not take pre-war divisions into account. Based on Simmel’s in-group/out-group argument (Levy 1988), the re-occurrence of previously existing conflict lines is a conceivable explanation as well. Even in ethnically divided societies, there are often other lines of affiliation with political relevance, such as regional or clan divisions. These divisions might have been largely covered by the ethnic civil war, but can become prominent and the basis for conflicts again when cohesion due to the civil war diminishes again. Thus, such earlier lines of political relevance have to be taken into account when analyzing post-war conflicts.

There is an additional reason for looking into pre-war divisions. In order to be able to talk about a new conflict line based on exile, it is important that there has not been a kind of self-selection process at the time of flight. If, for example, only elites from a certain faction within an ethnic group leave the country and engage in political and/or military activities, they probably do not constitute a genuinely new group. Surely, even such pre-existing groups can be expected to change during exile, but the argument on the impact of exile would be stronger if a broader group of elites across
existing factions went into exile without prior organizational separation. Obviously, it is not relevant here if exile groups become more radical or distinct in other ways during their time abroad. In fact, this is the central argument of this study; exile generally sets in motion a process of changing identities and preferences, and ultimately of different patterns of mobilization. Only if these alternative explanations are addressed by the case study and conflicts clearly based on exile divisions are identified does the return of mobilized exile elites have explanatory force by itself. Naturally, exile divisions can be linked to other lines of affiliation, but it is essential to make sure that their occurrence is not merely due to a renaming or transformation of an existing line.

The main causal mechanism linking the return of exile elites and the occurrence of a fragmentation of conflict lines proposed in this study is political integration. While return becoming a concrete option can be seen as a first step in incorporating exile elites, political integration really starts when they need to position themselves in relation to other actors from their home country. The argument is that this first phase of integration is conflictive due to the group formation in exile and the development of different interests of exile and non-exile elites. The mechanism of political integration also implies that an emerging internal-external conflict line can remain relevant even when the integration process advances, because the underlying affiliation and grievances continue to be present. Moreover, much as armed movements are expected to maintain their ideology, logic and structures even after the start of their transformation, exile-based patterns of mobilization will most likely remain relevant for a longer time period as well. The period after civil war is therefore likely to be characterized by a fragmentation of conflict lines that prevails during and possibly beyond the democratic transition. If political integration is ultimately successful, the conflict lines based on the civil war might disappear, but they could also leave a lasting mark in the organizational landscape of the home country.

The proposed causal mechanism of political integration needs to be substantiated by the case study. If the mechanism of integration is not at work in a post-war transition, newly occurring conflict lines should either not occur or quickly disappear again. A reason might be that no underlying group formation has taken place and thus the return of exile elites and the transformation of armed groups remove the original division. Other, unexpected dynamics might also come to the fore, showing for example that integration is an issue for the occurrence of conflicts, but not at the political but merely at the social level. If, however, political conflicts along the internal-external line emerge and persist over a longer time period, this is a strong indication that a political integration process underlies the proposed causal relation.

The argument of “democratization as integration” suggests that the
civil war creates new affiliations that become manifest with the integration of elites during the post-war transition. In the empirical literature on (re)integration, the most commonly named divisions produced by civil war are between those who fled, those who stayed and those who fought. Thus, the internal-external as well as the political-military conflict line outlined above are part of this process.

But the two phenomena of exile and rebellion also tend to overlap. In the literature on refugee militarization, it has been pointed out that persecuted groups can have strong incentives as well as opportunities to start a rebellion based in exile (Lischer 2005). In the case of state-in-exile groups as well as rebel movements that already exist, moving activities to the exterior has important advantages. On the one hand, these groups can evade state repression and, on the other hand, have access to new resources abroad, for example arms and finances provided by neighbor countries. Despite the problematic aspects of a relocation of activities, many movements have taken advantage of this strategy. In fact, more than half the rebel groups active since 1945 have had external sanctuaries at some point (Salehyan 2009, p. 10). The establishment of rebel groups in exile or their transfer to bases outside the country of origin generate the difficulty of keeping apart effects of exile and of rebellion at a later stage. It is of central importance for this study to isolate an effect of exile on conflict lines. Thus, implications of exile must not be confused with consequences that are simply due to armed rebellion. Yet the two phenomena can interact and exile might well introduce a new aspect to armed rebellion. Particularly in the case of persecuted refugee groups, exile can actually be the very basis on which the rebellion is founded – in terms of motives, but also opportunities. But beyond this interactive dimension, exile should also have a more independent effect on conflict lines. Therefore, a divide between elites who have been in exile and those who stayed inside the country of origin should occur not only between but also within political and military organizations as part of the political integration process.

The overall expectation of this study is that the return of mobilized exile elites can account for the fragmentation of political conflict lines during post-war democratic transitions beyond commonly applied explanations. Until now, such fragmentation has either been neglected, especially under power-sharing arrangements, or has been attributed merely to the transformation of armed groups or different versions of a moderate-extremist divide within one ethnic group.
Chapter 3

Research Design

This study applies a qualitative case study design to investigate the relationship between returning exile elites and the fragmentation of political conflict lines. A qualitative approach is appropriate here, because of its focus on the views of actors (in this case, political elites), its flexibility in dealing with novel or unanticipated findings and its preference for contextual understanding (Bryman 1984, pp. 77-78). The overall aim is to establish a valid relationship in a single most-likely case and to explore relevant causal mechanisms. In the larger framework of this research, the causal link proposed in the hypothesis also acts as a mechanism that can help to explain to what extent democratization after civil war is different from democratization without any prior armed conflict and why it is so difficult to sustain.

The reliability of case study findings is assured by various means. First, data and methodological triangulation is applied, because the data bases for the analysis are news sources as well as semi-structured interviews with political elites, and these are examined by using the congruence method and process-tracing. Furthermore, the data collection and interpretation are based on a detailed documentation of standards and coding procedures in order to increase the accuracy of measurement. The causal relation between the two variables is mainly demonstrated by the congruence method, but process-tracing as a complementary analytical approach also contributes to internal validity by establishing a causal path and substantiating findings based on the congruence method. Naturally, external validity cannot be assured based on a case study design despite some evidence from other cases and the provision of a general theoretical logic.

3.1 Research strategy and methodology

The case study explores a new argument, but also seeks to test existing theoretical propositions. A core hypothesis was developed based on the in-
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sights from theoretical and empirical studies. Instead of leaving the identification of a possible outcome of the integration of exile elites up to the analysis, this study proposed a specific effect, namely a fragmentation of political conflict lines. The assumed effect was derived from different strands of the conflict and refugee literature in subsection 2.1.4 and a general hunch based on empirical insights from different post-war countries where conflicts between returning exile and resident groups have been disclosed.¹ Furthermore, there was the empirical puzzle that many post-war countries undergoing a democratic transition face a process of political fragmentation despite the general assumption that a civil war should have deepened the main conflict line. Based on these insights, this study entails a mixture of inductive and deductive elements and, as commonly proposed, moved “from hypothesis generating to hypothesis testing” (Gerring 2007, p. 148). In this sense, cycles of exploration have alternated with cycles of theory testing, for example when a first field research trip was used as a plausibility probe for the relationship implied in this study.

The design presented in this section includes aspects of flexible and fixed designs. It provides more pre-specification than usual in flexible designs and produces data in the form of numbers as well as in the form of words. However, it is not as standardized as experimental or survey research and not aimed at statistical generalization (Robson 2002, pp. 4-6). The case study is not able to establish generalization, but it aims at understanding a larger population of cases and it contributes to the establishment of a general proposition (Gerring 2007, p. 37; Lijphart 1971, p. 691). Moreover, since the hypothesis put forward contradicts others in the relevant literature, especially the one that states that ethnic civil wars mainly lead to a deepening of the ethnic conflict line, the confirmation of the core hypothesis can demonstrate that these usual hypotheses are not generalizable as well. By presenting a logic as to why the hypothesis generated by this study could be generalizable, it also contributes to theory-building.

The topic at the core of this study that refers to variables and contexts for which the data base is weak lends itself to case study research, as the first line of evidence often comes from case studies (Gerring 2007, p. 39). The link between the return of mobilized exile elites and the fragmentation of conflict lines – a phenomenon often neglected in itself in post-war periods – has not been made systematically before. Studying a most-likely case is especially useful in this regard, because if despite a very deep analysis no causal link appears in such a case, it cannot be expected to appear in other cases. Thus, gathering and analyzing data on other, less likely cases only makes sense if this one case has provided clear evidence for a causal

¹The most important case in this regard was Rwanda which, however, did not qualify as a country case for this study because of the authoritarian character of its post-war transition which, moreover, was brought about by military victory. For the specification of case selection criteria, see section 3.3.
link. At a more general level, case studies can assure the uniformity of
background conditions over time and provide for the possibility to control
for the effect of third variables (van Evera 1997, p. 53). Both are important
for this study, which compares fragmentation after to polarization before
civil war and controls for alternative explanations.

Apart from the conceptual advantages of conducting a most-likely case
study, elaborating a cross-cases analysis would have gone beyond the scope
of this study. There are very little data available for countries emerging
from years or decades of civil war for the variables of interest here. There
are practically no systematic data on changes of conflict lines over time
in different countries that have experienced civil war, especially not at a
level that would be fine-grained enough for examining the relationship
proposed here. Even where authors at least mention intra-ethnic or other
possible conflict lines, their sources and underlying affiliations are poorly
specified, as in the case of the often cited “moderate-extremist” divisions.
Data on the return of refugees are generally available, but not system-
atically at the level of political elites. Many of the alternative explana-
tions would have also been difficult to examine based on existing accounts.
Therefore, a detailed case study is the best starting point to explore the hy-
pothesis proposed.

It is a common feature of case studies to look at periods of change, typ-
ically producing “before” and “after” observations (Gerring 2007, p. 32).
The case study conducted in the following chapter is no exception. It fo-
cuses on democratic transitions after ethnic civil war as a class of events
of which the case under examination is an instance (George and Bennett
2005, p. 17). As already illustrated, this study concentrates on the change
of conflict lines over time and the explanation of this change by the return
of exile elites in democratic post-war transitions. Based on the theoretical
framework and the hypothesis, there are three specific predictions:

1. The value of the independent variable changes prior to the one of the
dependent variable: fragmentation should occur or visibly increase
after an opportunity for the return of mobilized exile elites arises.

2. The independent variable has the power to explain the value of the
dependent variable or at least an important part of it: alternative ex-
planations can be ruled out or do not provide a sufficient explanation
for the value of the dependent variable.

3. There are causal mechanisms that link the independent and the de-
dependent variable: such mechanisms establishing a causal chain can
provide direct evidence of causality and specify how the independent
and dependent variable are connected.

These three predictions lead to three methodological steps in the re-
search design. First, the values of the dependent and the independent variable have to be defined. Since the expectation is that the return of mobilized exile elites should become an issue at the time peace negotiations start, fragmentation should start to occur afterwards. In order to set a baseline measure, the value of the dependent variable needs to be defined at least one year ahead of negotiations. There should be a move from polarization at the beginning of the period under investigation to fragmentation over the course of the transition. On the side of the independent variable, it needs to be demonstrated that a relevant number of exile elites exists, their mobilization is directed at political change in the country of origin and they have an intention to return.

In a second step in the investigation, the influence of other independent variables on the dependent variable can be eliminated using the congruence method. The ultimate goal is to show that at least an important part of the defined value of the dependent variable over time can be explained by exile return. Once the explanatory force of the independent variable in the hypothesis has been deduced by the congruence method, the third step aims to trace the process that connects the variables and identify a causal mechanism in order not only to explain that the variables are linked, but also show how they are linked.

The congruence method looks at the congruence or incongruence between values observed on the independent and dependent variable and can be based on observations within cases or across cases (van Evera 1997, p. 56-58). The theory employed in the congruence method can be formulated by the investigator for the first time and does not need to be well-established, which is important in the framework of this study (George and Bennett 2005, p. 182-183). This study uses multivariate congruence testing as proposed by George and Bennett (George and Bennett 2005, p. 185). This approach not only builds on the comparison of the values of the independent and dependent variable as the “congruence procedures” proposed by van Evera, but explicitly includes other explanatory variables. This is crucial, because post-war democratic transitions are a period of general change and, thus, the value of variables other than the return of mobilized exile elites can be expected to shift at the same time.

The multivariate version of the congruence method is basically a method of elimination. By ruling out alternative explanations, it can determine whether the general consistency of the main independent and dependent variable implies a causal link (George and Bennett 2005, p. 185). The expectation is that in this case study, at least a relevant part of the variation on the dependent variable over the course of the period of observation cannot be explained by commonly cited variables such as the re-occurrence of earlier divisions and that exile return is a plausible explanation for this part of variation. Thus, the congruence method can confirm the causal relationship proposed in this study and is the central means of
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assuring internal validity.

Process-tracing is applied to substantiate and extend the findings based on the congruence method. This method explores the chain of events linking the initial case conditions and the case outcomes. In doing so, process-tracing divides a cause-effect link into smaller steps (van Evera 1997, p. 64). Contrary to the part using the multivariate congruence method, the end and beginning of observations cannot easily be defined in the process-tracing part. However, in a non-sample-based study, this is not problematic (Gerring 2007, p. 179-180). Instead, the method deals with multiple links in a causal chain that should ideally be formalized and broken down into micro-mechanisms. In conducting process-tracing, however, it is reasonable to focus on those links in a causal chain that are weakest and most crucial for the overall argument (Gerring 2007, p. 181-184). Process-tracing cannot identify antecedent conditions for a relationship to operate since it simply focuses on the causal process, but it can strongly corroborate a theory’s ability to explain at least one case, which is the main objective in this case study (van Evera 1997, p. 66).

The combination of congruence method and process-tracing in this case study is useful for several reasons. In general, applying more than one method allows for a more reliable examination of the relationship proposed in the hypothesis. This kind of methodological triangulation is commonly employed to increase the confidence in the results produced. The congruence method aims to show that a theory or theoretical argument is congruent (or not congruent) with the outcome of a case, but it does not trace the whole causal process from the independent to the dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005, p. 153). Therefore, even in its multivariate version it is based on certain assumptions, and there might also be omitted variables that could have an influence on the causal relationship. Process-tracing identifies each of the significant steps in a causal sequence and can thus explain the link via a chain of mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005, p. 30+140-141). Therefore, process-tracing can generally be applied for cross-checking or the triangulation of results gained by other methods (Gerring 2007, p. 185).

Here, process-tracing serves the purpose of substantiating and specifying the causal effect proposed by the previous analysis based on congruity of magnitude with the ultimate goal of demonstrating that

“[…] individuals must have been capable of behaving, and motivated to behave as the macrolevel theory states, and that they did in fact behave the way they did because of the explicit and implicit microlevel assumptions embedded in the macrolevel theory.” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 142)

It can thus check those assumptions on which the congruence method
was based, and it can provide direct evidence for the influence of the return of exile elites.  

But process-tracing cannot only support (or refute) findings based on the congruence method; it can also give additional insights. By following the causal path, process-tracing can ensure that the independent variable(s) really preceded change in the dependent variable (Munck 2004, p. 112). For this specific study, it can also show to what extent exile was not merely the basis of mobilization and the underlying affiliation in later conflicts, but also what features and causes these conflicts had. Much as ethnicity or ethnic fractionalization as such hardly provide a sufficient explanation for ethnic conflict, exile-related conflicts are not just based on a specific exile background; its political relevance and underlying group formation also need to be detected. Furthermore, it is essential that process-tracing can identify how different factors interact that have been treated as separate by the congruence method. For example, exile and rebellion can be overlapping phenomena in civil wars and the related conflict lines can thus be linked as well. Finally, process-tracing can help to identify causal mechanisms. The main mechanism assumed in this study is political integration, but this needs to be substantiated by following the causal path.

**Time frame**

The main points of observation in the study are the outbreak of the civil war, the start of peace negotiations and the first post-war elections as the official end of the transition process. The first two points serve as different baseline measures, while the last one marks the end of the period that is at the core of this study: the democratic post-war transition. The outbreak of civil war is important for two reasons: first, it needs to be demonstrated that this period was marked by polarization rather than fragmentation in order to make sure that there is a difference in conflict lines before and after the civil war. Second, the time of the outbreak of civil war is the period when people usually start to leave into exile. Here, it is important to make sure that there is no self-selection in flight, meaning not that specific groups or factions left the country but that flight was a broader phenomenon.

Particularly for the first purpose, it is essential that the direct pre-war period is as similar to the post-war period with regard to the political process as possible. Ideally, the pre-war period was also a democratization period. This would allow for a before/after comparison that directly refers to the wider research question of this study, which considers to what extent

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2 Furthermore, the data sources for the congruence method and the process-tracing are different. The first analysis is based on information from news sources, while the second is based on semi-structured interviews from field research. As outlined in the section on data collection and analysis, data triangulation is another way to make the findings of the different empirical analyses more reliable.
democratization after civil war is different.

The relevance of the start of peace negotiations has already been mentioned. Fragmentation should occur at this point if the assumption that negotiations provide a first real prospect for exile return is correct. Yet negotiations could also have a more independent effect in their own right, which is taken into account in the part dealing with alternative explanations based on the congruence method. The first post-war elections mark the official end of the democratic transition.

The period of observation ends one year after the elections in order to account for further changes brought about by the change in government. The three main points of observation can also be seen as critical junctures in the whole process, because at each point the political development could have taken very different paths. Overall, this study relies on observing and measuring change in conflicts and conflict lines over time before exploring a causal effect and then, in a second analytical step, investigating the causal mechanism of political integration (Gerring 2007, p. 43).

For a case study of this format, the main aim is to establish a causal link between the return of exile elites and fragmentation of conflict lines that has not been systematically assessed before for one most-likely case. It cannot define antecedent conditions or uncover how often certain conditions or outcomes occur, but it can establish an internally valid causal path for the case under investigation.

3.2 Operationalization

In a next step, the relevant variables introduced in the theoretical framework have to be operationalized. In order to measure the dependent as well as the independent variables, including the alternative explanations, specific indicators of the concepts need to be developed. The operationalization of the dependent variable refers to conflict lines and fragmentation as the two central components. But since political conflicts are the concept on which the measurement of this variable is ultimately based, this concept is specified in greater detail. The operationalization of the independent variable and the variables derived from alternative explanations follows in the second subsection.

3.2.1 The dependent variable: fragmentation of conflict lines

The development of conflict lines can only be identified and measured when the universe of political conflicts is known. Changes in underlying lines of affiliation can only be assessed on the basis of this detailed knowledge of political conflicts. In that sense, the definition and operationalization of the concept of political conflict are fundamental and are
therefore undertaken in this subsection before the concepts of conflict line and fragmentation are outlined.

Political conflict

The first essential qualification for the concept of political conflict is that it comprises violent and non-violent events. The literature on ethnic conflict normally acknowledges this, but to describe non-violent events authors often use expressions like “dispute” or “tension”, and the choice of cases dealt with in volumes on ethnic conflict tends to be biased towards cases involving violence (Schneckener and Wolff 2004). More importantly, however, many works are based on definitions that are rather difficult to operationalize for a fine-grained analysis such as this study.

It is, therefore, worth starting from the concept of contentious politics. This strand of literature focuses mainly on mass phenomena such as social movements, revolutions or wars, but elites play a more or less prominent role in the different explanations. Furthermore, contention at the mass level is normally linked to elites whether these are seen as the source of contention or not. Despite focusing also on extreme events associated with violence of some kind, much of the relevant literature systematically includes less intense incidents like sit-ins, protests or demonstrations. These qualify as being contentious if they are not routine actions that are regularly scheduled (Bond et al. 1997, p. 556f.). One important underlying assumption is that most intense conflicts start with much less visible episodes of contention.

This study treats contentiousness as a necessary and sufficient condition for political conflict. The operationalization of political conflict by the two central dimensions of contentiousness and coerciveness has been proposed. However, Bond et al., for example, do not systematically treat coerciveness as a necessary condition for political conflict (Bond et al. 1997). Furthermore, they finally code coerciveness by the same indicators that define violence (material damage and destruction, physical injuries and death), although conceptually they treat violence as a byproduct or outcome of conflict and explicitly state that coercion may or may not include violence (Bond et al. 1997, p. 565+557).

Other authors argue that contentiousness alone is adequate to understand and investigate phenomena such as revolutions (McAdam et al. 2001). The definition provided by McAdam et al. for contentious politics can serve as the starting point for the operationalization of political conflict. According to this definition, contentious politics “is episodic rather than continuous, occurs in public, involves interaction between makers of claims and others, is recognized by those others as bearing on their interests, and brings in government as mediator, target, or claimant” (McAdam et al. 2001, p. 5). Overall, contentiousness is disruptive and creates uncer-
tainty in the sense that it diverges from routine action. Again in line with McAdam et al., this study does not differentiate between institutional and noninstitutional actions. It therefore does not assume that interaction has to be noninstitutional to be contentious, in contrast to earlier works on contention (Tarrow 1996). Particularly in the context of a system in transition, it makes little sense to define routine action by institutions and procedures. What qualifies as routine action is obviously defined by the context, but generally speaking it signifies regular events and claim-making within the channels of well-bounded organizations. It goes without saying that the threshold for contentiousness will be much lower in a post-war transition than in established stable democracies where much political interaction has become routine.

For an event to qualify as contentious and thus as an occurrence of a political conflict, the following criteria have to be fulfilled. The incident:

1. involves claim-making by political elites,
2. involves interaction between claim-makers and others whose interests are concerned,
3. is episodic,
4. is public,
5. is not routine action.

The criterion of government involvement implied in the definition by McAdam et al. has been dropped since it is not a necessary condition in a setting where only conflicts among political elites are considered. All remaining five features are necessary conditions. Accordingly, contentious action cannot a priori be linked to certain forms or goals of action. Furthermore, it is neither necessarily linked to violence nor do violent events automatically qualify as contentious. These criteria are therefore not applied in the decision whether an incident qualifies as a political conflict event.

A political conflict consists of several conflict events. Thus, a political conflict is an ongoing dispute on one issue between a constant group of actors. The exact indicators to identify political conflict events in line with these criteria are specified in section 4.2 which defines the value of the dependent variable. Conflict lines can be labeled in reference to one dominating conflict line based on more specific affiliations. In an ethnicized political context, the first option leads to categories like “inter-ethnic”, “intra-ethnic” and “trans-ethnic”. The second possibility allows for a more detailed classification within and beyond ethnic groups, for example by introducing a conflict line based on an internal-external division between people in exile and those who stayed inside the country. The advantage of
the first option is that it is easier to arrive at a classification based on the two indicators. The advantage of the second one is that it specifies affiliations underlying political conflicts and can thus help to identify the real sources of change over time. This study uses both options in the empirical analysis.

**Political conflict line**

A political conflict line refers to the underlying line of affiliation of political conflicts. According to the definition applied here, this means that a social division is consistently transferred to the political sphere (Schmidt 2000, pp. 238-239). The most prominent conflict line to start from in this study is the one between ethnic groups involved in a civil war, but conflict lines can take very different forms.

The two main indicators used to identify conflict lines in this study are claims and leadership. Naturally, both are only indicators of conflict lines in the context of events that qualify as political conflicts according to the criteria outlined above. Claims made in such a context can clearly indicate group affiliation. A political leader might specifically refer to a group whose interests he claims to represent, or there can be indirect reference to group affiliation by bringing up grievances or preferences that are peculiar to a certain group. Yet claims are not always so specific, and sometimes there are no claims indicating a conflict line at all. On the one hand, those involved in the conflict might want to conceal a certain affiliation; on the other hand, for the actors involved and their “audience”, the underlying affiliation of a conflict may be obvious, so that it does not need to be mentioned any more. This is especially true if a conflict has been going on for some time already.

Therefore, leadership is used as an additional indicator. Leadership here means the core group of elites heading a politically relevant group. In the case where such a group has its own organizational structures, the leadership comprises those elites that hold the top positions within this organization. If groups have a looser structure, as in the case of factions within organizations, those regularly making claims on behalf of this group and/or those identified by others as the leaders of such groups make up the leadership. What is relevant with regard to the indicator of leadership is what group affiliation the relevant leaders have. The problem here, obviously, is that one person can have several politically relevant attributes: for example, a leader may belong to an ethnic group but also to a certain clan that is involved in politics.

The combination of actors in conflict with each other can be an indicator for a certain conflict line. For example, if both parties belong to the same ethnic group and there is no ethnic defection in this context, ethnicity cannot be the relevant attribute in this conflict. This way, the relevant attribution of the leadership on both sides in the conflict can be
identified. If there are still several options, and claims also do not provide useful evidence, the only option is either to obtain direct information from actors involved or to rely on the classification by experts, for example in secondary sources. Otherwise, no conflict line can be identified. An identification of a conflict by claims and leadership is most reliable, but in certain situations only one of the two indicators might be available. In such cases, claims provide stronger evidence and can be sufficient to detect a conflict line if there is direct reference. Leadership is an indirect indicator and therefore can only clearly identify a conflict line if no other alternative lines are plausible in the respective context.

Fragmentation

In this study, fragmentation of conflict lines is defined as the opposite of polarization, because the two processes take place in an ethnicized political context. A fragmentation of conflict lines is present if there is no domination of political conflicts by one specific conflict line. There need to be at least two important conflict lines at a time to speak of fragmentation. According to the definition outlined in the theoretical framework, fragmentation as a process can take place on one side of an existing conflict line or boundary (Tilly 2003, p. 21) or it can cut across an existing group boundary (Diamond et al. 1990, p. 29). Thus, the frequent occurrence of intra-ethnic as well as trans-ethnic conflict lines indicate fragmentation in an ethnicized political context.

The fragmentation of political conflict lines refers to the existence of more than one dominating conflict line. A conflict line means a politically relevant division like the ethnic one in this context, but also divisions like those commonly named in the cleavage literature, for example the urban-rural divide. A political conflict consists of several conflict events that take place between the same actors around the same issue.

3.2.2 The independent variable

There is one main independent variable in this study, complemented by four alternative explanations that are treated as control variables: the option of negotiations, institutional change, the transformation of military actors and the re-occurrence of earlier divisions. These might also explain the occurrence of fragmentation of political conflict lines.

Independent variable

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3Polarization, on the other hand, can be identified by only one (relevant) conflict line at a time.
The main explanatory variable proposed by this study is the return of mobilized exile elites. First, it is important to specify who qualifies as elite and what the exile and resident labels refer to before operationalizing return. For the category of elites, one can distinguish between the core elite, including high-ranking members of the executive and legislative branch as well as party officials, and the sub-elite located between the core elite and the mass. The latter refers to regular backbenchers, leaders of medium and small interest groups and the middle ranges of the executive and the parties (Etzioni-Halevy 1993). This study will almost exclusively focus on the core elite for conceptual and practical reasons outlined in the subsection on data collection and analysis. The label of exile elites refers to those within this core elite who have been outside the borders of their home country because of the civil war for the whole period of war or for significant parts of it. What qualifies as a “significant part of the civil war” is obviously dependent on the total length of the civil war in a particular case. In the case examined in this study, these are officially 10 years. People should have been at least a fourth of this time outside their country of origin.

The meaning and indication of exile must be substantiated. All those who have acquired refugee status during the civil war are included in the exile category. However, this status is not the only indicator, because some leaders who flee their country during a war never officially apply for asylum, either because they do not have to (for example, because as a well-known leader they find refuge in a country without submitting an official application) or they do not want to (for example, because they want to pursue their political goals clandestinely from abroad). It is therefore sufficient if someone has lived abroad because of the civil war.

People who were already outside the country, for example for the purpose of university education, before the outbreak of the civil war and then stayed abroad because of the outbreak are also included in the exile category. The problematic part in general is to identify whether someone was outside the home country because of the civil war or, rather, whether it was coincidence that the person was living abroad at that time. There are two possible indicators for this point with regard to elites: a) the people identify themselves as having been in exile or b) others identify them as people who have been in exile. So together with the indicator of refugee status, there are three indicators in total for exile. Each of these indicators is sufficient by itself to identify an elite person who has been in exile.

The group of resident elites who have not been in exile is a residual category to the exile elites. It needs to be stressed that internal displacement does not count as exile, because no international border has been crossed. The conceptual reason for not including Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) is that there are hardly any systematic accounts of IDPs as an important actor group in conflict, especially not at the elite level. Furthermore, the crossing of an international border and the stay on foreign terri-
tory are seen as an essential part of refugee mobilization.

For the operationalization of the independent variable, it is important to remember that the mere existence of exile elites as a distinct social category is not sufficient to ascribe a potential for changing conflict lines to this factor, but that there are the additional aspects of mobilization and return. This means that exile elites need to be politically mobilized and their activities need to be directed at influencing politics in their country of origin. This indicates that they continue to be linked to the home polity and are relevant as a political category. Furthermore, exile elites must have the intention to return to their country of origin. This general intention is difficult to measure, because it cannot be observed directly. However, the later return of exile elites can be used as a proxy showing that elites did have the intention earlier, because it seems very unlikely that a mobilized exile person who returns never had the intention to do so.\(^4\)

Finally, an opportunity for return needs to open up at some point, for otherwise, a potential conflict line between those in exile and those inside the country cannot materialize. Only when return actually becomes an issue can divergent identities and interests come to the fore. The most direct indication of such an opportunity is the start of peace negotiations, because the security issue normally was the reason for flight. Whether and how exile elites are included in negotiations is not necessarily relevant; what is important is that with negotiations, a general window of opportunity at least exists. For an internal-external conflict line to occur, it is merely important that exile elites want to return and that it becomes a tangible option at some point. These are necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of conflicts along the internal-external line, but this line will only become manifest in the political system if elites actually return later on in the process.

### 3.2.3 Control variables based on alternative explanations

Among the alternative explanations, the first one is more directly linked to peace negotiations. The assumption is that when negotiations become a realistic option, this can trigger conflicts between factions that are more or less ready for dialogue with the other side of the ethnic divide. Such different factions practically always exist in a situation of civil war, and they are commonly labeled moderates and extremists within one ethnic group. Although the degree to which factions are located close to the moderate or extremist poles differ, the general expectation is that those more ready for dialogue will tend to join negotiations once the option arises, while the

\(^4\)In addition, only by the actual return of exile elites can an emerging conflict line really become manifest in the political system. Conflicts could occur without this, but they would only take place outside the home polity.
more extremist factions will tend to stay out and oppose the process. An indication of negotiations being an option which is the control variable here is that there is reference to this possibility by relevant actors, meaning that negotiations are at least being considered. Thus the central aspect that makes a division between more or less cooperative groups important are negotiations as a conceivable option to end the civil war.

The second potential alternative to explain the fragmentation of conflict lines is based on political institutions. The assumption is that changes in political institutions as a variable can also lead to change in conflict lines. In a situation where one conflict line is dominant and the institutional setting has been negotiated by elites from both sides of this main line, change might seem rather unlikely. When ethnic power-sharing arrangements are concluded, they tend to reinforce the main conflict line by accommodating it. But institutional settings that are negotiated can change over time, for example when the main conflict line is not that dominant any more.

The term “institutions” here refers to national political institutions as a system of rules and norms for generally binding decision-making and subsequent enforceability. There are three main categories of options in the design of political institutions: constitutional design, electoral system design, and (de)centralization or federalism (Simonsen 2005, p. 307). The latter category is excluded in the operationalization here because it is situated below the national level. Important changes in the two other categories over time during a democratic post-war transition indicate institutional change in this study. The expected effect here is that institutional change, for example a newly adopted election law, can provide incentives for a change of politically relevant affiliations and, thus, of conflict lines.

The third alternative to explain conflict line changes is derived from different modes of mobilization and action during the civil war. Most prominently, there is a potential division between political and military actors who employ different means of action based on different structures. Armed groups as military actors and political parties as the most important category among purely political actors can be, but are not necessarily, divided. There can also be a kind of division of labor between the two types of actors in a civil war. The central indicator for a possible transformation of armed groups which is the control variable is if the groups also have a political agenda. The establishment of armed groups pursuing political goals makes a “political-military” division potentially relevant for conflict line changes. Yet, as in the case of the internal-external line, the opportunity for the transformation of armed actors needs to become concrete in order for conflicts to really materialize. Here, again, the start of peace negotiations can be used as an indicator.

The last variable derived from the fourth alternative explanation is the re-occurrence of earlier conflict lines. Their temporary disappearance might be explained by the polarization taking place with the outbreak of
the civil war leading to stronger group cohesion. Once the cohesion along the main (ethnic) conflict line diminishes, previously existing divisions like regional, clan or religious divisions can become important again. However, there are two preconditions here: a) divisions have existed before the civil war and have not been eliminated or fundamentally changed by the war, and b) they had political relevance prior to the outbreak of the war. Only if both conditions are fulfilled can the re-occurrence of earlier conflict lines explain changes in conflict lines. If a division becomes politically relevant in the post-war period that had not occurred before in at least a similar form, one cannot classify this as a re-occurrence, but rather as a new line of affiliation. As with the other control variables apart from institutional change, the re-occurrence of earlier conflict lines can only be expected when group cohesion due to the civil war diminishes again, for example by peace negotiations.

All independent variables operationalized here can potentially explain conflicts between and within organizations as well as between and within ethnic groups.

### 3.3 Case selection

The theoretical framework has set the criteria in the search for an adequate case of a democratic post-war transition for the study of political conflict lines. First, the transition needs to follow an ethnic civil war; second, the transition is based on a negotiated peace settlement. Ideally, this settlement introduced ethnic power-sharing for the transition period, because in such a case, conflict line changes due to institutional change can be ruled out much more easily. All these general criteria make the potential case a difficult or “hard” one, because most strands of the relevant literature would expect no conflict line changes at all due to a deepening of the ethnic line by the civil war and due to the freezing effect of power-sharing on conflict lines.

Within the category of difficult cases for the fragmentation of conflict lines, however, this study relies on selecting a most-likely case for change by exile return. Generally, cases can be selected as most-likely, least-likely or crucial for a theory (George and Bennett 2005, p. 24). In a case study testing a new argument, a most-likely case is the adequate starting point, because if the proposed relationship cannot be established in this one case, it cannot be expected to occur elsewhere. What makes a case most likely in this study is the existence of a large group of exile people due to the civil war. In accordance with the operationalization, a certain level of mobilization in exile and the return of exile groups as an indicator for the intention to go back are equally important. This way of selecting cases is comparable to what has been called “extreme” cases, because of the selection due to an
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN

extreme value on an independent or dependent variable (Gerring 2007, p. 101). Here the “extreme” value is on the independent variable with regard to the extent of flight, mobilization and return.

Since data on these exile-related factors are not available for the elite level, general refugee data are consulted, which is appropriate since such refugee groups normally comprise elite people in the context of group persecution in ethnic civil war. As an indicator for mobilization in exile, information on refugee militarization as the strongest form of mobilization has been used to select a case as most likely. The table on the following pages shows the result of the search for most-likely cases along the outlined criteria: democratic transition after ethnic civil war, refugee outflows due to the civil war, mobilization in exile grasped by militarization and a significant return wave at the end of or after the war.

The table originally built on a list of 51 countries where ethnic armed conflict has taken place since 1960. Subsequently, data have been gathered on all these countries, but those that did not meet the criteria outlined above have been deleted from the table. The criterion of ethnic civil war was advanced during the selection process, so that only cases where armed conflict took place over government have been included. This has been done to ensure that the territorial unit remains the same over time, which is obviously often not the case in conflicts over territory. Potential country cases like Bosnia and Croatia had to be excluded for this reason. Only six countries remain that have undergone transitions qualifying as most-likely cases based on the strictly applied criteria.

The recent Burundian transition after the Arusha accord from 2001 until 2005 was finally selected as the case for detailed examination. First of all, this case complies with the relevant criteria: the transition followed an ethnic civil war, was based on a negotiated settlement and shows a large refugee population for the civil war period. Furthermore, the development of the size of this population shows that flight took place in the course of civil war with violence occurring in 1991 and then after 1994. The strong increase in 1993 is due to the outbreak of widespread ethnic violence that led to the civil war. However, it did not qualify as armed conflict due to the rules used in the respective dataset referred to in the table. Nonetheless, this violence led to a large outflow of refugees and the exile population remained high for the period after 1994 as well. Return has also taken place after the Arusha peace agreement in 2000 and more visibly after a ceasefire agreement with a remaining rebel movement in 2003. Militarization has equally taken place among Burundian refugees in exile, most notably in Tanzania. Thus, Burundi’s recent transition fits a clear set of circumstances.

5The features of the peace agreement and the Burundian constitution of 2005 outlined in the case study section show that Burundi’s transition after 2001 qualifies as “democratic” according to the definition under 2.2.
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN

where a predicted outcome, here the fragmentation of conflict lines due to exile return, should occur (Robson 2002, p. 182).

There are additional reasons for selecting Burundi, because the mentioned core criteria were fulfilled by all six remaining country cases as well. First, Burundi underwent a democratization process with executive power-sharing before the conflict outbreak, and the transition after the war has been based on a power-sharing arrangement as well. The advantage here is that it is possible to control for the political context when looking into an alleged change of conflict lines from polarization before and fragmentation after the civil war. Second, Burundi has only two politically relevant ethnic groups. This simplifies the identification of political conflict lines over time. No other country on the list adheres to both of these additional criteria.

Certainly, Burundi’s recent democratic transition is not representative of a wider population of cases, and this study therefore cannot generalize beyond the one case. By ruling out alternative explanations and conducting process-tracing, this study can demonstrate that a causal relation that had previously been neglected holds for this case. This is possible if there are different predictions on the causal process based on theory and as long as there is enough evidence for process-tracing and congruence testing (George and Bennett 2005, p. 29). While earlier sections have dealt with the first point, the latter one is at the core of the following section on data collection and analysis.
### Table 3.1: Most-likely country cases I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ethnic conflict</th>
<th>Democratization</th>
<th>Peace agreements</th>
<th>Refugee population</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>militarization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*b data bases: (Cederman et al. 2010); (Bächtiger et al. 2007); for peacebuilding operations with political liberalization: (Paris 2004); (Kim 2007); UN Peacekeeping Website: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ (02 July 2008).
*c data bases: (Harbom et al. 2006); several online sources.
*d data base: UNHCR Official Statistics
*e (Adelman 1998); (Gerdes 2006); (Lischer 2005); (Lischer 1999); (Loescher and Milner 2005); (Terry 2002).
## Table 3.2: Most-likely country cases II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ethnic conflict</th>
<th>Democratization</th>
<th>Peace agreements</th>
<th>Refugee population</th>
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<td>Country</td>
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3.4 Data collection and analysis

For a case study of this format, adequate data are not easily available. In this study, the values of the independent and the dependent variable and the causal mechanism(s) linking them could not be established without collecting new data. The inclusion of a previously neglected factor, the integration of exile elites, made field research almost indispensable, because “inductive field research methods typically lie behind every newly identified variable” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 21). Conducting interviews in Burundi was a promising approach for data collection on the independent variable and its link to conflict line changes.

Yet the precise establishment of the value of the dependent variable was not possible based on field research. Interviews with actors involved and experts cannot provide enough reliable information to define the universe of political conflicts and measure change of conflict lines in these conflicts over time. On the one hand, people cannot remember every incident qualifying as a conflict; on the other hand, they tend to reinterpret events that date back a longer time. Therefore, a content analysis of news sources was conducted to establish the value of the dependent variable. The added value is that the data could also be used for the identification of potential conflict lines with the congruence method. The two ways of collecting data are thus combined with the use of the two different methodological approaches: congruence method and process-tracing. By using different methods of data collection, it is also possible to cross-check certain information based on different sources, which again increases the reliability of results.

3.4.1 Content analysis of news sources

The content analysis of news sources was conducted in order to establish the dependent variable, fragmentation of conflict lines, and to provide data for identifying conflict lines with the congruence method. In general, content analysis is a systematic coding and categorization approach that is useful to examine large amounts of textual information. This kind of analysis can be applied in order to deal with all kinds of texts, for example media and policy documents, personal records, speeches and interviews (Grbich 2007, p. 112).

The decision to use reports from news services as sources for the analysis is a matter of adequacy as well as of availability. As Krippendorff has emphasized, “the inability to use direct observation is an invitation to apply content analysis” (Krippendorff 2004, p. 26), but this does not automatically mean that any kind of source is useful to compensate for direct observation. As already mentioned, the exclusive use of interviews to reconstruct conflict events that date back several years or even decades
is not a reliable approach. Respondents cannot be expected to give a complete account of a high number of events, because people simply forget and also reinterpret incidents after some time. In addition, there are basically no archives or other systematic collections of documents on the ground in countries emerging from civil war like Burundi.

A content analysis of news sources was the only viable way to identify political conflicts among Burundian elites over time. Such a content analysis focuses on manifest content (surface structure in the message) as opposed to the deep structural meaning expressed by the message (latent symbolic meaning) (Berg 2007, p. 308). Especially in communication science, the examination of texts is often applied “to understand what they mean to people, what they enable or prevent, and what the information conveyed by them does” (Krippendorff 2004, p. xviii).

However, this content analysis of news sources aimed to reconstruct conflict events and the change of the underlying affiliations over time. The use of news sources to reconstruct past events can be criticized, because news is not a proper reflection of reality, but rather the view of reality through the lenses and logic of mass media. In extreme cases, an identified change may in fact be due to a change in media preferences or organization rather than to actual change in real events. However, there was not only a lack of alternative options in this case; there were also possibilities of at least limiting the problem of source bias. First, it was essential to use more than just one news source; second, sources with different biases had to be included since no news service is without any bias. And third, sources with a different distance to the events needed to be selected, because there can be the tendency that the “further away” a news service is from the conflict theater, the more intense a conflict will have to be in order to be covered. International, regional and local services have therefore been included.

In order to have a consistent sample of media sources as well as a mixture of local and international sources, the use of data from the “factiva” database was appropriate. The reports over the period of observation had been indexed according to the rules of this one database and included diverse sources ranging from the Burundian news agency (ABP) to major international agencies such as Reuters. Texts also included transcribed reports from Burundian radio stations such as Burundi Radio or Radio Publique Africaine. The content analysis started by including all news items in the database dealing with Burundian politics in the period of observation. Out of this sample of 10,996 news items, 2,349 were pre-selected for the actual content analysis by excluding those that were clearly not linked to political conflicts.

The analysis is based on a coding scheme for identifying political conflict events in the news sources and for coding their core features such as

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6Reports were either in English or French.
conflict actors and conflict issue. The coding scheme applied was tested and adapted by a pilot coding of news items for one year. After the actual coding process, an intra-coder reliability test was conducted as well as a check of potential biases in the results due to the overrepresentation of certain news sources. The exact procedures of the content analysis are presented in section 4.2.

In general, the content analysis of news sources provides observations diachronically (observing case or subset of within-case units over time), not synchronically (observing within-case variation at a single point in time) (Gerring 2007, p. 21). Moreover, the analysis as conducted in the case study has qualitative as well as quantitative elements. Although the overall study only comprises one case, the sections based on the content analysis of news sources focus on political conflicts and political conflict events. The part applying the congruence method reduces the problem of a lack of variance on the dependent variable by using political conflict events as an alternative dependent variable. This is a common approach in case studies as they generally move down from the primary level of analysis to within-case cases (Gerring 2007, p. 28).

The congruence method is based on the “universe” of 1,249 political conflict events in Burundi over the period of observation. By examining the potential of the independent variable and of the four control variables to account for each single conflict event based on actor constellations, their importance over time can be assessed more reliably than by the use of larger concepts and this step in establishing a causal link secures internal validity. The more detailed procedures of the congruence method based on data generated by the content analysis of news sources are outlined in section 4.3.

Based on the data from the content analysis of news sources, the dependent variable can be measured and the congruence method can be applied. But even when the results give the internal-external division explanatory power, the link needs to be substantiated and specified. Thus, process-tracing is an essential second step in the case study. In order to collect data for the use of this approach, semi-structured interviews were conducted during field research in Burundi. These were used in order to triangulate findings based on the news sources and to establish a causal path between the independent and the dependent variable.

3.4.2 Field research and analysis of semi-structured interviews

The data collection for applying process-tracing was conducted during two field research trips to Burundi in 2007 and 2009. Overall, 53 interviews with political elites and 28 interviews with international and local experts were conducted. As with the content analysis of news sources, field research served more than one purpose.
A first field trip to Burundi from October to December 2007 was designed as a plausibility probe for the overall argument that the return of mobilized exile elites can lead to the occurrence of conflicts along the internal-external dimension. Another aim of this field trip was to check the feasibility of the design in terms of access and reliability of sources. Similarly, it was necessary to get an overview of the political context relating to the civil war and the following democratization period. The visit was also used to gain insights into the political importance of flight, exile and return in general.

The correctness of the decision to focus on the elite level was confirmed by the first field trip, because investigating conflicts between returnees and residents on the mass level turned out not to be feasible. The second visit thus continued the collection of material for process-tracing at the elite level. Secondary information for defining the independent variable more precisely was also gathered since data on exile, mobilization and return among elites are very meager. The two trips took advantage of both key functions of field research, namely the collection of data to test hypotheses and inductively deriving new propositions or understandings about social and political processes (Lieberman 2004, p. 2).

The data collection from elite interviews during both field trips was based on a semi-structured interview schedule. The schedules covered the general political context and the political background of respondents. One part focused specifically on the personal experiences of the respondents at the beginning and during the civil war as an exile or resident person and a subsequent part covered the period of negotiations and the following transition. Finally, elites were also asked about political developments since the first elections in 2005, officially marking the end of the transition.

By following this path chronologically and covering all periods from the outbreak of civil war to the post-election period, the interviews led elites through the entire process of relevance for the analysis without proposing any specific focus. Therefore neither the research question nor the hypothesis was revealed to respondents. Interviews were also structured in such a way as to prevent any bias resulting from leading questions or more extensive coverage of one of the mentioned time periods in comparison to the others. Despite a detailed schedule, it was often necessary to adapt the sequence of questions to the respective interview situation and use a less...
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itemized grid in some cases so as not to interrupt the flow of the interview too much. However, questions were always formulated in the same or very similar way according to the schedule.\(^\text{10}\)

The respondents in elite interviews comprised former exile as well as resident elites as a control group. During the two field trips, 53 elite interviews were conducted with 46 different respondents.\(^\text{11}\) Some elites were interviewed twice, and one person was even three times. Besides including persons who had returned from exile and had not been in exile, it was also crucial to pay attention to other attributes of interview partners. Ethnicity, regional origin and party membership have also been taken into account. The reason was not to have a representative sample of elites, but to avoid serious bias based on these three affiliations. Such a bias would have been harmful, because all three attributes relate to potentially relevant conflict lines in Burundi. The role of the ethnic affiliation was obvious after the ethnic civil war. Regional origin is known to be politically relevant from the pre-war period and party membership is an indirect way of retracing affiliation with military or political actors during and after the civil war, because former rebel movements that had joined the political transition had transformed into political parties. Among the respondents finally were 19 Tutsi and 27 Hutu respondents from 15 different provinces and 20 former exile and 26 resident elites. The party membership was similarly mixed, including (former) rebel movements as well as basically all the different political parties involved in the transition. The distribution was therefore balanced enough to prevent a serious bias in responses with regard to conflicts.

According to the elite definition outlined before, most respondents were members of the core elite during the post-war transition. The assumption was that they are likely to have very direct insights into the political process. However, the exact line between core and sub-elite is blurred and some interviewees might fall instead into the category of sub-elite, for example those who have been members of the National Assembly without holding a central position.\(^\text{12}\) Access was generally unproblematic, particularly for elites who had been in important positions during the transition, but were not in any high-ranking offices at the time of the field trips. Get-

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\(^{10}\) Most interviews took between one and two hours. About half of all interviews were recorded. In the other cases, it did not seem appropriate to ask for recording or it was specifically rejected by respondents. However, notes taken during these interviews were reconstructed directly afterwards.

\(^{11}\) The full list of respondents can be found in the annex. Anonymity was granted to all interview partners, so the table does not include names or specific functions. The information on regional origin has also been deleted from the list because in combination with other attributes, it could have revealed the identity of some respondents.

\(^{12}\) Two interview partners belonged to the sub-national elite: a former governor and a local administrator. These individuals were interviewed because they had specific insights due to their experiences during the civil war. However, the results of these interviews play a minor role in the analysis.
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN

ting the opportunity to interview members of the respective governments at the time was more difficult. The resulting limitations in access to this group of elites was, however, not severe since many did not have a central function during the transition. The number of interviews to be conducted was not clearly specified in advance, although a minimum of 30-40 interviews is a common amount in qualitative studies. The collection of sufficient data by interviewing tends to be defined by the information given. When the same or similar information on different aspects and time periods is repeated again and again in the respondents’ answers, the source – here elites – is exhausted. This was clearly the case towards the end of the interview process.

The interviews were systematically interpreted based on a grid of analysis containing 70 items in 10 categories related to the different time periods and steps of exile, mobilization and return. Based on this grid, all important information from interviews was condensed in tables and subsequently analyzed, taking into account the background of respondents where it was potentially relevant to the answers given. The general aim of this content analysis was to obtain first-hand information on the return of exile elites, not to interpret the underlying discourses. Thus, the kind of process-tracing applied in section 4.4 is a rather structural kind, similar to what George and Bennett call “analytic explanation” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 211). The interview results are also used in subsection 4.1.2 to define the independent variable for the elite level and in section 4.2 to triangulate the results of the content analysis of news sources.

Overall, 28 interviews were conducted with local and international experts in order to cross-check information provided by elites as well as to obtain important background information on political conflicts and the potential relevance of exile for their occurrence during Burundi’s transition. The expert interviews were conducted according to the same standards as the elite interviews, by not disclosing the research question or hypothesis and using an interview schedule which, however, was more flexible than in the case of elites. These interviews are not included systematically in the analysis in section 4.4, but were used as additional sources of information where other sources were not available or meager.

The results generated by the case study based on news sources and data from field research substantiate an argument which can help to better understand other cases of post-war democratization, but they are not externally generalizable. A projection to other cases is undertaken in the conclusion based on selective evidence from other country cases. This analytic or theoretical generalization (Robson 2002, p. 177) provides a first step in transferring the findings to other contexts. For establishing a causal link as for the recent democratic transition in Burundi, however, a more detailed

13The actual grid of analysis is available upon request.
qualitative or quantitative analysis of new cases would be indispensable.

This study engages in exploring a newly proposed relationship based on a most-likely case study design. The congruence method is applied in conjunction with process-tracing to link the return of mobilized exile elites to the fragmentation of conflict lines. The case of Burundi’s democratic post-war transition after 2001 is examined based on data from a content analysis of news sources and semi-structured interviews with Burundian political elites.
Chapter 4

Case Study: Integration and fragmentation in Burundi’s transition after ethnic civil war

This chapter examines the fragmentation of conflict lines and the link to elite integration during Burundi’s recent democratic transition from 2001 to 2005. The transition period started with the installation of the transitional government in November 2001 and officially ended with the first elections after the outbreak of the civil war in 2005. Identifying the transition period is difficult for the Burundian case as the peace process involved several different negotiated agreements. However, the negotiations at Arusha (Tanzania), starting in 1998, and the accord signed in August 2000 built the core of the process. After the signing of the accord, implementation was delayed; in consequence, the transition in this case did not start right after the conclusion of the agreement but more than one year later with the installation of the transitional government. This is in line with the definition in the Arusha accord itself, which states that the transition period shall commence from the time that the conditions necessary for the establishment of the transitional government have been met (Arusha Agreement 2000, p. 39).1

The introductory section of this chapter gives a brief overview of ethnic conflict and democratization in Burundi, particularly focusing on the period leading up to the outbreak of the ethnic civil war in 1993/4. This period provides the general baseline for assessing changes in conflict lines

1Similarly, the use of attributes such as “post-war” or “post-conflict” is ambiguous in the context of Burundi. The end of the civil war cannot be clearly defined because it was a gradual peace process; indeed, the last fighting rebel movement had not even been demobilized by the time the first field trip for this study was conducted in 2007. I will therefore refrain from using terms like “post-war” in the chapter on Burundi unless they have been used by other sources that are utilized in the following sections.
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY: INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION IN BURUNDI’S TRANSITION AFTER ETHNIC CIVIL WAR

over the course of the civil war.\(^2\)

The first section serves the purpose of providing the general background for the case study, but also outlines the central characteristics of the democratic transition in Burundi before the civil war in order to identify differences to the democratic transition after 2001. The following section presents some key features on flight and exile in the Burundian context. It also defines the independent variable by mapping out mobilization in exile and the return of refugees including exile elites during and after peace negotiations. Section 4.2 describes the measurement of the dependent variable and provides the empirical evidence for a change in political conflict lines in Burundi from the period of negotiations over the course of the transition up to the year following the elections in 2005. The data generated by this measurement are used in the following section to examine the influence of the independent variable and the four control variables for the fragmentation occurring in Burundi’s transition after 2001. The final section traces the whole process from 1993 to 2006 based on the elite interviews conducted in Burundi in 2007 and 2009. The aim of this last analytical section is to substantiate findings from the two previous sections on the relationship of exile return and fragmentation of conflict lines in Burundi. Furthermore, the causal mechanism of integration potentially linking the independent and the dependent variable needs to be verified.

4.1 Background of case study

Burundi is a small, landlocked country with a population of about 8,980,000 (CIA 2009). 85% categorized as Hutu, 14% as Tutsi and 1% as Twa (Sullivan 2005, p. 76). While these percentages for the three ethnic groups cannot be taken as exact numbers due to missing updated census data, they clearly show the relative weight of the groups. Not surprisingly, the Twa have been almost constantly marginalized, while the Hutu and Tutsi have been involved in power struggles for most of the post-independence period.

Since 1966, Burundi has been governed by military Tutsi rulers coming exclusively from the southern province of Bururi. This fact already hints at the two prevalent conflict lines in Burundi: firstly, the ethnic divide between Hutu and Tutsi with the overall exclusion of the former and the dominance by the latter, mainly based on their strong position in the national army, and secondly, the regional divide reflected in the preferential access to education and privileges in terms of infrastructure and public spending for those from the south, mainly from Bururi. While this divide could be termed “the south versus the rest”, it normally refers to conflicts between southern elites and those from the centre and north of the country.

\(^2\)The analysis of conflict lines based on news sources focuses on the period from 1997 to 2006 for reasons outlined in the relevant section.
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY: INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION IN BURUNDI’S TRANSITION AFTER ETHNIC CIVIL WAR

Within the Tutsi group, the conflicts were especially pronounced between those from Bururi and those from Muramvya, the historical centre of the old kingdom of Burundi. However, even within the Hutu leadership, antagonism towards southern elites has played a role after independence as they have been perceived as less marginalized than Hutu from other regions of the country (Ndikumana 2005, pp. 415-418). The competition over power, however, was most pronounced along ethnic lines after a first post-independence revolt led by Hutu officers in 1965 was followed by the extermination of thousands of Hutu, including most of their leaders and their exclusion from the army and political power (Lemarchand 1996, p. 71).

4.1.1 Ethnic conflict and democratization in Burundi

The following description of the political development in Burundi after independence serves two purposes. In the first part, it outlines the history of conflict and by doing so the most important underlying conflict lines. This paragraph obviously also provides general background information. The second part focuses on the period between the outbreak of violence in 1993 and the start of the transition in 2001 in order to highlight the development from polarization before to fragmentation after the civil war.

The path to civil war

Power struggles led to several violent outbreaks in Burundi before the actual civil war – often evolving around revolts, (alleged) coups and military repression. The worst ethnic massacres took place in 1972 when reprisals by the Tutsi-led army in response to an alleged Hutu coup attempt led to around 200,000 deaths and the flight of about 300,000 people (Ndikumana 2005, p. 421). This has been called a “partial genocide” since Hutu elites had been targeted in a systematic way to cleanse the army and the civil service and leave no educated male Hutu alive (Lemarchand 1996, p. 103). The unequal distribution of power in ethnic terms reached its peak under the regimes of Jean-Baptiste Bagaza (1976-1987) and Pierre Buyoya (1987-1993) with 80% and 74% of government positions filled with Tutsi respectively (Ndikumana 2005, p. 416). Despite its mainly military power, the Buyoya regime was also based on the party “L’Union pour le Progrès National” (Uprona). While having a nationalist agenda at the time of independence, this party increasingly developed into a party for promoting Tutsi interests. It became the single party during the first military regime under Colonel Micombero (1966-76).

After the violence in 1972, the new formation of a Hutu elite mainly took place outside Burundi. The increased mobilization and activities by the opposition to the Burundian regime in the course of the 1980s as well
as the changing international climate\(^3\) finally led to an opening by the military ruler, Pierre Buyoya. The starting point was a Commission on National Unity composed of an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi and a government of unity in 1989. The introduction of multi-partyism in 1992 finally culminated in free legislative and presidential elections in 1993 (Ndikumana 2005, p. 422; Curtis 2002, p. 9). Both elections were overwhelmingly won by the “Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi” (Frodebu), a political party mainly associated with the Hutu ethnic group. Frodebu originated in exile and was founded as a clandestine movement before it was finally registered as a political party in 1992. The more radical “Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu” (Palipehutu) that had been founded in 1980 in a Tanzanian refugee camp did not transform into a registered political party at the time (Reyntjens 2000, pp. 8-10).

The newly elected first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, won 65% of votes, compared to 32% for the previous officeholder Buyoya, in the presidential election. The outcome of the legislative elections based on a proportional representation system was even clearer, resulting in 80% of seats for Frodebu in the National Assembly and only 20% for Uprona (Sullivan 2005, p. 77). Frodebu and Uprona were the only significant parties and the only ones to pass the necessary threshold for being represented in the parliament (Curtis 2002, p. 10).

Election results tended to mirror the ethnic composition of the country, but the new Ndadaye government was based on an inclusive strategy with representation of both ethnic groups at the highest level of government. Only 13 of out 23 cabinet members came from the victorious Frodebu. Six posts went to Uprona plus the position of prime minister. Overall, the cabinet included 9 Tutsi ministers (Des Forges 1994, p. 205). In accordance with the provision in the 1992 constitution that the government should be composed of the different components of the Burundian population\(^4\) the Ndadaye government resembled a grand coalition (Sullivan 2005, pp. 76-84). With this balance and elite cooperation more generally, as well as certain measures to compensate the Tutsi minority, the arrangement after the elections came very close to a power-sharing arrangement. The constitution was strongly based on the notion of national unity, although it has also been stated that it “was a marvel of political engineering designed to provide maximum security for the Tutsi” (Des Forges 1994, p. 205). The composition of the National Assembly also took care of the regional issue since seats were apportioned to provinces according to their relative demographic weight (Reyntjens 2000, p. 11).

Despite all these efforts, the government was short-lived as an at-

\(^3\)This mainly refers to the “wind of change” after the end of the Cold War and increasing international pressure such as the threat of withdrawal of U.S. aid.

\(^4\)This provision was also established for the composition of voting lists.
tempted military coup by the still Tutsi-dominated army killed the president in October 1993 after only three months in office. Besides Ndadaye himself, several high-ranking Hutu politicians were killed, including the president and vice-president of the National Assembly and several ministers. Many other high-ranking Hutu politicians escaped assassination and the remaining members of the government fled to the French Embassy. The attempted overthrow of the government was not successful at first, but can be seen as the trigger of the ethnic civil war since it led to massive killings of Tutsi in the countryside by (Hutu) Frodebu militants and peasants followed by another round of retaliation by the army. About 50,000 people were killed in this first phase of violence, almost as many Hutu as Tutsi.

From polarization to fragmentation

In light of the generally smooth transition process and free and fair elections that, overall, had taken place in an atmosphere of “considerable calm and dignity” (Reyntjens 1993, p. 568), this development might seem like a sudden breakdown, but in fact it was preceded by a period of increasing polarization. Tensions had already been rising in 1990 and 1991, especially in the border areas to Rwanda where infiltration by the Palipehutu movement took place. This situation culminated in attacks by Hutu activists on military and police installations in November 1991 followed by repression by the security forces, including the killing of at least 1,000 civilians, mainly Hutu (Lemarchand 1996, p. 155-156). Generally, there were groups and people on both sides of the ethnic division who rejected the process of opening under Buyoya and the constructive course of the Frodebu. On the Hutu side, Palipehutu, with its strong ideology of Hutu liberation, partly denounced Ndayaye’s policy of cooperation, but certain elements also supported it. Among other things, this led to a split in the movement in 1992/3 between its leader in exile, Etienne Karatasi, and the military

5They were later moved to a hotel by Lake Tanganyika outside Bujumbura, protected by French gendarmes. It was there that Frodebu leaders allegedly started to prepare what was initially planned as a military wing, the “Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie” (CNDD) (Ould-Abdallah 2000, p. 36-41).

6Case studies and reports on Burundi usually assess the military coup in 1993 and the following violence as the start or trigger of the civil war. In the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1994 is listed as the year of conflict outbreak (UCDP-PRIO 2009). This coding seems to be due to the establishment of the larger Hutu rebel movement in 1994 and the start of its operations the same year. It could be disputed on several grounds, for example based on the fact that there were local Frodebu and Palipehutu elements organizing acts of revenge for the president’s death against Tutsi in 1993, so that both sides in the conflict were organized to a certain degree. For this study, however, the exact beginning of the civil war is not so relevant, because the overall argument here is that exile brought about by ethnic violence can lead to change in conflict lines in later transitions; and, moreover, violence in Burundi certainly qualified as civil after 1994.
chief, Cossan Kabura, who created the military wing “Forces Nationales de Libération” (FNL) (Prunier 2009, p. 59). But polarization also took place between the two main parties, Uprona and Frodebu. The political parties are often accused of having mobilized the people along ethnic lines after the introduction of multi-partyism in 1992 and despite the Charter of National Unity (Gahama 1995, p. 77). For Uprona, Frodebu was nothing more than a divisionist party allied to Palipehutu and pursuing a violent and Hutu-domination strategy; for Frodebu, Uprona was responsible for thousands of Hutu victims and for discrimination over the course of more than 20 years. While Frodebu did not distance itself clearly from Palipehutu, Uprona abused the state’s resources in its campaign against Frodebu (Nindorera 1995, pp. 91-92). How this polarization also evolved around rhetoric during the campaign is shown in the descriptions by a former Burundian president (Ntibantunganya 1999, p. 250-255).

Overall, the dynamic between the two largest parties was self-perpetuating and “starting at the end of 1992, the salience of ethnicity as a major electoral element emerged with increasing clarity” (Reyntjens 2000, p. 10). The president of the electoral commission at the time states that the reason why there were no major problems during the electoral campaign was most likely that both parties, Frodebu and Uprona, were sure to win the elections due to certain misinterpretations (Sinunguruza 2004, p. 86). In fact, it has commonly been noted that Uprona and more specifically Buyoya thought they would win (Watt 2008, p. 43; Reyntjens 1993, p. 568).

Yet Buyoya accepted the election results despite his party’s clear defeat and his own as presidential candidate. The results in fact demonstrated that voting had not been completely split along the Hutu-Tutsi line. However, the interpretation of elections as an ethnic census, mainly among the Tutsi group, nonetheless prevailed. There were demonstrations by Tutsi students against the “ethnicisation” of power and two revolts by small groups of soldiers occurred around the same time. While some Hutu thought that Ndadaye’s reforms in the first months were not going fast enough, many Tutsi seemed to think that they were already going too far (Watt 2008, pp. 43-44). Among the changes under the first elected Hutu president, the replacement of Tutsi and also Hutu members of Uprona in the civil service and the increasing appointment of Hutu to perpetuating the administration more generally have often been described as a source of contention. The Tutsis’ fear of losing status and income was obviously exploited by the press and Uprona, which organized demonstrations and protests (Prunier 2009, p. 63).

All these indicators of polarization before and during 1993 surely do not mean that the outbreak of violence and civil war was inescapable, but neither was the outbreak merely an unintended side-effect of a misguided coup attempt by a small army faction. While increasing tension can partly be assigned to the unconstructive role of more radical elements on both
sides, Uprona and Frodebu contributed to it as well. That polarization strongly ran along party lines is also indirectly shown by the fact that besides a large number of Tutsi killed in direct reaction to the assassination of the president in 1993, there was also a significant number of Hutu victims who were Uprona members. Yet the overall interpretation on the Tutsi side is that the events in 1993 were planned by Frodebu to eliminate the Tutsi minority (Lemarchand 1996, pp. xiii-xv).

Partly due to strong international pressure, the attempted overthrow in 1993 failed, leading to a long period of unclear power relations and a “creeping coup”. Between the 1993 coup attempt and a power-sharing arrangement set out in the Convention of Government in 1994, there was essentially a deadlock with the Frodebu government and factions of the opposition, delaying any real solution (Prunier 2009, p. 61). It had become increasingly clear that Uprona, which was backed by key sections of the army, would demand a major reallocation of power. In fact the power-sharing deal undertaken by the Convention gave 45% of political and administrative posts to Uprona and its allies and put real power in the hands of the Tutsi-dominated military based on the National Security Council (Lemarchand 1996, pp. xix-xx). The Convention did not take the elections results from 1993 into account, and the question of military reform had been excluded from negotiations (Curtis 2002, p. 11; Falch and Becker 2008, p. iii).

It is commonly assumed that the power-sharing under the Convention never really had a chance of working, especially in the light of an ongoing spiral of violence (Prunier 2009, p. 64). At the time of the conclusion of the Convention, a high-ranking Frodebu politician, Léonard Nyangoma, who had been a minister in Ndayaye’s cabinet, broke away from Frodebu and created the “Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie” (CNDD).

CNDD diverged from Palipehutu-FNL in various ways; most importantly, it had a “relatively mature political view of ethnicity” (Prunier 2009, p. 59) in contrast to the more extreme ideas of Hutu liberation. It was based on a rejection of the negotiated Convention and the conviction that only an armed Hutu movement could really counter the power of the Tutsi-dominated army. The Hutu rebellion – which, besides CNDD, also included the smaller movements of Palipehutu-FNL and the “Front pour la Libération Nationale” (Frolina) – pursued a guerrilla tactic moving constantly in and out of certain areas. Most of those who died in the civil war were civilians, killed by one side or the other on the grounds that they were allegedly collaborating with the enemy, or killed in ambushes and other random acts of violence. In total, the civil war caused the deaths of at least 300,000 people. About 500,000 people, mainly Hutu, fled to neighboring countries over the years (Sullivan 2005, p. 76; Curtis 2002, p. 10).

Violence continued despite the Convention of Government, and in July 1996 former military ruler Pierre Buyoya took power again in another coup.
with the official aim of ending instability and unclear power relations. This resulted in a scenario similar to the political setting before the elections in 1993, with the government and the army being in the hands of the Tutsi minority.

When negotiations became almost inevitable, the Buyoya government and the Frodebu negotiated the so-called “political partnership” inside the country and finally signed an agreement in June 1998. Larger peace negotiations took place in Arusha (Tanzania) starting the same month in 1998. These led to the signing of the Arusha accord on 28 August 2000 and the installation of a transitional government in November 2001. The agreement included strong power-sharing components, such as the distribution of positions in all central bodies along ethnic lines. The two larger rebel groups, CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL, however, only ended the armed struggle with agreements in 2003 and 2006 respectively.

At the end of this process, one factor stands out as especially striking: While Burundi only had two relevant political parties representing the two ethnic groups before the civil war, the political landscape was visibly fragmented at the end of the transition in 2005. The following table shows the increase of political parties over time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of participating parties</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of parties in Parliament</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This is the only number that is inconsistent in the literature.

This number of participating parties is from Daley 2007 (Daley 2007, p. 347).

This proliferation of parties has been described as a source of a more pluralistic environment during elections in 2005 as compared to the polarization in 1993 (Lemarchand 2009, p. 162). More importantly, it can be seen as a clear indicator of conflict line fragmentation over the course of the civil war. This study aims to explain this development and the exact effect of the civil war on political conflict lines. The value of the independent variable proposed – the return of mobilized exile elites – is outlined in the following section.

7 A detailed overview of the various negotiation processes follows in section 4.3
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IN BURUNDI’S TRANSITION AFTER ETHNIC CIVIL WAR

4.1.2 Flight, mobilization and return: Burundian exile groups

There was a large outflow of refugees at the elite and mass level after the violent events in 1993. With an already significant refugee population after the events of 1965 and especially 1972, the Burundian refugee crisis really took hold after the assassination of President Ndadaye. The main host countries of the predominantly Hutu refugees were located within the Great Lakes region, with Tanzania receiving by far the largest group of Burundians.

At the peak of the crisis in 2002, the Burundian refugee population officially comprised 574,471 persons and was the second largest worldwide in absolute terms, only outnumbered by the huge group of Afghan refugees (UNHCR 2004, p. 18). As part of this large outflow, there was a significant number of political elites. At least six ministers of Ndadaye’s government had been killed during the attempted coup in 1993 or in the following year. The majority of the remaining Frodebu ministers went into exile, among them the founder of the CNDD, Léonard Nyangoma. The threats to Frodebu politicians went beyond the immediate cabinet, targeting members of the National Assembly, among others. Between the end of 1993 and 1998, at least 33 of the Frodebu MPs – half of those originally elected – had either been assassinated or were forced into exile (Reyntjens 1999b, p. 9). There was thus a significant outflow of elites into exile.

The Burundian case is normally considered as an example of the militarization of refugee flows (Mogire 2006). The founding of CNDD was strongly based on Frodebu cadres and finally carried out in exile. The establishment of CNDD and also a military wing, the “Force pour la Défense de la Démocratie” (FDD), more specifically took place in September 1994 in Uvira (Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), at that time Zaire) where Nyangoma had been in exile since March 1994.

As already mentioned, one specific feature of the Burundian civil war was that the Hutu rebels never seized a larger territory inside the country, but followed a guerrilla strategy of moving in and out. This was facilitated by the fact that the Hutu rebel groups had bases abroad, namely in Tanzania and the Congo. The violent conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, DR Congo and to a lesser degree Uganda are all linked by refugee flows and military actors who extensively used Congolese territory “as bases for assault and retreat” (Reyntjens 1999a, p. 242). This also held true for the Burundian FDD which at first cooperated with the Rwandan ex-FAR and Interahamwe on Congolese territory.

The mixture of refugees and rebels made the refugee camp in Uvira a military target, finally leading to attacks of so-called Banyamulenge in October 1996. In fact, many of them seemed to be regular troops of the Burundian and Rwandan armies. One week after the first attack on the Uvira camp, the “Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du
Zaire” (AFDL) was created and was subsequently involved in dismantling refugee camps as well. With the return of about 40,000 Burundians forced to leave the camps and 100,000 who moved deeper into the DRC, the base of the FDD movement was decimated (Murison 2002, p. 228-229). Some sources stress that as a result of the worsening conditions in the DRC many Burundians fled to Tanzania, including a significant number of rebels (International Crisis Group 1999, p. 6; Turner 2007, p. 91).

Over the course of the civil war, Burundian rebel movements maintained outside bases. After the start of the Second Congo War in 1998, FDD was again militarily active in the DRC, this time on Kabila’s side. However, as the situation in the DRC deteriorated, the position of FDD strengthened in Tanzania where Frolina and Palipehutu had maintained small bases in Kigoma and Ngara districts. With the Buyoya coup the same year, the solidarity of the Tanzanian government with the rebellion and thus the room to maneuver increased.

But despite the fact that the “combatants on foreign soil” phenomenon has been acknowledged and directly addressed in the Burundian demobilization process (Boshoff and Vrey 2006, p. 41), it is difficult to systematically assess how strongly political and military activities were linked to or based in refugee camps. Due to their official prohibition, such activities have normally been clandestine, and Tanzanian authorities, camp managers and international actors often tend to deny their existence. As regards Burundian refugee camps in Tanzania, there certainly were rebel group activities such as recruitment and training, and there were cross-border attacks from Tanzanian territory. Rebels also entered camps to recover after battle. It is equally clear that several political movements or parties, most with military wings, were active in the camps (Lischer 2005, pp. 23+113; Prunier 2009, p. 199). But rebels apparently operated from the bush and on the border to Burundi and, by maintaining a low profile in the camps, were assured access to humanitarian aid. Refugee camps therefore did not directly function as military bases, whereas the level of political activities and meetings was high (Lischer 2005, p. 10; International Crisis Group 1999, p. 10).

Mobilization in exile did not only take the form of militarization in and around Burundian refugee camps. At the elite level, activities in exile were very pronounced as well. Basically all Hutu parties and movements had sections abroad including Frodebu, but most activities mentioned by respondents during interviews took place in connection with the rebellion, especially CNDD-FDD, but also Palipehutu and Frolina. Many political cadres were outside Africa, but some stayed in countries such as Tanzania, Kenya and Gabon, providing financial, logistic, ideological or diplomatic

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8BUR-II-17,13-03-09; BUR-II-13,10-03-09; BUR-II-14,10-03-09
assistance. In CNDD-FDD, the most active sections were supposedly in Tanzania, Gabon, DR Congo and Belgium. Among Burundian elites it is seen as logical that there were such activities in exile and that refugees had a politicized profile, partly because early political mobilization among Hutu elites had also taken place in exile, such as the founding of Palipehutu in a Tanzanian refugee camp in 1980 with branches in different European countries and Frodebu having its origins in a Rwanda-based refugee organization from the late 1970s (Lemarchand 1996, p. 143-145). Like these earlier activities, those after 1993 were directed at changing the political situation in Burundi, either by re-establishing the constitutional order of 1992 and reforming the army or by a more radical approach of Hutu liberation.

In fact, by the time peace negotiations started, there was already a return movement of Burundian refugees. The table in section 3.3 on the case selection showed that according to UNHCR data, about 200,000 Burundians returned between 2000 and 2006. However, other sources reveal that real numbers are significantly higher, with more than 430,000 returnees since 2001 from Tanzania alone (Ngayimpenda 2005, p. 81). Even UNHCR statistics set the number of returnees between 2002 and 2007 at almost 370,000, as the UNHCR Burundi Fact Sheet for September 2007 shows (UNHCR 2007).

The start of peace negotiations in 1998 – first the political partnership negotiations inside Burundi, then the more comprehensive Arusha negotiations in Tanzania – created a genuine opportunity to return. In the course of negotiations, there was no strong controversy over the right to return for all Burundian refugees. This seems remarkable given the (presumed) political disposition of the refugees. However, those parties who could not expect direct advantages from repatriation in terms of support most likely saw that comprehensive return could weaken the Hutu rebellion linked to refugee camps in Tanzania (International Crisis Group 2002, pp. 17-21). Since the two largest rebel movements at the time, CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL, did not participate in the Arusha process, this seemed to be a promising strategy. The prolonged exile of hundreds of thousands of Burundians clearly could not be in the interests of those included in the

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9BUR-I-11,14-12-07; BUR-II-17,13-03-09
10BUR-I-04,29-11-07
11BUR-I-06,10-12-07; BUR-I-08,12-12-07; BUR-I-09,12-12-07
12The reason for the difference in numbers is due to inconsistencies in the UNHCR data. In UNHCR’s statistical yearbooks, the tables in the statistical annexes indicate: “Population at the end of the year does not necessarily equal the population at the beginning of the year plus the increases minus the decreases”, see Table II.2 on refugee populations, new arrivals and durable solutions by origin from the 2004 yearbook (UNHCR 2005, p. 10). Because of this discrepancy in the yearbooks, the numbers are not always reliable in indicating return. Those from the Country Fact Sheet should be more reliable as these are provided by the country office in Bujumbura.
13This argument was also mentioned in the interviews: BUR-I-07,11-12-07
transitions process. Overall, refugee return was highest in 2003 and 2004, closely followed by the election year 2005, while it visibly fell in 2006 and 2007.

It is difficult to assess the return of Burundian elites in exact numbers. A census in March and April 2000 revealed that 2,215 cadres and state agents were in exile awaiting socio-professional reintegration (Ngayimpanda 2005, p. 81). In order to ascertain whether, according to the criteria set out by the research design, a significant number of elites returned, the Burundian elites – returnees as well as stayees – themselves were asked about return rates during the interviews undertaken in 2009. All respondents with the exception of only one person underlined that many returned, most even stating it was a majority or nearly everybody. There is reference to the return of cadres from CNDD, CNDD-FDD, Frodebu and later even the FNL as well as more specifically to the returning heads of parties after the conclusion of the Arusha negotiations in 2000. A South African Protection Force was set up specifically to provide protection to 150 returning elites in 2001.

Overall, there was not only relevant mobilization in exile, but also a significant return of elites after the various peace settlements. This is a clear indication that they also had the intention to do so during the civil war. This intention is also demonstrated by their activities during the war that aimed to change the political institutions in the home country so that they would be able to return. The high level of mobilization among refugees is also clearly linked to the desire to return in elite statements:

“The refugees are people who have a very politicized profile. You are refugee because you have suffered through something in your country. You find yourself outside and one preoccupation is to ask: what happened to me? Why am I here? Why do I suffer outside? Why do I not return? That’s really automatic. The conclusion is to say: what do I have to do for returning and changing things?”

The fundamental question examined in the following sections is if this intention to return becoming relevant at the time of peace negotiations can help to explain fragmentation during Burundi’s recent democratic transition. However, the next step in this analysis is to confirm that fragmenta-
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY: INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION IN BURUNDI’S TRANSITION AFTER ETHNIC CIVIL WAR

tion of political conflict lines indeed took place and to accurately measure the change over time.
4.2 Defining change: Political conflicts from peace negotiations to the post-transition period in Burundi

To identify the development of political conflict lines in Burundi over time, a content analysis of news sources was conducted. The results presented in this section are used to define change and thus establish the value of the dependent variable in this case study. It is not only crucial to demonstrate that there was some change in conflict lines, but that this change was relevant and requires further explanation. In accordance with the earlier comparison of the periods of democratization before and after the civil war with regard to political party development, the results should reflect the fragmentation of political conflict lines during the transition. An occurrence of fragmentation can be expected with the start of peace negotiations as the independent variable and the control variables are all linked to negotiations.

Fragmentation takes place if the inter-ethnic conflict line becomes clearly less important during the transition without completely disappearing while at least one other line becomes much more prominent. Other lines apart from the inter-ethnic one must have been negligible or even non-existent at the start of the period of observation because otherwise fragmentation is not a newly occurring process. Beyond indicating that fragmentation has taken place, the content analysis can also give initial indications where this fragmentation comes from. This section focuses on measuring the change of political conflict lines over time and thus, defines the value of the dependent variable. The results are also used in the following section to gain insights into specific constellations of actors in conflicts over time.

In accordance with the overall focus, the content analysis is confined to the level of national political elites. The baseline is the year before comprehensive peace negotiations started in 1998.19 One reason for choosing this baseline is that a coding of the preceding years would be very difficult, first, due to the very small number of news sources for the year of the outbreak of the civil war and the following years; second, because these years were characterized by what has earlier been described as a “creeping coup”. While a Hutu president from the Frodebu party was still in power, there are very clear indications that his influence was very limited. Officially there was executive power-sharing at the center, but there is little doubt that many decisions were taken behind the scenes among the Tutsi components in government and the Tutsi-dominated army. This means that power relations were very unclear, and the coding of one central actor

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19 Previously, there were only secret negotiations between the military government and the main Hutu rebel group CNDD-FDD in Rome in 1997. These were very short-lived and did not produce any tangible outcomes.
in conflict, the government, would have been extremely difficult for this period. This ambiguity disappeared with the coup and the return to power of former President Buyoya in 1996.

Furthermore, as already discussed, the expectation of this dissertation is that new conflict lines should only become relevant to the conflict structure at the time of peace negotiations. In particular, the process of return from exile more or less starts at this point. During civil war, different actors have been able to coexist and operate without too much interaction or interference. Different rebel groups can, for example, be militarily active in different areas of the country. While they operate outside the political system and are sometimes even based outside the country, certain political actors may remain inside the system, trying to maintain some control. Exile groups often have the function of organizing financial, logistical and political support for activities at home. These different actors within ethnic groups can even profit from a kind of division of labor during the war. With the start of peace negotiations, however, diverging grievances, interests and patterns of mobilization come to the fore. The groups have to engage in bargaining and thus directly compete – whether over (state) resources or over group representation more generally.

While negotiations can potentially be the cause of new conflicts, reduce group cohesion or lead to institutional change, they can also be linked to the occurrence of changes in conflict lines because they mark the start of a larger political integration process. To capture these different kinds of changes, it should therefore be sufficient to start coding news sources in the year before the actual Burundian peace process started. Furthermore, it was shown in the last section that there clearly was polarization between two dominant actors before the civil war in 1993, so there is also a reference for the baseline year without including it in the content analysis. The analysis ends with the year 2006, one year after the first elections since the outbreak of the war took place in Burundi and officially concluded the transition period. This year is included in order to take potential changes caused by elections and the installation of the new government into account.

The two most prominent conflict lines in Burundian politics since independence have been the ethnic and the regional ones. However, the ethnic conflict line clearly is the dominant one in the context of the civil war and during earlier episodes of violence, as the previous sections have shown. Thus, conflicts are categorized in reference to this main line in the following content analysis, meaning that conflicts are coded as inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, trans- or non-ethnic. However, the next sections discussing possible explanations for the development of conflict lines over time will break down these rather general categories and take into account the regional conflict line as well. For the purpose of this section, the coding with reference to ethnicity is most adequate.

As already mentioned, fragmentation – as opposed to polarization in an
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY: INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION IN BURUNDI’S TRANSITION AFTER ETHNIC CIVIL WAR

ethnic party system – involves the decreasing importance of the inter-ethnic divide and a relative increase in importance of other conflict lines that previously were non-existent or irrelevant. The first expected finding of the content analysis is that the number of political conflicts that are not inter-ethnic will increase substantially from a negligible level with the start of peace negotiations. Over time, the relative weight of inter-ethnic conflicts must decrease or increase to a much lesser extent, because otherwise the increase of other conflicts is simply due to a general rise in conflicts. This would not mean that no fragmentation of conflict lines has taken place at all, but it would render this phenomenon less meaningful.

With the coding of each conflict event as inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic (-Hutu or -Tutsi), trans-ethnic or non-ethnic,\(^{20}\) the development of these different lines can be set in relation to each other over time. If any or even several of those lines start to appear with peace negotiations, this could be an indication of one or several new conflict lines. In the further analysis in the next section, the coded conflict lines can also be subdivided into more fine-grained categories with regard to the actor groups involved, which is crucial in order to substantiate the sources of change. This section outlines the coding scheme and presents different tests concerning reliability and source bias as well as a discussion of the main findings.

4.2.1 Framework and coding scheme

A reported incident qualifies as a political conflict event based on the five criteria outlined in the research design section. It must involve claim-making by political elites, interaction between claim-makers and others whose interests are concerned and it must be episodic, public and not routine action. Such events are somewhere between minor disagreements or intense disputes between two or more actors. Actors in a conflict event can be groups or single persons acting on behalf of groups. In the latter case, the link to a certain group is either made directly by the person in his or her claims or indirectly indicated in the news report by mentioning the function of the person important in the context of the reported event. This can for example be the head of a political party, a minister in government or a leader of a rebel movement.

In accordance with the elite focus of the study, elite involvement needs to be reported at least on one side of the conflict for each event. For the first occurrence of a conflict, there even needs to be reference to elite involvement on both sides. The criterion of elite involvement is only fulfilled if national political (or for certain periods also military) elites are quoted or mentioned as actors. Events involving only political actors below this level,

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\(^{20}\)Non-ethnic conflicts have no reference to ethnicity and include non-ethnic actors, whereas trans-ethnic conflicts simply cross ethnic lines on both sides while actors involved still have an ethnic base.
for example provincial governors or local administrators, are not coded, neither are events referring to leaders of civic non-governmental associations as actors.

The five criteria for coding an incident as a political conflict event from news sources need to be specified for this content analysis:

1. **claim making by political elites**: statement or indirect quotation of an elite member or group making a political claim or engaging in specific action signifying a political claim.

2. **interaction between claim-makers and others whose interests are concerned**: reaction of those targeted by the claim indicated by statements, indirect quotation or by reported action in reference to the claim. These actors also have to be national political elites according to the general framework of this study. Once a conflict has started, it is no longer necessary that each event is reported with explicit elite involvement on both sides. If this criterion were not applied, certain events such as episodes in the civil war would be greatly underrepresented since they are rarely reported with elite participation on both sides. However, in each reported conflict event, direct elite involvement has to be reported on at least one side of the conflict.

3. **episodic incidence**: the incident is not a permanent situation, but only occurs temporarily within the period of interest. Regularly scheduled events such as associational meetings are excluded, although they can certainly lead to conflicts or be accompanied by conflict events. Generally, each conflict needs to comprise several events; one occurrence during the period of investigation is not sufficient.

4. **public occurrence**: the interaction is reported in the media. This condition is always fulfilled if an event occurs in a news report.

5. **no routine action**: the incident creates uncertainty. The kinds of qualifications – adjectives or hedges – used in reported statements are taken to indicate the uncertainty associated with the interaction. Direct threats and strong accusations are normally clear indications of non-routine actions. An important indication of uncertainty is the reaction of a person or a group targeted by a claim. Especially if claims on rather minor points lead to intense debates and/or lead to disputes over more general issues, the incident qualifies as a conflict. The context of statements and actions matters as well. The same accusation can be interpreted as a threat in one context and as routine action in another, for example when it is constantly repeated over longer time periods.
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This content analysis mainly follows a deductive approach with a categorical scheme suggested by theoretical perspective. The scheme was tested and adapted after a pilot coding of one year of news sources (2000).\(^{21}\) When an incident qualified as a political conflict event based on the criteria outlined and it was the first occurrence of this specific conflict, it was assigned a number. Each following event that belonged to the same political conflict was coded with the same number. For example, a prominent conflict over the leadership of CNDD-FDD that led to the split of the movement was conflict number 28 since it was the 28th distinct conflict at the time it first occurred. Overall, this single conflict comprises 16 different conflict events over time that are all coded under the same number.\(^{22}\) The first event in this conflict occurred in May 1998 and the last one in August 2000.

Thus, one political conflict consists of several conflict events\(^{23}\) that comprise the same actor constellation and the same issue over time. If a conflict event is identified that involves an issue and/or actors that had not previously occurred, a new political conflict marked with a separate number has been coded. In the example of conflict 28, the two parties to the conflict were always the faction led by the founding head of CNDD and the faction of the new head whose leadership was contested by the old leader. The issue of the conflict was the leadership of the movement, starting with the ousting of the old leader based on accusations of mismanagement. Afterwards, the two sides continued to claim that they were representing the group, and conflict events continuing along this line were coded as belonging to the same conflict. A later conflict, however, that also involved these two factions on each side was coded as a new conflict (no. 181), first, because it involved additional actors on both sides, and second, because it was about another issue – namely about a ceasefire agreement.

Based on this coding, the number of conflicts becomes relatively high.\(^{24}\) If an incident qualified as a political conflict event, several features of the conflict were coded for this event.\(^{25}\)

21The actual coding of news sources was carried out using the program Atlas.ti. This program allows for a systematic coding and the administration and elaboration of codes later on without real options for automatic coding. Automatic coding was not possible for this content analysis, because the decision whether an event qualifies as a conflict and the following coding of specific features of the conflict were too complex.

22I frequently refer to this conflict as a model case in this section to illustrate the different features of the coding process.

23Each conflict needs to consist of at least two events.

24In the test coding, one year (2000) had about 50 different political conflicts among political elites.

25Certain aspects that were coded based on this scheme are not directly relevant to the findings and the analysis of this study. For example, the sub-categories of violent and non-violent action are not taken into account at this point. However, they were coded with a view to the later use of the data and for possible checks on the intensity of single conflict events.
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Table 4.2: Coding scheme for political conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>actor making a claim</td>
<td>actorA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target(s) of the claim</td>
<td>actorB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other actors directly involved</td>
<td>actorC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict issue</td>
<td>con-issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>form of action</td>
<td>non-violent-sp (speech),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>non-violent-a (action);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>violent-mat (material damage),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>violent-phys (physical injuries and death)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict line</td>
<td>inter-ethnic,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>intra-ethnic-T (Tutsi),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>intra-ethnic-H (Hutu),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trans-ethnic,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>non-ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labeling of actors by themselves and</td>
<td>labelA-s (self-labeling of A),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by others</td>
<td>labelA-oa (labeling of A by other actor),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>labelA-om (labeling of A by media),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>labelB-s (self-labeling of B),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>labelB-oa (labeling of B by other actor),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>labelB-om (labeling of B by media)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although violence was not used as a criterion to identify a political conflict, it was still coded as “form of action” if an incident was violent or non-violent, because it is obviously relevant how many conflict events within a certain category have been violent and how violence develops over time in relation to conflict lines. The model case between the CNDD factions included 15 non-violent and one violent event – a politically motivated assassination.

The definition and operationalization of the conflict line coding were the most crucial but also the most complex aspect of the coding scheme. The five labels chosen are relatively general with the exception of the inter-ethnic line and are all set in relation to the central ethnic conflict line. The coding of an intra-Hutu conflict can, for example, refer to a conflict between regional components, between political and military actors or between exile and resident groups. However, such a general coding was necessary at this point, because only in this way can shifts in the importance of the inter-ethnic line easily be identified over time.

The decision whether a conflict was inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic (Hutu or Tutsi), trans-ethnic or non-ethnic depended on the claims of actors – or, alternatively, their general aims – and on the leadership of the organizations involved. Other criteria that could be used, such as organizations’ support base, would have been too difficult to measure over time due to insuffi-
cient information. Because the coding was limited to political and military actors, and their ethnic disposition based on the mentioned criteria is normally very clear in the case of Burundi, the conflict line coding was not generally problematic. For example, the conflict line coding of the model case was clearly intra-Hutu for the whole time the conflict occurred as it took place within a Hutu rebel movement and finally led to its split into two different groups that remained Hutu-dominated and made claims to represent this group.

Some difficulties arose with regard to the coding of the government and later on also with regard to the army as their leadership, and their claims also subsequently changed over time. In contrast to parties and movements that remained relatively stable concerning (ethnic) claims, aims and/or leadership during the period of observation,\textsuperscript{26} the coding of these actors needed to be changed at certain points.

Concerning the government, it was clear that the military government under Buyoya that came to power in a coup in 1996 had to be coded as Tutsi-dominated. I also decided to code the following government of the political partnership after mid-1998 as Tutsi-dominated since the inclusion of Hutu politicians was rather cosmetic. This is in line with the labeling in several news sources at the time, which talked about “the Tutsi-led government”. However, if an actor specifically referred to the Hutu components of the political partnership, the conflict line was coded with regard to this actor.

With the installation of the transitional government in 2001, the government as an actor becomes ethnically mixed. From this time onwards, it was therefore coded as an inter-ethnic coalition. This is not only due to the changes in leadership, but also to the claims made by government representatives. Again, if a conflict event only relates to one part of the transitional government – the Hutu or the Tutsi component – the coding refers to this one group.

The coding of the army as Tutsi-dominated does not change with the installation of the transitional government in 2001, because there was no significant change in the ethnic structure of the army. Such a change only takes place later with the inclusion of a relevant number of fighters and higher ranks from the CNDD-FDD movement that signed an agreement in 2003. However, I have not coded the army as ethnically mixed before the

\textsuperscript{26}Obviously, one could call into question this relatively stable coding of parties, because ethnic parties were no longer permitted to exist following the introduction of the new constitution in 2005. Furthermore, the former rebel movement CNDD-FDD pursued a strong “non-ethnic” rhetoric, at least after about 2000. But regardless of the credibility of this anti-ethnic discourse, the leadership structure of this movement and of other actors remained ethnically dominated. And due to the power-sharing components of the new political system, parties and groups were still defined with regard to ethnicity. I therefore decided to code these actors under the same ethnic label for the whole time period.
elections in 2005, because the integration process was protracted and there is no real indication of a change in claims made by army representatives before. A second reason for this coding is that it prevents the overemphasis of intra-Hutu conflicts at the time. Because one Hutu rebel movement, the FNL, was still fighting after the inclusion of CNDD-FDD, every clash between the army and the remaining rebels would have to be coded inter-ethnic as well as intra-Hutu if the army were coded as ethnically mixed. In order to prevent an overestimation of the increase in intra-Hutu conflicts based on this development, I used a more conservative coding of the army as still Tutsi-dominated. With the installation of the newly elected CNDD-FDD government in 2005, however, the army was coded as ethnically mixed due to a visible influence of the CNDD-FDD components.

The government after 2005 was coded as Hutu-dominated since CNDD-FDD occupied all important positions and pursued a policy that clearly limited the influence of other actors who had to be included in government due to the power-sharing arrangements.

A conflict was coded as trans-ethnic if there was a trans-ethnic coalition or at least a short-term alliance on both sides of the conflict. Conflicts in which Hutu and Tutsi actors only cooperate on one side or in which Hutu and Tutsi parties only make the same claims without any links or direct cooperation were not coded as trans-ethnic. This relatively high threshold was necessary because otherwise the conflict would not really have a trans-ethnic nature, but rather coincidentally cross ethnic boundaries. A situation where an ethnically defined actor attacked the ethnically mixed transitional government, for example, was coded as inter- as well as intra-ethnic, but not as trans-ethnic. Non-ethnic conflicts need to be independent of the ethnic divide and in any case include actors on both sides that are not defined in ethnic terms. Thus, their occurrence was highly unlikely for the period of observation.

The first three points in table 4.2 with the coding scheme include the coding of information on the kind of actors and specific sub-categories, potentially going down to individual persons. Here, the main criterion was the affiliation of an actor, normally meaning the organizational affiliation. In cases where a person or group acted on behalf of an organization – whether a rebel movement, the government or a political party – the conflict line was coded according to the organization’s disposition. If, for example, elites of two different parties that can be categorized as Hutu-dominated had a conflict and there was reference to the party affiliation, the conflict was coded as intra-Hutu.

Naturally, the duration of conflicts became visible after the coding because the results indicate at which points in time a conflict occurred and when it ceased to occur (of course, this does not automatically mean that it has been finally settled).

Conflict events were coded even if they were not (fully) taking place in-
side the political system. This is important since all relevant actors outside the Burundian institutions, such as the rebel movements, had a political agenda. If only those political conflicts taking place in the official political realm had been coded could newly emerging conflicts and conflict lines simply be due to a transfer of pre-existing conflicts outside the system.

All reports between 1997 and 2006 that were included in “factiva” reporting on Burundian domestic politics were originally selected. This is important because issues of newspapers or other units are not strictly independent of each other as many news events unfold in time and over several issues. The solution in quantitative content analysis is commonly to define sampling units, firstly, so that connections across sampling units, if they exist, do not bias the analysis and, secondly, to ensure that all relevant information is contained in individual sampling units, or omissions do not impoverish the analysis (Krippendorff 2004, p. 99).

For a content analysis that does not engage in quantitative measuring (e.g. word counting) but uses news sources to trace actual events, the interconnectedness of streams of messages creates similar problems. The first precautionary measure here was to include all potentially relevant reports without any pre-selection. Only in a next step and by actually reading all reports were those texts that clearly had nothing to do with political conflicts in Burundi excluded. The rest were included for a more thorough check during the actual coding process.

Table 4.3: Number of reports included in analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of all reports</th>
<th>No. of pre-selected reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,432</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,122</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2,293</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,996</td>
<td>2,349</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The connectedness of different news reports led to additional problems. In some cases, not all criteria that define a political conflict in this analysis must be present in one single news item; for example, the reaction of a targeted party can occur some time after the original claim was made. In cases where not all criteria for a political conflict were fulfilled in one report, the passage was assigned a question mark to decide later whether subsequent
reports made the coding of this incident as a conflict event necessary.

Furthermore, there was the challenge of how to code a conflict event that was reported by several news sources at the time. Since each coding would be counted as a conflict event later, the coding of the same single event in different reports would have blurred the numbers. In order to ensure that there are no double or even triple codings of the same event, one solution would have been to count events with the same number occurring on the same date as one political conflict event in the final analysis. However, in order to be as precise as possible, I checked all conflict events with the same number occurring within the same week and deleted double or triple codings of the same event.

Another potential problem is that many conflicts are frequently mentioned in the news sources although no new conflict event has actually taken place. Thus, there need to be certain standards on how long after a certain event reports can still be included in the coding. The decision taken here was that the event must have taken place within the last month before the date of the report. The reason for this time frame is that “factiva” also includes sources that only appear weekly or monthly. However, the same event will only be coded once even if the same news agency reports it several times.

4.2.2 Results and analysis

I conducted the coding of political conflicts for the whole period of 1997-2006 in accordance with the procedures outlined in the last subsection. Some conflicts that had originally been coded with different numbers were merged when it turned out that conflict issue and actor constellations were the same or very similar. However, this concerned very few conflicts. Furthermore, all cases of doubt have been re-examined and either coded or deleted, although some cases with an unidentifiable conflict line remained. The final step was to exclude all conflicts that only occurred once over the whole period. After these procedures, the results display actual political conflict events that were reported in the news sources over time.

In order to ensure the consistency of the coding procedure over time, an intra-coder reliability test was conducted. First, a sample of 100 news items was put together by randomly selecting 10 news reports from each year. Second, I recoded this sample two months after finishing the actual coding process. And finally, I compared a) the coding of political conflict events, and b) for consistently coded events, the coding of the different features of the conflict event.27

For the 100 news items, seven deviations occurred in the coding of political conflict events between the original and the reliability run. In four

27 With the exception of the conflict issue and the labeling of actors as these aspects were not of prime importance for the analysis.
cases, a conflict event was coded in the reliability test but not before, while three were not coded in the reliability test which had been coded before. All other conflict event codings corresponded, meaning that the same conflict events were coded based on the same text passages. However, the number of deviations was not only relatively low; it also did not show a systematic trend. First, there seems to be no general trend in the actual coding to over- or underestimate conflict events. Second, there seems to be no systematic bias towards one conflict line. Among those four events coded in the reliability test, but not in the actual coding process, there was one intra-Tutsi, two inter-ethnic and one inter-ethnic as well as intra-Hutu conflict. Among the events that were not coded in the reliability test were two inter-ethnic and one intra-Hutu conflicts.

There also seems to be no link between deviations and the time when news items were coded. For obvious reasons, the reports were originally coded along the timeline, but the deviations did not accumulate in a certain period or certain years. The following table shows the exact results of the reliability test.

The table also demonstrates that the coding of the central features of conflicts coded (actors, conflict line and form of action) had a very high consistency. There was no deviance in the coding of actors and very minor divergence for the other features. For the form of action and the conflict line, all deviations were due to the fact that some events had more than one coding for this feature (e.g. an event was inter-ethnic AND intra-ethnic or included violent AND non-violent actions) and the less intense feature was sometimes not coded in the reliability test. Generally speaking, the results of the test showed a very good consistency for the conflict codings and a high consistency for the coding of conflict features. The results presented in the following are therefore based on a coding that shows no systematic internal deviation over time or with regard to specific aspects of the conflicts.

In total, 269 political conflicts were identified by the content analysis over time. Coding results were first processed with regard to the conflict lines and the duration of conflicts. This means that all 269 conflicts were listed with regard to their first and last occurrence during the period of observation and with regard to their underlying conflict line(s). For the model case of conflict no. 28, this meant that May 1998 was recorded as the beginning and August 2000 as the end of the conflict, and the conflict line was intra-Hutu.
### Table 4.4: Results of intra-coder reliability test

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not consistent (conflicts coded in addition)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not consistent (conflicts not coded)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors, consistent</td>
<td>17 (17)</td>
<td>12 (12)</td>
<td>12 (12)</td>
<td>8 (8)</td>
<td>14 (14)</td>
<td>8 (8)</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>12 (12)</td>
<td>10 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict lines, consistent</td>
<td>8 (8)</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td>6 (7)</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>7 (9)</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>9 (9)</td>
<td>8 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of action, consistent</td>
<td>8 (9)</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>7 (8)</td>
<td>4 (5)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>6 (7)</td>
<td>5 (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[x (y) = y \text{ out of } x \text{ codings consistent}\]
While the first feature of the duration of a conflict was very easy to grasp, determining the conflict line(s) of each conflict for the whole duration was not always as easy as in the model case. The reason is that not all conflicts only had one underlying conflict line; in some cases there were two and very seldom three lines which, however, did not always appear in each single conflict event. For example, a conflict between anti-negotiation Tutsi parties and the parties to the political partnership negotiations in 1998 over the reforms of the partnership is recorded as intra-Tutsi as well as inter-ethnic. Since members of the partnership were Hutu and Tutsi actors, this group is ethnically mixed. Yet among the eight conflict events constituting this specific conflict, only five were inter-ethnic, while all were intra-Tutsi. This difference is due to the fact that the Tutsi opposition parties sometimes specifically attacked the Tutsi-dominated government and thus the Tutsi component of the political partnership. The whole conflict was listed as intra-Tutsi as well as inter-ethnic, because more than one-third of all conflict events had taken place along both lines. This is the threshold that has generally been applied to all conflicts that included events with more than one underlying conflict line. If the threshold was not reached by one conflict line, it was not included in the count for this political conflict.

The following diagram shows the development of political conflicts over time based on a list capturing the month when the conflict started, the month when it last occurred during the period of observation and the conflict line(s) for each of the 269 conflicts. When there were two underlying conflict lines, the conflict was counted half for each conflict line, and in the very seldom cases of three conflict lines, one-third for each conflict line. In the latter two years in particular, intra-Hutu codings of conflicts just missed the one-third threshold several times in conflicts that were mainly inter-ethnic. Therefore, this conflict line is rather underestimated for 2005 and 2006. Despite this fact and the conservative coding of the army as a Tutsi-dominated actor until 2005, the results show a shift towards the intra-Hutu conflict line over time.

It is important to stress that the diagram displays the conflict lines in an accumulative way. Thus, a rise in the upper lines in the diagram can simply be due to a rise in a lower line since all lines together add up to the total number of ongoing conflicts. What is relevant in order to identify the development of conflicts along the respective lines is the surface marked by different colors: blue for intra-Hutu, red for intra-Tutsi, yellow for inter-ethnic and green for trans-ethnic conflicts. For example, the visible rise in the lines in mid-1998 is only due to an actual increase in intra-Hutu conflicts at the time while intra-Tutsi and inter-ethnic conflicts remain at the same level.

The development of the three main conflict lines has several important turning points. First, intra-Hutu conflicts only occurred from March 1998 onwards with two small events in May and June 1997 in the context of
secret negotiations between the military government and the largest rebel movement CNDD. Both events, however, were only 0.5 codings, meaning that the conflicts were intra-Hutu as well as inter-ethnic.

Second, from March 1998 onwards, intra-Hutu conflicts almost permanently remained at a high level until a temporary decline in 2003. First they gained in relative importance with a clear increase by mid-1998 when the inter-ethnic conflict line remained at the same level with only a short rise in October 1998. In January 2000, the intra-Hutu line reached the level of the inter-ethnic line for the first time, although it was nearly at the same value several times before, especially in the second half of 1999. From June 2000 onwards, the inter-ethnic conflicts increased very strongly until the end of the year while the intra-ethnic conflicts remained basically at the same level.

Third, in April 2000 the intra-Tutsi line reached the level of inter-ethnic conflicts for the first time, and almost the level of the intra-Hutu conflicts. In March 2001 the three main conflict lines were nearly at the same level before intra-Tutsi and inter-ethnic conflicts also strongly increased with a peak in July 2001. Both lines did not increase until November 2001, when intra-Hutu conflicts had the highest value again (until February 2002). From this point on, the intra-Tutsi conflict line was in almost permanent decline for the period of observation with a minor revival from January to September 2003 before it completely disappeared by November 2004. There was not a single intra-Tutsi conflict from this month onwards and
there was only one ongoing conflict over the whole year 2004.

Fourth, the relation of the intra-Hutu and inter-ethnic conflict line changed several times before the intra-Hutu line became dominant from May 2005 onwards. From April to October 2002, inter-ethnic conflicts increased considerably while intra-Hutu conflicts remained at a more or less constant level. There was another strong peak in inter-ethnic conflicts lasting from January 2003 to July 2003, but this time the number of ongoing intra-Hutu conflicts increased at the same time to almost the same degree. In August 2003 there was a clear decrease in all conflicts which remain at a generally low level until intra-Hutu conflicts increase again between March and October 2006.

Finally, trans-ethnic conflicts occurred at a very low level and only over a relatively short time period from July 1999 to April 2000 and again very briefly in November 2001. The peak of this conflict line was in January 2000; in this month trans-ethnic conflicts outnumbered intra-Tutsi conflicts and were nearly at the level of inter-ethnic and intra-Hutu conflicts. Only one month later, however, they were at a low level again. As expected, non-ethnic conflicts were not reported over the whole time period.

There are several central results: 1) The intra-Hutu conflicts only really started to appear with peace negotiations in 1998 and there was only one intra-Tutsi conflict at the beginning of the period of observation. 2) The transition from 2001 to 2005 is clearly a period of fragmentation of conflict lines since inter-ethnic, intra-Hutu and intra-Tutsi conflicts are all at a relevant level. 3) Inter-ethnic conflicts decreased in importance relative to the intra-Hutu line at some points and permanently for the period of observation from mid-2005 onwards. Although ethnicity remains the reference line in politics and there are no non-ethnic conflicts, disputes between the two ethnic groups are much less frequent towards the end of the transition while intra-Hutu conflicts clearly dominate the arena, even more so since intra-Tutsi conflicts totally disappeared.

However, there are two shortcomings of analyzing the results based on the diagram. Firstly, it does not differentiate between violent and non-violent events. Secondly, it shows the duration of the conflicts, but not their intensity. A conflict taking place over the course of a whole year might include only two events while others could potentially include hundreds of events. Thus, the results have also been processed with regard to the number of conflict events per month and the share of violent events. Table 4.5 shows the events per year in order to give an overview of the most important developments.28

These results are based on a different count than the one underlying the diagram. While the diagram captured the number of ongoing conflicts at a time, the table contains all single conflict events, taking the conflict line and

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28The tables showing events per month can be found in the annex.
the form of action (violent or non-violent) for each event into account, regardless of how events have been distributed across the 269 conflicts. Thus, the numbers display the intensity of the different conflict lines over time.

The results of this count largely confirm the findings identified based on the diagram. The intra-Hutu conflict line only becomes relevant with the year 1998 after only two minor events occurred in 1997. For the last two years, the intra-Hutu conflicts outnumber inter-ethnic ones while the intra-Tutsi conflict line completely disappears after a strong peak in 2001. As already mentioned, the few trans-ethnic events had their peak in 2000, but were not very important in comparison to the number of codings for the three main lines.

The development of violent conflict events over time is just as interesting. While these were always highest in the inter-ethnic category, mainly because of the civil war, the number declines from 2002 onwards with a marginally lower value than violent conflicts among Hutu actors in the last year. Therefore, it makes sense to take a closer look at the violent conflict events of this last year.

The analysis shows that 10 conflicts in 2006 had an inter-ethnic as well as an intra-Hutu component. On the one hand, there were seven violent events between the army and the remaining rebel group, the FNL; on the other hand, three events referred to a conflict between the CNDD-FDD government and politicians from different parties accused of having planned to overthrow the government. The latter group comprised representatives of several Hutu and Tutsi parties who were arrested and tortured by the government’s security services. There is one conflict event between the FNL rebels and the FDD government without the army, and, thus, without an inter-ethnic component. The events with only material damage have not been included; only events with physical damage were counted for the tables. However, including events with lower levels of violence would not have made any difference for this year, because one of two events with material damage in 2006 was an inter-ethnic and one an intra-Hutu conflict. Violent events have hardly played a role at all in intra-Tutsi conflicts over time.

Generally, it can be concluded that even at the level of violent events, the inter-ethnic line is no longer dominant by 2006, but is still relevant because of the role of the (ethnically mixed) army and the targeting of basically all other parties by CNDD-FDD – regardless of their ethnic disposition.

\[\text{The one conflict event occurring in 2005 is not captured by the diagram since it did not lead to the passing of the one-third threshold for coding the whole conflict as intra-Tutsi.}\]
### Table 4.5: Conflict line codings per year

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-ethnic</td>
<td>30 (1)</td>
<td>46 (9)</td>
<td>66 (20)</td>
<td>86 (11)</td>
<td>110 (15)</td>
<td>154 (38)</td>
<td>125 (33)</td>
<td>109 (17)</td>
<td>37 (20)</td>
<td>59 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-Tutsi</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13 (1)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>112 (3)</td>
<td>31 (1)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-Hutu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27 (1)</td>
<td>35 (2)</td>
<td>76 (5)</td>
<td>76 (9)</td>
<td>47 (3)</td>
<td>59 (15)</td>
<td>107 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-ethnic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-ethnic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of violent conflicts in brackets; n.i. = not identifiable
Among the higher numbers of unclear conflict lines listed in the category “n.i.” of the table, those that are very probably intra-Hutu conflicts dominate. However, it was not possible to code the conflict line with complete certainty in these cases and these events are therefore ignored in the count. Again, this point tends to lead to an underestimation of intra-Hutu conflicts for the last three years.

Overall, the results on the number of conflict events—disclosing violent and non-violent events—verify the main findings set out in the diagram. When combining the results, the start of peace negotiations in 1998 and the elections in 2005 seem to be the important turning points for the intra-Hutu conflict line, while 2001 and 2004 mark important changes in the intra-Tutsi line. For the inter-ethnic line, there is a difference according to whether one focuses on duration or intensity. For the number of ongoing conflicts displayed in the diagram, intra-Hutu conflicts arrive at about the same level in 2000 and at several other points, while in terms of intensity this does not happen before 2005. However, it can be concluded that starting with 2005, the intra-Hutu conflicts were dominant and also relatively disconnected from the development of the inter-ethnic line. This turning point is obviously related to the elections and the installation of the new government.

However, no matter how results are measured and displayed, there is still the possibility of a serious bias in the news sources, especially with regard to which conflicts are reported. On the one hand, certain news sources may be more likely to report conflicts along certain lines; this should mainly be the case for local sources as these might be ethnically biased. On the other hand, conflicts in the context of certain events such as negotiations might have a higher likelihood of being reported, which should be especially evident in the case of international services since events with some international involvement such as peace negotiations are potentially of greater interest to their readership.

In order to check on a possible bias, I have counted the conflict codes per news service for each month over the period of observation. This count shows whether the codings based on certain services were strikingly high or low at certain points. Conspicuous changes can be compared with the list of conflict line codings and set in relation to certain events, for example negotiations.

I do not have any information on how and why certain services are included (more) in “factiva”. It is therefore not possible to account for a bias due to the pre-selection of news sources included in the database. However, the following table, which presents the number of conflict codings for international, regional and local new sources over time, at least indicates a certain balance.

Interestingly, codings from international sources remain very constant over time. There seems to be no clear bias with regard to the likelihood of conflicts being reported in the context of certain events. At least, such
Table 4.6: Sources of conflict line codings

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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International sources</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional sources</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local sources</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A bias would have been constant over the period of observation. Codings based on regional sources show a peak in the years 1999 to 2001 which can be explained with a special regional interest in the Arusha peace negotiations, especially in Tanzania. Yet the deviation for these three years is not very important in comparison to the number of conflict codings from international and local sources.

Regional news sources have had a weak influence on the codings over time in general. This low influence is not severe as long as local and international sources are relatively balanced. Generally, this is the case with two exceptions. First, in the years 1997 and 2005 a higher share of conflict codings came from international sources. Second, between 2000 and 2003 local source codings reach an extremely high level compared to the international source codings, which remain more or less constant. Concerning the first observation, the relatively low number of codings from local sources for the first three years is probably due to the fact that some important services only started to operate later. The difference in 2005 is more difficult to explain, but is most likely due to the fact that international sources reported more on the election campaign, the referendum and the elections followed by the installation of the new government. However, the findings for the conflict development in 2005, with increasing importance of the intra-Hutu conflict line, correspond with the development in 2006 when the number of coded local sources reached earlier levels again. Thus, the 2005 deviation seems to be rather negligible with regard to the consistency of results.

The greatest change is the very strong increase in codings from local sources between 2000 and 2003. Looking at codings in a more fine-grained way, meaning the number of codings for each single source, reveals that there is sufficient variation in the local services from which conflict codings are derived with the exception of these years. The rise is almost exclusively due to an extraordinary influence of Net Press, a privately owned Burundian news agency as the following table shows. In all the years indicated,

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30 The tables showing the number of events coded by source per month are available upon request.
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY: INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION
IN BURUNDI’S TRANSITION AFTER ETHNIC CIVIL WAR

Net Press codings outnumber the otherwise most numerous codings from Reuters with the exception of 2003 where the two reach exactly the same number. Without the Net Press codings, the numbers of local source codings only increase moderately. The problem of this strong influence is that Net Press is known to be a Tutsi-biased news service which is clearly confirmed by the rhetoric of the reports.\textsuperscript{31} Indeed, a closer look at the conflict line codings in Net Press reports from 2000 to 2003 show an unusually high number of intra-Tutsi codings for the years 2001 to 2003.

Table 4.7: Conflict codings in Net Press reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net Press codings</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-ethnic</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-Tutsi</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-Hutu</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-ethnic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>total</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.i. = not identifiable

This is not very surprising since Net Press is not only Tutsi-biased, but also known to be the mouthpiece of smaller Tutsi parties opposing the government(s) under Buyoya. Particularly the finding that intra-Tutsi conflict sharply increased in 2001 has to be called into question because of the strong influence of Net Press for this and the following years in relation to the total number of intra-Tutsi codings.

It seems credible that there was a certain rise in intra-Tutsi conflicts at the time, partly due to two coup attempts by (Tutsi-dominated) army factions in 2001. However, the extent of this increase cannot be taken for granted and should thus be treated with caution in the analysis. The decline and disappearance of intra-Tutsi conflicts despite the fact that Net Press was still included in the sample of news sources until the end of the period in 2006 seems to be an even more reliable result against the background of this finding.

The bias caused by Net Press for the years 2001 to 2003 seems to be the only systematic and problematic one in the content analysis. International sources like Reuters and later “Agence France-Presse” (AFP) undoubtedly had a strong influence, but they certainly have no ethnic orientation or another bias concerning conflict lines, and the level of codings has also not changed significantly over time. The relatively limited peak in codings based on regional services for 1999 to 2001 and the very low number of locally based codings in 2005 have not blurred the results in a way that

\textsuperscript{31}For example, Hutu rebels are often labeled “genocidal terrorists” by Net Press.
general findings have to be called into question. Similarly, the fairly low number of codings in 1997 does not make the over- or underestimation of one specific conflict line more or less likely for that year.

Surprisingly, there also seems to be no tendency – especially by the international services – to only report in the context of events receiving strong international attention. Looking for example at the Reuters codings for each year, but also per month for each year, it is difficult to argue that there is a strong accumulation of codings at certain points, and the small bias that might be there is certainly balanced by a relatively high number of locally based codings over time.

The check of a potential bias of news sources and the intra-coder reliability test have shown that the main findings of the content analysis on the development of political conflicts over time are credible and reliable with the exception of the strong rise in intra-Tutsi conflicts in 2001. Based on the content analysis, it can be concluded that there has been a visible and relevant change in conflict lines over time in Burundi. More importantly, there clearly was a process of fragmentation over the course of the democratic transition. This process had, however, already started before the official beginning of the transition. While there were a number of intra-Tutsi conflict events in 1997, intra-Hutu conflicts only really started to occur by mid-1998. It can clearly be stated that the inter-ethnic conflict line was dominant at the beginning of the period of observation, especially since it included violent events.\footnote{Violent incidents as part of the civil war are of course underestimated by the elite focus that implied that only events with either direct elite involvement or at least a reference of elites to these events have been coded.}

If it had been possible to start the content analysis with the year 1993, polarization and levels of violence would certainly have been higher. Nonetheless, this analysis shows that fragmentation did indeed take place since there was not only an overall increase in conflict events during the transition, but an increase in the importance of intra-Hutu conflicts and, for the first part of the transition, also intra-Tutsi conflicts. The intra-Hutu conflicts and conflict events almost constantly increased while inter-ethnic conflict events were in decline from 2002 onwards, although from a high level. Intra-Hutu conflicts became more important than inter-ethnic ones by 2005 and with regard to violent events by 2006. With regard to the disappearance of the intra-Tutsi conflicts, it is particularly interesting that this phenomenon occurred at the beginning of 2004, long before the elections took place and brought a Hutu-dominated government into power.

But to really validate the results of the content analysis, at least the most important findings need to be substantiated by other sources. The new occurrence of a relevant number of intra-Hutu conflicts in 1998 and their dominance by 2006 as well as a decrease in the importance of inter-ethnic
and intra-Tutsi conflicts can be seen as the main finding and puzzle for the following analysis. It should therefore be possible to substantiate it with other sources.

The most adequate source for such triangulation in this study are the interviews conducted during field research in Burundi in 2007 and 2009, which are also the basis of the analysis in the last section of this chapter. Indeed, a considerable number of respondents stated that the ethnic cleavage was less important or even resolved by 2007 or 2009. This is certainly relevant since both years are still very close to the final year of the content analysis. Furthermore, the group stressing a decreased importance of inter-ethnic conflicts shows no distinct commonality in ethnic terms, meaning that both Hutu and Tutsi were among those making this claim. Some stated that the ethnic question was almost resolved (BUR-I-12_15-12-07), or even that “tribalism which was the catalyst of the war is over today. At least to 90%, it is finished” (BUR-II-05_25-02-09). Others were more moderate in their assessment, but emphasized that the ethnic cleavage has become less important (BUR-II-24_23-03-09; BUR-I-07_11-12-07; BUR-I-03_28-11-07; BUR-I-08_12-12-07; BUR-I-09_12-12-07) and will certainly play less of a role in the coming elections (BUR-II-31_27-03-09; BUR-II-03_23-02-09).

Those evaluating the ethnic cleavage as still most important are normally Tutsi respondents (BUR-II-15_11-03-09; BUR-II-29_26-03-09), which is not necessarily inconsistent with the findings of the content analysis. Since there seem to be no more intra-Tutsi conflicts, it is hardly surprising that this group has a stronger tendency to still focus on the ethnic divide. The decline in intra-Tutsi conflicts was indirectly confirmed by several respondents who referred to the convergence of two different Uprona wings and attempts to reunite (BUR-II-31_27-03-09; BUR-II-32_27-03-09; BUR-II-38_03-04-09). Before and during the transition, conflicts between the anti- and pro-negotiation wings of Uprona made up an important part of the intra-Tutsi conflicts.

In addition, several respondents clearly stress the increasing importance of the intra-Hutu divide. Intra-Hutu conflicts are assessed as important since several Hutu parties compete for power (BUR-II-30_27-03-09). The following statement illustrates this perceived change in conflicts:

“At a certain point the Hutu had 80% because there was the ethnic framework. But today, there are many different Hutu. It is the Hutu today who will fight each other.” (BUR-II-02_21-02-09)

Overall, the interviews confirm the main findings of the content analysis, even more so since respondents were normally not asked directly about the importance of ethnic or intra-ethnic conflicts over time. There is also information about the decrease of ethnic affinity in the secondary literature.
(Watt 2008, p. 201-203), and this development has even been linked to the progression of the civil war (Ndikumana 2005, p. 419).

The results of the content analysis presented in this chapter have been used to identify the change of conflict lines in Burundi from 1997 to 2006. Thus, it was possible to outline the value of the dependent variable and variation over time. In order to ensure the adequacy of findings, different modes of analyzing results, an intra-coder reliability test and an examination of the distribution of codings over different sources were conducted.

The most important finding of this detailed analysis is that a fragmentation of conflict lines occurred during peace negotiations and over the course of the transition. While the inter-ethnic conflicts dominated at the beginning of the period since there were no intra-Hutu and very few intra-Tutsi conflicts, the two latter lines became much more important during the transition. Thus, there were not only more conflicts between mid-1998 and the beginning of 2004, but there was also a diversification rendering three different lines relevant. Most interestingly, however, the inter-ethnic line and the intra-Tutsi line declined from about the middle of the transition period onwards while by 2005 the intra-Hutu line was most relevant.

These main findings were confirmed by interview data from field research in Burundi. The detected change, including a fragmentation of conflict lines over the course of negotiations and the democratic transition with prevailing intra-Hutu conflicts towards the end of the official transition period, needs to be explained in the following. The new occurrence of intra-Hutu conflicts in 1998 could be a hint of one or several new conflict lines within this ethnic group. Since exile and rebellion have almost exclusively taken place on the Hutu side, new conflict lines based on these phenomena seem to be a possible explanation. An additional indicator for this relationship is the opposite development concerning intra-Tutsi conflicts, because exile and rebellion have been almost entirely absent on this side of the ethnic divide.

However, changes also seem to be linked to negotiations and elections. As expected, in the transitional power-sharing setting, there was hardly any fundamental change, especially when the strong increase of intra-Tutsi conflicts in 2001 is treated with caution. However, all important turning points in the development of conflict lines need to be discussed, even those that are less intense than the ones mentioned in this conclusion. The following section therefore systematically examines possible causes for the change based on the hypothesis and in doing so, opens the “black box” of the rather general conflict line codings in the analysis.

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33Of course, there is even more diversification if one looks into actor constellations of intra-ethnic conflicts in greater detail, as in the following section.
4.3 The relevance of exile divisions: Assessing different explanations of fragmentation

This section uses the congruence method to evaluate the influence of the independent variable and the control variables for the fragmentation of conflict lines in Burundi between 1997 and 2006. The aim is to show that a) the commonly discussed variables for conflict line changes cannot sufficiently explain fragmentation in Burundi, and b) the return of mobilized exile elites can explain a relevant number of conflict events. The other variables taken into account are those operationalized based on alternative explanations in the research design chapter: the option of negotiations, change in political institutions, the re-occurrence of pre-existing divisions and the transformation of armed groups with a political agenda.

The focus of this section is on conflict events rather than on the 269 political conflicts identified, because the events allow for a more thorough analysis and take into account every single conflict constellation. Conflict constellation here refers to the actors involved on both sides of one conflict event. The total number of conflict events coded by the content analysis for all years is 1,249. Another advantage of looking into underlying conflict lines of single events is that the importance of different constellations relative to others can be assessed. Political conflicts as a larger category can have a very different intensity and length and therefore cannot easily be compared. In contrast, single conflict events that constitute these political conflicts give a more precise insight into the effect of the different variables.

The last section defining the dependent variable demonstrated that a fragmentation of conflict lines has occurred in Burundi, starting with peace negotiations and continuing over the transition period. Towards the end of this period, the intra-Hutu conflict line became most relevant while the intra-Tutsi line disappeared and the inter-ethnic line became much less important. The fact that intra-Hutu conflicts have become most prominent could be an indication that the fragmentation over the course of the transition is alternating again with a period of increasing polarization, this time within the Hutu ethnic group. So far, however, the intra- and trans-ethnic conflict lines have been treated as black boxes without any consideration of the exact conflict constellations and more specific conflict lines potentially underlying them.

The following analysis based on the congruence method assesses all intra-Tutsi and intra-Hutu events in greater detail. For obvious reasons, it is not necessary to examine the inter-ethnic events again, because here the main underlying conflict line is clear. Furthermore, trans-ethnic conflicts are negligible, with only 14 conflict events over the whole time period, and

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34A table of all conflict events is available upon request, but has not been included here because it comprises 32 pages.
are therefore not discussed in greater detail. The analysis starts by assessing the four alternative independent variables in order to demonstrate that an important part of conflict events cannot be explained by the commonly mentioned factors. In a next step, the influence of the return of exile elites for conflict line changes is examined in comparison to the other four factors. Generally, the congruence method works backwards from the dependent variable, meaning that it is based on the question how much of the variance in the dependent variable can be explained by a certain factor, or even whether a factor has any explanatory force at all.

4.3.1 Value of the independent and the control variables

The core assumption here is that all variables assessed at least have the potential to influence conflict lines in Burundi in the period of interest. For the independent variable proposed in the hypothesis, it has already been shown in the background section of this case study that the core criteria for the return of mobilized exile elites are fulfilled. Thus, the value of the independent variable has developed in a way that potentially gives this factor explanatory force with regard to conflict line fragmentation. The same, however, holds true for the four alternative variables.

The option of negotiations was a given in Burundi even before the period of observation. The period after the military coup with the Convention of Government in 1994 occasionally involved negotiations or at least attempts to start talks, such as those initiated by former President Nyerere as early as 1996 (Prunier 2009, p. 64). However, these attempts never went very far and it seems that only the secret negotiations in 1997 between the military government and the main rebel movement CNDD in St. Egidio in Italy showed that negotiations really became an option again. These negotiations were going on secretly and were therefore not openly discussed, and they rapidly broke down after becoming public. But the mere fact that they took place and included the military actors in the war was an indication and “succeeded in achieving some very limited goals, most importantly bringing on board a key party to the conflict at a time when talks seemed almost impossible” (McClintock and Nahimana 2008, p. 85). Negotiations thus became an option again with the Rome talks before, finally, the political partnership in 1998 took a first step towards more comprehensive peace negotiations at Arusha. The following diagram gives an overview of the different negotiations after the first attempts at Rome and the parties involved.

Before the period with the genuine option of comprehensive peace negotiations in 1998, there certainly were groups more or less ready to engage in talks with groups from the other side of the ethnic divide. It was argued earlier that the categorization of groups in terms of moderate or extremist is highly questionable over time. But there certainly were factions and or-
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Figure 4.2: Peace negotiations 1998-2006

Organizations on both sides of the ethnic divide that differed in their attitude towards the other ethnic group and displayed standpoints that were more or less compatible with negotiating. For example, on the Hutu side, the Hutu liberation ideology of Palipehutu undoubtedly made it much more difficult to reach beyond the ethnic divide than the aims proclaimed by Frodebu and CNDD, namely the reinstatement of the constitutional order of 1992 and a reform of the national army. Equally, on the Tutsi side there were groups that pursued a strong genocide discourse with regard to violent events against Tutsi in 1993 and pushed for the prosecution of these crimes as a pre-condition for any kind of interaction across the ethnic divide. Thus, the emerging option of comprehensive peace negotiations at the time clearly had the potential to influence conflict lines.

Concerning political institutions as a second explanatory factor, there have been several important points of change over the course of the period under investigation. The two central options of designing political institutions outlined earlier – constitutional and electoral system design – have both been used over the course of the period of observation. In a narrow sense, changes only really materialized with the introduction of a new constitution by referendum in 2005, but several peace agreements had laid the ground for these changes and, more importantly, contained elements of constitutional and/or electoral system design. The first change came about by with the conclusion of the political partnership in June 1998, while an-
other more important change was based on the Arusha agreement implemented by the installation of a transitional government in November 2001, followed by the signing of the peace agreement with the largest rebel movement CNDD-FDD in 2003. In between, two smaller factions of the rebel movements signed an agreement in 2002. However, this agreement was of minor importance compared to the other negotiations and is therefore only included in the diagram at the bottom as an intermediary step between the Arusha and the Pretoria negotiations. As already mentioned, the final and potentially most influential institutional change came about with the adoption of a new constitution by popular referendum that “comes closer than any other African constitution, past or present, to putting into practice Lijphart’s model of consociationalism” (Lemarchand 2009, p. 167). The constitution therefore continued the power-sharing setting of the Arusha agreement.

The preconditions for a potential re-occurrence of older conflict lines are also fulfilled, firstly because the regional division was politically relevant in Burundi before the civil war and secondly, because there are no indications that regionalism has been totally abandoned or fundamentally changed by the civil war. In fact, even on the Hutu side, regional origin still seems to be a relevant category, because the main rebel movement CNDD that was officially founded in 1994 is commonly perceived as southern-dominated. Indeed, the political and the military leaders of CNDD at the time of its establishment both came from the southern Bururi province and are even cousins. The founding head of the CNDD, Nyangoma, in particular already had a strong support base from Bururi in the National Assembly (Ould-Abdallah 2000, p. 77) and like his military chief later on was even accused of seeking alliances with Tutsi from their home province (Reyntjens 2000, p. 19).

In general, a significant number of Hutu elites in 1993 were from Bururi, as was the case in the Tutsi ethnic group as well. Among the Hutu ministers in President Ndadaye’s cabinet in 1993, there were five from the province of Bururi while among the 10 remaining Hutu members, including the president himself, no other province was dominant.35 The reason for this dominance was that within Burundi not only Tutsi from Buriri were advantaged in terms of education and access to power, but also Hutu, though to a much lesser degree. Since an important part of the political Hutu elite came from Bururi, it is hardly surprising that the CNDD leadership was also dominated by southerners. The fact that CNDD was also perceived as a southern-dominated movement means that regional origin can still have political relevance for the period of observation if group cohesion based on the civil war diminishes. This could be the case in the framework of peace

35This means that not more than two of the other Hutu ministers came from the same province.
negotiations.

The transformation of armed movements with a political agenda has also clearly been present in Burundi. The most important rebel movements that fought in the civil war, Palipehutu-FNL and CNDD(-FDD), both had very clear political agendas and ideologies that also diverged from each other. As already mentioned, Palipehutu-FNL followed the ideology of Hutu liberation with a clear agenda of ethnic political domination, while CNDD-FDD, like Frodebu, demanded the reinstatement of the constitutional order of 1992 and the reform of the national army. Since the founders of CNDD were in most cases politically active at the time of destabilization in 1993 and some were even in government like its founder, there was not only a political agenda, but also a certain body of political experience available. The aim of CNDD was to regain political power by applying military force.

Generally, all Burundian Hutu rebel movements had political agendas and even political wings, including Frolina, which was founded in 1990 based on a party that was dominated by Imbo Hutu refugees in Tanzania (Watt 2008, p. 89). Furthermore, all Hutu rebel movements signed peace agreements and transformed into political parties at different points in time. The transformation basically started with the participation of the respective movements in negotiations.

4.3.2 Identifying conflict lines

All five potential explanatory factors for conflict line changes, including the return of mobilized exile elites, are present in Burundi for the period of observation and thus might have an influence on conflict lines. In order to assess their real impact on conflict line fragmentation, the conflict constellations of all events are assessed below with regard to which of the five factors could be underlying a specific event. The following conflict lines are linked to the different independent variables: pro- and anti-negotiation, institution-induced, regional (south vs. center-north), political-military and internal-external. As outlined in the research design chapter, conflict lines are generally identified by two factors in this study: claims and leadership. Both are used in this study to decide whether one single conflict event is based on a conflict line driven by the five different factors discussed. The actors in the conflict events are always factions, parties, movements or other organizational units, not individual persons because news reports always referred to persons with their function and thus indicate the relevant affiliation in the specific context. As already discussed in the operationalization, the two criteria of claims and leadership cannot always both be applied for each conflict line.

36The last movement that laid down arms, Palipehutu-FNL led by Agathon Rwasa, only signed a ceasefire in 2006 and joined institutions in 2009.
In order to identify conflict events that are based on the first explanation linked to negotiations, it is necessary to rely almost exclusively on claims showing that one side was in favor and the other against negotiations. One might argue that another possible solution would be to count conflict events between leaders whose organizations or factions joined negotiations and those who stayed out at a certain point in time. In general, this could be a solution to include the criterion of leadership for this conflict line, but in the case of Burundi it is not an adequate indicator, because the decision to join or not join the different negotiation processes was not (only) the decision of the actors themselves.

In the first negotiation process involving the political partnership, external actors – meaning those in exile – were categorically excluded by the initiator of this process, the military head of state at the time. His aim was to legitimize his government and to consolidate his position before negotiating outside of Burundi at Arusha where the facilitation and influence of different countries of the region would limit his influence. Thus, all those groups who stayed out but later joined the Arusha negotiations simply did not have the option of participating in the partnership negotiations in 1998.

The following Arusha process was more comprehensive, but not completely inclusive. On the side of the Hutu rebels, the political wings of Palipehutu and CNDD participated, but they had been detached from the rest of the movements: in the case of Palipehutu, this had already occurred in 1992, and in the case of CNDD in 1998. The remaining elements of both movements that also controlled most of the combatants were not present in Arusha, because they were not invited by the facilitation at the time since the mediator Nyerere decided that every movement or party that split during the negotiations was only permitted to participate when the factions took on different names, which logically was refused by the respective groups (Lemarchand 2009, p. 149; McClintock and Nahimana 2008, pp. 77-78). CNDD-FDD, as the part of CNDD which remained outside the process was called after the split in 1998, even claimed that they wanted to join negotiations at the time but were excluded. Whether these claims were credible or not, the mere absence of certain rebel groups at Arusha cannot simply be assessed in pro- and anti-negotiation terms, but was partly due to splits in these movements, leaving the question of who really represented a movement at the time unresolved, and partly due to decisions by the facilitation of peace talks. Therefore, conflict events based on a pro- and anti-negotiation division need to be identified based on claims, not based on which leaders were included in peace negotiations and which stayed out.

For conflict events that occur because of changes in institutions, leadership is the relevant indicator while claims are largely inadequate. The common assumption is that newly established institutions can lead to a shift in existing conflict lines in the sense that new cross-cutting alliances
develop that face each other, for example in an election campaign. It can hardly be expected that actors in these new, cross-cutting conflict constellations base their claims on direct reference to changes in the constitutional or electoral design. Rather, it is necessary to identify points in time when the institutional setting in Burundi changed and assess whether any new actors appear at the same time who bring together leadership groups that previously have not interacted in this way.

The institutional settings referring to constitutional and electoral design were changed several times over the period of observation. First, the political partnership officially called “Partenariat intérieur pour la paix” was signed in June 1998 between the Frodebu-dominated National Assembly and the Tutsi-dominated regime that came to power in the military coup in 1996. Based on this arrangement, former military ruler Pierre Buyoya was officially installed as president and the function of prime minister was replaced by two vice-presidents. The first vice-president was nominated from Frodebu, while the second was a former head of the National Bank. An ethnically mixed cabinet was installed and the National Assembly of elected Frodebu and Uprona MPs was extended by representatives of smaller parties and 28 representatives from civil society, of which 22 were Tutsi (Reyntjens 1999b, p.8). Generally, the partnership led to a weakening of the Frodebu and Hutu in the National Assembly and at the same time to the inclusion of Frodebu representatives in the executive.

Second, the Arusha agreement signed in August 2000 set out the constitution of the transitional government and National Assembly. The first president and vice-president had to come from different ethnic groups and political parties and the broad-based transitional government needed to include representatives of different parties in a proportion giving more than half and less of three-fifths of positions to the Hutu G7. Ethnic disparity in the National Assembly was guaranteed by including all members elected in 1993 who were mainly from Frodebu, by allowing three members from each party that was not included under this condition, and by including those members who were appointed under the Buyoya regime (Arusha Agreement 2000, pp. 41-43).

Third, the constitution adopted by referendum in 2005, which had basically been designed by the provisions in the Arusha agreement, laid out the post-transition institutional framework. The two vice-presidents of the republic are nominated from different ethnic groups and political parties, taking into account the dominant ethnic affiliation in their respective parties. The government has to comprise 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi among the ministers and deputy ministers. In addition, cabinet members come from all political parties that achieve more than 5% of votes in the elections. The National Assembly, elected on the basis of proportional representation, also has to consist of 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi members and three members co-opted from the Twa ethnic group. If election results do not reflect these quo-
tas, the imbalance is adjusted by co-optation of additional members. The senate comprises two delegates from each province, elected by a body that is composed of members from the communal councils coming from different ethnic groups. Furthermore, three Twa representatives and the former heads of state have to be included (Constitution du Burundi 2005, pp. 16-25). The agreement with CNDD-FDD in 2003 and its subsequent inclusion in the institutions is not taken into account in the following analysis because institutional change brought about by this agreement was marginal. The agreement was signed within the framework of the Arusha agreement and despite the integration of rebel troops into the security services and of the political leaders into institutions, the overall rules were not changed.

Since all the discussed arrangements were based on power-sharing between the two main ethnic groups and the overall framework of the ethnic quota system established by the Arusha accord remained largely untouched by the constitution, changes in conflict lines resulting from these arrangements seem rather unlikely. Yet potential impacts of institutional change are still assessed because the arrangements also go beyond mere ethnic power-sharing by including different political parties as well, especially according to the 2005 constitution.

It has already been pointed out that there are not always specific claims available for each conflict event to identify a possible underlying conflict line. Even inter-ethnic conflicts are seldom linked to clear ethnic claims reported by the news items. In particular, the remaining three explanations linked to attributes such as regional origin, rebellion and exile are difficult to substantiate with claims. The main reason is that by the time conflicts actually take place, conflict issues and conflict lines are likely to be relatively separated, so that claims cannot provide sufficient evidence of the underlying affiliation. This is different in pro- and anti-negotiation conflicts where conflict issue and conflict line are closely linked, at least at the beginning of the respective conflicts.

Thus, for the variables relating to regional origin, rebellion and exile, leadership is a more adequate and reliable criterion. Which province leaders come from, whether they are at the head of a political or military organization and whether they are politically active inside the country or from exile are all issues which can clearly be assessed. In this case, the criterion of leadership refers to the dominant attributes of the core leadership, normally meaning the two or three people heading an organization or faction. It is not relevant which individual person speaks out or is otherwise mentioned as being involved in a political conflict event; the relevant aspect is which group or organization these persons act on behalf of, and how these organizations can be labeled with regard to their leadership. But those persons cited in news items normally belong to the core leadership anyway, especially in a small country like Burundi where many organizations are centered around a few personalities.
For the political-military dimension, actors are simply categorized by the nature of the organization, indicating whether leaders from a rebel movement or a purely political organization interact. This is sufficient because the literature referring to this division normally assumes that it runs along organizational lines, because rebel movements are characterized by a certain militarization and have internal structures that are different from those of political organizations. Generally speaking, the “political” and “military” labels refer to different modes of mobilization and action. Since all rebel movements in Burundi follow political agendas, all of them can be linked to a political-military division. In the case of the regional line, the origin of the core group of leaders is assessed, but so is the general perception of the organization as cited in the secondary literature and the news sources. The latter factor is important in order to demonstrate that an accumulation of leadership in the hand of a regionally homogeneous group is not coincidental. For the categorization of actors as internal (non-exile) or external (exile,) again, the dominance of elites in exile or inside the country in the leadership is examined. In addition, it is taken into account whether the organization as a whole has a significant basis among elites in exile or not, in order to ensure that a group is not erroneously categorized as internally or externally based, because only the few core leaders are in a certain place.

For actor groups that bind together several different organizations, the same criteria of dominating leadership are applied to identify a possible regional, political-military and/or internal-external affiliation. For example, the transitional government installed in 2001, which included all Hutu groups that negotiated at Arusha, is coded as Frodebu-dominated on the Hutu side. Conflict events with a mixed actor constellation on one side that could not be categorized based on this criterion are excluded from the analysis.

The relevance that an attribute can have in a conflict depends on the conflict constellation. If two military groups are involved in a conflict, both are southern-dominated but one is largely located in exile and the other inside the country, this conflict is based on the internal-external division – if none of the other two explanations linked to negotiations and institutions have been found to be relevant. Obviously, this procedure can also produce more than one possible explanation for a conflict event if the actors involved can be differentiated by several characteristics. In these cases, one conflict event is counted for each line that is a potential basis. It is important that both sides in a conflict event need to be clearly defined according to the criteria discussed above. For example, to identify a conflict event as being based on the regional conflict line, it is not sufficient that one side in

\[37\] A more detailed explanation follows in the paragraph analyzing intra-Hutu conflict events.
the conflict is southern-dominated while the other is not, but the other also needs to have a regionally distinct leadership and a regional profile that is not southern-based. As already mentioned, the political-military and the internal-external division for obvious reasons cannot be expected to be present on the Tutsi side.

The specific categorization of the different Burundian actors in conflicts is illustrated in relation to the results produced by this procedure. According to the congruence method, each constellation is analyzed with regard to the five variables in order to assess if any or several of them can explain this constellation. An additional challenge in this context is the changing nature of actors over time. Obviously, rebel movements can become political parties after inclusion in a peace agreement and subsequent demobilization. Equally, when exile people return, they lose the official status of refugee and more generally are not labeled as an exile person any more. On the other hand, there is a certain path-dependency in the development of organizations. Social divisions underlying an organizational affiliation can persist even if organizations or groups change their official status. It is even the specific argument of this study that the label of rebellion and exile remains important even after the inclusion of organizations and persons in a new order. This is in line with the literature on rebel group transformation that assumes that the division brought about by the rebellion persists due to the different experiences and structures in rebel movements even when they officially become a political party (Söderberg Kovacs 2008). A similar argument has been made for refugees and exile groups returning home that remain distinct groups as returnees because of different social and political attributes. Furthermore, conflicts between pro- and anti-negotiation factions or organizations can persist as well, even after the issue at stake during negotiations has generally been settled.

What is relevant here is the origin of a change in conflict lines that shows in the occurrence of a specific actor constellation that can remain important even after the original source of the line has been removed. For this reason, if the same actor constellation linked to a certain conflict line occurs over and over again, it is counted as being based on this line. Nonetheless, this only holds true if the actors in these constellations remain basically unchanged with regard to leadership and organizational framework. If the leadership of an organizational unit changes in a way that calls into question the previous profile, the categorization needs to be reassessed. Similarly, if a rebel movement or party splits, newly emerging actors need to be categorized. However, splits can also simply be the continuation of conflicts that took place earlier inside the respective movement or party. In these cases, conflicts between the same two components after the split are still based on the same conflict line(s).

Splits in organizations have frequently occurred in Burundi. The first interesting insight is that all organizations that newly occurred in the pe-
period of observation are splits or alliances of existing parties, not newly established organizations. One exception is the “Mouvement pour la Réhabilitation du Citoyen (MRC)” which, however, started off as an alliance of several small Tutsi parties in 2001 and joined forces during the negotiations. So in this case, groups that had previously acted together gave their alliance an organizational framework. This is the only significant organizational change on the Tutsi side. When looking at the timing of splits on the Hutu side, the last split within a Hutu rebel movement occurred in 2002, in this case in Palipehutu-FNL. This split turned out not to be very relevant, and there are no new splits after that until the end of the period in 2006.38

The following diagram shows the most important changes in the organizational landscape over time.

![Diagram showing splits of Burundian parties and movements](image)

### Figure 4.3: Splits of Burundian parties and movements

All the splits took place in the context of negotiations. The fact that only splits or alliances led to newly emerging actors and only until 2002 could

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38The strong increase in political parties participating in the 2005 elections is due to the founding of several new parties during the transition. However, all these parties remained politically insignificant, as is evident from the fact that they basically never occurred in the conflict events coded and also that none of these parties reached the 2% threshold for entering the post-transition National Assembly.
be an indication that conflict lines did not fundamentally change any more after the official start of the transition. However, in order to clarify actual changes and underlying conflict lines, the following passages present the results of the analysis of conflict constellations in single events.

### 4.3.3 Intra-Tutsi conflict lines

On the Tutsi side, only one of the possible conflict lines occurred in the events between 1997 and 2006. A pro- versus anti-negotiation line can account for 124 out of 228 conflict events. 165 conflict events took place between government and opposition without any clear underlying conflict line.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.8: Intra-Tutsi conflict lines</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pro- vs. anti negotiations</td>
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<td>government vs. opposition</td>
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The pro- versus anti-negotiation line comprises events opposing the “Parti pour le Redressement National” (Parena) and/or a dissident wing of the Uprona party and the government component of Uprona. Looking at the claims, it becomes very clear that Parena and the dissident Uprona wing under Charles Mukasi were opposed to peace negotiations with Hutu parties, as proposed by President Buyoya. The first important conflict event included a claim by Mukasi accusing senior officials of betrayal a day after the president’s official declaration on the opening of negotiations with the rebels, and the claims even arise long after the signing of the Arusha accord when Mukasi is quoted in 2003 saying that “the original Uprona is known as the Unity for National Progress which he leads and which is not a signatory to the Arusha accord, whose signatories have resorted to lying, committing felonies and harassing organizations and individuals involved

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39 The missing 5 events to the total number of intra-Tutsi events over time could not be assigned to any of the two categories.
40 For example Reuters, “Row escalates over Burundi main pro-Tutsi party,”, 15.10.1998.
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in the fight against genocide.”

News sources also often label the two Uprona wings that split in 1998 as pro- and anti-negotiation wings. It must be pointed out that Uprona under Mukasi never joined any negotiations whereas Parena actually participated in the Arusha talks and even signed the agreement. Yet Parena did not join the transitional government based on the Arusha agreement and was also labeled as a hardline Tutsi party at the time. However, the conflict events involving Parena are those where the negotiation-related conflict line overlaps with the government-opposition conflict events, because Parena was also very strongly opposed to the Buyoya government beyond the issue of negotiations. This was mainly due to the fact that the president of Parena, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, had been ousted from power by Buyoya in a military coup in 1987. Similarly, a group of small Tutsi parties also strongly opposed the Buyoya government. Among these parties were some that also took a very critical stance on peace negotiations, but this does not hold true for the entire group of parties. Thus, these conflict events have not been counted as being based on the pro- and anti-negotiation line, although this also played a role in some conflict events between these actor groups. These events are merely included in the category of conflicts following a government versus opposition logic.

The institutional changes brought about by the implementation of peace settlements in 1998, 2001 and 2005 did not lead to any changes in the intra-Tutsi conflict constellations. The political partnership in 1998 did not result in any fundamental changes, especially not on the Tutsi side of the ethnic divide, since the Uprona-based government under Buyoya remained more or less the same. There is also no visible change in the political conflict events at the time. The anti-negotiation wing of Uprona and Parena also did not join the transitional government in 2001 and kept opposing the government. These conflicts were coded as inter-ethnic and intra-Tutsi from 2001 onwards because of the ethnically mixed composition of the government.

However, the intra-Tutsi component of the conflict events clearly continued to refer to the two parties mentioned that opposed Uprona in a government that was still led by Buyoya until 2003. An indicator for this is that, firstly, Parena and Uprona-Mukasi did not only oppose the transitional government as a whole, but also specifically the main Uprona wing until intra-Tutsi conflicts altogether disappear in 2004. Secondly, the six small Tutsi parties that gathered forces in the MRC to oppose the transitional leadership of President Buyoya during the Arusha negotiations also opposed the transitional government after 2001, although they all officially had one minister in the transitional cabinet. For these parties, however, the

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42 Net Press, “Current leadership is in power illegally - Tutsi party faction leader”, 03.05.2003.
transitional government was still clearly dominated by the main wing of Uprona that was also continuously opposed as a single actor by the MRC or the six Tutsi parties after 2001. Thirdly, there is not one single conflict event between Parena or Uprona-Mukasi on the one hand and the small Tutsi opposition parties on the other hand over the whole time period. So it seems highly unlikely that by opposing the transitional government, Parena and Uprona-Mukasi were also targeting the small Tutsi parties that were officially included in the cabinet.

In general, the conflicts based on the pro- and anti-negotiation line as well as those between government and the Tutsi opposition increased visibly in 2001 because of disputes over the issue of the transitional presidency since a candidate supported by the small Tutsi parties opposed the leadership of President Buyoya who was supported by his Uprona party. The two coup attempts also took place at this point in time, namely in April and July 2001. In addition to the conflict constellations discussed, there were 13 events connected to this conflict, with small anti-government factions of the army opposed to the majority of forces that remained loyal to President Buyoya. The coup attempt in April included six conflict events, while there were seven events linked to the second attempt between July and October 2001.

Both coup attempts quickly broke down. While there was no bloodshed in the first, the second included physical violence and left two soldiers and the bodyguard of a commander dead. They were clearly directed at overthrowing President Buyoya’s government and were linked to the issue of peace negotiations. The faction claimed that it was not totally opposed to negotiations, but accused the government of carrying out negotiations on behalf of Burundians who are not even informed about them. Yet in their statement they used a language that indicated a hardline stance on the issue of cooperation with the Hutu group when they claimed that the National Assembly dominated by genocide perpetrators would be dissolved.\(^{43}\)

Furthermore, Parena was accused of being implicated in the coup attempt and several of its activists were arrested, which again led to an increase in conflict events between Parena and the government. For the second attempt, officials and news sources linked the attempt to negotiations as well, assuming that hardline factions tried to oust Buyoya because they thought that he was planning to cede too much power to the majority Hutu.\(^{44}\) Due to all these indications, the 13 events directly linked to the coup attempt were categorized as being based on a pro- and anti-negotiation conflict line, but also as being part of the general opposition towards the Buyoya government among Tutsi actors.

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\(^{43}\)Net Press, “News agency reports change of power”, 18.04.2001. The so-called Tutsi hardliners frequently referred to the Frodebu opposition in the National Assembly as “genocidaires”.

Overall, intra-Tutsi conflict constellations remained surprisingly constant over the time they appeared and institutional change had no identifiable impact on underlying conflict lines or on actor constellations in general. Similarly, regional affiliation did not play a visible role in intra-Tutsi conflict events either. Parena and the main Uprona wing can be seen as dominated by people from the Bururi province, but neither the anti-negotiation wing of Uprona nor the small Tutsi parties allied in the MRC have a clear regional profile. It is true that the head of the main Uprona wing following the split in 1998 came from Bururi while his opponent, Charles Mukasi, leading the anti-negotiation wing of Uprona, was from a province. But the fact that Mukasi himself was Uprona president for more than two years until the split at least makes a conflict along regional lines unlikely as he would have hardly been elected to this position in the first place. There are also no indications in the literature referring to a regional profile of the Uprona-Mukasi.

Conflict lines linked to rebellion and exile were not occurring on the Tutsi side since both phenomena were absent or – in the case of exile – minor within this group.\(^{45}\) The impact of institutional changes resulting from the new constitution and elections in 2005 on intra-Tutsi conflicts does not need to be assessed since intra-Tutsi conflict events disappeared in 2004 with the exception of one single event in May 2005.

Looking at the bases of intra-Tutsi conflict events, it becomes clear why these conflicts ceased to occur: first, after President Buyoya handed over power to his former Hutu vice-president in 2003 and Uprona clearly lost ground, the core reason for the Tutsi opposition to confront the government and the governmental Uprona wing dissolved. Furthermore, the issue of whether to negotiate with the Hutu parties and movements became obsolete as well once a negotiated arrangement was in place and most Hutu actors had been included in institutions by 2004.

### 4.3.4 Intra-Hutu conflict lines

On the Hutu side, there are clear indicators that important changes in conflict lines have taken place over the course of the civil war. The most important finding is that only 11 out of all 473 intra-Hutu conflict events between 1997 and 2006 took place between actors that existed prior to 1993, namely Frodebu, Palipehutu-FNL, the Karatasi wing of Palipehutu and Frolina. This count includes all possible constellations among these actors. When adding those events where Frodebu was coded as dominant among several different Hutu organizations on one side of a conflict event, there are 34 more events that oppose Frodebu and the FNL. However, compared to the

\(^{45}\)Despite its party president being in Ugandan exile for several years, the Parena party cannot be labeled as an exile party, because basically all other important leaders were inside the country. So the party had no significant exile bases apart from its president.
total number of intra-Hutu conflict events, this is still a very low number. But despite this hint at the role of exile and rebellion for explaining change in the intra-Hutu conflict line, it needs to be examined in greater detail. Compared to the intra-Tutsi events, the picture of conflict constellations on the Hutu side is much more complex, as the following table shows.

The results show that the political-military and internal-external conflict line can explain most of the conflict events that could be assigned to any line. The regional or the pro- and anti-negotiation lines could only be linked to relatively few conflict events. There was no visible change in leadership cooperation at the time of institutional change. So this factor could not explain any of the occurring conflict constellations while the last year of the period of observations displays a number of conflict events that clearly follow a government versus opposition logic. These 38 events in 2006 have been included in the table, as have the intra-Tutsi conflict events as well, but they do not reflect a new conflict line. Previously existing Hutu parties of very different backgrounds, including former rebel movements, simply opposed CNDD-FDD, which dominated the new government after 2005. These results are analyzed and explained in greater detail in the following paragraphs.

Surprisingly, there are very few claims in favor of or against negotiations in the intra-Hutu conflicts indicating an explanation by the option of negotiations. The only relevant conflict along the pro- and anti-negotiation line is between two factions of the Palipehutu-FNL that finally split in 2002. One faction joined negotiations with the transitional government at that point while the other, main wing continued fighting. This split took place against a background of ongoing negotiations between the main Hutu rebel movement CNDD-FDD and strong international pressure and threats of sanctions against the FNL rebels who had opted out of negotiations. This background explains why the conflict occurred at this point in time and not earlier when negotiations first became a general option. It was only at this point that the FNL really had to consider a negotiated settlement.

The claims made by the leaders of the wing joining negotiations clearly referred to this factor, saying that “[d]ialogue is the only human path capable of resolving conflict” and that FNL leader Rwasa had been stripped of his functions because the people of Burundi should not become hostages to extremists.46 In response, Rwasa rejected any negotiations with the current government Palipehutu-FNL, and he repeated this rejection even in 2003.47 One news source also generally refers to the FNL-Mugabarabona wing as “a pro-negotiations faction”.48

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46AFP, “Second Burundi rebel group okays talks, boosts hopes of ceasefire”, 08.08.2002
47Bonesha FM radio, “Rebels say claim responsibility for attack on capital, demand talks”, 07.07.2003
48Net Press, “Rebel faction says rivals have received money to destroy it”, 10.09.2002
For this conflict constellation, no other conflict line was an option because both factions belonged to a rebel group, both are categorized as exile-based at the leadership level and there is no regional profile of any of the two factions. The institutional change brought about with the installation of the transitional government in 2001 also had no visible impact, especially since both factions were not included in the cabinet. This line only relates to 15 conflict events, and the offshoot of Palipehutu-FNL that joined negotiations at the time under Alain Mugabarabona very rapidly became politically insignificant, also because he had virtually no control over fighters on the ground. There were therefore no further conflict events over the last three years of the period of observation.

The assessment of an institutional influence comes to a similar conclusion as in the case of the intra-Tutsi conflicts: a) there was no change in conflict constellations indicating changes in conflict lines brought about by institutional change, and b) certain conflict constellations became more intense at the time of institutional change. First, the political partnership in 1998 had no visible impact on conflict events, especially since it only included the internal part of Frodebu on the Hutu side. The agreement did not lead to any kind of formal alliance between Uprona and Frodebu later on at Arusha. Since all other Hutu groups were excluded from the partnership, its adoption led to more intra-Hutu conflict events, but this was not due to the institutional design implemented by the partnership, but to the mere fact that Frodebu cooperated with the ruling military regime inside Burundi.

At first sight, the two points of institutional change later on, the installation of the transitional government in 2001 and the adoption of the new
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constitution followed by elections in 2005 brought about something of a change in actor constellations. After 2001, many events occurred that opposed different Hutu actors to the transitional government and therefore also to the Hutu component of this government. However, the transitional government only bound together those Hutu organizations that signed the Arusha agreement in 2000 and had previously been subsumed under the G7 label in Arusha. Furthermore, the transitional government did not really function as an alliance, but, rather, was a loose association of the different groups. A clear indication of this is that several Hutu movements that were officially included in the government, namely CNDD, Frolina and Palipehutu-Karatasi, kept opposing it, because it was dominated by Frodebu on the Hutu side. The rise in conflict events between the transitional government and Hutu groups that were not included is simply due to the fact that movements only gradually joined negotiations and therefore also the political institutions. Naturally, those not included in arrangements tend to strongly oppose them, but this does not signify a new conflict line, because there were conflict events before between the Hutu groups at Arusha, including Frodebu and those Hutu movements not participating.

So while the transitional government can be seen as a newly emerging actor linked to institutional change, it does not indicate conflict line changes, but simply a certain regrouping of existing lines. This also holds true for the second point of institutional change in 2005. After the victory of CNDD-FDD, the other Hutu organizations in the opposition got involved in political conflicts with the ruling party. Despite the fact that this superficially leads to the occurrence of a new actor constellation, the underlying lines do not change. In fact, the occurrence of a government versus opposition logic on the Hutu side simply binds together previously existing conflict lines. The Hutu opposition also does not build a new alliance or coalition; they are simply opposed altogether by the ruling party and are thus bound together by their opposition role. It should also be stressed that this new conflict constellation only occurred in 2006 after the elections, as indicated in the table above.

49 A member of Frodebu occupied the position of vice-president from 2001 to 2003 and then the position of the president of the republic. In addition, it had five ministerial positions in 2001 compared to only one or two respectively for other Hutu organizations. Therefore, the transitional government has been categorized as Frodebu-dominated. Obviously, this classification might be challenged on the grounds that it is unclear which Hutu organization in the transitional government was mainly opposed by rebel movements outside of the arrangement. Since two former movements included were splinter groups of the excluded rebel movements, the opposition to the transitional government could also be interpreted as a continuation of these earlier conflicts. However, when not classifying the transitional government as Frodebu-dominated, these events simply fall out of the analysis as the transitional government then has no clear profile along the regional, political-military and internal-external line. The number of events assigned to the political-military and internal-external line in the table would decrease by 110 events each, but the overall results would remain the same.
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So there were no alliances or new actors on the Hutu side before the elections due to the new institutional framework and incentives by the electoral system that is based on proportional representation. Therefore, institutional change did not lead to structural changes in leadership cooperation showing in the conflict constellations. The regrouping and increase in certain actor constellations simply took place because some groups were involved in an arrangement or government while others remained outside. A clear indication of this is that the groups in conflict in these events had previously been in conflict as single actors as well and continued to be so after the installation of the transitional and later the CNDD-FDD government.

There are only 29 conflict events that were assigned to the regional (south versus north-center) conflict line. All these events refer to a conflict between two CNDD-FDD factions opposing each other which finally lead to a split in the CNDD-FDD in 2001. The head of the first faction who was also the overall head of CNDD-FDD between 1998 and 2001, Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, is from the southern Bururi region, as was the previous head of CNDD, Léonard Nyangoma, who was removed from his function in the movement in 1998. This first split was not regional as both parts of the movements were headed by southerners. This is different in the second case, not only because the new CNDD-FDD leader from 2001 onwards, Pierre Nkurunziza, is from a northern province, but also because his part of the movement is seen as dominated by people from the center-north of the country. In contrast, CNDD-FDD under Jean-Bosco and Nyangoma were perceived as southern-dominated. Secondary sources regularly refer to this regional affiliation, mainly with regard to the political leadership (Vandeginste 2009, p. 70; Country Information & Policy Unit 2003, p. 68). Also, all four sources that report on the outbreak of the conflict between the two factions in 2001 refer to regionalism as a source of the conflict that occasionally even becomes violent. Thus, these events could clearly be assigned to the re-occurrence of the regional conflict line.

Among the 209 conflict events along the political-military line, all took place between Frodebu as a political party or Frodebu components in government and any of the Hutu rebel movements, in 143 cases CNDD and its different branches. 23 events involve Frodebu on one side and the Hutu rebel groups in general on the other side. As already mentioned, conflicts between Frodebu and FNL were comparatively rare with 36 conflict events between the two including only 4 events that oppose Frodebu on the one side and FNL on the other as single actors. The remaining 32 events refer to Frodebu as heading the G7 and the transitional government. The remain-

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ing 7 conflict events took place between Frodebu on one side and Frolina and/or Palipehutu-Karatasi on the other side. Based on the coding criteria, all these events could be linked to the political-military conflict line brought about by the transformation of the Burundian rebel movements. Conflict events between Frodebu on the one and CNDD and its different branches on the other side are the most common ones along this line.

Counting together the conflict events explained by the lines linked to the four control variables, a relatively high number of unexplained conflict events remains. So in order to fully account for the fragmentation taking place in Burundi over the period of observation, events that could be based on an internal-external conflict line were counted as well. The results in table 4.9 indicate that this number is higher than any of the other lines, actually as high as all the other events together.

Not surprisingly, however, the internal-external line strongly overlaps with the political-military one, because the rebel movements were all categorized as being based among elites in exile while Frodebu was categorized as an internal party due to its leadership. The Frodebu president, Jean Minani, was in exile in Tanzania after 1996, but all the other important cadres, including the secretary general and the executive secretary, were inside the country. Furthermore, there was a high number of Frodebu MPs in the National Assembly that was originally suspended after the coup in 1996, but had to be re-established by Buyoya the same year due to international pressure. In fact, the majority of MPs were from the Frodebu party at the time. That Frodebu was strongly based inside the country at the elite level is also indicated by the negotiation of the political partnership with the Buyoya government in 1998 that only included Frodebu and Uprona as political parties.

Generally, rebellion and exile are seen as strongly linked in Burundi. CNDD was even founded in exile in 1994 (Uvira, DR Congo) and has been described as a “political movement in exile” (Prunier 2009, p. 59). Its military wing FDD subsequently established bases abroad in Congo and Tanzania, but also inside the country, especially in the Kibira forest. The top leadership of CNDD was predominantly in exile – even when taking the different factions of the CNDD into account – and the existence of organizational sections in African and European countries and North America has already been mentioned. For Palipehutu-FNL, the picture is not as clear. The Palipehutu-Karatasi wing was clearly exile-based, but was very small, while the remaining FNL has strong bases inside the country. But as already outlined in the introductory part of this chapter, it also had important bases in Tanzania. More importantly with regard to the main criterion applied here, its leadership around Agathon Rwasa and Pasteur Habimana was located in Tanzania51 as well and their return together with a group of

51This also holds true for earlier leaders like Cossan Kabura.
cadres from exile in 2008 was widely reported in the media.\textsuperscript{52}

Thus, both movements and their various branches have been classified as exile-based while Frodebeu was categorized as internally based. This leads to the strong overlap of the political-military and the internal-external conflict line. Yet the exile-related line has explanatory power in itself, because there are an important number of conflict events that are only linked to this line without a connection to the political-military divide. The reason for the independent occurrence of this is that the internal-external line also ran through the main political party, Frodebu. A faction developed abroad around the party president Jean Minani and another one around the internal group comprising the other top officials. They became opposed to each other, particularly in the context of the negotiation of the political partnership. This split of Frodebu into an internal and external wing is also mentioned in the secondary literature (International Crisis Group 1998a, p. 30; Curtis 2002, p. 17; Reyntjens 1999b, p. 10). From 1998 onwards, 37 conflict events occurred between these two factions.

In addition, there are 12 conflict events in which Frodebu’s role in the political partnership was opposed by the external Hutu groups involved in the Arusha negotiations. Although there were (former) rebel movements among these groups, there was also the external Frodebu wing. Thus, the only line these conflicts could be assigned to is the internal-external one. The internal-external line is distinguishable from the political-military one and has independent explanatory power since it only occurred among political actors as well.

A number of unexplained events remain on the Hutu side. Most of these, namely 91, have taken place between different rebel movements or branches of rebel movements that could neither be related to the regional nor to the pro- versus anti-negotiation line.\textsuperscript{53} Most of these events comprise different branches of CNDD as conflict parties or CNDD-FDD on one and the FNL on the other side. Since these actors are all military and exile-based, no clear underlying line can be established. This means that there may be other lines that have not been taken into account here or the examined lines do not show up because of their specific operationalization. A relevant number of conflict events remain unexplained because the actors involved in a conflict were not distinguishable based on the criteria used. The following section therefore makes an important contribution to clarifying the background to these still unexplained conflict events.

Apart from these unexplained events, the results on intra-Hutu conflict lines clearly show the importance of exile and rebellion in bringing about change. In comparison to the regional and negotiations-related con-

\textsuperscript{52}RFI, “Rebel leader returns from exile”, 30.05.2008; BBC, “Exiled Burundi rebel head returns”, 30.05.2008.

\textsuperscript{53}The other remaining intra-Hutu events took place between constellations of minor importance.
Conflict lines the political-military and the internal-external conflict lines could account for a very high number of conflict events. The latter line, moreover, was linked to a relevant number of events that could not be explained by any other line.

4.3.5 Summary of results

Looking at the general results, it is rather surprising that pro- and anti-negotiation divisions played a minor role on the Hutu side compared to the Tutsi side where it was the only distinguishable conflict line. Yet negotiations seem to be important as a context for conflicts, because all splits between groups occurred during negotiations while there were no more splits after 2002. This makes the argument of the “hidden costs of power-sharing”, i.e. that rebel movements tend to split at the time of negotiations in order to be included on their own terms, appealing. Yet this approach cannot explain along what lines splits occur and it cannot explain political conflicts in a wider sense. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the effect of negotiations is so straightforward and one-dimensional, because there were very few references to negotiations as a direct conflict cause in the news sources, at least on the Hutu side.

Not surprisingly, no new alliances or conflict lines occurred at the time of institutional changes. Here, the effect was only that certain groups that previously tended to act separately were bound together in an institutional arrangement like the transitional government in 2001. But this, together with the coming into power of CNDD-FDD and the subsequent realignment among the Hutu opposition groups, was not due to the changes in the constitutional or electoral designs. This is substantiated by the fact that the parties on both sides of these conflict events had previously been opposed in conflicts as single actors and continued to be so afterwards. So there were no new underlying conflict lines.

The regional line reappeared on the Hutu side, but was not very pronounced, contrary to the political-military and internal-external lines. Even though these strongly overlap, they provide an explanation for 258 conflict events and thus for much more than the other two together. This clearly shows that the change caused by the civil war related to exile and that rebellion is highly relevant for the development of political conflicts in Burundi over the period of observation. Furthermore, the internal-external conflict line based on the return of mobilized exile elites can provide an independent explanation for a relevant number of events.

One factor that could compromise the comparability of conflict events discussed above is that some events are violent while others are non-violent. Generally, the minority of the intra-ethnic events over the time period are violent: only 5 on the intra-Tutsi side, which are mainly linked to the coup attempts in 2001 and 45 on the Hutu side, which mainly relate
to armed violence between the CNDD-FDD government and the remaining FNL rebels in 2005 and 2006. All intra-Hutu conflict lines in the table include violent events at some point, which is not surprising because the pro- versus anti-negotiation division and the regional division occurred within a rebel movement and the political versus military and internal versus external line strongly overlap.

Generally speaking, the occurrence of violent episodes is not limited to one specific line. However, the events that only occurred along the internal-external line have all been non-violent since they mainly took place within a political party. However, this does not call into question the influence of this line on the fragmentation of conflict lines, especially since violence in most other cases was at a minor level and very short-lived. The only exception is the violence between CNDD-FDD and the FNL, particularly after the former came into power in 2005. Since FNL only joined political institutions in 2009, this division is not of major importance for the period under investigation in this study. As already mentioned, the events including this conflict constellation also could not be included in the analysis.

However, there are not only many intra-Hutu events that could not be classified, but those that were linked to a certain conflict line have only indirectly been allocated, mostly based on claims and/or leadership of different groups engaged in conflict. In the first part of this section, it has also been shown that all five potential explanatory factors were generally present at the time intra-Hutu conflicts really started to appear and can thus have an impact. However, in order to substantiate the causal relation proposed on the basis of the congruence method between the transformation of rebel movements and the return of exile elites and conflict fragmentation on the Hutu side, the process needs to be traced in greater detail. Furthermore, the relation of rebellion and exile to the (main) political conflicts and their interaction need to be clarified. In addition, political integration as a possible causal mechanism has to be established which is done on the basis of process-tracing in the following section.

54The government versus opposition conflicts on the Tutsi side can also feature in the unexplained category. Since these conflicts disappeared, however, it is not so relevant to trace their exact source.
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4.4 Tracing the origin and path of exile-related conflicts in Burundi’s transition

This section looks at conflicts and conflict lines in Burundi’s recent democratic transition based on interviews with Burundian political elites. The intention is to trace the process by analyzing the information provided by elites and to gain insights into the development of conflict lines at the elite level to assess the role of exile and test the causal mechanism of integration. The aim is not to investigate the underlying discourse, but to engage in a detailed analysis of elite views in order to include first-hand information. 53 elite interviews were conducted with 46 different persons, including 26 resident and 20 (former) exile elites. Among the latter group, all respondents were abroad during the civil war for a time that is sufficient in order for them to qualify as an exile person.55 Some respondents had already left around 1972, when the most severe ethnic massacre among Hutu took place, or around 1993/94 when the actual outbreak of the war occurred. One person left in 1988 in the context of another wave of ethnic violence. A larger group of 11 people did not leave until the period between 1995 and 1998, influenced by the Buyoya coup in 1996 and various violent events over the course of this period. The respondents overwhelmingly returned to Burundi between 2000 and 2006.56 The average time in exile of respondents was 10.3 years, with three years being the lowest number and 32 years the highest.57

The elites who returned from exile had been in many different host countries, but eight were in Belgium and five in Tanzania and Congo, making these countries the most common host countries. There were also three cases of elites who had been in several countries during their exile. All respondents had either been in European or African countries, at least for most of the time. Nine of the respondents indicated that they had official status as refugees while all the others at least saw themselves as having been in exile.58

Almost all respondents were politically active during the civil war. 19 out of 20 (former) exile elites were active in political parties or the Hutu movements, mostly in CNDD-FDD. The same held true for the group of resident elites who overwhelmingly were Uprona or Frodebu cadres. Some

55There is only one exception of a person who already returned in 1994 and thus was in exile only for the very first part of the civil war. However, since the person had been in exile since 1972, she has still been classed as a returnee.
56In three cases, people had not fully returned to Burundi at the time of the interview, but were going back and forth between the country of asylum and Burundi.
57There are no references with interview codes in this section, because the information given could also potentially reveal the identity of the respondent.
58There was one case where a respondent lived abroad for a relevant time period, but crossed the border into Burundi very regularly. Since the person did not see herself as having been in exile, she was classed as a non-exile elite.
elites were not members of parties, but still held political positions or were in the administration for a significant part of the period of observation.

The following subsections give insights into the origin of exile, its social and political consequences and the underlying explanations of political conflicts during peace negotiations and the political transition. There is also an analysis of the immediate post-transition period. The first two subsections primarily set out the preconditions and underlying developments for a new internal-external conflict line while the following two subsections provide detailed evidence for their actual emergence. The aim of this section is to check on the findings based on the congruence method, identify the causal path and thus substantiate the proposed causal mechanism of political integration.

4.4.1 Exile and rebellion: flight and the creation of CNDD in 1994

The questioning of elites on reasons exile is used in the following to show that there is no underlying self-selection in who went into exile and who did not and that exile, in its origin, is a category distinct from rebellion. With the flight of many political elites and the establishment of CNDD as a Hutu rebel movement in Uvira (DR Congo) in September 1994 by some of these elites, exile and rebellion became entangled. The earlier sections have already pointed out that both CNDD and Palipehutu had bases inside and outside the country, but at the elite level they were strongly based in exile. CNDD, as the larger movement, found much appeal among refugees and exile elites and also prompted some people to leave Burundi and join the rebellion.

However, in treating exile as a potential base for a new conflict line, two aspects are of prime importance here: a) those leaving the country should not have been organized or mobilized in a different way before and b) exile and rebellion should not be completely congruent in their origin because this would make the specific contribution of exile to the development of conflict lines very hard to distinguish. The argument here is that exile provided the basis for the rebellion and many exile elites got involved with CNDD over time, but that the reason for leaving into exile was not (only) to engage in the armed struggle. The latter point has already been assured to a certain degree by showing in subsection 4.1.2 that there were also elites in exile that merely pursued political activities linked to Frodebu, which remained a political party over the whole course of the civil war.59

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59It needs to be pointed out that Frodebu was not totally inactive with regard to violent activities. Besides the alleged connection to CNDD that is discussed in the following paragraphs, it had its own militia inside the country (Watt 2008, p. 9).
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Exile as new category

The first point mentioned can largely be substantiated by the fact that CNDD was only established in exile after elites like Nyangoma had left the country. Since those elites founding CNDD were overwhelmingly Frodebu cadres and Frodebu did not merge into CNDD, but remained a distinct organization, CNDD as an exile movement was new and did not exist before. Furthermore, elites in exile were not only affiliated with CNDD, but also remained Frodebu members or active in the framework of other movements like Palipehutu or Frolina. Among the respondents who left, most were also active in political parties at the time, mostly in the Frodebu\(^\text{60}\), some were not politically active at all but started to engage in political parties or rebel movements in exile.\(^\text{61}\) 15 of the exile elites later became involved with or became leaders in the rebellion, mainly in CNDD and its different branches, as in the following case:

“In 98, […], it was then that I resigned from Frodebu, because I found the direction was not very close to the population in exile, in the camps.” (BUR-I-08, 12-12-07)

At a more general level, exile people might have simply been a distinct group before exile if they overwhelmingly came from a radical wing or faction of existing organizations. However, there are no indications that people leaving into exile with the outbreak of violence were seen as comprising such a distinct tendency. Some stayee elites even explicitly stress that those leaving at the elite level were not more extremist at the time:\(^\text{62}\)

“Those who left were not at all extremist. These were people who were scared […]. But that does not exclude that those who left developed extremist sentiments in exile, especially at the level of the Palipehutu. People went abroad with frustrations and the majority of those abroad entered the armed movements, for returning to Burundi and settle the scores.” (BUR-II-36, 01-04-09)

It was also underlined that at the time of the coup attempt in 1993, Frodebu was one single party and that it was only with the onset of violence that centrifugal forces set in – an indirect reference to the establishment of CNDD.\(^\text{63}\) It was the higher-ranking political elites who fled, for example

\(^{60}\text{BUR-II-04, 24-02-09; BUR-II-23, 20-03-09; BUR-I-04, 29-11-07; BUR-I-12, 15-12-07; BUR-II-21, 19-03-09; BUR-I-08, 12-12-07; BUR-I-13, 15-12-07; BUR-II-33, 30-03-09; BUR-II-03, 23-02-09}

\(^{61}\text{BUR-I-11, 14-12-07; BUR-II-17, 13-03-09; BUR-I-10, 13-12-07; BUR-II-19, 17-03-09}

\(^{62}\text{BUR-II-07, 03-03-09, BUR-II-36, 01-04-09}

\(^{63}\text{BUR-II-09, 25-02-09}\)
those who were in government in 1993 and all presidents of Hutu parties including the smaller ones attached to Frodebu, most of whom left after the Buyoya coup in 1996. Many of those who left were elites who had been in the political institutions before 1993/4 and, thus, can hardly be seen as comprising a particularly extremist group.

If those elites fleeing the country had been more radical in terms of ethnic ideology, they too would have joined Palipehutu to a larger degree, which was not the case. As already pointed out, most exile people joined CNDD. One exile respondent stresses that despite strong frustration and an intense wish to oppose the regime in Bujumbura in order to return, he did not join Palipehutu because it was an ethnist movement. In general, no stayee respondent raised the accusation that those leaving were more extremist. Only two Tutsi respondents among resident elites state that some people left because they were involved in “something” which clearly refers to inciting or being involved in violence. However, even these two respondents also refer to threats and killings around 1993 as reasons for those leaving the country.

The origin of exile and rebellion

Concerning the second point on the relationship of exile and rebellion, it is important to check that people did not only go abroad to join the rebellion, but that exile had a meaning in itself. Certainly, most exile elites joined CNDD at some point, but that does not imply that this was their (only) reason for leaving the country. In fact, the overwhelming majority of exile elites named personal threats and general insecurity as reasons for going into exile around 1993 or at earlier points in time. There were violent attacks and many assassinations of Hutu politicians after Ndaye’s assassination and the subsequent killings in the countryside. There were even death lists of Hutu personalities in a newspaper which included putting a price on people’s heads. It is mentioned that members of Frodebu were specifically targeted and that the security forces engaged in assassinations carried out in daylight against high-ranking personalities like MPs and ministers. The security situation at the time is described as unbearable by those who left:

\[\text{References}\]

64BUR-II-39,03-04-09
65BUR-II-04,24-02-09
66BUR-I-11,14-12-07
67BUR-I-09,12-12-07; BUR-II-31,27-03-09
68BUR-II-04,24-02-09; BUR-II-17,13-03-09; BUR-II-13,10-03-09; BUR-II-21,19-03-09; BUR-I-08,12-12-07; BUR-II-34,30-03-09; BUR-I-13,15-12-07; BUR-I-06,10-12-07; BUR-II-33,30-03-09; BUR-II-24,23-03-09; BUR-II-03,23-02-09
69BUR-II-21,19-03-09
70BUR-I-13,15-12-07
71BUR-I-08,12-12-07
“I was threatened as well, I was victim of several attacks against me. When I circulated in the city it was under extreme protection, that was an untenable life. We were between life and death.” (BUR-II-21_19-03-09)

It needs to be kept in mind that in essence, there was a power vacuum in Burundi in 1993 and part of 1994. Moreover, even after the negotiated Convention of Government in 1994, the government led by a Hutu president had very limited power and was sidelined by the Military Council, so that some elites already decided to leave at this point. More followed when Buyoya took power again in 1996. Three of the respondents stated that they specifically left to organize opposition or resistance from abroad in reaction to Ndadaye’s assassination and the Buyoya coup in 1996 respectively.\footnote{BUR-II-23_20-03-09; BUR-I-12_15-12-07; BUR-II-26_24-03-09} In two cases, this opposition included military, in the other only political activities.

However, the motives of those leaving were also assessed by those who stayed. The reasons for flight given by resident elites are important, because exile elites might want to hide their real intentions. But by far the largest part of stayee elites also cite fear, threats and insecurity as reasons for people leaving into exile.\footnote{BUR-II-32_27-03-09; BUR-II-16_12-03-09; BUR-II-11_06-03-09; BUR-II-37_01-04-09; BUR-II-22_20-03-09; BUR-II-36_01-04-09; BUR-II-18_16-03-09; BUR-II-10_04-03-09; BUR-II-38_03-04-09; BUR-II-30_27-03-09; BUR-II-05_25-02-09} One respondent clearly pointed out the threats against elites, saying that: “the Hutu elites were killed; there was the experience of 1972, the elites were eliminated” (BUR-II-28_25-03-09). This view of security as a motive to flee is dominant among Tutsi and Hutu respondents who staid inside the country, so there is also no ethnic bias in responses here. There are only six among the resident elites who also directly link motivations to go into exile to rebellion. Some, however, see the armed struggle rather as a consequence of exile\footnote{BUR-II-36_01-04-09; BUR-II-07_03-03-09} while the others simply refer to taking up arms as a cause for leaving into exile.\footnote{BUR-II-38_03-04-09; BUR-II-14_10-03-09; BUR-II-39_03-04-09; BUR-II-05_25-02-09} But even among the latter ones, only two\footnote{BUR-II-14_10-03-09; BUR-II-39_03-04-09} exclusively mention the armed struggle as a reason to leave while the others emphasize that insecurity and fear played a central role as well. This finding is important because if going into exile and joining the rebellion were equated by most elites, conflicts between stayee and exile elites later on could just be another version of the political-military divide.

In order to understand the link between exile and rebellion, it is also important to cast light on the establishment of CNDD more specifically as it was essentially an offshoot of Frodebu. Clearly, there was a division in
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Frodebu over the right strategy towards the army and Uprona after the coup attempt in 1993:

“The Frodebu leaders were not united [after the coup in 1993]; there were leaders who wanted to make a compromise with Uprona and the army, and us who refused, we separated; we organized CNDD and the others did the partnership, the convention with Uprona, Buyoya, and afterwards CNDD and Frodebu were always rivals. At a certain moment the armed struggle was inevitable.” (BUR-II-26, 24-03-09)

But there are many indications that the separation of Frodebu and CNDD was not as clear from the beginning. The reason often given by CNDD members is that the situation had become really unbearable in terms of security and exclusion and that resistance was the only possible choice at the time, because the power ultimately remained in the hands of the army without any countering force. But in fact, this is even acknowledged by those Frodebu elites who remained in Frodebu and pursued the path of negotiating their inclusion into the institutions. They stress that the armed struggle was necessary in order to fight the army and to accelerate negotiations with it and with Uprona. The original vision of the two organizations is also described as the same. The military struggle is mainly denounced, because it allegedly leads to a loss of objectives and principles over time. Obviously in the beginning, Frodebu supported putting pressure on the army, even constituting a paramilitary group. But when CNDD-FDD was constituted with a real armed wing and Frodebu supported negotiations, the ideology was no longer the same. Finally, with the negotiated settlement based on the partnership in 1998, a further problem facing Frodebu was that it needed to officially denounce the armed struggle, which led to tensions with CNDD.

There is also a more general perception among elites that the basis of the rebellion was Frodebu, but that it lost control of the movement, partly because Nyangoma had a problem with the other Frodebu leaders. There is also the assertion that Frodebu supported CNDD from inside the country after 1994, and that Buyoya could not accept that President Ntibantunganya negotiated with a rebellion he helped to create or

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77 BUR-II-04, 24-02-09
78 BUR-I-12, 15-12-07
79 BUR-II-22, 20-03-09; BUR-I-11, 14-12-07; BUR-II-14, 10-03-09
80 BUR-II-22, 20-03-09; BUR-II-07, 03-03-09
81 BUR-II-07, 03-03-09; BUR-II-36, 01-04-09
82 BUR-II-36, 01-04-09
83 BUR-II-37, 01-04-09
84 BUR-II-07, 03-03-09; BUR-II-28, 25-03-09; BUR-II-31, 27-03-09; BUR-II-32, 27-03-09; BUR-II-36, 01-04-09; BUR-II-07, 03-03-09; BUR-II-29, 26-03-09; BUR-II-38, 03-04-09

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Whether this holds true or not, CNDD started off as an umbrella for most of the different existing Hutu movements and parties. Frolina was founding member of CNDD and there obviously were never any problems in the relationship between the two, although Frolina did not stay in the CNDD for long. The Palipehutu branch under Karatasi as well as splinter groups of Frodebu, like its militia, were also originally included. Due to political problems outside of the country, these groups left CNDD again, but there clearly was no animosity of a more general nature.

The relationship to the military branch of Palipehutu, the FNL, was very different from the beginning. There was no real cooperation between Palipehutu-FNL and CNDD. Instead, episodes of violent clashes took place between the two, for example in 1995 when CNDD destroyed a radio run by Palipehutu-FNL. One often-cited reason for this is the different mentality and ideology of the two movements on the issue of ethnic relations. There was no longer any strong aggression between the two movements after 1998, but the original phase after CNDD’s founding was clearly marked by very strained relations.

So the division between those pursuing the armed struggle in CNDD and those remaining politically active in Frodebu was not as clear-cut and conflictive from the beginning, especially in comparison to relations with the Palipehutu-FNL. There are clear indications that there were no major differences in terms of ideology at the time CNDD came into being. Even the controversies over a military strategy seemed to be rather secondary at first since the use of some armed pressure was not totally rejected by Frodebu. Rather, over time, Frodebu and CNDD developed in different directions due to the fact that one was an exile movement with strong bases outside the country and the other remained inside the institutions of Burundi, forced to find an arrangement with the Tutsi power base. This obviously led to very different interests and experiences over time and the two organizations took very different paths becoming increasingly distanced and especially after 1998 even opposed.

When Frodebu allegedly tried to get gain control over CNDD again...
around the start of the Arusha negotiations in 1998 by including it as a military branch of Frodebu, this was completely unacceptable to CNDD, which had build up its own structures in the meantime. While Frodebu and CNDD had both built up outside and inside bases, they had different centers of gravity and followed increasingly divergent strategies. But this exile-related differentiation is not limited to the relationship of Frodebu and CNDD: it has much broader connotations, as the following subsection shows.

This subsection has demonstrated that exile elites did not constitute a politically distinct political group before they left, neither in organizational terms nor as a more extremist faction. Moreover, reasons for leaving into exile were not congruent with the intention to engage in the armed struggle, though many exile elites joined CNDD(-FDD) at some point. Finally, the main dividing factor between CNDD and Frodebu in the beginning was not of a political-military kind; rather, the real split took hold over time due to an increasing divergence of interests, strategies and also opportunities, given that CNDD was in exile and Frodebu remained inside the country. This is also substantiated by the findings of the following subsection, which illustrates differences between exile and resident elites.

4.4.2 Exile as social and political category

The last subsection has substantiated that there was not only a significant outflow of elites into exile, but that exile can also constitute a new group formation, because there was no previous distinct mobilization of those who went into exile, and exile was also not simply a different label for rebellion. However, if a kind of group formation really took place in exile social and political differences between (former) exile people and resident elites should appear in their answers. Furthermore, specific grievances should become visible, giving differences a conflictive potential. These are the preconditions for possible political conflicts between exile and non-exile elites and the development of a new conflict line. The analysis of differences between exile and resident elites follows three stages: First, differences are assessed with regard to the beginning of the war and the decision to leave the country or stay. Second, the different civil war experiences are compared, and third, the different views with regard to return of exile elites and the integration process are examined.

Staying or leaving

The first step is to compare the exile and stayee experience at the beginning, during the course and towards the end of the civil war in order
to identify social and political differences. The reasons for exile elites to leave the country have already been discussed in the last section. However, there is also the decision to stay by a great number of (Hutu) elites despite violence and insecurity. The reasons given by stayee elites already indicate a certain differentiation. In describing their motivation to stay inside Burundi during the war, it becomes apparent that resident elites generally see their decision as important to find a way out of the war. They mention two main reasons why they stayed inside the country: a lack of reasons to leave or a necessity to stay in order to keep contributing to politics inside Burundi.

Not surprisingly, those who felt they did not have a reason to leave were overwhelmingly Tutsi elites who had a secure official position at the time. The second and largest group of respondents, however, comprised many Hutu as well as Tutsi. They frequently stress patriotism and a general responsibility to stay and try to help in a difficult situation as a motivation to stay despite the violence and instability. Some people also cited personal reasons for staying. Only one person indicated that he stayed in order to join the rebellion on the ground. The most interesting aspect is that leaving into exile is also indirectly compared to treason, cowardliness or detaching from one’s country by stayee respondents and many clearly distance themselves from the idea of exile:

“When the crisis arrived, certain people fled. We said: we do not flee! We continue the struggle here [...] We took the option to stay and constitute a new internal struggle for democratic change. We did not want to dissociate from all those who voted for Frodebu. And we have continued the struggle here and thanks to God the history has proven us right.” (BUR-II-36_01-04-09)

So despite the fact that many stayee elites expressed a certain understanding that people left into exile for reasons of security, in a political sense they seem to evaluate it at least as an ambiguous choice. There is a clear indication that stayee elites feel that they have done the right thing and really contributed in an important way to saving the country. While the experience of the crisis inside the country is also described as traumatizing or there are negative personal experiences, such as imprisonment, staying

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95 BUR-II-38_03-04-09; BUR-II-10_04-03-09; BUR-II-28_25-03-09; BUR-II-18_16-03-09
96 BUR-II-32_27-03-09; BUR-II-12_09-03-09; BUR-II-22_20-03-09; BUR-II-38_03-04-09; BUR-II-31_27-03-09; BUR-II-14_10-03-09
97 BUR-II-11_06-03-09; BUR-I-09_12-12-07; BUR-I-03_28-11-07
98 BUR-II-20_18-03-09
99 BUR-II-37_01-04-09; BUR-II-07_03-03-09; BUR-II-39_03-04-09; BUR-II-05_25-02-09
100 BUR-I-09_12-12-07
101 BUR-II-15_11-03-09; BUR-II-12_09-03-09; BUR-II-05_25-02-09
inside the country is seen mainly as a positive decision and contribution. The Hutu respondents among stayee elites particularly emphasized fighting for democracy and continuing the political struggle inside the country, and stress that “you need to stay on the ground.” The main reason given for this is that if all the (Hutu) elites had left, return would have been very difficult later. The exile situation of Rwandan Hutu is seen as a warning example in this regard because basically all the political elites left in 1994 at the end of the genocide. At the same time, there was reference to imprisonment as a possible price for staying albeit one which, as Hutu stayees emphasized, they were willing to pay. These typical features are all present in the following statement:

“We said, for defending democracy, one shall not flee; despite the coup, despite imprisonment, we have not fled. We said, we prefer to die at the interior. If everybody would have been exiled, it would have been like in Rwanda. In Rwanda right now, there is no political opposition anymore.” (BUR-II-05_25-02-09)

Having followed the development during the war inside the country is not only seen as assisting political change, but also as an advantageous experience because of the insights gained and being in charge later when others come back from abroad and need to rely on local knowledge. Interestingly, there is no denouncement of the armed struggle in these statements: only two respondents indirectly display a negative view of exile in connection to the rebellion.

From the point of view of those who left, reasons for staying inside Burundi fall into three general categories: a lack of means to leave, a lack of reasons to leave because of being in power or linked to the power and the decision to try to “juggle with the situation”. The latter point clearly refers to Hutu elites who remained active inside the country balancing threats and negotiating their inclusion in the political institutions, especially after 1996. Allegedly those who left did not see those who stayed as patriots and as being corrupted by the regime in place during the civil war.

102 BUR-II-05_25-02-09; BUR-II-27_25-03-09; BUR-II-36_01-04-09
103 BUR-II-12_09-03-09
104 BUR-II-07_03-03-09; BUR-II-14_10-03-09; BUR-II-05_25-02-09
105 BUR-II-12_09-03-09; BUR-II-05_25-02-09
106 BUR-II-14_10-03-09
107 BUR-II-27_25-03-09; BUR-II-14_10-03-09
108 BUR-II-05_23-02-09; BUR-II-04_24-02-09
109 BUR-II-24_23-03-09; BUR-II-03_23-02-09
110 BUR-II-04_24-02-09; BUR-II-03_23-02-09; BUR-II-23_20-03-09
111 BUR-II-21_19-03-09
112 BUR-II-09_25-02-09; BUR-I-09_12-12-07
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The roles during civil war

Exile and resident elites have very different views of their experiences and roles during the war. Among the exile elites, some point out the great difficulties of exile, but most also refer to it as an enriching experience from which they greatly benefited. Exile as such has been described as hard, because one should live in his or her own country\(^\text{113}\), one is dependent on assistance and constricted\(^\text{114}\), gets a more negative view on Burundian politics and history\(^\text{115}\) or is unvalued in exile and cannot contribute to the home country.\(^\text{116}\) The positive aspects of exile mentioned include access to higher education\(^\text{117}\), professional experience, for example with international NGOs or companies\(^\text{118}\) and general experience with other cultures, values and political systems.\(^\text{119}\) One common view is that exile elites are more educated, experienced and open as well as tolerant than those who stayed.\(^\text{120}\) Furthermore, some respondents stress that exile was important as a basis for political activism and resistance and as such helped to solve problems in Burundi.\(^\text{121}\) Exile is seen as a basis for real opposition that was not possible inside the country\(^\text{122}\) and is seen by political and military actors as the factor that forced the military power in Bujumbura to the negotiating table at Arusha.\(^\text{123}\) Besides the financial, logistical and ideological help given to Burundian movements in exile\(^\text{124}\), political and diplomatic efforts directed at the countries of asylum are also seen as crucial:

“The image of Burundi has changed a lot. Certainly thanks to us. And I think effectively Burundi is known thanks to our activities. There the repatriates have done a great service to our homeland.” (BUR-I-11, 14-12-07)

In contrast to these assessments, resident elites emphasize that being inside Burundi during the war despite the threats was necessary in order to continue the political fight and that those inside really knew the political, economic and social situation and spoke on behalf of the population.\(^\text{125}\)

\(^{113}\) BUR-II-23\_20-03-09
\(^{114}\) BUR-I\_02, 26-11-07; BUR-I\_05\_03-12-07
\(^{115}\) BUR-I\_11, 14-12-07
\(^{116}\) BUR-II\_03\_23-02-09
\(^{117}\) BUR-I\_10, 13-12-07; BUR-II\_19, 17-03-09
\(^{118}\) BUR-I\_05, 03-12-07; BUR-I\_02, 26-11-07; BUR-I\_06, 10-12-07
\(^{119}\) BUR-I\_02, 26-11-07; BUR-I\_08, 12-12-07; BUR-I\_10, 13-12-07; BUR-II\_19, 17-03-09
\(^{120}\) BUR-I\_08, 12-12-07; BUR-I\_12, 15-12-07; BUR-I\_02, 26-11-07; BUR-I\_11, 14-12-07
\(^{121}\) BUR-II\_23, 20-03-09; BUR-I\_11, 14-12-07
\(^{122}\) BUR-II\_23, 20-03-09
\(^{123}\) BUR-I\_12, 15-12-07; BUR-II\_04, 24-02-09
\(^{124}\) BUR-II\_17, 13-03-09
\(^{125}\) BUR-II\_05, 25-02-09; BUR-II\_07, 03-03-09; BUR-II\_36, 01-04-09
The fact that exile elites, especially in Europe and North America, did not know what really was going on in the country is frequently mentioned as a source of problems and distrust. There is also a reference to group formation as returnee elites allegedly have advantages, because they were bound together much closer in exile in terms of activism. There were indeed close contacts among the elites in exile, for example between Frodebu and CNDD-FDD activists.

The accusation on the part of exile elites that those inside Burundi collaborated with the ruling regime and Uprona has already been mentioned and was obviously quite common:

“In the beginning they all agreed, the CNDD was the armed wing of the Frodebu. Nyangoma grew in importance, so that he called those inside the country cowards because they accepted to get together with the regime of Buyoya. So he said those of the Frodebu who are inside, they are cowards. He created his political wing the CNDD and the military wing FDD.” (BUR-II-37,01-04-09)

A common accusation on the part of resident elites is that those in exile were profiting from the assistance of neighbor countries and instrumentalized their support. Indeed, regional countries supported activities in different ways. CNDD-FDD received logistical and partly also financial support from Tanzania and Congo as well as military training in Sudan. At the time when CNDD-FDD sided with Laurent Kabila in the DR Congo, the political branch was even transferred to Lumumbashi. There is the general perception that the Buyoya coup strengthened the rebel movements, because afterwards they received (more) logistical help from countries like Tanzania and Congo and allegedly even Uganda. There is the common accusation on the part of stayee elites that the regional embargo imposed on Burundi by the neighbor countries after the Buyoya coup in 1996 can be attributed to the influence of exile people on these countries or that exile elites at least strongly supported it, because of a lack of knowledge about the consequences for the Burundian population. There were different opinions among leaders in exile and Hutu cadres inside the country whether the embargo should be kept in place.

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126 BUR-II-38,03-04-09; BUR-II-22,20-03-09
127 BUR-I-09,12-12-07
128 BUR-II-23,20-03-09
129 BUR-II-21,19-03-09; BUR-II-22,20-03-09
130 BUR-II-35,31-03-09; BUR-II-37,01-04-09
131 BUR-II-21,19-03-09
132 BUR-II-32,27-03-09
133 BUR-II-09,25-02-09; BUR-II-02,21-02-09

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Similarly, Burundian exile elites as well as regional states were against the negotiated internal partnership. However, as an internal political elite person stresses, the internal political force, by that time, had become too strong to overrule.\textsuperscript{134} Beyond the regional realm, there seems to be a more general suspicion that because of their contacts abroad, former exiles have certain political forces behind them.\textsuperscript{135} There is the assumption that Belgium exercises a certain influence on Burundian politics via those returnee elites who have dual nationality and hold important political positions today.\textsuperscript{136} Thus, exile elites were and are sometimes seen as taking advantage of their international connections or being a political gateway for outside influences later on.

\textit{Return and integration}

There are not only perceived differences and even grievances with regard to the role of exile and resident elites during the civil war, but also with regard to the return and integration of exile elites. First, there are very different views why exile elites actually returned after the negotiations. Exile elites themselves stress the conclusion of negotiations, the establishment of transitional institutions and the improvement in the security situation including the installation of a South African Protection Force.\textsuperscript{137} Moreover, they also name more idealist motivations, such as restoring democracy in Burundi and contributing to the reconstruction and political change for which they had fought politically and/or militarily before.\textsuperscript{138} Continuing the struggle was also mentioned as a motive to integrate into the political institutions.\textsuperscript{139} Interestingly, the only motivations for the return of exile elites mentioned by stayee elites is that they wanted to take up posts or get a promotion.\textsuperscript{140} It is also mentioned by stayee elites that some elites who returned to take up political positions left their families in Europe,\textsuperscript{141} and some left again after things did not turn out as they expected.\textsuperscript{142} Even a cadre who only returned temporarily stressed that those coming back from Europe did not return to help with the reconstruction of the country, but for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{134}BUR-II-36, 01-04-09
\item \textsuperscript{135}BUR-I-11, 14-12-07
\item \textsuperscript{136}BUR-II-32, 27-03-09
\item \textsuperscript{137}BUR-II-04, 24-02-09; BUR-II-23, 20-03-09; BUR-II-17, 13-03-09; BUR-II-26, 24-03-09; BUR-II-19, 17-03-09; BUR-I-06, 10-12-07; BUR-II-24, 23-03-09; BUR-II-03, 23-02-09
\item \textsuperscript{138}BUR-II-04, 24-02-09; BUR-I-11, 14-12-07; BUR-II-26, 24-03-09; BUR-I-10, 13-12-07; BUR-II-19, 17-03-09; BUR-II-34, 30-03-09; BUR-I-06, 10-12-07; BUR-I-13, 15-12-07; BUR-II-03, 23-02-09
\item \textsuperscript{139}BUR-II-20, 18-03-09
\item \textsuperscript{140}BUR-II-15, 11-03-09; BUR-II-30, 27-03-09; BUR-I-09, 12-12-07; BUR-II-37, 01-04-09
\item \textsuperscript{141}BUR-I-03, 28-11-07
\item \textsuperscript{142}BUR-II-37, 01-04-09
\end{itemize}
jobs after they encountered a difficult professional situation in Europe. However, stayee elites also complain that returnee elites are seen as being advantaged in terms of political compensation. From the point of view of returned exile elites, there is indeed mistrust concerning the distribution of political posts:

“Internal people are scared to lose posts. Because the people who were at the exterior are well educated people. All, all of us have university diplomas. Secondly, they are intelligent people, because they have lived in an open, democratic world. They have learned many things. They are competent, politically. So, one has to be careful, they plan to take the places, that is the attitude in Frodebu. This is actually why there are these conflicts within the parties.” (BUR-I-11, 14-12-07)

This issue also seems to be present in CNDD-FDD. It is mentioned that there were problems, because there was no real distinction between militant activism and merit, but those who had been in Europe had experience with democracy and raised concerns. In this context, the different experiences of exile elites and their openness are stressed as a source of contention, because the others do not agree.

The preceding paragraphs have demonstrated that exile and resident elites do indeed perceive each other as different in social and political terms. There is also a clear differentiation with regard to the contribution of each group to the resolution of the civil war and motivations for exile elites to return after the war. There are grievances that are indirectly expressed, but also direct references to advantages of one or the other group, for example with regard to political positions. Since there were no systematic group differences between exile and resident elites before the actual flight of the former, these differences indicate a process of group formation. This is even more significant since at the time of the interview, most exile elites had returned some years earlier and the civil war had officially been over since 2004. So the fact that differences are still remembered and expressed as relevant is a strong sign that these differences were and remain important. They also clearly show that political integration was an issue and challenge between exile and resident elites. Whether this really led to political conflicts and a newly emerging conflict line is discussed in the next two subsections.

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143 BUR-II-34, 30-03-09
144 BUR-II-05, 25-02-09
145 BUR-II-03, 23-02-09; BUR-I-04, 29-11-07
4.4.3 Peace negotiations after 1998 and political conflict lines

Peace negotiations can be expected to be a time of intense political conflicts, but also of a change in conflict lines. It has already been shown in section 4.2 that negotiations were indeed the point in time in Burundi when changes, particularly on the Hutu side, became visible. Peace negotiations might work as a dividing factor in themselves leading to conflicts between pro- and anti-negotiation factions, they might simply lead to a loss in group cohesion and a re-occurrence of older conflict lines, or they can work as the starting point of a political integration process including conflicts between political and military as well as internal and external actors. Based on the categorization by the congruence method, it has been demonstrated that the latter two lines explain a large part of the fragmentation in Burundi after the civil war. Yet the question is whether political elites see and explain conflicts in the same way. Their reference to conflicts in the context of negotiations is, therefore, outlined in this subsection with a special focus on the splits that occurred at the time of negotiations because they left permanent marks in the political landscape. The split between CNDD and Frodebu is not analyzed here, because it took place in 1994 and has already been discussed in the first subsection, showing that the split occurring over time was strongly related to exile and thus took on an internal-external division.

Organizational splits

There have been several relevant splits between 1998 and 2002 in Burundi. On the Tutsi side, the split that has been linked to the option of negotiations occurred within the ruling Uprona party. This assessment is strongly supported by the elite interviews. There is complete agreement among respondents that the split occurred because there was one faction in 1998 that wanted to negotiate under Buyoya and another that categorically refused to negotiate with “genocidaires”. Personal interests and frustrations are presumed to be an underlying conflict reason as well, but these are part of many political conflicts in general without constituting a new conflict line. Furthermore, even those referring to more individual motivations identified the dividing line between those in favor and those against negotiations as well:

"With the coup of Buyoya, the old head of the party, Mukasi, refused to negotiate, he said he would not go and negotiate with the 'genocidaires' from the Frodebu." (BUR-II-32,27-03-09)

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146 BUR-II-15,11-03-09; BUR-II-31,27-03-09; BUR-II-38,03-04-09; BUR-II-10,04-03-09; BUR-II-14,10-03-09; BUR-II-18,16-03-09; BUR-II-02,21-02-09; BUR-II-03,04-04-09; BUR-II-16,12-03-09; BUR-II-32,27-03-09
147 BUR-II-31,27-03-09; BUR-II-32,27-03-09
Many respondents, including those from Uprona, mention that there was a process of rapprochement and that tangible attempts to reunite were undertaken\(^{148}\) because the Arusha framework is a reality that can no longer be denied.\(^{149}\) This rapprochement is very much in line with the finding of disappearing intra-Tutsi conflicts after 2004. The great number of political conflicts between pro- and anti-negotiation factions obviously lost their reference point after the inclusion of (almost) all Hutu parties and movements.

On the Hutu side, one conflict that appeared at the time of peace negotiations but had in fact already developed earlier was between the internal and the external wing of Frodebu. As already outlined, this division refers to conflicts between Frodebu components inside the country under the secretary general Augustin Nzijibwami and those outside the country in exile with the party president Jean Minani. Nzijibwami was allied to Uprona or more specifically to Buyoya and tried to oust Minani from his position as party president, but was finally removed from his position at a party congress in 1999 (van Eck 2000, p. 7). Thus, there was an ongoing leadership struggle between these personalities, both claiming to represent Frodebu, but also a more profound conflict that led to the establishment of the party “Sangwe Pader” by Nzijibwami after his expulsion in 2001.\(^{150}\)

Based on elite interviews, this split can clearly be assigned to an underlying internal-external conflict line. The internal Frodebu comprised Augustin Nzijibwami and Domitien Ndayizeye as executive secretary and the external Frodebu Jean Minani with other cadres who fled from Burundi, some to Tanzania, others to Belgium, some to France.\(^{151}\) The rift is described in direct relation to exile and as being based on the flight of Minani who was accused of having ordered the violence against Tutsi in 1993.\(^{152}\) Outside the country Minani denounced the Buyoya coup in 1996 and allegedly used his international contacts to build up pressure while other leaders remained in Burundi to take over part of the political field again and not leave everything to the coup makers.\(^{153}\) Thus, there was a difference in views and strategy due to the internal and external location of the two components.

However, there is also reference to deeper disputes and grievances over who should rule Frodebu underlying this conflict. The external wing obviously assumed that the internal wing was not mature enough to gov-

\(^{148}\)BUR-II-15,11-03-09; BUR-II-05,25-02-09; BUR-II-38,03-04-09; BUR-II-14,10-03-09; BUR-II-18,16-03-09; BUR-II-16,12-03-09; BUR-II-32,27-03-09; BUR-II-03,23-02-09; BUR-II-04,24-02-09

\(^{149}\)BUR-II-31,27-03-09

\(^{150}\)BUR-II-16,12-03-09; BUR-II-12,09-03-09; BUR-II-14,10-03-09

\(^{151}\)BUR-II-36,01-04-09

\(^{152}\)BUR-II-32,27-03-09

\(^{153}\)BUR-II-17,13-03-09

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ern. The internal wing stressed that what matters is what happens on the ground and that the party needs to be ruled from the inside, not by orders from outside. There was also the familiar accusation that internal people were corrupted by power, while the internal people stressed that one should not flee in order to prevent a situation as in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{154}

The issue of negotiations increased the division, not because one wing was in favor and one against negotiations, but because the way negotiations should be conducted was disputed. Nzojibwami supported negotiations inside Burundi in the framework of the political partnership, while Minani was opposed to it due to the expectation that the military would put too much pressure on Frodebu inside the country. The internal negotiations with the military regime was also denounced as treason.\textsuperscript{155} So the partnership negotiations clearly did not have the blessings of Minani or of Frodebu elites in Europe because it was an internal initiative.\textsuperscript{156}

Another common perception of this internal Frodebu conflict is that the rift was due to manipulation by Buyoya who tried to divide the Hutu party by corrupting Nzojibwami.\textsuperscript{157} Even if these allegations might be exaggerated, the internal partnership was certainly a strategy by Buyoya to strengthen his position in the Arusha negotiations.\textsuperscript{158} However, manipulation can only take place along already existing political divisions, and certainly not create a new conflict line as profound as the internal-external one in this case. Possibly this line was instrumentalized or deepened by certain moves, but its origin cannot be explained this way.

After the internal partnership, Minani gained in influence, supposedly because of international support, especially by Tanzania.\textsuperscript{159} Partly due to his influence on the Tanzanian mediation, Minani is seen as having dominated the Arusha negotiations on the part of Frodebu.\textsuperscript{160} So the debate in Frodebu as to whether negotiations should take place inside or outside Burundi amplified a dispute between two different power centers and spheres of interest. Although the Frodebu delegation at Arusha comprised internal and external components\textsuperscript{161}, the perception is that with Arusha the external wing gained in influence:

“In the end it was those from the external branch who were on

\textsuperscript{154}BUR-II-05, 25-02-09
\textsuperscript{155}BUR-II-23, 20-03-09; BUR-II-22, 20-03-09; BUR-II-18, 16-03-09; BUR-II-28, 25-03-09
\textsuperscript{156}BUR-II-36, 01-04-09; BUR-II-07, 03-03-09; BUR-II-27, 25-03-09
\textsuperscript{157}BUR-II-17, 13-03-09; BUR-II-12, 09-03-09; BUR-II-07, 03-03-09; BUR-II-39, 03-04-09. The manipulative power of Buyoya is often cited, for example also with regard to a near split in a small Hutu party when the regime in Bujumbura nominated those on the ground as party officials in an attempt to divide the leadership (BUR-II-04, 24-02-09).
\textsuperscript{158}BUR-II-32, 27-03-09
\textsuperscript{159}BUR-II-16, 12-03-09; BUR-II-18, 16-03-09; BUR-II-05, 25-02-09
\textsuperscript{160}BUR-II-22, 20-03-09
\textsuperscript{161}BUR-II-02, 21-02-09
top, the others were put aside but their role was not negligible because we have created a balance at the interior that allowed Arusha to advance.” (BUR-II-18, 16-03-09)

The depth of the internal-external division in Frodebu is disputed among the elites. Some say that despite these conflicts Frodebu was still united, others speak of a period of deep rifts and problems while another group of respondents clearly interprets the conflicts in the light of a split between an internal and external wing that also led to the creation of the Sangwe Pader party. In any case, there was a period of intense conflict between the internal and external components of Frodebu between 1998 and 2001. There is frequent mention of disputes between internal Frodebu leaders and members abroad during the negotiation period and afterwards, because the latter did not understand or support the strategy of those inside. The final split in 2001 has also been attributed to regionalism, because Nzojibwami is from Bururi and the majority of other Frodebu leaders at the time was from the north like Minani and Ndayizeye. There is also the assumption that Buyoya or Uprona more generally corrupted Nzojibwami on the basis of regionalism as both leaders are from the south. The indications of a underlying regional conflict line are much weaker than those along the internal-external line, but it might explain why some of the internal leaders, despite their support for the political partnership and conflicts with Minani, did not follow Nzojibwami when he created his new party. Most (non-southern) Frodebu leaders remained in the Frodebu under the presidency of Minani that continued until 2005 while Nzojibwami took mainly Frodebu people from the south with him into his new party. So the regional factor only came into play at a later point around 2001 and possibly influenced certain leaders’ decision with whom to align. Apart from that, the conflict clearly runs along the internal-external line.

The first split that took place within CNDD could not be explained based on the congruence method in section 4.3: the division between a wing under the original founder, Léonard Nyangoma, and the military chief at the time, Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, that finally led to an organizational split in 1998. Both leaders were from Bururi, both were at the head of a military movement and both were outside the country. There was

162 BUR-II-23, 20-03-09; BUR-II-19, 17-03-09; BUR-II-37, 01-04-09; BUR-II-39, 03-04-09
163 BUR-II-12, 09-03-09; BUR-II-07, 03-03-09; BUR-II-28, 25-03-09; BUR-II-38, 03-04-09; BUR-II-31, 27-03-09
164 BUR-II-32, 27-03-09; BUR-II-16, 12-03-09; BUR-II-18, 16-03-09; BUR-II-14, 10-03-09; BUR-II-15, 11-03-09; BUR-II-13, 10-03-09
165 BUR-II-12, 09-03-09
166 BUR-II-05, 25-02-09
167 BUR-II-37, 01-04-09; BUR-II-36, 01-04-09
168 BUR-II-28, 25-03-09

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also no indication that one was generally opposed to negotiations and the other in favor. Looking at the information from elite interviews, the picture becomes relatively clear. The most commonly mentioned underlying reason for the split in elite responses was the lack of intermediary structures and the distance of Nyangoma to the cadres and fighters on the ground indicating a certain mismanagement.\textsuperscript{169} There clearly is an internal-external logic behind this split, even though Jean-Bosco was also outside Burundi in the Congo. But he obviously maintained strong links on the ground and was directly involved in operations.\textsuperscript{170} The fact that the outside position of Nyangoma became a problem and led to a rift is frequently mentioned:\textsuperscript{171}

\begin{quote}
“And there was tension between the intellectuals and the people on the ground. Nyangoma was more in Europe, and the communication between the political and military leadership has created a gap. Those on the ground felt excluded, it was not a good communication.” (BUR-II-28, 25-03-09)
\end{quote}

The allegations of bad management also refer to these tensions, because money in the CNDD tended, supposedly, to be spent on diplomatic activities and there were incident where military operations on the ground suffered from a shortage of resources.\textsuperscript{172} Nyangoma was often criticized for this mismanagement at the time and other sources also refer to a rift created when bases had to be moved from the Congo to Tanzania and the FDD had not enough means in the reorganization on the ground (International Crisis Group 1998b, p. 6). So the outside position and Nyangoma’s lack of connections are clearly identified as a cause of the split.

However, since Nyangoma was at the head of the political wing and those on the ground were mainly involved in military operations, there is also a political-military conflict line in this dispute. As the above statement shows, the conflict was also framed in these terms. The allegation that Nyangoma tended to focus on political activities and was very distanced from his troops on the ground is an expression of a political-military division within the movement. Only one respondent mentions the negotiations as having been at the root of this conflict finally leading to a split.\textsuperscript{173} Some refer to regionalism, because Nyangoma favored southerners in the movement and excluded cadres from other regions.\textsuperscript{174} Despite the fact that Jean-Bosco was also from Bururi and even a cousin of Nyangoma, there is

\textsuperscript{169}BUR-II-30, 27-03-09; BUR-II-37, 01-04-09; BUR-II-19, 17-03-09; BUR-II-32, 27-03-09; BUR-II-26, 24-03-09; BUR-II-21, 19-03-09
\textsuperscript{170}BUR-II-26, 24-03-09
\textsuperscript{171}BUR-II-20, 18-03-09; BUR-II-26, 24-03-09
\textsuperscript{172}BUR-II-21, 19-03-09
\textsuperscript{173}BUR-II-14, 10-03-09
\textsuperscript{174}BUR-II-28, 25-03-09; BUR-II-25, 23-03-09; BUR-II-19, 17-03-09
the assumption that the later leader, Hussein Radjabu, manipulated Jean-Bosco in order to remove Nyangoma.\textsuperscript{175} Thus, some respondents see the first CNDD split as linked to the second occurring in 2001 between Jean-Bosco and Hussein Radjabu, which is clearly linked to regionalism, as will be argued later on.

Another similarly large group of elites refers to the role of Tanzania in overthrowing Nyangoma as CNDD leader. Former president and mediator Nyerere – allegedly under the influence of Jean Minani – planned to include CNDD as the military wing of Frodebu and saw Nyangoma as the biggest obstacle to this plan. Therefore, he is said to have tried to obtain his removal via Jean-Bosco.\textsuperscript{176} This explanation is comparable to the one about Buyoya dividing Frodebu by corrupting Nzojibwami. Even if Tanzania was involved in the ousting of Nyangoma, it remains unclear what dividing line was instrumentalized in this case.

The relevance of the internal-external line in this first CNDD split combined with a political-military division can also be demonstrated by its occurrence in other cases. Almost exactly the same constellation can, for example, also be found in a comparable case within Palipehutu in 1991/2. The split between the political leader in exile, Etienne Karatasi, and the military leader, Cossan Kabura who was on the ground took on exactly this shape. Several elites mention that it was a divide between the military and the political wing\textsuperscript{177}, taking place because Karatasi was too far away from the troops in his exile in Denmark and the combatants felt neglected, especially since there were some badly planned military activities at the time.\textsuperscript{178} There is also the constant emphasis on the fact that Karatasi lost control because of his distance:\textsuperscript{179}

“Karatasi who was in Denmark became automatically president after Gahutu’s death [former Palipehutu leader], but he had very little connection with the ground, the fighters did not see his activities as support.” (BUR-II-33_30-03-09)

Like Nyangoma after the CNDD split, Karatasi had very few or no troops on the ground afterwards, but kept some sympathizers.\textsuperscript{180} This description of the Palipehutu split has been used to substantiate the explanation for the CNDD split: a division between the political wing in exile

\textsuperscript{175}BUR-II-37_01-04-09
\textsuperscript{176}BUR-II-05_25-02-09; BUR-II-25_23-03-09; BUR-II-16_12-03-09; BUR-II-32_27-03-09
\textsuperscript{177}BUR-II-11_06-03-09
\textsuperscript{178}BUR-II-05_25-02-09; BUR-II-28_25-03-09; BUR-II-33_30-03-09; BUR-II-34_30-03-09; BUR-
\textsuperscript{179}II-13_10-03-09
\textsuperscript{179}A second reason given for the Palipehutu split was that Karatasi engaged in negotiations with Buyoya without securing the support of the military wing (BUR-II-15_11-03-09; BUR-II-30_27-03-09; BUR-II-14_10-03-09)
\textsuperscript{180}BUR-II-17_13-03-09
and the military wing on the ground. Even though the military head, Jean-Bosco, was mostly based outside Burundi, he obviously was linked to the internal sphere and had the support of those on the ground at the time. Regionalism has already played a certain role in the removal of Nyangoma from his position as head of CNDD as well, but really became crucial in the 2001 split of CNDD-FDD, as the movement was called after the first split.\footnote{Nyangoma has kept the name CNDD for his faction until today.} 

This second split in the CNDD(-FDD) in 2001 is strongly based on the regional conflict line as already discovered by the congruence method. Regionalism is also the most commonly cited underlying cause of the conflict in the interviews. Allegedly the movement did not want to be ruled by people from Bururi anymore\footnote{BUR-II-15,11-03-09; BUR-II-30,27-03-09; BUR-II-37,01-04-09} and there were even violent clashes between combatants around 2001 on a regional basis.\footnote{BUR-II-31,27-03-09; BUR-II-20,18-03-09; BUR-II-35,31-03-09} 

The conflict is described in the well-known south versus north dimension and Radjabu is seen as the mastermind behind Jean-Bosco’s removal.\footnote{BUR-II-31,27-03-09; BUR-II-38,03-04-09; BUR-II-13,10-03-09} Although regionalism as the basis of the split is also disputed because on Jean-Bosco’s side there were people not coming from the South of Burundi\footnote{BUR-II-21,19-03-09}, the overall picture is rather clear. The connection to negotiations is also made via the regional affiliation. Since Jean-Bosco and Buyoya were both from Bururi, negotiations or exploratory talks taking place between them aroused suspicions, and there was the fear that people from Bururi would continue to rule after a negotiated settlement.\footnote{BUR-II-05,25-02-09; BUR-II-32,27-03-09; BUR-II-35,31-03-09} Again, there is also the assumption that there was intrusion by regional powers in order to divide the CNDD-FDD.\footnote{BUR-II-33,30-03-09; BUR-II-21,19-03-09} Similar to Nyangoma’s removal, it is also mentioned that Jean-Bosco was no longer close enough to his troops and mainly stayed in Congo as he was strongly allied with Laurent Kabila at the time.\footnote{BUR-II-26,24-03-09} This has even been phrased explicitly as an internal-external division in the CNDD-FDD\footnote{BUR-II-12,09-03-09; BUR-II-35,31-03-09; BUR-II-26,24-03-09; BUR-I-11,14-12-07; BUR-II-22,20-03-09}, meaning that Jean-Bosco’s involvement in the Congo also led to a loss of control and backing on the ground while the chairman, Hussein Radjabu, and the later CNDD-FDD leader, Pierre Nkurunziza, linked the two spheres. It is often stressed that both Radjabu and Nkurunziza were close to the troops and circulated between exile in Tanzania and Burundi, and in Radjabu’s case even the European sections of CNDD-FDD.\footnote{BUR-II-12,09-03-09; BUR-II-35,31-03-09; BUR-II-26,24-03-09; BUR-I-11,14-12-07; BUR-II-22,20-03-09} There are indications that Radjabu had been sidelined
in the movement in 2001, but that he was able to regain control by ousting Jean-Bosco using all his contacts and forces.\textsuperscript{191} So while both Radjabu and Nkurunziza were in Tanzanian exile, they also had one foot in Burundi and gained the support of the military actors on the ground in contrast to Jean-Bosco at the time who was strongly attached to the Congolese government. The removal of Jean-Bosco clearly has an internal-external logic as well while there is no reference to a political-military dimension of the conflict. The dominant line in this case, however, still is the regional conflict line.

A second split in the Palipehutu-FNL after 1991/2 again displays the importance of a loss of attachment to the ground due to exile. In 2001, the leader at the time, Cossan Kabura, was challenged and finally overthrown by Agathon Rwasa who had been the third person in the movement before. All respondents referring to this split stated exactly the same reason: Cossan stayed in Tanzania and Rwasa was with the troops on the ground.\textsuperscript{192} Rwasa led the military units in the west and was a successful strategist, while Cossan had left for Tanzania after 1993.\textsuperscript{193}

“Cossan was in Tanzania, and Rwasa on the ground, I think it is difficult to lead a movement from the outside.” (BUR-II-11_06-03-09)

There are hints of an accusation that Cossan enjoyed life in Tanzania and received the money collected inside Burundi for the movement without contributing to activities on the ground.\textsuperscript{194} In this regard the logic is very much the same as in the case of the first CNDD split and also the first Palipehutu split: There was a loss of control, because the military branch on the ground in Burundi felt neglected and betrayed by a perceived or real lack of coordination of its leader in exile. Much as in the case of the internal-external Frodebu split, there seem to be reproaches that the outside leaders were not really familiar with the reality on the ground and had quite a comfortable position in exile while others were risking their lives on the ground. The general assumption that rebel movements are, therefore, very difficult to lead from an exile basis is frequently underlined, also with regard to the first CNDD split.\textsuperscript{195}

The example of this Palipehutu-FNL split clearly shows that the internal-external line really is distinct in the splits inside rebel movements and not simply the same as a political-military division. In this case, no political-military division was present, because both Cossan and Rwasa were mainly military cadres. Finally, Rwasa, who also moved back and forth

\textsuperscript{191}BUR-II-21_19-03-09
\textsuperscript{192}BUR-II-30_27-03-09; BUR-II-33_30-03-09; BUR-II-34_30-03-09; BUR-II-17_13-03-09
\textsuperscript{193}BUR-II-32_27-03-09; BUR-II-30_30-03-09
\textsuperscript{194}BUR-II-33_30-03-09; BUR-II-34_30-03-09
\textsuperscript{195}BUR-II-32_27-03-09; BUR-II-30_27-03-09
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from Tanzania, won the power struggle and kept most of the combatants on the ground, while Cossan remained in Tanzania with some troops he maintained.196

The final split taking place in the period of observation in 2002 was put in relation to the option of negotiations in section 4.3, like the split between the two Uprona factions. This split took place because Agathon Rwasa’s leadership of FNL was disputed by Alain Mugabarabona who was in exile in the Netherlands and tried to push the movement towards participating in negotiations. He split off from the movement with a rather small group of supporters and negotiated an agreement in 2002, but quickly disappeared as an actor afterwards.

Indeed, many elite respondents link the underlying cause of the FNL split to negotiations, saying that after the start of the transition Mugabarabona wanted to finish negotiations quickly and Rwasa refused this strategy.197 Yet there is the strong assumption, again, that there was manipulation behind this split, either by Frodebu or by Buyoya and the South Africans.198 trying to divide the FNL in order to make Rwasa negotiate.199 In any case, Mugabarabona’s attempt is seen as having failed. He allegedly represented nothing, and had no followers on the ground.200 While there is some reference to Mugabarabona’s exile base in the responses, this conflict clearly took place between a pro- and anti-negotiation faction inside the FNL at the time. The split is not generally explained with reference to an internal-external dimension, and similarly not to a political-military one, but is linked to the question whether to negotiate or not.

The evidence from party and movement splits can be summarized as follows. While the Uprona split on the Tutsi side and to a lesser degree the last FNL split in 2002 on the Hutu side took place between pro- and anti-negotiation wings, the CNDD-FDD split in 2001 can clearly be interpreted in regional terms, being based on a conflict line between southern and northern elites despite also displaying a certain internal-external division. In contrast, the split within Frodebu that had its peak between 1998 and 2001 was clearly based on the internal-external conflict line and had no political-military aspect since it was taking place inside a political party. The regional component at the time of the creation of the party Sangwe Pader under the former secretary general of Frodebu was not very pronounced and of secondary importance in the responses of elites.

196 BUR-II-30,27-03-09
197 BUR-II-39,03-04-09; BUR-II-37,01-04-09; BUR-II-17,13-03-09
198 South Africa became more involved in the Burundian peace process after the death of Nyerere. Mandela was the new mediator after 1999
199 BUR-II-30,27-03-09; BUR-II-28,25-03-09; BUR-II-33,30-03-09; BUR-II-34,30-03-09
200 BUR-II-05,25-02-09; BUR-II-39,03-04-09; BUR-II-28,25-03-09; BUR-II-33,30-03-09; BUR-II-34,30-03-09; BUR-II-13,10-03-09
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This also holds true for the first CNDD split in 1998 when regionalism has already been relevant, according to some respondents in the light of the second split. More elites described the conflict as being based on a political-military conflict line in combination with the internal-external line. Here the two conflict lines most clearly overlap as both the exile basis of Nyan-goma and his preference for a certain political strategy were mentioned as underlying sources of the conflict.

The internal-external conflict line was crucial in the case of the split within the Palipehutu-FNL between Cossan and Rwasa while the earlier, first split in 1991/2 also ran along a military-political conflict line like the first CNDD split. The aspect that exile leaders – whether political or military – tend to veer away from the movement on the ground is frequently pointed out as an underlying cause for splits inside Burundian rebel movements.

In these cases, but also in the case of the internal and external Frodebu wings, the division stems from the fact that exile elites possibly have a different view as to which priorities and strategies should be used and which general direction the movement or party should take. As had been shown before, Minani, Nyangoma and Karatasi have all been accused of not really being familiar with the realities on the ground and thus pursued a course that was neglected by cadres and members inside the country, who started to support leaders closer to them. These leaders were sometimes in exile as well, but maintained close links to the ground or even circulated between the internal and external sphere.

An important insight from the discussion of the relevant splits at the time of negotiations is that the internal-external and the political-military lines were not simply taking place between the political parties, namely Frodebu, and the rebel movements that were mainly based outside Burundi, but often within these organizations. The internal-external split in Frodebu was identified by the congruence method, but lines underlying splits inside rebel movements remained unclear. The elite interviews helped to reveal the underlying sources of these other splits.

The result is that the political-military line does not run between Frodebu as a political party and all the branches of the rebel movements, but rather between Frodebu and the political branches of the rebel movements on one side and the military components of the rebel movements that ousted the political leaders in exile, on the other.

In this light, the original disentanglement of the CNDD from Frodebu in 1994 should also be seen, rather, as being based on an internal-external division than on a political military one. As has been argued under 4.4.1, Frodebu cadres obviously did not oppose a military strategy in general and even until the Arusha negotiations had the hope of incorporating the CNDD under Nyangoma as an armed wing of Frodebu again. There are indications that the party simply lost control of the movement due to its
mobilization basis in exile. The increasing militarization and the loss of the originally common goals over time obviously led to the ultimate split between CNDD(-FDD) and Frodebu. The period of distrust between the two really started after 1998, marking the year of Nyangoma’s departure as a political leader.\textsuperscript{201}

\textit{Political conflicts and negotiations}

The underlying conflict lines leading to splits and thus leaving permanent marks in the organizational landscape have been analyzed. However, it is also crucial to look at ongoing conflicts during peace negotiations in order to examine which conflict lines occurring in the splits were most important at the time. Not surprisingly, in the context of the partnership negotiations in 1998 the internal-external division dominates mainly with regard to the Frodebu split, but it is also more generally stated that:

“The essential of the partnership was how to steer the negotiations with the armed movements, and with the politicians who were at the exterior.” (BUR-II-36,01-04-09)

Thus, the division is of a more general nature since all outside forces were excluded – whether they were political or military actors. This internal-external division also continued at Arusha among the parties that negotiated, and Arusha is seen as dominated by the external people in contrast to the internal partnership.\textsuperscript{202}

Although the ethnic division is naturally assessed as dominant during the Arusha negotiations by elites\textsuperscript{203}, they also mention other relevant political conflicts. On the Tutsi side, these most concern conflicts between small Tutsi opposition parties and Uprona as well as the Buyoya government. More specifically, Buyoya was opposed as transitional president by those parties that later formed the MRC and proposed their own candidate.\textsuperscript{204} Separate from this conflict constellation, there is also reference to Parena under Bagaza opposing Buyoya as a presidential candidate.\textsuperscript{205} These two constellations refer to what has been identified as government versus opposition and pro- versus anti-negotiation conflicts in section 4.3. Obviously, the internal Uprona split did not play a role in the negotiations themselves, because the wing under Mukasi never participated.

On the Hutu side, there are many references to competition and conflict between CNDD and Frodebu over the leadership of G7 that bound together

\textsuperscript{201}BUR-II-22,20-03-09  
\textsuperscript{202}BUR-II-15,11-03-09  
\textsuperscript{203}BUR-II-38,03-04-09; BUR-II-31,27-03-09; BUR-II-01,16-02-09; BUR-I-08,12-12-07  
\textsuperscript{204}BUR-II-15,11-03-09; BUR-II-10,04-03-09; BUR-II-29,26-03-09; BUR-II-25,23-03-09; BUR-II-12,09-03-09  
\textsuperscript{205}BUR-II-15,11-03-09; BUR-II-38,03-04-09
all Hutu movements and parties at Arusha.\textsuperscript{206} There was the accusation that Frodebu symbolized those in power\textsuperscript{207} and Nyangoma allegedly supported Buyoya as transitional president in a maneuver to prevent a transitional president from Frodebu.\textsuperscript{208}

One important question at Arusha was also the return and integration of the leaders from exile. The fact that organizations like CNDD, Parena and Frodebu had leaders in exile is seen as important for the conflicts taking place at the time.\textsuperscript{209} Concerning the political-military divide, there is the view that Arusha only included the political actors because rebel movements such as CNDD under Nyangoma and the Palipehutu branch led by Karatasi did not really have troops on the ground.\textsuperscript{210} Thus, the political-military division, does indeed seem to run along a different line as previously pointed out. It is mainly CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL that can be seen as military actors while those negotiating at Arusha are commonly identified as political. That exile was relevant for political conflicts at Arusha is also verified by an expert:

“They had different views and visions. You have a party and some are from exile and some are from inside, and they did not necessarily get along.” (Interview with international expert, 11.12.08)

The relevance of the conflicts described by elites is confirmed by a look at the data from the content analysis of news sources. Over the course of the negotiations of the political partnership and the Arusha negotiations until 2001, the conflict events overwhelmingly took place between the constellations of the various splits and between CNDD and Frodebu, occasionally also with the smaller Hutu movements, Palipehutu-Karatasi and Frolina, siding with one or the other. Apart from that, conflicts with the movements remaining outside the negotiation process at the time, CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL, are relatively rare. When not taking into account the conflict events surrounding the splits, a maximum of 12 conflict events out of 105 took place between those involved in the Arusha negotiations and those not involved before the installation of the transitional government in 2001. Yet after the establishment of the transitional government, this number naturally increased and conflicts between the Arusha participants on the Hutu side decreased.

Further developments in this regard will be discussed in the next subsection on the transition and the immediate post-transition period. Thus,
on the Hutu side, the internal-external conflict line dominated at the time of the political partnership and the Arusha negotiations, while later on a shift towards the political-military conflict line can be expected. As the following diagram shows, these were the grounds on which parties and movements were included in the different negotiation processes.

Figure 4.4: Hutu organizations in peace negotiations 1997-2006

The diagram does not imply that the regional and the pro- and anti-negotiation lines had no importance. They also frequently occurred in political conflicts over time on the Hutu side, but were not systematically linked to the inclusion of certain groups in the respective peace processes. It can be assumed that (non-)participation deepened the indicated conflict lines, because the parties and movements that stayed out of the political partnership and the Arusha negotiations respectively were basically excluded from participation.

With regard to trans-ethnic conflicts, which have not been of any real importance according to results of the content analysis, the picture provided by elite interviews for the negotiation period is very much the same. Conflict constellations crossing ethnic lines on both sides existed at Arusha, mainly in the form of conflicts between two alliances. On the one side, a
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY: INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION IN BURUNDI’S TRANSITION AFTER ETHNIC CIVIL WAR

group around Uprona included Nzojibwami and his Frodebu wing while the other group was led by the remaining part of Frodebu, but also included Parena and some other small Tutsi parties and groups. These alliances were built around the issue of the transitional leadership after Arusha and basically took on a pro- and anti-Buyoya logic. It is commonly assumed that Parena joined the alliance with the Minani-led Frodebu because he simply wanted to oppose Buyoya. Many of those referring to these two groups stress that these were short-term alliances without any lasting impact in an organizational sense. Once the issue of the transitional leadership was settled, the alliances disappeared quickly. Thus, the conclusion based on the congruence method that trans-ethnic conflicts did not play any relevant role is substantiated by the interviews.

For the period of peace negotiations between 1998 and 2001, the central role of the internal-external conflict line has been substantiated by elite information on relevant organizational splits and political conflicts during the negotiations more generally. The analysis has also provided important indications that on the Hutu side, negotiations really function very much like a political integration process. First, real social and political differences occurred over the course of the civil war; second, these first became visible with the start of negotiations in 1998 when the internal negotiations were strongly opposed by elites in exile. Third, the conflicts themselves that emerged at the time are not simply framed as somewhat coincidental expressions of greedy ambitions, but as having more structural underlying reasons that often refer to an internal-external and/or a political-military conflict line.

While there was a re-occurrence of the older, regional conflict line and of a pro- and anti-negotiation line, many political conflicts on the Hutu side – particularly those ending in splits – were due to the other two lines. The fact that there really was a common logic of the internal-external divisions in different parties and movements also strengthens the argument of integration as a mechanism in the fragmentation of conflict lines. To what extent the conflict lines identified in this part based on elite interviews remained relevant during and after the period of the political transition in Burundi is discussed in the next subsection.

4.4.4 The change of conflict lines during and after the transition

After the start of the transition in November 2001, there were no relevant organizational changes in Burundi any more until 2006. Since the FNL splinter group under Alain Mugabarabona created in 2002 quickly disapp-
peared as an actor, the splits in 2001 and the foundation of the MRC are the last occurrence of new actors in the period of observation. This is indirectly underlined by the fact that the political elites, when asked about ongoing conflicts inside movements or parties during the transition period, provide only very general explanations while they specified more structural reasons for the conflicts during the negotiation period. For the transition and the (post-)transition period they ascribe political conflicts merely to greedy personal ambitions and/or again to manipulation by an invisible hand, meaning those in power or other actors like neighbor countries. Other underlying reasons for conflicts named are a lack of democratic structures and visions in the political parties, or simply competition over leadership.

The democratic transition

The continuity of conflict lines also shows in the further integration process. Generally, exile leaders, especially the politicians who had been at Arusha, returned under the protection of the South African Protection Force, which is seen as an important aspect of the transition. There is, however, still the suspicion or outright accusation that countries like Tanzania and South Africa favored certain of the Hutu groups in exile during the process. On the part of returnee elites, there are complaints that it was difficult to negotiate positions with Frodebu, which dominated the transitional government, and that apart from the political leaders returning with an EU assistance program other cadres of Frodebu and also CNDD-FDD did not get any real assistance. However, integration problems were also mentioned with regard to the smaller movements, namely CNDD-Nyangoma, Palipehutu under Karatasi and Frolina. In fact, Karatasi and the Frolina leader, Joseph Karumba, shortly returned to Burundi before leaving into exile again. Due to such experiences, there is the assumption that:

214BUR-II-13, 10-03-09; BUR-II-09, 04-03-09; BUR-II-23, 20-03-09; BUR-II-26, 24-03-09; BUR-II-06, 02-03-09; BUR-II-11, 06-03-09; BUR-II-37, 01-04-09; BUR-II-08, 03-03-09; BUR-II-36, 01-04-09; BUR-II-38, 03-04-09; BUR-II-14, 10-03-09
215BUR-II-17, 13-03-09; BUR-II-26, 24-03-09; BUR-II-08, 03-03-09
216BUR-II-34, 30-03-09
217BUR-I-08, 12-12-07; BUR-II-14, 10-03-09; BUR-II-14, 10-03-09
218BUR-II-12, 09-03-09; BUR-II-37, 01-04-09; BUR-II-20, 18-03-09; BUR-II-14, 10-03-09
219BUR-I-08, 12-12-07; BUR-II-26, 24-03-09
220BUR-II-25, 23-03-09; BUR-II-09, 04-03-09
221BUR-I-11, 14-12-07
222BUR-II-15, 11-03-09; BUR-II-13, 10-03-09; BUR-II-27, 25-03-09
223The Palipehutu-Karatasi transformed into a political party that still exists today, but had no further visible influence during the transition. The data of the content analysis show that there were only two conflict events in 2003 including this Palipehutu branch. Afterwards, there were no further conflict events with this actor. The exact same holds true for Frolina.
“Those returning from exile have lost their head, they are not inte-
grated in society, the money of HCR [UNHCR] is confiscated 
by the government.” (BUR-II-13_10-03-09)

The latter part of the statement refers to funds foreseen for returnees 
that allegedly were embezzled.\textsuperscript{224} Among the movements that remained 
relevant in the transition, there is the CNDD branch led by Nyangoma who 
permanently returned from exile in 2005. The CNDD was transformed 
into a political party and was accredited as a political party before the 
2005 elections. The two splinter groups that reached a settlement with 
the transitional government in 2002, the FNL under Mugabarabona and 
the FDD under Jean-Bosco, received very few posts and did not have any 
real impact in the transition.\textsuperscript{225} Concerning the internal-external division 
in Frodebu, there was a congress in 2001 calling for a reunification and on 
people abroad to return.\textsuperscript{226}

Nonetheless, political conflicts along the internal-external line contin-
ued after the start of the transition. There were conflicts over political posts, 
because those who stayed allegedly feared that returnees would take up 
their positions.\textsuperscript{227} These conflicts seem to have taken place predominantly 
within Frodebu. But the internal-external division also left a mark in the 
organizational landscape with the founding of Sangwe Pader that exists 
today. However, despite the fact that Nzojibwami took a significant num-
ber of Frodebu officials with him in 2001\textsuperscript{228}, Sangwe Pader has not become 
a central actor in Burundian politics and was marginal in the political tran-
sition. The data from the content analysis show that while in 2004 there still 
were 3 conflict events opposing Sangwe Pader and Frodebu or the transi-
tional government, conflict events including Sangwe Pader do not appear 
any more afterwards. Thus, the internal-external conflict line mainly re-
mained relevant within Frodebu.

There is also one newly occurring conflict constellation during the 
transition based on the internal-external line: political conflicts inside 
CNDD-FDD taking place after the separate peace settlement in 2001 be-
tween the returning exile elites integrating into political institutions and 
those who had stayed on the ground in the rebellion.\textsuperscript{229} Former exile elites 
criticized the party president Radjabu who allegedly manipulated the di-
vision between those who had been in exile and the military people inside 
Burundi.\textsuperscript{230}

\textsuperscript{224}BUR-I-11,14-12-07 
\textsuperscript{225}BUR-II-17,13-03-09; BUR-II-26,24-03-09 
\textsuperscript{226}BUR-II-29,26-03-09 
\textsuperscript{227}BUR-II-32,27-03-09; BUR-I-11,14-12-07; BUR-II-29,26-03-09 
\textsuperscript{228}BUR-II-12,09-03-09 
\textsuperscript{229}BUR-II-22,20-03-09; BUR-II-32,27-03-09 
\textsuperscript{230}BUR-II-03,23-02-09; BUR-II-33,31-03-09
“Inside the CNDD-FDD there is a conflict between the militaries and the intellectuals, those who were on the ground and those who were in Belgium studying. For administering a country you need intellectuals, but they do not have the confidence of the armed people. They say: it was us who fought for the country, we must have the last word. I think that is rather a conflict at the level of elites in the CNDD-FDD and it can express itself violently tomorrow.” (BUR-II-07_03-03-09)

On the one hand, there is the accusation that those returning from Europe mainly wanted to profit in a material sense by taking up posts.231 On the other hand, military people are perceived as pulling the strings in the CNDD-FDD after its transformation into a party. Allegedly people who fought on the ground in Burundi are favored in the selection for positions.232 The conflict is also labeled in the sense that those who were in Europe are more experienced, competent and open, but that there is a lack of democratic culture in the party because the elites from the rebellion on the ground see things very differently.233

The statement shows that the conflict is also framed as taking place between the militaries and the politicians who have not been in the “bush” at the interior.234 Thus, there is an underlying political-military line as well, because elites that overwhelmingly returned from European exile also naturally had a political function while those on the ground had a rather military profile. The core leadership, meaning Radjabu and Nkurunziza, also had political functions as chairman and commissioner, but both clearly had strong ties to the militaries on the ground.235 The underlying reasons mentioned for this conflict constellation inside CNDD-FDD also refer to the internal-external as well as to the political-military divide. The conflict became relevant because the political repatriates constitute a large and important group compared to the returnee elites inside Frodebu where the majority stayed in Burundi.236 On the other hand, it is assumed that because the inclusion was based on a negotiated settlement and not a military victory, everybody returned and the leadership question was not automatically resolved in favor of the military people.237

The political-military conflict line has also gained in significance for inter-organizational conflicts during the transition. As can be expected based on diagram 4.4 the peace agreement with CNDD-FDD in 2003 led
to an insertion of the political-military divide into the institutions and thus to an increase of conflicts along this line. Mostly, this increase shows in references to conflicts between Frodebu and CNDD-FDD by elites, but also with CNDD and FNL that still remained outside institutions at the time.

There are several indications that political conflicts between Frodebu and other Arusha parties such as the CNDD on one side and CNDD-FDD on the other were mainly based on a political-military divide. Differences are largely expressed in these terms. On the one hand, there is reference to the militarization of CNDD and its loss of a democratic vision in the course of the rebellion and an emphasis on the political experience of the Frodebu as in the following statement:

“You can get used to fighting and you know how to handle weapons, but politics that is not the use of weapons. They did not have a political branch and they had enormous problems. The Tanzanians advised them politically afterwards. The negotiations went slowly because they were not sure of themselves. In terms of experience, they were scared of us.” (BUR-II-32, 27-03-09)

On the other hand, there is outright opposition of CNDD-FDD towards Frodebu since it did not join the armed struggle, and its strategy of staying in the institutions is seen as treason. Frodebu supposedly also lost ground in the population to CNDD-FDD and later tried to include ex-combatants into its ranks in order to regain legitimacy.

But differences also show at a more general level between the political actors represented in the Arusha negotiations and the CNDD-FDD that joined negotiations later. The first group of parties tends to stress the positive impact of Arusha in creating a culture of dialogue and opening. They also refer to the problem that the CNDD-FDD was not involved in this negotiation process and therefore does not feel bound by the agreement and its spirit. Those who were not involved in these negotiations criticize the ethnic logic of the Arusha accord and the power-sharing arrangement based on it. CNDD-FDD people also tend to underline the reform of the army as a key point of the transition and criticize the dominance of Uprona and Frodebu that al-

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238 BUR-I-11, 14-12-07; BUR-II-07, 03-03-09; BUR-II-36, 01-04-09; BUR-II-12, 09-03-09. Since the FNL did not finalize a peace agreement during the period of observation, conflicts including this movement are not taken into account in the following discussion.

239 BUR-II-35, 31-03-09; BUR-II-36, 01-04-09

240 BUR-II-26, 24-03-09

241 BUR-II-31, 27-03-09; BUR-II-25, 23-03-09; BUR-II-01, 16-02-09; BUR-I-09, 12-12-07; BUR-I-01, 13-11-07; BUR-II-16, 12-03-09

242 BUR-II-05, 25-02-09; BUR-II-25, 23-03-09; BUR-I-12, 15-12-07

243 BUR-II-20, 18-03-09; BUR-II-03, 23-02-09; BUR-II-33, 30-03-09
legedly designed the constitution in their favor. This accusation most likely refers to the constitutional obligation to include every party with more than 5% of votes into post-transitional governments. Due to this rule Uprona and Frodebu were entitled to posts in the first post-transition cabinet. This political-military division is not new, but really becomes relevant during the political transition when CNDD-FDD officially transformed into a political party.

Political conflicts including a new actor constellation are rarely mentioned for the transition period. Since there are occasionally claims that regionalism plays a role in CNDD-FDD with a group of people grouped around leaders from Bubanza and another around elites from Gitega province, the elites were asked about possible conflicts inside CNDD-FDD on this basis. While these groups are assessed as existent by some respondents, they are not seen as very disruptive or relevant in a conflictive sense. Important personalities in government and generals are from Bubanza. Allegedly there is a certain tendency to nominate people from the mentioned regional backgrounds or more generally from the north of Burundi to positions, but no real conflicts because of these two factors are reported.

The post-transition period

The post-transition period officially started with communal/local and parliamentary elections as well as indirect elections for the senate in 2005. It involved a clear shift in the distribution of power, because CNDD-FDD won both rounds of direct elections and their candidate, Pierre Nkurunziza, was elected president by parliamentary vote. In the National Assembly, CNDD-FDD won 64 seats in comparison to 30 for Frodebu that had obtained 71% of votes in the 1993 elections. CNDD under Nyangoma won 4 seats while on the Tutsi side Uprona received 15 seats and the MRC 2 seats (Falch 2009, pp. 9-10). Because of the constitutional provision of mixed party lists, all parties needed to include candidates from both ethnic groups. But due to the high number of votes it attracted in many places, only CNDD-FDD has an important number of Tutsi MPs: 21 as compared to 43 Hutu MPs. The Frodebu has seven Tutsi representatives among its overall 30 MPs and CNDD has one Tutsi MP. Uprona and MRC, on the other hand, have no Hutu MPs in their ranks (Lemarchand 2006,

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245 BUR-I-10,13-12-07; BUR-I-06,10-12-07; BUR-I-08,12-12-07
246 BUR-II-31,27-03-09; BUR-II-38,03-04-09
247 BUR-II-32,27-03-09
248 BUR-II-37,01-04-09; BUR-II-35,31-03-09; BUR-II-19,17-03-09
249 This distribution already included 18 members of the National Assembly who were co-opted in order to guarantee the ethnic quotas set out in the constitution.

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p. 15). Frodebu and Uprona also still have members in government due to the power-sharing formula, although they initially received fewer ministries than they were constitutionally guaranteed and the influence of the respective ministers on government decisions is evaluated as almost non-existent.\textsuperscript{251}

There are three commonly named reasons for the success of CNDD-FDD: first, its popularity and legitimacy as an armed movement that allegedly "won" the war and enforced the reform of the Tutsi-dominated army, second, a certain intimidation by CNDD-FDD during the election campaign linked to the indirect message that if it would not win, it would possibly return to war, and third, the desire for political change with a new leadership after Uprona and Frodebu had proven incapable of preventing the severe destabilization in 1993 and had increasingly been discredited. The last point is also reflected in the clear rejection of the ethnic discourse by CNDD-FDD (Falch 2009, p. 10; Reyntjens 2005, p. 123). Some of the advantages of CNDD-FDD are summarized by the following statement:

"Those who are in power are the ex-rebels, they are supported by the population. They are inevitable, they are mobile, they have contacts. The politicians at Bujumbura do not know the interior of the country, and it is no easy to convince the population." (BUR-II-17,13-03-09)

All the reasons mentioned imply a political-military division since they are directly linked to the status of CNDD-FDD as an armed movement or to the difficult position of the more traditional political parties. And indeed, in the period leading up to elections and after the shift in power by elections, the political conflicts between the remaining relevant Hutu parties mainly ran along the political-military line. Conflicts inside CNDD-FDD along the internal-external and the political-military conflict line also continued with the post-transition period. It clearly showed in severe internal conflicts in CNDD-FDD in 2006 between several high-ranking party officials and the party chairman, Radjabu, who was criticized for corruption and his leadership style.\textsuperscript{252}

Many political conflicts at the time also took place between Frodebu and CNDD-FDD. There are different accusations on both sides, and during the election campaign there were even violent clashes between Frodebu and CNDD-FDD with assassinations of Frodebu and CNDD-FDD candidates as well as one CNDD official (International Crisis Group 2006, p. 4). While the Frodebu is presented as politically more experienced compared to CNDD-

\textsuperscript{251}BUR-II-25,23-03-09

\textsuperscript{252}AFP, "Burundi parliament okays fraud probe of two MPs", 05.05.2006; RFI, "Burundi vice-president warns political problems undermining donor confidence", 02.09.2006; RPA, "Burundi second vice-president resigns citing meddling by ruling party chief", 05.09.2006.
FDD\textsuperscript{253}, there are allegations that Frodebu and also Uprona use the political system to their advantage and instrumentalize civil society against CNDD-FDD.\textsuperscript{254} Uprona and Frodebu are also seen as those that were implicated in violence during and after 1993\textsuperscript{255} and as still being much more ethni-
cized compared to CNDD-FDD, which has a significant number of Tutsi members and MPs.\textsuperscript{256} All these claims clearly hint at the prominence of the political-military conflict that also has a general connotation beyond a competition between Frodebu and CNDD-FDD:

“The CNDD-FDD is a militarist party. It is the military branch that is the party; the military is seen as an instrument of politics. In the leadership of the party, there is no vision, no program.”

(BUR-II-09,04-03-09)

The general assessments of the post-transition period by the elites also mirror the political-military divide in a more general manner, meaning beyond a competition between Frodebu and CNDD-FDD. Many respondents from very different backgrounds stress that there were positive developments with a political opening, a strong freedom of expression and a very active civil society.\textsuperscript{257} But there is also intense criticism of the CNDD-FDD-led government. This concerns the supposedly militarist approach of CNDD-FDD and its lack of vision and political experience\textsuperscript{258}, neglect of the Arusha accord\textsuperscript{259} and corruption, bad governance and human rights abuses committed by CNDD-FDD.\textsuperscript{260} Furthermore, the behavior of CNDD-FDD is seen as exclusive and opposed to dialogue with the opposition.\textsuperscript{261} Apart from these accusations, the reference to a certain politicization of the armed forces and their use in politics\textsuperscript{262} also underlines the importance of the political-military conflict line in the post-transition period. The internal conflicts and problems in CNDD-FDD discussed before are also frequently mentioned and obviously continue to be relevant due to the tendency of the CNDD-FDD leadership.\textsuperscript{263} In opposing the CNDD-FDD for all these reasons, Frodebu sometimes cooperates with Uprona and also with the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{253}BUR-II-07,03-03-09; BUR-II-38,03-04-09
\item \textsuperscript{254}BUR-I-05,03-12-07; BUR-I-06,10-12-07
\item \textsuperscript{255}BUR-II-10,04-03-09
\item \textsuperscript{256}BUR-II-20,18-03-09
\item \textsuperscript{257}BUR-II-38,03-04-09; BUR-II-36,01-04-09; BUR-II-37,01-04-09; BUR-II-16,12-03-09; BUR-
II-03,23-02-09; BUR-I-08,12-12-07
\item \textsuperscript{258}BUR-II-05,25-02-09; BUR-II-12,09-03-09; BUR-II-16,12-03-09; BUR-II-03,23-02-09; BUR-
II-33,30-03-09; BUR-II-13,10-03-09; BUR-II-09,04-03-09; BUR-I-04,29-11-07; BUR-I-02,26-11-
07; BUR-II-23,20-03-09
\item \textsuperscript{259}BUR-II-15,11-03-09; BUR-II-38,03-04-09; BUR-II-14,10-03-09; BUR-II-32,27-03-09
\item \textsuperscript{260}BUR-II-37,01-04-09; BUR-II-16,12-03-09; BUR-I-08,12-12-07; BUR-I-12,15-12-07
\item \textsuperscript{261}BUR-II-07,03-03-09; BUR-I-03,28-11-07; BUR-I-09,12-12-07
\item \textsuperscript{262}BUR-II-14,10-03-09; BUR-II-36,01-04-09; BUR-II-08,03-03-09
\item \textsuperscript{263}BUR-II-26,24-03-09; BUR-I-10,13-12-07; BUR-II-37,01-04-09
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CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY: INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION IN BURUNDI’S TRANSITION AFTER ETHNIC CIVIL WAR

CNDD led by Nyangoma. Interestingly, on the Hutu side one party or former movement from each negotiation period marked in diagram 4.4 remained politically relevant in the post-transition period, namely Frodebu, CNDD and CNDD-FDD.

Change of divisions during the whole period

Elites have also assessed the change in political divisions over the course of the political transition more generally. There are several hints to the fragmentation that took place between 1993 and 2005. The ethnic conflict line is often evaluated as less pronounced, as disappearing or even as unimportant in the post-transition period, but remains an important reference point. Intra-Hutu conflict lines are often seen as most relevant since there are multiple parties of the Hutu tendency now that oppose each other, such as Frodebu, CNDD and CNDD-FDD.

“If you listen to the discourse today, ethnicism is over. It is really Hutu-Hutu politics, Nyangoma against the FDD, the Frodebu etcetera. The ethnic factor has not disappeared, but its importance has diminished a lot.” (BUR-II-16_12-03-09)

The different Hutu parties all compete for the Hutu votes and there are Hutu in power after 2005 who are also opposed by Hutu parties who do not agree with their way of governing. The fragmentation is also explicitly linked to exile:

“Today all parties have problems. There are at least four tendencies in the CNDD-FDD, there are two in the Frodebu and two in Uprona. In 1993, there were only two parties, Uprona and Frodebu. Practically it was the people of Frodebu who went into exile, and when they came back they returned to Frodebu or had changed to CNDD in the meantime.” (BUR-II-05_25-02-09)

The rather marginalized position of CNDD reflects the difficult position of former political exile elites in the new system. The externally based
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leaders at Arusha have all been rather unsuccessful in establishing an internal power base, since Karatasi and Karumba returned into exile, Minani lost his position as Frodebu president in 2005 and Nyangoma’s party has a very limited constituency. Inside CNDD-FDD, some returnee elites also lost their positions in the course of the conflict with the chairman in 2006, but others remain in the political institutions. Yet the leadership was clearly in the hands of those who were based inside Burundi or had strong ties to the ground.

The difficulty for political exile people might be that they lack legitimacy since they were neither directly attached to politics nor to the armed struggle on the ground. At the same time, their professional experience and international contacts sometimes make them suspicious to those who stayed inside Burundi – whether they are of a military or political background. For the last part of the period of observation, however, the political-military line became more important. Those heading the two largest parties, Frodebu and CNDD-FDD, today are those who stayed inside the country or those who were in nearby exile with close links to the ground. But the political fragmentation of conflict lines prevails due to the organizational marks left by the internal-external conflict line and continuing conflicts along this line during and after the political transition, for example within CNDD-FDD.

The regional line is still seen as important, although there is no longer a clear distribution of power along a regional plan. It still takes on a north versus south dimension, but now people from the south are allegedly excluded. The fact that the CNDD led by Nyangoma won most votes in Bururi and the neighbor province of Makamba is seen as an indication that it still is southern-based. Its mentioned marginalized position is also due to this factor.

There is no real reference to the institutional set-up bringing about a change in political conflict lines. Some people described the ethnic power-sharing as dangerous or out-dated while Uprona and Frodebu representatives tend to stress the importance of the Arusha framework. However, the political conflicts discussed in this section generally took place despite the ethnic quotas and not because of them, meaning that there were other sources of change. The elections of 2005 led to a power distribution that accentuated the political-military division, particularly because CNDD-FDD won the elections, mainly due to its former status as a rebel movement. But this is only a change in intensity of an existing line, not a new development. Conflicts mostly take on a government versus opposition logic after 2005,

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269 BUR-II-29.26-03-09; BUR-II-14.10-03-09; BUR-II-26.24-03-09
270 BUR-II-32.27-03-09
271 BUR-II-39.03-04-09; BUR-II-08.03-03-09
272 BUR-II-25.23-03-09
273 BUR-II-28.25-03-09; BUR-II-01.16-02-09; BUR-I-05.03-12.07; BUR-I-06.10-12-07

188
but the fragmentation at the organizational level clearly prevails, and so do the numerous political conflicts inside different parties. Therefore, another round of polarization, this time based on the political-military conflict line, seems rather unlikely at this point and so does a renewed confrontation in ethnic terms.

4.4.5 Summary of results

The main result of the analysis of the whole process between 1993 and 2005 is that whereas in 1993 there was a bipolar constellation with Frodebu and Uprona as the main actors, the political landscape in 2005 was more multipolar (Reyntjens 2005, p. 120). This study has shown that the reason for the more diverse, but also less ethnicized landscape is a fragmentation of conflict lines over the course of the civil war that finally became visible with negotiations. Political conflicts due to exile were of central relevance at this point and over the course of the transition, while after 2005 the political-military line became more important. This development indirectly reflects the decreasing influence of former exile elites, especially those who had been political leaders but lost their support of the base inside Burundi.

But the internal-external conflict line also left marks in the political organization among the Hutu. Most importantly, conflicts along the internal-external line occurred both within political parties and within rebel movements, meaning that it is not just another version of the political-military division. But despite the loss of positions of some former exile elites within the CNDD-FDD, it is within this party today that returnee elites still play a central role. They are also still in many higher-ranking positions despite a certain dominance of the former militaries. To what extent this can cause more internal conflicts in the future remains to be seen. However, a strong crisis within CNDD-FDD after the period of observation of this study in 2006 and again in 2009 showed that the conflict potential is still very high.

Political integration has, superficially, functioned well in Burundi since almost all exile elites as well as military actors have been included in the institutions. But a look at the rise in intra-Hutu conflicts after 2005 can be seen as an indication that it has not been ultimately successful. While the regional and the pro- and anti-negotiation line were not very relevant for this development, the internal-external and political-military line were crucial and have clearly not disappeared. At the same time, by leading to a fragmentation of conflict lines during the democratic transition after 2001, both lines also contributed to a diversification of the political landscape as many splits occurred over the course of the civil war and peace negotiations. Thus, it might have contributed to the decreasing importance of the inter-ethnic conflict line. Yet frustrations over exclusion – whether along the political-military or the internal-external line – also have the potential to create serious tensions and endanger democratic consolidation.
4.5 Case study findings

This chapter with a case study of Burundi’s democratic transition after 2001 has produced several findings on the fragmentation of conflict lines and the role of returning exile elites in bringing about this phenomenon. The relationship proposed in the core hypothesis has previously not been considered as a political factor in studies of democratic transitions. Furthermore, the internal-external conflict line introduced in this study had not been systematically assessed in relation to other conflict lines. The empirical investigation of this chapter has, overall, confirmed the assumptions made in the theoretical framework. The return of mobilized exile elites, indeed, played a central role in Burundi’s democratic transition by changing conflict lines and contributing in an important way to fragmentation.

In leading to this core finding, the analysis of the case study took several steps. First, the content analysis of news sources has demonstrated that a fragmentation of political conflicts lines indeed took place in Burundi. It started to occur after peace negotiations began in 1998 and included newly emerging intra-Hutu conflicts as well as a relevant increase in intra-Tutsi conflicts. Both remained at a high level over the course of the transition, but intra-Tutsi conflicts disappeared after 2004 while the intra-Hutu conflicts became most prominent after 2005. Over time, the inter-ethnic conflicts became less dominant and for the last period after 2005 even clearly less important than intra-Hutu conflicts. The general finding of the content analysis was also substantiated by information taken from the elite interviews conducted in Burundi in 2007 and 2009. Overall, the results indicated that a change had possibly taken place during the civil war, because intra-Hutu conflicts only newly emerged and it was on the Hutu side that exile and rebellion had become important factors while they were basically absent on the Tutsi side.

Yet in order to link the fragmentation of conflict lines to the independent variable of the hypothesis – the return of mobilized exile elites –, the connection to specific conflict events had to be made by means of an analysis based on the congruence method. By examining all 1,249 conflict events that occurred in Burundi between 1997 and 2006 based on their actor constellations, the explanatory force of the main variable as well as alternative explanations could be assessed. All Burundian actors on the Tutsi as well as on the Hutu side were categorized with regard to the five different possible explanations, and the development of these constellations over time was also used to analyze the impact of institutional change. While this latter factor had no visible influence on conflict lines, all other four explanations that were linked to the peace negotiations starting in 1998 have been found to have some relevance. Conflict events between pro- and anti-negotiation factions or groups have been dominant on the Tutsi side, but hardly had any real importance on the Hutu side. The regional conflict line
only appeared among Hutu for the period of observation, but could also only account for a relatively small number of conflict events.

The two clearly dominating explanations were the return of mobilized exile elites and the transformation of rebel movements since the internal-external and the political-military lines could explain by far the highest number of conflict events. They strongly overlapped, but the internal-external line also had independent explanatory force for the development of political conflicts since – in contrast to the political-military line – it could be assigned to events that only ran along this line. These were mainly conflicts between the exile and the resident components of Frodebu. However, the congruence method could not explain all occurring conflict events, leaving a significant number taking place mainly between rebel movements or different branches of a rebel movement unexplained.

In order to check on the findings from the first two analytical sections, extend or refine them and test the proposed causal mechanism of political integration, the final part of this chapter traced the process for the period of observation based on elite interviews. The most important findings from the other sections were indeed confirmed. Most assignments of conflict lines to specific events by the congruence method were supported by an analysis of the perception of splits and conflicts by elites over time. The internal-external conflict line played a central role, naturally only on the Hutu side since there hardly were any exile people of Tutsi origin.

The process-tracing also demonstrated that the political-military divide on the Hutu side ran along different organizational affiliations than previously assumed. Since both rebel movements, CNDD(-FDD) and Palipehutu-FNL, split off from their political branches and removed their exile-based leaders, the group that kept the combatants can be assessed as military actors, but not the political leaders who had practically no troops on the ground.

The internal-external conflict line turned out to be crucial in the separation of Frodebu and CNDD, and afterwards inside Frodebu as well as inside the rebel movements. Thus, several conflict events that remained unexplained by using the congruence method could indeed be traced to this conflict line and/or the political-military line as well. The overlap of these two lines, however, was not as far-reaching as the preceding section had proposed, since all actors involved in the first negotiation process were clearly internal and all others external, while all those involved in the later Arusha negotiations were all political while those not participating can be labeled as military actors.

The (non-)participation in the first two negotiation processes along the two most prominent conflict lines on the Hutu side certainly accentuated these lines further as they also marked the exclusion of certain groups from negotiations. However, several conflicts of an internal-external nature also occurred within the rebel movements that were mainly based
in exile. Here, the leaders based outside Burundi but maintaining strong links to the inside activities by going back and forth between exile and the interior of the country were regularly opposed to those who were more permanently based in exile and accused of neglecting the movement on the ground. These conflicts often overlapped with the political-military divide, but also occurred independently.

The regional conflict line occurred in one split on the Hutu side that had already been assigned to this conflict line by the congruence method. Regionalism also occurred as a secondary explanation in other conflict constellations, but it was of rather minor importance in the responses of elites for these conflicts. The pro- and anti-negotiation line was only present in one split on the Hutu side, but was very prominent in conflicts on the Tutsi side as confirmed by elite responses. Political institutions were not mentioned as a factor linked to political conflicts or conflict line changes by elites. There is a conflict around the Arusha accord and the power-sharing arrangements based on it, but it takes place between those parties on the Hutu side that participated in Arusha and CNDD-FDD that did not participate. This conflict constellation occurred regularly over the course of the transition and before and therefore does not constitute a change in conflict lines.

The findings of the process-tracing with regard to the explanations of conflict lines substantiated the importance of the political-military lines as well as the internal-external line that was in fact even more important than foreseen by the preceding section. Furthermore, it has been shown that exile also led to a process of group formation. There was a clear perception of social and political differences between exile and non-exile people by political elites; and there were grievances because of perceived advantages for one or the other group. The fact that these differences are still stressed by elites even after the return of most people had taken place years before the interviews underlines this finding even more. Thus, the link between return by mobilized exile elites and fragmentation can best be made via the mechanism of political integration. While incentives provided by the negotiations might have played a role in triggering conflicts, these clearly ran along lines that were fundamentally rooted in exile and rebellion. A loss of group cohesion at the time of negotiations certainly played a role as well, as shown by the re-occurrence of the regional line, but the negotiations also functioned as the start of a larger integration process. Overall, the return of exile elites had an important impact on the democratic transition in Burundi after 2001 and continues to be relevant after the official end of the transition period.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

The preceding case study has provided substantial evidence for the influence of returning exile elites on conflict lines in Burundi, but also for a wider political integration process during the country’s recent transition. The first section of this conclusion evaluates the findings of the case study in the larger theoretical framework on conflict lines. The second section provides evidence from other cases on the internal-external conflict line in the context of civil wars. And the third part interprets the results with reference to the implications for post-war democratization more generally and points out starting points for future research in the field.

5.1 Exile and conflict lines: theoretical assessment of findings

The case study on Burundi’s recent transition was conducted in order to find answers to the core research question of this study: how do political conflict lines change in post-war transitions, and can the return of mobilized exile elites explain this change?

With regard to the first part of the question, there were three general approaches to conflict line changes that were outlined in the theoretical framework: the static, primordialist view expecting no change or merely a deepening of the main ethnic line and two more dynamic approaches that explain change either by institutional change or by changes due to the civil war. The analysis of the development of conflict lines in Burundi over a ten year period has shown that a fragmentation of conflict lines has clearly taken place. The inter-ethnic conflict line was still very important at the end of the civil war that broke out after a period of increasing ethnic polarization. But intra-ethnic conflicts became relatively less important in Burundi over the course of the democratic transition following the war. This development has been detected by the content analysis of news sources as well as by information from elite interviews. In fact, most political con-
CONCLUSION

Conflicts in Burundi towards the end and after the transition took place among different Hutu actors. Therefore, the primordialist approach can clearly be discarded for this case which is in line with the general tendency in the literature to see identity as flexible and multi-layered.

The second way to explain conflict line changes by institutional changes that is very prominent in the democratization literature has also proven to be of little importance in the Burundian case. This is not surprising since power-sharing arrangements of which the Burundi transition and post-transition systems are clear cases hardly have the potential to change conflict lines, but rather accommodate the ethnic divide. The only visible effect of the different periods of institutional change in Burundi was an intensification or regroupment of existing conflict lines. Change in power based on changes in the institutional framework, for example with the installation of the transitional government or the elected post-transition government, certainly leads to shifts in political conflicts. But the new configurations were simply opposed by those parties or groups that were not part of them and either marked an intensification of pre-existing conflict constellations or bound together actors in a kind of government versus opposition logic. This dynamic, however, does not include the emergence of new conflict lines.

The finding of the content analysis that intra-Hutu conflicts started to occur with negotiations in 1998 and became increasingly relevant while intra-Tutsi conflicts disappeared from a very high level at the start of the transition, was an indication that exile and rebellion might play a role in the conflict line fragmentation found in Burundi. Both phenomena as a potential basis for new conflict lines were only really present on the Hutu side while all other bases for conflict lines existed on both sides of the ethnic divide. This indication was substantiated by looking into the underlying affiliation of all conflict events in Burundi between 1997 and 2006 as well as into interviews conducted with Burundian elites. Based on the congruence method, the exile- and rebellion-related conflict lines were found to be by far the most important ones on the Hutu side during the transition while obviously of no relevance on the Tutsi side that displayed an enormous uniformity in conflict constellations over time. Structural changes mainly occurred on the Hutu side, which was confirmed by the interview data.

The assessment of political conflicts over time by elites led to very similar conclusions: intra-Hutu conflicts had become dominant over the course of the transition and became more manifest after the 2005 elections. The most commonly named conflict lines on this side of the ethnic divide again were the internal-external and the political-military lines whereas the former dominated the first part of the transition and the latter became more relevant in the latter part due to the gradual peace process. Since both mentioned lines were clearly not present before the civil war, they can be identified as a direct consequence of the war.
Concerning the second part of the research question, this study has demonstrated a relevant and independent influence of the return of mobilized exile elites in bringing about conflict line changes. The internal-external conflict line between elites who had been in exile and those who staid inside Burundi, emerged in several different ways and remained relevant up to the post-transition period. The respective conflicts occurred within Hutu parties as well as rebel movements and thereby also led to a lasting change in the political landscape. Most notably, the CNDD as an exile movement is a direct result of this, but later periods also show splits based on the internal-external conflict line. Thus, the civil war does not only incite change with regard to the occurrence of a political-military conflict line after the war, but also by leading to a large outflow of refugees due to group persecution. Based on this experience many elites in exile remained or became mobilized and engaged in activities for bringing about change in Burundi in order to be able to return.

Over time exile led to a distinct group formation and due to the mobilization also to political differences between exile and resident elites. The elite interviews have clearly demonstrated the (perceived) differences with regard to the decision to flee or to stay, the experiences during the civil war and the process of return and integration. Overall, the fragmentation due to the internal-external conflict line can be seen as part of a larger political integration process that tends to be conflictive in its first stages. This confirms the relevance of the political integration approach proposed in the theoretical framework of this study. It also calls into question approaches that mainly see political factors as largely autonomous and driven by external material sources like instrumentalist constructivism (Cederman 2001, p. 1). In fact, this study has shown that the leaders themselves who supposedly mobilize certain cleavages to maximize their influence are also part of a larger group formation process. Surely, material interests and incentives play a role for political conflicts, but the findings have indicated that the underlying lines of affiliation are not arbitrary and limit the possibilities of conflict line development.

However, showing that an internal-external conflict line has developed does not mean that exile, mobilization and return have no other effects. The argument of this study does also not imply a negative assessment of the return of exile people in general. Surely, the inclusion of this group in post-war periods is essential and potentially beneficial for the country of origin due to the experiences of exile elites. The return of so many Burundian elites from exile and their engagement in political institutions can also be seen as a hopeful sign. This study simply argues that political conflicts in democratic post-war transitions are far from coincidental alignments and short-lived actor constellations. In fact, the political landscape of Burundi has remained surprisingly constant over the course of the transition with no more splits occurring after 2002. The explanation of the fragmentation
simply is that the occurring new conflict lines are natural components of a larger political integration process after a civil war. It does not include any judgment on the role single actors played in the Burundian transition neither does it take sides with exile or resident elites. It just provides an explanation for post-war fragmentation that has previously been neglected, but was found to be of central relevance in the Burundian case.

Obviously, this study cannot make any more general assumptions or deductions beyond the Burundian case; neither can possible preconditions for the relevance of the internal-external conflict line in countries emerging from civil war be identified. Thus, the following section gives some insights into other country cases. It cannot lead to any generalizations, but aims at providing evidence that exile, mobilization and return have played a role for political conflicts in other civil war contexts as a starting ground for further research.

5.2 Returning exile elites after conflict: Evidence from other cases

The consequences of exile return after civil war have rarely been assessed systematically for the political sphere. As the presentation of the refugee literature has shown, the conditions in many civil war contexts resemble the Burundian situation with regard to exile as the basis for mobilization and the perception of former refugees as a different group, even after return. Conflicts have occasionally been mentioned in these studies, but rarely at the political level. But looking at the more general literature on specific armed conflicts, the role of returning exile groups has frequently been discussed as an important factor in the political process. Unfortunately, these insights are not systematic due to the very general focus of the studies. Thus, the following evidence from other country cases is selective, but still useful in order to gain first insights beyond Burundi.

A case that has very similar background conditions as Burundi is Rwanda that has also been called Burundi’s “false twin” due a very similar population structure, but the opposite pattern of ethnic exclusion. In contrast to Burundi, Hutu militaries have ruled the country after independence until the genocide in 1994. Exclusion, therefore, mainly affected the Tutsi group and not very surprisingly, refugees of several outflows starting with the Hutu revolution in 1959 were mainly Tutsi (van der Meeren 1996, p. 252). The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that took power ending the genocide in 1994 was build on 40 years in exile, mainly in countries of Eastern and Central Africa but also Europe and North America. Its first military invasion was undertaken from Uganda where the RPF had strong bases (Reed 1996, p. 479). After its military victory in 1994 the RPF took over state power, the administration and the army (Reed 1996, p. 498). This
did not only lead to a large outflow of Hutu refugees including state cadres and military actors, but after 2000 also to a second wave of Tutsi fleeing the country. Among these were many so called “genocide survivors” who had experienced the genocide inside the country. This outflow including many elites was due to an intra-Tutsi conflict between the RPF that was build on the exile structures from Uganda and the “genocide survivors” who had staid inside Rwanda (Rafti 2004, pp. 1-19). Despite the ongoing importance of the ethnic division, Rafti concludes that:

“However, exclusion has taken a new form. Within the Tutsi community it is the returnees from Uganda who hold the positions of power. Military promotions, jobs in the administration and private business are taken by the ‘Ugandan’ Tutsi. The repatriated francophone diaspora is increasingly becoming disaffected with playing second fiddle to the Anglophones. The genocide survivors are also vexed with the Tutsi-led government that has marginalized them and treats them as ‘second-class’ citizens. Foreign aid is not reaching the widows and orphans of the genocide. Many genocide survivors have also fled the country.” (Rafti 2004, p. 8)

This statement shows that there not only was an internal-external conflict line within the Tutsi group, but also a division between those who had been in exile in Uganda where the core of the RPF was and those who had been in other, francophone countries. But discrimination mainly took place along the ethnic and the internal-external line among the Tutsi, which led to increasing tensions. Genocide survivors felt that they became second-class citizens and suspected the RPF had just been interested in military victory rather than in saving their lives (Reyntjens 2004, pp. 180-181). There also is the reproach of elites among the genocide survivors that the issue of genocide is politically instrumentalized, for example when commemorations are used for contemporary goals. Thus, private mourning of survivors is transformed into a collective act in the name of views that are not necessarily the ones of the survivors but those of the ruling power (Reyntjens 2004, p. 201).

The new conflict line led to the mentioned outflow into exile which also changed the face of the political opposition in exile. There, Hutu and Tutsi became united to a certain degree, even leading to a formal alliance of Hutu and Tutsi forces in 2002 (Rafti 2004, 24). For the ruling President who returned with his RPF forces in 1994 the ethnically mixed picture of the opposition in exile made criticism more difficult. He tries to discredit those who left by the well-known reproach of having been involved in the genocide. But since this basically refers to the Hutu component in exile, President Kagame now also imputes exile people by saying they simply left in order
to seek a more comfortable life in Europe being ignorant and misguided (Reyntjens 2004, p. 194). This development shows what a different path politics after civil war can take with the emergence of an internal-external conflict line, when the context is different from the Burundian one.

In contrast to Burundi, the conflict between returnees from Ugandan exile and the genocide survivors in Rwanda ironically led to another outflow of Tutsi refugees. The reason for this seems to be the authoritarian character of the Rwandan regime. The exclusion – not only on an ethnic basis, but also along the internal-external as well as other exile-related lines – also gave birth to a more diverse political opposition in exile. So, while the general phenomenon is similar to what has occurred in Burundi’s transition, the impact is very different in the Rwandan case. However, the grievances on both sides of the divide, especially of course by the excluded genocide survivors also indicate underlying processes of group formation.

Similar patterns are also described for several other cases that are much more different from Burundi and Rwanda. The following paragraphs are going to present evidence from such diverse countries as East-Timor, Indonesia (Aceh), South Africa, Afghanistan and Cambodia. The selection of these cases is simply due to the availability of information. But not very surprisingly two of the countries were also identified as most-likely cases earlier in this study, namely South Africa and Afghanistan.

In a very different context of conflict, the internal-external division became visible in the democratic transition within East-Timor. The tiny country became independent in 2002 after a long conflict with Indonesia that had invaded the area in 1975 which led to intense violence and the establishment of a government in exile (Smith 2004, p. 145-147). Many Timorese leaders were in exile in Mozambique over a period of 24 years (Shoesmith 2003, p. 238). Among the leadership today, there is a conflict between two personalities, the former resistance leader and the former main activist in exile, who both claim nationalist and revolutionary legitimacy and being the better representative of the main Timorese movement. (Shoesmith 2003, p. 232+p. 241) But there are more profound differences:

“Differences in perceptions of the occupation’s impact are a prominent feature of East Timorese society today. From those who left for exile in 1975 and returned in recent years, one is most likely to hear an across-the-board condemnation of the experience of occupation. Curiously, perhaps, people who lived through the occupation will generally give a more nuanced picture of the 24-year period. For one thing, they understand the scope of the resistance, which consisted of more than just fighters and politicians in exile: many people suffered greatly, among them human rights workers, church members, and youth activists – both in East Timor and Indonesia.” (Simonsen
2006, p.578)

This difference in views probably contributes to competing efforts in defining the character of the new nation East Timor. The government dominated by returnee elites uses fields like education to neutralize Indonesian influence and insert a new cultural content that is Timorese, but also Portuguese (Simonsen 2006, p. 578-579). These efforts are obviously not welcomed by everybody:

“Some observers detect a mood of resentment against the country’s new political elite, particularly the returned exiles and their determination to impose a Portuguese-style culture on the government and administration of the new state.” (Shoesmith 2003, p. 251-252)

These statements indicate that the internal-external conflict line in East Timor is also based on more profound differences in views and perceptions, as in the cases of Burundi and Rwanda. Intra-party tensions due to exile have also been detected in the conflict around the Indonesian province Aceh. An extensive study on the transformation of armed groups has generally identified exile return as an important factor leading to conflicts within the groups (Dudouet 2009, p. 44). But the report names the post-war transition in Aceh (Indonesia) as the case where this development emerged most visibly. The secessionist conflict around the province of Aceh basically took place between the Indonesian government and the “Gerakan Acheh Merdeka (GAM)” rebellion comprising leaders in exile and in Aceh. Negotiations between the GAM and the Indonesian government finally led to a peace agreement in 2005 including far-reaching self-government competences for the province (Aguswandi 2008, p. 6).

The return of the exiled government to Aceh finally led to a split of the former “Gerakan Acheh Merdeka (GAM)” into two camps. On the one side there were those who had been based in Swedish exile, on the other side there were the field commanders of the movement (Dudouet 2009, p. 44). Here as in Burundi another overlap of the internal-external and the political-military line becomes visible.

The mentioned study also refers to an internal-external division in another prominent case: South Africa. Rifts along this line have appeared inside the “African National Congress (ANC)” during the transition and allegedly still have an impact today. Here, again, another politically relevant group apart from exile and resident groups emerged, namely the political prisoners, sometimes called “‘Robben Islanders” (Dudouet 2009, pp. 44-45).

The ANC leadership was based abroad for most of the period from 1960-1990 (Ellis 1991, p. 439). As a banned organization inside South
Africa, it had political but also military structures in exile with camps in Angola that were closed in 1989, and others in Tanzania, Uganda and elsewhere existing until 1992 (Ellis 1994, p. 283). The ANC underwent several important changes in exile, for example a militarization under the leadership of the “South African Communist Party (SACP)” which was the dominant force in the ANC exile leadership after 1969 (Ellis 1994, p. 279). These changes might have been one basis for the conflicts that occurred later during integration:

“It is apparent that within the National Executive Committee of the ANC and, no doubt, within the Central Committee of the SACP, there have been sharp disagreements between those whose inclination is to air the mistakes of the past in public and those who would prefer to conceal them or to place the responsibility elsewhere. It appears that the first group includes particularly leaders like Nelson Mandela who were on Robben Island during the troubles of exile, backed up by former leaders of the United Democratic Front who had never been in exile. In the second group are ANC security officials and many veterans of the exile leadership.” (Ellis 1994, p. 297)

Another study still cites tensions between local comrades and those in exile as a source of poor coordination of activities in ANC branches in 2002/2003 (Lodge 2004, p. 195). Thus, internal-external conflicts have prevailed in South African politics over some time, though their exact influence cannot be established based on the available information.

In Afghanistan, which also was a most-likely case in the framework of this study, the internal-external dimension has played a role as well. In the most recent transition of the country, relations between elites returning from exile and those who staid inside have been described as difficult and leaving deep divisions (Rubin 2004, p. 13). Most central to the conflict became the issue of dual citizenship as many exile elites had become citizens of developed countries like the USA during their time abroad. A kind of nativism emerged that led to demands to ban dual citizenship for Afghan ministers:

“The struggle over this issue, however, divided the cabinet and left more bruised feelings than any other question.” (Rubin 2004, p. 13)

The issue of dual citizenship had also been mentioned in the Burundian case involving the suspicion that the international contacts behind former exile elites could make them a gateway for foreign influence. This has not been mentioned for the Afghan case, but it is clear that the struggle over
citizenship is strongly linked to identity and who has the right to belong to the nation.

This is also visible in the last case discussed in this section, namely Cambodia. Here, the political process after the Paris Agreement that was implemented under a UN peace-keeping force and led to elections in 1993 entailed the integration of a government-in-exile. Out of the 20 political parties participating in elections, 8 were led by returning Cambodian-Americans (Um 2007, p. 267). While they hold important positions, returnee elites do not have any real power, partly because there is a general suspicion towards (former) exile people:

“Given the acute scarcity of human capital in post-genocide Cambodia, the talent re-imported from the diaspora has been both significant and needed. It has nevertheless been met with resistance. Rhetoric of national reconciliation aside, intentions are still questioned. In essence, regimes in transition, such as those of Cambodia and Viet Nam, are typically ambivalent about overseas communities.” (Um 2007, p. 270)

This ambivalence seems to include a general distrust and is also expressed with regard to dual citizenship. Other typical aspects are the contention by the main political party that Cambodians who remained inside the country are “purer” and like in Burundi more patriotic. Refugees’ right to belong is disputed in a highly politicized discourse in Cambodia (Um 2007, p. 270-272). This case, surprisingly, shows quite a few parallels to Burundi in the way the rift was expressed despite the very different context.

All the cases addressed in this section display exile-related conflicts at the elite level in a transition after armed conflict. The problematic point is that the studies cited do normally not evaluate the overall importance of the conflict line in comparison to others. Furthermore, the reference to consequences of exile return is not systematic, rather providing snapshots than a complete picture. However, the cases have shown that the general argument of this study can be expected to be relevant for several other cases. It also needs to be stressed that conflicts along the internal-external line have also occurred in contexts of wars that have not been finally settled. The Palestinian exile community is a well-known example with conflicts emerging in the framework of the Declaration of Oslo in 1993, because different goals had obviously developed between the internal and the exile Palestinians (Bamyeh 2007, p. 99). Yet, the generally very heterogeneous elite structure with many possible lines of cleavages in the Palestinian case (Brynen 1995, p. 40) has not become fully visible since there has not been a more far-reaching integration process based on a peace settlement until now.

This section allows for the conclusion that the return of mobilized exile elites had an impact in many other transitions than the Burundian one, but
that the strength of the impact over time cannot be assessed. Though many patterns that also were present in Burundi, particularly the occurrence of identity issues and grievances were mentioned for the cases discussed, a more thorough analysis of single cases would be necessary to identify any preconditions or common paths. The following section, thus, also outlines starting points for future research in the field.

5.3 Democratization as integration: Implications of research and outlook

The last two sections have substantiated the findings from the Burundi case study and put it into a larger theoretical and empirical framework. This section links the results to the more overarching research question in how far post-war democratization is different. For Burundi, the specific features of the transition have been summarized as follows:

“Transitions like Burundi’s are moments of uncertainty. New institutions are developed, new entrants occupy positions on the central stage, new laws are written. Minds have been changed, hearts have been hardened, expectations shattered, networks dissolved.” (Uvin 2008, p. 77)

The first part of the mentioned aspects – changes in institutions, laws and actors – are present in transitions without prior civil war. The latter part points at aspects that might be more peculiar for post-war contexts involving a more profound integration process. Yet this study has argued that far from only destroying networks and hardening identities along the main ethnic line, civil war leads to the development of new, politically relevant affiliations. It has shown that the exile-related conflict line contributed prominently to the fragmentation of conflict lines in Burundi. This has certain implications with regard to the fields outlined in the literature at the beginning of this study: elite bargain, institutional power-sharing and the inclusion of rebel movements for peacebuilding.

First, the period of negotiations as the basis for a later elite pact was the starting point of the political fragmentation. This can partly be explained by the in-group/out-group argument developed by Simmel and modified by Coser (Levy 1988). While during the civil war, cohesion within (ethnic) groups should be rather high because of the “external” threat, negotiations can be the starting point of a loss in group cohesion. But negotiations also had another function: they marked the starting point of putting the pieces of a scattered political landscape together.

The difficulty of this process lies in the fact that different components develop during a civil war that all aim at bringing about political change,
but with different means, bases and organizational affiliations. Yet all these groups – whether exile or resident and military or political – tend to claim at the end of the war that they are entitled to play an important role in the new system because of their specific contribution. The start of the peace process therefore fosters disputes among the different components over who represents an ethnic group and who has contributed most to the group’s struggle.

Thus, the negotiations process is not only likely to be conflictive between the parties to the conflict, but also within these parties beyond the commonly treated moderate-extremist division. The internal-external dimension has been neglected in this process until now despite an often central role of exile elites in negotiation processes.

Second, the power-sharing arrangement in Burundi has certainly been crucial to find a way out of the civil war, and it is still important to assure the Tutsi minority. But it also risks impeding a more profound overcoming of the ethnic conflict line. Burundi has shown that conflict line changes are possible despite ethnic power-sharing formulas characterizing the system. But conflicts along the internal-external and the political-military lines remain constricted by the ethnic framework. There were strong indications that actors of the Hutu and the Tutsi side frequently work together in the post-transition period like Uprona and Frodebu, because of their common experience as political parties since the pre-war period. In the course of the current electoral process in Burundi, other alliances crossing ethnic lines have occurred as well.

Thus, the institutional design lags behind the political process, which certainly could become a point of tension. The issue of power-sharing is already controversial in Burundi. Yet, the dilemma of power-sharing is that a profound change of ethnic quotas at this point would unsettle the minority, though its representatives also tend to assess the ethnic division as less important or even disappearing. It seems that the occurrence of other conflict lines in post-war periods that even could potentially cross the ethnic line is overall ignored with regard to the institutional setting. The pessimism of representatives of the consociational approach regarding possibilities to transcend the ethnic divide can at least be questioned. Chances to integrate different ethnic groups might be better than commonly assumed, especially if other lines of affiliation emerge.

Third, the inclusion of armed movements in order to combine democratization and peacebuilding has been identified as a central aspect in the Burundian transition. The typical splits inside rebel movements occurred and the two largest rebel movements have tried to demonstrate their spoiler potential before their inclusion. Their transformation has also led to the manifestation of a more general political-military conflict line. But rebellion became entangled with exile in important ways during the civil war and the emerging new conflict lines interacted in important ways. The internal-
external conflict line has run through rebel movements as well, sometimes combined with a division between the political and military wings of a movement. Exile was the central basis of the rebellion which led to the complex integration process characterizing Burundian politics after 2001. Since refugee mobilization is a very common phenomenon in many parts of the world, the interaction between rebellion and exile certainly is of importance for other cases.

The contribution of the constructivist conflict and refugee literature lies in the fact that it interprets civil war not only as a period of rupture, but also as a period of change in affiliations and actor constellations. Therefore, other actors than commonly assumed might occur and become politically relevant. This study has demonstrated this by focusing on exile elites.

By contributing in a crucial way to the fragmentation of conflict lines, exile, mobilization and return also have the potential to influence the democratic transition more generally. One problem of such a wider analysis is that fragmentation can be interpreted in different ways: it could ease other conflict lines and contribute to a diversification of the political landscape; or lead to a blockage of democratization because of producing splinters and weakening cohesion. It is very difficult to assess the exact influence by a single case study and the very selective insights from other cases. Therefore, further analyses in this field should try to illuminate the wider importance of exile return for democratic transitions.

Future research should, however, start by substantiating the relationship between exile return and conflict lines changes. Conducting more detailed case studies on the topic could help to carve out preconditions for the occurrence of the relationship. The argument should, for example, be tested in other contexts like in countries with a more diverse ethnic landscape, transitions following non-ethnic civil wars or institutional settings not based on power-sharing. It could also be interesting to examine in how far different degrees of international involvement change the role of exile elites in transitions. It might be argued that their influence increases with outside interventions because of their stronger international links. Furthermore, the analysis that has exclusively taken place at the elite level could be extended to the mass level, though access to data will be even more problematic at this level. Finally, country cases with very different values on the independent variable could be compared. It could be analyzed what development conflict lines take after war if no significant mobilized exile community existed or such groups did not return. All these aspects can also lead to a more profound understanding of the influence of exile return on democratic transitions more generally.

This study has made a start and underlined that in order to understand a democratic transition after civil war, the course of the civil war is as important as the reason for its outbreak. Overall, post-war democratic transitions should be understood as a complex political integration process.
Chapter 6

Annex

6.1 Additional Information – Chapter “Research Design”

Table 6.1: Interview Schedule:
Introductory Part: Political context and position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Question</th>
<th>Question for maintaining topic</th>
<th>Concrete further questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are you active in a political party right now?</td>
<td>No: Have you been active in a party in the past?</td>
<td>What is / was your function?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is your party’s position in comparison to other parties in Burundi?</td>
<td>Where would you position your party in the political landscape of Burundi?</td>
<td>Are there parties close to yours?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What different factions are there within your party?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Since when do they exist?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Why do they exist?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(How) do they work together?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Are there groups or alliances across parties that are important in Burundian politics today?
Table 6.2: Interview Schedule: Part I: Exile, civil war and return I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Question</th>
<th>Question for maintaining topic</th>
<th>Concrete further questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How have you passed the period of the war since 1993?</td>
<td>Have you been in exile at some point?</td>
<td>Have you had official refugee status?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How long have you been in exile?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where have you spent that time?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why have you left Burundi?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you know reasons of other people to go into exile?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And the people who have decided to stay in Burundi, how would you describe them?</td>
<td>What could have been reasons for staying in Burundi?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there or have there been political activities among the Burundian refugees in exile?</td>
<td>What activities and what organisations?</td>
<td>In the camps (in Tanzania and Congo)? In European exile?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How was the rebellion organized?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Where was the basis of the rebellion?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you evaluate your time in exile?</td>
<td>What experiences have you made in exile?</td>
<td>Have you been politically active? Has your party had branches outside Burundi? What happened to these branches after the peace settlement? How did you stay in contact with Burundi?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6.3: Interview Schedule: Part I: Exile, civil war and return II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Question</th>
<th>Question for maintaining topic</th>
<th>Concrete further questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| What was your main motivation to return to Burundi? | What factors have helped you to decide to return to Burundi? | How have you perceived your return?  
Was it difficult to re-integrate?  
How was the situation for returnees in general? |
<p>| What has and has not changed in Burundi during your absence? | | What would you say, how are returnees perceived within Burundi? |
| In how far is your exile experience important for you today? | | Where are contacts from exile important for you today? |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Question</th>
<th>Question for maintaining topic</th>
<th>Concrete further questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How have you passed the period of the civil war since 1993?</td>
<td>Where have you passed the period during the war?</td>
<td>Do you know reasons of other people to stay in Burundi?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What was your main motivation to stay in Burundi?</td>
<td>What factors have helped you to decide to stay in Burundi?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And the people who have decided to go into exile, how would you describe them?</td>
<td>What could have been reasons for leaving Burundi?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there or have there been political activities among the Burundian refugees in exile?</td>
<td>What activities and what organisations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the camps (in Tanzania and Congo)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In European exile?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How was the rebellion organized?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you evaluate the time of the crisis for yourself?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What has and has not changed in Burundi during this period?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In how far is your experience of the crisis inside Burundi important for you today?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4: Interview Schedule: Part I (stayee): Civil war experience
Table 6.5: Interview Schedule: Part II: Peace Negotiations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Question</th>
<th>Question for maintaining topic</th>
<th>Concrete further questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you participated in the Arusha negotiations?</td>
<td>Why have you participated?</td>
<td>What has been your function during Arusha?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What different groups did exist among the Burundian actors?</td>
<td>Have there been other divisions than the ethnic one at Arusha?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Which ones?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What alliances have there been?</td>
<td>On what grounds?</td>
<td>Questions on specific alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you participated in the negotiations between CNDD-FDD and the government?</td>
<td>Why have you participated?</td>
<td>What has been your function during these negotiations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What were the main positions among actors at these negotiations?</td>
<td>Have there been any conflicts among the participating parties?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Which ones?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.6: Interview Schedule: Part III: Political transition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Question</th>
<th>Question for maintaining topic</th>
<th>Concrete further questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How have you experienced the political transition between 2001 and 2005?</td>
<td></td>
<td>What part of this transition process do you assess as most important from a political point of view?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What course did your party / movement take over the course of this period?</td>
<td></td>
<td>What were the main controversies within your party?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In how far has the political transition had an effect on your party?</td>
<td>Has there been a transformation of your party’s organization?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has there been a transformation in your party’s leadership?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If yes: why?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why did your party / movement split?</td>
<td>Alternative: why did you split away from party / movement xyz?</td>
<td>Why did party / movement xyz split?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the reasons for the internal conflicts in the political parties during and after the transition?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many politicians have returned from exile during the transition?</td>
<td>Why have people returned (only stayees)?</td>
<td>Are these people in important political positions today?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What are the social and political consequences of refugee return?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Has there been any effect of the return of Burundian elites during and after the transition?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6.7: Interview Schedule: Part IV: Post-transition period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Question</th>
<th>Question for maintaining topic</th>
<th>Concrete further questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How do you see the political development since the elections in 2005?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If you look at the current situation in Burundi, do you think everybody has a place in the new political system in Burundi?</td>
<td>How do you see the inclusiveness of the political system?</td>
<td>What is the strongest political dividing line today?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Have there been changes in political divisions after the transition?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Do you think that the experience of the civil war remains important at the level of Burundian elites today?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6.8: Interview Schedule: Final Part

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Question</th>
<th>Question for maintaining topic</th>
<th>Concrete further questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From my side there are no further questions. Is there anything that you would like to add?</td>
<td>Would you like to raise a point that has not been discussed during the interview?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there any person you could recommend as a good contact for my further studies?</td>
<td>May I use your information for my thesis?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview no.</th>
<th>Party membership (at time of interview)</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Exile (after 1993)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BUR-I-10,13-12-07</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Hutu-Tutsi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-I-13,15-12-07</td>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-I-01,13-11-07</td>
<td>None, formerly Palipehutu</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-I-05,03-12-07</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-I-07,11-12-07</td>
<td>None, former minister</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-I-08,12-12-07</td>
<td>None, formerly CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-I-09,12-12-07</td>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-I-03,28-11-07</td>
<td>None, formerly PP</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-I-11,14-12-07</td>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-I-06,10-12-07</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-I-12,15-12-07</td>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-I-04,29-11-07</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-I-02,26-11-07</td>
<td>None, formerly Palipehutu</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.10: List of Interviewees: 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview no.</th>
<th>Party membership (at time of interview)</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Exile (after 1993)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-01,16-02-09</td>
<td>None, high-ranking administration</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-02,21-02-09</td>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-03,23-02-09</td>
<td>Small opposition party</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-03,23-02-09</td>
<td>Small opposition party</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-04,24-02-09</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-05,25-02-09</td>
<td>Small Hutu opposition party</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-06,02-03-09</td>
<td>None, political association</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-07,03-03-09</td>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-08,03-03-09</td>
<td>None, former MP</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-09,04-03-09</td>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-10,04-03-09</td>
<td>Small Tutsi opposition party</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-11,06-03-09</td>
<td>None, formerly Palipehutu</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-12,09-03-09</td>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-13,10-03-09</td>
<td>Former rebel movement</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-14,10-03-09</td>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-15,11-03-09</td>
<td>Small Tutsi opposition party</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-16,12-03-09</td>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-17,13-03-09</td>
<td>None, formerly Palipehutu</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-18,16-03-09</td>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-19,17-03-09</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-20,18-03-09</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-21,19-03-09</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-22,20-03-09</td>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-23,20-03-09</td>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR-II-24,23-03-09</td>
<td>Small Tutsi opposition party</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
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## 6.2 Additional Information – Chapter “Case Study”

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no. of violent conflicts in brackets; n.i. = not identifiable

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no. of violent conflicts in brackets; n.i. = not identifiable
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no. of violent conflicts in brackets; n.i. = not identifiable

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no. of violent conflicts in brackets; n.i. = not identifiable

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*no. of violent conflicts in brackets; n.i. = not identifiable*

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*no. of violent conflicts in brackets; n.i. = not identifiable*

### Table 6.18: Political conflict events 2004

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*no. of violent conflicts in brackets; n.i. = not identifiable*
### Table 6.19: Political conflict events 2005

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<td>4 (2)</td>
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*no. of violent conflicts in brackets; n.i. = not identifiable*

### Table 6.20: Political conflict events 2006

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<td>5</td>
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*no. of violent conflicts in brackets; n.i. = not identifiable*
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tions and democratic regimes. In J. Higley and R. Gunther (Eds.),
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Professional Career

since Oct 2010  Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellowship for International Relations and Security (TAPIR), Stays at following institutions:

- United States Institute of Peace, Washington
- European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris
- German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin

Dec 2005 – Sept 2010  Swiss Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich
Research Assistant, Center for Security Studies & National Center for Competence in Research (NCCR)
“Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century”, Zurich, Member of Project “Democratizing divided societies in troubled neighborhoods”

Research fields:
conflict spread & transnational factors in civil wars (esp. refugee flows); peacebuilding & democratization; power-sharing in divided societies; fragile statehood

Geographic focus:  Sub-Saharan Africa, mainly African Great Lakes region

July 2001 – Nov 2005  Development and Peace Foundation / Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (SEF), Bonn
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PhD, Center for Security Studies &
NCCR Democracy,

Oct 1995 – July 2001  University of Bonn, Germany
Master (M.A.) in Political Science (Major),
International Law and Educational Science,

M.A. thesis (grade: 1.0)
“Ethnic Conflict in Africa: a comparison of Nigeria and South Africa”
(in German)

Sept 1998 – June 1999  University of Edinburgh, UK
Political Science, in particular African Studies and British
Government and Politics
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Conferences & Workshops (Selection)

Jan 2010  Annual Convention, Swiss Political Science Association,
Geneva (CH)
Single-authored paper presentation

learnt from two world regions”
NCCR Policy Transfer Event, Zurich
Organization & presentation of NCCR project results

July 2009  Biennial Conference, International Association for the
Study of Forced Migration 2009, Nicosia (Cyprus)
Panel organization & single-authored paper presentation

July 2007  2nd European Conference on African Studies of the
Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies,
AEGIS, Leiden (NL)
Single-authored paper presentation

Feb 2007  Annual Convention, International Studies Association,
ISA, Chicago (USA)
Single-authored paper presentation

June 2006  Regional Workshop “Democratizing Divided Societies
in the African Great Lakes Region”
NCCR Project Workshop, Zurich
Organization & follow-up report
Internships & Work Experience (Selection)

Assistant
Public Relations and Fundraising, Bonn office

Oct 1999 – Jan 2000  Center for Development Research (ZEF), Bonn
Research Assistant
Department of Economic and Technological Change

July – Aug 1999  Germanwatch, Bonn
Campaign on Climate Change +
Observer at the Fifth COP of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change

June – Sept 1998  German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development
Division “Basic Issues of Bilateral Co-operation”

Other Qualifications & Activities (Selection)

Nov 2009  NCCR Knowledge Transfer Award 2009
for Lectures on “Ethnic Conflict and Transformation in Burundi” at the KV Business School Zurich

Apr 2006 – July 2009  Doctoral Program, NCCR Democracy
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(3 semesters), 2 workshops and à la carte program

Apr 2006 – Apr 2007  Coordinator of Peer-mentoring Group
NCCR Democracy, Zurich

Aug/Sept 2006  Swiss Summer School on Advanced Methods in the Social Sciences, University of Lugano
Qualitative Data Analysis (Prof. Véronique Mottier)
Qualitative Interviewing (Prof. Max Bergman)

Language Skills

German: native
English: fluent (reading, writing and verbal skills)
French: very good (reading and verbal skills: very good; writing: good)
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Publications


Several published reports, for example:
