RUSSIAN MILITARY THINKING TODAY

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Russia’s New Military Doctrine: A Compromise Document
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Abstract
In an earlier Russian Analytical Digest article (RAD no. 62, 18 June 2009), I discussed President Dmitry Medvedev’s foreign security policy by analyzing his major security documents and statements at the time: the July 2008 Foreign Policy Concept, the August 2008 major policy principles, the September 2008 Arctic Strategy and the May 2009 National Security Strategy. I noted that Russia’s military doctrine, the third pillar of the “troika” of the country’s security policy hierarchy—after the national security strategy and the foreign policy concept—was expected to appear in a new edition during the course of 2009. With some delay, the new military doctrine was published on 5 February 2010. This article analyses the drafting process of the doctrine as well as the final text.

Preparation of a New Military Doctrine
After many years of discussion focused on revising the military doctrine of 2000, and repeated announcements predicting the publication of such a document, at the end of 2008 signals became stronger that the process of launching a new military doctrine was finally under way. Probably the on-going military reforms and the aftermath of the 2008 Georgian conflict had convinced Russia’s security elite that an updated military doctrine was now necessary.

In December 2008 the Kremlin announced plans for a new military doctrine. At a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF), Moscow’s highest security organ, an interdepartmental working group was formed, consisting of delegates from numerous federal state bodies, including the Duma, the Federation Council, the regional presidential representatives, the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Military Sciences, as well of scientific and civil organizations. The working group responsible for drafting the new doctrine under the auspices of the SCRF was led by Deputy Security Council Secretary Yuri Baluyevsky. Army General Baluyevsky was a former Chief of the General Staff (CGS). Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Anatoly Nogovitsyn was head of the working group of the Ministry of Defence on developing the military doctrine. Army General Makshut Gareyev, president of the Academy of Military Sciences and member of the scientific council of the SCRF, was also involved in drafting the new doctrine. In spite of the fact that an all-government working group was to draft the new doctrine, the key actors all had a military background. Thus, the influence of the military on the contents of the document must have been substantial. On 8 October 2009, Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the SCRF and former Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), announced that Russia would soon adopt a new military doctrine.

Statements in Advance of Publication
Several key figures involved in drafting the new military doctrine leaked elements of the early drafts, whetting outside interest in the document. The controversy these statements aroused, however, apparently prevented them from appearing in the final text. Instead, they were likely included in a secret protocol, whose existence was first signalled by Nogovitsyn.

Most importantly, Baluyevsky pointed out that statements on the use of nuclear weapons would be adjusted (“V Rossii” 2009). In an Izvestiya interview Patrushev stressed that in the foreseeable future nuclear weapons would remain Russia’s highest priority. The doctrine would list adjustments in the conditions for using nuclear weapons in repelling aggression with conventional arms, not only in large-scale wars, but also in regional and even local fighting. Furthermore, the doctrine would provide a variety of options for using nuclear weapons, depending on the situation and the intentions of the adversary. Patrushev also remarked that in situations critical to national security, pre-emptive (preventive) nuclear strikes against the aggressor would be possible. In addition to “traditional threats,” such as the USA and NATO, the escalating struggle for energy and other raw materials was to be listed as a new threat, since this would increase the potential for conflict on Russia’s borders, including the Arctic region.

The Military Doctrine of 2010
Russia finally published its new military doctrine on 5 February 2010. The following analysis examines it in light of the structure of Russia’s primary security document, the National Security Strategy.
Russia in the World Community

Russian security thinking about global developments in the military doctrine showed that its authors had a mixed view of the world. On the one hand, they saw reduced political and military threats, but, on the other hand, they highlighted the use of military force to solve conflicts and the intensification of military dangers in some areas. The chapter on dangers and threats started with the observation that the existing architecture of global security did not ensure the equal security of all nations. This concern seemed to correspond with President Medvedev’s call for a new European security architecture, in which the “Cold War vestiges” of the OSCE, NATO and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty would be replaced by an all-European security treaty and conference, preventing the use of force by individual states or organizations.

Russia’s National Interests

With respect to Russia’s national interests, three aspects in particular came to the fore. First, the authors expressed a desire to expand Russia’s circle of partner states on the basis of common interests in strengthening international security. This idea focused in particular on the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Second, they stressed that the RF Armed Forces might be used operationally outside Russia to protect the interests of Russia and its citizens and maintain international peace and security. The protection of Russians abroad appeared three times in the doctrine. Consequently, as laid out in the Law on Defence adopted after the 2008 Georgian conflict, Moscow gave itself the right to use military force abroad.

The third aspect comprised the creation and training of special units from the Armed Forces and other troops for use in the interests of Russia’s economy. This provision was probably related to protecting energy infrastructure and possibly also with an eye toward securing future resources, such as those in the Arctic region.

Threats to Russia’s Security

Previous doctrines only mentioned threats; this time the doctrine also referred to dangers. Actually, the threats seemed to be of less importance. They only appeared after the dangers. Furthermore, only the dangers were concrete, the (external) threats were of a vaguely-defined general nature: a drastic deterioration in the military-political situation (interstate relations); efforts to impede the operation of state and military command and control systems; a show of military force with provocative objectives on the territories of states contiguous to Russia or its allies; and the partial or complete mobilization of armies in other states. The listed dangers were specific and referred mainly to the West. First of all, the doctrine stated the danger that NATO posed, in particular by globalizing its endeavours and attempting to expand its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders, among others ways, by welcoming new members. Clearly, this section referred to plans to include Georgia and—until the 2010 Presidential elections—Ukraine into the alliance. The next danger described was the deployment (or expansion) of foreign military contingents on territories neighbouring Russia or its allies. This section probably pointed to the American military contingents deployed in Romania and Bulgaria. Another listed foreign danger was the development and deployment of missile defence systems. Although not specifically mentioned, this provision presumably meant the global US missile defence network of which the cancelled components in Poland and the Czech Republic were a part. Furthermore, the doctrine pronounced the danger of the use of military force on territories neighbouring Russia in violation of the UN Charter and other norms of international law. This entry possibly addressed NATO’s attack on Serbia in 1999, but even more Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia in August 2008.

Ensuring Russia’s Security

In response to dangers and threats, the doctrine explained that Russia retained the right to use nuclear weapons in response to an attack against itself or against its allies with weapons of mass destruction, and also against an attack with conventional weapons when the very existence of the state was under threat. Furthermore, Moscow would ensure the protection of Russian citizens abroad. Other provisions seeking to ensure Russian security related to the strengthening of collective security, within the framework of the CSTO, CIS, OSCE and SCO; as well as to developing relations in this field with the EU and NATO. Next, the main priorities of military-political cooperation were with Belarus, CSTO, CIS, SCO and the UN. More specifically, on international security cooperation, an armed attack on a (Russia-Belarus) Union State member or a member state of the CSTO would be regarded as an act of aggression provoking retaliatory measures. In addition to the listing of a (CSTO Treaty) military assistance article, the doctrine also underlined Moscow’s willingness to assign troop contingents to CSTO peacekeeping forces. Moreover, Russia can assign forces to the
CSTO Collective Rapid-Response forces for the purpose of responding promptly to military threats.

**Assessment**

As to threats to Russia’s security, the 2010 Military Doctrine considered NATO as the main problem. However, in denouncing NATO expansion, Russia did not recognize that states have the right of self-determination in choosing their alignments with international organizations, such as with the EU and NATO, even though the doctrine repeatedly states that international law is of crucial importance to Moscow. Even though Russia frequently declares that it has privileged interests in regions, i.e. the former Soviet Union, the Kremlin does not have the right to decide what the countries in this region are allowed to do. With regard to foreign troops deployed close to Russian borders, the military contingents of the USA deployed in Romania and Bulgaria were in other security documents mixed up with those of NATO. However, if US and NATO policy were the same, Georgia and Ukraine would already have been NATO members. Considering the West as the primary adversary was a disappointing continuation of old thinking. However, by listing the West under “dangers” instead of “threats,” damage to the relationship with NATO and the US was less than it could have been. In that respect, possibly, the term “dangers” was introduced in order to avoid complicating the then ongoing negotiations with the USA towards a new START Treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms.

In autumn 2009 some of the drafters revealed that the new doctrine would entitle Russia to use nuclear weapons in preventive (pre-emptive) strikes. At that time this news caused a lot of turmoil and criticism in the West. Perhaps because of that concern, this provision was absent in the doctrinal text of 2010. However, it is doubtful that this provision was totally deleted. On 5 February 2010, together with the Military Doctrine, President Medvedev also announced his approval of the “Principles of State Nuclear Deterrence Policy to 2020.” It is possible that this document, which was not released publicly, contains the secret nuclear part of the doctrine, including provisions on preventive (pre-emptive) nuclear strikes.

Another striking feature of ensuring security was the choice of “friends” for enhancing collective security and military-political cooperation: CSTO, Belarus and SCO were the main actors deemed suitable for cooperation. The inclusion of a clause on military assistance—derived from the CSTO Treaty—together with doctrinal provisions on Russian troop assignments to CSTO peacekeeping and rapid reaction forces, unmistakably marked the CSTO as the primary security partner for Moscow. The other international organization in which Moscow played a leading role, the SCO, was also given priority status for cooperation. However, in contrast with other recent security documents, the special relationship with China and India was not listed in the military doctrine. Perhaps by keeping silent about China, the Russian military thus avoided this taboo, making clear that China could develop into a threat to Russia. Finally, EU and NATO were mentioned in the sphere of collective security, as evidenced by RF military contingents participating in operations of both Western organizations. However, they were excluded from the list of military-political cooperation, underlining that these actors did not belong to the category of favoured military partners.

The contents of the new doctrine did not quite live up to the earlier statements related to it, nor to the realities of the RF Armed Forces. For instance, the expected emphasis on energy security was completely left out. Furthermore, the repeatedly announced provision on preventive/pre-emptive nuclear strikes was also missing. Moreover, the ongoing deep reforms of the RF Armed Forces and the intended huge influx of modern weapons before 2020 were also absent in the doctrine. The new doctrine was probably a compromise between different competing groups in the security elite, resulting in a document that has little relation with current international security developments. Domestic military reforms or the line in other security documents. Hopefully a better formulated doctrine will not take another decade.

**About the Author**

Lieutenant Colonel Dr. M. de Haas is Senior Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. This article is partly derived from his book *Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond*, which was published by Routledge in April 2010.

*(Literature: see overleaf)*
The Role of China in Russia’s Military Thinking

By Simon Saradzhyan, Cambridge, MA.

Abstract
The continuing rise of China requires the Russian military to prepare a plan that allows it to counter Beijing’s potential supremacy. However, military preparations alone will not suffice. Russia needs to reverse the negative socio-economic and demographic trends in the Far East and Siberia before they create conditions facilitating an armed conflict.

The East-2010 War-Game: Who Are Russia’s Potential Foes?

In June 2010 the Russian armed forces will stage an operational-strategic exercise dubbed Vostok-2010 (East-2010) that will become “the main combat-training event” of 2010, according to a recent Defense Ministry press release. Thousands of soldiers from the Army (including the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection Forces) Navy, Air Force, Airborne Troops and other elements of the Russian armed forces will participate in the joint exercise staged by the Far Eastern and Siberian Military Districts. While these two eastern districts and the fleet will play the lead role in the game, Vostok-2010 will also involve forces and assets from other military districts and all of Russia’s four fleets, including submarines, according to senior commanders. Russia’s long-range aviation and the Ministry of Interior Affairs’ Interior Troops will also participate in the war game.

The importance given to Vostok-2010 marks a significant change from the recent past. More often than not, it is the Zapad (West) exercise, which simulates a Russian war with NATO, that concludes the Russian armed forces’ combat training season. That was the case last year when tens of thousands of troops participated in Zapad-2009, which featured large-scale operations in western Russia and Belarus, including beach landings and a simulated nuclear strike.

But this year Vostok will mark the apogee of Russian military training, according to commander of the Ground Forces Col. General Alexander Postnikov. President Dmitry Medvedev has already promised to attend the war-game, during which troops will test the new chain of command (military district-operational command-brigade) and practice re-deployment from one region to another, chief of the General Staff Army General Nikolai Makarov told RIA Novosti on January 15.

While commenting extensively on the West war-games, top Russian commanders would not publicly identify either potential foes or the overall scenario for East-2010. One unnamed, but obvious foe to prepare for is Japan. In an April 7 interview Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin openly stated that one reason why Moscow wants to buy Mistral helicopter-carrying warships from France is because Russia has an unresolved territorial dispute with Japan.
The Russian leadership is also concerned about the unpredictability of the nuclear-armed North Korean regime and has even decided to deploy its newest air defense system – the S-400 – in the Far East, even though this system is not designed to shoot down ballistic missiles during the ascending or mid-course phases of their flight.

However, there is one more potential foe in the East whose growing military might requires Russia to prepare a counter-action strategy on the scale of Vostok-2010. And that potential foe is China.

Acknowledging the Potential Threat

Until recently, Russia’s military-political leadership had been extremely careful not to mention China as a potential foe while taking pains to stress how much relations with its powerful eastern neighbor have improved. Indeed, the two countries have settled their border disputes, signed a friendship treaty in 2001 and became partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. They also agreed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other or target their nuclear weapons at each other in a deal signed in 1992.

However, China is already challenging Russia’s dominance in oil- and gas-rich Central Asia. In the future, fast-growing China could come to pose a security threat to Russia’s resource-rich Siberia and Far East, especially given the growing disparity in population density, economic output and continuing labor immigration across the Russian-Chinese border.

But while Russian officials had avoided referring to China as a potential foe, perhaps, in order to avoid angering the eastern neighbor and buy time to prepare for its further rise, former officials and experts do point to the potential threat posed by China’s conventional supremacy. “After the end of the Cold War…Moscow lost its superiority in conventional forces over NATO, China and the far eastern alliance led by the U.S,” Alexei Arbatov, one of Russia’s most authoritative arms control experts and the co-author of Russia’s new national security doctrine, observed in 2004. Now Russia sees its conventional forces as the “nuclear equalizer,” compensating for the conventional forces lead held by the West and China.

More recently, the Defense Ministry top brass have begun to edge closer towards acknowledging the obvious. In July 2009 a reporter for the Defense Ministry’s newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda pointed out to Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Nikolai Makarov that one of the slides in the commander’s own presentation “show that it is, after all, NATO and China that are the most dangerous of our geopolitical rivals.” He then asked the general whether the brigades, which Makarov said are replacing Cold War era divisions to better prepare the armed forces to fight local conflicts as opposed to the all-out wars of the 20th century, will be ready to “conduct defensive operations in massive warfare.”

Makarov did not mention China in his answer. However, earlier at the same conference he did point out that “in terms of China, we are conducting a very balanced, well-thought out policy.” However, based on my experience working as a defense and security journalist in Russia for 15 years, Krasnaya Zvezda reporters typically seek pre-approval for the questions they ask top commanders, so the reference to China as “strongest geopolitical rival” is no accident.

Two months later chief of the Ground Forces Staff Lt. General Sergei Skakov made what leading Russian military expert Alexander Khramchikhin described as an “epochal statement.” When describing what kind of warfare the national armed forces should prepare for, Skakov said the following in September 2009: “If we talk about the east, then it could be a multi-million-man army with a traditional approach to conducting combat operations: straightforward, with large concentrations of personnel and firepower along individual operational directions.” Writing in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozrenie, Khramchikhin noted that “for the first time since the early days of Gorbachev, a high-ranking national commander has de facto acknowledged officially that the People’s Republic of China is our potential enemy.”

Should a conflict between Russia and China eventually break out, Russia should not hope that the conventional component of its one million strong armed forces will be able to stop the 2.8 million man People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China, whose military spending has increased at an inflation-adjusted rate of over 18 percent a year, according to G. John Ikenberry. Russia has repeatedly gamed out a limited nuclear strike

### Armed Forces Total Personnel (2008, in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

by air-launched cruise missiles to prevent a conventionally-superior foe from overwhelming its forces in a conventional conflict in the West and one may deduce from that that Russian generals have developed similar plans for conflicts in the East too.

However, while they serve as a powerful deterrent, nuclear weapons cannot be viewed as a panacea. Most importantly, even selected limited use of nuclear weapons, which Russian generals hope will demonstrate resolve and deescalate the conflict, can actually increase the risk that the foe will also choose to retaliate with nuclear weapons rather than sue for peace. Even the selective first use of nuclear weapons by Russia may prompt Beijing to respond by launching its ICBMs out of concern that Russia's nuclear strike may destroy most of its nuclear arsenal. And, as a 2003 Defense Ministry report, entitled "Urgent Tasks for the Development of the Russian Armed Forces," rightly notes: "When we speak about the nuclear deterrent, especially when this notion is applied to the deterrence of threats associated with the use of conventional forces by the enemy, we should also take into account that under contemporary conditions such deterrence can be effectively carried out only if well-equipped and combat-ready general-purpose forces are available."

"It's the Economy, Stupid."

However, neither nuclear weapons nor conventional weapons will be effective in reducing the risk factors that increase the likelihood of conflict between China and Russia. Among these is the growing demographic and economic disparity between the two countries. This gap is increasingly evident in light of the macroeconomic and social data describing Russia's Siberia and Far East.

China's economy has quadrupled in size since the late 1970s and may double again over the next decade. China already has a population of 1.32 billion and its GDP totaled $4,326 billion in 2008, ranking third in terms of GDP in the world, according to the World Bank. Russia's population totals some 141 million and its GDP totaled $1,601 billion in 2008, ranking ninth in the world, according to the same source. China is most likely to continue growing at rates unattainable for Russia while the latter can count only on migration to prevent further depopulation.

As of the early 2000s Russia's Far Eastern and Siberian Districts had a total population of 27 million and their combined gross regional products totaled $110 billion per year, according to then-governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai Alexander Khoponin's 2006 speech at the Baikal Economic Forum in 2006. The rapid growth of countries in the Asian Pacific region, which includes China, is the main challenge for Russia, Khoponin told a conference in September 2006, according to Russia's Ekonomika i Biznes.

Nevertheless, given the current pace of development, Russia is still decades away from a serious conflict with China, if one ever erupts. As Singapore's first premier Lee Kuan Yew, an astute observer of Asia, pointed out: "China wants time to grow. If there is going to be any conflict, they'll postpone it for 50 years." And before thinking of any conflict with Russia, China will of course want to re-gain Taiwan and establish its dominance in South-East Asia.

Russia should use the next several decades to pursue military reform until it produces a conventional force capable of deterring military threats along Russia's perimeter and on par with China's PLA, while also maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent. Russian authorities should also allocate resources and introduce incentives to reverse depopulation in the Far East and Siberia and facilitate the region's socio-economic growth to prevent the further deepening of the non-military disparities that increase the likelihood of a crisis in relations with China that may ultimately escalate into an armed conflict.

About the Author
Simon Saradzhyan is a fellow at Harvard University's Kennedy School Belfer Center where he researches terrorism and arms control. This article is partially based on his January 2010 paper "Russia's Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Their Current Configuration and Posture: A Strategic Asset or Liability?", http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19940/russias_nonstrategic_nuclear_weapons_in_their_current_configuration_and_posture.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F1897%2Fsimon_saradzhyan

Recommended Reading
• Lee Kuan Yew, Former Prime Minister of Singapore, Interview with Charlie Rose, October 22, 2009. Available at http://www.charlierose.com/download/transcript/10681.
Opinion Poll

The Russian Population on Military Threats and the State of the Armed Forces

Military Threats

In your opinion, is there at present a military threat to Russia from other countries?

![Graph showing the percentage of respondents who believe there is a military threat to Russia from other countries over time.]

In your opinion, will our army be able to defend Russia in the case of a real military threat from another country?

![Graph showing the percentage of respondents who believe the army will be able to defend Russia in the case of a real military threat from another country over time.]

In your opinion, what is NATO in relation to Russia?

![Graph showing the percentage of respondents' opinions on NATO's role in relation to Russia from 2003 to 2009. The graph indicates a trend where the perception of NATO as a serious security threat increases over the years.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Serious Security Threat</th>
<th>Neither Enemy nor Partner</th>
<th>A Partner</th>
<th>Hard to Say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


What would in your opinion best serve Russia’s interest in relations with NATO?

![Graph showing the percentage of respondents' opinions on what best serves Russia's interest in relations with NATO from 2005 to 2009. The graph indicates a trend where the perception of Cooperation with NATO for Common Security increases over the years.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Apply for NATO Membership</th>
<th>Cooperate with NATO for Common Security</th>
<th>Build a Security Alliance to Counterweight NATO</th>
<th>Hard to Say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How would you describe the relationship between Russia and the USA?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>friendly</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>good neighbourly</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>normal, quiet</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reserved, cool</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strained</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hostile</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hard to say</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Do You Think That the Growth of China is a Threat to Russian Interests?

- yes: 44%
- no: 39%
- hard to say: 17%

Do you think that the Chinese state is friendly or hostile towards Russia?

![Chart showing the percentage of people in Russia who think China is friendly, hostile, or hard to say between 2002 and 2009.](http://bd.fom.ru/pdf/d43kitay.pdf)


The State of the Russian Army

Would you want a close relative of yours to serve in the army under the present conditions?

![Chart showing the percentage of people in Russia who would want a close relative to serve in the army between 1998 and 2010.](http://www.levada.ru/press/2010021701.html)

In your opinion, should Russia continue to have an army based on conscription or should the country change to a professional army?

![Graph showing opinions on army type]


At present more than 1,100,000 people serve in our army. In your opinion, how big should the Russian army be?

![Pie chart showing opinions on army size]

Source: representative opinion poll of the Russian population conducted by VTsIOM in February 2009, [http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/11459.html?no_cache=1&cHash=e8f87c0929](http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/11459.html?no_cache=1&cHash=e8f87c0929)
Do you see any problems with our army? If yes, which? (open question, up to three answers possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abuse and cruelty by higher ranks against conscripts (dedovshchina)</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Readiness for use, arms and equipment</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of discipline, disorganization</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low qualification of military personnel</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad conditions for soldiers’ everyday life</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and embezzlement</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of housing for soldiers</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary levels</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low budget</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over conscripts</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not worried about the problems of the army</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: included are all issues named by at least 3% of respondents.


What do you think, should funding of the armed forces be changed in order to build a strong army?

- Yes, greatly increased funding is needed: 36%
- Yes, somewhat more funding is needed: 35%
- No, the present level of funding is sufficient: 17%
- Hard to say: 10%
- Yes, somewhat less funding would be sufficient: 2%
- Yes, greatly reduced funding is needed: 1%

Source: representative opinion poll of the Russian population conducted by VTsIOM in February 2009, http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/11459.html?no_cache=1&cHash=e8f87c0929

Opinion polls compiled by Christoph Laug
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