Russian Public Relations Activities and Soft Power

Journal Issue

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Publication date:
2010-06-16

Permanent link:
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-006249299

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Originally published in:
Russian Analytical Digest (RAD) 81
RUSSIAN PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITIES AND SOFT POWER

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“Russian World”—Russia’s Soft Power Approach to Compatriots Policy

By Andis Kudors, Riga

Abstract

Russia uses its compatriots’ policy as a way of exerting soft power on neighboring countries. In order to reach as wide a group as possible, Russian policy-makers developed the concept of the “Russian World.” In pursuing its policy, the state has teamed up with the Russian Orthodox Church in promoting values that challenge the standard Western tradition. Russian television is popular in many neighboring countries and serves as a vehicle for spreading influence. The policy has raised concerns in the Baltic countries, but it is too early to evaluate its overall effectiveness.

A New Reliance on Soft Power

In his October 2008 interview to the newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that Moscow’s relations with Russian compatriots residing abroad would be developed based on the principles of soft power. Soft power, as a new approach in Russia’s foreign policy, was first mentioned in the Russian Foreign Policy Review in 2007.

According to Joseph S. Nye, the chief proponent of the concept of soft power, its attractiveness is derived from three sources—culture (where it is perceived positively), values (if a state follows them both within and outside its borders) and foreign policy (if this policy is considered legitimate and morally grounded). Nye speaks about soft power which, contrary to its “hard” variety, can alter the behavior of countries without coercion or offering economic benefits. In other words, soft power stimulates others to wish what you wish, because you possess authority based on charisma.

Russia’s Compatriots Policy

Western researchers usually assess Russia's chances of exerting soft power towards the West as limited. The situation is quite different with regard to Russia’s neighboring countries, especially the ethnic Russians and so-called Russian speakers residing there. Even though many of these individuals have become citizens of their host countries, Russia chooses to see them as its compatriots.

Who are these Russian compatriots residing abroad? Although a law defining this concept has been in force in Russia since 1999, the discussion is still ongoing. Amendments to the law were submitted for consideration to the State Duma in February 2010 with the aim of more precisely defining the term compatriot, stressing an individual’s self-identification and his/her practical connection with Russia. Such a connection could be, for example, membership in a Russian non-governmental organization (NGO) operating abroad. Critics of the amendments inside Russia have already labeled them as creating a group of “professional compatriots”.

The previous definition of the term allowed Russian foreign policy makers to consider nearly all Russian-speaking residents of its neighboring countries as a target audience for its compatriots policy. Russia’s officially stated “concern” for this group allowed it to portray its active foreign policy towards the neighboring countries as a moral obligation. In practice, this “concern” has at times been little different from interference in the other countries’ internal affairs.

The debate on the principles of the compatriots’ policy has a lot to do with Russia’s ongoing search for identity. The multi-ethnic composition of the Russian population does not permit the proponents of its compatriots’ policy to base their concept on ethnicity. In her study entitled “Russian diaspora and the Russian compatriots”, Marlene Laruelle, a researcher at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, observes that Russia’s foreign-policy makers were faced with the task of finding a common denominator for compatriots living abroad that would somehow combine legal, ethnic and other aspects. Over-emphasizing one of these features over another might have caused problems for the policy. From this issue sprung the need for yet another concept, the “Russian World (Russkiy Mir),” which would forge a common bond between Russia and its emigrants who left at various times.

“The Russian World”

The term “Russian World” is generally understood to comprise not only the Russian diaspora itself, but also an ideological concept of Russian culture and its mission in the world. Petr Shchedrovitsky, Efim Ostrovsky, Valery Tishkov, Vitaly Skrinnik, Tatiana Poloskova and Natalia Narochnijkaia are among the foremost authors of this concept. Its ideas were first formulated as early as the 1990s. In 2000, Schedrovitsky published an article entitled “Russian World and Transnational Russian Characteristics,”
in which he laid out the main ideas and objectives of the "Russian World" concept. Schedrovitsky identified the Russian language as one of its cornerstones. In doing so, he followed the ideas of the 18th century German philosopher Herder on the mutual correlation between the processes of language and thinking. Like Herder, Schedrovitsky believes that a culture may be understood and “learned” only through its carrier—language. He insists that those who speak Russian in their everyday life—also think Russian, and as a result—act Russian.

Initially, the concept of the “Russian World” was developed in parallel to, but independently of, the official Russian compatriots policy. Once Putin rose to power, this changed—the concept of the “Russian World” was henceforth promoted officially, too. Since belonging to a cultural-linguistic group is considered to be the main determinant of one’s belonging to the “Russian World,” its boundaries are not strictly delimited. This characteristic in turn allows Russian federal authorities to target their policy of “protecting compatriots’ interests” at a broad group of foreign countries’ citizens, flexibly adapting it to changing circumstances. Putin’s speech at the October 2001 Congress of Compatriots Residing Abroad supported such an approach: “The term ‘compatriot’ is definitely not a legal category. [...] For, since the very beginning, the concept ‘Russian World’ has gone far beyond the geographical boundaries of Russia and even beyond Russian ethnic boundaries.”

**Competition of Values**

As already mentioned, according to Nye’s concept of soft power, its sources may include particular values which are broadly perceived as belonging to a country’s identity, as well as its foreign policy. During Putin’s first term as president, the Russian power elite started searching for common ideological denominators that could serve as tools for the integration of society. A message uniting Russians at home could theoretically also be used for strengthening ties between Russia and its compatriots abroad. This approach is based on the Russian power elite’s conviction that Russian society needs a mobilizing idea. A topic that has risen to great popularity among Russian compatriots’ NGOs lately is the idea that the USSR’s victory in World War II is evidence of the state’s might and the nation’s muscle. Another preferred subject is the Russian Orthodox Church and its traditional cultural values as an alternative to the ideas of liberal democracy. The “Russian World” concept broadens the goals of the compatriots’ policy by linking it to the transcendent mission of the Russian people to defend and disseminate concrete values.

In his 28 January 2008 interview to the Russia Today television network, Andranik Migranian, a foreign policy expert close to Russia’s ruling elite, answered in the affirmative a journalist’s question about whether the recently established Institute for Democracy and Cooperation, with offices in New York and Paris, was a Russian soft power project. Migranian, who heads the Institute’s New York office, explained that its goal would not be to compete against Freedom House and similar organizations, but instead it was created to help the US understand Russia’s position on human rights and democracy issues.

The founding of the Institute exemplifies a new tendency in Russia’s approach to human rights and democracy matters. If previously official Russia, while criticizing the European Union for alleged double standards, routinely professed its adherence to universally accepted human rights norms, the new Institute’s task is to initiate a discussion on the very universality of certain human rights tenets. In this discussion, the Russian power elite has the keen backing of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).

Metropolitan Kirill, before taking office as the spiritual leader of the ROC, addressed the 10th World Russian People’s meeting on May 2006, and declared that a unique Russian civilization, consisting of Russia and the “Russian World,” should oppose Western civilization in its assertion of the universality of the Western tradition. Patriarch Kirill’s current activities and his statements in the context of “Russian World” indicate that under his leadership the Church will actively participate in further spreading the State’s compatriots’ policy.

From the point of view of its proponents, one of the advantages of involving the Russian Orthodox Church in the compatriots’ policy is that it removes the program from the purely political realm, at least to a certain extent. While the traditionally close relationship between church leaders and the secular authorities in Russia cannot be negated, those in political office may arguably reduce the likelihood and fierceness of attacks against state activities by teaming up with the church in promoting the compatriots policy. Religious freedom, highly regarded in the West, offers some degree of legitimacy to the international activities of the Russian Orthodox Church.

**Instruments**

As regards the implementation of soft power, Nye mentions daily communication, strategic communication and cooperation with opinion leaders. Through the Kremlin’s direct or indirect control of the country’s major television networks, the Russian power elite controls the tools for maintaining a more or less uniform interpretation of
events on the country’s television channels, which are targeted at both domestic and foreign audiences. Russian television is quite popular in several CIS countries and in the Baltic States, especially among the so-called Russian speakers. For example, the strong influence of Russian media in Moldova is demonstrated by the fact that in 2008, Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, not the Moldovan leaders, ranked as the most popular politicians in opinion polls. Like their counterparts in Moldova, part of the Latvian and Estonian population in fact also lives within the information space of the Russian Federation.

With the help of satellite television, Russia’s extensive and flourishing popular culture, comprising its growing film industry, pop music, modern literature and dramatic art tradition, make Russia a rather attractive regional power. Moreover, in recent years, television channels under direct or indirect governmental control appear to be purposely cultivating nostalgia for the Soviet period.

The Russian television channel “RTR Planeta” has begun to broadcast a series called “The best time in our life” about life in the USSR. Journalists from Russia have arrived in Latvia to shoot reports about the “good Soviet times” and “huge losses after the collapse of the USSR.” And these are just a few examples. The cultivation of nostalgia for the USSR seems to suggest that maybe its restoration would not be too bad after all—if not in the form it once existed, then at least intellectually, with Moscow at its center.

Next to the media, NGOs are a second major channel for the implementation of soft power. NGO activities are one way of fostering changes in other countries’ public opinion, as well as in the behavior of their politicians. The Kremlin reacted to the wave of “colored” revolutions in neighboring countries by establishing in 2006 and 2007 a number of NGOs, as well as activating cooperation with compatriots’ organizations in the CIS, the Baltic countries and elsewhere in the world. The objective was to influence socio-political processes in the countries in a more favorable direction while at the same time preventing drastic political changes inside Russia.

In parallel to the Russian embassies, Moscow Houses and other official representative offices, the Russian World Foundation has an increasing share in managing the activities of pro-Russian NGOs in foreign countries. The establishment of the Russian World foundation in 2007 under the supervision of Vyacheslav Nikonov, a political scientist with close ties to the Kremlin, is one example of the practical implementation of the concept of “Russian World”. Popularizing the Russian language and culture abroad is among the main objectives of the foundation. Russkiy Mir enjoys financial support from the government, and the number of Russian centers established by it is rapidly growing. By 2010, Russkiy Mir had set up 50 Russian centers in 29 countries (including the US, Germany, China, etc.).

**Hard Power Displays Limit Effectiveness of Soft Power**

Smoothly-phrased slogans on the unity of the Orthodox world and the unique spiritual mission of Russia starkly contrast with the reality of Russia’s foreign policy as exemplified by the military conflict with Georgia. Demonstrations of crude power are likely to compromise the effectiveness of the Kremlin’s on-going soft power endeavors. Whether culture can successfully become a source of soft power depends on the concrete situation and the circumstances in which it is embedded.

Although a relatively large segment of the ethnic Russian population in neighboring countries has retained good Russian language skills, politicizing language issues is likely to alienize sizeable groups abroad from the “Russian World” idea and trigger counter-reactions. Unlike the so-called Russian speakers, the neighboring countries’ political elites are much less prone to the appeal of Russian soft power. Though officially so-called Russian speakers are not dissuaded from maintaining and strengthening their ethnic identity, the political instrumentalization of such tendencies by the proponents of the Compatriots Policy is viewed as problematic by many. Thus, Russian compatriots policy does not always possess the attractiveness and moral sway which Nye would see as essential to its effectiveness.

Politicians and analysts in the Baltic States are increasingly concerned about the fact that the values popularized by Moscow in the neighboring countries are irreconcilable with democratic values. Former Communist countries in Russia’s immediate neighborhood feel that the acuteness of their exposure to Russian influence is not always seen and understood further west. A fierce competition for people’s hearts and minds has begun. The Russian soft power projects are by no means sporadic or coincidental, they have a long-term character, and they are not likely to end either tomorrow or the day after.

Both the Russkiy Mir Foundation and the other institutions involved in the implementation of the compatriots policy have been operating only for a relatively short period of time. It is thus still too soon for an objective assessment of their effectiveness.

*About the Author*

Andis Kudors is Executive Director of the Centre for East European Policy Studies (Riga, Latvia).
Opinion Poll

Should Russia Defend Its Compatriots Abroad?

Should Russia take measures to protect Russians living in the “near abroad”*, and if yes, which measures?

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<th>July 2003</th>
<th>July 2008</th>
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<td>Russia should take political measures</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>53%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia should impose economic sanctions</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia should use military force</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia should not take measures</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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* “Near abroad” is the term for the successor states of the Soviet Union.
In your opinion, how effectively does the Russian government protect the rights of our compatriots abroad?

![Bar chart showing responses to the question about the effectiveness of the Russian government in protecting the rights of compatriots abroad, differentiated by age groups and years of the polls.]

Russia’s Use of PR as a Foreign Policy Tool

By Robert W. Orttung, Washington

Abstract
Public relations plays a major role in Russian domestic politics and its foreign policies. Vladimir Putin relied heavily on PR to establish his initial image in Russian politics. In foreign policy, the Russian state and corporations have hired Western PR firms to improve their image abroad. They have also engaged in a number of other techniques, from establishing a global television network to sponsoring a German soccer team. Russia itself seems to have derived few benefits from these efforts, particularly since self-inflicted wounds which result in extensive reputational damage tend to overshadow the benefits gained from successful PR campaigns. However, Russian companies such as Gazprom seem to gain some positive results from their efforts to promote business relationships.

PR Power
Countries around the world use a variety of hard power and soft power to either command or co-opt others into supporting their goals. Hard power tools include coercion and inducement, while soft power techniques emphasize agenda-setting and attracting others through positive values, culture, media, and overall effectiveness. Public relations techniques in all their various forms contribute a useful addition to this tool box, with persuasion fitting somewhere between the hard and soft ends of the power spectrum.

Russia is not alone in devoting considerable attention to this effort. Through the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), the US government supports civilian international broadcasting with the partial purpose of explaining American policies and values. Its outlets include the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio and TV Martí, and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks — Radio Sawa and Alhurra Television. BBG broadcasters distribute programming in 60 languages to an estimated weekly audience of 171 million people via radio, TV, the Internet and other new media, according to the BBG website. The agency’s 2008 budget was $682.1 million. Similarly, China has launched a $6.6 billion dollar juggernaut to establish a media giant that will give the rising power the ability to offer international audiences Chinese perspectives on a wide range of issues and to correct the misperceptions that Chinese leaders believe the Western media disseminates. The effort includes broadcasts by China Radio International, China Central Television, and the official Xinhua news agency.

The Domestic Context
PR has been a part of Russian life and politics since Rus’s beginnings in the ninth century, according to United Russia Duma deputy and MGIMO professor Vladimir Medinsky. His latest book, Osobennosti natsional’nogo PIARA [Peculiarities of national PR], traces this history in great detail showing how the authorities have tried to get their subjects to think what they want them to think without even realizing that their ideas are being dictated by external stimuli. The process is the same for selling a candy bar or the president, as Yeltsin’s famous slogan “Vote or you lose” demonstrated.

While all politicians in all countries rely on PR to build their image with the public, Vladimir Putin had a special need for such techniques, as Greg Simons points out in his 2010 study of media in Russia. When Yeltsin chose him as his successor to the Russian presidency, Putin was largely unknown to the electorate. The Kremlin image makers could start with a reasonably blank slate to build him up as someone whom voters would support as their next leader. Even though Yeltsin chose Putin as Russia’s second president, Putin’s campaign for office created an image that both separated him from Yeltsin and contrasted him with his predecessor, depicting him as a chief executive who was healthy, young, energetic, and able to reassert control over the violence-plagued North Caucasus.

From his start as a Russia’s president, Putin has effectively shaped his image. He quickly asserted control over the national television networks, where most Russians gain their information, in order to ensure that his message reached its intended audience without filtering through independent journalists and analysts. The Kursk submarine incident early in Putin’s tenure as president taught him the importance of constant vigilance in securing his image. When the submarine sank, killing 118 sailors, Putin at first appeared unconcerned and remained on vacation. When he finally did travel to the sub’s base, angry relatives still grieving their loss berated him. Putin did not make this mistake again.
Subsequently, Putin has understood the importance of appearing to be a popular leader. In 2003, his Kremlin took control of the country’s then most respected polling agency VTsIOM, provoking an exodus of the key staff into the Levada Center, a new organization independent from the government. He also held annual press conferences that gave the impression that he was accessible to the population even though the questions were tightly controlled in advance.

Putin uses PR to make his policies palatable to a wide spectrum of the Russian audience. While Putin presents himself as the scourge of the oligarchs to the broad public, most of Russia’s richest men continue to thrive, as Miguel Vazquez Linan points out in a recent analysis of Kremlin propaganda. And while the government describes Putin’s policies as lifting Russia off its knees from prostration before the West, Russia in fact frequently cooperates with Western policy. The combination of extensive energy subsidies and the government’s “monologue of power” control of the media ensure that the population will continue to back the current leadership.

PR in Foreign Policy
Russia’s attempts to use PR strategies in its foreign policy extrapolate from the Kremlin’s successful use of media tactics inside Russia to achieve similar ends on the international stage. The Russian government, regional governments, state-owned corporations, and even individual oligarchs have hired Western public relations firms to achieve their purposes. This work goes on around the world but is most transparent in the US since the US government requires all PR firms working on American territory to disclose their public relations activities conducted on behalf of foreign governments and companies (See Table 1). The Justice Department publishes these disclosures on the Internet.

When Russia served as the G8 president and hosted the group in St. Petersburg in June 2006, it sought Ketchum’s help in organizing its media relations, paying $2 million to the PR giant for this support. In 2007 the Russian government again hired Ketchum for advice, lobbying, and media relations support to promote energy security, the Russian Federation as a place favorable for foreign investments, and the Russian Federation’s accession to the World Trade Organization. The Russian government sought to promote greater visibility and understanding of its goals. It paid $845,000 for a two month contract at the beginning of the year. Similarly, in the first five months of 2009, the Russian government paid $175,000 for help gathering information on US policies that affected Russia. (See Table 1 for the details). The government currently does not have any contracts on file in the database.

By comparison, the Georgian government is spending more than $2 million on PR and lobbying contracts in the US during 2010, according to data collected by Lincoln Mitchell and Alexander Cooley. The German government does not engage PR firms for this kind of work. On July 11, 2007, the Congressional Affairs Office of the Chinese embassy in the US hired Patton and Boggs for the fee of $22,000 per month and a term of one year to provide counsel on US congressional matters.

Regional governments have also hired PR firms. For example, Krasnodar Krai worked with APCO Worldwide Inc. in order to arrange meetings with prominent US media outlets such as Business Week, the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, and The New York Times for the purpose of promoting foreign investment in the region.

Russian corporations have also hired PR firms to promote their interests in the US. According to the publicly available documents, Gazprom and its subsidiary Gazprom Export have paid approximately $350,000 a month for PR services in the US since August 2007. The goal is to work with the media to improve understanding of Gazprom’s basic business strategies and strengthen investor trust in the company. The basic idea was to encourage Western media to broaden their focus away from problem areas in covering Gazprom, such as its prominent energy conflicts.

Techsnabexport (TENEX), the key Russian exporter of nuclear materials, hired APCO Worldwide in April 2010 to improve the image of Rosatom, Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation, as a reliable supplier for US utilities among relevant American decision-makers. It also sought help in overcoming existing political and trade barriers and in overcoming information attacks by competitors.

Additionally individual oligarchs have hired US firms to help promote their business. Oleg Deripaska, the head of a diversified business empire with major stakes in Russia’s aluminum and automobile sectors, has sought help trying to obtain a US visa. The US government has denied him a visa allegedly on the basis of allegations that he is linked to organized crime. He also sought help in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to purchase General Moter’s European operations.

A Variety of Techniques
The Russian government has employed a variety of other techniques as well. The most prominent is the global RT (formerly Russia Today) television network.
Set up in 2005, the network now broadcasts 24/7 in English, Spanish, and Arabic in over 100 countries, according to its website. It has correspondents in New York, Washington, London, Paris, Delhi and Tel Aviv. It also claims to be the first network to “set up a bureau in Tskhinval, the capital of South Ossetia after the August 2008 conflict”. When President Medvedev visited Washington for the Nuclear Security Summit in May, he gave an interview to the local RT bureau, an honor that only Izvestia has received this year, according to Nezavisimaya gazeta on June 2.

Among the more subtle PR techniques Russia employs are purchasing space in prominent foreign media. For example, the official government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta has funded monthly supplements in newspapers in India, Britain, Bulgaria and the United States, including a paid supplement in the Washington Post.

“Russia Now,” as the supplement is called, presents a sophisticated view of Russian domestic politics and advocates Russia’s foreign policy positions. Although the official Rossiyskaya Gazeta is the source of most of the information, the May 26 supplement to the Washington Post included an article entitled “Outpost of Change” that was “prepared in cooperation with gazeta.ru,” the well-regarded Russian-language Internet news portal, which is now owned by Alisher Usmanov, who has close ties to Gazprom. The article, using a clever identification with Obama’s change theme, puts a positive spin on opposition protests that took place in Kaliningrad in January this year, in which as many as 10,000 participants joined a rally where some placards called for Putin’s resignation. The article described the northwestern exclave as a “model for constructive dissent” where some of the activists claim that they “are starting to be heard.” This picture of the domestic scene in Russia contrasts sharply with news usually presented in the Post and New York Times, which paints events in a much harsher light.

The supplement also makes a clear case for Russia’s foreign policy priorities and explains through example how Russian actions should be portrayed in the West. Under an unflattering picture of the Georgian president, it asks “Should America support Saakashvili?” Another article proclaims “Kremlin’s New Foreign Policy: Partnership with the West.” That text was written by the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Dmitry Trenin and republished from the Moscow Times.

Such efforts are only a small part of a much larger campaign. For example, as Gazprom’s image in Europe was sinking fast after the 2006 gas dispute with Ukraine, the company managers decided to follow the example of Roman Abramovich, who gained celebrity status in the UK by purchasing the Chelsea football club. Since UEFA rules prevent Gazprom from purchasing a second club in addition to St. Petersburg’s Zenit, it could only sponsor one. Zenit President Andrei Fursenko recommended that the company sponsor Germany’s Schalke 04, since it has the same colors as Zenit. Gazprom is now the chief sponsor of the club and its logo is displayed prominently on team jerseys and the website. Similarly, in December 2008, as it was becoming clear that gas deliveries to Ukraine would probably be affected in the upcoming dispute, Gazprom opened a website for the crisis—Ukrainefacts (http://www.gazpromukrainefacts.com/)—which carried daily reports of meetings, press conferences, and the company’s version of events as they unfolded.

**Mixed Results**

The use of public relations techniques has produced different results for the Russian state and Russian companies. The Russian state has had little success in improving its foreign image. Russia often inflicts serious damage to itself in moves that receive wide attention in the Western media. Russia’s invasion of Georgia, energy conflicts with its neighbors, high levels of corruption and human rights violations at home win considerable attention in the West. The negative consequences of such actions greatly overshadow the positive benefits Russia receives from its wide ranging PR campaigns.

Additionally, it is not clear that many people are interested in this kind of material. For example, few of the US’s Russia policy-makers are likely to be swayed by this effort, while the general public is unlikely to focus on events in Russia when economic and political problems closer to home are much more pressing.

However, Russian companies, including state-owned Gazprom, who want to achieve very specific aims may be able to use PR effectively in these more concrete cases. Many observers have claimed that the blame for the 2009 gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine was more evenly shared between the two countries because Gazprom had improved its PR in comparison to the 2006 crisis. Gazprom’s business partners were obviously well prepared and supported Gazprom not only with words but also with proposals for concrete actions (like financing the additional gas needed for transport purposes). These results likely had an impact on political decision-makers. Of course, Gazprom will not be able to convince Western audiences, particularly the gener-
al public, that it is a white knight, but its PR may just be enough to assure business partners and governments that they can profitably do business with Gazprom. Such outcomes are crucial for the company.

About the Author
Robert Orttung is the president of the Resource Security Institute and a visiting fellow at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich.

Recommended Reading

Please see p. 11 and 12 for an overview of recent Russian public relations and lobbying activities in the US, as described in the US Justice Department Database.
### Recent Russian Public Relations and Lobbying Activities in the US, as Described in the US Justice Department Database

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal</th>
<th>PR Firm</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Fee</th>
<th>Activities (according to statements filed with the US Justice Department)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Techsnabexport (TENEX) | APCO Worldwide Inc | April 12, 2010 for one year | $3,000,000 plus 18% Russian VAT plus up to $125,000 in expenses per quarter | A. Creating and promoting a new image of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom as a global diversified company, leading provider of nuclear technologies and a reliable supplier for the US energy market among the US government, law-making authorities, business and financial circles, public and academic community, and also in the mass media  
B. Supporting the interests of Rosatom in the USA (reputational, political, and business support) and rendering assistance in establishing efficient mutual relationships with politicians and decision-makers including local and state authorities  
C. Rendering assistance in overcoming the existing political and trade barriers, including practical efforts to support the activities related to submission for Congressional approval of the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the USA for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy dated May 6, 2008. …  
E. Creating for subsidiaries of Rosatom operational tools and channels to respond to information attacks by competitors. …  
G. Rendering the necessary support to TENEX’s contracting campaign with US utilities – operators of nuclear power plants to ensure the maximum efficient realization of commercial potential of Russian nuclear products deliveries… |
| Gazprom Export | Clark & Weinstock | November 12, 2009 | $27,900 per month plus taxes | Clark & Weinstock has been engaged as a subcontractor of Ketchum Inc. to monitor government activities regarding energy policies for Gazprom Export. Clark & Weinstock will monitor government activities regarding energy policies (international and domestic); mergers and acquisitions in the energy sector; foreign relations regarding energy policy; and foreign investment in the US. Work may include, but is not limited to, meeting with government officials, covering relevant Congressional hearings, and tracking relevant legislation and regulations. |
| Oleg Deripaska | Endeavor Group | May 6, 2009 | $40,000 per month plus actual expenses | Endeavor Group assists the principal Mr. Deripaska in the preparation of a US visa application and advocates for US approval of such application. Endeavor Group also advises on and assists in the execution of commercial transactions. Additionally, Endeavor Group provides legal advice and assistance to Mr. Deripaska with respect to global aluminum issues. Endeavor group expects to … interact with the United States Trade Representative office to encourage US participation in the intra-governmental global aluminum discussions and engage with the Department of Treasury’s Auto Task Force regarding the prospective acquisition of General Motor’s European operations. |
| Russian Federation Executive Branch | Alston & Bird LLP (a subcontractor to Ketchum) | January 1, 2009-May 31, 2009 | $175,000 ($35,000 a month) | Alston & Bird will gather information and provide advice and analysis on various areas of US foreign and foreign economic policy, including trade, energy, and politico-military issues which affect the bilateral US Russian relationship. Alston & Bird LLP will also monitor and report on legislative developments in the Congress in similar issues areas. |

(continued overleaf)
Recent Russian Public Relations and Lobbying Activities in the US, as described in US Justice Department Database (continued from previous page)

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<th>Principal</th>
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<th>Fee</th>
<th>Activities (according to statements filed with the US Justice Department)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gazprom</td>
<td>Gavin Anderson &amp; Co. (working as a subcontractor to Gavin Anderson's UK office)</td>
<td>Apparently beginning August 2007</td>
<td>$100,000/month (fees and out of pocket expenses)</td>
<td>Provide on-going financial media relations support for Gazprom. Improve understanding of Gazprom's basic business strategies. Strengthen the trust of investors in Gazprom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazpromexport</td>
<td>Ketchum, a subcontractor to Gavin Anderson UK</td>
<td>Beginning August 2007</td>
<td>$247,500/month (fees and out of pocket expenses)</td>
<td>Provide media relations support for Gazprom Export as requested and media monitoring. Ketchum will pursue various activities, including arranging interviews between representatives of Gazprom and members of the media; monitoring media coverage; developing message points for interviews; press releases, fact sheets, and backgrounder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation Executive Branch</td>
<td>Ketchum and its 100% owned subsidiary The Washington Group</td>
<td>January 2007 – February 28, 2007</td>
<td>$845,000</td>
<td>Provide public relations counsel, lobbying and media relations support for the purpose of promoting energy security, the Russian Federation as a place favorable for foreign investments, and the Russian Federation's accession to the World Trade Organization. The primary focus of the support provided by the Ketchum-led team of agencies is to facilitate the relationship between representatives of the Russian Federation and the government and media in other WTO-member countries, in particular the G8. The objectives in facilitating media and government relations is to promote both visibility and understanding of the goal of energy security, the merits of the Russian Federation's accession to the WTO, and Russia as a place favorable for foreign investments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation acting as G8 president</td>
<td>Ketchum</td>
<td>April 2006 – December 31, 2006</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
<td>Ketchum will pursue several communications activities to facilitate a relationship between Russia's Presidency of the G8 and the media. These activities include: arranging interviews between representatives of the G8 Presidency and members of the media; clipping media coverage; assisting in registering journalists planning to attend the G8 summit in St. Petersburg; staffing the press center at the G8 Summit; developing talking-points for interviews; press releases, fact sheets and backgrounder; and facilitating meetings between representatives of Russia's G8 Presidency and persons frequently quoted as experts in stories about international relations, such as authors and academics.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

About the Russian Analytical Digest

Editors: Stephen Aris, Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perović, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder

The Russian Analytical Digest is a bi-weekly internet publication jointly produced by the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen (www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de), the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich), the Resource Security Institute and the Institute of History at the University of Basel (http://histsem.unibas.ch/seminar/). It is supported by the German Association for East European Studies (DGO).

The Digest draws on contributions to the German-language Russland-Analysen (www.laender-analysen.de/russland), the CSS analytical network on Russia and Eurasia (www.res.ethz.ch), and the Russian Regional Report. The Russian Analytical Digest covers political, economic, and social developments in Russia and its regions, and looks at Russia’s role in international relations.

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Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen

Founded in 1982, the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen is dedicated to socialist and post-socialist cultural and societal developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In the area of post-socialist societies, extensive research projects have been conducted in recent years with emphasis on political decision-making processes, economic culture and the integration of post-socialist countries into EU governance. One of the core missions of the institute is the dissemination of academic knowledge to the interested public. This includes regular email services with nearly 20,000 subscribers in politics, economics and the media.

With a collection of publications on Eastern Europe unique in Germany, the Research Centre is also a contact point for researchers as well as the interested public. The Research Centre has approximately 300 periodicals from Russia alone, which are available in the institute’s library. News reports as well as academic literature is systematically processed and analyzed in data bases.

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich is a Swiss academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and information services in the fields of international and Swiss security studies. The CSS also acts as a consultant to various political bodies and the general public. The CSS is engaged in research projects with a number of Swiss and international partners. The Center’s research focus is on new risks, European and transatlantic security, strategy and doctrine, area studies, state failure and state building, and Swiss foreign and security policy.

In its teaching capacity, the CSS contributes to the ETH Zurich-based Bachelor of Arts (BA) in public policy degree course for prospective professional military officers in the Swiss army and the ETH and University of Zurich-based MA program in Comparative and International Studies (MACIS); offers and develops specialized courses and study programs to all ETH Zurich and University of Zurich students; and has the lead in the Executive Masters degree program in Security Policy and Crisis Management (MAS ETH SPCM), which is offered by ETH Zurich. The program is tailored to the needs of experienced senior executives and managers from the private and public sectors, the policy community, and the armed forces.

The CSS runs the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), and in cooperation with partner institutes manages the Crisis and Risk Network (CRN), the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP), the Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SSN), and the Russian and Eurasian Security (RES) Network.

The Institute of History at the University of Basel

The Institute of History at the University of Basel was founded in 1887. It now consists of ten professors and employs some 80 researchers, teaching assistants and administrative staff. Research and teaching relate to the period from late antiquity to contemporaneous history. The Institute offers its 800 students a Bachelor’s and Master’s Degree in general history and various specialized subjects, including a comprehensive Master’s Program in Eastern European History (http://histsem.unibas.ch/beriche/osteuropaesische-geschichte/).

Resource Security Institute

The Resource Security Institute (RSI) is a non-profit organization devoted to improving understanding about global energy security, particularly as it relates to Eurasia. We do this through collaborating on the publication of electronic newsletters, articles, books and public presentations.