Urban Planning in the Soviet Union and Russia

Author(s):
DeHaan, Heather D.; Dixon, Megan

Publication date:
2010-11-01

Permanent link:
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-006249412

Rights / license:
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted

Originally published in:
Russian Analytical Digest (RAD) 85
URBAN PLANNING IN THE SOVIET UNION AND RUSSIA

- **ANALYSIS**
  Dynamic Cityscapes: Contesting the Soviet City
  By Heather D. DeHaan, Binghamton
  2

- **ANALYSIS**
  Chinese Developers and Russian Urban Planning
  By Megan Dixon, Caldwell, Idaho
  5
Dynamic Cityscapes: Contesting the Soviet City
By Heather D. DeHaan, Binghamton

Abstract
Even in the Soviet period, Russian cities were negotiated entities, emerging from the complex intersection of institutional, social, and political interests. As seen in Nizhnii Novgorod in the 1930s, despite the Stalinist government’s overarching economic and political power, no truly centralized program for the city’s growth emerged. The conflict-ridden interplay of planners, municipal leaders, industrial interests, Politburo demands, and common residents determined the city’s actual, as opposed to planned, development. In effect, as Soviet-era planners complained, the city built itself.

The Limits of Planning
Visitors to Nizhnii Novgorod in 2010 will discover a city transformed by new construction projects, which have gradually replaced the low-rise wooden buildings of the late Imperial and early Soviet period with up-to-date residential and commercial complexes. Popular reactions to this change have been mixed, ranging from an excited embrace of such symbols of prosperity to regret for the homogenizing, destructive power of post-Soviet capital. The more architecturally attractive and creative buildings naturally inspire more appreciation than those of weak design or execution, but all—to citizens’ chagrin or delight—push the landscape higher. Such upward mobility of infrastructure, coupled with the economic mobility of citizens, has garnered all of the dirt, noise, congestion, and air pollution typical of busy metropolitan life. For better and for worse, as Marx might have predicted, all that was once solid (and stubbornly so, in Soviet opinion) now melts into air.

Of course, even in the Soviet period, the urban landscape—and the forces within it—proved to be quite dynamic, in ways that Soviet leaders often rued. At the height of the Stalinist 1930s, after Nizhnii Novgorod had been christened “Gorky” in honor of the eponymous Nizhnii-born Soviet proletarian writer, the city’s growth reflected not the singular force of Stalin’s will, but rather the tense and confused operations of state power, as mediated by various social, economic, and political groups. Industrial managers, common citizens, competing planning bodies, as well as municipal leaders thwarted city planners’ attempts to design and build the city according to a scientific plan. Even when these planners opted for an overtly monumental Stalinist urban design, they failed. For then, as now, the cityscape was not simply an extension of central power, but a medium of power—something negotiated, contested, made and unmade. Behind the sameness of the Soviet Union’s seemingly drab cityscapes lay vital battles for power and resources, as imbedded in urban form.

Some Soviet planners implicitly acknowledged this reality, but most initially operated as if they could simply monopolize development, imposing their rational-scientific technologies on an unruly urban landscape. In seeking to achieve this coherence, they conceptualized all competing claims to resources as manifestations of urban functions, to be rationally accommodated and controlled through scientific planning. After all, to planners the city was an organism defined by the circulation of goods and people, the elimination of waste, the consumption of energy, the inhalation of fresh air, and rapid growth. Roads provided the skeleton of the whole, while architecture offered a sense of style, a fashionable costume to clothe the urban body with identity and grace. According to this vision of the city, all conflict could be resolved through function-harmonizing urban plans.

These professional illusions collapsed almost immediately, thanks to the Soviet Union’s limited human and material infrastructure. Its lack of educated foremen, its shortage of funding for housing and municipal construction, its lack of such effective “technologies of rule” as updated maps, as well as the Soviet penchant for popular spontaneity challenged the technocratic systems that planners had hoped to impose. Given so many shortages, neither Soviet law nor the “command economy” could enforce planning standards or ensure that funds and goods allocated for planners’ purposes reached their destination. In such a setting, planners found themselves compelled to step out of their ivory towers and into the socio-political fray, where they might negotiate support for their initiatives. The people of the city, as they discovered, were not merely functions, but willful individuals.

Competing Interests
For all the planners’ blindness, some of their troubles could be attributed to Moscow itself—not simply to its economic system (which often takes all the blame), but to the state’s insistence that all initiatives, including all plans, win Moscow’s approval. Had Moscow been the only contender on the local political scene, this might not have posed a problem. But, planners also answered to municipal and provincial leaders, whose priority was...
to alleviate the city's housing and service crisis. Industrial bodies, threatened by planners' attempts to regulate emissions, remove them from the city center, or claim their reserve lands, also merited attention, particularly insofar as they controlled the resources upon which municipal construction depended. Indeed, funding and supplies for urban development tended to be channeled through industrial bodies. Planners therefore had to accommodate everyone.

In theory, given Moscow's total authority over all dimensions of urban development, planners' need to please several varied institutions would have posed little challenge. However, within the overall program of building socialism, individual institutions advanced particular agendas. Industry sought maximal space and resources, while local government sought to build the greatest amount of infrastructure and housing in the least amount of time, using minimal resources. Although both theoretically answered to the Politburo, in practice these institutions answered almost exclusively to their distinct, function-defined overseers in Moscow, such as the Commissariat of Heavy Industry or the Commissariat for the Municipal Economy. The self-interest of such commissariats generally overrode the sort of compromise upon which planners' success depended.

Ideals v. Functionality

The Scientific Technical Council of the Russian Commissariat for the Municipal Economy, which was responsible for approving all city plans, also tended to prioritize purely institutional interests. Displaying little concern for the social and budgetary problems facing most municipal governments, the Scientific Technical Council limited its scope of vision to the analysis of planning proposals' theoretical and scientific validity. Tending to abstraction, this agency looked askance at the various compromises that planners inserted into their designs, as they sought to cut costs and facilitate short-term expansion. As a result, the agency initially rejected each of the city plans that it received, including that submitted for Nizhnii Novgorod.

A similar problem, which also appeared in the 1930s, derived from Moscow's other abstraction—not pure science, but pure aesthetics. Although Soviet authorities instituted many sensible and enduring approaches to urban design in the mid-1930s, the imposition of Socialist Realist aesthetics interfered with functional, pragmatic plans for urban growth. Monumental to the extreme, the Socialist Realist vision of the cityscape made no compromise with local economic and social limitations. Such planning symbolized the vast potential of socialism, projecting the image of an alternative, not-yet-realizable world. Of course, because it featured a vision whose implementation depended on yet-undiscovered technologies, resources, and engineering feats, Socialist Realist design did little to solve the problems facing industrial and municipal leaders. The disjunction between on-the-ground realities and the abstract utopias envisioned in Moscow could hardly have been more stark.

Working Out Central Plans in Nizhnii

Mandated with addressing the real needs of real cities, planners in Nizhnii Novgorod did not neglect their socialist commitment to equal services and housing for workers in all industries and all regions. Yes, they officially conformed to Moscow's newly imposed aesthetic, if only to win state approval for their work. At times, they comforted themselves with the assurance that all plans envision a place-yet-to-be and are, in that sense, utopian. At the same time, however, they did not forget the city's economic limitations. In fact, when drafting the annual construction plans purportedly designed to achieve their more monumental, long-term vision for the city, planners effectively sustained the very patterns of growth and construction that predated the new plan and had been advanced by planning experts well before the advent of Socialist Realism.

Such inability to garner agreement between the locality and the center was exacerbated by the Soviet Union's lack of a stable and coherent urban vision. In the First Five-Year Plan, authorities advocated the construction of housing combines, which offered fully collectivized living, as made possible (at least in theory) by the industrialization of domestic chores. These combines released women from such domestic duties as cleaning, food-preparation, and child-rearing by assigning these tasks to specialized facilities. Unfortunately, economic and administrative failures, coupled with popular preference for familial life, soon shattered this vision, spawning so-called "transitional combines" that permitted for some degree of family life. A few years later, when Soviet authorities rehabilitated the family, these, too, fell by the wayside.

This wavering urban vision extended to the broader cityscape. In the late 1920s, authorities favored garden cities over large metropolises, which were deemed corrupt and unhealthy. By 1935, however, the highly centralized, mega-city was once again in vogue. Along with this, authorities rehabilitated traditional city quarters, which were delineated by a rectangle of housing-lined roads. The older meridian construction, whereby all homes stood on a north–south axis to permit a maximum of sunlight to enter via East- or West-facing windows, was deemed to be a waste of urban space.
The People Decide
For all the disruptive impact of such elite disputes, these arguably had less impact on development than urban residents, whose battles for power and resources were waged in and through the space of the city. In collusion with industry, for instance, workers circumvented the state’s passport and regulatory system, shifting from one job to another without state authorization. In need of waterfront land. Wielding its economic clout, industry with flood protection, drainage, as well as transporta
which local industry might be able to obtain much-
workers, whether or not they were legal occupants.
To complicate matters, when planners or construction trusts tried to evict these workers so that they might tear down a building and make space for new construction, workers often refused to vacate. Because Soviet law required that ousted residents be granted alternative dwellings, which the state could not always provide, officials were loath to remove workers, whether or not they were legal occupants.

Industry, too, proved a powerful contender in the urban arena. Soviet authorities in Moscow channeled construction resources to the localities through industrial commissariats, which forwarded such resources to municipal leaders via their local industrial subordinates. For industrial leaders, however, supplies designated for municipal use were simply too tempting a resource. Industry itself was poorly supplied, and “excess” materials (i.e. goods initially designated for urban development) made valuable bartering tools, in exchange for which local industry might be able to obtain much-needed goods. So, taking advantage of weak Soviet accounting practices, industry generally neglected to transfer supplies meant for municipal development to city leaders. To the contrary, by threatening to withhold funds or supplies, industry attempted to assert control over city planning, thereby reclaiming the valuable lands from which planners and sanitary officials had hoped to ban it. While land was plentiful, developable land— with flood protection, drainage, as well as transportation, sanitary, and energy systems—proved rare, as was waterfront land. Wielding its economic clout, industry fought to retain its control over these scarce resources.

Everyday foremen and builders also exercised tremendous power. In theory, all their work should have conformed to preapproved, expert-produced architectural and engineering designs. But, the construction trusts for whom these figures worked generally encouraged building crews to take expert authority somewhat lightly. As all knew, because of the shortage of skilled administrators in the city planning office, plans were long in coming and often defective. A construction trust that awaited an officially approved design might stand idle throughout the summer, when construction should have been progressing rapidly. Besides, even when timely and accurate, architectural designs often called for the use of deficit, excessively costly, or unavailable construction materials. With tight deadlines and limited budgets, Soviet construction trusts therefore preferred to launch construction prior to obtaining official designs, as well as to exercise the freedom to make alterations to designs as needed, without seeking official permission. Such ad hoc changes, made by poorly educated foremen and builders, account for many a defective or strange-appearing Soviet building. Ironically, then, in seeking to beautify the city with elaborate construction—or rather, elaborate designs—experts in the city planning office merely increased the chance that a new building would be defective or clumsy in appearance.

Politicizing Constrains Stalin’s Power
Clearly, the cityscape was more directly shaped by intra-city competition for resources than by Stalin’s dictates or the constraints of ideology. Not that ideology or Stalin were irrelevant. Both set the parameters of what was possible and acceptable, even mandated. Every agency and individual acted in accordance with both. Managers of local factories answered for the successful fulfillment of their production plans, deemed vital to building socialist industry. Similarly, common citizens defended their right to housing, deemed essential to their role in production and reproduction. Planners, too, defended their authority on grounds that the socialist city should be lovely and beautiful. All of these figures operated within ideological bounds. However, as planners discovered, within this framework there was much scope for competition.

Although planners continued to pose as scientific experts whose vision was objective and therefore transcended politics, they fully recognized the degree to which their success depended upon politicking. In this regard, in 1936 planners in Nizhnii Novgorod opted to consult the population about their planning work. Their decision was not entirely voluntary: at the time, because the state wished to appear more open and accountable to society, it ordered state representatives such as planners to “draw closer to the masses.” Nonetheless, planners’ turn to public relations was not only avant-garde, being launched well before such consultation became widespread practice in the West, but also shrewd. Consultation made their plan appear to derive from the people, the heart and soul of the state. Granted, in this performance, “the people” were an abstraction. Popular feedback had little impact on the plan itself. But, the event did ground planners’ authority in their “democratic” stance, indirectly acknowledging not only the theoretical power of the people, but also their real power to sculpt the cityscape. In fact, hoping to capitalize on
their democratic posturing, planners simultaneously tried to mobilize the population for garbage-removal, building repair, tree-planting, and other city beautification initiatives.

The Nizhnii Novgorod cityscape, then, did not emerge in accordance with a scientific, ideological, or centrally-imposed plan. Instead, thanks to incessant battles for power, resources, and influence, the city effectively “built itself,” eluding planners’ control. Both ideology and state oversight moderated this intra-city competition, of course. Nonetheless, even at the height of Stalin’s power, no central apparatus dictated the form of the city. Even ideology failed to fully define urban form, for the precise meaning of ideology repeatedly morphed, reflecting the state’s ever-changing social, political, and economic concerns. As a result, planners could not behave as objective, all-powerful mediums of state or ideology; to the contrary, they had to negotiate for influence and resources. In fact, it was this highly dynamic struggle between state, planners, industry, and people that fostered stagnant, failed development. In this sense, the dynamism of the post-Soviet cityscape is not entirely new; only its visible bustle and rapid-paced physical change mark a departure from the past.

About the author
Heather D. DeHaan is Assistant Professor of History as the State University of New York at Binghamton.

ANALYSIS

Chinese Developers and Russian Urban Planning

By Megan Dixon, Caldwell, Idaho

Abstract
The Baltic Pearl is a multi-use district under construction southwest of St. Petersburg, Russia. It is projected to occupy over 200 hectares and to include housing, commercial areas, and recreational facilities, such as hotels and water parks. In interviews for the local construction press, officials of the Baltic Pearl firm continue to insist that the financial crisis has not and will not affect the Baltic Pearl’s construction schedule. Today the firm and its partners operate with apparent independence from the administrative bureaucracy, but from 2003 to 2007 the city planning apparatus held it under close scrutiny. The development of the Baltic Pearl presents an intriguing window into urban planning in St. Petersburg over the years 2003–2010.

The Baltic Pearl Project
The Baltic Pearl is located just west of the Southern Victory Park, between Peterhof Highway and the Gulf of Finland. As of autumn 2010, the project continues to move ahead. By summer 2010, two residential complexes along the Peterhof Highway were completed; over 700 units in the lower-priced complex have been sold and keys delivered to new owners.

The project was conceived by Jiang Jiren, Chairman of the Shanghai People’s Political Advisory Committee, who came to St. Petersburg with a Chinese trade delegation in early 2003. The developer, the Baltic Pearl Company, is a subsidiary of a consortium of five large development firms from Shanghai, China, with the Shanghai International Investment Corporation (SIIC) as the lead member. (SIIC had had a small trading firm in Petersburg since the mid-1990s.) Both the Petersburg and Shanghai governments backed the project and Governor Valentina Matviyenko traveled to Shanghai in April 2004 in order to sign an agreement with SIIC about the development of the Baltic Pearl district. In this way, the project was a large state-sponsored project much like large projects that had developed with state approval in the Soviet period.

In spite of the strong connections to both states and their desires for political rapprochement, the Baltic Pearl was also vigorously framed as an investment project. In St. Petersburg, in her first few annual addresses to the City Legislative Assembly following her election in 2003, Matviyenko repeatedly described the Baltic Pearl as a catalyst for increased overall investment in the city. In China, the designers of the district visualized the project as a profit-generating answer to St. Petersburg’s demand for “new good product” in the housing market, as their website explains. In the first years (2003–2005), the project was heralded as a saving grace for the city’s budget and future investment prospects.

In contrast to high levels of official enthusiasm for the project in 2004, this project has not entrained addi-
While it was described as an investment project, the Baltic Pearl received close supervision by architect-planners from NIPIgrad, the privatized version of the former city planning apparatus. As related to me by Sergei Nikitin, the lead Russian architect who worked with the Chinese, NIPIgrad served as a mediator between initial Chinese-authored visions of the actual construction and Russian building codes and norms; Russia’s vast “construction norms and rules” (stroitelnye normy i pravila, or SNIPs) presented many obstacles to the swift implementation of practices that the Chinese development firms used in China on a regular basis.

As part of the evaluation of the project’s compliance with local Russian code, each iteration of the overall design had to pass examination by the Gradostroitelnii Soviet (Gradsovet), or Urban Planning Council, of St. Petersburg (a group of officials, architects, planners, and specialists who offer expert advice to the City Governor and the Committee on Planning and Architecture). While the Gradsovet cannot bind the city administration, a negative assessment of any project by this body generally entails redesign. The Gradsovet repeatedly returned the design proposals to the Baltic Pearl firm and demanded changes. This dissatisfaction led to attempts by the Chinese firm to bring in Western architects and expertise; the Chinese contributions were seen as too sterile (and often too “soviet”), while Russian firms were perceived as having lost the ability to design such a large site. In 2005, a Chinese subcontracting group from Tongji University managed an International Proposal Collection that gathered design ideas from several prominent Western firms and architects, including HOK and Rem Koolhaas’s OMA. In 2006, the continued dissatisfaction of the Gradsovet led to the temporary employment of the British firm ARUP for a design book produced that fall.

Initial objections to the Baltic Pearl design involved the geometry of the housing layout and the transportation (especially pedestrian) infrastructure. Officials and planners continue to hold the Baltic Pearl to high standards or expect it to meet their highest aspirations for bringing contemporary global architecture to St. Petersburg.

Urban Planning Background
Urban planning as a discipline experienced a lull in Russia during the 1990s, when it was perceived as a holdover from the control economy of the Soviet regime. While resources for building were scarce enough that massive new construction was avoided, Russia’s major cities still underwent some haphazard building that contradicted previous strict planning principles.

St. Petersburg created the first City Master Plan after the passage of the federal Law on Construction in 2004. Specialists in the Committee on Architecture and Construction (KGA) had been working on a vision for the city’s development since the early 2000s; the Leon-tief Centre was contracted to produce a written vision. This vision document (Konseptsiia/Conception) emphasized that St. Petersburg was an “open European city.” It also set out various principles of development, such as maintaining the distinctness of historic “nodes” around greater St. Petersburg (Pavlovsk, Pushkin, Peterhof) and preventing sprawl-like development that would cause these areas to meld into one another. The Conception represented a more control-oriented type of planning that would carefully manage new development to fit in with St. Petersburg’s historic appearance. For example, the historic preservation area was initially designated by a line that entirely enclosed much of the central city. By the fall of 2006, this approach had changed to protecting individual buildings with a buffer area of a few meters.

Concurrently with the development of these planning documents, stakeholder interests arose which put pressure on the idealized planning vision of the Conception, particularly greater citizen participation in hearings and public demonstrations, and greater pressure from developers to release land and permit independently-designed structures. A particularly contentious issue that brought these two groups into conflict was infill, or in its much more expressive Russian term ‘uplotnitelnaya zastroika’ or uplot-nilovka: Building new commercial structures in previously green courtyards or in parks (such as Olimpiia Park along Moskovskii Prospekt) irked residents, who had become attached to certain spaces that in some cases had long historic standing and in others were lacunae created by a lack of resources for development in Soviet times. Developers desired to find open sites near existing lines of transportation and pedestrian (consumer) traffic. These struggles eventually affected the tidy vision of the Conception.

To implement the goals of the Master Plan in codes and ordinances, city planners and colleagues at NIPI-grad developed the Rules for Land Use and Construction or PZZ (Pravila Zemlepolzovaniia i Zastroiki), which sought to define land use throughout the city and also to expand zones for commercial development. The PZZ were slated for public presentation and legislative endorsement by the end of 2006. Angered by the spread of infill projects, citizens brought their frustration to public hearings on the PZZ in each of the 18
city districts in October 2006. Many residents feared that their residential areas would experience the intrusion of commercial structures, overtaxing old infrastructure for electricity and water and increasing competition for space around buildings—frequently between residents and parked cars. By contrast, developers hoped for greater flexibility in the approval process for individual projects (especially for securing exceptions to the codes).

The Baltic Pearl’s Special Features

Through its location far outside the historic city center, the Baltic Pearl avoided many of these conflicts; it is built on a greenfield site, in part on land reclaimed since 1990. In its explicit connection to the city administration, the Baltic Pearl recalls Soviet-era state-sanctioned projects; local construction firms consider that the project received special patronage, including a low “price” for the site (instead of purchase in an open tender) and the option to lease for 49 years once construction is complete.

In other ways the Baltic Pearl seems set to introduce new planning practices to St. Petersburg that will help the city make the transition forward from less efficient central planning. The city still faces the difficulty of improving and updating, or adding new elements to, its aging infrastructure, and must work on requiring developers to devote a certain portion of their sites to city needs. In a gesture that possibly was aimed to set a precedent as well as take advantage of Chinese experience and practices, the Baltic Pearl firm agreed to construct infrastructure in its district, including arterial roads, schools, and infrastructure for sewage, heating, and electricity.

Further, the Baltic Pearl has not drawn the kind of sustained opposition provoked by other high-profile projects. While some anti-Chinese outbursts occurred when the project was publicly announced (early 2005), the most virulent and simplistic of comments on the blog site of a local newspaper covering construction (Nevastrazhka) peaked in early 2006 and then seemed to taper off entirely. The project has maintained steady progress, avoiding the limelight as well as bad press. Initially the city administration spoke of the project in terms that heralded it as almost the savior of the city’s prospects for investment, but this language also disappeared as Russian-generated projects (such as Gazprom’s Okhta Center) began to dominate the public discussion and bear the city administration’s hopes for urban revitalization. The Baltic Pearl in effect does not prompt the same resistance or controversy that many other centrally-located prestige development projects have aroused (Okhta Center, a replacement for the demolished Kirov Stadium, the new stage for the Mariinsky Theater, the renovation of New Holland), which seems to indicate that timely and reliable development is possible in the city and will produce tacit acceptance even when completed by foreign developers and investors. In fact in July 2010, the Real Estate Bulletin published an article entitled “Petersburgers trust the Baltic Pearl.”

The Baltic Pearl broke ground at a moment (June 2005) when certain ideals of the Soviet-era planning regime were regaining a vigor lost in the cash-strapped 1990s. In 2006, interviews with former Chief Architect Oleg Kharchenko and NIIgrad architect Sergei Nikitin indicated that the Baltic Pearl focused the planning desires of many officials and Soviet-trained specialists in St. Petersburg; they saw this project as a chance for large-scale planning to work, free from the obstruction of miserly Soviet-era bureaucrats, buttressed by the considerable financial resources of the Baltic Pearl firm with its sponsorship by the Chinese central government.

These discourses of ideal planning may be deployed in order to control and/or slow unwanted (or politically uncooperative) development, as well as to compel the production of a more livable city. In the case of the Baltic Pearl, as sites within the district are developed and vetted by the Gradsovet, the district has received the attention of planners who ostensibly hope to see the Baltic Pearl forward certain cherished ideas in planning. For example, its “Pearl Plaza,” formerly called the “Southern Square” when it was a Chinese-only design, was labeled as “banal Europeanism” by a city official after the presentation of a new design by the Baltic Pearl firm and a Finnish partner, SRV Group. For its part, the Baltic Pearl firm continually insists in its publications and public self-presentation that its district will offer the best in modern European living. Its representatives have publicly criticized the city administration for its lack of support for developers, with the implication that China has much more effective policies in this area. In the local press, the Baltic Pearl has acquired the reputation of a residential district that serves a more affluent group of Petersburgers who value a quieter “green” district further outside the city center (the website displays photos of a crowded showroom taken at an exhibition of housing units). At the very least, the Baltic Pearl demonstrates that local consumers of housing increasingly do have quite a varied choice of places to live beyond the sleeping districts of Soviet times.

About the author
The Russian Analytical Digest is a bi-weekly internet publication jointly produced by the Research Centre for East European Studies [Forschungsstelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen (www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de), the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich), the Resource Security Institute and the Institute of History at the University of Basel (http://histsem.unibas.ch/seminar/). It is supported by the German Association for East European Studies (DGÖ). The Digest draws on contributions to the German-language Russland-Analysen (www.laender-analysen.de/russland), the CSS analytical network on Russia and Eurasia (www.res.ethz.ch), and the Russian Regional Report. The Russian Analytical Digest covers political, economic, and social developments in Russia and its regions, and looks at Russia’s role in international relations.

To subscribe or unsubscribe to the Russian Analytical Digest, please visit our web page at www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich is a Swiss academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and information services in the fields of international and Swiss security studies. The CSS also acts as a consultant to various political bodies and the general public. The CSS is engaged in research projects with a number of Swiss and international partners. The Center’s research focus is on new risks, European and transatlantic security, strategy and doctrine, area studies, state failure and state building, and Swiss foreign and security policy.

In its teaching capacity, the CSS contributes to the ETH Zurich-based Bachelor of Arts (BA) in public policy degree course for prospective professional military officers in the Swiss army and the ETH and University of Zurich-based MA program in Comparative and International Studies (MACIS); offers and develops specialized courses and study programs to all ETH Zurich and University of Zurich students; and has the lead in the Executive Masters degree program in Security Policy and Crisis Management (MAS ETH SPCM), which is offered by ETH Zurich. The program is tailored to the needs of experienced senior executives and managers from the private and public sectors, the policy community, and the armed forces.

The CSS runs the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), and in cooperation with partner institutes manages the Crisis and Risk Network (CRN), the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP), the Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SSN), and the Russian and Eurasian Security (RES) Network.

The Institute of History at the University of Basel

The Institute of History at the University of Basel was founded in 1887. It now consists of ten professors and employs some 80 researchers, teaching assistants and administrative staff. Research and teaching relate to the period from late antiquity to contemporary history. The Institute offers its 800 students a Bachelor’s and Master’s Degree in general history and various specialized subjects, including a comprehensive Master’s Program in Eastern European History (http://histsem.unibas.ch/bereiche/ osteuropa-eische-geschichte/).

Resource Security Institute

The Resource Security Institute (RSI) is a non-profit organization devoted to improving understanding about global energy security, particularly as it relates to Eurasia. We do this through collaborating on the publication of electronic newsletters, articles, books and public presentations.