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Theory and Evidence

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International Partnerships, Foreign Control and Income Levels: Theory and Evidence

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International Partnerships, Foreign Control and Income Levels:
Theory and Evidence

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Abstract
We analyze the effects of different regimes of control rights over critical resources on the total domestic income of open economies. We consider home control, foreign control, and international partnerships in a theoretical model where contracts are incomplete, resource exploitation requires local capital, and foreign technologies are more efficient. Enacting foreign control is never optimal, and assigning complete residual rights to foreign firms reduces domestic income. Two testable predictions are derived. First, international partnerships tend to generate higher domestic income than foreign control. Second, the typical regime choice is either partnership or foreign control when the international relative profitability of the domestic resource endowment is high or intermediate, and home control with low relative profitability. We test these predictions using a new dataset on petroleum ownership structures for up to 68 countries between 1867-2008, finding strong empirical support for the theoretical results.

Jel Codes D23, F20, O13.

Keywords Property rights, control rights, income, oil, panel data.

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1 Introduction

In a world with costly transactions and incomplete contracts, the allocation of control rights over productive assets influences the size and the distribution of the gains from economic activity, and directly affects the incentives for agents to invest. From this perspective, who has control over the exploitation of critical resources – e.g., essential primary inputs – is a crucial determinant of economic performance, especially in developing countries richly endowed with natural wealth.\(^1\) In this paper, we investigate the causes and consequences of different regimes of control rights over the exploitation of primary resources. Our analysis has four distinctive features. First, we look beyond the conventional division between private and public ownership and instead focus on domestic, foreign, and mixed ‘international partnership’ forms of control rights regimes. Second, control rights regimes are the outcome of bargaining between exploiting firms and the State, which is the \textit{de jure} owner of the resource stock.\(^2\) Third, we study how different control regimes influence the aggregate income of a resource-rich economy when the primary sector coexists with, and withdraws rival inputs from, non-primary sectors. Fourth, we address this issue at both the theoretical and empirical levels, testing the predictions of the model on a new dataset on petroleum control rights structures.

Situations of substantial foreign control over strategic primary resources are quite common in today’s globalized world. Considering a representative sample of sixty-four oil-producing economies in 2005, we observe that domestic control is the dominant property structure in only nine countries: foreign control and international partnerships prevail in the vast majority of cases – twenty-four and thirty-one countries, respectively.\(^3\) Standard economic reasoning suggests that technological gaps play a fundamental role in the rise of foreign-control regimes or international partnerships. Countries that discover new stocks of natural resources often lack the technological know-how necessary to exploit these endowments, and the foreign firms operating abroad in the sector of interest are typically more efficient than yet-to-be-established domestic enterprises. In this scenario – which most likely but not exclusively arises in less developed economies – the resource-rich country may gain from assigning full or partial control rights to foreign firms: the natural endowment is exploited with the most efficient technology and generates additional domestic income as the foreign firm pays concession fees and royalties.

The flip side of enacting foreign control is that the residual profits reaped from resource exploitation are repatriated and potentially re-invested abroad. A recent OECD study shows that, in low-income countries, foreign firms’ profit remittances exceeded new foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in every year between 1999-2005 – a pattern which is especially strong during periods of economic crisis, when parent companies tend to repatriate financial resources to strengthen their balance sheet (Mold et al. 2009). More generally, foreign-based firms have

\(^1\)In this paper, we distinguish between property and control rights: the former regards basic ownership rights, while the latter includes access, exploitation and investment rights, which can be assigned independently of basic ownership of an asset. The link between property rights and economic development is the subject of a growing body of literature. An excellent discussion of the main ideas is Besley and Gathak (2010).

\(^2\)The United Nations General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December, 1962 (on “Permanent sovereignty over natural resources”) grants “The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources”, a concept that is echoed in most countries’ constitutions. Given this basic assignment of ownership over natural resources to the State, the salient question becomes who has the right to exploit these resources, or alternatively: \textit{who has access to and control over the resource}.

\(^3\)See Section 5 below for a detailed description of sources and methods.
little interest in raising domestic welfare in the host country as this is beyond the scope of their profit-maximization obligation towards shareholders (Vrankel, 1980; Onorato, 1995).

Building on these considerations, we construct a model in which the technological differences between domestic and foreign firms, and the asymmetric objectives pursued by foreign firms and the ‘State’ (i.e., the authority assigning exploitation rights over domestic resources), are explicit determinants of the surplus generated by primary production under different regimes. We consider a small open economy where a newly discovered natural resource endowment can be exploited to produce a tradeable ‘commodity’. Producing the commodity also requires the use of local capital withdrawn from the pre-existing ‘traditional sector’. In this setup, control rights include (i) the rights of access to the resource endowment, to produce and sell the commodity; (ii) the rights to choose the level of investment; and (iii) the residual rights of control over the local capital. The State considers three possible regimes: Home Control, which assigns all control rights to a domestic enterprise; Foreign Control, which assigns all control rights to a foreign firm endowed with the most productive technology; or creating an international Partnership involving mixed control, where the foreign firm provides the best technology and the State provides local capital. The profits from commodity production are shared according to Nash Bargaining, and the regime of control rights affects equilibrium outcomes for two reasons. First, residual rights over local capital are a source of bargaining power because investment levels are not contractible ex-ante (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Second, the impact of residual rights on investment incentives is asymmetric because the parties aim at different targets: while the foreign firm maximizes its share of ex-post profits, the State maximizes total domestic income taking into account the reallocation effects induced by the shifting of local capital from traditional to commodity production.4

We analyze two variants of the model by considering alternative ways in which local capital is transferred to domestic firms in the event of bargaining breakdown under Foreign Control. In the first variant, the State confiscates the foreign firm’s local capital. In the second variant, the State is credibly committed to compensate (part of) the initial investment cost so that the foreign firm has (partial) residual rights. Both circumstances are empirically plausible: confiscation characterized several processes of nationalization (Guriev et al., 2011); but partial or complete State repurchase, including forms of compensation such as preferential access for the formally expropriated firms, is not a rare event either (Philip, 1994). Remarkably, both versions of the model show that Partnership can be jointly optimal whereas Foreign Control cannot. Another interesting result is that the State should not assign complete residual rights over local capital to the foreign firm because this would generate massive crowding-out in the traditional sector and thereby lower domestic income: the ideal degree of residual rights always lies between the polar cases of ‘confiscation’ and ‘complete repurchase’.

Besides these results, the main insights that we draw from the theoretical model are two testable predictions. First, in most parametrizations, Partnership yields higher domestic income

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4The maximization of national income and pursuit of national interest is often mentioned as a reason for greater state involvement in a crucial sector. For example, Kobrin (1984) traces the evolution of petroleum sector control rights from mostly foreign control to increasing participation (right up to nationalization) by host-country governments as "the perception that foreign investors could not be trusted to develop resources in the national interest became widespread" (ibid., p. 146). In her case study, Randall (1987) describes how the "remarkably high rate of repatriation of profits [by foreign oil firms] from Venezuela" (ibid., p. 21) led to a decades-long series of negotiations over rent distribution that culminated in the 1976 nationalization of the petroleum industry.
than Foreign Control. Second, the typical regime choice is either Partnership or Foreign control when the international relative profitability of the domestic resource endowment is high or intermediate, and Home Control with low relative profitability.

In order to test these theoretical predictions, we consider the petroleum sector. Oil is an important economic resource, and it is found in a large number of countries in different regions and at different stages of development, making a comparison particularly relevant. Collecting data from a variety of primary and secondary sources, we present a large new dataset on control rights regimes and national incomes for up to 68 oil-producing countries, starting as early as 1867 and extending to 2008 in up to 28 five-year periods. The empirical results from fixed-effects panel data estimations confirm the first prediction that Partnership leads to higher national income than Foreign Control. In an extension of this prediction, we also find that both Partnership and Foreign Control lead to higher domestic income than Home Control when we take into account the technology level. The results are strongly significant and robust to controlling for factors such as institutional quality, OPEC membership and time effects. Concerning the second prediction, the findings from pooled multinomial logit estimations are also in line with the model’s predictions: the more profitable oil sectors tend to be under Foreign Control or Partnership, while the least profitable ones are likely to be domestically controlled. We thus have remarkably strong empirical support for our theoretical results.

Our analysis is connected to different strands of literature. The role of residual control rights as a source of bargaining power is a key insight of the modern theory of the firm pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). In this framework, several studies analyzed private versus public provision of services (Hart et al., 1997), as well as private versus government ownership of public projects (Besley and Ghatak, 2001). We depart from these contributions in many respects. Most importantly, our analysis abstracts from the issue of public versus private control and we consider a bargaining problem in which the joint surplus is not a public good. Rajan and Zingales (1998) study the problem of selecting and choosing the number of managers to be granted access rights to critical inputs within a firm. Our analysis differs in that we consider a State which chooses between domestic and foreign technologies under the hypothesis that foreign firms are more productive but will repatriate all residual profits.

The parallel literature specialized in resource economics typically also focuses on the consequences of private versus public ownership for the productive efficiency of primary sectors both at the theoretical and the empirical levels (Al-Obaidan and Scully, 1992; Megginson, 2005; Wolf, 2009; Guriev et al., 2011). We depart from sectoral observations concerning efficiency – e.g., productivity in the oil industry – and instead analyze the consequences of control regimes

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5 Hart et al. (1997) show that the private contractor’s incentive to reduce costs is too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on other non-contractible characteristics that matter for the government – e.g., service quality. Besley and Ghatak (2001) show that when the parties value the project differently, ownership should lie with the party with highest valuation regardless of who is the key investor and of other aspects of technology.

6 In our model, a government implementing ‘Home Control’ is actually indifferent between private and public management: the absence of local market failures implies an efficient allocation of local assets regardless of whether the extractive firm is controlled by the State or by local households.

7 The same difference arises with respect to the recent literature studying the effects of incomplete contracts in the organization of production within multinational firms (Antrás, 2005). More generally, our analysis abstracts from the problem of selecting a specific domestic (foreign) technology provider drawn from a given set of domestic (foreign) firms: each of the two technologies compared in our model can be interpreted as the most productive (domestic and foreign) technology arising from a selection process that has already taken place.
in the primary sector for the aggregate domestic income of resource-rich economies. In several related studies from the political science field, Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001, 2010) have long held that ownership structures are important when looking at the socio-economic impacts of resource abundance, particularly petroleum and natural gas. We draw inspiration from their work in the empirical part of this paper, but depart from their focus on public versus private ownership and fiscal policy by performing a quantitative analysis of the relationship between domestic versus foreign control and total domestic income in oil-rich countries.

The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Sections 3 and 4 characterize the equilibria under confiscation and under credible repurchase, respectively. Section 5 presents our empirical analysis and section 6 concludes.

2 The Model

A small open economy, denoted by $E$, produces a tradable final good $Z$ – henceforth referred to as the traditional good – and is endowed with a stock of natural wealth which consists of a rival and excludable primary good (e.g., oil wells, mineral deposits) and can be exploited to produce a commodity, denoted by $X$. Prior to the discovery of the natural endowment, the economy only produces $Z$ and the access rights over the resource are held by the agent $State$. As domestic firms are initially specialized in $Z$-production, the economy has little knowledge of the production process of commodity $X$ – which requires a specific technology for extraction and processing as well as investment in local capital. In this environment, the State may implement three different regimes of control rights – i.e., rules defining the rights to exploit the resource and sell the commodity, the rights to choose investment levels, and the residual rights over local capital – indexed by $i = h, f, p$. The first option is to implement Home Control ($i = h$), that is, assigning all control rights to a newly established domestic enterprise, which may be public or private (see below). The second regime is Foreign Control ($i = f$), that is, assigning all control rights to a specialized foreign firm upon payment of a license fee. Third, the State may create a Partnership ($i = p$) in which the foreign firm provides the technology, exploits the resource and sells the commodity while the State provides local capital: a public manager chooses investment according to the State’s objective, which is to maximize total domestic income.

2.1 Markets and Technologies

Both the traditional good and the commodity are sold on competitive world markets at the respective prices $q_z$ and $q_x$, taken as given by each producer. Producing the commodity entails two types of cost. First, the owner of the processing technology – i.e., the domestic manager under Home Control, the foreign firm under Foreign Control or Partnership – must pay a fixed start-up cost, denoted by $s_i$, which can be thought of as a technology-specific investment bearing internal cost to the firm – e.g., in-house R&D effort. Importantly, the payment of $s_i$ does not imply any additional income for the residents of economy $E$. Second, the firm producing the commodity must rent local capital, a rival input exclusively supplied by residents of country $E$ – for example, land – and rewarded at the interest rate $r$ that prevails in the local market. Local capital is internationally immobile but nationally mobile, being essential to produce the traditional good as well as the commodity. Denoting by $x$ and $z$ the physical output levels of
goods $X$ and $Z$, we posit
\[ x_i \equiv \chi_i (k_i) \text{ and } z_i \equiv \zeta (k_{\text{max}} - k_i), \quad i = h, f, p, \quad (1) \]
where $k_{\text{max}}$ indicates the total endowment of local capital in economy $E$. The commodity technology $\chi_i (\cdot)$ and the level of investment in the commodity sector, $k_i$, are regime-contingent whereas the technology of the traditional sector $\zeta (\cdot)$ is independent of the control regime in the commodity sector.\(^8\) Under Foreign Control and Partnership, the commodity sector uses the same foreign technology, so that $\chi_f (\cdot)$ and $\chi_p (\cdot)$ are identical. Local capital exhibits positive and strictly decreasing marginal productivity in commodity production, $\chi'_i (k_i) > 0$ and $\chi''_i (k_i) < 0$, a necessary assumption to have strictly positive profits for the foreign firm under regimes $i = (f, p)$. For good $Z$, we assume that $\zeta (\cdot)$ displays constant returns to scale so that the traditional sector can be represented as a unit mass of perfectly competitive firms producing output
\[ z_i \equiv \zeta (k_{\text{max}} - k_i) \equiv \rho \cdot (k_{\text{max}} - k_i), \quad (2) \]
where $\rho > 0$. Perfect competition in the local market implies that capital will be rewarded at the equilibrium rental rate
\[ r_i = q_z \cdot \zeta' (k_{\text{max}} - k_i) = q_z \rho \quad (3) \]
as long as the traditional sector produces a positive quantity. We will assume that aggregate capital $k_{\text{max}}$ is sufficiently abundant to ensure an interior equilibrium $0 < k_i < k_{\text{max}}$ under any regime $i = (h, f, p)$. Notice that the value of domestic income generated by the traditional sector equals the total value of sectoral production, $q_z z_i$, whereas this is not always true for the commodity sector: under Foreign Control and Partnership, part of the residual surplus $(q_z x_i - s_i)$ is appropriated by the foreign firm.

### 2.2 Cost Sharing

Under Home Control, the domestic firm pays the start-up cost $s_h$, chooses the investment level $k_h$ paying the associated rents $r_h k_h$, and produces the commodity using the domestic technology, $x_h = \chi_h (k_h)$. All the revenues in excess of the cost of in-house R&D effort, $q_z x_h - s_h$, become additional income for residents. Under Foreign Control, the foreign firm pays the start-up cost $s_f$, chooses investment $k_f$ paying the associated rents $r_f k_f$, and produces the commodity using the foreign technology $x_f = \chi_f (k_f)$, which is ceteris paribus more productive than the domestic technology $\chi_h (\cdot)$. From the perspective of a benevolent State, the advantage of Foreign Control is that the commodity is produced more efficiently. The drawback is that only a fraction of the foreign firm’s revenues become domestic income: the foreign firm pays a license fee to the State in order to obtain the concession but sends all residual gains back to its country of origin, outside $E$. The level of the license fee, $\ell_f$, is determined by bargaining between the State and the foreign firm.

Under Partnership, the foreign firm provides the technology $\chi_p (\cdot) = \chi_f (\cdot)$ and bears the cost of in-house R&D, $s_p$. The State provides local capital $k_p$ and pays the associated rents $r_p k_p$.

\(^8\)In (1), we implicitly assume full utilization of local capital $k_{\text{max}}$ between the traditional and the commodity sectors. This is without loss of generality since our assumptions in sections 2 and 3 guarantee an interior equilibrium in the allocation of local capital. The possibility of corner solutions is discussed in detail in the extended model of section 4.
using the proceeds from taxes imposed on domestic residents. The two parties then bargain over the level of the license fee, $\ell_p$, which determines the respective shares of profits from commodity sales.

### 2.3 Productivity Differences

Foreign Control and Partnership can be valid alternatives to Home Control only if the foreign technology is ceteris paribus more efficient, that is $\chi_f (k') = \chi_p (k') > \chi_h (k')$ for any $k' > 0$. In general, we assume that the two technologies are identical up to a Hicks-neutral productivity parameter implying that the foreign technology yields higher commodity output for a given input level. When deriving more specific results that require a full analytical characterization of equilibrium outcomes, we will use

$$x_h \equiv \chi_h (k_h) \equiv \varphi_1 \cdot \psi k_h^{\beta} \quad \text{with} \quad \varphi_1 > 0,$$

$$x_i \equiv \chi_i (k_i) \equiv \varphi_2 \cdot \psi k_i^{\beta} \quad \text{with} \quad \varphi_2 > \varphi_1 \quad \text{for} \quad i = (f, p),$$

where $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is the elasticity of output to capital, $\psi > 0$ is a scale parameter representing a country-specific characteristic – e.g., the size of the domestic resource endowment – and $\varphi_2$ and $\varphi_1$ are productivity parameters implying that the foreign technology is ceteris paribus more productive than the domestic technology.

### 2.4 Domestic Income and Firm’s Profits

Aggregate domestic income in the various regimes, $Y_i$, is given by the expressions reported in Table 1. Under Home Control, domestic income $Y_h$ equals aggregate domestic production net of the start-up cost. The expressions for $Y_f$ and $Y_p$ clarify the difference between Foreign Control and Partnership. In both cases, the State exhibits balanced budget and rebates to the households the license fee paid by the foreign firm via lump-sum transfers. Under Foreign Control, residents also receive $r_f k_f$ from the foreign firm whereas, under Partnership, the cost of local investment $r_p k_p$ is paid by the State – and, hence, by residents via lump-sum taxes – so that the net domestic income generated by commodity production only consists of the license fee, $\ell_p$. Table 1 also reports the profits earned by the foreign firm in the various regimes: if the State chooses Home Control, the foreign firm may produce outside economy $E$ and earn the reservation profit $\Pi_0$.

### 2.5 Behavioral Assumptions and Timing of Events

In any regime $i$, the foreign firm aims at maximizing profits $\Pi_i$ whereas the State aims at maximizing aggregate domestic income $Y_i$. Under Home Control, the State does not interact with the foreign firm and the social problem has a fairly simple structure: there is no source of inefficiency and residents may enjoy the maximum level of income that the use of the domestic technology allows to obtain (see section 2.7 below). Considering Foreign Control and Partnership, the detailed timing of events is as follows:

**Stage 0 (Regime choice).** The State and the foreign firm sign a contract establishing which regime $i = (f, p)$ will be enforced. Investment levels $k_i$ are not contractible at this stage.
Table 1: Domestic income ($Y_i$) and foreign firm’s profits ($\Pi_i$) under alternative control regimes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Domestic income</th>
<th>Foreign firm’s profits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home Control</td>
<td>$Y_h \equiv q_z z_h + q_x x_h - s_h$</td>
<td>$\Pi_0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Control</td>
<td>$Y_f \equiv q_z z_f + r_f k_f + \ell_f$</td>
<td>$\Pi_f \equiv q_x x_f - s_f - r_f k_f - \ell_f$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>$Y_p \equiv q_z z_p + \ell_p$</td>
<td>$\Pi_p \equiv q_z x_p - s_p - \ell_p$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stage 1 (Investment). The foreign firm pays $s_i$ and the party in charge of local investment chooses $k_i$ paying $r_i k_i$. Both $s_i$ and $r_i k_i$ are henceforth sunk and local capital $k_i$ is henceforth fixed: the traditional sector uses the residual amount $k_{max} - k_i$ to produce $Z$.

Stage 2 (Profit-Sharing Problem). The State and the foreign firm decide the level of the fee $\ell_i$ according to Nash Bargaining, determining the respective shares of total profits from commodity production $q_x \chi_f (k_f) - s_f - r_f k_f$.

Stage 3 (Commodity Production). If the parties reach an agreement on profit-sharing at stage 2, the commodity is produced with the foreign technology $x_i = \varphi_2 \psi_2 k_i^3$ and the agreed transfer $\ell_i$ is enforced. If bargaining at stage 2 breaks down with no agreement, economy $E$ produces the commodity using the domestic technology while the foreign firm operates abroad.

A crucial assumption is that investment levels are non-contractible at Stage 0. Since both parties anticipate that $k_i$ will affect each party’s bargaining power at Stage 2, the investor will set $k_i$ at Stage 1 in order to maximize its overall payoff. Control rights and residual rights over local capital thus affect the allocation, in line with Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). However, differently from standard cake-sharing problems, we observe an important asymmetry between the overall payoffs of the two parties ($Y_i$ and $\Pi_i$) and the bargaining payoffs at Stage 2: the State aims at maximizing total domestic income, not just the share of profits from commodity production. Also, we do not postulate a specific bargaining procedure at Stage 0 to determine the initial regime choice. Instead, we characterize the outcomes of different regimes studying whether, and under what circumstances, a given regime is optimal and/or ‘agreeable’. The usefulness of this approach will become clearer in section 3.3.

2.6 Bargaining and No-Trade Payoffs at Stage 2

At Stage 2, the State and the foreign firm choose the level of license fee $\ell_i$. We assume that the profits from commodity production are shared according to the Nash bargaining solution, i.e., the parties split their renegotiation surplus 50/50 over the disagreement point. The bargaining
payoffs at Stage 2 for the State \((S_i)\) and foreign firm \((F_i)\) under regime \(i\) are given by
\[
S_f = \ell_f \quad \text{and} \quad F_f = q_x \chi_f (k_f) - s_f - r_f k_f - \ell_f, \\
S_p = \ell_p - r_p k_p \quad \text{and} \quad F_p = q_x \chi_p (k_p) - s_p - \ell_p.
\]

The disagreement point is identified by the respective no-trade payoffs, that is, the payoffs that the parties receive if no agreement is reached at Stage 2 and bargaining breaks down. Since \(k_i\) is fixed at Stage 1, and both the start-up cost \(s_i\) and the investment cost \(r_i k_i\) are sunk at Stage 2, the no-trade payoffs differ from the benefits that the parties would get if the State were to choose Home Control at Stage 0. Specifically, the no-trade payoffs are determined by the following circumstances.

If negotiations break down, economy \(E\) can exploit the available capital \(k_i\) by creating a new domestic enterprise that produces the commodity using the domestic technology \(\chi_h (\cdot)\). This is a source of bargaining power for the State which affects both parties’ investment decisions. However, the rights to use \(k_i\) after the breakdown are contingent on who holds the residual control rights. Under Partnership, no transfer between foreign and domestic firms is needed; the State already holds the rights on \(k_p\) and transfers them to a domestic firm. Under Foreign Control, instead, the foreign firm holds the rights but cannot use local capital outside economy \(E\) so that \(k_f\) must be transferred to domestic firms in some way. The first possibility is that the State confiscates \(k_f\) by exereting is power to set and enforce the local laws, in which case the foreign firm has no residual control rights over local capital. The second possibility is that the State is credibly committed to repurchase the rights on \(k_f\) by paying the full (partial) investment cost born by the foreign firm, in which case the foreign firm has complete (partial) residual rights. We consider both scenarios since they are equally plausible reality. In the present and in the next section, we analyze the case of confiscation. Credible repurchase is introduced in section 4.

Recalling that the economy \(E\) is subject to domestic start-up costs \(s_h\) in the event of bargaining breakdown, the no-trade payoffs for the State, \(D_i\), and for the foreign firm, \(\Delta_i\), respectively equal
\[
D_f = q_x \chi_h (k_f) - s_h \quad \text{and} \quad D_p = q_x \chi_h (k_p) - s_h, \\
\Delta_f = \Pi_0 - s_f - r_f k_f \quad \text{and} \quad \Delta_p = \Pi_0 - s_p.
\]

The fact that local capital affects no-trade payoffs in both regimes implies that the party in charge of investment can modify its own bargaining power at Stage 2 by choosing \(k_i\) strategically at Stage 1.

### 2.7 Home Control

While Foreign Control and Partnership require agreement between the State and the foreign firm, the allocation arising under Home Control can be immediately characterized. The State calculates the investment level that maximizes aggregate domestic income,
\[
k_h = \arg \max \{Y_h = q_z \zeta (k_{\text{max}} - k_h) + q_x \chi_h (k_h) - s_h\}. 
\]
The solution is characterized by the standard efficiency condition,
\[ q_x \cdot \chi_h' (k^*_h) = q_z \cdot \zeta' (k_{\text{max}} - k^*_h) = r_h, \tag{8} \]
which depicts a first-best scenario where the marginal product of local capital matches its marginal cost. The State may implement solution (8) in several ways. Provided that the domestic firm producing the commodity acts as a price taker on the local input market, there is no difference between creating a State enterprise (that rebates all rents to residents via lump-sum subsidies) and a private domestic firm (that maximizes profits taking \( r_h \) as given): in either case, the equilibrium in the market for local capital will guarantee equal marginal productivities across sectors, and domestic residents will receive
\[ Y^*_h = q_z \zeta (k_{\text{max}} - k^*_h) + q_x \chi_h (k^*_h) - s_h, \tag{9} \]
which is the first-best level of domestic income under Home Control. Indeed, when defining the Home Control regime, we purposely avoided distinguishing between private and public domestic enterprises: in the current setting, this characteristic does not matter for the results.\(^9\)

3 Bargaining Equilibria

Under Foreign Control and Partnership, the State and the foreign firm share profits from commodity production according to Nash Bargaining. Solving the model backwards, we characterize the solution to the profit-sharing problem (Stage 2), the investment strategies (Stage 1), and the characteristics of optimality and feasibility that determine the initial regime choice (Stage 0).

3.1 Profit Sharing and Investment Strategies

At Stage 2, the State and the foreign firm agree on the level of transfers \( \ell_i^N \) that maximizes the Nash product
\[ \ell_i^N \equiv \arg \max \left\{ (S_i - D_i) \cdot (F_i - \Delta_i) \right\} \quad \text{for} \quad i = (f, p). \tag{10} \]
We assume that the parameter values are such that the Nash Bargaining solution yields strictly positive gains so that the equilibrium outcome is ex-post efficient.\(^10\) In the current problem, the Nash bargaining solution, indicated by superscript \( N \), yields the following levels of domestic income and foreign firm’s profits for each regime \( i = (f, p) \):
\[ Y_i^N \equiv q_x \zeta (k_{\text{max}} - k_i) + \frac{1}{2} \cdot [q_x \chi_i (k_i) - s_i + r_i k_i] + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (D_i - \Delta_i), \tag{11} \]
\[ \Pi_i^N \equiv \frac{1}{2} \cdot [q_x \chi_i (k_i) - s_i - r_i k_i] - \frac{1}{2} \cdot (D_i - \Delta_i). \tag{12} \]

\(^9\) Under Home Control, the State has no incentive to impose a concession fee on domestic private firms: this would introduce an unnecessary hold-up problem that conflicts with the objective of maximizing total domestic income. Under Foreign Control and Partnership, instead, the license fee is imposed because otherwise all the residual profits from commodity production accruing to the foreign firm are repatriated abroad.

\(^10\) The agreement yields strictly positive gains in regime \( i \) provided that the aggregate profits from commodity production satisfy \( S_i + F_i = q_x \chi_i (k_i) - s_i - r_i k_i > D_i + \Delta_i \) under regime \( i \).
At stage 1, the party in charge of the investment decision chooses $k_i$ anticipating the bargaining outcomes (11)-(12). Under Foreign Control, the foreign firm chooses $k_f$ in order to maximize ex-post profits $\Pi_f^N$. Under Partnership, the State chooses $k_p$ in order to maximize ex-post domestic income $Y_p^N$. Since the no-trade payoffs (6) depend on investment levels, different regimes yield different allocations of local capital. For the sake of generality, the following Proposition summarizes the solution to the investment problem without using the specific technologies (2) and (4): the conditions listed below hold in interior equilibria $k^*_i \in (0, k_{\text{max}})$ under generic well-behaved technologies $\chi_i(\cdot)$ and $\zeta(\cdot)$. Denoting equilibrium values by superscript `*`, we have:

**Proposition 1** Under Foreign Control, the foreign firm chooses $k^*_f \in (0, k_{\text{max}})$ in order to satisfy

$$q_x \cdot \chi_f'(k^*_f) = 2 \cdot r^*_f + q_x \cdot \chi_h'(k^*_f).$$  

(13)

Under Partnership, the State chooses $k^*_p \in (0, k_{\text{max}})$ in order to satisfy

$$q_x \cdot \chi_p'(k^*_p) = 2 \cdot q_x \cdot \zeta' \left( k_{\text{max}} - k^*_p \right) - q_x \cdot \chi_h'(k^*_p) - r^*_p \cdot q_x \cdot \zeta'(k^*_p),$$  

(14)

which, given the equilibrium rental rate $r^*_p = q_x \cdot \zeta' \left( k_{\text{max}} - k^*_p \right)$, implies

$$q_x \cdot \chi_p'(k^*_p) = r^*_p - q_x \cdot \chi_h'(k^*_p).$$  

(15)

Proposition 1 clarifies how both regimes depart from the first-best allocation of local capital characterized by the ideal condition $q_x \chi_i'(k^*_i) = r^*_i$. The first element of distortion is the non-contractibility of investment combined with profit sharing: the expectation of splitting the revenues with the other party prompts the investor to rent an amount of capital yielding a marginal benefit equal to two times its marginal cost. This mechanism operates in both regimes and implies the ‘double-interest terms’ appearing in (13) and (14). The second element of distortion is the fact that domestic firms can use local capital in case of disagreement: a marginal increase in $k_i$ raises the commodity output that economy $E$ would obtain from the domestic technology in the event of bargaining breakdown, which translates into a marginal increase in the State’ bargaining power measured by $q_x \chi_h'(k^*_i)$. The increase in the State’ bargaining power is an additional cost of investment for the foreign firm under Foreign Control – see (13) – and is an additional benefit for the State under Partnership – see (14).

The last term appearing in (14) reflects the fact that, under Partnership, the State already holds the rights to use local capital and therefore ‘saves’ the cost of acquiring it if bargaining breaks down. The foreign firm, instead, does not have residual rights over local capital under Foreign Control since we are currently assuming confiscation if bargaining breaks down. This asymmetry in residual rights implies that the investment strategy under Partnership is closer to the first-best allocation relative to Foreign Control.\hspace{1em}\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11}In (13), the tendency of the foreign firm to under-invest is boosted by two self-reinforcing mechanisms. In (14), instead, the ‘residual-rights term’ sterilizes the ‘double-interest term’ and the resulting condition (15) implies that, under Partnership, the only deviation from the first-best allocation consists of the ‘bargaining-power term’.
3.2 Income Levels and Profits

The general message of Proposition 1 is that, with respect to the first-best allocation, Foreign Control implies under-investment whereas Partnership yields over-investment in local capital. We now discuss the consequences of these investment strategies for the equilibrium levels of domestic income and foreign firm’s profits when the production technologies are given by (2) and (4). In this case, the sign of income and profit gaps between alternative regimes is exclusively determined by two parameters: the elasticity of commodity production to local capital, $\beta \in (0, 1)$, and the index of productivity gap,

$$\gamma \equiv \frac{\varphi_2}{\varphi_1} > 1,$$

which measures the extent to which the foreign technology is more productive than the domestic technology. Setting $s_f = s_p$ without loss of generality, we obtain the following

**Proposition 2** Under the technologies (2) and (4), the investment rules (13)-(14) determine a critical level of the productivity gap $\gamma_0 \equiv \frac{e_2}{e_1} \approx 6.7$ such that:

- If $\gamma < \gamma_0$ then $Y_p^* > Y_f^*$ for any $\beta \in (0, 1)$;
- If $\gamma > \gamma_0$ then there exists $\beta_0(\gamma) \in (0, 1)$ such that

\[
\begin{cases}
Y_p^* > Y_f^* \text{ for any } \beta > \beta_0(\gamma), \\
Y_p^* \leq Y_f^* \text{ for any } \beta \leq \beta_0(\gamma).
\end{cases}
\]

Concerning foreign firm’s profits, there exists a critical level of the productivity gap $\gamma_1 \equiv \Gamma(e) \approx 2.2$ such that:

- If $\gamma < \gamma_1$ then $\Pi_f^* > \Pi_p^*$ for any $\beta \in (0, 1)$;
- If $\gamma > \gamma_1$ then there exists $\beta_1(\gamma) \in (0, 1)$ such that

\[
\begin{cases}
\Pi_f^* > \Pi_p^* \text{ for any } \beta > \beta_1(\gamma), \\
\Pi_f^* \leq \Pi_p^* \text{ for any } \beta \leq \beta_1(\gamma).
\end{cases}
\]

Both $\beta_0(\gamma)$ and $\beta_1(\gamma)$ are increasing in $\gamma$.

We stress that the threshold values $\gamma_0 \approx 6.7$ and $\gamma_1 \approx 2.2$ hold irrespective of the values taken by all the parameters appearing in the model. Consequently, Proposition 2 is a valid basis for assessing, in general, the probability of observing positive or negative gaps in income and profit levels between Foreign Control and Partnership. In this respect, we obtain two main results.

First, domestic income is higher under Partnership than under Foreign Control in the majority of parametrizations: $Y_p^* > Y_f^*$ holds in most cases, i.e., the portion of the parameter

---

12Recall that the start-up cost is paid by the foreign firm under both regimes $i = (f, p)$. Setting $s_f = s_p$ implies that the foreign firm faces identical start-up costs independently of who is in charge of local capital investment. This assumption is not restrictive because start-up costs are technology-specific: under Foreign Control and Partnership, commodity production is obtained using the same technology – i.e., the foreign technology. Moreover, the assumption $s_f = s_p$ plays no role in the determination of the income gap $Y_p^* - Y_f^*$, which is unaffected by start-up costs (see the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix). Hence, letting $s_f \neq s_p$ would only complicate the comparison between firm’s profits under alternative regimes, $\Pi_f^*$ and $\Pi_p^*$, without adding substantial insights to our conclusions.

13The proof of Proposition 2 does not assume specific values for any of the parameters: the threshold levels $\gamma_0 \approx 6.7$ and $\gamma_1 \approx 2.2$ stem from the quasi-exponential forms that income gaps and profit gaps take under the assumed production functions (2) and (4). See the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix.
Figure 1: Regime rankings. Partnership yields higher income in the area lying above the $\beta_0$ locus (Graph (a)) and higher profits in the area lying below the $\beta_1$ locus (Graph (b)). The joint rankings (Graph (c)) determine three parametrization spaces where set $A$ is characterized by $Y_p^* > Y_f^*$ and $\Pi_p^* > \Pi_f^*$.

Foreign Control yields higher domestic income only when the productivity gap is very high and the elasticity of capital is very low; for example, if the foreign technology is ten times as productive as the domestic technology ($\gamma = 10$), the capital elasticity must lie below the threshold level $\beta_0 \approx 0.19$ in order to have $Y_f^* > Y_f^*$. The reason for this result is that Partnership implies two contrasting effects on domestic income: investment is higher than under Foreign Control (positive ‘accumulation effect’) but the rents paid to local capital employed in commodity production are entirely financed by taxes on domestic residents instead of being paid by the foreign firm (negative ‘rent effect’). The positive impact of the accumulation effect typically dominates, but it is weaker the higher is the productivity gap and the lower is the capital elasticity. Hence, for high $\gamma$ and low $\beta$, the negative rent effect may dominate, in which case Partnership yields lower domestic income.\(^\text{14}\)

The second implication of Proposition 2 is that the foreign firm’s profits are higher under Partnership in many cases: as shown in Figure 1, graph (b), moderately high values of $\gamma$ combined with moderately low values of $\beta$ yield $\Pi_p^* > \Pi_f^*$. The intuition is twofold. On the one hand, an increase in $\gamma$ increases the rental cost born by the foreign firm more than it increases commodity production under Foreign Control relative to Partnership; this implies $\Pi_p^* > \Pi_f^*$ for high values of $\gamma$. On the other hand, an increase in the capital elasticity reduces the joint surplus more under Partnership than under Foreign Control because the State (foreign firm) overinvests (underinvest) in local capital, and this implies $\Pi_p^* > \Pi_f^*$ for low values of $\beta$.

\(^{14}\)See the Appendix (below the proof of Proposition 2) for further details on this point.
3.3 Initial Regime Choice and Joint Optimality

Proposition 2 bears important consequences for the initial regime choice at Stage 0. In this section, we characterize the optimality properties of control regimes in two logical steps. First, we restrict our attention to the choice between Foreign Control or Partnership by assuming that each of these two regimes yields to each party higher returns than Home Control (subsection 3.3.1). Second, we study the conditions under which one or both parties disregard Foreign Control and/or Partnership because Home Control yields higher payoffs (subsection 3.3.2).

Importantly, we do not assume a specific type of game or bargaining procedure for determining the initial choice at Stage 0. The analysis is more general in the sense that we study the optimality properties and the characteristics of agreeability of the different control regimes. On this basis, we can determine which regimes can arise as (optimal) outcomes of different bargaining procedures at Stage 0. To this aim, we exploit the following definitions.

Considering Foreign Control and Partnership, regime \(i = (f, p)\) is agreeable for the State if it implies \(Y_i^* > Y_h^*\), and is agreeable for the foreign firm if it implies \(Y_i^* > Y_p^*\). Accordingly, regime \(i = (f, p)\) is jointly agreeable if it implies \(Y_i^* > Y_h^*\) and \(Y_i^* > Y_p^*\). In other words, (joint) agreeability signals whether one (every) party is willing to make an agreement on regime \(i = (f, p)\) at Stage 0. Considering all the three regimes, we label regime \(i\) as jointly optimal if it guarantees the highest payoff to each party – that is, if it yields maximal income and profits with respect to all alternative regimes. Accordingly, we will call spontaneous agreement an agreement at Stage 0 that implements the jointly optimal regime.

3.3.1 Optimality: Foreign Control versus Partnership

Suppose that both Foreign Control and Partnership are jointly agreeable: the foreign firm and the State strictly prefer regimes \(f\) and \(p\) to Home Control. Combining the loci \(\beta_0(\gamma)\) and \(\beta_1(\gamma)\) defined in Proposition 2, we obtain the joint rankings of domestic income and foreign firm’s profits. The remarkable result is that only Partnership can be jointly optimal. More precisely, defining the four parametrization sets

\[
A \equiv \left\{(\gamma, \beta) : Y_p^* > Y_f^* \text{ and } \Pi_p^* > \Pi_f^* \right\}, \quad B \equiv \left\{(\gamma, \beta) : Y_p^* < Y_f^* \text{ and } \Pi_p^* > \Pi_f^* \right\},
\]

\[
C \equiv \left\{(\gamma, \beta) : Y_p^* > Y_f^* \text{ and } \Pi_p^* < \Pi_f^* \right\}, \quad G \equiv \left\{(\gamma, \beta) : Y_p^* < Y_f^* \text{ and } \Pi_p^* < \Pi_f^* \right\},
\]

we can prove that \((A, B, C)\) are all non-empty whereas \(G\) is empty. In other words, Foreign Control can never be jointly optimal because the inequalities \(Y_p^* < Y_f^*\) and \(\Pi_p^* < \Pi_f^*\) cannot hold simultaneously. This result is graphically shown in Figure 1, graph (c), and formally established below.\(^{15}\)

**Proposition 3** Suppose that both Foreign Control and Partnership are jointly agreeable under technologies (2) and (4). Then, Foreign Control cannot be jointly optimal. Partnership, instead, is jointly optimal provided that \((\gamma, \beta) \in A.\)

\(^{15}\)The result \(G = \emptyset\) is derived in the Appendix – see the proof of Proposition 3. In particular, it is shown that \(\lim_{\gamma \to -\infty} \beta_1(\gamma) = 1\) whereas \(\lim_{\gamma \to -\infty} \beta_0(\gamma) < 0.5\), so that the \(\beta_1(\gamma)\) locus always lies above the \(\beta_0(\gamma)\) locus: \(\beta_1(\gamma') > \beta_0(\gamma')\) holds for any \(\gamma'\) as well as in the limit as \(\gamma' \to -\infty\). Hence, in graphical terms, we can set \(\gamma\) arbitrarily large in Figure 1, graph (c), and still obtain the three parametrization spaces \(A, B, C\) as well as \(G = \emptyset\). See Figure 3 (f) in Appendix for an enlarged picture with \(\gamma \in (1, 100).\)
Proposition 3 establishes that only Partnership can be a spontaneous agreement at Stage 0. Under parametrization $A$, each party chooses Partnership and has no incentive to deviate because this regime maximizes each party’s payoff. Foreign Control cannot be a spontaneous equilibrium because all the parametrizations outside $A$ entail conflict between the parties. The State (foreign firm) strictly prefers Partnership (Foreign Control) under parametrization $C$, and vice versa under parametrization $B$. In these cases, which regime is going to be implemented depends on the bargaining environment at Stage 0: different procedures may yield different solutions to the inherent conflict. To stress this point, we will henceforth call conditional agreement any agreement reached at Stage 0 when no jointly optimal agreement exists.

Among the various conditional agreements that may arise under parametrizations $C$ or $B$, of particular interest are the outcomes in which the State fully exerts its initial bargaining power to obtain the most favorable conditions for domestic residents. Being the de jure owner of the resource endowment at Stage 0, the State may impose bargaining procedures that lead to the income-maximizing outcome. An extreme but clear example is the case in which the State makes a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ offer to the foreign firm at Stage 0: the State proposes only Partnership (only Foreign Control) under parameterization $C$ (parametrization $B$) and the foreign firm accepts because the proposed regime yields higher profits relative to the reservation level, $\Pi_0$. Obviously, the ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ offer is just an example, and alternative bargaining procedures may yield different conditional agreements that favor the foreign firm instead. Tackling this issue is not our main objective. In the remainder of the analysis, we keep the bargaining procedure at Stage 0 unspecified, and focus on the more general question of which regimes are agreeable, and which regime is jointly optimal, in a complete ranking that compares Home Control, Foreign Control and Partnership.

### 3.3.2 Agreeability: Complete Characterization

The results discussed in the previous subsection characterize the initial regime choice when both Foreign Control and Partnership are jointly agreeable. A complete characterization of the outcomes, however, requires considering all the other cases in which Home Control yields higher benefits than one or both regimes to one or both parties. In this respect, a crucial role is played by the value of the reservation profit for the foreign firm, $\Pi_0$. For each party, the agreeability of each negotiated regime is determined by a specific inequality that restricts the value of the reservation profit:

$$Y_p^* > Y_h^* \quad \text{iff} \quad \Pi_0 < \Pi_0^{pp}, \quad \Pi_p^* > \Pi_0 \quad \text{iff} \quad \Pi_0 < \Pi_0^{sp},$$

$$Y_f^* > Y_h^* \quad \text{iff} \quad \Pi_0 < \Pi_0^{pf}, \quad \Pi_f^* > \Pi_0 \quad \text{iff} \quad \Pi_0 < \Pi_0^{sf}. \quad (16)$$

The intuition behind the upper-bounds that determine agreeability for the State, $\Pi_0^{pp}$ and $\Pi_0^{pf}$, is that a high reservation profit implies high disagreement payoff for the foreign firm and thereby a lower share of the profits from commodity production for domestic residents: the higher $\Pi_0$ the higher the probability that the State prefers Home Control to the alternative regimes. The upper-bounds determining agreeability for the foreign firm, $\Pi_0^{pf}$ and $\Pi_0^{pf}$, signal that the firm will prefer Partnership and/or Foreign Control only if the profitability of operating abroad, $\Pi_0$, is sufficiently low.
Combining the restrictions imposed by Home Control in (16) with the parametrization sets \((A, B, C)\) previously defined, we can determine which regimes are agreeable, and possibly optimal, as the reservation profit ranges from low to high values. Importantly, some of the upper-bounds listed in (16) can be explicitly ranked: as shown in the Appendix, the inequalities

\[
\Pi_{0}^{pp} > \Pi_{0}^{fp} \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi_{0}^{pp} > \Pi_{0}^{p^f}
\]

hold for any constellation of parameters. Result (17) restricts the sequence of regimes that are jointly agreeable as the reservation profit varies. For example, suppose that \((\gamma, \beta)\) belongs to the parametrization set \(B\). In this case, we necessarily\(^{16}\) have \(\Pi_{0}^{p^f} > \Pi_{0}^{pp} > \Pi_{0}^{fp} > \Pi_{0}^{f^f}\). This implies that both Partnership and Foreign Control are jointly agreeable for low levels of the reservation profit; only Partnership is jointly agreeable for intermediate levels of the reservation profit; only Home Control can arise for high levels of the reservation profit, and is possibly jointly optimal.\(^{17}\) Repeating this exercise for all parametrizations, we obtain the results reported in Table 2 – where, under parametrization \(C\), we have two subcases, respectively labelled as \(C_1\) and \(C_2\) (see the Appendix for detailed proofs).

The most general result delivered by Table 2 is that Home Control is always associated to high levels of the reservation profit. When \(\Pi_{0} > \max\{\Pi_{0}^{f^f}, \Pi_{0}^{fp}\}\), neither Partnership nor Foreign Control are jointly agreeable because the foreign firm surely prefers operating outside economy \(E\). Moreover, Home Control becomes jointly optimal when \(\Pi_{0} > \max(\Pi_{0}^{p^f}, \Pi_{0}^{pp})\).

In the last row of Table 2, the reservation profit is sufficiently low to imply that both Foreign Control and Partnership are jointly agreeable – that is, we have \(\Pi_{0} < \min\{\Pi_{0}^{f^f}, \Pi_{0}^{p^f}, \Pi_{0}^{fp}, \Pi_{0}^{pp}\}\). In this case, the outcomes are those already emphasized in section 3.3.1: under parametrization \(A\), Partnership is jointly optimal; outside \(A\), either regime may arise as a conditional agreement.

Concerning intermediate levels of the reservation profit, we obtain that Partnership is the only agreeable regime in most albeit not all parametrizations. The reason is that, as \(\Pi_{0}\) increases, the first restriction that is violated is, typically, either \(\Pi_{0} < \Pi_{0}^{f^f}\) or \(\Pi_{0} < \Pi_{0}^{pp}\). In other words, when the reservation profit increases from low to intermediate levels, the regime of Foreign Control ceases to be agreeable for either the foreign firm or the State.

\(^{16}\text{By definition, parametrization } B \text{ implies } Y_{t}^{f} > Y_{t}^{p} \text{ and } \Pi_{0}^{f} > \Pi_{0}^{p}, \text{ which implies } \Pi_{0}^{p^f} > \Pi_{0}^{pp} \text{ and } \Pi_{0}^{fp} > \Pi_{0}^{f^f}. \text{ Combining these inequalities with result (17) we obtain } \Pi_{0}^{f^f} > \Pi_{0}^{pp} > \Pi_{0}^{fp} > \Pi_{0}^{f^f}. \text{ Further details are reported in the Appendix (see the complete proof of the results reported in Table 2).}

\(^{17}\text{Specifically, both Partnership and Foreign Control are jointly agreeable if } \Pi_{0} < \Pi_{0}^{f^f}; \text{ only Partnership is jointly agreeable if } \Pi_{0}^{f^f} < \Pi_{0} < \Pi_{0}^{pp}; \text{ only Home Control can arise if } \Pi_{0} > \Pi_{0}^{pp}; \text{ moreover, Home Control is jointly optimal if } \Pi_{0} > \Pi_{0}^{f^f}.\)

<table>
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<th>(B)</th>
<th>(C_1)</th>
<th>(C_2)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Partnership</td>
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<td>Foreign</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Foreign/Partnership</td>
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<td>Foreign/Partnership</td>
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Table 2: Agreeable and implemented regimes in relation to the foreign firm’s reservation profit.
3.4 Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Testing

The results so far obtained shed light on two fundamental questions that deserve empirical scrutiny. The first concerns the relationship between control regimes and economic performance: do Partnership-like regimes imply higher or lower aggregate income than Foreign Control? Answering this question empirically is furthermore interesting in view of the fact that the existing literature on ownership and resource extraction (e.g., Megginson, 2005; Wolf, 2009) concentrates on the profitability, or efficiency, of the primary sectors without assessing the impact on aggregate income. In this respect, our theoretical results strongly favor the hypothesis that Partnerships are associated to higher income: Foreign Control cannot be a jointly optimal outcome (cf. Proposition 3) and yields lower aggregate income under most parametrizations (cf. Figure 1, graph (a)). In section 5, we tackle this issue at the empirical level in the context of oil-producing economies, checking whether the dominance of Partnership-like (Foreign Control-like) regimes in the oil-extracting sector is actually associated to higher (lower) levels of aggregate domestic income.

A second empirical question is suggested by Table 2, which associates the rise of specific control regimes to the level of the reservation profit. Since \( \Pi_0 \) measures how convenient is to operate outside \( E \) for the foreign firm, the reservation profit in our model can be interpreted as an inverse index of the profitability of the economy’s resource base relative to the profitability of the resource stocks existing in the rest of the world.\(^{18}\) In this respect, Table 2 suggests an interesting hypothesis: high relative profitability of resource extraction in \( E \) (that is, low \( \Pi_0 \)) is associated with either Partnership or Foreign Control; intermediate relative profitability in \( E \) (that is, intermediate \( \Pi_0 \)) is mostly associated with Partnership; low relative profitability in \( E \) (that is, high \( \Pi_0 \)) is associated with Home Control. In section 5, we test this prediction empirically by checking which regimes are associated to different degrees of relative profitability in resource extraction.

Before turning to the empirics, some remarks on the robustness of our theoretical results are in order. In the next section, we show that our main conclusions do not change if the State assigns to the foreign firm the ‘correct amount’ of residual rights of control over local capital.

4 Residual Rights and Credible Repurchase

So far, we have assumed that the foreign firm expects the confiscation of local capital if negotiations break down at the profit-sharing stage. This expectation has an impact on both income and profits under Foreign Control because the lack of residual rights on capital further reduces the foreign firm’s incentive to invest. We now extend the model to include (partial) residual rights for the foreign firm. Suppose that, in the event of bargaining breakdown under Foreign Control, the State is willing to compensate (a fraction of) the investment cost initially born by the foreign firm before transferring \( k_f \) to domestic firms. We denote by \( \lambda \in (0, 1) \) the fraction

\[^{18}\] This interpretation can be easily formalized in our model. In expression (4), we have defined the scale parameter \( \psi > 0 \) as a country-specific characteristic – e.g., the size of the domestic resource endowment. This implies that, if the foreign firm operates in economy \( E \), the residual profits are an increasing function of \( \psi \). Similarly, the reservation profit will be an increasing function \( \Pi_0 (\psi_0) \), where \( \psi_0 \) denotes the resource endowment that the foreign firm might exploit outside economy \( E \). The level of the reservation profit is therefore an inverse index of the international relative profitability of the domestic resource endowment in economy \( E \).
of the investment cost \( r_f k_f \) repaid by the State. Letting \( \lambda \to 0 \), we are back to the case of confiscation. Letting \( \lambda \to 1 \), the State buys residual rights at full price (‘complete repurchase’).

The issue of residual rights is empirically relevant: partial or complete State repurchase, or the granting of preferential access to ‘expropriated’ firms, is often observed in reality (Philip, 1994). Resource-rich States compensate the foreign firm’s investment for a variety of reasons that typically include political opportunity. In our model, there is a clear incentive for the State to compensate the foreign firm: the concession of residual rights over \( k_f \) increases the foreign firm’s willingness to invest, which creates potential gains in domestic income under Foreign Control.

Formally, we assume that the initial contract signed at Stage 0 contains a declaration stating which degree of repurchase \( \lambda \) will be applied in case of breakdown under Foreign Control. Clearly, the declaration is effective only under credible commitment: in the absence of commitment devices, the State is tempted to confiscate the foreign firm’s local capital. We thus have two polar cases. If the State’s declaration concerning repurchase is not credible, the foreign firm rationally expects confiscation and therefore operates under the hypothesis that the true \( \lambda \) is zero; in this scenario, all our previous analysis remains valid and the results of section 3 continue to hold. If, instead, the commitment is fully credible – e.g., because the initial contract is subject to international laws that are binding for the State\(^{19}\) – the foreign firm expects the true \( \lambda \) to coincide with the initially declared value; in this case, we obtain the results summarized below.

### 4.1 Profit Sharing and Investment with Credible Repurchase

The introduction of credible repurchase only affects the regime of Foreign Control. The bargaining payoffs in (5) are unchanged whereas the no-trade payoffs of both parties under Foreign Control, \( D_f \) and \( \Delta_f \), are replaced by

\[
D_{f\lambda} = q_x \chi_h (k_{f\lambda}) - s_h - \lambda r_f k_{f\lambda} \quad \text{and} \quad \Delta_{f\lambda} = \Pi_0 - s_f - (1 - \lambda) r_f k_{f\lambda},
\]

where the subscript ‘\( f\lambda \)’ denotes the regime of Foreign Control under credible repurchase. At Stage 2, the Nash bargaining solution yields the ex-post levels of domestic income and foreign firm’s profits

\[
Y_{f\lambda}^N = q_x z_{f\lambda} + r_f k_{f\lambda} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot [q_x \chi_h (k_{f\lambda}) - 2 \lambda r_f k_{f\lambda} + q_x \chi_f (k_{f\lambda}) - s_h - \Pi_0],
\]
\[
\Pi_{f\lambda}^N = \frac{1}{2} \cdot [q_x \chi_f (k_{f\lambda}) - 2 (1 - \lambda) r_f k_{f\lambda} - q_x \chi_h (k_{f\lambda}) + \Pi_0 + s_h - 2 s_f].
\]

At Stage 1, the foreign firm chooses \( k_{f\lambda}^* \) in order to maximize (20). In an interior solution, the investment strategy is characterized by

\[
q_x \chi_f (k_{f\lambda}^*) = 2 r_{f\lambda}^* + q_x \chi_h (k_{f\lambda}^*) - 2 \lambda r_{f\lambda}^* \quad \text{for} \quad 0 < k_{f\lambda}^* < k_{\text{max}}.
\]

Condition (21) replaces and generalizes our previous result (13). The introduction of credible repurchase creates residual control rights for the foreign firm and therefore boosts investment:

---

\(^{19}\)For example, modern petroleum contracts typically include explicit provisions for arbitration in case of disputes (Taverne 1994; Onorato 1995).
\( k^*_\lambda \) increases with \( \lambda \). However, granting complete residual rights to the foreign firm, \( \lambda = 1 \), is not desirable from an efficiency viewpoint: albeit a moderate degree of repurchase contrasts the foreign firm’s tendency to under-invest, an excessive degree of repurchase would induce over-investment in commodity production. The following results clarify this point.

Assume that the production technologies are given by (2) and (4). Then, there exists an upper bound for the degree of repurchase, \( \lambda_{\text{max}} \), above which the investment problem has a corner solution where the foreign firm reaps all the available capital and the traditional sector disappears (see Appendix):

\[
\exists \quad \lambda_{\text{max}} < 1 \quad \text{such that} \quad \lambda \geq \lambda_{\text{max}} \implies k^*_\lambda = k_{\text{max}} \quad \text{and} \quad z_{f\lambda} = 0.
\]  

(22)

Hence, an interior solution to the investment problem requires \( 0 < \lambda < \lambda_{\text{max}} \). The intuition is that excessive residual rights drive the overall marginal investment cost for the firm to zero and thus push investment toward the maximum feasible level. More generally, increasing the degree of repurchase generates a tradeoff in aggregate income levels. As \( \lambda \) ranges from zero to \( \lambda_{\text{max}} \), commodity production \( x_{f\lambda} \) increases due to higher investment but traditional production \( z_{f\lambda} \) shrinks due to the crowding-out of local capital. In particular, there exists a critical threshold level of the degree of repurchase, \( \hat{\lambda} \), above (below) which the positive income effect of higher commodity production dominates (is dominated by) the negative income effect of crowding-out in the traditional sector:

**Proposition 4** Under technologies (2) and (4), the equilibrium domestic income under Foreign Control with credible repurchase, \( Y^*_\lambda \), is a hump-shaped function of \( \lambda \) within the relevant range \( 0 < \hat{\lambda} < \lambda_{\text{max}} \); the maximum, characterized by \( \partial Y^*_\lambda (\lambda) / \partial \lambda = 0 \), is associated to the threshold level

\[
\lambda = \hat{\lambda} \equiv \frac{2 + \beta (\gamma - 1)}{\gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1)} < 1,
\]  

(23)

which lies within the relevant range \( 0 < \hat{\lambda} < \lambda_{\text{max}} \) provided that \( k_{\text{max}} \) is sufficiently large. Instead, the equilibrium profit of the foreign firm, \( \Pi^*_\lambda \), is an increasing convex function of \( \lambda \).

Proposition 4 delivers two important results. First, the income-maximizing degree of residual rights always lies between the polar cases of ‘confiscation’ and ‘complete repurchase’; the corollary is that the State should not grant complete residual rights over local capital to the foreign firm because a high value of \( \lambda \) generates negative effects on total domestic income. Second, residual rights over local capital have opposite consequences under different regimes. Under Partnership, the State has complete residual rights over \( k_p^* \) and this pushes investment close to the efficient level (see Proposition 1). Under Foreign Control, instead, assigning complete residual rights to the firm, \( \lambda = 1 \), implies massive over-investment in the commodity sector because the foreign firm does not care about the crowding-out effects that this strategy induces in the traditional sector.

Both these results stem from our main behavioral assumption: the State aims at maximizing domestic income whereas the foreign firm only pursues profit maximization at the sectoral level. We also stress that, if we interpret the scenario of massive crowding-out as a “Resource-Curse phenomenon” – that is, a reduction in aggregate productivity induced by the creation of the resource-based sector – our results unveil a new potential explanation for the low income levels.
4.2 Income, Profits and Regime Choice with Credible Repurchase

In the analysis of section 3.2, we characterized the income and profit gaps arising between Foreign Control and Partnership in terms of two parameters, $\beta$ and $\gamma$. Under credible repurchase, relative incomes and profits also depend on $\lambda$. In the limiting case $\lambda = 0$, we re-obtain the previous results. In this subsection, we concentrate on the case $\lambda = \bar{\lambda}$, that is, we assume that the State declares the degree of repurchase that maximizes domestic income under Foreign Control. This hypothesis is furthermore reasonable if we interpret $\lambda$ as a potential control variable for the State at Stage 0.\(^{21}\)

The analysis of the case $\lambda = \bar{\lambda}$ essentially confirms our previous results, the only difference being that credible repurchase restricts the parametrization space in which Partnership is jointly optimal. Still, there is no possibility that Foreign Control is jointly optimal. The analogy with Propositions 2 and 3 is formally established below.

**Proposition 5** Under the investment rules (14) and (21) with $\lambda = \bar{\lambda}$, the technologies (2) and (4) determine a critical level of the productivity gap $\gamma_2 = \frac{1 + \ln 2}{1 - \ln 2} \approx 5.5$ such that:

- if $\gamma < \gamma_2$ then $\Pi^*_p > \Pi^*_f$ for any $\beta \in (0, 1)$;
- if $\gamma > \gamma_2$ then there exists $\beta_2(\gamma) \in (0, 1)$ such that $\begin{cases} \Pi^*_p > \Pi^*_f & \text{for any } \beta > \beta_2(\gamma), \\ \Pi^*_p \leq \Pi^*_f & \text{for any } \beta \leq \beta_2(\gamma). \end{cases}$

For foreign firm’s profits, there exists a critical level of the productivity gap $\gamma_3 = 1 + \frac{2}{\ln(2)} \approx 3.9$ such that:

- if $\gamma < \gamma_3$ then $\Pi^*_f > \Pi^*_p$ for any $\beta \in (0, 1)$;
- if $\gamma > \gamma_3$ then there exists $\beta_3(\gamma) \in (0, 1)$ such that $\begin{cases} \Pi^*_f > \Pi^*_p & \text{for any } \beta > \beta_3(\gamma), \\ \Pi^*_f \leq \Pi^*_p & \text{for any } \beta \leq \beta_3(\gamma). \end{cases}$

The combined thresholds $\beta_2(\gamma)$ and $\beta_3(\gamma)$ imply that, when both regimes are jointly agreeable, Partnership can be jointly optimal whereas Foreign Control cannot be jointly optimal.

Figure 2 graphically represents the critical thresholds defined in Proposition 5 and compares them to the thresholds previously obtained in the basic model with $\lambda = 0$. The bold-style curves are the ‘new’ loci $\beta_2(\gamma)$ and $\beta_3(\gamma)$, the dotted-style curves are the ‘old’ loci $\beta_0(\gamma)$ and $\beta_1(\gamma)$. The three diagrams show that credible repurchase restricts the portions of the

\(^{20}\)The theoretical explanations for the rise of Resource-Curse phenomena are numerous and diverse – see van der Ploeg (2011) – but mostly fall in three categories: (i) Dutch-Disease mechanisms, (ii) bad institutions and/or rent-seeking behavior, (iii) crowding-out of inputs from strategic non-resource sectors. To our knowledge, the literature on this topic has so far neglected the possibility that the crowding-out mechanism stems from incomplete contracts and the granting of excessive residual rights to foreign firms.

\(^{21}\)The exogenous or endogenous nature of $\lambda$ is not relevant for our analysis as long as we do not specify the bargaining procedure determining the initial regime choice at Stage 0. When solving the model backwards, the value of $\lambda$ is taken as a given parameter in Stages 1,2,3 because it is fixed at Stage 0. Nonetheless, studying the strategic interactions between the initial regime choice and the choice of the degree of repurchase $\lambda$ is an interesting extension of the model which may deserve further analysis.
Figure 2: Regime rankings under credible repurchase with $\lambda = \tilde{\lambda}$. Partnership yields higher income in the area lying above the $\beta_2$ locus (Graph (a)) and higher profits in the area lying below the $\beta_3$ locus (Graph (b)). The joint rankings (Graph (c)) determine three parametrization spaces where set $\tilde{A}$ is characterized by $Y^*_p > Y^*_f$ and $\Pi^*_p > \Pi^*_f$.

parameter space in which Partnership yields higher income and higher profits. This means that credible repurchase enhances the returns from enacting Foreign Control for both the State and the foreign firm.

However, like in the basic model with $\lambda = 0$, the regime of Foreign Control cannot be jointly optimal: we cannot have $Y^*_f > Y^*_p$ and $\Pi^*_f > \Pi^*_p$ simultaneously. This is shown in Figure 2, graph (c), where the three parametrization sets ($\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}, \tilde{C}$) are defined analogously to ($A, B, C$). When both regimes are jointly agreeable, the only regime that can be jointly optimal is Partnership: credible repurchase restricts but does not eliminate this possibility.

Another remark concerns the superiority of Partnership in generating domestic income: despite the introduction of credible repurchase, the area in which $Y^*_p > Y^*_f$ holds is limited. Moreover, if we consider alternative scenarios in which $\lambda \neq \tilde{\lambda}$, the space in which $Y^*_f > Y^*_p$ holds becomes even smaller (total income under Foreign Control is maximized when $\lambda = \tilde{\lambda}$). Hence, the previous conclusion that Partnership induces higher domestic income in the majority of parametrizations is indeed robust to the introduction of residual rights for the foreign firm.

Also our previous results concerning the role of the reservation profit (section 3.3.2) are fully confirmed in the current setting. Under credible repurchase with $\lambda = \tilde{\lambda}$, the conditions determining the agreeability of Foreign Control in (16) are fully confirmed in the current setting. Under credible repurchase with $\lambda = \tilde{\lambda}$, the conditions determining the agreeability of Foreign Control in (16) are replaced by

$$Y^*_f > Y^*_h \iff \Pi_0 < \tilde{\Pi}_0^f, \quad \Pi^*_f > \Pi_0 \iff \Pi_0 < \tilde{\Pi}_0^f,$$

where the upper-bounds $\tilde{\Pi}_0^f$ and $\tilde{\Pi}_0^f$ can be explicitly derived under technologies (4). In line with the basic model with confiscation, we can prove that

$$\Pi_0^{fp} > \tilde{\Pi}_0^f \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi_0^{pp} > \tilde{\Pi}_0^{fp}$$

hold for any constellation of parameters. Result (25) is analogous to (17), and implies the same scenarios described in Table 2, with reference to the new parametrization sets ($\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}, \tilde{C}$).
The bottom-line is that the main predictions of the basic model with confiscation ($\lambda = 0$) hold even under credible repurchase at the income-maximizing rate ($\lambda = \hat{\lambda}$). This reinforces our previous remarks on the testable predictions of the model (subsection 3.4), and provides further legitimation to the empirical analysis presented below.

5 Empirical Evidence

Our objective is to test the two main theoretical predictions described in section 3.4. First, we explore the relationship between the control rights regime governing the petroleum sector and national income, and test whether Partnership does indeed lead to higher domestic income than Foreign Control (Prediction 1). Second, we look at the link between relative profitability in the petroleum sector and control rights regimes, testing whether Foreign Control and Partnership are always linked to higher relative profitability than Home Control (Prediction 2). We start out by describing the data and empirical methodology, and then present and discuss the estimation results.

5.1 Data Description

Our dataset includes information on 68 oil-producing countries from all regions of the world (see the Appendix for a detailed list). The main criteria for inclusion in the dataset were that the country had a minimum of 0.2 billion barrels in (proved) oil reserves between 1980-2008, and that it produced an average of at least 20'000 barrels of crude oil per day during one year or more over the same period. The principal source for this information was the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), though we cross-checked the entries with the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2010), which covers fewer countries in detail, but over a longer time period. Our criteria thus enable us to include many countries that are not usually considered oil-rich, as well as oil producers from both the developed and the developing world. Our sample includes 96.6 percent of known proved crude oil reserves in 1980, while in 2008 the share goes up to 99.9 percent.

Our main variable of interest is the control rights structure of the petroleum industry. Following the theoretical model, we distinguish between Domestic or Home, Foreign, and mixed domestic-foreign (i.e. “Partnership”) control rights regimes, and focus on oil exploration and extraction/production. The classification methodology is inspired by the one developed by Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001, 2010), but differs from it in that we distinguish between domestic, foreign, and mixed domestic-foreign control of the petroleum sector. Moreover, our sample includes a wider range of countries from both the developed and the developing world, while Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001, 2010) concentrate mainly on transition economies. We code each country according to the following criteria:

22 The oil refinery and petroleum-derived products industries are not considered, as these do not presume the presence of an actual oil production sector in a country and are therefore more similar to other manufacturing sectors.

23 Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001, 2010) draw up four categories of resource ownership: state ownership with control, state ownership without control, private domestic ownership, and private foreign ownership. They propose a (qualitative) theory of how petroleum ownership structures influence fiscal policy outcomes.
Domestic control: The state or private domestic firm(s) holds the rights to develop the majority of petroleum deposits and owns the majority of shares (over 50%) in the oil sector. The managerial power lies mainly in domestic hands, with foreign involvement being limited to roles with little or no operational and managerial control (e.g., service contracts).

Partnership: The rights to develop the majority of petroleum deposits and the majority of shares (over 50%) in the oil sector lie in domestic hands, but there is substantial involvement by foreign firms. Both domestic and foreign oil firms (private or public) have operational and managerial competencies, e.g., through Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs).

Foreign control: Foreign (private or state-owned) firms hold the rights to develop the majority of petroleum deposits and own the majority of shares (over 50%) in the domestic oil sector. The managerial power lies mainly in foreign hands, e.g., via concessions.

As these criteria imply, control right structures are seldom absolute in the sense that either domestic or foreign firms hold the exclusive rights to all exploration and extraction of petroleum. For practical purposes, the essential point is who holds the majority rights to develop petroleum deposits according to domestic legislation. For the coding, we rely on the countries’ constitutions, official laws and regulations governing the petroleum sector, sample petroleum contracts (where available), and secondary sources. The initial (post-independence) year of inclusion of each country is based on the date of the first national law, rule or regulation pertaining explicitly to the petroleum sector, as opposed to general mining sector regulation. Note that for the case of former colonies, the simple act of maintaining colonial-era contracts upon independence does not constitute a national law in the sense of it being passed deliberately by a sovereign government. The year of inclusion of a country in our dataset does therefore not necessarily coincide with its year of gaining independence. We have been able to gather information on control right structures for 68 countries starting as early as 1867 up until 2008, with the average time period of a country’s inclusion being around 53 years.

We are aware that there is often a time lag between the introduction of a new piece of legislation and its full implementation throughout the petroleum industry. For example, the decision to switch from a domestic control structure to partnership may involve delineating the geographical sectors to be offered for tender to foreign companies, organizing the bidding rounds, and drawing up the final contracts, a process which can take several months or even years. However, a legislative change in control rights structures is usually eventually transformed into a real change, which is why we concentrate on the date of the passing of the legislation rather than on the less precisely definable date of its full implementation.

24 The only exception is Canada, where petroleum-specific legislation is passed by the provincial governments, while the national government sets out the laws for the mining sector in general. The first mining sector law was passed in 1867, the year of Canada’s independence from Great Britain. Given that oil refining (for kerosene production) was originally invented in Canada in the 1840s, and that the Canadian petroleum industry developed in parallel with that of the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century, we argue that the 1867 law fully applies to the petroleum sector. Canada therefore enters our dataset in 1867.

25 A borderline case is presented by Argentina between 1910-1963. The original executive decree of December 1907 excluded private concessions for the newly-discovered petroleum reserves, and therefore set up a majority domestic control structure. However, after Law 7059 of 1910, the deposits were little by little opened to exploitation by private (mostly foreign) investors, with the new national oil company being limited to the deposits on
We condense the dataset into five-year periods to avoid capturing short-term fluctuations, starting with the period 1870-1874, 1875-1879, ..., until 2005-2008, for a total of potentially 28 periods and 762 observations. Since not all countries enter the dataset at the same time, we have an unbalanced panel. 206 country-periods had domestic control; 316 had foreign control; and 240 had partnership. 36 countries from all parts of the world changed their regimes at least once during the period of observation, for a total of nearly 60 switches. Many changed regimes twice or even more, with Bolivia showing a record five changes since 1920. Several of these regime changes, especially in the pre-1970 period, came in the wake of general national upheavals such as revolutions or other profound changes in the political regime. In more recent times, changes have usually come about more smoothly during the course of adapting the control regimes to new developments and learning processes.

5.2 Methodology

We use two different approaches to test the two predictions. **Prediction 1** is tested with the following panel fixed-effects estimation (note that the Hausman test rejects random-effects estimation in favor of fixed effects):

\[ Y_{it} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 \text{regimedummy}_{it} + \alpha_3 X_{it} + \omega_{it}, \]  

where \( i \) is the country index and \( t \) is the period index. The dependent variable \( Y_{it} \) is (the natural logarithm of) real income per capita at the start of period \( t \), taken from the historical dataset of Maddison (2006) and measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis PPP-adjusted USD. \( X_{it} \) is a vector of control variables, and \( \omega_{it} \) is the composite error term. Our main variable of interest is \( \text{regimedummy}_{it} \) and its coefficient \( \alpha_2 \).

We have three 0-1 regime dummies for *Domestic Control, Foreign Control* and *Partnership*, constructed according to the classification described above. A dummy takes on value one if a country had the respective control regime for at least three of the five years in a given period. To test Prediction 1, we exclude all country-periods with Domestic Control and take Foreign Control as our base regime to see whether Partnership leads to significantly higher income than Foreign. We term this the “simple test” of Prediction 1. In a second step, we also consider an interesting “extended test” of Prediction 1, which includes all control rights regimes and thus delivers a complete ranking of control regimes in terms of aggregate income. In the extended test, we take Domestic control as our base outcome, testing whether Partnership and Foreign Control (in that order) lead to higher incomes than Domestic Control with a given technology level. The challenge lies in finding a good proxy for technology level: we will consider two variables, average labor productivity per worker in a period, measured in thousands of 1990 USD (The Conference Board Total Economy Database, 2011), and average years of schooling (Barro and Lee, 2010).\(^26\)

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\(^{26}\) The correlation coefficient between labor productivity and schooling years is 0.51.
In addition to the proxies for technology levels described above, we include the following control variables. First, a dummy variable for OPEC countries to take into consideration the possible effects of the wave of privatizations that swept through the major oil producers in the late 1950s and 1960s and led to the Organization’s creation. This provides an exogenous, historical reason for the adoption of a particular control rights structure (see also the discussion below). We also include two political variables taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2010) to control for the effects of institutional quality on the choice of petroleum sector contracts a country offers. Foreign or Partnership regimes would be less likely in countries with poor institutional quality and unstable or unpredictable political systems, as this increases the uncertainty for foreign firms evaluating an investment in the oil sector.\footnote{For example, Jodice (1980) argues that the propensity to expropriate foreign firms is affected by political factors such as state capacity and the stability of the political system.}

The first political measure is the composite variable \textit{polity} (i.e. the \textit{polity2} variable from the original Polity IV dataset), which takes on values within a range from -10 (strong autocracy) to +10 (strong democracy). The second is one of the component variables of the total polity score, namely \textit{executive constraints}: this measures the decision rules, or the extent to which chief executives face institutionalized constraints on their decision-making. It arguably also proxies for the strength of the legal system and particularly property rights (see also Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Values range between 1 (unlimited authority) and 7 (executive parity or subordination).

We expect both political measures to enter with a positive sign. In further robustness tests, we also include period dummies.

All independent variables except for the OPEC and time dummies are lagged by one period. Similar results were obtained for up to seven lags (i.e. 35 years) in the simple test of Prediction 1, and up to five lags (i.e. 25 years) in the extended test. We believe that this robustness to using various time lags is particularly relevant when it comes to the question of reverse causality: although not considered by the theoretical model, it can be argued that the development level (i.e. the income) of a country influences its choice of control regime. However, income levels are surely less persistent than the 25-35 year period for which our results hold, making the hypothesized direction of influence from control regime towards income – instead of vice versa – more probable.\footnote{We are not interested in dynamic effects and the partial adjustment of income to ownership structures over time, so we do not add a lagged dependent variable. Note however that the main results of the extended test of Prediction 1 are robust to the addition of lagged income.}

The composite error term consists of the country-specific error component \( \epsilon_i \) and the combined cross-section and time series error component \( u_{it} \), according to \( \omega_{it} = \epsilon_i + u_{it} \). The assumption of the classical error component model is that any temporal persistence is due to the presence of the same country \( i \) across the panel, and that this effect can be captured by the fixed country term \( \epsilon_i \). However, this is likely to be too restrictive here, where a shock - e.g., a control regime change - in one period is likely to affect the behavioral relationship for several periods (see e.g., Baltagi, 2008, ch. 5.2). The error component \( u_{it} \) would then be serially correlated across periods: tests following Wooldridge (2002) confirm this suspicion. Failing to correct standard errors for serial correlation leads to biased statistical inference and less efficient estimates. We tackle this problem by reporting two different estimates of the standard errors. The first uses robust clustered errors at the panel (i.e. country) level. This approach of one-level-up clustering - in this case, at the country instead of the country-period level - allows for
unrestricted correlation of the residuals within clusters (see e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2009, ch. 8). The second approach uses adjusted standard errors according to the nonparametric covariance matrix estimator suggested by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and adapted by Hoechle (2007) to unbalanced panels. This approach has the added advantage of producing heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that are robust to very general types of both temporal and spatial dependence. The latter point may be important when we consider the possible diffusion and contagion effects of events across oil producers, for example the signalling effect of the unsuccessful nationalization of the petroleum sector in Iran in 1951 or the formation of OPEC in 1960.29

Prediction 2 is tested with a pooled multinomial logit estimation:

\[ \text{controlregime}_{it} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \text{relprofit}_{it} + \beta_3 X_{it} + \nu \] (27)

where \( \nu \) is the error term. The dependent variable \( \text{controlregime} \) is derived from a recoding of the previous control regime dummies to take on values 1 (Domestic Control), 2 (Foreign Control), or 3 (Partnership). 1 = Domestic is our base outcome.

Our main variable of interest here is relprofit, which measures the relative profitability of the domestic oil sector vis-à-vis other countries. According to the theory, the higher the relative profitability, the higher the likelihood of adopting either a mixed domestic-foreign (Partnership) or Foreign control regime; for intermediate levels of relative profitability, Partnership should be the most likely outcome; Home Control should always be linked to the lowest profitability. In line with our interpretation of “international relative profitability” (see footnote 18), we identify relprofit with the country’s share (in percent) of total proved crude oil reserves in a period, where the total oil reserves is the sum of all known and proved oil reserves in our sample of 68 oil producers. The main sources for the reserves data were the EIA (2010), BP (2010), Jenkins (1989), the UK Institute of Geological Sciences (IGS, various years), and the German Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (various years). The earliest available data is from 1935: at that time, the United States had around 63 percent of proved crude oil reserves. The U.S. oil reserves share drops to 21.8 percent in 1960, when data on Saudi Arabia becomes available, and to 8.6 percent in 1970, when oil reserves for most major current oil producers are known; in 2005, U.S. oil reserves made up for barely 2.5 percent of proved oil reserves, while Saudi Arabia alone had over 21 percent.

The basic additional variables included in \( X_{it} \) are dummies for the top 20 oil countries, defined as the twenty countries with the highest relative oil shares in 1995 (and later), plus the USSR (and without the former Soviet republics) for the pre-1995 period.30 Further control variables include the OPEC dummy and the political measures described above; labor productivity and years of schooling as proxies for the level of technology; and the average oil price over the previous five years (in constant 2009 USD, from BP, 2010). The latter captures the

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29For example, Myers Jaffe (2007) argues that the events in Iran between 1951-54 - the failed oil sector nationalization - affected policy in Iraq, since the Iraqi government was considering similar measures to increase its share in foreign companies’ oil profits, but then opted for a less aggressive ownership strategy. On diffusion as a possible exogenous explanation for nationalization (or lack thereof), see also Kobrin (1985).

30In addition to the USSR, the following country dummies are included: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, Mexico, United States, Libya, Nigeria, China, Kazakhstan, Norway, Canada, Algeria, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Oman. Results remain robust when adding dummies for the top 30 oil countries. Adding the full range of country dummies - down to the countries with less than 0.5 percent of total oil reserves shares - proved fruitless, since most coefficients were completely insignificant.
Table 3: Prediction 1: Partnership vs Foreign control and income levels

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Notes: Countries with Domestic Control are excluded, so Foreign Control is base outcome. The dependent variable is (log) income per capita at start of five-year period. All covariates except the OPEC dummy are lagged by one period. Estimations are fixed effects (within) panel estimations. T-statistics for robust country-clustered standard errors are in parentheses, and for Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in square brackets. *, **, *** statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively (refers to country-clustered standard errors).

5.3 Estimation results

Prediction 1. Table 3 shows the results for the “simple test” of Prediction 1 without considering the countries with Domestic Control throughout the period examined, which eliminates three out of the potential 63 countries for which we have all data available. The first and most important finding is that all specifications show that Partnership leads to significantly higher income than Foreign Control, as predicted by the theory. The total income effect for choosing a mixed domestic-foreign control regime over mainly foreign control is estimated at 20-30 percent, keeping all else equal. Moreover, the effect remains significant even when we successively add measures of political institutions and the OPEC membership dummy.

Both measures of political institutions are positive and highly significant, which well accords with other studies demonstrating the importance of institutions for economic development. OPEC countries also seem to have had significantly higher income levels than non-OPEC members; this is probably due to the income effect of oil production and export among these large oil-exporting economies. The estimation fit, as captured by the within $R^2$, is also quite
Table 4: Extended Prediction 1: control regimes and income levels

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<tr>
<td>Labor productivity</td>
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<td>0.027***</td>
<td>0.027***</td>
<td>0.027***</td>
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<td>(4.967)</td>
<td>(5.474)</td>
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<td>[6.76]</td>
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<td>7.904***</td>
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<td>(103.8)</td>
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<td>Ave obs per country</td>
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<tr>
<td>R² within</td>
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<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>0.425</td>
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</table>

Notes: All countries in sample are included. Domestic Control is base outcome. The dependent variable is (log) income per capita at start of five-year period. All covariates except the OPEC dummy are lagged by one period. Estimations are fixed effects (within) panel estimations. T-statistics for robust country-clustered standard errors are in parentheses, and for Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in square brackets. *, **, *** statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively (refers to country-clustered standard errors).

Table 4 shows the results for the estimations of our “extended test” of Prediction 1, including our full sample of countries and periods. The relevant base outcome is now Domestic Control, and we are testing whether Partnership and Foreign Control (in that order) lead to higher income levels. This extended version of Prediction 1 presupposes that we effectively account for technology levels. We concentrate on the results with labor productivity, which proved highly significant; the results with years of schooling are shown in the Appendix.

Column (1) of Table 4 gives a parsimonious specification for comparison without controlling for the technology level (i.e. labor productivity). We see that, ceteris paribus, Foreign Control leads to lower per-capita income levels, while partnership has a positive, albeit insignificant coefficient. More important are the results in columns (2)-(6), obtained when controlling for labor productivity. They show that both Partnership and Foreign Control lead to higher income levels than Domestic Control regimes, holding all other factors fixed, and that the difference is statistically significant. More remarkably still, the coefficients indicate that the ranking of control regime corresponds to the one expected from the theory: Partnership has the highest positive impact on income levels (between 24-26 percent higher than Domestic Control), followed
Table 5: Prediction 1: robustness analysis with time effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>simple test</th>
<th>simple test</th>
<th>extended test</th>
<th>extended test</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
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<td>Partnership</td>
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<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.145**</td>
<td>0.156**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[0.71]</td>
<td>[0.71]</td>
<td>[3.15]</td>
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<td>Foreign</td>
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<td>(1.374)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[1.92]</td>
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<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(1.182)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[0.10]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labor productivity</td>
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<td>(33.77)</td>
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<td>[40.11]</td>
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<td>465</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>453</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ave obs per country</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$ within</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: In columns (1)-(2) countries with Domestic Control are excluded, while in columns (3)-(4) all countries in the sample are included. The dependent variable is (log) income per capita at start of five-year period. Period dummies are included in all specifications. All covariates are lagged by one period. Estimations are fixed effects (within) panel estimations. T-statistics for robust country-clustered standard errors are in parentheses, and for Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in square brackets. *, **, *** statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively (refers to robust country-clustered standard errors).

by Foreign Control (between 10-13 percent higher than Domestic). A simple Wald test confirms that this difference in the coefficients for Partnership and Foreign Control is indeed significant and systematic. Of the three ownership structures that we consider, Domestic Control invariably leads to the lowest income levels. The additional variables have the expected signs, and the estimation fits are remarkably good when we account for labor productivity.

In robustness tests, we consider several alternative specifications. First, we add period dummies to control for possible aggregate effects such as time-specific oil demand or supply shocks that may be more general than the effects captured by the OPEC membership dummy. Table 5 shows that the results for the simple test (columns (1)-(2)) are not robust to adding time effects, although the signs on the Partnership coefficient remain positive. However, the extended test in columns (3)-(4) remains consistent, particularly as regards the significance of the Partnership variable, although the size of the coefficients does diminish with respect to Table 4. Similarly, labor productivity remains positive and highly significant, but its magnitude decreases. Neither the polity variable nor the measure of executive restraints (not shown) proves very robust to controlling for time effects, with polity even changing signs in the extended test (column (4)).

Second, we substitute years of schooling for labor productivity as the proxy for the level of technology: Table 7 in the Appendix reports the results of the specifications corresponding to the ones in Table 4. The findings are generally weaker, although both Partnership and Foreign
Table 6: Prediction 2: profitability and control regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1a) Foreign (regime=2)</th>
<th>(1b) Partnership (regime=3)</th>
<th>(2a) Foreign (regime=2)</th>
<th>(2b) Partnership (regime=3)</th>
<th>(3a) Foreign (regime=2)</th>
<th>(3b) Partnership (regime=3)</th>
<th>(4a) Foreign (regime=2)</th>
<th>(4b) Partnership (regime=3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>oil reserves share</td>
<td>0.306** (2.509)</td>
<td>0.297** (2.269)</td>
<td>0.260* (1.894)</td>
<td>0.240* (1.706)</td>
<td>0.516** (2.135)</td>
<td>0.511** (2.057)</td>
<td>0.555** (2.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oil price</td>
<td>-0.0235** (-2.509)</td>
<td>-0.009 (-1.148)</td>
<td>-0.023* (-1.806)</td>
<td>-0.020 (-1.350)</td>
<td>-1.957 (-2.135)</td>
<td>-0.510 (-2.057)</td>
<td>-0.023* (-2.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>-0.736 (-2.509)</td>
<td>1.985** (2.248)</td>
<td>-0.559 (-2.057)</td>
<td>-1.957 (-2.057)</td>
<td>-0.807 (-2.057)</td>
<td>-0.020 (-2.057)</td>
<td>-0.807 (-2.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>polity</td>
<td>0.111*** (1.566)</td>
<td>0.0395 (1.566)</td>
<td>0.008 (-2.459)</td>
<td>-0.037** (-2.459)</td>
<td>0.080** (1.566)</td>
<td>-0.042* (-2.459)</td>
<td>0.080** (1.566)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labor productivity</td>
<td>0.111*** (3.885)</td>
<td>0.0395 (1.566)</td>
<td>-0.011 (-2.459)</td>
<td>-0.042* (-2.459)</td>
<td>1.976 (1.566)</td>
<td>-0.07** (1.566)</td>
<td>1.976 (1.566)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lag regime</td>
<td>3.787*** (7.74)</td>
<td>6.496*** (11.01)</td>
<td>3.954*** (7.74)</td>
<td>6.026*** (11.01)</td>
<td>0.080** (6.224)</td>
<td>-0.07** (6.224)</td>
<td>0.080** (6.224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.752*** (7.74)</td>
<td>0.694*** (11.01)</td>
<td>1.005** (7.74)</td>
<td>1.396*** (11.01)</td>
<td>-4.862*** (-10.94)</td>
<td>-11.46*** (-10.94)</td>
<td>-3.720*** (-8.343)</td>
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<td>476</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>397</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
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<td>-371.2</td>
<td>-286.0</td>
<td>-286.0</td>
<td>-204.9</td>
<td>-204.9</td>
<td>-161.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chi2</td>
<td>286.01</td>
<td>286.01</td>
<td>323.9</td>
<td>323.9</td>
<td>580.86</td>
<td>580.86</td>
<td>537.7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All estimations are pooled multinomial logit with dummies for top 20 oil countries included (not shown). The dependent variable is control regime, which ranges from 1 (Domestic) over 2 (Foreign) to 3 (Partnership). Domestic Control (=regime 1) is base outcome; the results show the log probability of choosing either Foreign or Partnership over Domestic. z-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Summing up the empirical findings for Prediction 1, we can say that it is clearly supported both in the simple and the extended versions: Partnership leads to higher income than Foreign Control, and moreover both Partnership and Foreign Control lead to higher income than Domestic Control. We believe that this result is quite remarkable and lends a lot of credence to the theoretical model.

**Prediction 2.** Table 6 shows the findings for the test of Prediction 2 using multinomial logit, where Domestic Control (regime=1) is the base outcome. The coefficients on the relative profitability measure therefore give the log probability of choosing either Foreign or Partnership over Domestic. Estimation (1) shows a parsimonious specification with only the oil reserves share, our proxy for relative profitability, and the dummies for the top 20 oil countries. Estimation (2) includes further control variables, and estimations (3) and (4) add the lagged dependent variable to focus only on the transition to a control regime, without considering its persistence.

The main result is that the log probability of choosing either Foreign or Partnership over Domestic Control increases with an increase in the oil reserves share, and hence in the relative
profitability: this is in line with the theoretical predictions. It is ambiguous whether Foreign Control or Partnership is linked to highest (or intermediate) relative profitability: although the magnitudes of the coefficients suggest that it may be Foreign, a simple Wald test shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same in all estimations. This however does not contradict the model, which predicts that either Foreign or Partnership will be associated with high relative profitability, while intermediate relative profitability is most likely associated with Partnership.

The control variables show some interesting results. An increasing oil price decreases the chances of having either Foreign or Partnership instead of Domestic Control, which probably lies in the greater temptation for nationalizing an increasingly lucrative industry. The polity measure shows opposing effects: it increases the likelihood of choosing Partnership over Domestic, but decreases the likelihood of having Foreign Control instead of Domestic, although the effects are not very strong. The alternative political measure executive constraints gave no significant results (not shown). Technology levels – measured by either labor productivity or schooling years (not shown) – tend to negatively affect the likelihood of any foreign involvement, either under majority Foreign Control or Partnership. Finally, the highly significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variable shows that there is indeed path dependency in control rights regimes: the likelihood of switching regimes is small.

In additional robustness tests in Table 8 (see the Appendix), we first confine the sample to the post-1970 period, and then to the post-1980 period, for which we have the most complete and reliable oil reserves data. This aims at checking whether the results crucially depend on a particular time span. In both cases, Partnership is consistently and significantly linked to higher relative profitability when we take into account the persistence of control regimes (estimations (2) and (4)) and is otherwise insignificant, though still positive. Foreign instead sometimes changes signs, becoming the least likely outcome as relative profitability increases (estimations (1) and (3)). We also drop Saudi Arabia and the United States (estimations (5)-(6)), two possible outliers which may be unduly influencing our results. Both Foreign and Partnership still have a consistent and significant higher log probability of being the observed outcome with growing relative profitability than Domestic.

In sum, the empirical results for Prediction 2 confirm that either Foreign Control or Partnership are the more likely control regimes when a country’s oil sector is relatively highly profitable, with either one being chosen instead of Domestic Control.

6 Conclusions

Understanding the impact of different regimes of property and control rights on economic performance is a fundamental question in economics. The quantitative analysis of the effects of control rights on income levels, in particular, has substantial implications for policymaking. Our analysis provides a theoretical basis and strong empirical support for two hypotheses concerning the role of control rights over the exploitation of critical resources. First, international partnerships in which the investment choices of foreign firms are constrained by the decisions of domestic (public) managers tend to generate higher domestic income than regimes of ‘pure’ foreign control. Second, the typical control regime that arises as a bargaining equilibrium is either partnership or foreign control when the international relative profitability of the domestic resource endowment is high or intermediate, and home control with low relative profitability.
In our analysis, the key mechanism through which control regimes affect economic activity is the non-contractibility of investment before resource extraction takes place. From the empirical point of view, this is an important element in the negotiations because extractive industries require high investment before production begins (see e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz, 1983). Nonetheless, there might be alternative mechanisms that reinforce our main conclusions while capturing other relevant aspects of control regimes — e.g., the fact that foreign firms are more subject to the threat of rent-extracting royalties under pure foreign control than under partnerships. Also, our results concerning the degree of residual rights on local capital to be granted to foreign firms deserve attention. In our model, assigning complete residual rights to foreign firms is inefficient for the allocation of local capital in the host country and yields negative effects on total domestic income. The idea that there exists an optimal degree of residual rights suggests that there are strategic interactions between the choice of the regime and the extent to which foreign firms are allowed to exploit the domestic inputs required to extract resources. Addressing this issue is an interesting topic for future research.

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34
### A Appendix – Empirical Evidence

#### A.1 Additional tables

Table 7: Extended Prediction 1: ownership structures and income levels, controlling for years of schooling

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<th>(5)</th>
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<td>Ave obs per country</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
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<td>R² within</td>
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<td>0.33</td>
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**Notes**: All countries in sample are included. *Domestic ownership* is base outcome. The dependent variable is (log) income per capita at start of five-year period. All covariates except the OPEC dummy are lagged by one period. Estimations are fixed effects (within) panel estimations. t-statistics for robust country-clustered standard errors are in parentheses, and for Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in square brackets. *, **, *** statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively (refers to robust country-clustered standard errors).
### Table 8: Prediction 2: robustness analysis

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<td>oil reserves share</td>
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<td>0.089</td>
<td>-0.266</td>
<td>1.239**</td>
<td>-3.595***</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>1.017</td>
<td>3.006***</td>
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<td>0.252*</td>
<td>0.813**</td>
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<td>-0.557</td>
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<td>-2.668</td>
<td>(0.341)</td>
<td>(0.513)</td>
<td>-2.709</td>
<td>(1.761)</td>
<td>(1.732)</td>
<td>(2.507)</td>
<td>(2.334)</td>
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<td>oil price</td>
<td>-0.019**</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.023*</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.030**</td>
<td>-0.024**</td>
<td>-0.104***</td>
<td>-0.1***</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.013)</td>
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<td>(1.689)</td>
<td>(1.485)</td>
<td>(2.502)</td>
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<td>(-2.935)</td>
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<td>1.221</td>
<td>2.741*</td>
<td>4.359**</td>
<td>6.536**</td>
<td>-0.836</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
<td>(2.237)</td>
<td>(0.721)</td>
<td>(0.463)</td>
<td>(0.713)</td>
<td>(1.921)</td>
<td>(1.99)</td>
<td>(2.212)</td>
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<td>(-0.808)</td>
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<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.066*</td>
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<td>0.093**</td>
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<td>-0.053</td>
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<td>0.108***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<td>(1.437)</td>
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<td>(3.777)</td>
<td>(1.577)</td>
<td>(1.533)</td>
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<td>-0.059**</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
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<td>(-1.172)</td>
<td>(-1.977)</td>
<td>(-2.07)</td>
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<td>(-2.301)</td>
<td>(-2.595)</td>
<td>(0.741)</td>
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<td>2.459***</td>
<td>2.745***</td>
<td>-7.172***</td>
<td>-13.59***</td>
<td>0.824*</td>
<td>1.327***</td>
<td>-4.584***</td>
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<td>(-4.199)</td>
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<td>(-4.742)</td>
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<td>0.63</td>
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<tr>
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<td>296.1</td>
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<td>507.8</td>
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<td>289.9</td>
<td>475.6</td>
<td>475.6</td>
<td>295.4</td>
<td>295.4</td>
<td>510.9</td>
<td>510.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All estimations are pooled multinomial logit with dummies for top 20 oil countries included (not shown). The dependent variable is ownership structure, which ranges from 1 (domestic) over 2 (foreign) to 3 (partnership). Domestic ownership (=owner 1) is base outcome; the results show the log probability of choosing either foreign or partnership over domestic. Specifications (1)-(2) refer to post-1980 period; specifications (3)-(4) look at the post-1980 period, and specifications (5)-(6) drop data for Saudi Arabia and the United States. z-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
A.2 Data description

Countries for which control rights regime data is available, with period included (starting with beginning of first five-year period):


Data and sources


oil control rights regime: oil sector control rights variable categorized into majority domestic, majority foreign, or majority mixed domestic-foreign (i.e. partnership) control, according to description in text. Source: own coding.


polity: revised Combined Polity Score. This variable modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or “fix,” to convert instances of “standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores, i.e., within the range, -10 (strong autocracy) to +10 (strong democracy). Source: Polity IV database (Marshall et al. 2010).

executive constraints: measure of the decision rules that define the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decisionmaking powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. The measure ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination). Source: Polity IV database (Marshall et al. 2010).

OPEC: dummy variable with value one in a period when a country is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Source: own coding based on OPEC information on http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/.


years of schooling: Average years of total schooling of population over previous five-year period. Source: Barro Lee education dataset v. 2.0, 07/10 (Barro and Lee, 2010).
Appendix – Theoretical Model with Coniscation

Nash Bargaining: derivation of (11)-(12). From (5) and (6), we have

\begin{align*}
S_f - D_f &= \ell_f - (q_x\chi_h (k_f) - s_h), \\
S_p - D_p &= \ell_p - (q_x\chi_h (k_p) + r_p k_p - s_h), \\
F_i - \Delta_i &= q_x\chi_i (k_i) - \Pi_0 - \ell_i \quad \text{for} \quad i = (f,p).
\end{align*}

Hence, defining

\begin{equation}
\Omega_f \equiv q_x\chi_h (k_f) - s_h \quad \text{and} \quad \Omega_p \equiv q_x\chi_h (k_p) + r_p k_p - s_h,
\end{equation}

we can write the Nash product in (10) for each regime in both cases

\begin{equation}
(S_i - D_i) \cdot (F_i - \Delta_i) = (\ell_i - \Omega_i) \cdot (q_x\chi_i (k_i) - \Pi_0 - \ell_i) = \ell_i \cdot (q_x\chi_i (k_i) - \Pi_0 + \Omega_i) - \ell_i^2 - \ell_i \cdot (q_x\chi_i (k_i) - \Pi_0),
\end{equation}

and obtain the first-order condition for maximization

\begin{equation}
\ell_i^N = \frac{1}{2} \cdot (q_x\chi_i (k_i) - \Pi_0 + \Omega_i).
\end{equation}

Plugging \( \ell_i = \ell_i^N \) into the definitions of domestic income, \( Y_f \) and \( Y_p \), in Table 1, we obtain

\begin{align*}
Y_f^N &= q_z z_f + r_f k_f + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (q_x\chi_f (k_f) - \Pi_0 + \Omega_f), \\
Y_p^N &= q_z z_p + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (q_x\chi_p (k_p) - \Pi_0 + \Omega_p),
\end{align*}

where we can substitute \( \Omega_f \) and \( \Omega_p \) from (B.1) to get

\begin{align*}
Y_f^N &= q_z z_f + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left[ q_x\chi_f (k_f) + q_x\chi_h (k_f) - s_h - \Pi_0 + 2r_f k_f \right], \quad (B.3) \\
Y_p^N &= q_z z_p + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left[ q_x\chi_p (k_p) + q_x\chi_h (k_p) - s_h - \Pi_0 + r_p k_p \right]. \quad (B.4)
\end{align*}

From (6), we have

\begin{align*}
D_f - \Delta_f &= q_x\chi_h (k_f) - s_h - \Pi_0 + s_f + r_f k_f, \quad (B.5) \\
D_p - \Delta_p &= q_x\chi_h (k_p) - s_h - \Pi_0 + s_p. \quad (B.6)
\end{align*}

Substituting (B.5) and (B.6) in (B.3) and (B.4), respectively, we obtain

\begin{equation}
Y_i^N = q_z z_i + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left[ q_x\chi_i (k_i) + r_i k_i + D_i - \Delta_i - s_i \right]
\end{equation}

in both cases \( i = (f,p) \). Substituting \( z_i \equiv \zeta (k_{\text{max}} - k_i) \) in the above expression and rearranging terms, we have result (11). Next, we substitute \( \ell_i = \ell_i^N \) from (B.2) into the definitions of profits, \( \Pi_f \) and \( \Pi_p \), in Table 1, obtaining

\begin{align*}
\Pi_f^N &= q_x\chi_f (k_f) - s_f - r_f k_f - \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left[ q_x\chi_f (k_f) - \Pi_0 + \Omega_f \right], \\
\Pi_p^N &= q_x\chi_p (k_p) - s_p - \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left[ q_x\chi_p (k_p) - \Pi_0 + \Omega_p \right],
\end{align*}

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where we can substitute $\Omega_f$ and $\Omega_p$ from (B.1) to get
\[
\Pi_f^N = \frac{1}{2} \cdot [q_x \chi_f(k_f) - 2s_f - 2r_f k_f + \Pi_0 - q_x \chi_h(k_f) + s_h], \quad (B.7)
\]
\[
\Pi_p^N = \frac{1}{2} \cdot [q_x \chi_p(k_p) - 2s_p + \Pi_0 - q_x \chi_h(k_p) - r_p k_p + s_h]. \quad (B.8)
\]
Plugging (B.5) and (B.6) in (B.7) and (B.8), respectively, we obtain result (12) in both cases $i = (f, p)$.

**Proof of Proposition 1.** Under Foreign Control, the expected level of foreign firm’s profits after bargaining, $\Pi_f^N$, is given by (12) and can be re-written as in (B.7) above. Maximizing (B.7) with respect to $k_f$ taking the rental rate $r_f$ as given yields the first order condition (13). Under Partnership, the expected level of domestic income after bargaining $Y_p^N$ is given by (11) and can be re-written as in (B.4), or equivalently,
\[
Y_p^N = q_x \zeta (k_{\text{max}} - k_p) + \frac{1}{2} \cdot [q_x \chi_p(k_p) + q_x \chi_h(k_p) - s_h - \Pi_0 + r_p k_p]. \quad (B.9)
\]
Maximizing (B.9) with respect to $k_p$ taking the rental rate $r_p$ as given yields the first order condition (14) and thereby (15).

**Proof of Proposition 2.** From (9), (B.3) and (B.4), equilibrium incomes read
\[
Y_h^* = q_x \rho (k_{\text{max}} - k_h^*) + q_x \chi_h(k_h^*) - s_h, \quad (B.10)
\]
\[
Y_f^* = q_x \rho (k_{\text{max}} - k_f^*) + \frac{1}{2} \cdot [q_x \chi_f(k_f^*) + q_x \chi_h(k_f^*) - s_h - \Pi_0 + 2r_f k_f^*], \quad (B.11)
\]
\[
Y_p^* = q_x \rho (k_{\text{max}} - k_p^*) + \frac{1}{2} \cdot [q_x \chi_p(k_p^*) + q_x \chi_h(k_p^*) - s_h - \Pi_0 + r_p k_p^*]. \quad (B.12)
\]
From (8), (13) and (15), the rents paid by the commodity sector equal
\[
r_h^*k_h^* = \beta \cdot q_x \psi(k_h^*)^\beta, \quad (B.13)
\]
\[
r_f^*k_f^* = \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \cdot \beta \cdot q_x \psi(k_f^*)^\beta, \quad (B.14)
\]
\[
r_p^*k_p^* = (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) \cdot \beta \cdot q_x \psi(k_p^*)^\beta. \quad (B.15)
\]
Combining (B.13)-(B.15) with the demand for local capital of the traditional sector (3), and using (4), we have the equilibrium levels
\[
k_h^* = [(q_x/q_z) (\beta/\rho) \psi \cdot \varphi_1]^{1/\gamma}, \quad (B.16)
\]
\[
k_f^* = \left[(q_x/q_z) (\beta/\rho) \psi \cdot \frac{1}{2} (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \right]^{1/\gamma}, \quad (B.17)
\]
\[
k_p^* = [(q_x/q_z) (\beta/\rho) \psi \cdot (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1)]^{1/\gamma}. \quad (B.18)
\]
From (B.7) and (B.8), the equilibrium profits of the foreign firms read
\[
\Pi_f^* = \frac{1}{2} \cdot [q_x \chi_f(k_f^*) - 2s_f - 2r_f^* k_f^* + \Pi_0 - q_x \chi_h(k_f^*) + s_h], \quad (B.19)
\]
\[
\Pi_p^* = \frac{1}{2} \cdot [q_x \chi_p(k_p^*) - 2s_p - r_p^* k_p^* + \Pi_0 - q_x \chi_h(k_p^*) + s_h]. \quad (B.20)
\]
Expressions (B.17)-(B.18) imply $k^*_p > k^*_r$ and, by technologies (4), this implies $x^*_p > x^*_r$. The rest of the proof proceeds in three steps: (i) ranking domestic incomes, (ii) ranking foreign firm’s profits, (iii) deriving the loci $\beta_0$ and $\beta_1$ as increasing functions of $\gamma$.

\textit{(i) Ranking Domestic Income Levels.} Recalling that $r^*_i k^*_i = q_i \rho k^*_i$ in any regime $i$ due to the equilibrium condition (3), and using the technologies (4), equations (B.11) and (B.12) imply

\[
\begin{align*}
Y^*_f &= q_x \rho k_{\text{max}} + \frac{1}{2} \left[ q_x (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) \psi(k^*_r)^\beta - s_h - \Pi_0 \right], \\
Y^*_p &= q_x \rho k_{\text{max}} + \frac{1}{2} \left[ q_x (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) \psi(k^*_p)^\beta - r^*_p k^*_p - s_h - \Pi_0 \right],
\end{align*}
\]

from which, exploiting (B.15), we get

\[
Y^*_p - Y^*_f = \frac{1}{2} q_x (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) \psi \left[ (1 - \beta) (k^*_p)^\beta - (k^*_r)^\beta \right].
\]

From (B.22), the gap $Y^*_p - Y^*_f$ is positive (negative) when the term in square brackets, or equivalently, the logarithm of the relevant ratio, $\ln[(1 - \beta) (k^*_p/k^*_r)^\beta]$, is positive (negative). Using (B.17)-(B.18) to substitute for capital levels, we have

\[
\ln[(1 - \beta) (k^*_p/k^*_r)^\beta] = \ln \left[ (1 - \beta) \left( \frac{2\varphi_2 + \varphi_1}{\varphi_2 - \varphi_1} \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\beta}} \right] = \ln (1 - \beta) + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \ln \left( \frac{2\varphi_2 + \varphi_1}{\varphi_2 - \varphi_1} \right),
\]

which is positive if and only if

\[
(1 - \beta) \ln (1 - \beta) + \beta \ln \left( \frac{2\varphi_2 + \varphi_1}{\varphi_2 - \varphi_1} \right) > 0.
\]

Defining the productivity-gap index $\gamma \equiv \varphi_2/\varphi_1 > 1$, we can re-write inequality (B.23) as

\[
\Xi_1(\beta; \gamma) \equiv \beta \ln \left( \frac{2 \cdot \varphi + \frac{1}{\gamma - 1}}{\gamma - 1} \right) > \Xi_2(\beta) \equiv - \ln (1 - \beta)^{1-\beta}.
\]

Holding $\gamma$ fixed, functions $\Xi_1(\beta; \gamma)$ and $\Xi_2(\beta)$ are graphically represented in Figure 3, graph (a). In particular, holding $\gamma$ fixed, function $\Xi_1(\beta; \gamma)$ is an increasing straight line satisfying

\[
\lim_{\beta \to 0} \Xi_1(\beta; \gamma) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_1(\beta; \gamma) = \ln \left( 2 \cdot \varphi + \frac{1}{\gamma - 1} \right),
\]

whereas $\Xi_2(\beta)$ is a hump-shaped function satisfying

\[
\lim_{\beta \to 0} \Xi_2(\beta) = 0, \quad \lim_{\beta \to \infty} \Xi_2(\beta) = 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_2(\beta) = \ln (1 - \beta) + 1, \quad \frac{\partial^2}{\partial \beta^2} \Xi_2(\beta) = -(1 - \beta)^{-1} < 0,
\]

\[
\lim_{\beta \to 0} \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_2(\beta) = 1, \quad \lim_{\beta \to \infty} \frac{\partial^2}{\partial \beta^2} \Xi_2(\beta) = -1.
\]

First, we determine the critical threshold $\gamma_0$. Properties (B.25) and (B.26) imply that, if $\Xi_1(\beta)$ is steeper than $\Xi_2(\beta)$ in $\beta \to 0$, then the two functions $\Xi_1(\beta; \gamma)$ and $\Xi_2(\beta)$ do not cross: we
would have \( \Xi_1(\beta, \gamma) > \Xi_2(\beta) \) for any \( \beta \in (0, 1) \) and, hence, \( Y_p^* > Y_f^* \) for any \( \beta \in (0, 1) \). From (B.25) and (B.26), having

\[
\lim_{\beta \to 0} \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_1(\beta, \gamma) > \lim_{\beta \to 0} \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_2(\beta)
\]

requires satisfying \( \ln \left( 2 \cdot \frac{\gamma + 1}{\gamma - 1} \right) > 1 \), that is, requires satisfying

\[
\gamma < \frac{e + 2}{e - 2} \equiv \gamma_0 \approx 6.7. \quad (B.27)
\]

Hence, satisfying the inequality \( \gamma < \gamma_0 \) ensures that \( Y_p^* > Y_f^* \) for any \( \beta \in (0, 1) \). Now suppose that \( \gamma > \gamma_0 \). In this case, we have

\[
\lim_{\beta \to 0} \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_1(\beta, \gamma) < \lim_{\beta \to 0} \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_2(\beta),
\]

which implies that there exists an intersection \( \Xi_1(\beta, \gamma) = \Xi_2(\beta) \) such that \( \Xi_1(\beta, \gamma) \) cuts \( \Xi_2(\beta) \) from below, as shown in Figure 3, graph (a). Consequently, when \( \gamma > \gamma_0 \), there exists a unique value of \( \beta \), which we denote by \( \beta_0 \in (0, 1) \), such that

\[
\Xi_1(\beta; \gamma) = \Xi_2(\beta) \quad \text{for} \quad \beta = \beta_0, \quad \text{and} \quad \Xi_1(\beta; \gamma) \leq \Xi_2(\beta) \quad \text{for} \quad \beta \leq \beta_0.
\]

This implies that, when \( \gamma > \gamma_0 \), we have \( Y_p^* > Y_f^* \) for \( \beta > \beta_0 \), and \( Y_p^* \leq Y_f^* \) for \( \beta \leq \beta_0 \).

(ii) Ranking Foreign Firm’s Profits. Using the technologies (4), equations (B.19) and (B.20) imply

\[
\Pi_f^* = \frac{1}{2} \left[ q_x (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \psi(k_f^*)^\beta - 2r_f^*k_f^* - 2s_f + \Pi_0 + s_h \right],
\]

\[
\Pi_p^* = \frac{1}{2} \left[ q_x (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \psi(k_p^*)^\beta - r_p^*k_p^* - 2s_p + \Pi_0 + s_h \right],
\]

where, setting \( s_f = s_p \) and using (B.14) and (B.15) to eliminate \( r_f^*k_f^* \), we get

\[
\Pi_f^* - \Pi_p^* = \frac{1}{2} q_x \psi \left\{ (1 - \beta) (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) (k_f^*)^\beta - [(\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) - \beta (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1)] (k_f^*)^\beta \right\}. \quad (B.29)
\]

Equation (B.29) already contains a critical condition on parameters: if \( \beta > \frac{\varphi_2 - \varphi_1}{\varphi_2 + \varphi_1} \), the term in square brackets is negative, implying \( \Pi_f^* > \Pi_p^* \). Exploiting the definition \( \gamma \equiv \varphi_2/\varphi_1 > 1 \), we can re-write this result as

\[
\beta > \tilde{\beta}(\gamma) \equiv \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma + 1} \implies \Pi_f^* > \Pi_p^*. \quad (B.30)
\]

Bearing result (B.30) in mind, the remainder of the proof focuses on the case \( \beta < \tilde{\beta}(\gamma) \). When \( \beta < \tilde{\beta}(\gamma) \), the profit gap \( \Pi_f^* - \Pi_p^* \) is positive (negative) if and only if the term in square brackets, or equivalently, the logarithm of the relevant ratio

\[
\ln \left[ \frac{(1 - \beta)(\varphi_2 - \varphi_1)}{\varphi_2 + \varphi_1} \left( \frac{k_f^*}{k_p^*} \right)^\beta \right], \quad (B.31)
\]
is positive (negative). Using (B.17)-(B.18) to substitute for capital levels, and exploiting the definitions of $\gamma$ and $\bar{\beta} (\gamma)$, expression (B.31) becomes

$$
\ln \left[ \frac{(1-\beta)(\varphi_2 - \varphi_1)}{(\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) - \beta(\varphi_2 + \varphi_1)} \right] = \ln \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1 - \beta(\gamma - 1)}{\gamma - 1 - \beta(\gamma + 1)} \right] = \\
= \ln \left\{ \bar{\beta} (\gamma) \cdot \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta(\gamma) - \beta} \cdot \left[ \frac{1}{2} \bar{\beta} (\gamma) \right] \right\}
$$

which is positive if and only if

$$
\Xi_3 (\beta; \gamma) \equiv \ln (\bar{\beta} (\gamma)) + (1 - \beta) \ln \left( \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta(\gamma) - \beta} \right) > \Xi_4 (\beta) \equiv \beta \ln (2), \tag{B.32}
$$

Holding $\gamma$ fixed (which implies that $\bar{\beta} (\gamma)$ is fixed), function $\Xi_4 (\beta)$ is an increasing straight line satisfying

$$
\lim_{\beta \to 0} \Xi_4 (\beta) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_4 (\beta) = \ln (2), \tag{B.33}
$$

whereas function $\Xi_3 (\beta; \gamma)$ is an increasing convex function displaying

$$
\lim_{\beta \to 0} \Xi_3 (\beta; \gamma) = 0, \quad \lim_{\beta \to \bar{\beta} (\gamma)} \Xi_3 (\beta; \gamma) = +\infty, \\
\frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_3 (\beta; \gamma) = \frac{1 - \beta(\gamma)}{\beta(\gamma) - \beta} \ln \left( \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta(\gamma) - \beta} \right), \quad \frac{\partial^2}{\partial \beta^2} \Xi_3 (\beta; \gamma) = \frac{1 + \beta}{(\beta(\gamma) - \beta)^2} + \frac{1}{1 + \beta} > 0 \tag{B.34}
$$

$$
\lim_{\beta \to 0} \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_3 (\beta; \gamma) = \frac{1 - \beta(\gamma)}{\beta(\gamma)} + \ln \bar{\beta} (\gamma) > 0, \quad \lim_{\beta \to \bar{\beta} (\gamma)} \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_3 (\beta; \gamma) = +\infty.
$$

Functions $\Xi_3 (\beta; \gamma)$ and $\Xi_4 (\beta)$ are graphically represented in Figure 3, graph (d). First, we determine the critical threshold $\gamma_1$. Properties (B.33) and (B.34) imply that, if $\Xi_3 (\beta; \gamma)$ is steeper than $\Xi_4 (\beta)$ in $\beta \to 0$, then the two functions $\Xi_3 (\beta; \gamma)$ and $\Xi_4 (\beta)$ do not cross: we would have $\Xi_3 (\beta; \gamma) > \Xi_4 (\beta)$ for any $\beta \in (0, \bar{\beta} (\gamma))$ and, hence, $\Pi^*_1 > \Pi^*_p$ for any $\beta \in (0, \bar{\beta} (\gamma))$. From (B.33) and (B.34), having

$$
\lim_{\beta \to 0} \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_3 (\beta; \gamma) > \lim_{\beta \to 0} \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_4 (\beta)
$$

requires satisfying $\frac{1 - \beta(\gamma)}{\beta(\gamma)} + \ln \bar{\beta} (\gamma) > \ln (2)$, that is, requires satisfying

$$
\frac{\gamma + 1}{\gamma - 1} + \ln \left( \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma + 1} \right) > 1 + \ln (2), \tag{B.35}
$$

The right hand side of (B.35) is independent of $\gamma$ whereas the left hand side of (B.35), denoted as $\Phi (\gamma)$, is a decreasing hyperbola satisfying $\lim_{\gamma \to 1} \Phi (\gamma) = \infty$, $\lim_{\gamma \to \infty} \Phi (\gamma) = 1$, and $\Phi' (\gamma) < 0$ for each $\gamma \in (1, \infty)$. Consequently, there exists a unique critical level of $\gamma$, which we denote by $\gamma_1 \in (1, \infty)$, such that

$$
\Phi (\gamma_1) = 1 + \ln (2) \quad \text{and} \quad \Phi (\gamma_1) \geq 1 + \ln (2) \quad \text{for} \quad \gamma \leq \gamma_1. \tag{B.36}
$$
Result (B.36) is graphically represented in Figure 3, graph (c). Note that the critical level \( \gamma_1 \) is exclusively determined by the condition \( \Phi(\gamma_1) = 1 + \ln(2) \) and its value only depends on the elasticity of the logarithmic curve. We can thus denote it as \( \gamma_1 \equiv \Gamma(e) \). In numerical terms, the value of \( \gamma_1 = \Gamma(e) \) is determined graphically in Figure 3, graph (c) and is equal to \( \gamma_1 \approx 2.2 \).

Result (B.36) implies that, for any \( \gamma < \gamma_1 \), inequality (B.35) is satisfied and, consequently, \( \Pi^*_f > \Pi^*_p \) must hold:

\[
\gamma < \gamma_1 \Rightarrow \Phi(\gamma) > 1 + \ln(2) \Rightarrow \lim_{\beta \to 0} \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_3(\beta; \gamma) > \lim_{\beta \to 0} \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \Xi_4(\beta) \Rightarrow \ldots
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \Xi_3(\beta; \gamma) > \Xi_4(\beta) \text{ for any } \beta \in (0, \bar{\beta}(\gamma)) \Rightarrow \Pi^*_f > \Pi^*_p \text{ for any } \beta \in (0, \bar{\beta}(\gamma)) \quad \text{(B.37)}
\]

Instead, if \( \gamma > \gamma_1 \), we have \( \Phi(\gamma) < 1 + \ln(2) \). In this case, \( \Xi_3(\beta; \gamma) \) is less steep than \( \Xi_4(\beta) \) in \( \beta \to 0 \) and there exists a unique intersection between the functions \( \Xi_3(\beta; \gamma) \) and \( \Xi_4(\beta) \). This is shown in Figure 3, graph (d): for a given value of \( \gamma > \gamma_1 \), there exists a unique value of \( \beta \), which we denote by \( \beta_1 \in (0, \bar{\beta}(\gamma)) \), such that \( \Xi_3(\beta_1; \gamma) = \Xi_4(\beta_1) \). Since function \( \Xi_3(\beta; \gamma) \) cuts \( \Xi_4(\beta) \) from below in \( \beta = \beta_1 \), it follows that

\[
\gamma > \gamma_1 \Rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\Xi_3(\beta; \gamma) < \Xi_4(\beta) \text{ for any } \beta \in (0, \beta_1) \\
\Xi_3(\beta; \gamma) \geq \Xi_4(\beta) \text{ for any } \beta \in (\beta_1, \bar{\beta}(\gamma))
\end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow \ldots
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\Pi^*_f < \Pi^*_p \text{ for any } \beta \in (0, \beta_1) \\
\Pi^*_f \geq \Pi^*_p \text{ for any } \beta \in (\beta_1, \bar{\beta}(\gamma))
\end{array} \right\} \quad \text{(B.38)}
\]

Combining results (B.30), (B.37) and (B.38), we obtain the full ranking of foreign firm’s profits. Specifically, combining (B.30) and (B.37), we have that \( \gamma < \gamma_1 \) implies \( \Pi^*_f > \Pi^*_p \) for any \( \beta \in (0, 1) \). Combining (B.30) and (B.38), we have that, if \( \gamma > \gamma_1 \), there exists a critical level \( \beta_1 \in \left(0, \frac{1}{\gamma_1 - 1}\right) \) such that \( \Pi^*_f < \Pi^*_p \) when \( 0 < \beta < \beta_1 \), and \( \Pi^*_f > \Pi^*_p \) when \( \beta_1 < \beta < 1 \).

(iii) Deriving the loci \( \beta_0 \) and \( \beta_1 \) as increasing functions of \( \gamma \). First consider the \( \beta_0(\gamma) \) locus. For given \( \gamma \), the critical level \( \beta_0(\gamma) \) is determined by condition \( \Xi_1(\beta; \gamma) = \Xi_2(\beta) \). As shown in Figure 3, graph (b), an increase in \( \gamma \) leaves \( \Xi_2(\beta) \) unaffected whereas the straight line \( \Xi_1(\beta; \gamma) \) rotates clockwise around the origin \( \beta = 0 \). As a consequence,

\[
\beta_0(\gamma) \text{ is strictly increasing in } \gamma \text{ for any } \gamma \in (1, \infty). \quad \text{(B.39)}
\]

However, the rotation of \( \Xi_1(\beta; \gamma) \) exhibits decreased intensity as \( \gamma \) becomes high. Letting \( \gamma \to \infty \), we have

\[
\lim_{\gamma \to \infty} \Xi_1(\beta; \gamma) \equiv \beta \ln(2)
\]

so that the condition \( \Xi_1(\beta; \gamma) = \Xi_2(\beta) \) determining \( \beta_0 \) reduces (asymptotically as \( \gamma \to \infty \)) to:

\[
\lim_{\gamma \to \infty} \beta_0 = \arg \text{ solve } \left\{ \ln \left( (2) \beta_0 (1 - \beta_0)^{(1-\beta_0)} \right) = 0 \right\} = 0.5. \quad \text{(B.40)}
\]
Results (B.39)-(B.40) imply that the critical level $\beta_0$ can be represented as an increasing locus $\beta_0(\gamma)$ bounded from above by 0.5. The locus is graphically represented in Figure 1 for the range $\gamma \in (0, 10)$. The enlarged picture with $\gamma \in (0, 100)$ is reported in Figure 3, graph (f).

Next consider the $\beta_1(\gamma)$ locus, with the help of Figure 3, graph (e). For given $\gamma$, the critical level $\beta_1(\gamma)$ is determined by condition $\Xi_3(\beta; \gamma) = \Xi_4(\beta)$. An increase in $\gamma$ leaves $\Xi_4(\beta)$ unaffected. Instead, the effect of an increase in $\gamma$ on $\Xi_3(\beta; \gamma)$ is twofold. First, the vertical asymptote $\beta(\gamma)$ shifts to the right; second, the convex curve $\Xi_3(\beta; \gamma)$ rotates clockwise around the origin $\beta = 0$. Formally, from (B.30) and (B.32), we have

$$\beta'(\gamma) = \frac{\partial \beta(\gamma)}{\partial \gamma} = \frac{2 \cdot (\gamma + 1)^{-2}}{\beta(\gamma) - \beta'(\gamma)} > 0,$$

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \gamma} \Xi_3(\beta; \gamma) = \frac{\beta \cdot \beta'(\gamma)}{\beta(\gamma) - \beta'(\gamma)} < 0.$$  

As shown in Figure 3, graph (e), these effects imply that, following an increase in $\gamma$, the intersection point $\beta_1(\gamma)$ shifts to the right, that is,

$$\beta_1(\gamma) \text{ is strictly increasing in } \gamma \text{ for any } \gamma \in (1, \infty). \quad (B.41)$$

Moreover, following an increase in $\gamma$, the intersection point $\beta_1(\gamma)$ becomes closer to the asymptote $\beta(\gamma)$. Since $\lim_{\gamma \to \infty} \beta(\gamma) = 1$, we thus obtain

$$\lim_{\gamma \to \infty} \beta_1(\gamma) = 1. \quad (B.42)$$

Results (B.41)-(B.42) imply that the critical level $\beta_1$ can be represented as an increasing locus $\beta_1(\gamma)$ bounded from above by 1. The locus is graphically represented in Figure 1 for the range $\gamma \in (0, 10)$. The enlarged picture with $\gamma \in (0, 100)$ is reported in Figure 3, graph (f).

**Further details on Figure 1.** The loci $\beta_0(\gamma)$ and $\beta_1(\gamma)$ appearing in Figure 1 originate from two simple algorithms that calculate

$$\beta_0(\gamma) \equiv \text{arg solve } \{\Xi_1(\beta; \gamma) = \Xi_2(\beta)\} \text{ and }$$

$$\beta_1(\gamma) \equiv \text{arg solve } \{\Xi_3(\beta; \gamma) = \Xi_4(\beta)\} \quad (B.43)$$

for each value of $\gamma \in (0, 10)$. The shape of both loci is characterized analytically in step (iii) of the Proof of Proposition 2 above. The intuition for these results is as follows.

Concerning the $\beta_0(\gamma)$ locus, it follows from (B.22) that the income gap $Y_p^* - Y_f^*$ is positive when $(1 - \beta)(k_p^*/k_f^*)^\beta > 1$. Here, $(1 - \beta)$ represents the negative “rent effect”, and $(k_p^*/k_f^*)^\beta$ represents the positive “accumulation effect” of Partnership relative to Foreign Control (see the main text, below Proposition 2). Now, the equilibrium conditions (B.17)-(B.18) imply that $(k_p^*/k_f^*)^\beta$ decreases with $\gamma$ and increases logarithmically with $\beta$. Consequently, a sufficiently high $\gamma$ combined with a sufficiently low $\beta$ yield $(k_p^*/k_f^*)^\beta < (1 - \beta)^{-1}$ and therefore $Y_p^* < Y_f^*$.

Concerning the $\beta_1(\gamma)$ locus, the intuition is twofold. On the one hand, an increase in $\gamma$ increases the rental cost born by the foreign firm more than it increases commodity production
under Foreign Control relative to Partnership; this implies $\Pi_p^* > \Pi_f^*$ for high values of $\gamma$.\footnote{To see this formally, note that, from (B.17)-(B.18), the equilibrium output ratio is $x_f^*/x_p^* = \left( \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma + 1} \right)^{\beta}$, whereas the ratio between the shares of investment costs born ex-post by the foreign firm’s (that reduce ex-post profits) is $\left( 2r_f^*k_f^* / r_p^*k_p^* \right) = \frac{2}{\gamma + 1} \left( \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma + 1} \right)^{\beta}$. Consequently, the increase in $\gamma$ yields an increase in $\left( 2r_f^*k_f^* / r_p^*k_p^* \right)$ that more than offsets the increase in $(x_f^*/x_p^*)$, thus favoring profits under Partnership relative to profits under Foreign Control.} On the other hand, an increase in $\beta$ reduces the joint surplus more under Partnership than under Foreign Control because the State (foreign firm) overinvests (underinvest) in local capital, and this implies $\Pi_p^* > \Pi_f^*$ for low values of $\beta$.\footnote{To see this formally, note that, from (B.29), the profit gap $\Pi_f^* - \Pi_p^*$ is positive if and only if $\left[ \left( \phi_2^* - \phi_1^* \right) - \beta (\phi_2^* - \phi_1) \right] > 1$, where the term in square brackets is the ratio between the shares of joint surplus received by the foreign firm. An increase in the capital share $\beta$ increases the term in square brackets – that is, reduces ex-post profits more under Partnership than under Foreign Control – because $(\phi_2^* + \phi_1) > (\phi_2^* - \phi_1)$.}

**Proof of Proposition 3 (graphical).** The proof hinges on the fact that the $\beta_0 (\gamma)$ locus always lies below the $\beta_1 (\gamma)$ locus in the $(\gamma, \beta)$ plane. A first, quicker proof is graphical. From Figure 1, the strict inequality $\beta_1 (\gamma) > \beta_0 (\gamma)$ holds for and $\gamma < \gamma' \in (1, \infty)$ such that $\beta_0 (\gamma') = 0.5$. Combining these properties with the limits (B.40) and (B.42) as well with the fact that both $\beta_0 (\gamma)$ and $\beta_1 (\gamma)$ are strictly increasing in $\gamma$ from (B.39) and (B.41), it follows that the strict inequality $\beta_1 (\gamma'') > \beta_0 (\gamma'')$ holds for any $\gamma'' \in (1, \infty)$. As a consequence, there is no region of the parameter space $(\gamma, \beta)$ in which $\Pi_p^* < \Pi_f^*$ and $\Pi_p^* < \Pi_f^*$ hold simultaneously. The proof that the parametrization sets $(A, B, C)$ are non-empty follows immediately from Figure 1. 

**Proof of Proposition 3 (analytical).** An alternative, longer but analytical proof that $\beta_1 (\gamma'') > \beta_0 (\gamma'')$ holds for any $\gamma'' \in (1, \infty)$ is as follows. Substituting the definitions of $(\Xi_1, \Xi_2, \Xi_3, \Xi_4)$ from (B.24) and (B.32) into expressions (B.43), the two loci $\beta_0 (\gamma)$ and $\beta_1 (\gamma)$ are determined by

$$
\begin{align*}
\beta_0 (\gamma) & = \text{arg solve} \left\{ \beta \ln (2) = \ln \left[ \beta (\gamma) \right] - \ln \left[ \beta (\gamma) \cdot (1 - \beta) \right]^{-\beta} \right\}, \\
\beta_1 (\gamma) & = \text{arg solve} \left\{ \beta \ln (2) = \ln \left[ \beta (\gamma) \right] + \ln \left[ (1 - \beta) / \left( \beta (\gamma) - \beta \right) \right]^{-\beta} \right\}.
\end{align*}
$$

Given the properties (B.39)-(B.40) and (B.41)-(B.42), a sufficient condition for having $\beta_1 (\gamma'') > \beta_0 (\gamma'')$ for any $\gamma'' \in (1, \infty)$ is that $\beta_0 (\gamma)$ and $\beta_1 (\gamma)$ do not exhibit any intersection. We now prove that prove that $\beta_0 (\gamma)$ and $\beta_1 (\gamma)$ do not exhibit any intersection. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that $\beta_0 (\gamma) = \beta_1 (\gamma)$. From (B.44)-(B.45), this would require that

$$
-\ln \left[ \beta (\gamma) \cdot (1 - \beta) \right]^{-\beta} = \ln \left[ (1 - \beta) / \left( \beta (\gamma) - \beta \right) \right]^{-\beta}
$$

which is possible if and only if $\gamma$ is such that

$$
\gamma = \tilde{\gamma} \implies \beta (\gamma) = \beta (\tilde{\gamma}) = \frac{\beta}{1 - (1 - \beta)^2}
$$

(2.47)
However, when \( \gamma = \gamma' \), both the equalities inside the curly brackets in (B.44)-(B.45) determining \( \beta_0 (\gamma) \) and \( \beta_1 (\gamma) \) are violated: substituting \( \beta (\gamma) = \frac{\beta^\delta}{1-(1-\beta)^\delta} \) in either equality we obtain

\[
\ln (2) = \frac{1}{\beta} \ln \frac{\beta^\delta}{(1-\beta)^{1-\beta}}, \tag{B.48}
\]

which is absurd because \( \ln (2) > \frac{1}{\beta} \ln \frac{\beta^\delta}{(1-\beta)^{1-\beta}} \) for any \( \beta \in (0,1). \) The impossibility of satisfying (B.48) implies that the loci \( \beta_0 (\gamma) \) and \( \beta_1 (\gamma) \) do not exhibit any intersection. Given the properties (B.39)-(B.40) and (B.41)-(B.42), it follows that \( \beta_1 (\gamma'') > \beta_0 (\gamma'') \) holds for any \( \gamma'' \in (1,\infty) \). Consequently, there is no region of the parameter space \((\gamma, \beta)\) in which \( Y_p^* < Y_f^* \) and \( \Pi_p^* < \Pi_f^* \) hold simultaneously. The proof that the parametrization sets \((A, B, C)\) are non-empty follows immediately from Figure 1. 

**Derivation of result (16).** The proof consists of four steps, numbered (i)-(iv).

(i) *Derivation of the upper bound \( \Pi_{0}^{up} \).* From (B.10) and (B.12), using the technologies (2) and (4) and the equilibrium conditions \( r_i = q_i \rho \), we obtain the income gap

\[
Y_p^* - Y_h^* = \frac{1}{2} \left[ q_x \psi \left( \varphi_2 + \varphi_1 \right) \left( k_p^* \right)^\beta - r_p^* k_p^* \right] - \left[ q_x \psi \varphi_1 \left( k_p^* \right)^\beta - r_p^* k_p^* \right] - \frac{1}{2} \left( \Pi_0 - s_h \right),
\]

where we can substitute \( r_p^* k_p^* \) by (B.13) and (B.15), obtaining

\[
Y_p^* - Y_h^* = q_x \psi \left( 1 - \beta \right) \cdot \left[ \frac{1}{2} \left( \varphi_2 + \varphi_1 \right) \left( k_p^* \right)^\beta - \varphi_1 \left( k_p^* \right)^\beta \right] - \frac{1}{2} \left( \Pi_0 - s_h \right). \tag{B.49}
\]

From (B.16) and (B.18), we have \( k_p^* = \left[ \varphi_1 / \left( \varphi_2 + \varphi_1 \right) \right]^{1/\tau_p} k_p^* \), which can be substituted in (B.49), along with \( k_p^* \) from (B.18), to obtain

\[
Y_p^* - Y_h^* = q_x \psi \left( 1 - \beta \right) \left( k_p^* \right)^\beta \cdot \left[ \frac{\varphi_2 + \varphi_1}{2} - \frac{\varphi_1}{\varphi_2 + \varphi_1} \right]^{\tau_p} - \frac{1}{2} \left( \Pi_0 - s_h \right),
\]

\[
Y_p^* - Y_h^* = q_x \psi \left( 1 - \beta \right) \left( k_p^* \right)^\beta \cdot \varphi_1 \left( \frac{\gamma + 1}{2} - \frac{1}{\gamma + 1} \right)^{\tau_p} - \frac{1}{2} \left( \Pi_0 - s_h \right),
\]

\[
Y_p^* - Y_h^* = q_x \psi \left( 1 - \beta \right) \left[ \left( q_x \varphi_2 / q_2 \right) \left( \beta / \rho \right) \psi \right]^{\tau_p} \varphi_1^{\frac{1}{\tau_p}} \cdot \frac{1}{2} \left( \gamma + 1 \right)^{\frac{1}{\tau_p}} - \frac{1}{2} \left( \Pi_0 - s_h \right) \tag{B.50}
\]

This implies that the State prefers Partnership to Home Control if and only if

\[
\Pi_0 < \Pi_{0}^{up} \equiv s_h + \left[ q_x \psi \left( 1 - \beta \right) \left[ \left( q_x / q_2 \right) \left( \beta / \rho \right) \psi \right]^{\tau_p} \varphi_1^{\frac{1}{\tau_p}} \right] \cdot \left[ \left( \gamma + 1 \right)^{\frac{1}{\tau_p}} - 2 \right], \tag{B.51}
\]

that is, if and only if

\[
\Pi_0 < \Pi_{0}^{up} \equiv s_h + Q \cdot \left[ \left( \gamma + 1 \right)^{\frac{1}{\tau_p}} - 2 \right], \tag{B.52}
\]

\(^{33}\)Specifically, the right hand side of (B.48) is a hump-shaped function \( \beta \) over \( \beta \in (0,1) \); it reaches a maximum in \( \beta \approx 0.8 \), where it takes the value \( \frac{1}{\beta} \ln \frac{\beta^\delta}{(1-\beta)^{1-\beta}} \approx 0.18 \), which is strictly less than \( \ln (2) \approx 0.69 \).
where \( Q \) is defined as the term in curly brackets in (B.51),

\[
Q \equiv q_x \psi (1 - \beta) \left[ \left( \frac{q_x}{q_z} \right) \frac{\beta}{\rho} \right]^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} \varphi_1^{\frac{1}{1 - \beta}}. \tag{B.53}
\]

(ii) Derivation of the upper bound \( \Pi_0^{up} \). From (B.20) – or equivalently, the second expression in (B.28), the foreign firm prefers Partnership to no initial contract, \( \Pi_p^* > \Pi_0 \), if and only if

\[
s_h - 2s_p + q_x \psi (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) (k_p^*)^\beta - r_p^* k_p^* > \Pi_0,
\]

where we can substitute \( r_p^* k_p^* \) from (B.15), and \( k_p^* \) from (B.18), to obtain

\[
\begin{align*}
s_h - 2s_p + q_x \psi \varphi_1 [\gamma - 1 - \beta (\gamma + 1)] (k_p^*)^\beta & > \Pi_0, \\
\frac{s_h - 2s_p + q_x \psi \varphi_1 [\gamma - 1 - \beta (\gamma + 1)] (q_x/q_z) (\beta/\rho) \psi \cdot (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}}{1 - \beta} & > \Pi_0, \\
\frac{s_h - 2s_p + q_x \psi [(q_x/q_z) (\beta/\rho) \psi]^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} \varphi_1^{\frac{1}{1 - \beta}} [\gamma - 1 - \beta (\gamma + 1)] (\gamma + 1) \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}}{1 - \beta} & > \Pi_0,
\end{align*}
\]

that is, \( \Pi_p^* > \Pi_0 \) if and only if

\[
\Pi_0 < \Pi_0^{up} \equiv s_h - 2s_p + Q \cdot \left[ \frac{(\gamma - 1) (\gamma + 1) \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}}{1 - \beta} - \frac{\beta (\gamma + 1) \frac{1}{1 - \beta}}{1 - \beta} \right]. \tag{B.54}
\]

(iii) Derivation of the upper bound \( \Pi_0^{upf} \). From (B.11) and (B.12), using the technologies (2) and (4) and the equilibrium conditions \( r_i = q_x \rho \), we obtain the income gap

\[
Y_f^* - Y_h^* = q_x \psi \left[ \frac{1}{2} (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) (k_f^*)^\beta - (1 - \beta) \varphi_1 (k_h^*)^\beta \right] = -\frac{1}{2} (\Pi_0 - s_h). \tag{B.55}
\]

From (B.16) and (B.17), we have \( k_h^* \equiv \left[ 2 \varphi_1 / (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \beta}} k_f^* \), which can be substituted in (B.55) to obtain

\[
\begin{align*}
Y_f^* - Y_h^* & = q_x \psi (k_f^*)^\beta \left[ \frac{1}{2} (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) - (1 - \beta) \varphi_1 \left( \frac{2 \varphi_1}{\varphi_2 - \varphi_1} \right) \right] - \frac{1}{2} (\Pi_0 - s_h), \\
& = \frac{1}{2} q_x \psi (k_f^*)^\beta \left[ (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) - 2 (1 - \beta) \varphi_1 \left( \frac{2 \varphi_1}{\varphi_2 - \varphi_1} \right) \right] - \frac{1}{2} (\Pi_0 - s_h), \\
& = \frac{1}{2} q_x \psi (k_f^*)^\beta \varphi_1 \left[ (\gamma + 1) - 2 (1 - \beta) \left( \frac{2}{\gamma - 1} \right) \right] - \frac{1}{2} (\Pi_0 - s_h),
\end{align*}
\]

where we can substitute \( k_f^* \) from (B.17) to obtain

\[
Y_f^* - Y_h^* = \frac{1}{2} q_x \psi \left[ (q_x/q_z) (\beta/\rho) \psi \right]^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} \varphi_1^{\frac{1}{1 - \beta}} \left[ (\gamma + 1) \left( \frac{\gamma - 1}{2} \right) \right] - \frac{1}{2} (\Pi_0 - s_h),
\]

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where we can substitute the definition of $Q$ to obtain

$$Y_f^* - Y_h^* = \frac{1}{2} \cdot Q \cdot \left[ \frac{\gamma + 1}{1 - \beta} \left( \frac{\gamma - 1}{2} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} - 2 \right] - \frac{1}{2} (\Pi_0 - s_h), \quad (B.56)$$

which implies that the State prefers Foreign Control to Home Control if and only if

$$\Pi_0 < \Pi_0^{\text{eff}} \equiv s_h + Q \cdot \left[ \frac{\gamma + 1}{1 - \beta} \left( \frac{\gamma - 1}{2} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} - 2 \right]. \quad (B.57)$$

(iv) Derivation of the upper bound $\Pi_0^{\text{eff}}$. The second expression in (B.28) implies that the Foreign Firm prefers Foreign Control to no initial contract, $\Pi_f > \Pi_0$, if and only if

$$s_h - 2s_f + q_x (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \psi (k_f^*)^\beta - 2r_f^* k_f^* > \Pi_0,$$

where we can use (B.14) to substitute $r_f^* k_f^*$, obtaining

$$s_h - 2s_f + q_x \psi (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) (1 - \beta) (k_f^*)^\beta > \Pi_0.$$

Eliminating $k_f^*$ by (B.17), we have that $\Pi_f > \Pi_0$ if and only if

$$s_h - 2s_f + q_x \psi (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) (1 - \beta) \{ (\psi / \varphi_1) (\beta / \rho) \}^\beta \left[ (\gamma - 1) \left( \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} \left( \frac{1}{2} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} \right] > \Pi_0,$$

that is, if and only if

$$\Pi_0 < \Pi_0^{\text{eff}} \equiv s_h - 2s_f + Q \cdot \left[ (\gamma - 1) \left( \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} \left( \frac{1}{2} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} \right]. \quad (B.58)$$

Derivation of result (17). From (B.52) and (B.54), we have

$$\Pi_0^{\text{fp}} - \Pi_0^{\text{pp}} = 2s_p + Q \cdot \frac{(\gamma + 1) \left( \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} - 2 (1 - \beta) - (\gamma - 1) (\gamma + 1) \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \right) + \beta (\gamma + 1) \left( \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}}}{1 - \beta},$$

which reduces to

$$\Pi_0^{\text{fp}} - \Pi_0^{\text{pp}} = 2s_p + Q \cdot \frac{2}{1 - \beta} \cdot \left[ (\gamma + 1) \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \right) - (1 - \beta) \right] > 0,$$

so that $\Pi_0^{\text{fp}} > \Pi_0^{\text{pp}}$. From (B.52) and (B.58) we have

$$\Pi_0^{\text{fp}} - \Pi_0^{\text{eff}} = 2s_f + Q \cdot \left[(\gamma + 1) \left( \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} - 2 - (\gamma - 1) \left( \frac{1}{2} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} \left( \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} \right].$$
the sign of which is the same as that of

\[
\ln \left[ 2^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} \frac{(\gamma + 1)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} - 2}{(\gamma - 1)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}} \right] = \ln \left[ 2^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} \left( \frac{\gamma + 1}{\gamma - 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} - \left( \frac{2}{\gamma - 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \right] > 0,
\]

which implies \( \Pi_0^{pp} > \Pi_0^{\pi f} \) for all constellations of parameters. Next, consider (B.52) and (B.54): the gap \( \Pi_0^{pp} - \Pi_0^{\pi p} \) equals

\[
\Pi_0^{pp} - \Pi_0^{\pi p} = Q \cdot \left( (\gamma + 1)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} - 2 - (\gamma + 1)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} (\gamma - 1) \right) + 2s_p,
\]

where we can substitute \( (\gamma + 1)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} = (\gamma + 1)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} (\gamma + 1)^{-1} \) and rearrange terms to get

\[
\Pi_0^{pp} - \Pi_0^{\pi p} = Q \cdot \left( (\gamma + 1)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} - 2 - (\gamma + 1)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \left( \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma + 1} \right) \right) + 2s_p,
\]

\[
\Pi_0^{pp} - \Pi_0^{\pi p} = Q \cdot \left\{ (\gamma + 1)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} - 1 \right\} + 2s_p,
\]

where, given \( \gamma > 1 \), the sign of the term in curly brackets is always positive. Hence, \( \Pi_0^{pp} > \Pi_0^{\pi p} \) for all constellations of parameters.

**Proof of the results listed in Table 2.** The general logic is the following. If \( \Pi_0 \) lies below the lowest of all upper-bounds, \( \Pi_0 < \min\{\Pi_0^{pp}, \Pi_0^{\pi f}, \Pi_0^{\pi p}, \Pi_0^{\pi f} \} \), both Foreign Control and Partnership are jointly agreeable: in this case, the choice of the regime depends on the assumed values of \( (\gamma, \beta) \) and on the bargaining procedure followed at Stage 0, as explained in detail in section 3.3.1. If \( \Pi_0 > \min\{\Pi_0^{\pi f}, \Pi_0^{\pi p} \} \), we exclude Foreign Control as a candidate outcome as it is not jointly agreeable. Similarly, we exclude Partnership if \( \Pi_0 > \min\{\Pi_0^{\pi p}, \Pi_0^{pp} \} \). The proof of the results listed in Table 2 hinges on the following

**Lemma 6** The three parametrization sets \( (A, B, C) \) are associated to the following inequalities:

\[
A \implies \Pi_0^{pp} > \Pi_0^{\pi f} \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi_0^{\pi p} > \Pi_0^{\pi f}, \quad (B.59)
\]

\[
B \implies \Pi_0^{\pi f} > \Pi_0^{pp} \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi_0^{\pi p} > \Pi_0^{\pi f}, \quad (B.60)
\]

\[
C \implies \Pi_0^{pp} > \Pi_0^{\pi f} \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi_0^{\pi p} > \Pi_0^{\pi f}, \quad (B.61)
\]

**Proof:** Using the definitions of \( \Pi_0^{pp} \) in (B.52), \( \Pi_0^{\pi f} \) in (B.57), \( \Pi_0^{\pi p} \) in (B.54) and \( \Pi_0^{\pi f} \) in (B.58), expressions (B.50), (B.56), and (B.28) imply

\[
Y_p^* - Y_h^* = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \Pi_0^{pp} - \Pi_0 \right\} \quad \text{and} \quad Y_f^* - Y_h^* = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \Pi_0^{\pi f} - \Pi_0 \right\}, \quad (B.62)
\]

\[
\Pi_p^* - \Pi_0 = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \Pi_0^{\pi p} - \Pi_0 \right\} \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi_f^* - \Pi_0 = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \Pi_0^{\pi f} - \Pi_0 \right\}. \quad (B.63)
\]

Results (B.62) and (B.63) respectively imply that

\[
Y_p^* \geq Y_f^* \implies \Pi_0^{pp} \geq \Pi_0^{\pi f}, \quad (B.64)
\]

\[
\Pi_p^* \geq \Pi_f^* \implies \Pi_0^{\pi p} \geq \Pi_0^{\pi f}, \quad (B.65)
\]

Combining (B.64) and (B.65) with the definitions of the parametrization sets \( (A, B, C) \), we obtain results (B.59), (B.60) and (B.61).
Given Lemma 6, the results reported in Table 2 can be obtained by considering each parametrization in turn.

### Table 2: Parametrization A. Under parametrization A, the combination of results (17) and (B.59) implies three possible cases:

\[
A \implies \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\Pi_0^p > \Pi_0^\pi > \Pi_0^p > \Pi_0^f \\
\Pi_0^p > \Pi_0^\pi > \Pi_0^p > \Pi_0^f \\
\Pi_0^p > \Pi_0^p > \Pi_0^f > \Pi_0^f \\
\end{array} \right.
\]

This scenario is described in Figure 4, graphs (a)-(b)-(c). In all the three cases, both Partnership and Foreign Control are jointly agreeable for low levels of the reservation profit; only Partnership is jointly agreeable for intermediate levels of the reservation profit; only Home Control can arise for high levels of the reservation profit, and is possibly jointly optimal.

### Table 2: Parametrization B. Under parametrization A, the combination of results (17) and (B.60) implies

\[
B \implies \Pi_0^f > \Pi_0^p > \Pi_0^\pi > \Pi_0^f.
\]

Consequently, under Parametrization B, both Partnership and Foreign Control are jointly agreeable if the reservation profit is low (\(\Pi_0 < \Pi_0^\pi\)); only Partnership is jointly agreeable if the reservation profit takes intermediate levels (\(\Pi_0^f < \Pi_0 < \Pi_0^p\)); only Home Control can arise if the reservation profit is high (\(\Pi_0 > \Pi_0^\pi\)); moreover, Home Control is jointly optimal if \(\Pi_0 > \Pi_0^f\).

### Table 2: Parametrization C. Under parametrization C, the combination of results (17) and (B.60) implies

\[
C \implies \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\Pi_0^p > \Pi_0^\pi > \Pi_0^p > \Pi_0^f \\
\Pi_0^p > \Pi_0^\pi > \Pi_0^p > \Pi_0^f \\
\Pi_0^p > \Pi_0^f > \Pi_0^f > \Pi_0^f \\
\end{array} \right. \implies C1
\]

The subcase C1 is described in Figure 4, graph (d), whereas the subcases C2 are described in Figure 4 graphs (e)-(f). In subcase C1, both Partnership and Foreign Control are jointly agreeable if the reservation profit is low (\(\Pi_0 < \Pi_0^f\)); only Partnership is jointly agreeable if the reservation profit takes intermediate levels (\(\Pi_0^f < \Pi_0 < \Pi_0^p\)). In subcases C2, both Partnership and Foreign Control are jointly agreeable if the reservation profit is low (\(\Pi_0 < \Pi_0^\pi\)); only Foreign Control is jointly agreeable if the reservation profit takes intermediate levels (\(\min\{\Pi_0^f, \Pi_0^\pi\} < \Pi_0 < \Pi_0^p\)). In all cases, only Home Control can arise if the reservation profit is high and is jointly optimal if \(\Pi_0 > \Pi_0^p\).

### C Appendix – Theoretical Model with Credible Repurchase

#### Derivation of (19)-(20). From (5) and (18), we have

\[
S_f - D_{f \lambda} = \ell_f \lambda - (q_x \chi_h (k_{f \lambda}) - s_h - \lambda r_f k_{f \lambda}),
\]

\[
F_f - \Delta_{f \lambda} = q_x \chi_f (k_{f \lambda}) - \Pi_0 - \lambda r_f k_{f \lambda} - \ell_f \lambda.
\]
Hence, defining

\[ \Omega'_{f\lambda} = q_x \chi_h (k_{f\lambda}) - s_h - \lambda r_{f\lambda} k_{f\lambda} \quad \text{and} \quad \Omega''_{f\lambda} = q_x \chi_f (k_{f\lambda}) - \Pi_0 - \lambda r_{f\lambda} k_{f\lambda}, \]  

(C.1)

we can write the relevant Nash product as

\[ (S_f - D_{f\lambda}) \cdot (F_f - \Delta_{f\lambda}) = (\ell_{f\lambda} - \Omega'_{f\lambda}) \cdot (\Omega''_{f\lambda} - \ell_{f\lambda}) = \ell_{f\lambda} (\Omega'_{f\lambda} + \Omega''_{f\lambda}) - \ell_{f\lambda}^2 - \Omega'_{f\lambda} \Omega''_{f\lambda} \]

and obtain the first-order condition for the maximization of the Nash product:

\[ \ell_{f\lambda}^N = \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\Omega'_{f\lambda} + \Omega''_{f\lambda}) . \]  

(C.2)

Plugging \( \ell_{f\lambda} = \ell_{f\lambda}^N \) into the definitions of domestic income and profits, \( Y_f \) and \( \Pi_f \) in Table 1, we obtain

\[ Y_{f\lambda}^N = q_x z_{f\lambda} + r_{f\lambda} k_{f\lambda} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\Omega'_{f\lambda} + \Omega''_{f\lambda}) , \]

\[ \Pi_{f\lambda}^N = q_x \chi_f (k_{f\lambda}) - s_f - r_{f\lambda} k_{f\lambda} - \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\Omega'_{f\lambda} + \Omega''_{f\lambda}) , \]

where we can substitute \( \Omega'_{f\lambda} \) and \( \Omega''_{f\lambda} \) from (C.1) to get (19) and (20).

**Proof of results (21) and (22).** At Stage 1, the foreign firm chooses \( k^*_{f\lambda} \) in order to maximize ex-post profits (20). The first order condition for an interior solution is (21). Under technologies (2) and (4), condition (21) reads

\[ q_x (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \beta \psi (k^*_{f\lambda})^{\beta-1} = 2 (1 - \lambda) r^*_{f\lambda} , \]  

(C.3)

from which an interior solution \( 0 < k^*_{f\lambda} < k_{\text{max}} \) is characterized by

\[ r^*_{f\lambda} k^*_{f\lambda} = \frac{q_x (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \beta \psi}{2 (1 - \lambda)} (k^*_{f\lambda})^{\beta} , \]  

(C.4)

\[ k^*_{f\lambda} = \frac{q_x (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \beta \psi}{2 (1 - \lambda) q_x \rho} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\beta} \right] , \]  

(C.5)

where (C.5) follows from substituting the equilibrium interest rate \( r_{f\lambda} = q_x \rho \) in (C.3). Notice that (C.5) implicitly defines the interior \( k^*_{f\lambda} \) as a function of \( \lambda \) with the following properties:

\[ \lim_{\lambda \to 0} k^*_{f\lambda} (\lambda) = k^*_{f\lambda} (0) = k^*_{f} = \left[ \frac{q_x (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \beta \psi}{2 q_x \rho} \right]^{\frac{1}{\beta}} , \]  

(C.6)

\[ \frac{\partial k^*_{f\lambda} (\lambda)}{\partial \lambda} = \frac{1}{(1 - \beta) (1 - \lambda)} \cdot k^*_{f\lambda} (\lambda) > 0 , \]  

(C.7)

where (C.7) further implies the convexity property \( \partial^2 k^*_{f\lambda} (\lambda) / \partial \lambda > 0 \). Since the term in square brackets in (C.5) tends to \( \infty \) as \( \lambda \to 1 \), there must be a unique critical level \( \lambda_{\text{max}} \in (0, 1) \) such
that
\[ k_{f}^{*}(\lambda_{\text{max}}) = \left[ \frac{q_{x}(\varphi_{2} - \varphi_{1})\beta}{2(1 - \lambda_{\text{max}})q_{z}\rho} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \beta}} = k_{\text{max}} < \infty, \tag{C.8} \]
\[ k_{f}^{*}(\lambda') = \left[ \frac{q_{x}(\varphi_{2} - \varphi_{1})\beta}{2(1 - \lambda')q_{z}\rho} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \beta}} < k_{\text{max}} \text{ for any } \lambda' < \lambda_{\text{max}}, \]
which implies result (22). In particular, expression (C.8) implies that the upper bound is given by
\[ \lambda_{\text{max}} \equiv 1 - \frac{q_{x}(\varphi_{2} - \varphi_{1})\beta}{2q_{z}\rho (k_{\text{max}})^{1 - \beta}}, \tag{C.9} \]
and is therefore higher the higher is \( k_{\text{max}} \).

**Proof of Proposition 4.** First consider the income function \( Y_{f}^{*}(\lambda) \) assuming that \( \lambda \) is always such that we have an interior solution. Substituting \( r_{f} = q_{z}\rho \) and \( q_{z}r_{f} = r_{f}(k_{\text{max}} - k_{f}) \) in (19), the equilibrium ex-post income level reads
\[ Y_{f}^{*} = \frac{1}{2} q_{x} (\varphi_{2} + \varphi_{1}) \psi (k_{f}^{*})^{\beta} \lambda - r_{f} k_{f} + q_{z}\rho k_{\text{max}} - \frac{1}{2} (s_{h} + \Pi_{0}), \]
from which, using (C.4) to substitute \( r_{f}^{*} k_{f}^{*} \), we get
\[ Y_{f}^{*} = \frac{1}{2} q_{x} (\varphi_{2} + \varphi_{1}) \psi (k_{f}^{*})^{\beta} - \frac{1}{1 - \lambda} \frac{1}{2} q_{x} \psi \beta (\varphi_{2} - \varphi_{1}) (k_{f}^{*})^{\beta} + q_{z}\rho k_{\text{max}} - \frac{1}{2} (s_{h} + \Pi_{0}). \tag{C.10} \]
Combining (C.5) with (C.10), equilibrium income \( Y_{f}^{*} \) can be represented as a function of \( \lambda \),
\[ Y_{f}^{*}(\lambda) = \frac{1}{2} q_{x} (\varphi_{2} + \varphi_{1}) \psi (k_{f}^{*}(\lambda))^{\beta} - \frac{1}{1 - \lambda} \frac{1}{2} q_{x} \psi \beta (\varphi_{2} - \varphi_{1}) (k_{f}^{*}(\lambda))^{\beta} + q_{z}\rho k_{\text{max}} - \frac{1}{2} (s_{h} + \Pi_{0}). \]
Defining the constants
\[ \varsigma_{0} \equiv \frac{1}{2} q_{x} \psi (\varphi_{2} + \varphi_{1}) \text{ and } \varsigma_{1} \equiv \frac{1}{2} q_{x} \psi \beta (\varphi_{2} - \varphi_{1}), \tag{C.11} \]
we have
\[ Y_{f}^{*}(\lambda) = \left( \varsigma_{0} - \varsigma_{1} \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} \right) \cdot (k_{f}^{*}(\lambda))^{\beta} + q_{z}\rho k_{\text{max}} - \frac{1}{2} (s_{h} + \Pi_{0}). \tag{C.12} \]
Differentiating (C.12), we obtain
\[ \frac{\partial Y_{f}^{*}(\lambda)}{\partial \lambda} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} \left( \varsigma_{0} - \varsigma_{1} \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} \right) \cdot (k_{f}^{*}(\lambda))^{\beta} + \left( \varsigma_{0} - \varsigma_{1} \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} \right) \cdot \beta (k_{f}^{*}(\lambda))^{\beta - 1} \frac{\partial k_{f}^{*}(\lambda)}{\partial \lambda}, \]
where we can substitute (C.7) to get
\[ \frac{\partial Y_{f}^{*}(\lambda)}{\partial \lambda} = \left[ \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} \left( \varsigma_{0} - \varsigma_{1} \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} \right) + \beta \frac{\varsigma_{0} - \varsigma_{1} \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda}}{(1 - \beta)(1 - \lambda)} \right] \cdot (k_{f}^{*}(\lambda))^{\beta}, \]
\[ \frac{\partial Y_{f}^{*}(\lambda)}{\partial \lambda} = \left[ \beta \frac{\varsigma_{0} - \varsigma_{1} \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda}}{(1 - \beta)(1 - \lambda)} - \frac{\varsigma_{1}}{(1 - \lambda)^{2}} \right] \cdot (k_{f}^{*}(\lambda))^{\beta}, \]
and, hence,
\[
\frac{\partial Y^*_f(\lambda)}{\partial \lambda} = \beta (\varsigma_0 + \varsigma_1) (1 - \lambda) - \varsigma_1 \cdot \frac{(k^*_f(\lambda))^{\beta}}{(1 - \beta)(1 - \lambda)^2}. \tag{C.13}
\]

The sign of \(\partial Y^*_f(\lambda)/\partial \lambda\) is determined by the term in square brackets in (C.13). In particular, there exists a critical value
\[
\hat{\lambda} = \frac{\beta (\varsigma_0 + \varsigma_1) - \varsigma_1}{\beta (\varsigma_0 + \varsigma_1)} \tag{C.14}
\]
such that \(\partial Y^*_f(\lambda)/\partial \lambda \geq 0\) if \(\lambda \leq \hat{\lambda}\). Consequently, \(Y^*_f(\lambda)\) achieves a maximum in \(\lambda = \hat{\lambda}\). Substituting (C.11) in (C.14), we obtain
\[
\hat{\lambda} = \frac{(\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) - (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1)(1 - \beta)}{(\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) + \beta (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1)} \tag{C.15}
\]
Recalling the definition of \(\gamma \equiv \varphi_2/\varphi_1\), we can rewrite (C.15) as
\[
\hat{\lambda} = \frac{2 + \beta (\gamma - 1)}{\gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1)}. \tag{C.16}
\]

Obviously, since \(Y^*_f(\lambda)\) is defined over \(\lambda \in (0, \lambda_{\text{max}})\), the maximum is actually an interior maximum provided that \(\hat{\lambda}\) lies within the range of interior solutions to the investment problem, that is, provided that parameters are such \(\hat{\lambda} < \lambda_{\text{max}}\). As shown in (C.9), \(\hat{\lambda}\) lies within the range of interior solutions \((0, \lambda_{\text{max}})\) provided that \(k_{\text{max}}\) is sufficiently large.

Next, consider the profit function \(\Pi^*_f(\lambda)\). Using (4) and result (C.4), equilibrium profits of the foreign firm read
\[
\Pi^*_f(\lambda) = \frac{1}{2} q_\tau (1 - \beta) (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \psi \left( k^*_f(\lambda) \right)^\beta + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\Pi_0 + s_k - 2 s_f). \tag{C.17}
\]

From (C.7), the first derivative reads
\[
\frac{\partial \Pi^*_f(\lambda)}{\partial \lambda} = \frac{1}{2} q_\tau (1 - \beta) (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \psi \beta \left( k^*_f(\lambda) \right)^\beta > 0
\]
and, consequently, \(\partial^2 \Pi^*_f(\lambda)/\partial \lambda^2 > 0\).

**Proof of Proposition 5.** From (B.18) and (C.4), the ratio \(k^*_f/\lambda^*_p\) equals
\[
\frac{k^*_f}{k^*_p} = \left[ \frac{1}{2 (1 - \lambda)} \cdot \frac{\varphi_2 - \varphi_1}{\varphi_2 + \varphi_1} \right]^{1/\beta}.
\]
Substituting \(\lambda = \hat{\lambda}\) with \(\hat{\lambda}\) given by (C.15), we obtain
\[
\frac{k^*_f}{k^*_p} = \left[ \frac{\varphi_2 + \varphi_1 + \beta (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1)}{2 (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1)} \right]^{1/\beta} > 1,
\]
so that \(k^*_f < k^*_p\) and \(x^*_f < x^*_p\). The rest of the proof proceeds in three steps, concerning (i) the ranking of relative domestic income levels, (ii) the ranking of relative foreign firm’s profits,
and (iii) the fact that Partnership can be jointly optimal whereas Foreign Control with credible repurchase and $\lambda = \hat{\lambda}$ cannot be jointly optimal.

\((i)\) Ranking Domestic Income Levels. Under the technologies \((4)\), the equilibrium income levels \((B.12)\) and \((19)\) read

$$Y^*_f = \frac{1}{2} \left[ q_x (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) \psi (k_f^*)^\beta - 2\lambda r_f^* k_f^* \right] + q_x \rho k_{max} - \frac{1}{2} (s_h + \Pi_0), \quad (C.18)$$

$$Y^*_p = \frac{1}{2} \left[ q_x (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) \psi (k_p^*)^\beta - r_p^* k_p^* \right] + q_x \rho k_{max} - \frac{1}{2} (s_h + \Pi_0). \quad (C.19)$$

Taking the difference, we get

$$Y^*_p - Y^*_f = \frac{1}{2} q_x \psi \left\{ (1 - \beta) (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) (k_p^*)^\beta - \left[ (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) - \frac{\lambda \beta (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1)}{1 - \lambda} \right] (k_f^*)^\beta \right\}. \quad (C.20)$$

Substituting $\lambda = \hat{\lambda}$ with $\hat{\lambda}$ given by \((C.15)\), the term in square brackets in \((C.20)\) reduces to

$$Y^*_p - Y^*_f = \frac{1}{2} q_x \psi \left\{ (1 - \beta) (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) (k_p^*)^\beta - \left[ (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) + \beta (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \right] (k_f^*)^\beta \right\}. \quad (C.21)$$

From \((C.21)\), the gap $Y^*_p - Y^*_f$ is positive (negative) when the term in curly brackets, or equivalently, the logarithm of the relevant ratio,

$$\mathcal{L}_1 (\lambda) \equiv \ln \left[ \frac{(\varphi_2 + \varphi_1)}{(\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) + \beta (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1)} (k_p^*/k_f^*)^\beta \right], \quad (C.22)$$

is positive (negative). Using \((B.18)\) to substitute $k_p^*$ and \((C.4)\) to substitute $k_f^*$, expression \((C.22)\) becomes

$$\mathcal{L}_1 (\lambda) = \ln \left\{ \frac{\gamma + 1}{\gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1)} \left[ 2 (1 - \lambda) \frac{\gamma + 1}{\gamma - 1} \right]^{\frac{\beta}{\gamma}} \right\},$$

which, substituting $\lambda = \hat{\lambda}$ with $\hat{\lambda}$ given by \((C.16)\), equals

$$\mathcal{L}_1 (\hat{\lambda}) = \ln \left[ \frac{2\beta}{\gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1)} \right]^{\frac{\beta}{\gamma}}. \quad (C.23)$$

From \((C.23)\), $\mathcal{L}_1 (\hat{\lambda})$ is positive if and only if the term in square brackets exceeds unity, that is, if and only if

$$\Xi_5 (\beta) \equiv \beta \cdot \ln 2 > \ln \left( 1 + \beta \cdot \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma + 1} \right) = \Xi_6 (\beta). \quad (C.24)$$
Function $\Xi_5(\beta)$ is an increasing straight line whereas function $\Xi_6(\beta)$ is increasing and concave with

$$\lim_{\beta \to 0} \Xi_6(\beta) = 0, \quad \lim_{\beta \to \infty} \Xi_6(\beta) = \infty, \quad \Xi'_6(\beta) = \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma + 1 + \beta(\gamma - 1)}, \quad (C.25)$$

$$\lim_{\beta \to 0} \Xi'_6(\beta) = \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma + 1}, \quad \lim_{\beta \to \infty} \Xi'_6(\beta) = 0. \quad (C.26)$$

These properties imply two cases. First, if the $\Xi_5(\beta)$ is steeper than $\Xi_6(\beta)$ in $\beta = 0$, then $\Xi_5(\beta) > \Xi_6(\beta)$ for all $\beta \in (0, 1)$ and, hence, $L_1(\hat{\lambda}) > 0$ for all $\beta \in (0, 1)$. Formally,

if $\ln 2 > \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma + 1}$ then $\lim_{\beta \to 0} \Xi'_6(\beta) > \lim_{\beta \to 0} \Xi'_6(\beta)$ and, hence, $L_1(\hat{\lambda}) > 0$ for all $\beta \in (0, 1)$,

which is equivalent to:

$$\text{if } \gamma < \gamma_2 \equiv \frac{1 + \ln 2}{1 - \ln 2} \approx 5.52 \text{ then } Y^*_p > Y^*_f \text{ for all } \beta \in (0, 1). \quad (C.27)$$

The second case implied by properties (C.25)-(C.26) for condition (C.24) is that, if $\gamma > \gamma_2$, then (i) $\Xi_6(\beta)$ is initially steeper than $\Xi_5(\beta)$ in $\beta = 0$, and (ii) there exists a unique finite value of $\beta$, called $\beta_2$, in which $\Xi_6(\beta)$ cuts $\Xi_5(\beta)$ from above. Formally,

if $\gamma > \gamma_2$ then $\Xi_5(\beta) < \Xi_6(\beta)$ for $\beta < \beta_2$ and $\Xi_5(\beta) \geq \Xi_6(\beta)$ for $\beta \geq \beta_2$, \quad (C.28)

where the value of $\beta_2$ is determined by the condition $\Xi_5(\beta_2) = \Xi_6(\beta_2)$ and can be shown to be strictly less than unity.\footnote{The functions $\Xi_5(\beta)$ and $\Xi_6(\beta)$ exhibit the properties $\lim_{\beta \to 0} \Xi_5(\beta) = \ln 2$ and $\lim_{\beta \to 1} \Xi_6(\beta) = \ln \left(1 + \frac{1}{\beta + 1}\right)$ where $1 + \frac{1}{\beta + 1} < 2$ implies that $\Xi_5(1) > \Xi_6(1)$. As a consequence, the intersection $\beta_2$ in which $\Xi_6(\beta)$ cuts $\Xi_5(\beta)$ from above must be such that $\beta_2 < 1$.}

Hence, result (C.28) can be equivalently restated as:

if $\gamma > \gamma_2$ then there exists $\beta_2 \in (0, 1)$ such that $\begin{cases} Y^*_p \geq Y^*_f & \text{for } \beta \geq \beta_2 \\ Y^*_p < Y^*_f & \text{for } \beta < \beta_2 \end{cases}$.

\text{(ii) Ranking Foreign Firm’s Profits.} Substituting technologies (4) in (20) and (B.20), respectively, equilibrium profits read

$$\Pi^*_f = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left[ q_x (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \psi (k^*_f)^\beta - 2(1-\lambda) r^*_f k^*_f + \Pi_0 + s_h - 2s_f \right],$$

$$\Pi^*_p = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left[ q_x (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \psi (k^*_p)^\beta - r^*_p k^*_p + \Pi_0 + s_h - 2s_p \right].$$

Taking the difference $\Pi^*_f - \Pi^*_p$ with $s_f = s_p$ and using (C.4) and (B.15) to eliminate $r^*_f k^*_f$ and $r^*_p k^*_p$, we obtain

$$\Pi^*_f - \Pi^*_p = \frac{1}{2} \cdot q_x \psi \left\{ (1-\beta)(\varphi_2 - \varphi_1)(k^*_f)^\beta - [(\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) - \beta (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1)](k^*_p)^\beta \right\}. \quad (C.29)$$
Equation (C.29) already contains a critical condition on parameters: if \( \beta > \frac{\varphi_2 - \varphi_1}{\varphi_2 + \varphi_1} \), the term in square brackets is negative, implying \( \Pi^*_f \lambda > \Pi^*_p \). We can re-write this result as

\[
\beta > \tilde{\beta} \equiv \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma + 1} \implies \Pi^*_f \lambda > \Pi^*_p. \tag{C.30}
\]

Restricting the attention to the case \( \beta < \tilde{\beta} \), result (C.29) implies that the gap \( \Pi^*_f \lambda - \Pi^*_p \) is positive (negative) when the term in square brackets in (C.29), or equivalently, the logarithm of the relevant ratio,

\[
L_2(\lambda) \equiv \ln \left[ \frac{(1 - \beta) (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1)}{(\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) - \beta (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1)} (k^*_f \lambda / k^*_p)^\beta \right], \tag{C.31}
\]

is positive (negative). Using (B.18) to substitute \( k^*_p \) and (C.4) to substitute \( k^*_f \lambda \), expression (C.31) becomes

\[
L_2(\lambda) = \ln \left\{ \frac{(1 - \beta) (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1)}{(\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) - \beta (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1)} \left[ \frac{1}{2(1 - \lambda)} \cdot \frac{\varphi_2 - \varphi_1}{\varphi_2 + \varphi_1} \right]^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} \right\}
\]

which, substituting \( \lambda = \tilde{\lambda} \) with \( \tilde{\lambda} \) given by (C.16), equals

\[
L_2(\tilde{\lambda}) = \ln \left\{ \frac{\gamma - 1 - \beta (\gamma - 1)}{\gamma - 1 - \beta (\gamma + 1)} \left[ \frac{\gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1)}{2(1 - \lambda)} \cdot \gamma - 1 \right]^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} \right\}. \tag{C.32}
\]

Recalling the definition of \( \tilde{\beta} \), we can rewrite (C.32) as

\[
L_2(\tilde{\lambda}) = \ln \left\{ \tilde{\beta} \cdot \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta - \beta} \cdot \left[ \frac{1 + \beta \tilde{\beta}}{2} \right]^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} \right\}. \tag{C.33}
\]

From (C.33), \( L_2(\tilde{\lambda}) \) is positive if and only if

\[
\Xi_7(\beta) \equiv (1 - \beta) \ln \left( \tilde{\beta} \cdot \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta - \beta} \right) + \beta \ln (1 + \beta \tilde{\beta}) > \Xi_8(\beta) \equiv \beta \ln (2). \tag{C.34}
\]

Function \( \Xi_8(\beta) \) is an increasing straight line with

\[
\Xi_8(\beta) = \ln (2) > 0. \tag{C.35}
\]

Function \( \Xi_7(\beta) \), instead, is an increasing hyperbula displaying \( \lim_{\beta \to 0} \Xi_3(\beta) = 0 \) and \( \lim_{\beta \to \beta^*} \Xi_3(\beta) = +\infty \) over the relevant range \( \beta \in (0, \tilde{\beta}) \). In particular,

\[
\Xi'_7(\beta) = \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta - \beta} + \ln \left[ \frac{(1 + \beta \tilde{\beta})(\beta - \beta)}{\beta - \beta} \right] + \frac{\beta \tilde{\beta}}{1 + \beta \tilde{\beta}}, \tag{C.36}
\]

\[
\lim_{\beta \to 0} \Xi'_7(\beta) = \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta}, \quad \lim_{\beta \to \beta^*} \Xi'_7(\beta) = \infty.
\]
Results (C.35) and (C.36) yield a sufficient condition for having $\Pi^*_\lambda > \Pi^*_p$. Specifically, if $\lim_{\beta \to 0} \Xi^\ell_2 (\beta) > \Xi^\ell_3 (\beta)$, we surely obtain $\Pi^*_f \lambda > \Pi^*_p$ because then $\Xi^r (\beta) > \Xi^s (\beta)$ holds for any $\beta \in (0, \beta)$. That is:

$$1 - \beta > \ln (2) \implies \Pi^*_\lambda > \Pi^*_p \text{ for any } \beta \in (0, \beta). \quad (C.37)$$

If $\lim_{\beta \to 0} \Xi^\ell_2 (\beta) < \Xi^\ell_3 (\beta)$, instead, there exists a region of the parameter space, $(0, \beta_3) \subset (0, \beta)$, such that $\Pi^*_f \lambda < \Pi^*_p$ for $\beta \in (0, \beta_3)$ and $\Pi^*_f \lambda > \Pi^*_p$ for $\beta \in (\beta_3, \beta)$, that is:

$$1 - \beta < \ln (2) \implies \begin{cases} \Pi^*_f \lambda < \Pi^*_p & \text{for } \beta \in (0, \beta_3), \\ \Pi^*_f \lambda > \Pi^*_p & \text{for } \beta \in (\beta_3, \beta). \end{cases} \quad (C.38)$$

Notice that, given the definition of $\bar{\beta}$, we can define a specific restriction on the parameter $\gamma$ that allows us to discriminate between cases (C.37) and (C.38). Using $\beta \equiv \frac{2 - 1}{\gamma - 1}$, the critical inequality $1 - \beta > \bar{\beta} \ln (2)$ can be equivalently re-written as

$$\gamma < 1 + \frac{2}{\ln (2)} \iff \gamma_3 \approx 3.88.$$ 

Hence, we have a critical threshold $\gamma_3$ whereby results (C.37) and (C.38) can be equivalently restated as

$$\begin{align*}
\gamma < \gamma_3 & \implies \Pi^*_f \lambda > \Pi^*_p \text{ for any } \beta \in (0, \beta), \\
\gamma > \gamma_3 & \implies \begin{cases} \Pi^*_f \lambda < \Pi^*_p & \text{for } \beta \in (0, \beta_3), \\ \Pi^*_f \lambda > \Pi^*_p & \text{for } \beta \in (\beta_3, \beta). \end{cases} \quad (C.39)
\end{align*}$$

From (C.39) and (C.30), we obtain the two results concerning the foreign firm’s profits reported in Proposition 5. First, the case $\gamma < \gamma_3$ in (C.39) combined with (C.30) implies that if $\gamma < \gamma_3$ then $\Pi^*_f \lambda > \Pi^*_p$ for any $\beta \in (0, 1)$. Second, the case $\gamma > \gamma_3$ in (C.39) combined with (C.30), implies that, if $\gamma > \gamma_3$, there exists a critical level $\beta_3 \in \left(0, \frac{2 - 1}{\gamma - 1}\right)$ such that $\Pi^*_f \lambda < \Pi^*_p$ when $0 < \beta < \beta_3$, and $\Pi^*_f \lambda > \Pi^*_p$ when $\beta_3 < \beta < 1$.

(iii) Joint optimality. Proceeding in the same way as for the proof of Proposition 2 above, the critical loci $\beta_2 (\gamma)$ and $\beta_3 (\gamma)$ represented in Figure 2 are obtained by running two simple algorithms that calculate

$$\begin{align*}
\beta_2 (\gamma) & \equiv \arg \text{ solve } \{ \Xi^r (\beta) = \Xi^s (\beta; \gamma) \}, \\
\beta_3 (\gamma) & \equiv \arg \text{ solve } \{ \Xi^r (\beta; \gamma) = \Xi^r (\beta) \},
\end{align*}$$

for each value of $\gamma$. The resulting loci are such that $\beta_3 (\gamma') > \beta_2 (\gamma')$ is satisfied for any $\gamma \in (1, \infty)$. This implies that there is no region of the parameter space $\gamma \in (1, \infty)$ in which $Y^*_p < Y^*_f \lambda$ and $\Pi^*_p < \Pi^*_f \lambda$ hold simultaneously. The proof that the parametrization sets $\left( \bar{A}, \bar{B}, \bar{C} \right)$ are non-empty follows immediately from Figure 2.

**Derivation of conditions (24).** First, consider the upper-bound $\bar{\Pi}^H$. From (B.18) and (B.10), using the technologies (2) and (4) and the equilibrium conditions $r_i = q_x\rho$, we obtain the income gap

$$Y^*_f \lambda - Y^*_h = \frac{1}{2} \left[ q_x (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) \psi (k^*_f \lambda)^{\beta} - 2 \lambda r^*_f k^*_f \lambda \right] - q_x \psi (1 - \beta) \varphi_1 (k^*_h)^{\beta} - \frac{1}{2} (\Pi_0 - s_h),$$

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where we can substitute (C.4) to eliminate \( r^*_f k^*_f \), obtaining

\[
Y^*_f - Y^*_h = \frac{1}{2} q_x \psi \left[ (\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) - \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} \beta (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1) \right] (k^*_f)^\beta - q_x \psi (1 - \beta) \varphi_1 (k^*_h)^\beta - \frac{1}{2} (\Pi_0 - s_h).
\]

Substituting \( \lambda = \tilde{\lambda} \) with \( \tilde{\lambda} \) given by (C.15), the term in square brackets reduces to

\[
(1 - \beta) [(\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) + \beta (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1)]
\]

and we obtain

\[
Y^*_f - Y^*_h = q_x \psi (1 - \beta) \left\{ \frac{1}{2} [(\varphi_2 + \varphi_1) + \beta (\varphi_2 - \varphi_1)] (k^*_f)^\beta - \varphi_1 (k^*_h)^\beta \right\} - \frac{1}{2} (\Pi_0 - s_h),
\]

that is,

\[
Y^*_f - Y^*_h = q_x \psi (1 - \beta) \varphi_1 \left\{ \frac{1}{2} [(\gamma + 1) + \beta (\gamma - 1)] (k^*_f)^\beta - (k^*_h)^\beta \right\} - \frac{1}{2} (\Pi_0 - s_h).
\]

(C.40)

Equilibrium local \( k^*_f \) is given by (C.4): using \( \lambda = \tilde{\lambda} \) with \( \tilde{\lambda} \) given by (C.16), we obtain

\[
k^*_f (\tilde{\lambda}) = \left\{ \frac{q_x \varphi_1 [(\gamma + 1) + \beta (\gamma - 1)] \beta \psi}{2 q_x \rho} \right\} \frac{1}{1 - \beta}.
\]

(C.41)

From (C.41) and the first expression in (B.16), we have

\[
\frac{k^*_h}{k^*_f (\tilde{\lambda})} = \left\{ \frac{2}{\gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1)} \right\} \frac{1}{1 - \beta}.
\]

(C.42)

Using (C.42), we can rewrite (C.40) as

\[
Y^*_f - Y^*_h = q_x \psi (1 - \beta) \varphi_1 (k^*_f)^\beta \left\{ \frac{1}{2} (\gamma + 1) + \frac{1}{2} \beta (\gamma - 1) - \left[ \frac{1}{2} (\gamma + 1) + \frac{1}{2} \beta (\gamma - 1) \right] \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \right\} - \frac{1}{2} (\Pi_0 - s_h),
\]

and then substitute \( k^*_f \) by (C.41) to obtain

\[
Y^*_f - Y^*_h = Q \cdot \left\{ \frac{1}{2} (\gamma + 1) + \frac{1}{2} \beta (\gamma - 1) \right\} \frac{2 - \beta}{2 (\gamma + 1) + \frac{1}{2} \beta (\gamma - 1)} - \frac{1}{2} (\Pi_0 - s_h),
\]

(C.43)

where \( Q = q_x \psi (1 - \beta) \left[ (q_x / q_z) (\beta / \rho) \psi \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \beta}} \varphi_1^{\frac{1}{1 - \beta}} \) is defined in (B.53). Result (C.43) implies that the State prefers Foreign Control (with credible repurchase at rate \( \lambda = \tilde{\lambda} \)) to Home Control if and only if

\[
\Pi_0 < \Pi^{bf}_0 \equiv s_h + Q \left\{ 2 \left\{ \frac{1}{2} (\gamma + 1) + \frac{1}{2} \beta (\gamma - 1) \right\} \frac{2 - \beta}{2 (\gamma + 1) + \frac{1}{2} \beta (\gamma - 1)} \right\}.
\]

(C.44)
Next consider the foreign firm’s profits. From (C.17), the gap between the profits under Foreign Control with credible repurchase and the reservation profit equals

$$\Pi_f^* (\lambda) - \Pi_0 = \frac{1}{2} q_x (1 - \beta) (\phi_2 - \phi_1) \psi (k^*_f (\lambda))^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (s_h - 2s_f - \Pi_0). \quad (C.45)$$

With $\lambda = \tilde{\lambda}$, we can substitute $k^*_f (\lambda)$ with (C.41), obtaining

$$\Pi_f^* (\lambda) - \Pi_0 = \frac{1}{2} q_x (1 - \beta) (\phi_2 - \phi_1) \psi \left\{ q_x \phi_1 \left[ \gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1) \right] \beta \psi \right\}^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (s_h - 2s_f - \Pi_0),$$

$$\Pi_f^* (\lambda) - \Pi_0 = Q \cdot (\gamma - 1) \left\{ \frac{1}{2} \left[ \gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1) \right] \right\}^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (s_h - 2s_f - \Pi_0),$$

which implies that the Foreign Firm prefers Foreign Control to no initial contract, $\Pi_f^* > \Pi_0$, if and only if

$$\Pi_0 < \tilde{\Pi}_0^f = s_h - 2s_f + Q \cdot (\gamma - 1) \left\{ \frac{1}{2} \left[ \gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1) \right] \right\}^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}}. \quad (C.46)$$

**Derivation of result (25).** The second inequality in (25), $\Pi_0^{up} > \Pi_0^{op}$, is already proved in (17). The first inequality, $\Pi_0^{up} > \tilde{\Pi}_0^f$, is proved as follows. From (B.52) and (C.46), we have

$$\Pi_0^{up} - \tilde{\Pi}_0^f = 2s_f + Q \cdot \left\{ (\gamma + 1) \left[ \gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1) \right] \right\}^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (s_h - 2s_f - \Pi_0). \quad (C.47)$$

We now show that the term in curly brackets in (C.47) is always positive: re-writing it as a function

$$\Xi_0 (\gamma) \equiv (\gamma + 1) \left[ \gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1) \right]^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} - 2 - (\gamma - 1) \left[ \frac{1}{2} (\gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1)) \right]^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}}, \quad (C.48)$$

the derivative with respect to $\gamma$ is

$$\Xi_0' (\gamma) = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \left\{ (\gamma + 1) \left[ \gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1) \right]^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} - \Lambda_\gamma \cdot [(\gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1))]^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} \right\}, \quad (C.49)$$

with $\Lambda_\gamma \equiv \left( \frac{1}{2} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}} \frac{\gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1) - \beta (\gamma + 1)}{\gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1)} < 1. \quad (C.50)$

The sign of $\Xi_0' (\gamma)$ is positive for any $\gamma > 1$. The proof is by contradiction: suppose that $\Xi_0' (\gamma) < 0$. From (C.49)-(C.50), this would imply

$$\Lambda_\gamma > \left( \frac{\gamma + 1}{\gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1)} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}},$$

$$\frac{\gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1) - \beta (\gamma + 1)}{\gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1)} > \left( 2 \cdot \frac{\gamma + 1}{\gamma + 1 + \beta (\gamma - 1)} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}}, \quad (C.51)$$
which is absurd because the left hand side of (C.51) is less than unity whereas the right hand side of (C.51) greater than unity.\textsuperscript{35} As a consequence,

\[ \Xi_0'(\gamma) > 0 \text{ for all } \gamma > 1. \]

Combining this result with

\[ \lim_{\gamma \to 1} \Xi_0(\gamma) = (2)^{1-\beta} - 2 > 0, \]

it follows that the term in curly brackets in (C.47) is positive for any value of \( \gamma > 1 \), which means that \( \Pi_0^{\text{pp}} > \Pi_0^{\text{pf}} \) for any constellation of parameters.

\textsuperscript{35}The fact that the right hand side of (C.51) is greater than unity can also verified by contradiction: imposing

\[ 2 \cdot \frac{1}{\gamma+1+\beta(\gamma-1)} < 1 \]

we obtain \( \beta > \frac{\gamma+1}{\gamma-1} > 1 \), which is absurd because \( \beta < 1 \).
Figure 3: Graphical proof of Proposition 2.
Figure 4: Agreeability of regimes: proof of the results reported in Table 2.
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