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The Diversity of Russia’s Arctic Cities
By Svetlana Badina, Plekhanov Russian University of Economics; Institute of Economic Forecasting, Russian Academy of Sciences; Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia

ANALYSIS
COVID-19 in Russia’s Arctic
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Abstract:

Russia’s new Arctic strategy lays out plans for the region through 2035. While the main threats to the region are social and economic, Moscow currently prioritizes increased military spending. Moscow’s dilemma of whether to open up for increased economic investment, including from foreign companies, or remain closed to pursue its vision of national sovereignty will shape Arctic developments for years to come.

A New Policy for the Arctic

On 5 March 2020 President Putin approved the “Basic Principles of the Russian Federation State Policy for the Arctic to 2035” (hereinafter referred to as the Basic Principles to 2035).1 This document defines the goals, main tasks, security challenges, as well as mechanisms of implementation for Russian policy in the region. The new document updates the previous state policy, which was approved in 2008.2 After 2008, Russia had to revise its policies to take into account increased tensions with the United States, an evolving relationship with China, growing economic challenges, strengthening resecuritization in the north, and new opportunities to explore for natural resources in the face of climate change.

Russia prizes the Arctic for its extensive hydrocarbon and biological resources and the potential trade benefits from the Northern Sea Route. Opportunities in these areas are increasing due to climate change. Efforts to realize these economic benefits push Russia to strengthen its military presence in the Arctic. However, investment needs for strategic economic projects, shortcomings in northern infrastructure, and difficult living conditions for the population of the Russian Arctic region are Achilles heels for Moscow. With just over 1.5% of the country’s population, the Arctic zone provides almost 10% of Russia’s GDP through oil and gas production, 10% of all investments, and demonstrates high growth rates for labor productivity and wages. Nevertheless, poverty and unemployment rates are below the Russian average, according to the Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East. As a result, people are fleeing the North, with 300,000 leaving in the past 15 years.3 The current population of the Russian Arctic is about 2.4 million people.4

Russia will assume the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2021–2023. Most likely that prospect drove it to update its Arctic policies to reflect current conditions.

The Basic Principles: Security Aspects

At the end of 2019, the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East started the procedure for approving the new draft Arctic Development Strategy within the Russian government. The document included a special economic regime for the Arctic for the first time.5 The new policy defines Russia’s national interests in the Arctic as:

• ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation;
• preserving the Arctic as a territory supporting stable and mutually beneficial international partnerships;
• ensuring a high quality of life and well-being for the population;
• the development of the Arctic zone as a strategic resource base and its rational use in order to accelerate the economic growth of the Russian Federation;
• development of the Northern Sea Route as a competitive national transportation route on the world market;
• the environmental protection of the Arctic, including the original habitat and traditional way of life for Indigenous peoples living there.

The main changes and additions to the list of national interests are: emphasizing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia’s Arctic, ensuring a high quality of

2 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 2009. Ob Osnovakh gosudarstvennoy politiki Rossii v Arktike na period do 2020 goda i dal’neyshuyu perspektivu, Sto-
lichnyy vypusk no. 0(4877), March 29, https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html.
rossiia-opredelila-nacionalnye-interesy-v-arktike.html.
5 Ibid.
life and well-being for the Arctic population, and protecting Indigenous peoples’ life styles.

Moreover, although the role of the Arctic as Russia’s “strategic resource base” and the importance of the Northern Sea Route are noted in the Basic Principles to 2020, there are some changes in the recent document. If, in the previous document, the Arctic zone is stressed as just “a strategic resource base for the further development of the country,” in the new one, the development of the Arctic zone as a strategic resource base and its “rational use” have greater prominence. In the previous document, the Arctic region is stressed as “a competitive national transport system” on the world market. 6

The main challenges for Russia in the Arctic, according to the document, are attempts by a number of foreign states to revise the basic provisions of international treaties governing economic and other activities in the north and create systems of national legal regulation without taking into account such treaties and regional formats of cooperation; the incompleteness of the international legal delimitation of marine spaces in the Arctic; obstruction of the implementation by the Russian Federation of legitimate economic or other activities in the Arctic by foreign states and/or international organizations; the military build-up by foreign states in the Arctic and the growing conflict potential in the region; and the efforts to discredit the activities of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. 7

The documents also list important changes regarding military and security tasks. The Basic Principles to 2020 depict military tasks in general terms (such as strengthening the capabilities of military forces in the region) and included them in the same article with border security tasks. Moreover, border issues took precedence. But, in the Basic Principles to 2035, military and border security tasks are depicted in separate articles (19 and 20) and military issues are much more important than they were in the previous document. According to article 19, the main tasks in ensuring Russia’s military security in the Arctic are:

- implementing a set of measures aimed at preventing the use of military force against Russia, protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- increasing the combat capabilities of general-purpose troops, other troops, military units and bodies in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and maintaining their combat potential at a level that guarantees repelling aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies;
- improving the system of integrated control over the air, surface and underwater conditions in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation;
- and creating and modernizing military infrastructure facilities. 8

Russian strategic documents typically emphasize security problems in recent years. Generally, the “fortress under siege” thinking in them has increased. The growing tensions with the West are reflected in Russia’s general security documents as well. However, the new security-related text in the Basic Principles to 2035 demonstrates Russia’s will to defend its interests in the Arctic. This aspect is the main facet distinguishing the new document from the Basic Principles to 2020. However, as in the previous document, regional, bilateral and multilateral cooperation are welcomed in the Basic Principles to 2035.

The Basic Principles: Social and Economic Aspects

Additional novelities can be found in the “Assessment of the state of national security in the Arctic” and articles 7 and 8, “The main threats to national security in the Arctic” and “The main challenges in ensuring national security in the Arctic.” Although the activities of “some countries” (although not named, the references suggest the United States and its NATO allies) are defined as challenges for Russia’s national security, all of the explicitly listed threats are domestic economic and social problems. 9 In the parlance of Russian officials, a challenge is a concern, while a threat is an acute danger for security and could spark conflicts or huge social and economic disasters.

The main social, economic, infrastructure and environmental problems include: population decline; the low level of development of the social, transport, information and communication infrastructure; slow progress in geological exploration of promising mineral resource centers; the absence of a system of state support for business entities that ensures cost and risk reduction in the implementation of economic projects; non-compliance with deadlines for creating the Northern Sea Route infrastructure, including the construction of icebreaking, rescue and auxiliary fleets; the slow pace of the creation of land vehicles and aircraft to operate in Arctic

7 Ibid. p.4.
8 Ibid., p.12.
9 Ibid., pp.3–4.
conditions, the development of domestic technologies necessary for the development of the Arctic; and the Arctic environmental monitoring system’s lack of readiness to address environmental challenges.  

The document provides extensive detail on energy and transportation projects, especially those affecting the Northern Sea Route, and river, railway and air projects, as well as encouragements for small and medium-sized enterprises. Demographic problems, such as the health and wellbeing of the local population, are also prioritized.

Additionally, the problems of the Indigenous peoples are emphasized several times. Several violations of Indigenous rights in the Russian Arctic have been reported in recent years. For instance, in November 2019, the Center for Support of Indigenous Peoples of the North/Russian Indigenous Training Center (CSIPN/RITC) was closed after a Moscow court upheld the Justice Ministry’s request to disband the Indigenous rights group over “multiple” violations of the Russian NGO law. CSIPN/RITC denied claims that its paperwork and registration were incomplete. Indigenous rights activists said the shutdown of the group was an example of Russia’s clamping down on voices critical of the authorities ahead of its Arctic Council chairmanship.

The Basic Principles to 2035 only referred to minorities [malochislennye narody] rather than describing them as Indigenous [korennoogo naseleniya]. The Basic Principles to 2020 used both terms regarding the Indigenous peoples. However, the new document stressed their problems 7 times while the previous version only used “minorities” once and “Indigenous people” twice. The use of “minorities” rather than “Indigenous people” likely reflects Moscow’s anxiety about strengthening separatism in the traditional Indigenous regions.

The document describes the development of a unified statistical and information-analytical system for monitoring and managing the socio-economic development of the Russian Arctic zone. Alexey Chekunkov, head of the Far East and Arctic Development Fund, said that the Fund is going to implement this project. He plans to develop a dynamic mathematical model that takes into account Arctic resources, logistics, economic, and environmental factors and allows calculating future development scenarios of the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route depending on the speed and scale of economic, social and climate change. “In fact, we will create the first digital model of the Northern Sea Route.”

Implementing the Basic Principles

The Russian Security Council staff have already announced that they will prepare a unified plan for the implementation of the Basic Principles to 2035 and the Strategy for the development of the Arctic zone and national security for the period until 2035. “In addition, in order to implement the Basic Principles and the Strategy, a new edition of the state program ‘Socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation’ will be prepared,” said the office of the Security Council.

In November 2019 Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East Aleksandr Kozlov said that the Arctic Development Strategy thoroughly describes all the mechanisms for the development of the territory and their financial support during the first stage of the strategy’s implementation. The strategy blames the low profitability of the oil industry on the high initial and operating costs in the current tax environment. Accordingly, it proposes a new set of tax privileges. According to the Ministry of Energy, at least five projects will be launched. Their tax revenues, even taking into account the discounts, will deliver 823 billion rubles to the national budget.

Kozlov notes that currently there is no natural gas chemical production in the Arctic. The government will launch three new projects under the beneficial tax regime, delivering an additional 1.5 trillion rubles to the budget. “By creating a new oil province in the Eastern Arctic, we will be able to increase the profitability of projects in the north of the Krasnoyarsk region, in Yakutia and in Chukotka.” Russia also plans to launch 21 mining and forestry projects worth a trillion rubles, including the construction of the port of Indiga in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug; the development of platinum ores deposits in the Krasnoyarsk and the Murmansk regions;

10 Ibid., p.3.
15 Ibid.
and the creation of a full-cycle timber industry in the Arkhangelsk Region.\textsuperscript{16}

To stop the population exodus from the Arctic, the government plans to launch hundreds of projects in the region, according to the minister, creating up to 200,000 jobs. The efforts are expected to attract new residents to the region. Additionally, the government will prepare a separate program to increasing geological exploration in the Arctic. “We will increase our investments while stimulating private investment,” Kozlov wrote. Starting in 2021, a new subsidy program will be developed for local air travel in the Arctic.

At least 350 billion rubles will be needed for the various projects, according to Kozlov. The government plans to generate some of these funds through tax revenues from new projects.\textsuperscript{17}

Unfortunately, the optimism of Kozlov’s November 2019 announcement did not last long. In February 2020, the Ministry for the Development of the East simplified the state program for the development of the Arctic. It cut total funding for the program in 2020–2022 by 50 billion rubles—from 190 billion to 140 billion rubles. Only two measures remain secured by funds for the three-year period—the creation of support zones in the region and subsidies to the Agency for the Development of Human Capital in the Far East and in the Arctic.

Earlier plans included social projects—the construction of kindergartens, schools, and the creation of conditions for the development of traditional industries of the Indigenous peoples of the North (reindeer husbandry, fishing, and hunting). The Ministry estimated the set of measures for the social development of the Arctic at 230 billion rubles. However, the draft amendments to the program presented 27 February did not provide for any such measures. But it is possible that those projects or some of them would be added to the program later.\textsuperscript{18}

The drop in oil prices and the COVID-19 crisis forced the Russian government to conduct further simplifications, budget cutting and additional tax relief to attract foreign and local investments.

On July 13, President Putin signed a Federal law “On state support for entrepreneurial activity in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation”.\textsuperscript{19} It creates new preferential rules in the Arctic for companies that plan to implement new projects there. According to the new law, any entrepreneur registered in the Arctic who is ready to implement a new investment project and invest at least 1 million rubles will be able to obtain resident status, offering a number of tax breaks and other preferences. An investment project is recognized as new if, on the date of application, the volume of capital investments made during its implementation does not exceed 25% of the total volume of capital investments provided for by the business plan.\textsuperscript{20}

Russia’s Federation Council approved a package of laws to spur private investments in the Arctic. Any business willing to invest more than 1 million rubles will get Arctic resident status with tax preferences. The goal is to attract up to 7 trillion rubles by 2030.\textsuperscript{21}

In July, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnev stated that disagreements over the bill on liberalizing private investors’ access to the Arctic shelf had been resolved, but there were still controversial issues with the Federal Antimonopoly Service and the Energy Ministry.\textsuperscript{22} The Ministry does not agree with the percentage of the state share in consortia with private investors when working on the shelf as it is in the new bill. The ministry is in favor of retaining a 50% stake in state ownership (versus 25% in the bill), Trutnev explained.

The Russian Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, within the framework of the prepared draft law, proposes to liberalize access to the shelf of the Arctic and Pacific Ocean from 2021, allowing Russian private and foreign companies to operate there. According to new changes, companies can be admitted only if “the state registration of a legal entity or a subsidiary of a foreign legal entity is carried out on the territory of the constituent entities of Russia that are part of the land areas of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation or the Far Eastern Federal District.”\textsuperscript{23} It is expected that the new government program for Arctic area development will be approved in September 2020. Total program financing until 2024 will be 57 billion rubles.\textsuperscript{24} According to Kozlov, the presidential administration

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{16} Ibid.
\bibitem{17} Ibid.
\bibitem{23} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
will sign the Strategy for Development of the Russian Arctic Zone in August.\(^25\)

Moreover, on August 25, President Putin signed a decree on the establishment of the Interagency Commission of the Security Council “on the Issues of Ensuring Russia’s Interests in the Arctic”. It will be headed by the Security Council deputy chairman Dmitry Medvedev. The responsibilities of the commission will include, among other things, “analyzing the state and prospects for the development of the international (including the military-political) situation in the Arctic”, assessing the progress in implementing strategic priorities, and identifying internal and external national threats in the region. The commission will also prepare proposals and recommendations to the Security Council on the organization of military cooperation between Russia and other states; the prevention and elimination of natural and man-made disasters; and the use of special economic measures to ensure Russia’s national security in the region. Its responsibilities also included the consideration of draft state programs related to ensuring national security and socio-economic development of the Arctic.\(^26\)

**Conclusions**

The drivers and main components of the Basic Principles to 2035 are economic and social issues. The plans also take into account Russia’s perspective chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2021–2023. The texts emphasize problems of the settler and Indigenous populations which have been acute in recent years. The document more clearly defines the goals, tasks, threats and security challenges, as well as mechanisms for implementing the Russian state policy in the Arctic than the Basic Principles to 2020. The document also emphasizes Moscow’s political will to defend its interests through military means if necessary. However, amidst acute economic problems, there may be simplifications or delays in the realization of the tasks of the document.

Moreover, despite the Russian government’s efforts to attract more private investments, both domestic and foreign, implementation of several projects in the region still face huge challenges. Ironically, the strategic significance of this region blocks its economic development. On the one hand the Russian government needs investments to realize energy and infrastructure projects, but, on the other hand, there are several strategic military bases in the Russian Arctic zone given its strategic geographic position. These considerations push the government to deeply scrutinize its partners, especially foreign companies.

Moscow’s dilemma is whether to open up to attract investment or clamp down to ensure its security. This dilemma affects the development projects of the Russian Arctic zone. And this dilemma is a main reason for the confrontation between economic and security factions within the Russian Government regarding Russia’s Arctic development policy. Currently the general securitization in Russia means that security issues dominate over economic development needs. The situation is likely to remain the same in coming years, influencing the implementation of the Basic Principles and other state goals.

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The Diversity of Russia’s Arctic Cities

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DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000440622

Abstract: This article describes the diversity of Russia’s Arctic cities. As a group, Russia’s northern urban agglomerations are larger than those found in the West. But there is enormous diversity among them that makes the region one of the most dynamic in the Russian Federation.

Extensive Urbanization in the Russian Arctic

Russia’s Arctic region boasts the highest level of urbanization in the country—about 88%. The population of the Arctic zone in Russia is 2.4 million people (1.6% of Russia’s total), while their economic activities generate almost a tenth of the country’s GDP (Leksin et al 2019).

The main distinguishing feature of Russia’s Arctic cities is their large populations. The Russian Arctic population is larger than the populations of the Arctic regions in all of the other Arctic countries combined. Russia also has the most Arctic cities with populations larger than 100,000 people and extensive centers for mining and processing natural resources (Pilyasov, 2011).

However, the internal differences among Russia’s Arctic and Far Northern cities is as great as the differences between Russia’s Arctic cities and the Arctic urban centers in Europe and North America. The following discussion lays out a typology of Russian Arctic cities.

Capital Cities in the European Part of Russia’s Arctic

Murmansk and Arkhangelsk are among the oldest urban centers in the Russian Arctic and are distinguished by their relatively soft climate conditions and the good transportation links to Russia’s major metropolitan centers, which are the main drivers of the Russian economy. Thanks to these features, the two cities have unusually large populations for the Arctic (288,000 and 347,000 respectively) and numerous capital city features which afford a high standard of living—international airports, theaters, museums, symphony orchestras, and large regional hospitals. These cities play important roles as hub transportation centers, particularly through their port functions. Historically, Arkhangelsk was the only port from the 16th to the beginning of the 18th century facilitating the export of Russian goods abroad. Murmansk is now a key modern port. Murmansk is Russia’s northernmost ice-free port and the largest freight port on the Barents Sea. It shipped 60.7 million tons in 2018, which makes up 7.4% of Russia’s trade freight and 65.5% of all trade ports in the Russian Arctic sea. Currently, in connection with plans to develop the Northern Sea Route, the federal government is making major investments in developing the region as a transportation corridor.

Naryan-Mar (pop. 25,000) occupies a special place within this group. It is the capital of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Called a national okrug in Soviet times, it is the home to a population that is primarily not ethnic Russian; in this case Nenets. During the 1930s, it was a support base for mining coal and oil from Komi. The first petroleum sector enterprise opened in the territory in the 1960s. This new industry cardinally changed the nature of the regional economy and shifted it to extracting fossil fuels. The resulting wealth led to the development of Naryan-Mar.

Capital Cities of the Asian Part of the Russian Arctic

Salekhard, Yakutsk, Anadyr, and Magadan represent regional capitals in the Asian part of Russia’s far north. Salekhard (population 51,000) began to provide capital city services in the 16th century. However, the role of this city in region is relatively small since it is located far from the extraction sites of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug and is poorly accessible. Due to these factors, its contribution to the social-economic life of region is the lowest of the cities we examine in Russia’s Asian Arctic (See Table 1 on p. 10).

In contrast, Yakutsk, Anadyr, and Magadan concentrate practically all of the potential of their regions within their city limits. Yakutsk is unique as the capital of a republic within the Russian federal structure. Since the Soviet era, republics continue to exert a significant degree of autonomy. Yakutsk is also distinguished by the heavy Indigenous population. The Yakuts’ unique culture, language, traditions, and local institutions are all well developed. Yakutsk is a major scientific and educational center, boasting many scientific organizations, including a Siberian branch of the Russian Academy
of Sciences and several universities. Accordingly, along with Arkhangelsk, the city is a regional base for Russian Arctic research. Yakutsk is developing thanks to considerable transfers from the federal budget. The city is one of the most heavily subsidized in the country, which in combination with the money that it earns from local natural resource mining, makes it possible to accumulate significant financial reserves.

Magadan and Anadyr are the most remote and isolated capitals of the Far East’s two northern regions. In the post-Soviet period these cities have experienced the most significant population outflows—Magadan Oblast lost three-fourths of its population since 1989 and the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug has lost more than two-thirds. As a result, the main economic potential of the region is concentrated in these two cities.

In Anadyr, the local elite played the main role in its contemporary development. When Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich served as governor of Chukotka (2000–2008), he and other sources provided significant investment into the city and its social infrastructure. In 2005, Anadyr was named Russia’s Most Comfortable City.

Magadan’s economy is focused on mining gold and is therefore dependent on the fluctuations in the international gold prices. Given this dependence on unreliable markets, local resources to develop Magadan’s city infrastructure are limited.

Cities Focused on Extracting Oil and Gas
Novyi Urengoi, Noyabrsk, and Nadym are centers of Russia’s oil and gas production. Novyi Urengoi (pop. 118,000) and Noyabrsk (pop. 107,000) are unusual for Russian cities in that their population and economies are larger than that of the regional capital Salekhard. As major centers of the oil and gas industry, these cities serve as among the few examples for the Russian Arctic of a sustainable trend of population growth in the post-Soviet period (Zamyatina 2017). Gazprom’s investments in city development through its Home Town program and the high income level of the population make these cities among the most attractive for labor migrants coming from other Russian regions.

Monocities with a Stable Social-Economic Situation
Vorkuta is a coal-producing city in the Komi Republic that has outlasted much of the demand for its main product. The majority of Russia’s Arctic monocities grew up during the Soviet era of industrialization as part of regional production complexes. Vorkuta developed as part of the Komi-Pechersk complex, while Norilsk grew within the North Yenisey complex. Severodvinsk emerged as a center of the military industry.

Currently, under market conditions, the problem of monocities is acute (Zemlyansky et al 2014) since many of them have relatively large populations which face constant hardship due to the struggles of the industries their cities serve. To address this problem, the Russian government has adopted a number of measures aimed at the diversification of the economies of monocities. Depending on the specialization of the key factory in each city, as well as its integration into larger industrial holding companies, monocities can be stable and self-sufficient over long periods of time.

The key enterprise for Vorkuta (pop. 54,000) is Vorkutaugol [Vorkuta Coal], which is part of Severstal [Northern Steel], one of the largest producers of steel in Russia. As a result, the social-economic situation of the city among other monocities is reasonably stable. But the stability does not address the ongoing challenges facing the city. In the post-Soviet period, Vorkuta has lost more than half of its population.

Monocities that Risk a Worsening of the Social-Economic Situation
Norilsk (and the associated port city Dudinka), Monchegorsk, Nikel, and Severodvinsk are the best representatives of this category. Norilsk, Nikel, and Monchegorsk are cities of the Nornikel concern, which produces 35% of the world’s palladium, 25% of its platinum, 20% of its nickel, 20% of its rhodium, and 10% of its Cobalt. Under favorable market conditions, the concern is profitable and the social-economic situations of the cities is stable. Severodvinsk, which is closed to foreign visitors, is the largest center of Russian ship construction, including production of atomic submarines, and is part of the Arkhangelsk agglomeration.

Monocities in a Difficult Social-Economic Situation
Onega and Kirovsk face debilitating challenges. The base of the Onega economy is forestry products, whereas Kirovsk focuses on mining apatite-nepheline ore. Kirovsk is now developing cross-country ski tourism and has become one of the skiing centers in Russia thanks to its long season and low prices. Its rates are lower than those charged by the ski resorts of the Caucasus region and has better transportation links for residents of the European part of the country than do Siberian resorts.

Exceptional Cities
Labynngti, Kandalaksha, and Apatity do not fit into any of the categories above. Labynngti has an important transport-geographical location. It is the end of
the line railroad station for year-round passenger service from Moscow and Vorkuta. It serves as a transportation and freight hub for the train leading to the Bovanenko natural gas deposits in Yamal. It figures in the construction of such major Russian infrastructure projects as the Northern Latitudinal Line as a key hub on the planned railroad track. Currently the city is heavily subsidized and depends on transfers from the Okrug budget.

Kandalaksha, which produces aluminum, and Apatity, which produces apatite-nepheline ore, are de facto monocities with all the attendant social-economic problems, but they are not formally included in the official list of monocities in the Russian Federation.

Conclusion
The Arctic is experiencing some of the fastest changes in climate on the planet. Gaining a better understanding of the cities that currently populate this region will enhance our understanding of how best to address these transformations and how to adapt to the new conditions. (For the author’s vision of climate change risks in the Russian Arctic, see Badina 2016, 2020).

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Acknowledgements
The study was funded by the Russian Foundation of Basic Research: scientific project no. 18-05-60005.
Table 1: The Role of the Largest Arctic and Far North Cities in Their Regions

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<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Number of private sector employees</th>
<th>Investment in fixed capital</th>
<th>Fixed assets</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Providing electric power, gas and steam, air conditioning</th>
<th>Water supply, drainage, waste collection and disposal</th>
<th>New housing construction</th>
<th>Retail turnover</th>
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COVID-19 in Russia’s Arctic
By Leah Silinsky, George Washington University
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000440622

Abstract:
This article lays out the broad dimensions of Russia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and then shows how these policies affected developments in the Arctic. The Kremlin initially denied that the disease would be a problem and then, when such denials were no longer tenable, has sought to minimize reports of its impact through pressure on doctors and journalists. Several doctors have died in mysterious circumstances. The Arctic has not been immune from the disease, with outbreaks coming from migrant workers building new energy infrastructure.

COVID Comes to Russia
A pandemic reminiscent of the Spanish Influenza, the novel coronavirus has wreaked havoc and destruction. What began as a small outbreak in the little-known city of Wuhan, China, soon grew to be a world-wide pandemic. As hospital beds grew overcrowded and medical supplies ran short, countries across the globe have responded in different ways to counter the effects of this disease. Some have been more successful than others. Russia has been one of the worst performers.

The Kremlin has been actively involved in censoring coverage of Russian healthcare and the status of the coronavirus within its borders. This unwillingness to provide objective information has resulted in the death of many citizens, arrest of doctors and journalists, and propaganda campaigns initially denying the severity of the disease.

Russia’s policy regarding COVID-19 began with initial denial and censorship. Underdeveloped and underfunded healthcare exacerbated the problem. The Kremlin has targeted and attacked doctors and activists who have exposed gaps in Russia’s healthcare, and its inability to cope with the strains brought on by the pandemic. Ineffective policies have exacerbated the spread of the disease as well. Finally, the Kremlin has engaged in hacking and corrupt behavior to make it appear as if the Russian government has been handling the pandemic effectively and responsibly. Russia’s difficulties with the pandemic unfolded as Russian president Vladimir Putin sought public approval of his decision to rewrite the Russian constitution with the goal of formally extending his rule from 2024 to 2036.

Initial Denial and Censorship
The Kremlin has actively denied the severity of COVID-19. As the world began to recognize the seriousness of the problem in March, various Russian-backed sources argued that the coronavirus was a lie spread by American “Big Pharma.” The Pentagon has since published reports exposing China and Russia as having been engaged in disinformation campaigns regarding COVID-19. RT, formerly known as Russia Today, and Sputnik Radio spread various conspiracy theories, while insisting that Russia and China were acting as “responsible powers.” In early March, pro-Kremlin Russian news sources argued that the coronavirus itself was part of a foreign disinformation campaign. An EU watchdog organization which tracks disinformation campaigns reported on 1 April that various pro-Kremlin social media accounts were saying that the EU was on the verge of collapsing and therefore unable to deal with the coronavirus. While downplaying the severity of the virus...
inside Russia’s borders, the Kremlin also seized the pandemic as an opportunity to undermine the European Union. From the outbreak of the disease the Kremlin has sought to propagate the narrative that the coronavirus was part of a Western disinformation campaign created to sow panic and discord. At the same time, the Kremlin has actively suppressed statistics and information related to the pandemic to promote this narrative.

In addition to statements made by pro-Kremlin journalists and politicians, the Russian government has also taken concrete legislative action limiting discussion around the pandemic. In March, The Russian Federal Security Service took down a viral post which stated that the true number of COVID-19 cases had reached over 20,000. By 1 April, the Russian Supreme Court declared spreading “false information” about COVID illegal, stating that the punishment for doing so would be five years in prison. Since this ruling, over 20 websites and 80 watchdog groups were blocked for publishing “fake news.”

The Russian government has actively hidden the true number of patients infected with coronavirus, casting doubt on the statistics published by Russian organizations. By June 2020, there was considerable controversy over how the Russian government was reporting on the coronavirus. Both the Financial Times and the New York Times accused the Kremlin of purposefully underreporting cases of COVID, to make it appear as if the government had everything under control. Among the deceptions was reporting coronavirus cases as “pneumonia.” The Russian Foreign Ministry stated that these allegations were themselves “disinformation.”

Hiding the Ineffectiveness of Russia’s Healthcare System

Much of the Kremlin’s propaganda functions not only to hide the severity of the coronavirus, but also mask widespread problems with the Russian healthcare system. This pandemic has exposed problems created by a lack of reforms, as well as failures to provide sufficient medicines, medical equipment, and funding. There have even been instances in which outdated ventilators burst into flames, killing patients. According to data from the Russian Ministry of Health, as of May, Russian doctors were nine times more likely to die from COVID-19 than doctors from Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, and Iran. Failures in Russia’s healthcare have negatively affected doctors and patients alike. There have been various firsthand accounts by journalists and doctors complaining about the lack of medical supplies, face masks, and protective equipment.

The death of Russian journalist Anastasia Petrova marks the devastating consequences of negligence and medical malpractice. Petrova died from the coronavirus in March and documented her experience of seeking medical help on Facebook. When Petrova was experiencing symptoms, she went to the hospital and was told she was fine. The doctors refused to see her, and after Petrova left, the hospital refused to take her calls or test her for the coronavirus. On Facebook, Petrova wrote, “They have no instructions about where to take people or how…No one has a clear idea about anything.” She later went to a second hospital and died while on a ventilator on March 31. While having tested positive for the virus at the second hospital, authorities declared Petrova to have died of pneumonia.

As time progressed and the Kremlin could no longer deny the presence of the virus, the Russian government targeted and censored its online critics, limiting independent press reporting on COVID. Sergey Kovalchenko and Galina Artemenko are journalists who work for the St. Petersburg publication, “M7.” On May 27, Kovalchenko stated that Facebook blocked his articles related to COVID. Artemenko took to Facebook say-
ing that their articles were labeled as “spam” when, in reality, they were exposing overcrowded hospitals in St. Petersburg. These articles explained how doctors in St. Petersburg were underpaid, had little access to PPE, and were becoming sick on the job. Doctors and journalists who have exposed gaps in Russia’s healthcare system have also been the target of abuse, arrest, and harassment by the government.

Attacks on Doctors and Journalists

On April 2, 2020, Russian doctor Anastasia Vasilieiva was arrested for challenging official COVID-19 figures reported by the government. Vasilieiva is the head of a medical union called the Alliance of Doctors, which exposes the conditions of Russia’s hospitals and healthcare system. She has routinely accused Putin and the Russian government of lying about the state of COVID in the country and has used social media and the union’s website to deliver her message.

Deemed a liar by Russian state media, Vasilieiva and her union posted videos on their website of doctors providing testimonials saying that they were ill equipped with protective gear, and that Russian hospitals were not prepared to deal with this crisis. These statements contradicted the Kremlin’s narrative. Vasilieiva’s work exposed that the Kremlin did not have the situation under control.

Vasilieiva was arrested on 2 April, after driving to a small town in Novgorod Oblast to deliver medical equipment. Police detained her on charges of violating “self-isolation rules” despite having all necessary documents required for travel. This arrest occurred one day after Putin signed an amendment to the Russian Criminal Code against spreading “fake news” about the virus.

A few days later, Russian authorities arrested St. Petersburg activist Anna Shushpanova for documenting the state of COVID in the Russian Federation. Investigators searched Shushpanova’s apartment on 3 April and took her computer and phone. These actions came immediately after Shushpanova posted on VKontakte concerns of inadequate quarantine measures in a hospital and clinic in Sestroretsk. The investigation was considered the Kremlin’s first application of the criminal code in reporting on the virus.

As time progressed, censorship policies grew more severe. In May, Doctor Alexander Shulepov fell from a third story window after making a video about the lack of hospital supplies in treating COVID. Shulepov stated that despite being diagnosed with COVID, he was forced to keep working, and that he and colleagues were warning others about shortages of PPE in Voronez. Shulepov was the third doctor who mysteriously fell out a window after exposing the lack of hospital supplies and inadequate treatment.

COVID in Russia’s Arctic Cities

Within the context of the abdication of national leadership and a campaign of misinformation, regional leaders, such as those in the Arctic, have been forced to act on their own. Norilsk Mayor Rinat Akhmetchin accused local authorities of underreporting coronavirus cases in the region by at least 200% on July 16. While only 293 cases have been reported, Akhmetchin stated that, in fact, there were at least 832 cases. Despite Akhmetchin’s attempts to notify regional authorities, Krasnoyarsk health officials ignored his statements, saying that there was no need for intervention. After declining in Moscow, coronavirus spread through other regions, posing a threat for Russia’s Arctic cities.

Many of the cases of COVID in the Russian Arctic have been brought in from mainland Russia and have been spread by various oil and gas companies. The city

16 “Петербургское издание МР7 заблокировали в фейсбуке после массовых жалоб на статьи про коронавирус.” (St. Petersburg publication from Mr7 was blocked on Facebook after publishing an article about coronavirus.) medizona, May 27, 2020, https://medizonaotics-doctor-detained.html
21 Ibid
24 Ibid.
of Belokamenka in Murmansk Oblast is home to the Kola Yard liquefied natural gas project. Beginning in 2017, Novatek employs about 9,000 to 10,000 employees on the project, many of whom are migrant workers from Turkey and the Central Asian states. Since April, there have been over 2,000 cases of COVID in Belokamenka. This remote region has only limited access to necessary medical equipment and other resources. Family members of infected workers stated that not only did Kola Yard fail to provide workers with hand sanitizers and gloves, but the migrant workers were forced to live in cramped dormitories, unable to maintain appropriate social distancing. Despite extensive publicity on social media from workers and residents about these conditions, Novatek declined to comment on the matter.

Federal authorities began paying more attention to this Arctic city thanks to the social media attention it generated. The federal watchdog organization “Rospotrebnadzor” came to the site and gave workers masks and gloves. By mid-April, hundreds were infected, and a field hospital was built. Patients were also dispatched to hospitals in the larger cities of Novy Urengoy and Salekhard. Despite the infections, by mid-June, the governor of Murmansk, Andrei Chibis, reduced many of the restrictions.

While the case in Belokamenka is among the most dire, other Russian Arctic cities in Yakutia and Siberia have also been hit by the pandemic. In late April, several workers at the Chayanda natural-gas field in Yakutia were diagnosed with the coronavirus. The Sabetta Port of the Kara Sea, which transfers and receives liquefied natural gas from the Yamal Peninsula, has also seen various COVID-19 cases. By May, Severodvinsk, a city in the Arkhangelsk Oblast, saw a drastic increase in COVID cases. As of June, the Murmansk region remains the most heavily-hit region in the Russian Arctic. By 21 June, there were 188 cases in Apatity, 291 cases in Monchegorsk, and 114 cases in Kirovsk. Many trace these cases to the Kola Yard project in Belokamenka.

Indigenous people make up a prominent part of the Arctic population. According to reports from the Arctic Council, the Indigenous populations of the Russian Arctic are considered an especially vulnerable group to the COVID-19 pandemic. Those in the Yamal Nenets Okrug are at especially high risk. The Indigenous elders have strong memories of the 1918 pandemic and have largely avoided contact with towns, relying on traditional ways to feed themselves. However, even with these precautions, the trade restrictions associated with the pandemic have negatively affected the Indigenous economy as well.

### About the Author
Leah Silinsky is a graduate student at George Washington University.

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28 Ibid


30 Ibid


32 Ibid

33 Ibid


ABOUT THE RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST


The Russian Analytical Digest is a bi-weekly internet publication jointly produced by the Research Centre for East European Studies [Forschungsstelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen (www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de), the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich), the Center for Eastern European Studies at the University of Zurich (http://www.cees.uzh.ch), the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at The George Washington University (https://ieres.elliott.gwu.edu), and the German Association for East European Studies (DGO). The Digest draws on contributions to the German-language Russland-Analysen (www.laender-analysen.de/russland), and the CSS analytical network on Russia and Eurasia (www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/rad.html). The Russian Analytical Digest covers political, economic, and social developments in Russia and its regions, and looks at Russia’s role in international relations.

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ISSN 1863-0421 © 2020 by Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität Bremen, Bremen and Center for Security Studies, Zürich
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