Monograph

Keeping the process alive
The N+N and the CSCE follow-up from Helsinki to Vienna (1975-1986)

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KEEPING THE PROCESS ALIVE:
THE N+N AND THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP
FROM HELSINKI TO VIENNA
(1975 – 1986)

Series editor:
Andreas Wenger
Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich
To little Frederik, who has brought a whole new experience to life.
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PREFACE

As Switzerland and Serbia are preparing to take over the presidency of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in a two-year Chairmanship package for 2014 and 2015 respectively, this provides opportunity to look back into these countries’ legacies in the multilateral European security framework. The OSCE nowadays is an international institution somewhat in the shadows of the European Union, the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Coming to life during a brief period of relaxation of tensions in the Cold War during the 1970s, its predecessor, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), however, turned out to be the central forum for East-West negotiations in Europe over the following two decades.

At the time the neutral and non-aligned states (N+N), including Switzerland and former Yugoslavia, played a particular role in bridging the gaps in European security talks between the opposing military blocs of NATO/EC and Warsaw Pact/COMECON. Indeed, as this study shows, the contribution of the N+N to keeping the CSCE negotiating process alive in the early 1980s during the most critical years of crises in the later Cold War period was crucial. Although the geo-strategic and ideological context is altogether different today, there still might be some lessons to learn under what conditions European non-alliance member states can come into play to move multilateral negotiations forward. The CSCE experience with its open negotiation structure and all-inclusive thematic approach is a case in point.

The study at hand meticulously traces the role of the European neutral and non-aligned states in the CSCE history beyond the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 making widespread use of previously unexplored private and public archival material and oral history sources. Its author, Thomas Fischer, who has emerged once as a young scholar from our Center, has established himself in the past decade as a leading international expert on the neutral and non-aligned states participation in the CSCE process. Following up on his Neutral Power in the CSCE: The N+N States and the Making of the Helsinki Accords 1975, I am happy to present his new study as the latest addition to the Zürcher Beiträge zur
Sicherheitspolitik. I would like to thank him for his most profound study, which is once more at the forefront of historical research on the subject. I am also grateful to Miriam Dahinden for her careful layout work.

Zurich, November 2012

Prof. Andreas Wenger
Director, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As always, there are a number of people the author would like to thank for their help and assistance in the making of this study. In 2008, after spending four years in Vienna, I had finished a manuscript on the Neutral and Non-Aligned States (N+N) and the Making of the Helsinki Final Act 1975. I already had in mind a continuation of my research in the field with a sequel on the bridge-building role of the N+N in the CSCE Follow-Up Process from 1975 to 1989. Decisive encouragement for this project came from Odd Arne Westad when I first presented the tentative hypothesis of the N+N as an important lifeline to the Helsinki Process in the period of renewed East-West tensions in the later Cold War at a conference in Copenhagen in late 2007.

After my return from Austria to Switzerland in 2008, it was Jussi Hanhimäki from The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva who helped me “to set up tent” as a visiting research fellow and lecturer at his institute for the coming years with my new project. The staff of the International History and Politics Unit at the Graduate Institute in Geneva gave me a warm welcome and provided a stimulating surrounding for my research. In particular, I would not want to omit to thank Valérie von Daeniken on the administrative side as well as my teaching assistant Bernhard Blumenau for all their support during my time at the institute.

In 2009, I had the possibility to spend one month at the University of Helsinki at the invitation of my colleague Juhana Aunesluoma for the purpose of archival research in the Finnish Foreign Ministry Archive. Juhana seconded to me his research assistant Sampo Lindgren during my stay in Helsinki for the purpose of unlocking the Finnish language materials, which otherwise would not have been accessible to me due to my lack of knowledge in Finnish. Sampo spent many hours sitting with me in the archive translating first-hand documentary material. Juhani and Elisabeth Karppinen, as on previous occasions, lent me the use of their flat in Helsinki for that stay, for which I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude. My research in Finland was made possible financially by a research grant of the Swiss National Science Foundation for
international short-term visits. Jussi Hanhimäki and Odd Arne Westad have helpfully supported this grant application.

In Vienna, my good colleague Erwin A. Schmidl, head of contemporary history at the Institute for Strategy and Security Studies of the Austrian National Defence Academy, as well as the Finnish head of mission to the OSCE, Antti Turunen, were helpful in setting up oral history workshops in 2008 and 2009 on the history of the neutral states in the CSCE follow-up process. In Helsinki, retired diplomat Markku Reimaa was similarly instrumental in convening a number of former Finnish CSCE colleagues for an oral history roundtable during my stay in October 2009.

Another important source for this project came from former Swiss CSCE diplomat Hans-Jörg Renk. As for my previous project, he let me use all the private archival materials he retained from ten years of CSCE diplomacy, including highly insightful notes from the Belgrade and Madrid follow-up meetings in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Decisive stimulus also came from three younger colleagues who have recently followed in the footsteps of my previous research with individual country studies on the neutral states Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland in the CSCE. Benjamin Gilde (Austria), Aryo Makko (Sweden), and Philip Rosin (Switzerland) have unearthed highly valuable new archival material in the national archives of these states and have actively engaged in an exchange over their findings with my previous research. I would like to thank all three of them for having made available their yet unpublished PhD theses for my own research for this study. As Gilde and Rosin have so far published results of their studies in German only, I also see my study as a means of drawing attention to these new important contributions to the field in the non-German speaking community of CSCE-historians.

Aryo Makko, in particular, has become a dear colleague and trusted friend over the period of a one-year stay at the Graduate Institute in Geneva in 2010/11, during which time we regularly discussed our mutual findings and understanding of the information contained in the source material. Aryo read the whole manuscript of this study and gave very useful critical comments for the establishment of the definite version. Research for this study has also profited from the work of a number of other colleagues in the field of CSCE history, in particular from

Sarah B. Snyder, Svetlana Savranskaya, Markku Reimaa, and Angela Romano’s recent publications. Having said this, it is clear that responsibility for the text and the findings of this study remains entirely with the author.

When I finally began looking for a suitable outlet for this study, Andreas Wenger, the director of the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, agreed to publish the manuscript in his online and print series Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik, for which I am very grateful; Christopher Findlay edited and proofread the English language of this manuscript. Juhani Karppinen checked the spelling of the Finnish language documents cited in the footnotes.

At home my wife Barbara, herself a career diplomat in the Swiss Foreign Ministry, has tolerated my absence for research and conference participations abroad over the course of the project and has supported me in the idea of writing this study. As we are setting sail this year once again to a new posting of hers in Canada – now for the first time as a family with our two-year old son Frederik –, I would like to thank her wholeheartedly for everything she has brought to my life in the past ten years.

Berne/Ottawa, Summer 2012

Thomas Fischer
INTRODUCTION

As is widely acknowledged today, the neutral and non-aligned states of Europe played a remarkable role in international Cold War history when it came to the original Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the years 1972 to 1975.¹ During the multilateral talks leading to the signing of a concluding document to the conference – the so-called Helsinki Final Act of 1975 –, these states came together to form a loose coalition under the label of “N+N” to participate as a third group actor besides the EC/NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact in the diplomatic negotiations; this was an unprecedented development in the history of any other international organization or negotiation so far. The CSCE in fact remained the only occasion where the neutral and non-aligned states of Europe came to act in such close coordination. The N+N excelled as a group at presenting their own proposals for the multilateral conference as much as at building bridges and fostering compromises to get the diplomatic talks going again when opposing standpoints between the military alliance members seemed insurmountable.

Although the N+N states originally had wanted to prevent the CSCE from turning into East-West bloc negotiations, the ideological context of the time inevitably led to such a development, with the N+N states mostly ending up as mediators between the two camps. After the Helsinki summit of 1975, the CSCE continued over a series of review meetings in Belgrade (1977/78), Madrid (1980–83), and Vienna (1986–89), a period that became known as the Helsinki Follow-Up Process. Particularly at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, at the height of renewed superpower tensions in Europe, the Helsinki follow-up process on several occasions reached the verge of a breakdown. The follow-up process from one review meeting to the next was never automatically guaranteed; each new conference had to decide on a continuation of the talks in form of a next meeting. Based on their own national interests, the N+N had developed a keen interest in a follow-up to the

original CSCE,\(^2\) and therefore during later times of crisis and ideological dispute constantly acted as a “glue” for the talks and made indefatigable efforts for a continuation of the Helsinki process, despite harsh criticism towards the negotiations raised on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It was during the crucial years of the Belgrade and Madrid meetings, this study argues, that the N+N played their most important role in European Cold War diplomacy, as they saved the European security talks from failure more than once and provided an indispensable lifeline to the Helsinki process. In the long run, the CSCE meetings in Belgrade and Madrid became an important bridge from the Helsinki summit in 1975 to the third follow-up meeting in Vienna, which ultimately took place under more promising international circumstances again, leading to a turning point with regard to an end of the Cold War in Europe.

In order to arrive at a nuanced picture of the N+N states’ role in the Helsinki follow-up process between 1975 and 1986, a number of questions are formulated here that helped guide the research for this study, and which will give the reader an idea of what to expect from subsequent chapters:

- How serious was the risk of a discontinuation of the Helsinki follow-up and a premature ending of the CSCE process in the years 1975 to 1986?
- What instruments and means did the N+N have at their disposal to mitigate existing disputes between the military bloc powers and to work against the frequent threats to break up the CSCE in light of insurmountable ideological differences during the follow-up process?
- Why were the N+N so readily available and willing to accept the role of bridge-builders and catalysts again in the CSCE follow-up process? Did they ever have hopes for a role change after Helsinki 1975?

\(^2\) For some of these countries – Austria, Finland, and Yugoslavia (the three neutrals/non-aligned bordering the Iron Curtain) –, the CSCE in itself became an element of stability, and thus assumed a fundamental importance in their national security policy. For a more detailed description of the different approaches taken by the neutral and non-aligned countries to the early European security talks, see Fischer, *Neutral Power in the CSCE*. 
• What factors contributed to the success/failure of neutral mediation in the CSCE follow-up process?

• What was the overall significance of neutral bridge-building for the CSCE process in the long run?

• What form did the N+N collaboration take in the Helsinki follow-up?

• What would have happened if the neutral and non-aligned countries had just idly sat by on the margins of the Helsinki follow-up?

• What does the CSCE tell us about the role of the neutrals in the Cold War as a whole?

The chapters of this study are structured as follows: The first chapter describes how, after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the N+N went to the first CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade with a great deal of ambition to influence the talks and actively steer the course of the conference. It further analyzes how and why the N+N, against their initial intent, almost completely lost the initiative in the course of the meeting to the bloc powers, who negotiated the final outcome of the first review meeting over their heads. The second chapter picks up the story after Belgrade and delineates the indefatigable efforts of the N+N to keep the process alive through the various ups and downs of the second follow-up meeting in Madrid. Contemporary witnesses have pointed out the remarkable fact that although the Madrid meeting took place under the most adverse international circumstances conceivable, it was successful in producing a meaningful result for the future of the conference in its concluding document; a success in which the N+N claimed a significant share, and which will be analysed in greater detail in this part of the study. The third chapter finally looks at the special meetings that were agreed upon in Madrid to bridge the gap to the next full CSCE review meeting in Vienna. Although archival source material is still scarce for that period, it is clear that the atmospheric turn in East-West relations occurring during these years made the N+N mediatory services appear less critical for the future of the CSCE. A final assessment of the role of
the N+N in and their significance for the CSCE follow-up process from 1975 to 1986 will be given in the conclusions to this study.

The multi-perspective approach applied to cooperation between the N+N states, as well as the special focus on their role as bridge-builders and intermediaries during the Helsinki follow-up, entails that individual initiatives of the N+N states of minor relevance to the other partner states are not discussed in full. Rather, the narrative and analysis concentrate on their common actions as a group in bringing the follow-up meetings in Belgrade and Madrid to a meaningful result and in securing a continuation of the Helsinki process over time. This approach will also show the opportunities as well as the limits of a common N+N policy within the framework of the CSCE.

It is not the ambition of this study to add yet another claim for a “champion” of the CSCE; rather, this study is based on the view that a complex negotiation process like the increasingly multilateral and multi-layered European security talks of the 1970s and 1980s can best be understood by telling the story from multiple angles, including state and non-state actors alike, as well as from the perspectives of alliances and individual states. Only in the synopsis of these various narratives can the historical puzzle be reconstructed. If important parts are missing in this undertaking, the greater picture will not emerge. The CSCE was like a play, where the failure of any one actor to appear on the scene would render the spectacle a futile exercise. At the same time, this study seeks to demonstrate that – for once – the N+N states did play a crucial role in European Cold War history and were at the center of the stage at various acts of this play called the “CSCE process”. Without telling their version of the story, something essential would be lacking, and the story would remain incomplete.

In order to strengthen the argument for why the role of the N+N as mediators and bridge-builders in the Helsinki follow-up period was such a crucial one, a few general observations are added here concerning the significance of the CSCE process for the overall development of the Cold War in Europe. When the concluding document of the original Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in 1975 by the 35 participating countries, including all European states (except Albania) and the Soviet Union as well as the US and Canada, a new comprehensive framework for negotiating East-West
relations in the Cold War had been created. But very few participants and contemporary observers actually expected this document to have any fundamental long-term effect on the overall political developments in Europe. The Helsinki Final Act was not legally binding, and most of the principles mentioned therein guiding future relations between the signatory states, such as the recognition of sovereign equality of all states, the non-use of force, and the respect for territorial integrity, were already well established in international affairs. However, almost immediately after the ending of the Helsinki summit and the publication of the Final Act in 1975, dissidents in the East and activists in the West discovered that the stipulations of its Principle VII on the respect of “human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion”\footnote{Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki 1975, available from: http://www.osce.org/mc/39501 (last visited 30 September 2011).} as well as more detailed provisions on human contacts in Basket III constituted a powerful instrument for human rights advocacy in the East-West conflict.\footnote{Initially, it had been smaller Western European states like Belgium, the Netherlands (human rights), and the Vatican (freedom of religion), supported by Italy and the UK, that pressed for the adoption of this principle in the CSCE. However, in the follow-up to the Helsinki conference, Principle VII was increasingly used by the US and its major European allies to pursue a more confrontational human rights policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Floribert Baudet, “‘It was Cold War and we wanted to win’: human rights, ‘détente,’ and the CSCE”, in Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny, and Christian Nünlist (eds.), Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process revisited, 1965–75 (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 183–98; Jacques Andréani, Le Piège: Helsinki et la chute du communisme (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005), 47f.}

Against the widely held expectations that the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act with regard to the issue of individual freedoms and human rights would soon sink into oblivion again, non-governmental activists succeeded in keeping these issues on the agenda for the first review meeting in Belgrade.\footnote{Svetlana Savranskaya, “Unintended Consequences: Soviet Interests, Expectations and Reactions to the Helsinki Final Act”, in Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart (eds.), Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe (New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), 175–90, at 183.} Eastern dissident movements, Western human rights activists, journalists, and political leaders started to form a

transnational Helsinki network⁶ and exerted considerable influence on the diplomatic negotiations. Together, and across national borders, activists in East and West now pressed at Belgrade, Madrid, and Vienna for adherence to the human rights and human contacts provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, taking on a significant role in the Helsinki process and in bringing down Communist regimes in the East at the end of the Cold War.⁷ At the theoretical level, the success of these activities has been explained with the so-called “boomerang model” of transnational human rights advocacy.⁸

In order for the above mechanisms of human rights advocacy on a non-governmental level to have long-term effects in the Soviet Union and its Socialist satellite countries, it was extremely important that the Helsinki process as a platform for the diplomatic negotiations between the military bloc powers survived during the most critical years of the later Cold War period – as a discontinuation of the CSCE meetings would have deprived the human rights activists in East and West of one of their most meaningful instruments to stage their campaigns and to confront the participating Eastern states with their violations of Helsinki standards. It it is important to recall that all other diplomatic frameworks for East-West negotiations, such as the superpowers’ Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), broke down in the early 1980s as a consequence of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, NATO’s double-track decision, and the declaration of martial law in Poland. The CSCE review process alone continued during this period of high tension, although the scenario of dissolution of the talks without resumption loomed over the follow-up meetings on several occasions. In the end, the CSCE remained the only functioning multilateral framework

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for diplomatic contacts across the ideological Cold War divide until the advent to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR, which opened new prospects for a fundamental change in East-West relations by the late 1980s.

Part of the explanation why the Helsinki follow-up process never completely broke down is that human rights were only one of several key dimensions in the Helsinki Final Act – alongside military-security and economic issues. As will become clear in this study, the Eastern interests in the latter and the linkage of all three dimensions in the Western negotiating strategy are key factors that go a long way towards explaining the Soviet Union’s ongoing commitment to the CSCE process and its willingness to endure the public battering on human rights issues in Belgrade and Madrid.

If the superpowers and their allies in the most critical instances always came to the conclusion that there was still something to gain from the continuation of the CSCE, they still needed a third party that provided them with a face-saving strategy to be able to give in to the necessary compromises for a solution. A basic will for compromise between the blocs was a definite pre-condition for any successful mediation in the CSCE, but the procedural and diplomatic creativity of the “unsusceptible third” was still needed to bring these compromises about. The N+N and some of their heads of delegation in Belgrade and Madrid managed to play this part particularly well without completely losing sight of their own countries’ interests.

The closer collaboration of the group of the N+N had gradually evolved during the course of the original CSCE negotiations in the years 1972 to 1975. A first topical rallying point of the four neutral states Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, and Finland with non-aligned Yugoslavia had been the creation of the instrument of military Confidence-Building Measures (CBM). Stemming from this core of N+N countries, a loose coalition of non-bloc member states evolved at the conference that included Malta as well as Cyprus and occasionally San Marino and Liechtenstein. Unlike the member states of the European Community,
the so-called EC-Nine, the N+N never developed an institutionalized process for exchanging and harmonizing their positions in the CSCE, but remained rather flexible in their co-operation, formulating common proposals and initiatives only when and where their interests coincided. Nevertheless, the ambition to intensify this informal collaboration was visible in the aftermath of the Helsinki summit from a series of meetings held among the N+N in preparation of the first follow-up conference in Belgrade.

Throughout the review meetings in Belgrade and Madrid, cooperation between the N+N remained an important feature of the CSCE talks. With the beginning of the third full review meeting in 1986 in Vienna, however, the N+N group collaboration mostly lost its significance. This was due to two main developments: First, after the initial years of the Gorbachev government in the Soviet Union, East and West entered into direct negotiations on various topics again. After Reagan and Gorbachev had personally met twice in Geneva and Reykjavik in 1985 and 1986, the West slowly started to believe that Gorbachev was serious about “glasnost” and “perestroika”, and strategic arms reduction talks were taken up again by the superpowers. Overall, East-West relations appeared to be definitely less strained again than in the preceding years. This was also reflected in the framework of the CSCE negotiations with indications that it would become possible for the military and economic blocs to engage in direct talks at the third full review meeting in Vienna again, without constantly taking recourse to the mediatory services of the N+N group of states. After a bumpy start, the special Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures that had opened in Stockholm in 1984 came to a timely and successful conclusion in 1986, and the mood at the expert meetings in Ottawa 1985 on human rights and in Berne 1986 on human contacts slowly began to change despite the lack of agreement on substantial concluding documents.

9 In the early 1970s, the EC member states had developed the instrument of European Political Cooperation (EPC) – a mechanism first applied in the CSCE – as a means to coordinate their foreign policies in international negotiations. See Angela Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009); and Daniel Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity (London/New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009).
The second reason why the N+N gradually lost their key role in the CSCE process during the Vienna meeting were the internal problems Yugoslavia was starting to face in the late 1980s. The implosion of the Republic of Yugoslavia a few years later was the final coup de grâce for N+N cooperation in the CSCE. But the group’s destiny would have been unsure anyway after the end of the Cold War in Europe, as the ideological blocs dissolved and the CSCE in 1994 transformed into a standing organization, the OSCE, even as a number of the neutral states became formal members of the European Union.

Returning to the most crucial years of the N+N group policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it is important finally to point out that the role of mediators and honest brokers in the CSCE fell to the N+N states not only because of the prevailing bloc constellation, but also because the countries at the core of the N+N – Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, Finland, and Yugoslavia – were all already familiar with the notion of political “bridge-building” as a central element of their individual states’ neutrality/non-alignment conceptions in the Cold War years preceding the beginnings of the conference. Hence, their diplomatic apparatuses were readily and skilfully disposed to assume this role when the CSCE turned out to be in dire need of these services.

As for the literature used in this study, it is worth pointing out that a number of important historical monographs and conference volumes

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have appeared on the early history of the CSCE in the past ten years.\textsuperscript{11} Most of these publications, however, still focused almost exclusively on Western perspectives and/or primarily dealt with the pre-1975 period up to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. The lack of archival access to documents for the post-Helsinki phase of the CSCE was still felt in the contributions to a conference volume commemorating the first follow-up meeting in Belgrade 30 years after the event in 2008.\textsuperscript{12} Only very recent projects have opened up new perspectives on the CSCE process making use of new archival resources that now also cover the late 1970s and early 1980s.\textsuperscript{13}

The author of this study has contributed some of the first tentative studies based on primary material on this period from an N+N perspective in recent years. Chapter 1 of the study at hand is in fact a revised and updated version of a contribution to the conference volume on the


\textsuperscript{12} Vladimir Bilandžić and Milan Kosanović (eds.), \textit{From Helsinki to Belgrade – The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade 1977/78}, Contributions to the International Conference organized by the Zikic Foundation and the OSCE Mission to Serbia, Belgrade 8–10 March 2008 (Beograd: Čigoja stampa, 2008).

\textsuperscript{13} Sarah B. Snyder, \textit{Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), based on her 2006 PhD thesis “The Helsinki Process, American Foreign Policy, and the End of the Cold War”. For a number of new national perspectives, including Eastern European participating states and covering the time period of the 1980s, see the list of country studies in the research project of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte München “Der KSZE-Prozess: Multilaterale Konferenzdiplomatie und die Folgen” (1975–1989/91), http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/der_ksze_prozess0.html (last visited 18 October 2011); two small conference volumes with preliminary results have resulted so far from this project: Helmut Altrichter and Hermann Wentker (eds.), \textit{Der KSZE-Prozess: Vom Kalten Krieg zu einem neuen Europa 1975 bis 1990} (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011); Matthias Peter and Hermann Wentker (eds.), \textit{Die KSZE im Ost-West-Konflikt: Internationale Politik und gesellschaftliche Transformation} (Munich: Oldenbourg, forthcoming 2012).
Belgrade follow-up meeting edited by Bilandžić and Kosanović, while Chapter 2 contains some elements of a paper first presented at the Cold War history conference in Copenhagen in 2007.

Previously, the field has been mainly occupied by studies of political scientists and contemporary observers. This literature still represents an important point of departure for any researcher dealing with the CSCE follow-up process, but with primary documents becoming increasingly accessible, it is now possible to study these events in greater detail and check the contemporary accounts against the written source material. In the meantime, a number of new accounts by participating diplomats have been published that now also cover the follow-up period of the


17 Most Western states in their archive legislation stipulate a general 30-year period of access restriction, defining an imaginary line along which historical research moves up on the timescale.

CSCE process. \(^\text{18}\) Of particular interest for this study is Markku Reimaa’s book Helsinki Catch, which appeared in 2009. \(^\text{19}\) In addition to his personal recollections, Reimaa, himself a trained historian and a long-standing Finnish CSCE diplomat, profited from almost unrestricted access to the materials in the Finnish Foreign Ministry archives as well as from a large number of interviews with former CSCE colleagues that he conducted in the course of the preparation of his study. Unfortunately for the historian, his book carries no footnotes giving references to the documents he consulted, but otherwise reveals some important pieces of information on the Finnish side of the story. New insights on the neutral states at the Belgrade and Madrid meetings are also provided by two recently completed PhD projects by Benjamin Gilde on Austria and Philipp Rosin on Switzerland, undertaken in the context of a bigger research project of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte München-Berlin on the CSCE follow-up process. \(^\text{20}\) While Gilde’s thesis has produced highly interesting new source material, Rosin repeats much of the findings of earlier publications on Switzerland in the CSCE, but has added some interesting details in particular on the preparations of the neutral states for the Madrid meeting. A third PhD project on “Sweden and the CSCE” has recently followed in the footsteps of previous research on the N+N in the Helsinki Process, exploring for a first time the Swedish archival materials on the topic. \(^\text{21}\) Initial results of this project offer interesting archival insight into the Swedish approach towards the European security talks as well as into specific Swedish interests in dis-


armament proposals in the CSCE and its follow-up process.\textsuperscript{22} It is one of the aims of the study at hand to draw attention to these studies and to make some of the results in these writings available to non-German speakers in the CSCE research community.

As for first hand archival material the original basis was provided by the diplomatic documents on the CSCE history up to the year 1983 from the Swiss Federal Archives, to which the author already had access for the preparation of his PhD thesis in the early 2000s.\textsuperscript{23} A most important source in addition to this material came to my attention, when in the course of writing my study on Neutral Power in the CSCE former Swiss diplomat Hans-Jörg Renk made available his private papers on his participation in the Helsinki process.\textsuperscript{24} The handwritten notes taken by Renk during the Belgrade and Madrid meetings proved to be of particular value for this study.\textsuperscript{25} Finally, in 2009, the author spent a month at the University of Helsinki to work through the Finnish Foreign Ministry Archive documents regarding the N+N cooperation in the CSCE follow-up process. As the archive only observes a 25-year access restriction rule, it was possible to see all relevant material for the


\textsuperscript{25} The notes taken by Hans-Jörg Renk, at the time a member of the Swiss delegation to the Belgrade and early Madrid meetings of the CSCE in 1977/78 and 1980, originally served as the basis of the regular reports that the delegation sent to the Swiss government authorities in Berne. According to their author, they do not constitute official records and therefore do not commit the participating states or their representatives quoted. The handwritten notes of the Belgrade meeting were reproduced in typescript by Hans-Jörg Renk in 2007, as they were originally taken, with slight drafting adaptations for easier understanding during the transcription. They do not claim to be complete, since the note-taker was not present at all meetings in Belgrade all the time. As for the Madrid meeting, the notes only cover the initial phase of the talks. At the later stages of Madrid, Renk was no longer a member of the Swiss delegation, as he had left the diplomatic service by that time for a new position in the private sector. The author would like to thank Hans-Jörg Renk for making available transcripts for this research.

period of interest in this study. Together with the source material unearthed by Gilde, Rosin and Makko for their individual country analyses on Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden in the CSCE, this provided a quite complete documentary basis for the writing of this study, at least for the chapters up until the Madrid follow-up meeting. For the period after 1984, the documentary basis remains rather patchy; a few glimpses at first-hand reports from the Ottawa 1985 and Berne 1986 meetings on human rights and human contacts are provided by the private paper collection of Swiss member of delegation Eugen Voss, kept at the Archive of Contemporary History at ETH Zurich.

In addition to the written sources mentioned above, the study at hand has benefited from a large number of oral history interviews with former participants and contemporary observers conducted by the author and others over the course of the past ten years. Some of this material is also available in transcript on the internet and constitutes an important source on the history of the CSCE in the later Cold War years.

A final word on the official documents produced by the CSCE needs to be included at the end of this introduction. In order to foster the confidentiality of the talks and to further the free exchange of ideas, the delegates at the preparatory talks of the original CSCE in Dipoli/Helsinki

26 It should be pointed out, however, that due to the abundance of material in the Foreign Ministry Archive in Helsinki on the CSCE history and due to the author’s lack of knowledge of the Finnish language, much still remains to be done in exploring this material more exhaustively.

27 Voss was a Swiss protestant priest of Russian descent and the founder of an interdenominational religious NGO, which became a founding member of the International Helsinki Federation established in 1982. Voss himself was one of the first NGO representatives to become an official member of delegation at the special topical meetings of the CSCE decided upon in Madrid for the preparation of the next full review meeting in Vienna.

decided that no official minutes of their deliberations should be taken. In consequence, only officially presented proposals and formal decisions were registered on paper at the later CSCE talks. This is why the historian finds little information in the OSCE archives at the organization’s Prague Office today on the actual negotiations themselves that would explain how the final decisions came about. The officially registered proposals, however, remain an important source for the research on the history of the Helsinki process, as they often reflect the specific interests and positions of a state or group of states at a certain point in time. The author of this study has mainly made use of copies of the official CSCE papers contained in Renk’s and Voss’ private paper collections.
1 DISAPPOINTED HOPES: THE FOLLOW-UP IN BELGRADE 1977/78

The neutral and non-aligned (N+N) states had developed a remarkable role as a third important group actor besides EC/NATO (the Western caucus) and the Warsaw Pact (the Eastern caucus) during the CSCE negotiations in the years 1972 to 1975, but it was only in the wake of the Helsinki summit in 1975 that co-operation between the N+N states became more regular and quasi-institutionalized. Hoping to gain a certain degree of leverage with the military alliances and bloc powers by closely coordinating their positions, the N+N went to the first follow-up meeting in Belgrade with clearly defined ambitions regarding the substance of the talks. Once the multilateral preparatory meetings for Belgrade started, however, the N+N soon realized that their ability to influence the course of events was limited. In the context of a renewed Cold War atmosphere, their room for maneuver was very narrow, and their role in Belgrade was mainly reduced to mediating between the blocs and trying to keep the talks alive. In the end, they had to limit themselves to signing a minimal concluding document that secured the continuation of the Helsinki process with a follow-up meeting in Madrid.

1.1 FROM HELSINKI TO BELGRADE (1975 – 1977)

When the 35 participating states had left the CSCE summit after the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki on 1 August 1975, it was agreed that the delegates should meet again in two years’ time in Belgrade to review the implementation of the Helsinki provisions and discuss new proposals on European security and cooperation. The neutral and non-aligned states, which had won much respect for their active participation in the talks leading to the Helsinki summit, were keen on continuing their role in the follow-up of the CSCE. With the Helsinki experience in mind, Finland in November 1975 took the initiative to invite the political directors of the foreign ministries of neutral Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, and Finland as well as non-aligned Yugoslavia to talks to Hel-
sinki about the follow-up to the conference.\textsuperscript{29} Cyprus and Malta were explicitly left out of the initiative. The two small Mediterranean states had only played a minor role in the neutral and non-aligned cooperation in the Geneva negotiations,\textsuperscript{30} whereas Yugoslavia as the designated host of the first review meeting, and not only as the leading non-aligned power in Europe, was likely to play a central role in the next stage of the CSCE.

In principle, the Finnish proposal for talks among the five N+N countries was met with interest by the other neutrals; the Swiss, however, stated in talks with the Finnish ambassador to Berne, Kaarlo Mäkelä, that they would prefer to meet only with the four neutrals at first and wait until a later stage of the talks before including Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{31} The reason for the reluctance to include Yugoslavia in the meeting at an early stage was that the collaboration of the neutrals with non-aligned Yugoslavia in Geneva had mainly been limited to military and procedural aspects of the talks, while cooperation in Basket III, dealing with human rights issues, had been handled exclusively by the four neutrals. The Austrians concurred with the Swiss view, while the Swedes and Finns favored involving Yugoslavia from the beginning.\textsuperscript{32}

Yugoslavia for its part, as the future host of the first follow-up meeting, displayed a keen interest by late 1975 and early 1976 in meeting with the four neutrals in order to co-ordinate its policies with them further in anticipation of the Belgrade meeting.\textsuperscript{33} Sweden, Switzerland, and

\textsuperscript{29} For the Finnish invitation to the other neutral states and Yugoslavia for a meeting in preparation of the CSCE follow-up in Helsinki, see: Ulkoasiainministeriön Arkisto (Finnish Foreign Ministry Archive), Helsinki [hereafter: UMA], 7 B, ETYK Beograd, Box 98: “Puolueettomien maiden ETYK-yhteistyön jatkaminen; Tapaamisen järjestäminen Helsinkiä”, Jaakko Iloniemi, Helsinki, 15 November 1975; cf. Reimaa, Helsinki Catch, 184f.


\textsuperscript{32} For the Finnish reasoning on the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the neutral states’ cooperation at an early stage of preparation, see: UMA, 7 B, ETYK Beograd, Box 98: “Puolueettomien maiden ETYK-yhteistyön jatkaminen; Tapaamisen järjestäminen Helsinkiä”, Markku Reimaa, Helsinki, 13 November 1975; “We should think about to what extent future host Yugoslavia should be included in the neutral cooperation. Yugoslavia has a great role in the preparatory work, so Finland is in favour of inviting them. Their inclusion at an early stage is well-founded in Finland’s point of view.”

and Austria generally supported the idea, but were still skeptical as to whether the time had already come for such a meeting. Regarding this hesitancy, the Finns envisaged that the meeting could be started among the four neutrals alone, but that the Yugoslavs would be included as soon as possible. The following steps were recommended to reach this goal: A meeting of the Nordic CSCE caucus member states scheduled for January 1976 was to be followed by a first meeting of neutral states soon after, which would involve the four European neutrals exclusively; at the same time, bilateral contacts would be established with Belgrade, as Yugoslavia had already proposed such consultations to Finland at the Helsinki summit 1975; subsequently, a meeting of the N+N states should be held once the states concerned had established more guidelines.34

From 8 to 11 March 1976, a Finnish delegation comprising the Geneva head of delegation Jaakko Iloniemi, his colleague Esko Rajakoski, ambassador to Geneva, and the Finnish ambassador to Belgrade, Esko Vaartela, went to the Yugoslav capital for bilateral talks on the subject.35 The terrain for cooperation between the neutral states was further prepared by high-level contacts between State Secretary Matti Tuovinen and Iloniemi in Helsinki during March 1976.36

In the follow-up to these bilateral contacts, the Finnish Foreign Ministry invited representatives (political directors, heads of departments, and CSCE experts) of the four neutral states exclusively to the Königstedt manor in Vantaa near Helsinki for a two-day meeting on 29 and 30 April 1976. The purpose of the meeting was a first “informal brainstorming” on how to prepare for the follow-up in Belgrade.37

Despite stressing the importance of a review of the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, the neutrals basically agreed that they had no

interest in turning “Belgrade” into a tribunal. The conference was to provide an opportunity for review as well as an outlook on future possibilities for co-operation and security in Europe. Finland, which had time again been suspected of acting as a surrogate of the Soviet Union in the CSCE, was anxious to prove the independence of its initiative for a neutral states’ meeting and stressed that the N+N was “not a service club” for others. Regarding the substance of the Belgrade conference, it was manifest from the talks at Königstedt that Finland, Sweden, and Austria had an eminent interest in the enhancement and refinement of CBM. Other N+N activities were expected to emerge from questions concerning Basket III (human contacts, free flow of information, and culture and education).

Concerning their collaboration, it was decided that the form of co-operation from the Geneva phase of the CSCE should be continued, with the four neutrals either acting alone or together with the non-aligned states in the extended N+N group, depending on the issue under discussion. An enlargement of the group was rejected; Romania’s desire for a closer association with the group as well as a possible Spanish demand were judged undesirable, since they would only complicate the group’s situation.

Furthermore, on Swiss and Austrian demand, it was agreed that Malta and Cyprus should not be excluded from further N+N meet-


39 Indeed, as Reimaa mentions, the Soviets hoped to capitalize on the trust and central role Finland enjoyed with the other participants in the course of the Helsinki follow-up: “Finland’s role could be positive, provided that in the future it consults closely with representatives of the socialist countries. The Soviet Union tries to do its utmost so that Finland would become close to them. For this reason, in many matters we must in future extend positive courtesies (towards the Finns).” Quoted from a briefing Ambassador Mendelevich gave to the Helsinki embassies of the Socialist countries after his talks with Iloniemi in March 1976, in: Reimaa, Helsinki Catch, 184.


41 Ibid.; As a matter of fact, at that point, only San Marino had officially asked for participation in the N+N collaboration, which it had already joined in some aspects in Geneva.
ings in preparation for Belgrade.\textsuperscript{42} Yugoslavia, in its function as host of the first follow-up conference, was nevertheless treated as a special case among the non-aligned countries, and Finland was asked to brief Belgrade in detail on the neutrals’ exchange of ideas at Königstedt.\textsuperscript{43} Further bilateral contacts with Yugoslavia were envisaged for the following months to clarify on the question of an N+N meeting towards the end of the year 1976. Before meeting with the non-aligned states, it was agreed that the representatives of the neutrals would meet once again on their own in Vienna in autumn to discuss preparations for Belgrade in more concrete terms.\textsuperscript{44}

The bilateral talks of the four neutrals with Belgrade in the course of the first half of 1976 revealed that Yugoslavia attributed great importance to the N+N co-operation established in Geneva. Their own contacts with the US, the USSR, Romania, and other participating states since 1975 had left the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry officials with the impression that both blocs were trying to reinterpret the Helsinki results to suit their own interests. They therefore considered close collaboration between the N+N all the more important as a safeguard for the continuation of the negotiations and catalyst for the Helsinki process. This was particularly true with regard to the military aspects of the CSCE, which Yugoslavia defined as a top priority of N+N preparations for the first follow-up meeting.\textsuperscript{45}

Meanwhile, the relations among the neutrals were not free from irritations. In June 1976, Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky had launched a call for a closer “Western cooperation” (including the neutrals) in preparation for the Belgrade meeting in order to be better prepared than for

\textsuperscript{42} The Swiss were the main advocates of including Cyprus and Malta in the talks in order to give the Mediterranean “chapter” a platform in the CSCE, a priority fully supported by Austria. The Nordic neutrals, Sweden and Finland, were always more reluctant to engage the N+N group in that direction.

\textsuperscript{43} The Maltese and Cypriot CSCE delegations that had remained in Geneva were informed by a summary report from the Finnish representative, and the Swiss conveyed information about the Königstedt meeting in outlines to Liechtenstein’s representation in Berne.


\textsuperscript{45} After Finland and Austria had sent delegations to Belgrade at the beginning of the year, the Swiss held extended talks in the Yugoslav capital from 2 to 4 June, and Sweden followed with a delegation later that month. BAR, E 2200.48 (-) 1992/148, 11: “KSZE – Konsultationen mit Jugoslawien”, Vertraulicher Bericht H.-J. Renk, Berne, 10 June 1976.
Helsinki. The appropriate platform to initiate this “political OECD”, he said, was the Council of Europe in Strasbourg; the occasion would be the upcoming inauguration of the organization’s new building there. However, this initiative would have sidelined Finland, which due to its “special position” vis-à-vis the Soviet Union at that time was not yet a full member of the Council of Europe. Finland was therefore eager to prevent such a step, as Swedish, Swiss, and Austrian CSCE experts had already exchanged their countries’ positions twice previously after Helsinki on the occasion of Council hearings in Strasbourg, leaving the Finns out of these talks. Also, the Swiss reaction to Kreisky’s idea was outright negative. Neutral Switzerland did not want to be involved in the creation of a “Western council of war”, as Swiss State Secretary Albert Weitnauer put it to West German interlocutors.⁴⁶ Apparently, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt did not warm to the idea either, and the proposal soon disappeared from the agenda again.⁴⁷ According to Reimaa, the Austrian chancellor “in many situations was deeply cynical, uncaring and disparaging towards the CSCE”, and the Austrian initiative may have been driven by a certain envy of Finland’s distinct CSCE profile.⁴⁸ As with a number of other Kreisky proposals in the CSCE context, it might well be that the Austrian Foreign Ministry was not even privy to the initiative before the call was launched.⁴⁹ At least on the level of civil servants, cooperation for the Belgrade meeting between the neutrals continued as planned.

The four neutrals held their second high-level preparation meeting on 22/23 November 1976.⁵⁰ This time, not only the political directors, heads of departments, and CSCE experts of the Foreign Ministries gathered in the Austrian capital, but experts of the four Defense Ministries had also come to meet in parallel talks. The diplomatic delega-

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⁴⁷ Gilde, *Neutraler Vermittler oder missionarische Absichten?*, 328.
⁵⁰ The meeting had originally been scheduled for October, but was delayed for some weeks because of a change at the top of the Austrian Foreign Ministry (Social Democrat Willibald Pahr took over the ministry from his party colleague Erich Bielka). In the meantime, CSCE experts from Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland had met for a third time in the context of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 16 November 1976.
tions explicitly stated their intention to continue their co-operation in the spirit of the Helsinki and Geneva talks. That meant: no construction of a third bloc, no common initiatives “at any price”, but close “body contact” and coordination among them. While the constitution of a rigid bloc would have contravened the very principles of neutrality, a continuation of a loosely coordinated group policy on an ad-hoc basis was deemed an adequate and beneficial form of cooperation for their states in the CSCE follow-up. In that sense, and irrespective of the results of the upcoming N+N meeting of the neutrals with non-aligned Yugoslavia, a third preparatory meeting of the four neutrals alone was envisaged for spring 1977 in Berne.51

In their overall assessment of the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, Austria and Finland were slightly more positive than Sweden and Switzerland. Nevertheless, the four parties agreed that the CSCE principles needed to be seen as an indivisible entity. The tendency by certain powers to single out any one of them in order to reinterpret the Final Act had to be prevented. In the context of the Helsinki principles, Switzerland informed its neutral partners of its intention to announce details of their revised project for a System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes among CSCE states (SRPD, after its French acronym) at the Belgrade meeting.52 As for Basket II on economic aspects, Finland showed some interest in considering a Soviet idea for a conference on environmental issues, which was met with reservation by the other neutrals. Sweden raised the question of an energy conference, another idea launched by the Soviet Union.53 A further Soviet proposal for shortening the time limits for visas was rejected by all four. Besides, Basket III provided little additional grounds for discussion, since close coor-


52 The Swiss, who had first introduced the SRPD project in the Dipoli talks, had to settle in the Helsinki Final Act for a mandate that envisaged future talks on the project. The Eastern states had rejected the obligatory character of the system, but reservations about the project were also manifest within the Western camp. For the Belgrade meeting, Switzerland spurred the announcement of a separate expert reunion on their revised project following the follow-up conference, yet insisted on its obligatory character.

53 A third Soviet proposal on a topical conference on transport was not discussed further by the neutrals.
dination among the four neutrals already existed in that field and was considered a routine matter since the Geneva days.\textsuperscript{54}

Apart from common considerations on CBM discussed separately by the military experts, it was the follow-up mechanism that preoccupied the neutrals’ talks in Vienna. In their eyes, it was important that a certain \textit{periodicity} of the follow-up meetings be guaranteed in the future. They did not think it was necessary to establish a predefined time schedule for a series of follow-up meetings, but at the end of every follow-up conference, a date for the next meeting should be set. A common N+N position in this respect was expected at the Belgrade conference.\textsuperscript{55}

Concerning the military aspects of security, where congruity of interests among the neutrals was most visible, eight clearly defined positions were drafted by the neutral military experts in their meeting in Vienna and included in the diplomatic delegations reports:\textsuperscript{56}

1.) On the parallel negotiations on \textit{Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction} (MBFR) of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, no initiative was envisaged, but the neutrals wanted to remind the military alliances that the non-participating states had a critical interest in being informed. 2.) Concerning the \textit{parameters} defined in the Helsinki Final Act on the announcement of \textit{military maneuvers}, a reopening of the discussion was not requested, but the conditions for observers of such maneuvers needed to be improved. 3.) A new N+N proposal was to be expected, however, with regard to the announcement of the \textit{movement of troops} of a certain number (similar to the parameters defined for the military maneuvers). 4.) If Sweden decided to raise the issue of \textit{transparency of defense budgets} again (first proposed during the Geneva phase of the CSCE), the other neutrals would support the proposal. 5.) A Yugoslav proposal on “\textit{self-restraint}” (e.g., no maneuvers exceeding a certain number of troops) was viewed with skepticism and needed further specification to win the neutrals’ support. 6.) The idea of \textit{banning military maneuvers and activities in border regions} was deemed out of question, for the neutral small states


\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
believed that their defense had to begin right at the borders. 7.) Initiatives aimed at the **dissolution of the military alliances** were considered not to be within the scope of the neutral states’ field of activity. 8.) The idea of **nuclear-weapon-free zones** (as proposed by the Finnish President Urho Kekkonen for the Nordic region in the 1960s) was beyond the scope of the CSCE, which had no mandate to discuss that issue. Therefore, no neutral initiative was envisaged in this respect.

The neutrals considered these deliberations on military aspects a useful first platform for future activities in the Belgrade meeting, but some reservations remained, notably in Finland and Switzerland. However, it became evident that a common proposal by the N+N was most likely to emerge in the field of refining and enhancing CBM. A necessary next step was now the coordination with the non-aligned states, as Western military specialists of NATO and EC had also begun further preparatory work on qualitative and quantitative confidence-building measures in the meantime. Only after consultation with Yugoslavia, Cyprus, and Malta could the details of a definite N+N proposal for Belgrade be worked out in combination with the Western proposals in the field.

The preparatory consultations of the N+N states finally took place on 31 January and 1 February 1977 in Belgrade. On 8 December 1976, the four neutrals, Cyprus, and Malta had received an invitation from Yugoslavia to attend an N+N meeting in late January and early February 1977. In early January, Liechtenstein also asked to participate in the meeting in Belgrade, and received an invitation thanks to the support of Switzerland and Austria. The protocol of the talks in the Yugoslav capital confirms the strong interest Sweden and Yugoslavia had in improving CBM based on the priorities highlighted by the neutral military experts in their earlier meeting held in Vienna in November 1976 (better definition of “big maneuvers”, improvement of conditions for observers, transparency of defense budgets, announcement of smaller movements of troops). The N+N consultations also showed a clear common interest in the idea of **consecutive** CSCE follow-up meetings in the future. The eight states agreed that it was important to fix at least a date


and place for a next review meeting after Belgrade. 59 In their final communiqué of the meeting, the participating states described the atmosphere of the talks as constructive and the exchange of ideas as useful. The communiqué explicitly stated the will of the N+N states to continue their dialog in the future. 60 However, no common positions or direction had been decided, and rumors that the group of the N+N had envisaged itself as playing a mediating role in the follow-up conference were vigorously denied. 61

When the neutrals met for a third and last time on their own on 9 and 10 May 1977 in Berne in preparation for the Belgrade meeting, the general trajectory of the previous neutral gatherings was confirmed. 62 Sweden presented a first concrete draft proposal on CBM, and the neutrals concurred in their views on the general importance of reaching agreement on new proposals in addition to the Helsinki Final Act. At the same time, they were aware that the US under the new administration of Jimmy Carter would want to have ample time for the review of implementation debate. While the N+N did clearly not yet anticipate the fierce confrontation over the issue of human rights that would transpire at the Belgrade meeting, they agreed that the neutral states should also insist on the implementation of Principle VII (on human rights) and Basket III provisions. Even the Swedish representative Leif Arvidsson, whose country usually called upon the neutrals to limit their efforts in the third basket to the “politically feasible”, did not object to this. However, Finnish Ambassador Iloniemi stated that “there is no use to use publicity as a ‘weapon’”, and his Swiss colleague supported the view that it would be difficult to use Principle VII for the solution of individual cases of human rights violations. Furthermore, the situa-


60 Ibid.: “Meeting of Representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries of Europe, Belgrade, 31 January to 1 February 1977, Press communiqué”, 1 February 1977


tion did not suggest optimism regarding their own ambitions on CBM and other issues. In the light of these rather bleak expectations, it was mainly agreed that the continuity of the Helsinki dialog was of utmost importance specifically for the smaller states, even if concrete results could not always be expected from the talks. This seems to have been the main “lesson learned” for the neutral states during the Helsinki and Geneva phase of the CSCE in the years 1972 to 1975. When they left the meeting in Berne, the four neutrals agreed to hold a last exchange of views between themselves before the Belgrade meeting on 14 June 1977, on the day before the opening of the multilateral preparatory consultations in Belgrade.

1.2 THE BELGRADE PREPARATORY MEETING (15 JUNE – 5 AUGUST 1977)

When the delegations of the 35 CSCE states met again for the preparatory conference in Belgrade between 15 June and 5 August 1977, the N+N soon realized the change in the overall atmosphere of the conference. The specter of a complete disruption in relations between Moscow and Washington was looming over the talks. Little was left of the spirit of the superpower détente of the early 1970s. Soviet military interventions in Africa, the end of the “Kissinger era” in US foreign policy, followed by a rhetorically more aggressive human rights policy by the new government of President Jimmy Carter, and a first stalemate in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were all hampering a positive development of the talks in Belgrade.

The Swedish CBM proposal was further discussed in a meeting of N+N military experts in Belgrade on 21 and 22 July 1977. On that occasion, Sweden was mandated to develop further their proposal based on the commonly held N+N discussion, but the other group members still reserved the right ultimately to grant or withhold support. The Swiss remained particularly restrained about the idea of making it a commonly sponsored N+N initiative. Rosin, Einfluss durch Neutralität, chapter 6 (computer printout with unnumbered pages).

The US so far had considered the CSCE a sideshow of its foreign policy activities. Now, Washington decided that this forum would provide the perfect ground to test the Soviets. President Carter made the Belgrade review conference a top priority and called for a rigid examination of human rights standards in the East. In 1976, the US Congress had decided to establish the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which became a focal point for monitoring Eastern compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and promoting an activist human rights policy. The initiator of the so-called Helsinki Commission was Millicent Fenwick, a Republican representative from New Jersey. In a meeting with a US congressional delegation in Moscow after the Helsinki summit, Fenwick had been urged by long-time Soviet dissident Yuri Orlov to use the Final Act as a means of putting pressure on the Soviet government. Orlov himself, at an impromptu press conference held on 12 May 1976 in the apartment of Nobel Peace Prize winner Andrei Sakharov, the most prominent Moscow dissident, announced the creation of a “Public Group to Assist the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR” (generally known as the Moscow Helsinki Group). Very quickly, similar groups were formed in other republics of the Soviet Union, such as Ukraine, Lithuania, and Georgia. The groups immediately began to interact with each other as well as with other religious and nationalist organizations throughout the USSR. They all saw potential of using the Helsinki Final Act – namely, its Principle VII – as leverage against the regime in Moscow.

In advance of the first CSCE review conference scheduled to take place in Belgrade in 1977, the Moscow Helsinki Group began collecting and disseminating information about violations of the Helsinki principles in the USSR to the West:

65 For the evolution of the US attitude toward human rights in the CSCE process, see: Mastny, Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security.

66 The first chairperson of the CSCE Commission in the US Congress was Democrat Dante Fascell of Florida. The long-term general secretary of the commission was Spencer Oliver, who later worked as head of the CSCE and OSCE parliamentary office in Copenhagen.


After the Group's formation was broadcast on Western radio stations, many Soviets knew of its existence and addressed group members to report instances of abuse. [...] Initially, the Moscow Helsinki Group made 35 copies of each document and sent them by registered mail to 34 foreign embassies in Moscow affiliated with the CSCE, and directly to Soviet Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. As that proved ineffective due to state interference with their mailings, various methods were used to deliver Moscow Helsinki Group documents to foreign embassies, e.g. through Western correspondents.

Eastern European dissidence increased as the Belgrade meeting approached and activists realized the meeting was a way to highlight their plight and grievances, resulting in the emergence of a network committed to protecting human rights in Eastern Europe. Charter 77, a group of loosely affiliated activists in Czechoslovakia, even chose its name to make a direct link to the start of the Belgrade review meeting. The establishment of Charter 77 and a number of other Eastern Helsinki Monitor Groups in fact marked the beginning of a productive collaboration between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and Western CSCE delegations, most effectively in the US. The USSR, in turn, began to criticize US foreign policy for its interference in internal Eastern affairs and was anxious to keep the Belgrade meeting as brief and its final recommendations as non-committal as possible. Questions regarding human rights should be excluded and only military aspects and economic cooperation discussed.

Under these circumstances, the preparatory meeting in summer 1977 already turned into a serious test for the continuation of the CSCE process. At that early stage of talks, the mediatory services of the N+N states proved to be crucial for a first time. Based on their initial efforts, a compromise on the procedure and time schedule for the upcoming follow-up conference was established. Discussions at the Belgrade preparatory meeting mainly evolved around date, duration, and work organization of the conference. The West demanded a two-stage conference, containing a broad discussion on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act followed by the examination of new proposals. The implementation of the Final Act provisions was to be examined chapter by chapter by separate working bodies. The USSR, on the other hand, insisted on a short and general plenary debate charged with the review of the past as
well as with the discussion on the future. The Soviets originally resisted the creation of special working bodies for the review and threatened to discontinue the exercise for good after Belgrade.\textsuperscript{69} The polarization of the talks between the US and the USSR not only put pressure on the EC-Nine that had been the leading power in the Western bloc at the CSCE so far, but also threatened to hamper the neutral and non-aligned states’ aims for the conference (including a substantial concluding document as well as a fixed date and place for a next follow-up meeting).\textsuperscript{70}

The N+N, therefore, in an attempt to find a solution, on 22 June proposed that the conference should begin with a number of plenary meetings devoted simultaneously to the assessment of what had happened since 1 August 1975 and to the examination of new proposals, which should then be discussed more systematically in five working groups chapter by chapter.\textsuperscript{71} A subsequent N+N proposal, registered as CSCE/ BM-P/9 on 14 July (amended on 20 July), further tried to clarify the terms for the subsidiary working bodies.\textsuperscript{72} Swiss delegate Edouard Brunner, meanwhile, engaging on his own account in confidential contacts with both sides, tried to advance a compromise solution regarding the

\textsuperscript{69} Ghébali, \textit{La diplomatie de la détente}, 22f; from time to time during the Belgrade meeting, the Soviets repeated their warnings that the continuation of the debate on human rights might bring the conference to a “total breakdown” and the CSCE process to a premature end. Cf. Skilling, “The Belgrade Follow-up”, in Spencer (ed.), \textit{Canada and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe}, 286 and 298.


\textsuperscript{71} The N+N document was registered as CSCE/BM-P/5; cf. “Neutrale legen Gegenmodell Nummer 3 vor”, \textit{Tages-Anzeiger}, 23 June 1977; Zielinski, \textit{Die neutralen und blockfreien Staaten und ihre Rolle im KSZE-Prozess}, 243.

\textsuperscript{72} During the Belgrade preparatory meeting, the four neutrals met on average three times a week for discussion, with extra meetings in the N+N constellation in addition. The Swiss and the Austrians were the most active in finding a solution to the organizational questions. On the basis of their work, Sweden drafted a first paper for an N+N proposal presented on 4 July to the other neutrals. Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland then sounded out the basis for their compromise on the working bodies with the Eastern states at a meeting with the USSR, GDR, Poland, Bulgaria, CSSR, and Hungary on 8 July 1977. UMA, 7 B, ETYK Beograd, Box 98: “Eräitä huomioita Suomen ja muiden puolueettomien maiden yhteistyöstä valmistavan kokouksen alkuvaiheessa”, Muistio Pekka Ojanen, Helsinki, 6 July 1977; Private Papers Hans-Jörg Renk, Riehen/Basle [hereafter: Renk Papers]: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Working Party, 8 July 1977; on differing opinions about the structuring and timing of the negotiations among the four neutrals during this phase, see Benjamin Gilde, “Keine neutralen Vermittler: Die Gruppe der neutralen und nicht-paktgebundenen Staaten und das Belgrader KSZE-Folgetreffen 1977/78”, \textit{Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte} (3/2011), 413–44, at 419–22.
open questions of the final date and organizational structure of the conference. As a result of these explorations, a Swiss-Swedish compromise proposal was drafted and presented to the other members of the N+N on 25 July suggesting 15 December as a date by which a final document should be drafted – with the possibility to continue the exercise for a defined period of another month after 16 January 1978 if the December deadline was missed, under the condition that “it will not, however, end its work without having fixed the date and place of the next similar meeting”.

Initially, not all N+N group members warmed to this idea, but they ultimately agreed to give it their support. The East, however, contested the specifics of the proposal as presented to all participating states on 26 July and, instead, insisted on 9 December as the definitive final date for the deliberations of the conference. Brunner had obviously left his interlocutors on both sides in the dark about certain aspects of the “puzzle” when exploring the compromise. Thus, the “deal” quickly fell apart again when the full details were disclosed to all participants with the tabling of the Swiss-Swedish proposal.

With the Brunner initiative having failed, the Spanish delegation now picked up the pieces and tried to wrap up the previous proposals in a new compromise a few days later on 29 July (CSCE/BM-P/12). While the basic model of the N+N proposal for the conference was accepted therein, the discussions once more centered on the opening date for the follow-up conference (27 September or 4 October), as well as on the establishment and limitation of the working time for the subsidiary working bodies. Romania entered a new wording on the latter issue asking that 9 December be fixed as the date for ending the subsidiary

73 Quoted in Gilde, “Keine neutralen Vermittler”, 423.
74 In particular, the Austrians wanted to keep the option of an open-ended conference to make sure that it had to close with a concluding document based on the consensus of all participating states.
75 The Swiss-Swedish proposal mentioned 9 December only as the date when the subsidiary working bodies would have to report on their work to the plenary meeting. Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 26 July 1977. It was then decided that a contact group of the USSR, GDR, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Malta, Belgium, the Netherlands, the US, and Canada/FRG should further discuss this point.
76 Gilde, “Keine neutralen Vermittler”, 423f.
77 Ibid., 424f.
working bodies, while leaving the option to continue their discussions in the editorial groups assigned to the plenary afterwards if necessary.\textsuperscript{78}

In a separate group meeting on 2 August, the N+N generally agreed to accept this solution under the assumption that the conference would start on 27 September.\textsuperscript{79} The following day, the USSR and GDR dropped their resistance to the Spanish P/12, and on 4 and 5 August, agreement was reached on the final details of the Belgrade conference.\textsuperscript{80} It was ultimately agreed that the first phase of the conference would start on 4 October and the subsidiary working groups should start reporting to the plenary from week 8 onwards. The working bodies were scheduled to last until 16 December, in order to allow the plenary meeting time to draft the final document by 22 December. Failing agreement on the final document by that date, the plenary would reconvene for another month in 1978. It was understood at the same time that the conference would in any case end with the conclusion of a final document and the fixation of a date and place for the next follow-up meeting.\textsuperscript{81} Thereby one of the main aims of the N+N regarding the follow-up mechanism of the CSCE had been secured at the preparatory meeting for the Belgrade conference.\textsuperscript{82} With their insistence on a clearly defined follow-up for the future, the N+N had even exceeded Western demands and expectations for the preparatory meeting.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{78} Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 29 July 1977; Plenary meeting, 30 July 1977; Plenary meeting, 1 August 1977; Also: Renk Papers: CSCE Folder Belgrade B 1+2, Press briefings, 30 July and 1 August 1977.

\textsuperscript{79} Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Meeting of the N+N Group, 2 August 1977.

\textsuperscript{80} Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 4 August 1977, 1500 h; Plenary meeting (closed), 5 August 1977, 1210 h; Also: Renk Papers: CSCE Folder Belgrade B 1+2, Press briefings, 3 and 4 August 1977.


\textsuperscript{82} Cf. Leo Matés, “The Neutral and Nonaligned Countries”, in Andrén and Birnbaum (eds.), \textit{Belgrade and Beyond}, 51 – 63, at 53.

\textsuperscript{83} Gilde, “Keine neutralen Vermittler”, 426; Cf. Oliver Bange, “The FRG and the GDR and the Belgrade CSCE Conference (1977 – 78)”, in Bilandžić/Kosanović (eds.), \textit{From Helsinki to Belgrade}, 311 – 44, at 324; the Austrian head of delegation, Ambassador Franz Ceska, states that the most important discussions in Belgrade were held in the final week of the preparatory meeting since procedural matters were political key questions: Statement Franz Ceska, Panel 4, “The Historical Experience of the Neutral and Non-Aligned States in the CSCE”, Vienna Oral History Workshop, Summary Notes Day 2, 23.
It cannot be stressed enough that against the background of strained US-Soviet relations and an almost complete standstill at SALT and MBFR negotiations, it was a significant achievement for the N+N to reach agreement on exact working procedures for, as well as a continuation of the CSCE talks beyond, the Belgrade meeting. At the same time, the multilateral preparatory meeting between June and August 1977 had left no doubt that despite a generally friendly spirit at the talks, further ideological polarization was to be expected for the main meeting. This would certainly narrow the room for independent initiatives of substance on the side of the N+N. Instead, they would most likely have to restrict themselves to guaranteeing the follow-up of the conference with initiatives of a mediatory kind between East and West. The N+N were not only confronted with a more restrictive standpoint on the part of the Warsaw Pact and a differing point of departure of the Western caucuses, but also with a new interest of the public and the media in the follow-up meeting due to the activity launched by the various national Helsinki committees on a non-governmental level. As a consequence, already at the preparatory talks, the delegations were constantly surrounded by a “flock of reporters”, which made the informal way of negotiating known from the Helsinki and Geneva rounds of CSCE talks more difficult, as delegations adopted new information policies aimed at the public at home and abroad. This did not necessarily broaden the latitude for new initiatives, given the prevailing atmosphere in East-West relations at the time.

The N+N capitals received further sobering news with regard to the possibilities for the realization of their own ideas in Belgrade when the Carter administration in September 1977 announced that it had nominated Arthur J. Goldberg as the head of delegation for the main meeting. Goldberg, a former US supreme court justice and ambassador to the United Nations under President Lyndon B. Johnson, was known to be an outspoken advocate of Carter’s confrontational human rights policy. Whereas his predecessor, Ambassador Albert Sherer, was a classic career diplomat who tended to work towards achieving small steps behind the scenes, Goldberg was the exact opposite. He had been specially selected by Carter as a public figure who had negotiated with the Soviets before and who would be willing to criticize them at Belgrade. In the White House’s opinion, his appointment would enhance the stature of
the talks and establish a new leadership of the US in the CSCE. In the final consultations with the neutrals before Belgrade, even the US State Department acknowledged that this nomination meant a more aggressive tone for the main meeting than initially outlined by their officials at the preparatory talks.\footnote{84}

1.3 THE BELGRADE FOLLOW-UP MEETING (4 OCTOBER 1977 – 8 MARCH 1978)

The day before the official talks began, the four neutral delegations met for a final exchange of views on the situation and for mutual information on the statements that their respective heads of delegation would deliver at the opening session of the Belgrade main meeting the following day.\footnote{85} The Swiss displayed considerable skepticism with regard to the overall prospects for the conference. The Finns were slightly more optimistic that the most difficult period in bilateral relations between the US and the USSR was over, and the Swedes particularly deplored the lack of progress in SALT and MBFR. The head of the Austrian delegation, Franz Ceska, announced that his delegation would continue to stress implementation of the Helsinki Final Act provisions, especially concerning human rights and Basket III. Since there were greater chances of achieving results in Basket II, however, Austria would submit concrete proposals only in that area (on European inland waterways, on cooperation in the energy sector, and on business contacts and trade promotion).\footnote{86} Sweden declared it would concentrate on presenting only one proposal in the field of CBM, and Finland announced it was not planning to bring forward any concrete proposals, but it had identified four fields of special interest: disarmament, standardization, environ-


\footnote{85} Abridged German versions of the opening statements of Yugoslavia, Finland, and Austria of 4 and 5 October 1977 are reprinted in Volle and Wagner (eds.), \textit{Das Belgrader KSZE-Folgetreffen}, 86–90 (Yugoslavia), 94ff. (Finland), 101ff. (Austria).

\footnote{86} The Austrian engagement in Basket II with a number of initiatives in Belgrade was directly owed to Chancellor Kreisky’s personal ideas on the improvement of European East-West relations: Gilde, \textit{Neutraler Vermittler oder missionarische Absichten?}, 333ff.
ment, and the follow-up. The Swiss delegation announced it would table a revised project for an expert meeting regarding their SRPD on the table as well as a proposal on information and working conditions for journalists.87 This meant that all four continued to pursue subject matters that had already been at the center of their CSCE policies during the Helsinki and Geneva negotiations in the years 1972 to 1975. On procedural matters, the four neutrals decided to meet again following the opening session of the Belgrade main meeting in a working group on procedural matters on 5 October to further discuss the program on the exchange of views on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act.88

The Belgrade main meeting that officially opened on 4 October 1977 was held at the newly constructed SAVA conference center, located away from the historic city center and other built-up areas. The conference site was built in a contemporary 1970s architectural style and held plenty of room to welcome the CSCE in the Yugoslav capital. Marshal Tito as the host of these international talks was determined to present his country as the leading non-aligned European country and as a progressive and modern Socialist society. When the conference began, the US and the Soviet Union immediately seized the floor and made clear in their opening statements that the diplomatic tone of the preparatory talks was definitely a thing of the past, and was being replaced by ideological speech and stern accusations on both sides. During the following debate on the implementation of the conference, the neutrals adopted a firm critical position towards the Eastern states, similar to that of the Western states. Contrary to the latter, however, the neutral and non-aligned formulated their criticism in a more conciliatory way by refraining from blaming individual governments.89 Instead, they tried


88 Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade / N+N Meetings, Meeting of the 4 N group on organizational questions, 5 October 1977.

“constructive” criticism by using the talks to introduce and establish new standards to the CSCE process.

After the opening statements, the plenary meeting had started to review the implementation of Helsinki and to discuss new proposals in the week of 10 October. The Soviet Union launched its idea of a treaty on *No First Use* (NFU) of nuclear weapons, and the Western alliance members mainly stressed the importance of compliance with human rights standards set by the Final Act. The neutral and non-aligned states staged the scene on the following day: In their statements, most of the N+N delegates backed the Western views on human rights and stressed the importance of a new initiative in the field of CBM, a subject that was of particular concern to them. The Swiss SRPD project was specifically mentioned in a number of interventions.

The first delegation among the N+N to officially bring forward a new proposal was that of Malta with its request for a standing committee on Mediterranean security and cooperation, including all states of the region as well as the US and the Soviet Union. Austria followed the next day with the three proposals it had announced on European inland waterways, business contacts and trade promotion, and cooperation in the energy sector. But both initiatives remained rather isolated also within the N+N.

Regarding the Soviet idea for a no-first-strike treaty, the neutrals’ attitude was rather negative, although their official position was that

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90 Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 10 October 1977.
91 Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 11 October 1977
92 Sweden stated that it intended to put forward some concrete proposals, including on military movements and greater openness of budgets. Neutral support came from Austria and Switzerland, while in the Western camp Norway, the UK, and Belgium stated their interest in further military CBM.
93 Explicit support for the SRPD came from the N+N partners Austria, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, and San Marino, as well as from Italy and Luxembourg.
94 Registered on 10 October 1977 as CSCE/BM/1.
95 CSCE/BM/2, 3, and 4 respectively, presented on 12 October 1977.
this was primarily a matter for the nuclear states to discuss.\textsuperscript{96} The N+N as a group in particular tried to lead the discussion in military aspects of security by tabling their new proposal on CBM first, which happened on 28 October 1977. These negotiating tactics had been tested already in Helsinki and Geneva phases of the initial CSCE: Their aim was to occupy the field with an independent initiative before the military alliances came forward with proposals of their own, effectively making any N+N initiative a possible compromise solution. The N+N proposal on military confidence-building measures was formally introduced by Sweden and registered as CSCE/BM/6.\textsuperscript{97} In addition to existing CBM in the Helsinki Final Act, the N+N paper demanded the announcement of smaller-scale military maneuvers taking place at the same time in a limited geographic area; improvement of the conditions for observers of maneuvers; announcement of larger movements of more than 25’000 troops; and more openness regarding military budgets. The US welcomed the “serious contribution of the N+N, which we will give sympathetic and careful attention”.\textsuperscript{98} The UK and Norway positively echoed the US. Apart from the Soviet Union, which had taken noncommittal note of “the interest of the N+N countries in the CBM”, only Romania referred (favourably) to the N+N proposal on the Eastern side.\textsuperscript{99}

The NATO countries had previously announced that they would come forward with CBM proposals of their own, and formally introduced their ideas on 2 November. The proposal was officially presented

\textsuperscript{96} For the Swedish and Swiss statements regarding NFU, see: Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 11 October 1977. The Soviet NFU proposal was officially put forward and discussed on 24 October 1977 as CSCE/BM/5: Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting (Military aspects of security), 24 October 1977. For N+N reactions to the Soviet proposals in the military dossier, see also: Wilhelm Kuntner, “Österreich und die vertrauensbildenden Massnahmen”, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik [hereafter ÖZA] (Special Issue on the CSCE Belgrade Meeting, Sonderheft 1978), 14ff., at 15.

\textsuperscript{97} Aryo Makko, “Das schwedische Interesse an Vertrauensbildenden Massnahmen und Abrüstungsfragen”, in Peter/Wentker (eds.), Der KSZE-Prozess (Munich: Oldenbourg, forthcoming 2012). Malta and San Marino denied their formal support for the initiative. Malta had already explained in an N+N meeting on 14 October that it could not co-sponsor the paper since it favored a political approach to military questions. Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade / N+N meetings, 14 October 1977.

\textsuperscript{98} Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting (N+N proposal on CBMs), 28 October 1977.

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.: “Accueille avec intérêt et favorablement le document N+N dont certaines idées rejoignent nos préoccupations.”
by Norway and co-sponsored by Canada, the UK, and the Netherlands (CSCE/BM/11). The Western paper doubled down on the N+N demands regarding improvement of conditions for observers and announcement of movement of troops over 25’000. In addition, the Western paper required announcement of maneuvers already at a threshold of 10’000 troops.\(^{100}\) The proposal was met with “friendly noises” by Poland and Romania on the Eastern side (while the Soviet Union announced it would return to the Norwegian proposal at a later stage). Malta, which had not co-sponsored the N+N proposal, commented favorably on the Norwegian initiative.\(^{101}\)

On the same day, Yugoslavia presented its proposal on a “Year of Cultural Cooperation among CSCE States” for 1980 (CSCE/BM/10), while in the meantime, on 31 October, the Swiss delegation had also introduced its proposal on information, which called for an expert-level meeting on working conditions for journalists and the dissemination of information in print following the Belgrade meeting.\(^{102}\) The latter initiative in particular triggered considerable discussion: The Soviet Union had immediately reacted (in the negative) to the proposal by stressing the central role of states when looking at the question of dissemination of information. Sweden, Austria, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Belgium, in turn, extended their full support to the Swiss initiative, while the GDR and Hungary backed up the Soviet position. The FRG took positive note of the Swiss initiative and the US answered the Soviet Union by stating that not only states were entrusted to implement the Final Act, but that this was also a “people’s document”\(^{103}\).

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\(^{100}\) Originally, during the Geneva phase of the negotiations, the N+N had also hoped that a lower threshold would be set for the announcement of maneuvers. In order not to endanger the Helsinki package on CBM, however, they did not ask to renegotiate these parameters in Belgrade. Cf. Wilhelm Mark, “Zwischenbilanz der KSZE 1977 aus militärischer Sicht”, in Alois Riklin, Rudolf Bindschedler, Hans Jörg Renk, Wilhelm Mark, *Die Schweiz und die KSZE: Stand Frühjahr 1977* (Zurich: SAD, 1977), 34–40.

\(^{101}\) Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 2 November 1977.


\(^{103}\) Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 31 October 1977.
While other initiatives of the neutral and non-aligned states were less disputed,\textsuperscript{104} neither the Norwegian nor the N+N proposal on CBM found support by the USSR in the continuation of the talks in November; neither had the Swiss proposal on information or the Yugoslav proposal for a cultural year gained support by the time discussions on the drafting of a concluding document began on 18 November 1977.\textsuperscript{105} As was to be expected, the atmosphere at the Belgrade meeting, which was already fraught with ideology at that early stage, left little room for independent initiatives from the neutral and non-aligned side.

While the battle between East and West over human rights issues went on,\textsuperscript{106} the N+N soon resorted to their role of catalysts for procedural matters. In the course of November, the Swiss and Swedish delegates reminded the conference that it was necessary to think about the structure of a concluding document and proposed a two-part document, consisting of A) a factual-political part and B) decisions on the basis of the proposals submitted to the meeting.\textsuperscript{107} In the following days, the N+N held extensive joint consultations based on a Yugoslav draft of 19 November, which was then elaborated into a first N+N draft paper on

\textsuperscript{104} The other commonly sponsored proposal of the N+N (CSCE/BM/18, registered on 4 November 1977) supported the general aim of arms reduction and demanded concrete results in that respect in the UN and other forums dealing with the question. For a complete list of proposals introduced to the Belgrade meeting until Christmas 1977 see Volle and Wagner (eds.), \textit{Das Belgrader KSZE-Folgetreffen}, 187 – 192.


\textsuperscript{106} The US formally introduced their proposal on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (CSCE/BM/60) on 2 December 1977. The states of the Eastern bloc countered with proposals on the right to work (Hungary, CSCE/BM/62), equal rights for women (Bulgaria, CSCE/BM/63), and the demand that all CSCE states subscribe to the UN human rights compacts (Bulgaria & GDR, CSCE/BM/64).

\textsuperscript{107} Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 18 November 1977. At first, the Austrians (as well as a number of Western bloc states) reacted critically to the Swiss proposal to press ahead with the drafting of the factual-political text of a final document before the operational parts were clear. Gilde, “Keine neutralen Vermittler”, 429.
22 November 1977. At the same time, the EC states started working on the basic framework for the concluding document. The result of the internal N+N deliberations was finally announced to the other participating states in a four-page document (CSCE/BM/65) on 7 December 1977 as a basis for further plenary talks on the concluding document. The Swiss delegate, speaking on behalf of the N+N, demanded that the plenary be transformed in a next step into three “groupes de rédaction” on 1) security, 2) economy and the Mediterranean, and 3) Basket III and follow-up. He urged the groups to start putting together the texts for a concluding document on 16 December when the subsidiary working bodies had to hand in their reports. As for the time and deadline, the Swiss suggested a four-week working schedule with one-week deliberations as early as December 1977, and further deliberations during three weeks in January/February of the following year.

When the N+N proposal for a final document was presented in detail to the conference on 9 December, it gained immediate support from France, which had previously submitted a first concrete scheme for a concluding document independently of the EC-Nine. Malta, which had been closely involved in the drafting of the N+N paper, but was not co-sponsoring it because of the lack of a link to the Mediterranean issue, introduced its own proposal (CSCE/BM/66) on the Mediterranean. Initial reactions to the N+N proposal from the East were rather negative.


109 For the internal deliberations among the N+N between 22 November and 7 December, in particular Finnish attempts to give the formulations regarding the state of détente a more “positive” twist, see Gilde, “Keine neutralen Vermittler”, 429ff. A German version of CSCE/BM/65 is reprinted in Volle and Wagner (eds.), Das Belgrader KSZE-Folgetreffen, 146–148. Cf. Zielinski, Die neutralen und blockfreien Staaten und ihre Rolle im KSZE-Prozess, 244; Ghébali, La diplomatie de la détente, 24.

110 Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 7 December 1977.

111 The French proposal was registered on 2 December 1977 as CSCE/BM/61.
(from the USSR, to a lesser degree the CSSR, and Hungary). Support came from the UK and Norway.\textsuperscript{112}

After the arbitrary decision of the chairman (FRG) to assign the task of setting up a new working program to the four neutrals was protested by Romania for formal reasons, Austria was asked on 12 December by the chair to hold informal consultations with the other delegations on the issue of the working program first.\textsuperscript{113} On the basis of these contacts, the four neutrals on 14 December presented their working program for the period from 19 December 1977 to 10 February 1978 (CSCE/BM/68).\textsuperscript{114} On the same day that the special working bodies reported to the plenary, on 16 December, Belgium on behalf of the EC-Nine introduced a new proposition for a final document (CSCE/BM/69), which was co-sponsored by Canada.\textsuperscript{115} The UK declared that BM/69 simply continued where the N+N proposal BM/65 had left off, but the East strongly contested the Western paper.\textsuperscript{116} In the following days, the Soviet delegation at first denied agreement on the working program presented by the N+N in BM/68 and apparently only changed its mind at the very last moment on direct orders from Leonid Brezhnev.\textsuperscript{117} Hence, the editorial work could formally begin on 19 December, but since the Eastern bloc states were not prepared to take any concrete stances on the Western proposals, the meeting had to adjourn for the Christmas break on 22 December until 17 January 1978 without further results.\textsuperscript{118} It looked as if the East was now simply playing for time.

The events before Christmas foreshadowed a negative turn of the conference over the turn of the year 1977/78. In a report of 10 January 1978, the Swiss member of delegation Hans-Jörg Renk displayed considerable skepticism concerning the continuity of the Helsinki process beyond a next follow-up meeting: East and West would currently both,
each in their own way, make their long-term commitment dependent on the development of détente. On the other hand, only the N+N, Romania, and Spain had so far made a strong plea to continue the CSCE process under all circumstances in order not to let it become a “fair weather event”. The role of the N+N with regard to the continuity of the follow-up would, therefore, be a crucial one in the remaining weeks of the Belgrade conference.\footnote{119}

Renk’s assessment of the situation was confirmed in a meeting of the former head of the US delegation to the CSCE, Albert Sherer, with the Swiss ambassador to Washington, Raymond Probst, in early January 1978, when Sherer noted that the US and the Soviet Union were currently on “collision course” in Belgrade. At the same time, the Soviet Ambassador in Berne deposited a vocal complaint to the Swiss about the “confrontational attitude” of certain states at the CSCE negotiations.\footnote{120}

Thus, the policy of the N+N was guided by a serious concern for the continuation of the Helsinki process when the talks in Belgrade re-started after New Year. The N+N tried to reinvigorate the discussion on a final document when Austria aimed to secure the meaning of the follow-up by introducing a new proposal on the level of representation at the next CSCE meeting in Madrid, calling for at least a foreign ministers’ meeting on the opening and conclusion of the talks as an incentive for détente (CSCE/BM/71).\footnote{121}

However, a Soviet draft for a final document presented the same day (CSCE/BM/70) simply omitted any of the proposals previously made by the other delegations, be they Western, neutral and non-aligned, or


\footnote{120} Rosin, Einfluss durch Neutralität, Chapter 6.4 “Verschärfung der Konfrontation zu Jahresbeginn 1978”.

Eastern.\textsuperscript{122} The Western, N+N, and even some of the Eastern European representatives were clearly taken aback by the Soviet move and openly referred to it as a very discouraging development. At least, the Soviet document spoke of a continuation of the CSCE process, mentioning a number of possible future expert meetings and naming Madrid as a venue for the next follow-up meeting, including a concrete opening date in November 1980. On the wording of the concluding document for the Belgrade meeting, however, the US and the Soviet Union in the following days became increasingly entrenched in their respective positions, and many delegates felt a sense of urgency that something had to be done to mitigate the conflict between the superpowers in the conference.\textsuperscript{123}

The N+N at first disagreed on how to react to the latest Soviet document. While Yugoslavia and Austria pressed for a compromise solution, Finland and Sweden warned of the dangers of dramatizing the situation and launching a premature mediation offer.\textsuperscript{124} Encouraged by the West and seemingly also by a number of Eastern delegations, the N+N eventually agreed to try to save the substance of the talks by presenting a new basis for a final document on 1 February 1978. They decided to start with a comprehensive catalogue of all substantial provisions proposed so far.\textsuperscript{125} As subsequent plenary discussions led nowhere, Finland,


\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 436.

\textsuperscript{125} The document is to be found in: Renk Papers: CSCE Folder Belgrade B 3, N+N 1978. A German version of the N+N paper of 1 February 1978 is reprinted in Volle and Wagner (eds.), \textit{Das Belgrader KSZE-Folgetreffen}, 148f. Cf. BAR, E 2001 (E) 1988/16, 215: “Die Mitarbeit der Schweiz in der Gruppe der neutralen und nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten im Rahmen der KSZE”, Bericht Daniel Woker, Februar 1978. In order to draft the paper, the N+N had set up eight internal topical working groups (“task forces”) to check the implementation of the Final Act provisions in the respective fields and to draw up new proposals. The eight working groups were: 1) principles (Yugoslavia/Switzerland/Cyprus); 2) military issues (Austria/Sweden); 3) economic issues (Finland/Austria); 4) human contacts (Austria/Sweden); 5) information (Switzerland/Liechtenstein); 6) culture and education (Finland/Yugoslavia); 7) Mediterranean (Malta/Yugoslavia); 8) follow-up (Sweden/Finland). UMA, 7 B, ETYK Beograd, Box 98: Telegram, Belgrade, 21 January 1978; Telegram, Belgrade, 31 January 1978; cf. Gilde, \textit{Neutraler Vermittler oder missionarische Absichten?}, 388f.
which chaired the session on 3 February, proposed to resort to informal contact groups co-ordinated by the four neutral states and Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{126} They were to deal with the most disputed aspects of the various proposals.\textsuperscript{127} The work of the contact groups was to start on 6 February, but the informal explorations by the Finns with the main parties to find out acceptance of this procedure had already been discouraging. While both sides, East and West, were in general favorably disposed towards the idea of the informal contact groups, it became clear that “the US and Soviet views on the substance are far apart, and there is no sign of a will to compromise.”\textsuperscript{128} Under these circumstances, the attempt by the N+N to broker a substantial final document based on their position paper of 1 February ultimately failed.\textsuperscript{129} In the analysis of a Swiss diplomat, its failure was mainly due to the fact that in many of its aspects, the informal “non-paper” of the N+N did not represent a balanced intermediary position between East and West, but was rather a reflection of their own ideas on the most disputed issues of the conference – ideas that were often close to the Western position.\textsuperscript{130} But as Gilde has illustrated in a recent publication, the Soviets were simply not prepared to compromise at all, and the N+N had probably misread earlier signs of this intransigence.\textsuperscript{131} That means that the “natural role” of the N+N as mediators was no longer wished for, at least by one of the superpowers, and with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the N+N group had

\textsuperscript{126} Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting (informal continuation), 3 February 1978.

\textsuperscript{127} The Swiss delegation was in charge of the principles, Yugoslavia of the military questions, Finland of economic issues, Austria of human rights and Sweden of the follow-up. UMA, 7 B, ETYK Beograd, Box 98: N+N head of delegations meeting (no document title), Belgrade, 3 February 1978. Cf. Zielinski, \textit{Die neutralen und blockfreien Staaten und ihre Rolle im KSZE-Prozess}, 244f.

\textsuperscript{128} UMA, 7 B, ETYK Beograd, Box 98: N+N head of delegations meeting (no document title), Belgrade, 3 February 1978.


\textsuperscript{131} Gilde, “Keine neutralen Vermittler”, 437.
exhausted their options as bridge-builders between East and West by that particular stage of the Belgrade negotiations.

On 16 February, the French delegation proposed yet another compromise between the latest N+N document and the Soviet paper BM/70 (and its revisions 1, 2, and 3). This seems to have been an attempt by President Giscard d’Estaing primarily to gain international profile for domestic reasons, and in the end, the French initiative was to no avail either. Yet, with the French proposal officially on the table, the potential of the N+N paper as a basis for compromise was definitely rendered null and void, as it now stood as a “maximalist” position beside the French paper.

However, the N+N were not yet ready to give up entirely on their proposal. Switzerland introduced a new working program to the plenary on the morning of 20 February (CSCE/BM/74), but the Soviet Union in the end withdrew from the contact groups and simply declined to discuss any substantial precisions of the Helsinki Final Act in the remaining two weeks of the negotiations. All attempts by the N+N countries to broker a compromise were frustrated, and none of the proposals presented by the East, France, and the N+N was able to achieve consensus. Pondering the remaining options, the Swiss delegate Edouard Brunner had already suggested in a late-night statement at the plenary of 20 February that the CSCE might end with a short final document. Under the circumstances, the sole solution would consist of a minimal document reaffirming the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and announcing the convocation of a number of expert meetings and the decision to hold the next meeting in Madrid in 1980 in order to safeguard

the continuation of the CSCE meetings.\textsuperscript{136} According to an Austrian report, Brunner had stressed

\[\ldots\] that it was about time to take note of the statements of the USSR. It was regrettable, but a fact, that a truly substantial document was not achievable and that no consensus could be found on indispensable references to human contacts, human rights, and CBM.\textsuperscript{137}

The developments of February not only led to a total disillusionment of the N+N with regard to their possibilities to influence the talks further, but also induced a serious dispute among the N+N over how to proceed regarding their own demands. Brunner’s call for a short final document had been made on his own initiative and had not been discussed beforehand within the N+N group.\textsuperscript{138} Furthermore, when the head of the Swiss delegation, Ambassador Rudolf Bindschedler, insisted in an N+N meeting on 21 February that the N+N paper of 1 February be published mainly to make clear to domestic audiences that any potential further compromises were not in line with what the N+N had originally proposed, Finland and to some extent Sweden opposed this idea. A publication of the N+N draft paper of 1 February would only serve as an unnecessary demonstration of their political standpoint, while its original aims could no longer be achieved. It was now the Yugoslav hosts that proposed the N+N should still try to contribute to a new substantial document nevertheless. Following this call, the N+N decided that the vice head of delegations should once more draft a new “short but substantial” final document on the basis of the Swiss and Yugoslav ideas. Its principal demands should be: Commitment of all participants to the Helsinki Final Act, confirmation of new measures that had already found approval in the Belgrade talks so far, and continuation of the CSCE process.\textsuperscript{139} Yugoslavia now took the lead in sounding out the potential acceptance of such an approach in separate discussions

\textsuperscript{136} Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 20 February 1978; Reuters, 20 February 1978, 2145h.

\textsuperscript{137} Original Austrian source in German, quoted in Gilde, “Keine neutralen Vermittler”, 440f.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 439f.

with Eastern and Western delegations. Finnish and Austrian documents make it clear that the text on which the Yugoslavs’ exploratory talks were based was “not really an N+N paper” any more. On 24 and 25 February, the N+N held separate hearings with the Warsaw Pact, EC, and NATO countries, as well as Romania in order to seek acceptance of a final document based on the existing N+N draft. The reactions of the Eastern and, in particular, the Western states remained outright negative, however, and on 27 February, Swiss delegation leader Bindschedler declared in an N+N meeting that the N+N non-paper was irrevocably “dead” with no possibility of a revival. On 28 February, some of the members of the group in the end would have been ready to abandon a large portion of the substance of their 1 February proposal (last revised on 23 February) to achieve a compromise between East and West. This created considerable dissent within the group again, and from that point on, the N+N lost the initiative.

At this point in the final days of negotiations, Denmark, which had taken over the Presidency of the EC on 1 January 1978, played a central role...
role in bringing about a final document for the Belgrade meeting.\textsuperscript{146} Like the N+N, the EC caucus, which had been the key player in the Western camp at the pre-1975 CSCE negotiations, had so far been sidelined by the US and Soviet delegations for the most part of the negotiations at Belgrade. It was only at this late stage of the conference, as the super-powers needed the help of a third party that was not yet exhausted to reach a conclusion of the talks, that the EC-Nine came into play to provide a face-saving solution. According to Goldberg’s proposition, Danish Ambassador Skjold Mellbin on behalf of the EC-Nine was to work out a new proposal that “would be void of any particular substance, but contain provisions, which would establish the importance of détente and of the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act.”\textsuperscript{147} Furthermore, by establishing the time and place for the next follow-up meeting, the proposal would ensure that the CSCE process was kept alive and pursued further. Mellbin accepted this suggestion and informed the other EC countries, which agreed to the idea – as did the Soviet delegation leader Yuli Vorontsov, who had probably been briefed on the plan by Goldberg beforehand. Hence, the Danes came forward with a new proposal (CSCE/BM/76), which was finally accepted by the US and the USSR as a basis for a text of final recommendations of the conference on 2 March 1978.\textsuperscript{148} For once, the situation at the conference was reversed, as it was now up to Goldberg, Vorontsov, and Mellbin to convince the neutrals and non-aligned of the merits of the Danish proposal, since it had been agreed among them that further changes proposed by any of the non-bloc participating states would only be accepted if all three of them agreed.\textsuperscript{149}

As the N+N were pondering the remaining chances of their own proposals against the backdrop of this relatively rigid NATO-EC-Warsaw Pact working scheme, the Swiss on 2 March proposed that the N+N should definitely give up on their paper, but insist at least on the de-

\textsuperscript{146} Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 28 February 1978. On Denmark’s role in the final weeks of the Belgrade negotiations, see the account of the then Danish delegation leader Skjold Mellbin, “Appendix: From Helsinki to Belgrade”, in Villaume and Westad (eds.), \textit{Perforating the Iron Curtain}, 243–51, at 250f.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 250.

\textsuperscript{148} Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 2 March 1978.

\textsuperscript{149} Mellbin, “Appendix: From Helsinki to Belgrade”, 251.
mand for future expert meetings on CBM and information.\textsuperscript{150} The Yugoslav delegate Ljubivoje Aćimović was immediately ready to support the Swiss position, and Sweden argued strongly in favor of insisting on the CBM expert meeting and supported the Swiss proposal on information. Malta, Austria, and Finland at first still had hopes of reopening negotiations with EC/NATO and the Warsaw Pact states on the Danish paper, but it soon became clear that all negotiations were now being held between the blocs exclusively, over the heads of the N+N.\textsuperscript{151}

As predicted by Brunner, all signs hinted to a short text merely repeating the basic assumptions of the Helsinki document. The only important point that all participating states could obviously agree upon was the convening of another follow-up meeting to be scheduled for 1980 in Madrid. The one thing the N+N could still try to do was to introduce amendments to the Danish BM/76 in the final editorial work. A common course of action was, however, no longer possible due to divergences of opinion on the tactics and content of individual N+N positions.\textsuperscript{152}

Finally, it was Romania that took up the previous N+N text on an expert meeting on CBM and introduced it as an amendment to the Danish paper on 3 March as CSCE/BM/77. Malta demanded that additional points be included on the expert group on the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{153} However, as the Yugoslav representative Aćimović stated in the plenary the following day, since “22 countries supporting BM/76 were not willing to accept one single change in the letter of this proposal” – not even a symbolic move as a gesture of goodwill – there was obviously no use in negotiating further on anything.\textsuperscript{154} This final call for a substantial document triggered a series of coffee breaks, until finally Denmark was able to present a new version of its document (CSCE/BM/78) in the even-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{150} Up to that point, only two expert-level meetings on the Swiss SRPD project and on scientific cooperation had been agreed – both of them already envisaged in the Helsinki Final Act.
\item \textsuperscript{151} Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade / N+N meetings, 2 March 1978 (1515h and continuation of the meeting at 1820h after break).
\item \textsuperscript{152} Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade / N+N meetings, 3 March 1978; cf. Gilde, “Keine neutralen Vermittler”, 441f.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 3 March 1978 (Drafting on the basis of BM/76; Discussion on point 6 of Romanian amendments on military expert group; Discussion on expert group on the Mediterranean).
\item \textsuperscript{154} Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 4 March 1978 (1030h).
\end{itemize}
ing. Most of that day was dedicated to the discussion of a new Maltese
text on the Mediterranean issue. Demands for a separate CBM ex-
pert meeting were ultimately dropped by the N+N, before the USSR,
the US, and a number of Eastern and Western delegations in the even-
ting declared that they would recommend to their government to give
agreement to this text; but Malta was still not satisfied.

Switzerland had renounced its demand for an expert meeting on
information and only insisted in a new text introduced to the Plenary
on 6 March that contacts be continued in this respect and the issue be
taken up again in Madrid. Patience with the Maltese delegation was
rapidly fading in the remaining days until finally, after long and tiring
coffee-break discussions, the Maltese introduced a more conciliatory
new wording (CSCE/BM/79). On 8 March, the conference was able to
announce a consensus on BM/78, including the Maltese amendments.

1.4 ASSESSMENT OF THE BELGRADE RESULTS

While the Belgrade conference was considered by many participants
a “fairly comprehensive failure” in the end, the N+N countries were
among the most disappointed of all. The head of the Austrian delega-
tion, Helmut Liedermann, in his concluding statement summarized
that the final document “unfortunately gives us no detailed informa-
tion of what has happened during our Meeting.” The outcome of the
Belgrade talks, he went on, merely represented the lowest common de-
nominator rather than the highest common factor that the 35 partici-

155 The original Maltese text of 28 February and its amendment of 4 March 1978 are in Renk

156 Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 4 March 1978 (Continuation of
meeting at 1255h after coffee break; Continuation at 1610h; Continuation at 1805h; Con-
tinuation at 2115h).

157 Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 6 March 1978 (1545h).

158 Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Belgrade, Plenary meeting, 7 March 1978 (Continuation of
meeting at 1445h; Continuation at 1612h); Plenary meeting, 8 March 1978 (New proposal
by Malta BM/79; Continuation of meeting at 1150h; Continuation at 1230h, discussion
on BM/78 and BM/79; 1235.42h: Consensus). The Maltese had insisted on including the
issue of security in the Mediterranean experts’ meeting (the only additional expert meeting
agreed on in Belgrade), but in the end settled for discussion of this issue at the next follow-
up meeting in Madrid, and agreed on a purely economic, cultural and scientific agenda for
the Mediterranean expert-level meeting.

parting states had originally sought – a statement that the other Western delegates agreed with.\(^{160}\) The disappointment of the N+N with the concluding document signed on 8 March is also expressed in a statement of the Swiss head of delegation Bindschedler to the press immediately after the conclusion of the plenary meeting, where he said that the conference had been a one-per cent success, but a 99-per cent failure.\(^{161}\) The one per cent success he attributed to the decision to hold another follow-up meeting in Madrid in 1980, whereas the failure was clearly obvious from the fact that none of the more than 100 new proposals brought forward at the conference had been included in the final document. This was also deplored by the Swedish head of delegation, Leif Arvidson, who pointed particularly to the omission of the set of proposals regarding confidence-building measures – the N+N’s overriding aim in the preparation of the Belgrade negotiations.\(^{162}\) Arvidson insisted that the N+N still retained their proposals in mind and stated that he expected this to give new impulses in the future.

The N+N had gone to the follow-up meeting with rather high expectations. At first, it seemed that the greater cohesion among the N+N would indeed lead to an enhanced role between the blocs. However, their ambition not to let the talks in Belgrade become a tribunal was swept away by the new confrontational strategy of the Carter government regarding human rights – personified in the nomination of Judge Goldberg as the new US delegation leader – and by the resulting consequences for the whole atmosphere at the CSCE. Despite their intensified preparation and stronger cohesion within the group during most

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of the Belgrade talks, the N+N in the end had to learn the hard way that their options for shaping the conference and brokering a substantial document were limited when one of the superpowers’ blocked these efforts completely and the other was obviously content to agree to a document that merely repeated the Helsinki Final Act provisions.

Given the degraded state of superpower détente, the aim of further developing the Helsinki provisions in substance was neither shared by the USSR and its allies, nor was it fully supported by the Western camp. According to a British source, unlike in Helsinki, the lack of coherence between the positions of the N+N and those of the NATO states was one of the reasons why the N+N states were unsuccessful both in gaining support for any of their individually or commonly sponsored proposals and in their efforts to provide the basis for a substantial document. As much as the N+N “regretted vociferously” the Danish method of proceeding by negotiating a concluding document between East and West bilaterally over their heads, the N+N states eventually had no other option but to consent to this text in the end in order to safeguard the follow-up meeting. The fact that the N+N had no hand in this final deal was also partly owed to the fact that cohesion within the group was lost in the final weeks of Belgrade over the question how to proceed with their own proposals and because of Malta’s insistence on its special demands on the Mediterranean, which nearly prevented even the achievement of a minimal consensus.

Nevertheless, it is probably true that even if the N+N had had a more consistent common negotiation strategy and achieved greater cohesion with their Western European partners, the chances for an overall compromise would still have been bleak. From New Year 1978 onwards, the USSR simply showed no signs of altering any of its intransigent posi-

163 It is particularly remarkable that, despite differences in ideology, Yugoslavia gave its support to a common N+N position in the 1 February 1978 paper, which clearly reflected Western views on human rights issues. In general, Yugoslavia – in contrast to the Geneva phase of the negotiations – was much more involved in the N+N activities and co-operation during the Belgrade talks, above all because of its role as a host country, which it interpreted very actively.

164 Mr. R.E. Parsons (Budapest) to Dr. D.A.L. Owen, Budapest, 13 March 1978, in The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Appendix III.

165 On the lack of cohesion amongst the Western and N+N states, see also Franz Josef Neuss, “Die dürftige Belgrader Bilanz”, Europäische Rundschau, Nr. 2/1978, 17–22, in particular 19.
tions on the central issues of human contacts, human rights, and CBM, while the US at the same time continued to steer a confrontational course on these questions. Under the prevailing circumstances, there was simply no more room for any substantial compromises. This was not necessarily a specific outcome of the first CSCE follow-up meeting, but rather a reflection of the bigger picture of the state of the Cold War in the late 1970s. In this respect, the Belgrade meeting was first and foremost an indicator of the progressive degeneration of superpower détente and the limited role that the European neutral and non-aligned small states could play under these circumstances in the multilateral negotiations on European security.

Hence, the only real achievement that the N+N could at least claim some credit for was the important decision to continue the Helsinki process. Already during the preparatory conference to the Belgrade meeting, the N+N had made clear that the CSCE follow-up was not only to be precisely defined, but from the very outset was to be conceived as an automatic and self-sustained development over many years, covering an unlimited number of meetings. At that early stage of the Belgrade talks, they had resisted all attempts to play down the importance or the time-perspective of the follow-up process. Even though the periodicity of the follow-up meetings was dropped from the pared-down version of the concluding document of the Belgrade meeting of 8 March 1978, given the difficult state of affairs in world politics, the notion of “further meetings” was considered a success. As Matés writes, during the last days of the Belgrade meeting, the expectations of the N+N countries had reached the lowest ebb, and the mere agreement on an opening date for the next follow-up conference was the source of some satisfaction to them:

T[he N+N] stopped thinking of the Belgrade meeting as a step forward. They were now interested only in saving it as a possible bridge from the sombre present to the

166 The decisive phrase in the Belgrade concluding document reads: “In conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Act and with their resolve to continue the multilateral process initiated by the CSCE, the participating States will hold further meetings among their representatives. The second of these meetings will be held in Madrid commencing Tuesday 11 November 1980.” Concluding Document of the Belgrade Meeting 1977 (8 March 1978). Reprinted in Andrén and Birnbaum (eds.), Belgrade and Beyond, 161ff. as well as in: Mastny, Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 350ff.
hopefully brighter future. It was essential to secure the undisturbed flow of the follow-up process, to secure a meeting in Madrid.¹⁶⁷

These hopes expressed by the N+N reflected their continued belief in the CSCE and were a sign of their determination to work further to advance this process despite their disappointment with the big powers in Belgrade. With the benefit of hindsight, the guarantee of a continuation of the Helsinki process was an even more substantial achievement than most contemporaries probably realized at the time amidst their disappointment with the Belgrade outcome.

2 LIFELINE TO THE HELSINKI PROCESS: THE FOLLOW-UP IN MADRID 1980 – 83

When the preparatory talks for the second follow-up conference in Madrid began on 9 September 1980, the overall situation was by no means better than it had been two years earlier in Belgrade. On the contrary, since 1978, the process of détente between East and West had further degenerated. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Day 1979 was only the most visible sign of this deterioration. After Carter had suspended the ratification of the SALT-II agreement in Congress in the summer of 1980 and plans for a nuclear rearmament of NATO in Europe were made public, US-Soviet relations had reached a virtual nadir. Mutual distrust and a general perception of a renewed Cold War dominated the atmosphere. Given these general circumstances, and with the Belgrade experience in mind, it was clear that the role of the N+N states in Madrid would be mainly restricted to mediating between East and West. At the same time, there were also developments, in particular in the field of regional initiatives for disarmament in Europe, that gave raise to a certain hope that the CSCE could remain an important forum for East-West negotiations. As it turned out, against all odds, the Madrid meeting would become an important bridge from the ruins of superpower détente to a new dialog on security in Europe initiated in the mid-1980s with the advent to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union.

2.1 FROM BELGRADE TO MADRID (1978 – 1980)

Having secured the minimal, but important result of a continuation of the Helsinki Process, the N+N states after the Belgrade meeting analyzed the state of affairs and future options for the CSCE negotiations. At Belgrade, “détente” and “human rights” had been linked for the first time, and in the eyes of Western participants, no further détente in East-West relations was to be achieved without progress in humanitarian questions and the issues of human contacts and information – a
view mostly shared by the N+N.\textsuperscript{168} The question remained whether the USSR and its Eastern allies would be any more willing to compromise on these points in Madrid than they had been at Belgrade, or whether they would be ready, if pressured further on the human rights issues, to abandon the CSCE negotiations altogether, as they had threatened after Belgrade.\textsuperscript{169}

At the same time, French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing had opened up a new discussion in February 1978 on disarmament in Europe, as the Belgrade meeting had revealed an obvious inconsistency between the declared aim of détente and the prevailing superpower relationship. France no longer wanted the topic of disarmament to be left to the UN disarmament committee in Geneva and the MBFR talks in Vienna alone, where the superpowers had the lead, but instead hoped that “discussions [on disarmament] among the CSCE member states would offer a fresh opportunity.”\textsuperscript{170} Under the French proposals, disarmament was to be dealt with more as a regional issue, and more attention was to be given to the reduction of conventional armaments in the future. At the First UN Special Session on Disarmament in May 1978, Giscard d’Estaing officially proposed the convening of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), an initiative of which all CSCE participating states were notified in the same month.\textsuperscript{171} According to the French proposal, the conference was to take a two-step approach: In the first phase, the discussions would concentrate on the enhancement


\textsuperscript{169} According to Yuri Kashlev, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had personally suggested that the Belgrade Meeting be brought to an early end without a concluding document, and there were serious discussions at the ministry in Moscow at the time as to “whether it was worthwhile to pursue the Helsinki process or whether it was more appropriate to consider the Helsinki decisions as a one-time, though essential, success”. Kashlev, “The CSCE in the Soviet Union’s Perspective”, 30.

\textsuperscript{170} French source quoted in Reimaa, Helsinki Catch, 195.

of existing CBMs, while negotiations on the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and forces would be held in a second phase.\footnote{172}{On the context of the French proposal for a general conference on disarmament in Europe, see also: Aurel Braun, “Confidence-Building Measures, Security, and Disarmament”, in Spencer (ed.), \textit{Canada and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe}, 202–27, in particular 215.}

The French disarmament initiative met halfway with Soviet calls for a Conference on Confidence Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe that had been launched in a speech by Brezhnev in Moscow in October 1977. This opened up new prospects for the CSCE, as there was now something on the negotiation table for Madrid that was of high priority to the USSR. The French proposal also created unexpected possibilities to revive previous CBM proposals made by the N+N that had fallen victim to the zero outcome of the Belgrade conference. So far, the N+N states had ignored calls for a European disarmament conference from the Warsaw Pact, as they had come “from the wrong side”. This changed with the new outlook the French disarmament proposal provided. While the N+N countries continued to observe closely the Western course of action with regard to human rights, military aspects of the CSCE talks soon began to dominate the agenda of their preparations for Madrid.

Finland tried to jump on the bandwagon of the French disarmament initiative first with a re-launch of its own idea for a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ). In a speech held on 8 May 1978 in Stockholm, President Kekkonen proposed that a nuclear weapons-free North be extended to include a larger arms control system.\footnote{173}{Reimaa, \textit{Helsinki Catch}, 195 and 198.} While the French CDE proposal did not exclude the idea of nuclear weapons-free zones, this was not the main focus of the project, and neutral and non-aligned discussions soon centered on more promising plans for the reinforcement of CBM.

The first N+N meeting after Belgrade in San Marino from 7 to 9 September 1978 still concentrated on reviewing the results of the first CSCE follow-up conference. While the disappointment over the Belgrade results prevailed, the N+N agreed on the importance of having preserved the Final Act in its entirety as well as on the fact that the CSCE negotiations would continue. When the N+N declared the end
of their post-Belgrade review phase a year later in a group meeting in Vienna, the focus shifted to concrete preparations for Madrid. In view of their marginal ability to influence the course of events with regard to the debate between East and West on human rights, and given their well-established cooperation with commonly drafted proposals on military aspects of security in Geneva and Belgrade, the N+N representatives decided to focus their discussion on the renewed chances of their own CBM ideas in the near future.\textsuperscript{174}

In a next step, Sweden invited its N+N partner states to a further meeting in Stockholm to exchange views on the French idea of a separate two-stage conference on disarmament (CDE I = CBM, CDE II = disarmament).\textsuperscript{175} At the meeting on 2 and 3 October 1979, the Swedes stressed the view that the prospects for new CBM initiatives were much better than in Belgrade, since the Warsaw Pact member states were about to review their hitherto negative stance towards the matter given that discussions on disarmament in Europe were a priority for them. Austria then stated three pre-conditions for agreeing to the disarmament conference: that all 35 CSCE participating states be invited; that the conference be organizationally linked to the CSCE; and that it be carefully prepared. The Swiss concurred with the Austrian views, but stressed their general preference for peaceful settlement efforts over disarmament, since for Switzerland, disarmament could not be the beginning, but only the result of détente; “arbitrage–sécurité–désarmement” was the general order they preferred. Nevertheless, they agreed to work with the other N+N states on a redefinition of CBM parameters.\textsuperscript{176}

As the diplomats discussed the general prospects for a possible CDE, military experts from the N+N countries met in parallel in Stockholm to talk about the specific content of new CBM proposals. They quickly agreed that the substance of the N+N proposal presented at Belgrade in October 1977 (CSCE/BM/6) could essentially still form the basis for a

\textsuperscript{174} Rosin, \textit{Einfluss durch Neutralität}, chapter 8.2.


\textsuperscript{176} Rosin, \textit{Einfluss durch Neutralität}, chapter 8.2.
possible new CBM proposal of the N+N in Madrid.\footnote{In addition to the existing CBM in the Helsinki Final Act, CSCE/BM/6 had called for the announcement of smaller-scale military maneuvers taking place at the same time in a limited geographic area; improvement of the conditions for observers of maneuvers; announcement of larger movements of troops over 25'000 men; and more openness regarding military budgets.} The military experts decided to aim for the threshold for the announcement of military maneuvers to be lowered to 18’000 men, while raising the timeframe for the announcement from 21 to 30 days in advance; parameters for larger naval and air force maneuvers were to be more concretely defined; and a maximum number of participating soldiers was to be fixed at the level of 40 – 50’000 troops.\footnote{Makko, “Das schwedische Interesse an Vertrauensbildenden Massnahmen und Abrüstungsfragen”, 11.}

The preparations among the N+N for Madrid subsequently ran on several tracks, including the highest political and diplomatic levels, CSCE experts, as well as military representatives. Often, representatives first met in a constellation of the four neutrals exclusively to discuss things, then brought in Yugoslavia, and finally met with the rest of the non-aligned states to define a common course of action. This was once again a continuation of the informal arrangement of their cooperation that had been established in the course of the Helsinki, Geneva, and Belgrade negotiations in preceding years.

Finland tried to keep the dialog on the proposals for disarmament in Europe going with an initiative presented on 19 October 1979 in the UN General Assembly in New York, aimed at examining whether a special “European Disarmament Programme” should be outlined.\footnote{Reimaa, Helsinki Catch, 200f. The details of the Finnish disarmament program were first disclosed in a working paper distributed in January 1980: UMA, 7B, ETYK Beograd, 98: Working Paper, Helsinki, 22 January 1980.} In early February 1980, State Secretary of the Finnish Foreign Ministry Matti Tuovinen invited his three neutral colleagues, Albert Weitnauer (Switzerland), Alois Reitbauer (Austria), and Leif Leifland (Sweden) to continue their regular exchange of views on world affairs in early April 1980 in Helsinki. When discussing the agenda for the neutrals’ meeting, Weitnauer and Tuovinen agreed to focus their attention on the implications of the general international situation for security, co-operation, and disarmament questions in Europe, and more specifically on prep-
arations for the CSCE meeting in Madrid.\textsuperscript{180} Leifland and Reitbauer agreed to this agenda and confirmed that they would be accompanied to the meeting scheduled for 1 April 1980 by their CSCE and disarmament specialists Carl Johan Rappe and Carl-Magnus Hyltenius (Sweden), and Franz Ceska (Austria).\textsuperscript{181}

Meanwhile, a further opportunity to discuss general N+N views among CSCE specialists arose on the occasion of the CSCE Scientific Forum taking place between 18 February and 3 March 1980 in Hamburg, Germany.\textsuperscript{182} On the fringes of this expert meeting, CSCE delegates of the four neutral countries together with the Yugoslav representative met separately on 26/27 February to ponder the prospects for Madrid and to discuss new Austrian proposals for the development of CBM.\textsuperscript{183} The diplomats agreed that the meeting in Spain had to be carefully prepared and that the N+N should focus their common ambitions especially on military issues, which would be a main area of discussion, while the balance between the baskets of the Helsinki Final Act absolutely had to be preserved.

As stated above, the fact that the N+N countries shifted the focus of their preparations for Madrid at an early stage to military questions was a direct consequence of the outcome of the Belgrade meeting, at which the fierce ideological debates had made any progress in the field of human contacts/rights impossible. At the same time, one of the lessons that the N+N states learned at Belgrade had been that in order to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} Ibid.: Letter Tuovinen to Weitnauer, Helsinki, 1 February 1980; Letter Weitnauer to Tuovinen, Berne, 14 February 1980.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Ibid.: Letter Leifl and to Tuovinen, Stockholm, 19.2.1980; Telegram Finnish Embassy, Vienna, 25 March 1980.
\item \textsuperscript{182} Among the scarce results achieved in Belgrade was the agreement on continuing the Helsinki process on the official level until the opening of the next full review meeting with three meetings of experts – one on Mediterranean questions in La Valletta (Malta, February-March 1979), another on the peaceful settlement of disputes in Montreux (Switzerland, October-December 1978), and a third, a scientific forum, in Hamburg (Germany, February-March 1980). While the first was specifically designed to satisfy the particular wishes of Malta, the second was mainly “an exercise in verbal gymnastics”, and only the third in Hamburg brought substantial results. Skilling, “The Madrid Follow-Up”, 309f, quote 309. For the reports prepared by these expert meetings on their deliberations to the 2nd CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid, see Volle and Wagner (eds.), \textit{Das Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffen}, 93 – 110.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Ibid.: “Madridin seurantakokouksen valmistelujä käsittelevät keskustelut puolueettomien ja sitoutumattomien ETYK-valtioiden edustajien välillä Hampurissa 26.2. – 27.2.1980”, Klaus Törnudd, 10 March 1980.
\end{itemize}
reach a compromise on an independently launched initiative from their side, it was crucial that both superpowers have a stake in the respective field of negotiations. With the French CDE proposal at hand, this seemed to be the case primarily in the military dossier – a situation that provided a new chance to table their own ideas with regard to a further development of CBMs again.

Hence, in March 1980, Sweden presented further ideas on CBM, which were discussed in the following by the military experts of the four neutral states in a meeting on 19 and 20 March in Berne. While they agreed on the basic aims regarding announcement of maneuvers and exchange of observers, the neutral partners deemed some of the Swedish proposals regarding “movements of troops” too ambitious. In the discussion on the basic framework for a future European disarmament conference, Sweden wanted to make sure that such a conference would take place “under the umbrella” of the CSCE, as France and the Soviet Union had both recently shown tendencies to detach the envisaged CDE from the CSCE. Switzerland agreed with Sweden on the need for a reporting system from the CDE to the CSCE. Austria noted a degree of rapprochement between the positions of the EC-Nine and of the Warsaw Pact states on the question of a CBM conference (“CDE I”) after the CSCE meeting in Madrid, but the second part of the French plan (“CDE II” on disarmament) was still obscure. The neutrals, they believed, should therefore press for a sufficiently accurate mandate for the planned CBM and disarmament conference. The Austrians also raised the issue of where the CDE should take place, while the date for the conference could still be left open. As for the relationship between the CDE to the CSCE, the Austrian military expert advocated an “organic link” between the two with a reporting of the results of CBM/CDE conference to the next full CSCE review meeting after Madrid. At the end of their meeting, the military experts decided to continue their discussions on 14 and 15 April in Vienna, to which they also invited their

186 Sweden obviously considered Stockholm to be a natural choice for the venue, should such a conference eventually take place. Ibid., 10f.
Yugoslav colleague.^{187} The Swiss and the Swedish representatives were given the task of drawing up a summary of the discussions held so far as a basis for this next round of talks.^{188}

At the military expert meeting in Vienna in mid-April 1980, the representatives of the four neutral states and non-aligned Yugoslavia finally sat down to work on a first draft for a commonly sponsored CBM proposal on the basis of the working papers forwarded so far.^{189} While they reached agreement on re-defined parameters regarding prior notification of major military maneuvers, the issue of the area of application yet remained open, and the drafting of an additional text on smaller-scale naval and amphibious landing maneuvers was delegated to a “tripartite committee” of Yugoslavia, Sweden, and Finland (the three riparian states with naval forces of their own).^{190} The ambitions and the speed with which the N+N were now developing their draft proposal for CBM, however, met with open criticism of the military bloc states. At that time, Washington in particular opposed greater activities in the field of CBM as proposed, for example, also by Norway within NATO. As for the USSR, it generally disapproved of the degree of detail the N+N CBM proposals had reached in the meantime.^{191}

At the same time, France had stirred the “CSCE pot” once more in a Council of Europe meeting in spring 1980 by raising the question of postponing the opening of Madrid in light of the rapid worsening of the state of East-West relations after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan over Christmas 1979. Although the French proposal in the end won little support, as “neither East nor West, and certainly not the N+N states,

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189 By April 1980, Yugoslavia too had provided a working paper for a common N+N CBM proposal. Ibid.: “Confidence-Building Measures (Draft proposal of NN countries for Madrid)”, Non-paper Yugoslavia, April 1980.


wished to see an end to the CSCE process” at that time, the N+N were clearly alarmed by this possibility.

When the state secretaries of the four neutral foreign ministries met in Helsinki on 1 April to discuss the overall prospects for Madrid, the French proposal of a postponement was fresh on everybody’s mind: The Austrian representatives stressed the importance of holding the Madrid meeting at the decided time as well as the significance they attached to the first and the last stage of the conference being held at the level of foreign ministers. Vienna believed that this would step up the pressure on the big powers for a successful outcome of the meeting, but did not find much support for the idea. The Swedish interlocutors, on the contrary, seemed to be ready to consider a postponement of the Madrid meeting if a potential failure of the conference endangered the whole CSCE process. The Swiss representative strongly contested this view, as it was precisely such a possible postponement that would entail the risk of ending the CSCE process altogether. It would be extremely difficult to find a new consensus on a new date among all CSCE states once the opening date had been submitted to renegotiations. Therefore, it was in the interest of all neutral states that the meeting should take place as scheduled. The matter of the level of representation at the opening could still be left to the multilateral preparatory talks in the Swiss view. The statements illustrate the slightly different approaches taken by the various neutrals towards the CSCE in general, with the Austrians still being convinced of the Helsinki process as an important vehicle for détente, the Swedes showing a realpolitik attitude, and with the Swiss, who had developed a sincere engagement for the continuation of the negotiations despite all difficulties and shortcomings of the process, somewhere on the halfway line between these two positions.

In the continuation of their meeting, the Austrian CSCE expert Franz Ceska noted that there was no consensus (among East and West) on a postponement, and therefore Madrid should open as scheduled with the preparatory meeting. Only the prevailing atmosphere at the preparatory talks would later decide whether there was prospect for con-


193 The Swiss also reminded the other neutrals of their aim of yet another expert meeting on peaceful settlement after Madrid.
crete achievements at the main meeting. In order to increase the chances of success of their proposals, the N+N were to limit themselves to a number of initiatives, as Sweden had already suggested in the discussions. Apparently, the NATO/EC countries would only present two or three overall proposals in Basket III, not 20 to 30 individually drafted “mini-proposals” as in Belgrade, in order to improve the chances of acceptance. At the same time, the N+N and NATO countries would have to avoid making only “undisputed” proposals just to reach consensus on something. This would marginalize the whole CSCE process. Austria suggested that the N+N states should concentrate on the issues of “energy”, CBM, and “information”, where Switzerland had recently prepared a new proposal. But clearly, CBM would be the most concrete field for a common N+N proposal, as the French CDE proposal seemed to have opened a window of opportunity here.

As a consequence of this appraisal of the situation, the second part of the meeting was entirely dedicated to the question of a disarmament conference. Finland presented its “European Disarmament Programme” with the idea of initiating some kind of structured discussion in Madrid, which was to lead to a decision on whether there was a basis for this program. Sweden thought that the Finnish “European Disarmament Programme” could serve as a tentative agenda for a CDE, and at the same time, the Swedes officially suggested Stockholm as the venue for such a conference when the time was ripe. The Swiss and Austrian representatives were less explicit about their support for the Finnish ideas and stated that the plan first needed to be discussed in their respective capitals back home.

In fact, the other neutrals were probably not too convinced by the Finnish “European Disarmament Programme”, as it clearly went fur-
ther than they had so far expected any N+N initiative in the field to go. The Swedes made friendly noises, but were primarily interested in putting themselves in the front row when it came to choosing the venue for a possible disarmament conference in the near future. After Helsinki, Geneva, and Belgrade – and with MBFR talks so far taking place in Vienna – they likely believed it was about time they got their turn in hosting a part of the European security talks. The organization of stage I of the CDE in Stockholm would be a very suitable topic, as CBM and disarmament initiatives had always been a subject of primary interest in the Swedish CSCE policy so far.

The meeting of the four neutrals in Helsinki was sort of a prelude to the N+N group meeting that took place a little later on invitation of Liechtenstein at the end of April 1980 in Vaduz/Gaflei, which was attended by diplomatic delegations from the four neutral countries as well as from non-aligned Cyprus, San Marino, Yugoslavia, and Liechtenstein (but not Malta). The meeting reuniting the neutrals with their non-aligned partner states returned to discuss more general aspects of the upcoming second CSCE follow-up conference. It mainly confirmed the importance that the N+N states attached to the holding of the Madrid meeting at the set date, even though the international situation had worsened since the end of the Belgrade meeting. As the representatives went through their individual countries’ preparations, it became obvious that they were all keen to make sure that some of the mistakes of Belgrade were not repeated in Madrid. For example, like the Western countries, they wanted the implementation debate to be open, but the structure of the talks should not allow these debates to take up the whole meeting, which could be accomplished by defining a clear time limit for the review at the multilateral preparatory conference. The N+N delegations were definitely concerned that under the prevailing circumstances, it would be difficult to inject new substance into the CSCE, as the Soviet attitude proved ever more reserved towards all new proposals. The Kremlin’s only interest seemed to be the disarmament project, which reinforced the determination of the N+N to come forward with

197 Ibid.: Letter Embassy of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Embassy of Finland in Berne, Invitation to the N+N meeting in Vaduz, 7 February 1980; Final List of Participants, Meeting of Neutral and Non-aligned States, Vaduz/Gaflei, 29–30 April 1980.
a common proposal of their own on CBM for the talks in Madrid. The group meeting ended with a decision to convene once more for a final exchange of views on the eve of the multilateral preparatory meeting in Madrid scheduled to start on 9 September 1980.\textsuperscript{198}

Notwithstanding the criticism the N+N states had received for their “ambitious” CBM proposals from both East and West, the military experts in summer 1980 finalized their draft proposal on CBM for Madrid in a meeting on 17 and 18 June in Belgrade, in which ultimately all the N+N states (besides Yugoslavia also Malta, San Marino, Liechtenstein, and Cyprus) participated. The draft not only proposed the lowering of the threshold for the announcement of major military maneuvers from 25’000 (as in the Helsinki Final Act) to 18’000 troops, and extending the timeframe for the prior notification of such maneuvers from 21 to 30 days, but it also included smaller scale naval exercises involving amphibious forces over 5’000 strong. Only the geographic definition of the area of application for the prior notification of major naval maneuvers remained somewhat vaguely described as “European waters” (leaving the status of the Atlantic in particular open).\textsuperscript{199}

When analyzing the N+N states’ preparations from 1978 until the opening of the Madrid talks in September 1980, a number of things stand out in comparison with their preparations as a group actor before Belgrade. With regard to the injection of new substance into the CSCE talks, one of the “lessons of Belgrade” seems to have been a much more moderate level of expectation for what could be achieved with a common N+N policy at Madrid: Only where and when the military alliances (and the superpowers in particular) opened up the windows for possible consensus did the N+N proposals stand a realistic chance of acceptance. If there was no general will to compromise between the blocs, there was also little or no room for the N+N states to maneuver. Their prepara-


tions in Madrid were therefore overshadowed by the limited likelihood that their proposals would be accepted in the overall atmosphere at the negotiations, rather than the enhanced opportunities they had seen before Belgrade to “actively steer” the course of the meeting if acting as a unified third group actor.

Given their long-standing track record in the specific field of military CBM as well as the realistic perspectives for a serious consideration of the topic in the context of the French disarmament conference initiative in Madrid, the decision of the N+N to focus their ambitions for a common proposal on CBM was certainly a reasonable choice. That the Soviet Union in the field of disarmament would most likely be in the position of a demander at Madrid provided additional leeway for the overall negotiations; this had not been the case at Belgrade. In the end, much still depended on the general approach the US would take with regard to human rights and the anticipated reactions of Moscow to that policy, as progress in Basket I (military aspects) was clearly intertwined with principles and Basket III (human rights, human contacts) for the West. As a result, at the outset of the Madrid conference, the nature of the interests pursued by East and West at the CSCE resembled the balanced situation in Helsinki and Geneva rather than the asymmetrical constellation at Belgrade. At the same time, the overall international circumstances and the state of superpower relations were definitely worse than at the first follow-up meeting.

It is characteristic of that situation that Switzerland in anticipation of Madrid patterned its CSCE policy as closely on that of the US as on that of the members of the N+N group. This was based on a changing understanding of the CSCE in many participating countries, where the European security talks after Belgrade were no longer seen as an expression of détente, but primarily as a forum of US ideological warfare with the East and as an indicator of the state of East-West relations in general. The Swiss outlook on the Madrid meeting therefore remained


rather skeptical, and an internal report of January 1980 stated that “one had to be content if Madrid produced yet another Belgrade”. In Austria, and to a lesser degree also in Sweden and Finland, the governments was more critical of Washington’s CSCE policy and together with a minority of Western European states including France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway and Denmark hoped to turn the CSCE Madrid meeting into a “motor for East-West-détente” again. In the view of these states, it was absolutely paramount for Madrid to achieve more substantial results in its concluding document than the mere survival of the CSCE without any dynamic development: “Another Belgrade” had to be avoided, they believed, as this would only amount to a further weakening of the CSCE. While the necessity of greater cohesion among Western states, including the N+N, seemed to be key for the achievement of this goal, prevailing differences in outlook on the meaning of the CSCE in the early 1980s persisted between Switzerland and some of its partner states in the N+N (“barometer of East-West relations” vs. “motor of détente”). As will be seen, these differences were to become a bone of contention within the group over the negotiation strategy at various points in the Madrid main meeting.

With regard to the structure of the group’s cooperation, the N+N preparations for Madrid illustrate the persistently “hierarchical” character of this collaboration as established in previous CSCE negotiations— with the four neutrals building the core of the group and Yugoslavia as the most important non-aligned contributor to the discussions. The rest of the non-aligned CSCE participants were only invited to join in at the later stages, when first exchanges of views had been held and new draft proposals had been scrutinized in the “inner circle” of the five leading states. At the same time, a certain ad-hoc quality as well as a clear distinction between the “exclusively neutral” and the “N+N” group remained a defining feature of this cooperation.

With regard to other external factors connected to the state of superpower relations that influenced the preparations of the N+N for Madrid,

201 Report quoted in Rosin, Einfluss durch Neutralität, chapter 8.3.
203 See Fischer, Neutral Power, 344ff.
it was particularly on the non-governmental level that new actors took to the stage in this period. On the one hand, NATO’s double-track decision of December 1979 to deploy over 500 Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles in five West European countries as a measure to counter the Soviet Union’s deployment of SS-20 missiles in its western area had triggered much public debate all over the continent. Citizens’ movements became active both to prevent a new round of the arms race and to freeze the current levels of armaments. On the other hand, after the Belgrade meeting, human rights NGOs had begun to intensify the surveillance of the Helsinki Final Act provisions in Eastern Europe. Helsinki monitor groups in the Communist world in the pre-conference stages of the Madrid meeting began to link up with Western human rights advocates in a movement leading to the foundation of an international Helsinki association, later the International Helsinki Federation (IHF, formally established in 1982). Moscow and its allies partly reacted to this development by arresting, exiling, and imprisoning activists in their countries, thereby severely depleting the Eastern monitor groups in strength and number, but as the exchange of information between national Helsinki association members and foreign ministries in the Western countries intensified, the monitor groups in East and West proliferated and developed extensive networks of supporters. In joining forces, they actively tried to influence CSCE delegates in Madrid to adopt their agendas, a development that was also to be observed in the neutral states. Under these circumstances, parliamentarians and members of government in the neutral states took a much more vested, and also more critical, interest in their national delegations’ preparations for the Madrid meeting.


206 Edouard Brunner, the head of the Swiss CSCE delegation at the time, gives an example in his memoirs of this “new opposition” in government and parliament in the case of Switzerland, recounting how he was sent by Foreign Minister Pierre Aubert to talk to his Federal Councillor colleague Fritz Honegger, who headed the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and to members of the parliamentarian Foreign Affairs Committee to defend Switzerland’s participation in the Madrid meeting. Edouard Brunner, Lambris dorés et coulisses: Souvenirs d’un diplomate (Genève/Paris: Georg, 2001), 56f.
2.2 PROVIDING A WAY OUT OF THE LIMBO OF THE PREPARATORY MEETING (9 SEPTEMBER – 11 NOVEMBER 1980)

Shortly before the opening of the Madrid preparatory meeting in September 1980, the debates on international standards of human rights and Soviet misbehavior were fuelled once more with the summer Olympics taking place in Moscow between 19 July and 3 August 1980. On the one hand, just before the games, the Soviet regime had once more arrested a number of dissidents and allegedly evacuated one million people from the city for “security reasons” to make sure that the event took place in “undisturbed circumstances”. The US government, on the other hand, as part of the flurry of reactions to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, had not only suspended ratification of SALT-II in Congress, imposed a grain embargo, and recalled its ambassador from Moscow, but had also decided to boycott the 1980 summer Olympics, in order not to let the games become a propaganda success for global Socialism.

In addition, everybody was curious to see how Spain as a country in transition to democracy after years of autocratic rule, would perform as host to the upcoming CSCE meeting.207 When the multilateral preparatory talks for the second CSCE follow-up conference finally began on 9 September 1980 at the Palacio de Congressos in Madrid, the West – as anticipated by the N+N – again demanded a broad debate on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act (notably to criticize the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the disrespect for human rights standards in Eastern Europe). Against the backdrop of the latest international events, the Soviet delegation at the Madrid preparatory meeting in September/October 1980 wanted to keep the review of implementation debate as short as possible, and declared that it had no interest at all in the main meeting taking place under constant accusations. It openly threatened to walk out of the talks if the preparatory meeting did not ensure this discussion was limited to an absolute minimum. A total failure of the Madrid follow-up meeting therefore seemed imminent before it had even started, although most delegations realized that Soviet threats were...
primarily a ploy with which the East tried to get the Western countries to give in to their demands regarding agenda and timetable.

However, during the Madrid preparatory talks, the unfolding events in Poland seriously threatened to topple the whole of the conference. Over the previous few months, the trade union “Solidarity” had assumed the role of a broad political opposition movement in the Eastern European country, and there were fears in Moscow as well as in other satellite states that the “Solidarność virus” would spread to the rest of the Socialist world. Many Western delegations observed the increasing degree of Soviet intervention in Poland with great concern, and there was widespread fear that this would jeopardize the Madrid meeting, and with it the entire Helsinki process. At that particular time, it was no longer certain whether the demonstrated disinterest by the Soviets in holding the main meeting was just a bluff. Still, in the end Western and N+N delegations came to the conclusion that the Eastern delegations had, in fact, just as much interest in continuing the CSCE follow-up process despite the situation in Poland, and with their intransigent position were simply trying to get the upper hand again in the negotiation process. But this still left the problem of finding a way out of the impasse the preparatory meeting had maneuvered itself into. The longer the Soviets continued with their obstruction tactics, the more the talks would become bogged down. At this moment, the N+N came into play for the first time as decisive bridge-builders in Madrid: As the Swiss delegate Petar Troendle reported from the final days of the preparatory meeting in early November 1980, “as usual in such CSCE situations all eyes would turn to the neutrals” to find a way out of the stalemate, and “the Soviet delegation treated us separately and the US and other Western States claimed to be in dire need of an initiative from the neutrals to at least unblock the preparatory meeting.”

208 Skilling, “The Madrid Follow-Up”, 308f. The situation grew particularly tense in the final week of the preparatory conference (ibid., 312): “During the week of 5 to 10 November the fate of the conference, and indeed of détente in general, seemed to hang in the balance as the crisis at Madrid reached a high point at the same time as events in Poland reached a crisis over recognition of the legal status of the Solidarity independent trade union.”

209 Cf. Sizoo and Jurrjens, CSCE Decision-Making, 194 and 221.

The N+N were not unprepared for the situation. Already at their final coordination meeting on the eve of the opening of the preparatory talks at the Finnish delegation’s quarters in early September 1980, the likely role as facilitators of compromise and bridge-builders had been highlighted. In a subsequent meeting between the four neutrals later the same day, the Austrians had disclosed a draft document prepared for the preparatory talks similar to the N+N proposals in Belgrade for the timetable and agenda questions. While it remained to be established at the beginning of the preparatory meeting to what extent the blocs were in favor of such mediating activities, the neutrals already then discussed the possibility of making the Austrian draft the basis of a common N+N proposal for a working program for the main meeting.\footnote{UMA, 7B, ETYK Beograd, 98: “ETYK; seurantakokouksen valmistelu”, 9 September 1980.}

When the Soviets at the opening of the preparatory talks questioned the “Yellow Book” – the Belgrade Final Document – as a basis for the procedural rules for the Madrid conference altogether, however, the N+N decided not to launch their initiative. Instead, Liechtenstein with the silent blessing of the other group members presented a proposal for a new working agenda for the preparatory meeting. Spain as the host of the meeting tried to reinvigorate the debate in mid-September with a first proposal for a concluding document of the preparatory meeting, but when the Czechoslovak delegation presented the official Eastern proposal to limit the implementation debate at the main meeting to two weeks, the conference immediately reached a deadlock.\footnote{Both proposals are to be found in Renk Papers: CSCE Folder Madrid M 1, Proposal Submitted by the Delegation of Spain (CSCE/RM-P/2), Madrid, 16 September 1980; Proposal Submitted by the Delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Concerning the Organizational Structure of the Madrid Meeting 1980 (CSCE/RM-P/7/Rev.1), Madrid, 25 September 1980.}

The discussions were now entirely dominated by the bloc powers, with the Eastern European delegations refusing to begin serious negotiations on the problems concerning the agenda and timetable for the main meeting well into October.\footnote{Cf. Renk Papers: CSCE Notes Madrid, Plenary, 10, 13, and 15 October 1980; see also the GDR “proposal” for a working program: Vorschlag der Delegation der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Arbeitsprogramm (CSCE/RM-P/9), Madrid, 10 October 1980.} For tactical reasons, the N+N had decided not to come forward with any mediatory proposals at an early stage, as a
premature initiative could easily waste its effect in the fierce dispute between East and West as long as the two sides had not shown clear signs of a will to compromise.\textsuperscript{214}

In early October, Switzerland on behalf of the four neutrals had first entered the discussion with a catalog of 13 questions regarding the procedural arrangements for the main meeting, which in fact all boiled down to the single central question of how long the discussion on implementation should last.\textsuperscript{215} However, the initiative led nowhere, and neither did an individual attempt by the Swiss head of delegation Edouard Brunner to generate rapprochement between positions at that point by proposing a transitional phase before Christmas during which the conference would deal with aspects of implementation \textit{as well as} with new proposals. In the last week of October, the four neutrals finally began a chain of unofficial bilateral discussions in order to clarify views about the remaining differences concerning the positions presented so far.\textsuperscript{216}

When the time for submission of a compromise formula from the neutrals’ side ultimately arrived in early November, the Swiss delegate Brunner had already left Madrid to demonstrate his displeasure with the Eastern bloc’s stalling tactics and ordered his delegation from Berne to stay firmly in line with the West on the issue of the implementation debate. Against the backdrop of the election of Republican Ronald Reagan on 4 November 1980 as the new president of the United States, the Swiss Foreign Ministry even considered provoking a postponement of the Madrid meeting altogether.\textsuperscript{217} Given this position, a common initiative of the N+N was impossible at first.\textsuperscript{218} Finally, Sweden on 8 November declared its readiness to present an individually sponsored informal paper to help move the discussion in Madrid out of the deadlock

\textsuperscript{214} The list of 13 questions is in Renk Papers: CSCE Folder Madrid M 1, “Questions”, 2 October 1980.

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid.: Telegram from the Swiss CSCE delegation in Madrid to Berne, 3 October 1980.


\textsuperscript{217} Rosin, \textit{Einfluss durch Neutralität}, chapter 8.3.

\textsuperscript{218} On differing opinions between the neutral states regarding the negotiation tactics at the preparatory conference see Ambassador Ceska’s statement in panel 4 of “The Historical Experience of the Neutral and Non-Aligned States in the CSCE”, Oral History Workshop, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Vienna, Austria, 22/23 February 2007, Summary Notes Day 2, 26.
– after the other neutral delegations (including Switzerland!) had stated their basic support for the initiative. Switzerland in the end agreed to the Swedish proposal on the condition that important Western partners, in particular London, signalled their support for it as well. 219 With the Swiss head of delegation absent from Madrid, his deputy Petar Troendle now played an important role as go-between in the ensuing negotiations behind the scenes, as Eastern and Western delegates still refused to enter into direct contacts. 220 However, despite the intense activities by a number of delegations trying to build a consensus on the Swedish proposal, no solution was found until 10 November, the day before the official date for the opening of the Madrid review meeting. Only the procedural loophole of stopping the clock on this final day of the preparatory talks a few minutes before midnight prevented the second follow-up meeting from a premature break-up and gave the delegates some virtual extra time to establish a working program for the conference. 221

During the night of 10 to 11 November 1980, the Austrian delegation circulated a new compromise text on the agenda and timetable, 222 and the Spanish foreign minister together with the US, Luxemburg, Netherlands, and Soviet delegations explored every possibility of agreement. However, the Soviet head of delegation Yuri Dubinin repeatedly recalled previously made concessions in the course of this process, so that the head of the US delegation told the press on 11 November that prospects for a conference were bleak. In the end, the Western delegations did not allow this scenario to go on forever, and on the evening of 11 November decided to abandon the fiction of the stopped clock to allow the Spanish government the opportunity of opening the main meeting on the date that had officially been set two years ago. According to the academic observers Sizoo and Jurrjens, the NATO countries were now willing to “call the bluff”. 223

219 Fischer, *Die Grenzen der Neutralität*, 292f.
222 Ibid., 454.
While the foreign ministers of the participating states, who had been invited by the Spanish hosts officially to open the talks of the second CSCE follow-up meeting, had to do so without any pre-defined agenda, the conference still desperately needed a way out of the impasse. Spanish Foreign Minister José Pedro Pérez-Llorca opened the Madrid meeting 20 minutes before midnight on 11 November and announced that at 12 p.m., a working group under Spanish chairmanship including the Soviet Union, the US, Norway, West and East Germany, and neutral Switzerland and Austria would start to push forward discussions on the agenda for the meeting and that the next plenary session would begin at 11 a.m. the following day.\(^{224}\)

Meanwhile, numerous informal negotiations on a possible compromise had taken place between official sessions. The NATO and Warsaw Pact caucuses “had settled down in a separate part of the congress building and had sent out ‘messengers’, making use of the Swiss delegate [Troendle] as go-between”, who in turn had acted as a link to the group of N+N states.\(^{225}\) Building on these services, the Swiss head of delegation Edouard Brunner, who had by now returned to Madrid, and his Austrian counterpart Franz Ceska decided in an N+N group meeting in the afternoon of 12 November to force the two blocs to accept a compromise stipulated by the N+N. By 13 November, East and West had come relatively close to agreement in the working group but still demanded certain omissions and amendments. While the Western wishes were finally included in a slightly alleviated form, the Eastern demands were consciously ignored when the N+N presented their ultimate proposal for an agenda to the conference that same day.\(^{226}\)

To highlight the dramatic situation, Brunner and Ceska decided that their compromise paper should be explained to the public by the foreign ministers of the N+N countries present in Madrid in a press con-

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224 Ibid., 196f.
225 Ibid., 196.
ference as a “last offer” to both sides.\textsuperscript{227} If this take-it-or-leave-it-option were not agreed upon, the conference would have to be postponed for another year. After three days of lingering, this diplomatic maneuver by the N+N worked according to plan, to everybody’s relief. On 14 November, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilichev, who had replaced Dubinin as the head of delegation for the Madrid main meeting, accepted the propositions in the N+N paper, and the talks in Madrid finally got underway.\textsuperscript{228}

In the end, the Soviet negotiating strategy at the preparatory meeting had not paid off. According to a close observer, it was not easy to explain the intransigence of the Soviet delegation during the preparatory session or its about-face at the last minute, which made the opening of the conference possible:

The initial hard line may have been a result of the crisis in Poland and the desire of Moscow to keep a free hand for any action it deemed necessary. The temporary hiatus in the Polish crisis was followed within a few days by the compromise settlement in Madrid. Brezhnev had invested his personal prestige in the CSCE from the beginning and the Soviet government was probably reluctant to terminate the process by blocking the Madrid meeting. Nor did they wish to foreclose a businesslike relationship with a new United States administration. They anticipated economic and technological benefits from Basket II and, above all, desired a

\textsuperscript{227} The four N+N foreign ministers present in Madrid were those of Austria, Sweden, Yugoslavia, and Cyprus, whereas four other members of the group (Switzerland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Malta), which were not represented on this level, would give the paper its full official support. Finland abstained from the initiative, because the Finnish foreign ministry considered the proposed commitments to the follow-up after Madrid to be too weak in the document. See statement of the Finnish head of delegation Markku Reimaa on panel 3 of “The Historical Experience of the Neutral and Non-Aligned States in the CSCE”, Vienna Oral History Workshop, Summary Notes Day 2, 17.

security conference, and hence were willing to pay the price of accepting criticism of their behaviour under Baskets I and III.²²⁹

According to the compromise brokered by the N+N states, which was officially registered as CSCE/RM/2, the debate on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act provisions was to be limited to the six weeks before the Christmas break, whereas the rest of the time was to be dedicated to the discussion of new proposals. More precisely, the implementation debate was to last until 19 December and was to be followed by the examination of new proposals after the New Year until 11 February. New proposals could already be made in the final weeks of the implementation debate (as Brunner had earlier proposed), allowing the delegations to study them over the Christmas break, which would last until 27 January. The subsequent redaction of a final document should take no longer than until 5 March 1981, but the date of conclusion of the conference was deliberately left open in the N+N proposal to make sure the follow-up to Madrid was not endangered by a closure without a final document.²³⁰

2.3 ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE A FINAL DOCUMENT – TAKE 1 (THE INFORMAL N+N NON-PAPER OF 31 MARCH 1981)

As expected, the review of implementation debate in the first six weeks of the Madrid meeting turned out to be much harder than the one in Belgrade. The Western caucus had closed ranks in preparation for Madrid and sharply attacked the Eastern alliance members and its leading power the Soviet Union for non-compliance with the Helsinki Final Act provisions. The replacement of Judge Goldberg by Max Kampelman as the head of the US delegation after Belgrade had been successful in bringing about a re-unified NATO position in Madrid. In particular, he convinced his West European partners to continue the US strategy

²²⁹ Skilling, “The Madrid Follow-Up”, 316f. It is still difficult to get an informed first-hand source on the Soviet side of these events. For a glimpse of the general discussions held in Moscow after Belgrade on whether to continue the CSCE, see Kashlev, “The CSCE in the Soviet Union’s Perspective”, 30.

of “naming names” on questions regarding human rights, i.e., citing specific cases of human rights abuses.\(^{231}\) The Washington lawyer Max M. Kampelman had originally been co-appointed as the US delegation leader together with Griffin B. Bell, a former attorney general and old Georgia friend of the outgoing president, Jimmy Carter. The incoming conservative Reagan administration did not keep up the nomination of the co-chairmanship for the CSCE delegation, but to the surprise of many stuck to Kampelman – a Democrat Party member – as head of delegation for Madrid. Kampelman was active in the Jewish community on the domestic scene and was known to be a stern critic of the Soviet Union, which presumably earned him Reagan’s trust to continue his mandate at the CSCE.\(^{232}\)

Kampelman’s Soviet counterpart at the Madrid main meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilichev, was fairly advanced in age and had little experience in CSCE matters. He had mainly earned a reputation in the Kremlin nomenclature as Khrushchev’s head of propaganda and as a negotiator with China on a bilateral level in previous decades. However, the delegation also included Deputy Minister Alexei Kovalev and Soviet Ambassador to Madrid Yuri Dubinin, two long-standing CSCE veterans from the Helsinki, Geneva, and Belgrade negotiations. The man known to be the broker of delicate matters in the Soviet delegation was still KGB representative General Sergei Kondrashev, another veteran of previous CSCE meetings.\(^{233}\)

In the N+N group, the “young generation” of the original CSCE negotiations – first and foremost represented by the Swiss Edouard Brunner and the Austrian Franz Ceska, who both had in the meantime become their countries’ heads of delegation – had definitely taken charge of leading the group’s policy in Madrid. They were joined by the Yugoslav delegation leader Ljubivoje Aćimović, another Helsinki pioneer and an experienced CSCE negotiator. With the exception of Ambassador Richard Müller, who headed the Finnish delegation, Helsinki had


\(^{233}\) Reimaa, *Helsinki Catch*, 208f.
also nominated a number of diplomats to Madrid with a long-standing CSCE track record. In contrast, Carl Johan von Rappe, the head of the Swedish delegation, previously the first ambassador of his country to East Berlin in the 1970s, and his deputy Carl-Magnus Hyltenius, a specialist on Swedish disarmament policy, had little CSCE experience before they came to Madrid.

The N+N states in the general debate at Madrid mainly sided with the West in their accusation of Soviet policy, while Moscow could only count on the unconditional support of a very limited number of allies – namely the GDR and CSSR. Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria in their opening statements had openly criticized the Eastern countries for their disrespect of fundamental Helsinki principles, but as in Belgrade refrained from putting the blame on individual countries by “naming names”. Due to its sensitive geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, Finland gave a more cautious opening statement. Despite the harsh treatment they received, Eastern delegates spoke of a “more businesslike and less aggressive implementation debate than in Belgrade”, which was read by Western delegates as a sign of the Warsaw Pact’s interests in a substantial outcome of the conference – in particular, in a mandate for a disarmament conference.

When the conference proceeded from the review to the tabling of new proposal in the final weeks before the Christmas break, Austria, Spain, and Switzerland on 1 December 1980 submitted their commonly sponsored initiative on “information” (CSCE/RM/3), and Austria fol-
ollowed up with its individually drafted proposal on “energy” (CSCE/RM/4). More important for the overall conference, though, were the proposals on “Convening a conference on Military Détente and Disarmament in Europe” (CSCE/RM/6) submitted by Poland on 8 December and on “Security in Europe” (CSCE/RM/7) by France the following day, which proposed the start of CBM/disarmament talks within the CSCE framework. For the Madrid conference, France had refined its CDE proposal, including an expanded area of application for confidence- and security-building measures to cover all of Europe, with a higher military significance. In the same field, the N+N on 12 December 1980 registered their commonly prepared and sponsored proposal on “Confidence-Building Measures” (CSCE/RM/21). In addition, independently drafted initiatives by Yugoslavia for a “Conference on Disarmament in Europe” (CSCE/RM/27, 12 December 1980), Romania for a “Conference on Confidence-Building and Disarmament in Europe” (CSCE/RM/31, 15 December 1980), and Sweden on “Questions Relating to Disarmament” (CSCE/RM/34, 15 December 1980) were entered in the same topical field on the list of proposals. The US and its allies, meanwhile, had presented their major proposal on “Human Contacts” on 10 December (CSCE/RM/11). All in all, by the time of the pre-defined Christmas break, some 85 proposals had been submitted to the conference through the plenary and its special working bodies.

While relations between East and West were already strained during the initial weeks of the debate in Madrid due to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the situation turned from bad to worse over Christmas 1980, as the crisis in Poland began to take center stage again. By January, the Reagan administration had taken office, and the frontlines between East and West became ever more inflexible in the CSCE discussions. Not a single day would pass without the Afghanistan and Poland issues being mentioned when the talks re-opened in Madrid on 27 Jan-

uary 1981. Human rights remained at the forefront of a confrontational US CSCE policy, but irreconcilable opinions also obstructed any progress with regard to the debated issue of a CBM/disarmament (CDE) conference for Europe.

After Christmas, the US head of delegation, Max Kampelman, officially welcomed France’s CDE proposal. However, with regard to new confidence-building measures, Kampelman stated the importance of their “credible military significance” and effective verifiability. In place of the hitherto voluntary actions, future CBMs would have to be carried out under “strong political obligations”. In response, France suggested that the conference on confidence-building measures after Madrid should develop further ways to increase European stability with new inspection and monitoring systems in an area of application “from the Atlantic to the Ural”. Further measures in arms control would be examined only after the effectiveness of these new confidence-building measures had been assessed. In a speech on 16 February, Kampelman announced that on this basis, the new President Ronald Reagan, and therefore the US delegation, fully supported France’s disarmament proposal.²⁴¹ Not only did the French calls obviously carry the necessary political weight – in contrast to previous N+N CBM initiatives in the field – to make the US enter into talks about the subject, but the Carter administration had always been more hesitant about CDE proposals, in part because it did not want to isolate security elements of the CSCE from human rights.²⁴²

The Soviets first officially reacted with a surprise offer made outside the Madrid negotiations by President Brezhnev in a speech to the 26th Congress of the CPSU on 23 February that Moscow would be prepared to expand the area of application of confidence- and security-building measures to cover the whole of the European part of the Soviet Union (previously only a 250-kilometer zone from the border into the territory of the USSR), provided that the West agreed to a similar corresponding concession. However, the US refused to consider expanding the geographic area of CBM applicability to cover the Atlantic Ocean, and the situation remained deadlocked. In consequence, the originally

²⁴² Snyder, “The CSCE and the Atlantic alliance”, 66 (fn. 25).
ensimaged date for a conclusion of the Madrid conference on 5 March 1981 remained far out of reach.243

True to his government’s fundamental belief in the CSCE as an important driver of détente,244 it was now Austrian Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr who tried to unblock the situation in Madrid with a personal initiative. On 24 February 1981, Pahr invited the governments of Sweden, Yugoslavia, and Switzerland to consider a common initiative of the N+N countries to save the conference from failure.245 CBM and the project of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe, his argument went, were a matter of common interest to all their states, and without further progress on the central issue of disarmament, the USSR would never be ready to compromise on human rights issues and the free flow of information as demanded by the West. While the Swedish and Yugoslav ambassadors to Vienna concurred with Pahr’s view, Swiss Ambassador Jürg Iselin took a more skeptical stance. The rather negative attitude of the Swiss Foreign Ministry resulted from the conviction that first the Soviets had to re-establish trust by complying with the (human rights) standards of the Helsinki Final Act. Only then should the other delegations consider give-and-take in the talks on a Conference on Disarmament. As the head of the Swiss CSCE delegation Brunner stressed in an internal dispatch, this did not signify a general unwillingness of the Swiss delegation to work out compromises, but at that stage, a Conference on Disarmament in Europe would simply lead nowhere.246

Despite these differing views, the Swiss ambassador in talks with Pahr in Vienna declared his country’s readiness to participate in a meeting of the four foreign ministers of Sweden, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Switzerland in March to further discuss the issue of mediating between East and West in Madrid. Swiss Foreign Minister Pierre Aubert, Iselin stated, had already taken on other obligations for the proposed date of

243 Ibid., 213f; Sizoo and Jurjens, CSCE Decision-Making, 230f.
14 and 15 March, however, and would therefore be replaced by Ambassador Brunner in the talks.²⁴⁷ In the end, Finland was also invited to the meeting in Vienna, where it was represented (like Switzerland) by the head of the country’s CSCE delegation. In the meeting on 14 March, the Austrian foreign minister again canvassed his initiative to “immediately” start work on a substantial non-paper for a concluding document in order to be able to table it in Madrid before Easter – provided, of course, that East and West would not have found a way out of the deadlock themselves by that time.²⁴⁸ To give it the necessary weight, he proposed that the presentation of the paper in Madrid be made on the level of N+N foreign ministers. Pahr’s Swedish counterpart, Ola Ullsten, supported the Austrian idea, but the Finns stated that it was still hard for them to understand the Austrian-Swedish tactics, taking into account the mistakes the N+N countries had made in Belgrade by proposing their own non-paper too early. The Finnish side was all the more irritated as the Austrian initiative had not been pre-consulted in Helsinki.²⁴⁹ In the end, however, the differences between the five N+N states on how to proceed in Madrid were overcome in this gathering outside Madrid, and a common strategy was envisaged to bring the conference forward with a new proposal by the N+N.²⁵⁰

On the basis of the sources available for this study, it is not entirely clear why Finland had originally not been invited to the meeting in Vienna by the Austrian foreign minister. Parallel evolving talks among the N+N delegations in Madrid on the question of a possible initiative²⁵¹ suggest, however, that it was due to the distinctive Finnish rejection of


²⁵⁰ Cf. Fischer, Die Grenzen der Neutralität, 297f. According to Edouard Brunner, initial Swiss resistance to a common N+N initiative at that time was mainly due to the opposition from the Swiss defense ministry against the project of a disarmament conference, which would endanger the Swiss concept of armed neutrality. This resistance was assuaged once it had been made clear that the envisaged CDE was to deal primarily with CBM and only to a lesser degree with proper disarmament. Interview with Edouard Brunner, Berne, 15 January 2003.

²⁵¹ Gilde seems not always to distinguish sufficiently between the different levels of negotiations, cf. Gilde, Neutraler Vermittler oder missionarische Absichten?, 427f.
any premature steps from the neutral’s side: On 9 March, the Austrian head of delegation Franz Ceska had invited all his N+N colleagues in Madrid to a group meeting to consult whether they should actively begin to make draft texts for each of the baskets. The Austrian delegate stressed that if the N+N postponed drafting and presenting texts, the Madrid meeting would last for many weeks longer without results. Along the same lines as his foreign minister in the meeting in Vienna, Ceska therefore proposed that the N+N should start to draft their own paper immediately. The Swedish and Swiss heads of delegation, Carl Johan Rappe and Edouard Brunner, supported the Austrian view, while Cyprus, Malta, and Yugoslavia – without in principle opposing the Austrian proposal – said that it would be useful to wait with the initiative “until the great powers had revealed their cards”. Malta explicitly recalled the mistake made in Belgrade with the inappropriate timing of the N+N paper. A pronounced objection to the Austrian proposition was raised by the Finnish head of delegation Richard Müller: He warned the others about excessive eagerness on the part of the N+N group to prepare its own papers, because it was likely not to be able to keep these preparations secret from the other conference participants. If information about the N+N draft spread, it would only make the situation more difficult. He also warned of repeating the mistakes made in Belgrade, where the N+N – in the Finnish view – had presented their non-paper too early. In the end, however, the Austrian proposal won the day and the head of delegations agreed that a basket-based coordination in drafting the texts was needed next.

Given these initial discussions, it is not surprising that the N+N still had to overcome considerable differences in the ensuing drafting of a common paper during March 1981. While they agreed to table a “balanced” paper, opinions differed on what the obvious Soviet interest in a mandate for a conference on confidence-building and disarmament in Europe meant for their overall approach. While Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland concurred in the view that this should be used to squeeze the Soviet Union for as many concessions to the West as possible in par-

253 Ibid.
ticular in Basket III, Finland disapproved of a provocative approach and would have favoured to split the document in several individual papers on the different baskets so as not to have to subscribe to the pro-Western parts in the Basket III draft. It is remarkable, on the one hand, that Yugoslavia, contrary to Finland, tacitly went along with the maximalist positions in this particular question. On the other hand, differences of opinion also surfaced between Austria and Switzerland on the possibility of a short document in the Belgrade style. While the Swiss head of delegation Brunner still saw this as an alternative last resort to save the continuation of the Helsinki process, his Austrian colleague Ceska thought that this would “accentuate dangerous East-West tensions and compromise the CSCE as the only available forum for talks”. A solution as in Belgrade could only be found once, and Ceska feared a total breakdown of the entire CSCE process.\textsuperscript{254}

Despite all internal differences, the N+N – without Malta, which abstained from supporting the initiative – were able to present a first \textit{informal non-paper} as a basis for the closure of the conference on 31 March 1981.\textsuperscript{255} The paper summed up the points that had already found consensus among the participating states and ignored all proposals known to be strictly resisted by either East or West. The idea was that it would then be possible, after the three-week Easter break, to form five informal contact groups, each coordinated by a member of the N+N, to continue negotiations on the outstanding issues, which were: Amendment of the catalog of principles (Finland), disarmament and CBM (Sweden), economic relations (Yugoslavia), follow-up and preamble (Switzerland), and human contacts (Austria).\textsuperscript{256}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{255} Renk Papers: CSCE Folder Madrid M 1, Informal Proposal Submitted by the Delegations of Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, Draft Concluding Document, Madrid, 31 March 1981. According to Zielinski, the main work in preparing the document had been done by Austria and Sweden, which seems plausible in light of their declared interest in a substantial final result of the conference. Zielinski, \textit{Die neutralen und blockfreien Staaten und ihre Rolle im KSZE-Prozess}, 253.
\textsuperscript{256} Fischer, \textit{Die Grenzen der Neutralität}, 297ff.
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While the N+N countries had been working towards drafting an integral, substantive concluding document in order to see whether differences of opinion between East and West could be accommodated in that way, a parallel development had set in during March 1981, where plans were emerging among both N+N and EC delegations to try for an early adjournment of the conference for a considerable period without agreement on a substantive concluding document. Another plan among EC delegations even foresaw to adjourn the conference for one to two years if a deadline set for closure by mid-June had been missed. Both alternative plans clearly entailed the risk of a disruption of the CSCE talks.  

2.4 SUMMER BREAK 1981 AND NEUTRAL BRIDGE-BUILDING (PART I)

An unexpected about-face took place after the Easter break 1981, however, which saw the Soviet Union all of a sudden pressing for an early closure of the conference with a substantial document; at the same time, in view of tensions in and around Poland, the foreign ministers of the EC countries had decided in a meeting on 10 May not to leave Madrid for the present – contrary to tendencies shown before Easter. The change in the Eastern position was attributed to the sudden urgency to achieve a breakthrough on the Soviet Union’s objective of a European conference on military détente and disarmament as part of Brezhnev’s bigger Peace Program. This change of the situation seemed to provide the window of opportunity to break the deadlock in Madrid on the basis of the N+N paper, but the conference was soon to fall into another lull in the summer of 1981. Again negotiations stalled over questions of the implementation of human rights standards and the free flow of information, CBM parameters, and the CSCE disarmament conference. Consensus between East and West had been reached on the model of a two-stage conference dealing with CBM in stage I and arms limitation and disarmament proper in stage II, but as the USSR insisted on reciprocal concessions in the geographic expansion of the area of CBM application (“from the Atlantic to the Ural”), a solution could not be


258 Ibid., 233.
reached, as NATO feared a general surveillance of its fleet in the Atlantic under these conditions.

In July, Swiss delegate Brunner reported from Madrid that both sides now wished for a longer break of the conference – until November of that year – to explore new compromises and had asked the N+N to introduce a proposal for adjournment accordingly. At first, the Austrian delegation resisted such an initiative, since it still believed in the possibility of finding a solution for the current blockade of the talks, but Brunner denounced any further initiative from the N+N at that point in time as a “non-starter”. In fact, Austrian Foreign Minister Pahr had again stipulated a meeting of the neutrals’ foreign ministers for late June/early July to consider yet another initiative, and his delegation circulated a draft for a common N+N declaration on the state of the international situation and CSCE prospects. The meeting never took place, however – officially because the other foreign ministers were not available on the proposed dates, but more likely because they did not believe such an initiative had any chances of success. Finally, the four neutral delegations in Madrid agreed to request that the conference officially take a recess for a long summer break from 28 July to 27 October 1981 to provide for a breather on all sides. In the following weeks, the delegations of Austria, Finland, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia each further tried to find a solution in informal bilateral contacts with the bloc states, but to no avail. Superpower relations during summer 1981 remained bogged down, and following the intense discussions of the mandate for a possible CDE in spring, which had come close to agreement, the US government shifted the focus again on the third basket in the CSCE to “restore the balance” between security and human rights issues.


When the four neutral heads of delegation met again on 24 and 25 September in Berne for an exchange of views on their individually held explorations, they agreed that if irreconcilable disagreements in Madrid persisted after the summer break, the conference should not be carried on over December. At the same time, they were clear that a breakdown of the CSCE process had to be avoided.262 The N+N in early October therefore invited three delegations each of East and West to informal talks on their premises in Madrid “to sketch in the furthest limits of each side’s willingness to compromise in order to define what was politically feasible”.263 On 15 and 16 October, the N+N heads of delegation held yet another group meeting, this time in Nicosia at the invitation of Cyprus, to discuss their strategy and specifically how the follow-up of the conference could be guaranteed.264 On the basis of the informal talks held with the Western powers, Ceska told his colleagues that the most disputed issue still seemed to be the geographical area of implementation for CBM and that he saw no potential solution for the parameter issue on the horizon. Swiss delegate Blaise Schenk, who was sitting in for Brunner in the meeting, thought that despite the non-advancement on the area parameter question, there was still space for future negotiations, and that the specific CBM issue should therefore not prevent the N+N from working in favor of an overall compromise. The Yugoslav head of delegation Ljubivoje Aćimović complained about the Soviet Union’s “blackmailing tactics” as it continued to demand agreement on a disarmament conference in return for agreement to defining the date and place of the next full CSCE review meeting after Madrid. While Swedish delegation leader Rappe concurred in this view, he stressed the importance of breaking the conditioning link of the Soviet Union and suggested that the N+N therefore “should get out of the shelter” with a proposal of their own during November. The Finnish representative Müller was less optimistic that the Soviet Union would make con-

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cessions, as the Soviet tactics simply represented the hard great power model of thinking; however, they agreed that the N+N should not allow the Madrid meeting to end without a clear decision on the follow-up. Nevertheless, in the end, as Ceska stated, all Western powers had in principle accepted a possible disarmament conference to be held after Madrid in Stockholm, and thus the prospects of finding a way out of the impasse were still there.\textsuperscript{265}

In fact, Brunner, who had been absent from the talks in Nicosia, believed he had received, in bilateral talks held around the same time in Moscow on 13 and 14 October, positive signals from the Soviet side for the N+N to continue their mediating efforts. The Soviet head of delegation Leonid Ilichev, according to Brunner’s report, had asked him during the encounter to transmit a message to US delegate Max Kampelman confirming the basic Soviet willingness to sign a concluding document of the CSCE negotiations.\textsuperscript{266} In a meeting with the US delegate the very next day, Kampelman agreed to deliver a response to the Soviets via Brunner signalling his willingness to hold a direct meeting with the Soviet side to talk about a solution of the CSCE problem. However, when the Swiss ambassador to Moscow returned to the Soviet foreign ministry with this offer, Ambassador Lev Mendelevich, who was responsible for the CSCE in the foreign ministry and Ilichev’s superior, told his Swiss interlocutor that this must have been a misunderstanding, as no such interest for a bilateral meeting with Kampelman had been signalled from their side in the discussions with Brunner in Moscow.\textsuperscript{267}

\textsuperscript{265} The remaining part of the meeting was dedicated to a longer discussion on potential host cities for the next follow-up meeting. Brussels and Bucharest had been suggested by the two military alliances, while Austria on this occasion declared it would be prepared to offer Vienna as a place for the venue.

\textsuperscript{266} Fischer, \textit{Die Grenzen der Neutralität}, 300f.

\textsuperscript{267} Hence, as Rosin points out, Brunner’s recollection in an interview with the author of this study in 2003 of a secret meeting between Kampelman and Ilichev taking place to discuss things face to face a little later is probably erroneous. For the details of this episode, see Rosin, \textit{Einfluss durch Neutralität}, chapter 8.7. For the interview referencing Brunner’s allusion to the Kampelman-Ilichev meeting, see Fischer, \textit{Die Grenzen der Neutralität}, 300f.; Brunner’s bilateral talks with the Soviet and US heads of delegation in mid-October 1981 are also conveyed in more general terms in an unpublished master’s thesis: Jacqueline Béatrice Moeri, \textit{Die Rolle der Schweiz in der N+N-Gruppe der KSZE während der Madrider Folgekonferenz} (Hochschule St. Gallen für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Diplomarbeit 1984), 89.
Another bilateral contact between a neutral head of delegation and Kampelman around the same time seems to have had more effect: After returning to its quarters in Madrid in September 1981, the Finnish delegation had held consultations with its US colleagues, which explicitly encouraged the Finns to produce an initiative to force a breakthrough with a compromise suggestion for the mandate of the disarmament conference.268 After the summer break, the general atmosphere in Madrid had improved somewhat, not least because Western fears that the Soviet Union would intervene in Poland had not materialized. It seemed that everybody now wanted the CDE, but no one so far had been able to generate the language that could provide the basis for a solution. The matter was crucial, as the Soviets had made it perfectly clear that they would refuse any compromise on other issues in the CSCE until agreement was reached on the mandate for the disarmament conference.

2.5 ATTEMPT FOR A FINAL DOCUMENT – TAKE 2 (CSCE/RM/39 OF 16 DECEMBER 1981)

It was now the Austrian delegation that took the lead in sounding out Warsaw Pact and NATO countries on the most disputed issues. A real competition between the neutral heads of delegation set in, in particular between Franz Ceska (Austria), Edouard Brunner (Switzerland), and Richard Müller (Finland), over who would become the champion of a compromise solution for the CSCE.269 In November, the Austrians presented a new draft for a closing document of the Madrid talks in a synthesis of Eastern and Western positions. The proposal was first tabled for discussion within the N+N group, which considered the chances of acceptance to be realistic and was ready to give it the status of an official

269 See Gilde, Neutrale Vermittler oder missionarische Absichten?, 431. An explanation for the marked absence of the Swedish delegation in this competition may be their traditional approach to the CSCE, in which Sweden primarily sought “stability not change” in Europe. Accordingly, Sweden would also be less dependent on a continuation of the CSCE for its overall political aims on the European level, and thus be less inclined to put much effort in building bridges for the big powers at critical moments of the conference. Correspondence Aryo Makko to the author, 2 January 2012. On Sweden’s approach to the CSCE, see also Makko’s forthcoming article “Sweden, Europe and the Cold War: A Reappraisal”, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 14, no. 2 (Spring 2012).
N+N proposal. In a meeting held in Zurich, Switzerland, attended by all N+N members with the exception of Malta, which had already declared its intention in Nicosia to follow through with its own initiatives, the N+N discussed the strategy for the Austrian proposal. The Finns – encouraged by their bilateral talks with Kampelman as well as with the Soviet side – suggested first to launch a trial balloon with an individually proposed “nucleus package” comprising the following elements: principles, Basket III, area issue of disarmament conference. This suggestion met with the support of the other members of the group:

Although [the Finnish] effort failed, its consequence was that all four Neutral delegations, as a group went into direct, intensive consultation with both Eastern and Western delegations on either side, to find a solution for all the questions that still remained undecided.

Thus, the neutrals worked the ground for the presentation of a new final draft document in mid-December to allow the conference to finish before Christmas 1981, if possible. If they should fail to find consensus on the basis of their document, the N+N would propose a conference break for several months after the New Year in order to have time for new explorations.


271 Yugoslavia had suggested yet another optional scenario in Zurich, which foresaw to reach a decision on holding the disarmament conference by agreeing first on a place and date for a preparatory meeting for the CDE; the preparatory meeting would then continue drafting the exact mandates, including the area of application question for the disarmament conference. The proposal, however, stood no chance of acceptance with the West, as it played directly into the hands of Eastern propaganda.


The time for compromise seemed ripe in early December 1981. However, when the Austrian paper was finally presented to the conference and was officially registered as CSCE/RM/39 on 16 December 1981, events on the international stage had overtaken the N+N agenda once more. On 13 December, General Wojciech Jaruzelski imposed martial law in Poland, and a few days later everything fell to pieces again in Madrid. Under the impression of worldwide protests against the situation in Poland, Ilichev on 17 December officially withdrew previous Soviet support for CSCE/RM/39, and the conference had to recess again over the Christmas break without result. When the meeting in Madrid resumed on 9 February 1982, most Western and neutral states refused to resume the talks until the violations of the Helsinki Final Act in Poland had been rectified.\(^{274}\)

The N+N had come together in a meeting in Vienna on 25/26 January 1981 to ponder the state of affairs at the CSCE in the light of the latest developments.\(^{275}\) They agreed that only a break could save the talks after the fierce international reactions the Polish crisis had triggered; a discussion on the N+N draft paper RM/39 at this point in time would almost certainly lead to a collapse of this document. The Finns, on the one hand, were of the opinion that the proposal for a break should not be made immediately at the beginning of the reconvention of the talks in Madrid, as this would too obviously refer to the Polish situation and was likely to cause further resistance to the N+N paper from the Soviet side. Brunner, on the other hand, stated that he was no longer able to support the document as it stood, but would be willing to make an effort for additional changes. Switzerland and Austria now clearly preferred a “break-solution” to put RM/39 on hold “in the fridge” until the international situation had changed again.\(^{276}\)

As a consequence, Swiss Foreign Minister Pierre Aubert, who had come to give a statement to the Madrid meeting, in his official address to the plenary on 10 February immediately demanded a break of the

\(^{274}\) Skilling, “The Madrid Follow-Up”, 332f.


conference, as “a continuation of the meeting would be inconsiderable as long as martial law in Poland was proclaimed”.\textsuperscript{277} In an internal report, the Finnish head of delegation Müller bitterly complained about Aubert’s move, as the Swiss behavior changed the matter of the break from a procedural one to a political measure.\textsuperscript{278} Again, this incident illustrated the different approaches among the neutrals towards the CSCE in the early 1980s, with the Swiss representing a straightforward “Western” standpoint and the Finns showing considerable reservations about exposing the Soviet side to too much public criticism.\textsuperscript{279} The Finns felt the initiative of the Swiss foreign minister had been counterproductive, if not in fact a “self-mutilation” of the N+N idea to propose a break of the conference later for 1 March 1982 on a procedural basis. After Switzerland had broken the silence, however, the French and Austrian foreign ministers in their statements to the plenary in February also officially demanded that the CSCE negotiations be adjourned until the international situation had cooled down to a level where discussions between East and West would become possible again.\textsuperscript{280} Despite Finnish fears that the N+N would loose all means of influencing the discussion on the question of a break, the Swiss (and Austrian) initiative did not damage the group’s reputation in the end.

In prolonged discussions during February and March 1982, the N+N were ultimately instrumental again behind the scenes in bringing about consensus on the decision to adjourn the conference for some months. On 17 February, the N+N had agreed to start informal bilat-

\textsuperscript{277} Fischer, \textit{Die Grenzen der Neutralität}, 302; Moeri, \textit{Die Rolle der Schweiz in der N+N-Gruppe der KSZE während der Madrider Folgekonferenz}, 90f. Foreign Minister Aubert and Ambassador Brunner explained their reasons for an adjournment of the Madrid meeting to the Committee for External Affairs of the Swiss national parliament on 18 February 1982. On this occasion, they also stated that the Swiss proposal for adjournment had been pre-decided in an informal N+N meeting: BAR, E 2850.1 (-) 1991/234, 12, Personal Papers Pierre Aubert: Sitzungsprotokoll der Kommission für auswärtige Angelegenheiten des Nationalrates, Bern, 18 February 1982.

\textsuperscript{278} UMA, 13–4, ETYK Madrid: "Madridin seurantakokous II; 5. työväte; puolueettomien ja sitoutumattomien toiminta", Richard Müller, 18 March 1982.

\textsuperscript{279} For the statement of the Finnish Foreign Minister Matti Tuovinen in the February 1982 plenary debate, see: UMA, 13–4, ETYK Madrid: Statement by Mr. Matti Tuovinen, Secretary of State of Finland, at the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting, on February 12, 1982.

eral talks with the other delegations to find a solution.\textsuperscript{281} On the basis of these informal consultations, general agreement was achieved with all sides to adjourn the meeting. On 23 February, Austrian Foreign Minister Pahr and his Yugoslav colleague Josip Vrhovec launched a call to the other N+N foreign ministers for an initiative in which, before the final statements in this plenary were read, “one of the N+N-delegations should give in brief and general terms the assessment of the consultations and at the same time propose adjournment.”\textsuperscript{282} On this occasion, the N+N were to make clear that the proposal stemmed from a widespread feeling among the other delegations that such a proposal should be made by the N+N-countries, which themselves would have preferred to negotiate a balanced and substantive document on the basis of their RM/39 paper at this stage of the conference:

During the recess consultations could be undertaken by the N+N-countries in a coordinated way with other participants aiming at the continuation of the CSCE-process and in order to prepare the ground for an agreement by consensus on the concluding document in fall.\textsuperscript{283}

This procedure found the support of the other N+N states, and it was the Finnish head of delegation Müller who on 1 March 1982 officially proposed the break to the conference.\textsuperscript{284} By 8 March, a gentlemen’s agreement was reached with the great powers on this proposal, and the conference finally decided to break for eight months starting on 12 March, with an agreement to reconvene on 9 November 1982.\textsuperscript{285} With that decision, another much-needed respite was provided for the conference, which would allow for a renewed debate on a concluding document when the delegations reconvened again in autumn later that year.

According to the former Polish CSCE delegation leader Włozimierz Konarski, his government and other Warsaw Pact member states had

\textsuperscript{281} UMA, 13–4, ETYK Madrid: Telegram, Madrid/ETYK, 17 February 1982.
\textsuperscript{282} UMA, 13–4, ETYK Madrid: Telegram, Madrid/ETYK, 23 February 1982.
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{284} UMA, 13–4, ETYK Madrid: Telegram, Madrid/ETYK, 8 March 1982.
\textsuperscript{285} For a detailed discussion of the issue of recess for the conference in 1982, see Sizoo and Jurjens, \textit{CSCE Decision-Making}, 197–208; on the N+N negotiating a compromise behind the scenes, cf. ibid. 208.

...seriously considered not returning to Madrid after the Christmas break 1981/82. Konarski himself had succeeded Marian Dobrosielski as the new Polish head of delegation after the latter had been dismissed from his post on 30 December 1981 by his country’s government, as he had openly expressed opposition to the declaration of martial law. By early 1982, civil liberties in Poland were curtailed, the Solidarity movement was banned, and obedience of journalists and teachers towards the emergency government was closely monitored. As a consequence of events in Poland, the US contemplated leaving the conference table in Madrid in the first half of 1982, and allegedly, it was only due to the personal intervention of West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that such a step by the White House was prevented at the time. Under these circumstances, it was all the more important that the Soviet delegate Ilichev had declared to the N+N in the informal consultations of February 1982 that the Soviet Union was ready to continue the work of the Madrid meeting on the basis of the group’s 16 December draft concluding document CSCE/RM/39. Ilichev’s promise to continue negotiating, and Genscher convincing the Americans to remain at the table, at least left the options open for further N+N bridge-building activities.

2.6 SUMMER BREAK 1982 AND NEUTRAL BRIDGE-BUILDING (PART II)
As agreed in their group discussions in early 1982, the N+N wanted to make use of the conference break in summer to find a procedural solution that would help the CSCE negotiations escape from the gridlock: Swedish Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten therefore suggested to his N+N colleagues in early April that after a period of cooling down, the N+N foreign ministers should meet in Stockholm in late August or early September in order to develop a common N+N basis for launching a round of consultations with the other CSCE states in the period before the resumption of the Madrid meeting on 9 November. Preparations for the foreign ministers’ meeting in Stockholm should be made in the

286 Reimaa, Helsinki Catch, 222f.
288 Reimaa, Helsinki Catch, 224.
It was therefore agreed to hold a meeting of their CSCE delegations beforehand on 1 and 2 July in Belgrade to discuss the general situation and to examine possible initiatives for the conference. Yugoslavia and Malta remained extremely pessimistic about the prospects for the continuation of the Madrid meeting, but Brunner of Switzerland was more optimistic. After all, the superpowers had restarted their negotiations on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty since February and set in motion preparations for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in the meantime; the Polish situation thus no longer seemed to be a stumbling block for direct talks between the US and the USSR. The Swedish and Finnish delegates agreed that these bilateral superpower negotiations in Geneva were definitely an important signal. Given the international circumstances, they saw no reason to change the basis of their RM/39 proposal substantially for the continuation of Madrid. Brunner agreed in so far as there was no use in continuing the game of accusations in the CSCE; rather, the N+N were to show the Socialist states that they were working for compromise; at the same time, the N+N would have to explain to the West that they still supported the demand for a more efficient implementation of the Helsinki Final Act provisions. In the end, the N+N delegations stressed their resolve to continue working in that direction at their foreign ministers’ meeting scheduled for 29 and 30 August in Stockholm. The delegations further decided to continue their working discussion at the level of civil servants in Helsinki on 7 and 8 October.


291 With the benefit of hindsight, Brunner’s assessment of the situation was clearly too optimistic, as neither of the concrete proposals made by the Reagan government with regard to INF and START were serious offers to negotiate and thus were not acceptable to the Soviet Union at the time.

In their meeting on 29 and 30 August 1982 in Stockholm, the foreign ministers of the nine N+N states definitely decided to prepare a second draft for a final document based on their December 1981 proposal. They believed they had received sufficiently positive signs from all sides for another attempt. In a first step, the N+N intended to advance the talks in Madrid after re-opening by resorting to the instrument of informal mini-groups, which would deal with the unresolved issues one after another. This should then make clear the necessary changes on RM/39 in order to be able to achieve consensus on it. By autumn of 1982, the danger of a possible discontinuation of the talks on the US side ultimately been averted by a caucus decision at NATO’s October meeting in Lisbon to enter into actual negotiations on the N+N draft RM/39, with new Western proposals concerning human rights and civil liberties to be introduced in November 1982 in return for a more precise mandate required by the East for a European disarmament conference. Until Christmas 1982, the informal work in these mini-groups coordinated by the N+N – Sizoo and Jurjens refer to them as the “sherry groups” – reached a point where the heads of delegation of the N+N were ready to discuss final details in order to table their new official proposal. The tactics of working towards a rapprochement between the blocs by informal small steps seemed to pay off in the end.

That the N+N had reached this point was no small feat. As the group meeting in Helsinki in October had illustrated, it was difficult, during all the preparations for a revised RM/39 document, to maintain cohesion within the group: The Swiss had repeatedly threatened to withdraw their support for the N+N proposal and to side with the transatlantic position instead. In Helsinki, Brunner had even raised the option of a short final document as in Belgrade again (which seemed to be what the US policy was heading for). The Finns, at the other end of the spec-

293 UMA, 13–4, ETYK Madrid: “Puolueettomien ja sitoumattomien ETYK-maiden ulkomi

294 Again, West German Foreign Minister Genscher seems to have had a decisive influence on the US concerning that question.

295 Reimaa, Helsinki Catch, 227; Sizoo and Jurjens, CSCE Decision-Making, 162.

296 Ibid.
trum, seemed to be ready to find a “successful conclusion” of the Madrid meeting and a continuation of the Helsinki process with the Soviet Union almost at any price.²⁹⁷

2.7 “LAST ATTEMPT” FOR A FINAL DOCUMENT (CSCE/RM/39REV. OF 15 MARCH 1983)

In a separate group meeting in Berne at the end of January 1983, the N+N delegations agreed that either a quick ending to the negotiations in Madrid would have to be found based on their proposal, or they would cease their mediating efforts, and the conference would have to be interrupted for several years.²⁹⁸ They started one more round of informal consultations on their initiative in the beginning of February, and their activities were generally greeted with enthusiasm in East and West.²⁹⁹ Hence, when the CSCE delegates were re-convoked to Madrid for 8 February, the N+N states were finally optimistic that this would be the very last phase of a conference that had already “lasted too long”.³⁰⁰ Martial law in Poland was finally suspended on 22 February 1983, and on 15 March, the N+N proposal for a final document was officially introduced to the conference in Madrid and registered as CSCE/RM/39revised.³⁰¹ Six of 14 additional Western demands to the original N+N proposal


²⁹⁹ Ibid.: ETYK, Telegram, 8 March 1983; Cf. Sizoo and Jurrjens, CSCE Decision-Making, 239f.


³⁰¹ On the procedure of how the N+N arrived at establishing the text of RM/39rev. in prolonged discussions, first in informal contact groups (the so-called “sherry groups”), and ultimately by resorting to formal mini-groups, see: Sizoo and Jurrjens, CSCE Decision-Making, 163f. and 219.
had been included in the compromise paper, while the most disputed of these points, which the Soviets had threatened to veto, were omitted.  

By the time of the presentation of RM/39rev., the N+N had been able to reduce the number of open questions to four, with the area of application for CBM and the American demand for an additional expert meeting after Madrid on “human contacts” remaining the most disputed ones.  

As Kampelman made clear to the press, unless the latter request was fulfilled, the US would reject the N+N draft for a final document. In Kampelman’s view, the N+N document was not yet a final version, but rather a fairly good basis for a last round of negotiations, for which there was still time.  

However, Finnish President Mauno Koivisto decided to throw in his personal prestige to push for acceptance of the N+N proposal as it stood at the conference. By the end of March 1983, a personal letter from President Koivisto to the N+N heads of state and government was prepared in Helsinki with a proposal for a joint ultimate appeal to the other CSCE participants to finish the Madrid meeting on the basis of RM/39rev. “successfully” before Easter. The text was sent to the state secretaries of the N+N foreign ministries on 5 April, with the idea to officially launch the appeal on Monday, 11 April 1983. Koivisto’s initiative was met with mixed reactions among the N+N governments, however: The Swedish and Yugoslav reactions were positive. The Austrian government embraced the idea and basically endorsed the draft text provided by the Finns for the appeal, but Austria made its support conditional on the agreement of Switzerland to participate in the initiative as well. However, in a letter from Foreign Minister Aubert of 8 April 1983, Switzerland declared that it was not ready to support the

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302 Zielinski, _Die neutralen und blockfreien Staaten und ihre Rolle im KSZE-Prozess_, 256.

appeal. Instead, Switzerland (as well as Liechtenstein) at that point sided with the US position that thought RM/39rev. did not yet constitute a balanced final document, and that it needed another three to four modifications. The letter by Aubert also said that the government in Berne would not object to the other N+N states’ going ahead with the Koivisto initiative without Switzerland. As a reaction to the negative initial Swiss response, Finland and Austria made further appeals to Switzerland to participate in the initiative, but Brunner explained on behalf of his government that it did not want to subscribe to something that would almost certainly be considered a “one-sided” initiative, since only the East could accept RM/39rev. in its current form; the West still wanted additional changes. The Swiss position at the time was certainly influenced by growing public pressure at home, caused by the activities of NGOs and parliamentarian Helsinki monitors. At the same time, the delegation’s outlook on the Madrid negotiations had been “transatlantic” from the beginning.

As for other N+N reactions to the Finnish plan, San Marino stated its support, while Cyprus endorsed the Koivisto initiative, albeit with some requests for changes in the text, but Malta’s attitude turned out to be negative as well. As Yugoslavia wanted to preserve the unity of the N+N group and Austria again stated to the Finns that it would still like to have Switzerland “on board”, the Finnish plan to launch the appeal on 11 April ran into trouble. The negative Swiss and Liechtenstein reactions finally toppled the originally envisaged schedule, so that Finland invited the other group members to an extraordinary meeting in Geneva on 14 April 1983 to save the initiative. The Finnish idea was to find a

309 The main reason for the Swiss denial of support to the Koivisto initiative was the fact that the proposal for an expert meeting on human contacts had been omitted from the N+N draft of 15 March 1983 for the final document. Fischer, Die Grenzen der Neutralität, 375f. Cf. Moeri, Die Rolle der Schweiz in der N+N-Gruppe der KSZE während der Madrider Folgekonferenz, 94ff.
quick agreement in an N+N-minus-three (Switzerland/Liechtenstein/Malta) constellation, in order to be able to launch the appeal immediately the following day – Friday, 15 April. Austria and Yugoslavia finally agreed in Geneva to go ahead with the Finnish initiative without Switzerland, but Austria said that it still wanted to instruct its embassies in the CSCE countries first before the appeal was launched. Friday, 15 April was therefore impossible as a date to make the appeal public for “technical” reasons. That meant that the publication of the Koivisto initiative had to be postponed to the following Monday, 18 April 1983. This renewed hold-up caused Finnish CSCE diplomats to suspect their Austrian colleagues of having received new instructions from Vienna not to support the demarche after all. Helsinki immediately contacted the Austrian foreign ministry to find out what was going on, and – with no immediate answer forthcoming – Finnish Foreign Minister Stenbäck even summoned the Austrian ambassador to Finland in Helsinki. It took some time until Ambassador Alholm could report back late on 15 April from Vienna that he had received confirmation that Austria would in fact support the initiative. The diplomatic incident between Helsinki and Vienna in the end turned out to be just an “unfortunate misunderstanding”, for which the Finnish Foreign Minister Pär Stenbäck personally apologized. But the episode illustrated how the Finnish initiative – rather than imparting a decisive impetus to the N+N paper RM/39rev. – instead spurred further dissent within the N+N group over their common strategy in the final weeks of the Madrid talks. It is also an illustration of the mistrust Finnish policy still had to overcome even among its neutral partner states in the early 1980s with regard to suspicions of its CSCE diplomacy being directly influenced by Moscow.

When President Koivisto finally launched the appeal in a letter co-signed by the heads of state and government of Austria, Cyprus, San Marino, Sweden, and Yugoslavia, which was sent to all CSCE participants on 18 April 1983, the initiative was immediately suspected by the West to be a Moscow-inspired move. The US and its allies considered

the maneuver a one-sided attempt to pressure the NATO countries into a compromise that clearly favored the East. In their letter to the conference, the six N+N states had declared that they did not only consider their proposal a basis for further negotiations, but a “last attempt” from their side to bring the conference to a meaningful end:

The Neutral and Non-Aligned States, on whose behalf we address this letter, now fear that the Madrid meeting has reached a point where continued and protracted negotiations will no longer serve the aims of bringing us closer to a common understanding, but rather lead to an erosion of the basic aims and purposes set forth by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

It is for this reason that eight neutral and non-aligned countries have recently made a proposal in Madrid for a substantial and balanced concluding document. It is a compromise endeavour and cannot as such fully satisfy all demands. Yet it contains a number of concrete commitments in all fields of the CSCE process, including the strengthening of military security and the promotion of human rights. […]

The Neutral and Non-Aligned States in question share the serious belief that a political decision must now be made without delay regarding the outcome of the Madrid meeting and thus the future role of the CSCE process in Europe. A positive conclusion would demonstrate a renewed resolve by us all to enhance stability and strengthen continuity. Failure to reach agreement in Madrid would, we fear, be detrimental to the entire process and thus adversely affect the political development in Europe itself.

When the initiative was presented on 18 April to the US State Department, US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt asked the Finnish ambassador to Washington, Jaakko Iloniemi, outright whether the Finns had been asked by the USSR to launch this appeal, and declared that the N+N compromise (CSCE/RM/39rev.) was still “just too weak”. UMA, 13–4, ETYK Madrid: “Asia: Puolueettomien ja sitoutumattomien ETYK-maiden valtion ja hallitusten päämiesten vetoomus – 18.4.1983”, Washington, Jaakko Iloniemi, 18 April 1983; and “Kommentti tänään 18.4.”, Washington, Jaakko Iloniemi, 18 April 1983. Cf. Reimaa, Helsinki Catch, 234f.

Ibid.: Circular Note, Statement by the President of the Republic, Helsinki, 18 April 1983 (embargo at 8.30 p.m.). Emphasis added by the author. The letter was co-signed by Bruno Kreisky (Federal Chancellor of Austria), Spyros Kyprianou (President of the Republic of Cyprus), Adriano Reffi and Massimo Roberto Rossini (Captains Regents, San Marino), Olof Palme (Prime Minister of Sweden), Petar Stambolić (President of the State Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).

The signatories of the appeal made it sufficiently clear that should their RM/39rev. fail to find consensus, they would stop all their efforts for a successful conclusion of the conference. The Soviet Union reacted to this appeal with a final change of strategy, and in a letter signed by Secretary General Yuri Andropov dated 6 May 1983 declared that the USSR was ultimately ready to accept CSCE/RM/39rev. on the condition that no changes at all would be made – thereby putting pressure on the Western and the N+N states to sign this paper in its current form as a final document for the conference. In the ensuing discussions, the West and the dissenting N+N countries Switzerland and Liechtenstein still insisted on at least four amendments to RM/39rev. (on a specific wording, on the prohibition of radio jamming, on calling a meeting of experts on human contacts, and on clarification of the mandate for a European Disarmament Conference). As the US State Department had already declared upon receipt of the text of the Koivisto initiative, the Reagan government wanted to keep the CSCE process alive, and the US side was still ready to search for a compromise on the basis of the N+N paper, but additional changes needed to be made. The Soviet delegation, however, showed no inclination to re-open negotiations on any of these amendments after the Koivisto initiative, and thus the stalemate in Madrid lasted for yet another two months. In the end, the initiative of the Finnish president had brought about the open alienation of Switzerland and Liechtenstein from the N+N compromise paper


318 In addition, Romania and Malta had both filed amendments, which were acceptable to no one. Sizoo and Jurrjens, CSCE Decision-Making, 240f. For the official replies of Great Britain, France, and the FRG to the Koivisto initiative, see: UMA, 13–4, ETYK Madrid: “Message from the Right Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP, Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to His Excellency Dr. Mauno Koivisto, President of the Republic of Finland, 24 May 1983” and “Reply from the British Prime Minister to the Appeal of Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries, Tuesday, 24/5/1983 (Press Release)”; Letter François Mitterand to Mauno Koivisto, Paris, 21 May 1983; Verbalnote, “Antwortschreiben von Bundeskanzler Kohl and Seine Exzellenz Herrn Dr. Mauno Koivisto, Präsident der Republik Finnland”, Helsinki, 1 June 1983.

319 The definition of the area of application for CBM in the Atlantic remained the main concern for the US until the very end. UMA, 13–4, ETYK Madrid: “Asia: Puolueettomien ja sitoutumattomien ETYK-maiden valtion ja hallitusten päämiesten vetoomus – 18.4.1983”, Washington, Jaakko Iiloniemi, 18 April 1983.

RM/39revised, but no solution for a substantial concluding document of the conference was reached in April or May 1983.

2.8 END GAME – THE BRUNNER-GONZÁLEZ NEGOTIATIONS OF JUNE 1983

At the very last moment, Spain, as the current host of the talks, had also tried to prevent the publication of the appeal of the six N+N heads of state and government. On 17 April, Under-Secretary of State Puente had explained to the Finnish CSCE representatives that Spain as the host should have been approached on this matter in beforehand. According to Puente, the Spanish government’s view was that not all the possibilities for negotiations had been exhausted yet, and it consequently was not prepared to support the unilateral N+N-minus-three declaration. Puente’s Finnish interlocutor, Joel Pekuri, replied that the text of the appeal of the Finnish president had already been sent to the press agencies about an hour ago and could therefore no longer be prevented from publication. The Spanish under-secretary of state accepted this position, but also announced a discrete statement by the Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González for the next day.

In fact, the Spanish newspaper “El Pais” had already speculated on some kind of Spanish initiative, since Kampelman had apparently asked the Spanish to act as mediators in the circumstances. Indeed, a message from González conveyed to Helsinki later that day revealed that Spain, like most of the Western countries, wanted further changes regarding human rights to be introduced into the final document. González explained to the Finns on 18 April that he felt the appeal launched by Koivisto and his five N+N colleagues was some sort of a personal challenge to him as the host chairman of the conference. Apparently, he had already considered making a statement of his own, but the Finnish initiative definitely forced him to come forward with a declaration. The situation was all the more delicate because Spain, after years of isolation, had only recently become a new member of the

320 Cf. Rosin, Einfluss durch Neutralität, chapter 10.3.
NATO alliance,\textsuperscript{323} and the US had made clear in discussions with the Spanish hosts that it would have great problems (not least for domestic reasons) to accept the appeal of the six N+N states to sign RM/39rev. as a final document. González therefore felt a special responsibility for the successful conclusion of the talks with substantial results, without alienating Spain’s new alliance partners.\textsuperscript{324}

In a very last attempt to cut the Gordian knot, the Spanish prime minister in May 1983 tried to find agreement on yet another version for a final document, which once more sought to achieve a compromise between the Western and the Eastern positions. On 17 June, González finally summoned the 35 heads of delegation to his residence in Madrid to present his proposal as an ultimate compromise and called upon all participating states to come to a conclusion of the meeting. Behind the scenes, the Swiss head of delegation, Brunner, had played a key role in assisting González in the drafting of the formulations for the proposal.\textsuperscript{325} The “deal” prepared by Brunner and González on the basis of RM/39rev. envisaged a renunciation of the Western demand on radio jamming (which so far had been a “must” for the US side) in return for Eastern agreement to an expert reunion on human contacts to be held in Berne. In order to smooth the way for Moscow to agree to this compromise without loss of face, the expert level meeting on human contacts would not be mentioned in the final Madrid document, but in a separate annex to it. In addition, the proposal contained a fixed date and place for the opening of the disarmament conference in Stockholm in 1984, as well as an agreement on a next full CSCE review meeting scheduled for 1986 in Vienna. Besides the expert meeting on “human contacts”, an expert meeting on “human rights” would also be held in the meantime (scheduled to take place in Ottawa for 1985). The area of application question for CBM was finally described to cover “the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and air space”, with a functional rather than a geographic definition for the Atlantic region.

\textsuperscript{323} Spain joined NATO on 30 May 1982.
(including only the prior notification of maneuvers that were “a part of activities in Europe”). In this vein, about 50 per cent of the four Western amendments were preserved, while the Soviet Union had received a definite commitment from the West to the disarmament conference mandate. As it turned out, this was the long sought-after final solution to the protracted negotiations in Madrid, and on the basis of this document, a last-minute failure of the conference was ultimately prevented by July 1983.326

The Soviet Union had initially refused the González compromise, claiming the original N+N paper of 15 March was the most it was ready to agree to, but the West after internal consultation concurred with the amendments on 24 June. Finally, the East gave in as well, and on 15 July agreement by all major powers on the González-proposal was reached.327 The fact that it would still take six weeks until the signing of the final document in September 1983 was solely owed to the fact that Malta tried to blackmail the conference into acceptance of its demand for a future CSCE meeting on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean. The maneuver failed when the other delegations after some time signalled the Maltese that if they continued their obstruction, the conference would simply be resolved and reconvened the next day at 34 states, leaving Malta out completely.328 From 7 to 9 September, the representatives of all 35 states finally met for the signing ceremony of the concluding document for the Madrid meeting.329

Although for a long time, the prospects for a successful result appeared even more dismal than at the first follow-up meeting, Madrid

328 Interview with Edouard Brunner, Berne, 15 January 2003; *Le rôle de la Suisse à la CSCE: témoignage de l’Ambassadeur Edouard Brunner*, 41f.; Zielinski, *Die neutralen und blockfreien Staaten und ihre Rolle im KSZE-Prozess*, 256f.; Fischer, *Die Grenzen der Neutralität*, 376f. On the “Malta phase” specifically, see Sizoo and Jurjens, *CSCE Decision-Making*, 242ff.; and Moeri, *Die Rolle der Schweiz in der N+N-Gruppe der KSZE während der Madrider Folgekonferenz*, 99f. All that Malta achieved in the end was agreement from the other participants to a CSCE “seminar” on security in the Mediterranean in Venice before the next follow-up meeting.
329 A German version of the final documents of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid of 6 September 1983 is reprinted in Volle and Wagner (eds.), *Das Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffen*, 181–98.
against the backdrop of a bleak international situation saw a much more positive outcome in the end. This was mainly due to the Soviet interest in the convening of a new European disarmament conference, which had offered the potential for a second major East-West trade-off in the CSCE process with the opening of new negotiations on military security against new commitments and specialized follow-up meetings on human rights and Basket III. Another important reason why the negotiations in Madrid – despite frequent threats from both blocs – never broke off entirely before an agreement on a concluding document was reached in summer 1983 seems to have been that no country was willing to take the individual blame for a premature disruption of the talks and for ending the CSCE process altogether.

It is in this context that the N+N activities at Madrid took place and that their role performance as mediators between the blocs must be judged.

2.9 ASSESSMENT OF MADRID

In the end, the N+N states were content, in the words of the Austrian head of delegation Ceska, to observe that the final document of the Madrid meeting “was the first comprehensive East-West-agreement since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975”. His Swiss counterpart Brunner with hindsight judged that “the final document of Madrid was at the same time balanced and substantial”. In their official concluding statements to the conference, most N+N foreign ministers remained cautious in their assessment of what the Madrid result meant for the future of the CSCE and East-West relations, but they were clearly hopeful that it would pave the way for further significant steps in the Helsinki pro-

330 The very last days of the conference were once more overshadowed by an international incident involving the US and the USSR, when a South Korean airliner (KAL 007) was shot down over Soviet territory.


cess. At the Madrid meeting, the CSCE had not yet reached a turning point, but prospects definitely looked better than after the first follow-up in Belgrade. That the CSCE had survived this difficult period in the later Cold War was to no small degree also the achievement of the N+N states. The heads of the Austrian and Swiss delegation, Brunner and Ceska had repeatedly acted as “lubricants” for the stuttering motor of the negotiations and saved the talks from a break-off more than once in Madrid with their initiatives. The third head of delegation of an N+N country that had tried to leave his personal imprint on the Madrid negotiations was the Finnish representative Richard Müller, but he could not quite compete with the standing of his aforementioned colleagues. Nevertheless, most observers would probably agree that the mediatory role played by the N+N states as a group in the second CSCE follow-up meeting had so far been their most important contribution to the Helsinki process – Lehne and Neuhold even refer to Madrid as the “heroic phase in the history in the N+[N] group”.

Whenever the talks at the conference stalled, all heads turned towards the N+N group in the expectation that they would “do something”. Over the course of the three-year meeting, the N+N consistently provided important services as bridge-builders for new ideas and as mediators of compromises to bring the talks forward and save the follow-up of the process. The Soviet delegate, Yuri Kashlev, once likened the role of the N+N in settling the differences between the East and the

334 The concluding statements of foreign ministers Pierre Aubert (Switzerland) and Erwin Lanc (Austria) are partially reprinted in: Volle and Wagner (eds.), *Das Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffen*, 199–201, and 223ff. For a brief summary of the statement by Finnish Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen, see: Reimaa, *Helsinki Catch*, 241.

335 While Ceska was nicknamed “Mister Madrid” by the other conference participants for his indefatigable engagement for a substantial outcome of the meeting, the press dubbed Brunner the “Swiss ‘Metternich’ of the CSCE” for his efforts in the final weeks of the Madrid negotiations. Gilde, *Neutraler Vermittler oder missionarische Absichten?*, 435 (on Ceska); Fischer, *Die Grenzen der Neutralität*, 377 (on Brunner).

West in Madrid to a “referee in a boxing match”.\textsuperscript{337} Given the prevailing atmosphere of a renewed superpower Cold War, it is no exaggeration to say that the N+N had the function of a much-needed lifeline for the European security talks at Madrid in the early 1980s, and be it only because NATO and the Warsaw Pact needed someone who “sold compromise positions for them”, as neither of them could accept proposals made directly by the opposite camp.\textsuperscript{338}

At the same time, the N+N countries in Madrid showed substantial differences of view, with Switzerland and Liechtenstein being more “Atlanticist”, and Austria, Yugoslavia, and Sweden taking a more “continental European” (referring to France and the FRG) outlook, whereas Finland could hardly disguise its more Soviet-leaning position in the talks. These positions also reflected the different approaches taken after the Belgrade experience, which varied from viewing the CSCE as “a potential motor of détente” to “the mirror of East-West relations, fallen victim to the whims of the superpowers”.\textsuperscript{339} Of the N+N, Austria was probably the most consistent in its outlook and initiatives, whereas Switzerland with the ever-inventive Edouard Brunner at the head of the delegation was more erratic at times and less foreseeable in its actions. Finland was a very active member of the group discussions this time, but its initiative on the European Disarmament Programme as well as President Koivisto’s late appeal to publicly push for acceptance of RM/39rev. raised eyebrows not only in the Western caucus, but also among some fellow N+N partner states. Yugoslavia, which had been a very active member of the group will acting as host of the talks in Belgrade, took a somewhat lower profile in Madrid, which may have also been a consequence of the death of its charismatic leader Josip Broz Tito on 4 May 1980. Sweden, for its part, almost exclusively concentrated on gaining the mandate for the organization of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM).\textsuperscript{340}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[337] Kashlev, “The CSCE in the Soviet Union’s Perspective”, 30.
\item[338] Quote taken from an interview with Franz Ceska, Vienna, 2 August 2005.
\item[339] Quotes from the concluding statement of Austrian Foreign Minister Erwin Lanc to the Madrid meeting on 8 September 1983.
\item[340] Cf. Gilde, Neutrale Vermittler oder missionarische Absichten?, 435f.
\end{footnotes}
When it comes to their common proposals for the Madrid meeting, the N+N had been fairly successful in introducing as many of their ideas as possible in the drafts they had presented for a final document (RM/39 of 16 December 1981 and RM/39rev. of 15 March 1983). In addition, Austria had been designated as the host country of the next full CSCE review meeting to be held in Vienna, and Sweden, finally, received the mandate to organize the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm.\(^{341}\) For Switzerland, the holding of the expert meeting on “human contacts” in Berne had become a matter of specific importance during the Madrid talks and was finally secured with the Brunner-González deal. Most of the substance of the proposal jointly sponsored by Austria, Spain, and Switzerland on “information” finally found its way into the respective sub-chapter in the third basket.\(^{342}\)

Madrid was a relative success for the development of the Helsinki process in a number of respects, and not only from the perspective of the N+N countries. For the Helsinki network activists in East and West, the fixing of a next full review meeting for 1986, and in particular the stipulation of a number of topical conferences and expert meetings over the intervening years, were equally important achievements. The most prominent of these special meetings would certainly be the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament (CDE I), but from the perspective of the International Helsinki Federation and the Eastern human rights movements, the most important conventions would be the Expert Meetings on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms scheduled for 1985 in Ottawa, Canada, and the one on Human Contacts to take place the following year in Berne, Switzerland. The agreement on three further specialized CSCE meetings taking place between the Madrid and the Vienna conferences – the Athens Meeting on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (1984), the Venice Seminar on Economic, Scientific, and Cultural Co-operation in the

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\(^{341}\) In closely following the French two-stage model for the conference, important criteria of the N+N were satisfied in this field (prioritization of CBM over disarmament, and emphasis on “military significance”, “politically binding”, “application from the Ural to the Atlantic”, and “adequate verification”).

\(^{342}\) Cf. Rosin, *Einfluss durch Neutralität*, chapter 10.5. In Basket III, a special forum on cultural cooperation to be held in Budapest was agreed.
Mediterranean (1984), and the Budapest Cultural Forum (1985) – were of lesser significance in this respect.\textsuperscript{343}

\textsuperscript{343} For a short introduction to these meetings, see the descriptive part of Arie Bloed (ed.), \textit{The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972–1993} (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993).
3 BRIDGE TO THE VIENNA MEETING: THE SPECIAL MEETINGS BETWEEN 1984 AND 1986

In this third chapter, we will look in more detail at the special meetings that were agreed upon in Madrid to bridge the gap to the next full CSCE review meeting in Vienna. Although archival source material is still somewhat scarce for this period, it is clear that the atmospheric turn in East-West relations and the changing character of the CSCE talks during these years made the N+N mediatory services appear less critical for the future of the Helsinki process. The years 1984 to 1986 were actually a transitional phase in the history of the Helsinki follow-up reflecting the broader changes in the superpower relationship and the consequences for the role of the N+N states in the European security talks.

As described at the end of the last chapter, the delegates in Madrid had decided on six topical meetings to prepare the ground for the next full CSCE review meeting in Vienna scheduled for 1986, with the most important of the six being the one on military Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) in Stockholm, which began in 1984. Equally significant for tracing the changing course of action of the bloc powers in the CSCE were the two expert meetings on human rights, scheduled for Ottawa in 1985, and on human contacts the following year in Berne. It is worth recalling that the adoption of these two meetings in the follow-up program had been an important precondition for the West to give its consent to the concluding document in Madrid. Also, the holding of a special forum on cultural cooperation in Budapest, which had been agreed upon in Basket III, was likely to
become a good indicator of the extent to which it had become possible to talk about common interests and aims of East and West again. The expert meeting in Athens on the peaceful settlement of disputes and a CSCE seminar on cooperation in the Mediterranean, on the contrary, had only been included to satisfy the special needs of Switzerland and Malta and bore little significance for the future of the CSCE or the role of the N+N therein in a general vein.

3.1 CDE I: TALKS ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN STOCKHOLM

Despite the successful conclusion of the Madrid Meeting in September 1983, including a mandate for the conference on confidence- and security-building measures as part I of the envisaged Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE I), it is important to remember that prospects for real progress in the military aspects of the CSCE talks looked rather dismal at the time. In autumn 1983, all disarmament talks between the military blocs came to a standstill due to NATO’s impending deployment of Pershing II missiles and other intermediate-range nuclear forces to Europe. When the first of these weapons systems from the US reached European NATO partner states in mid-November 1983, the Soviet Union immediately broke off the INF and START negotiations and interrupted the MBFR talks.

At this low point of US-Soviet relations, CDE I opened on 17 January 1984 in Stockholm. The opening proposals illustrated the widely diverging approaches of East and West. In the Western conception, CSBMs according to the Madrid mandate had to concentrate on technical-military improvements based on the four criteria “military significant, politically binding, covering the whole of Europe, and subject to adequate forms of verification”. The Warsaw Pact countries, on the other hand, aimed at a politico-military conception focusing on declaratory measures, such as the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, a treaty on the renunciation of military force, a ban on chemical weapons, restrictions on military budgets, and support for nuclear-weapon-free zones.

These far-reaching proposals made by the Soviet Union, however, were considered outside the scope of the Madrid mandate and clearly non-negotiable by the West. Romania provided an independent proposal that contained some elements of the NATO proposals (prior notification and verification of movements of troops) as well as of the Warsaw Pact ideas (nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans, treaty on the renunciation of force), but the first year of the CDE was almost entirely dominated by controversial discussions on the divergent interpretations of the Madrid mandate and by protracted procedural debates. In summer 1984, the East boycotted the Los Angeles Olympics in reprisal for the Western boycott of the Moscow Olympics four years earlier, and it was still a long way until Mikhail Gorbachev took office in the Kremlin in March 1985.

The N+N, which basically concurred with the Western views at the Stockholm conference (except when it came to the political aspect of a renunciation of the use of force), did not play their usual intermediary role in these “position fights” in the initial months of the talks in 1984. Given their own interests in an enhancement of existing confidence-building measures, they mostly acted as demanders alongside the US and its Western allies in the discussion. At the same time, it was obviously much more difficult to define common group positions than in previous CSCE talks. The first N+N proposal officially registered at the CSBM conference on 9 March 1984 (CSCE/SC.3) already presented a hard-won compromise between the members of the group, which had only been secured after difficult internal debates. Yugoslavia’s demand for military diluted zones found no support among the other partner states, and neither did a Swedish proposal for nuclear-weapons-free zones. The Swiss with their large militia army in reserve were particularly con-

345 A little later, Malta, too, delivered its “obligatory” independent proposal on naval activities (CSCE/SC.5) to meet its individual security concerns regarding the Mediterranean.


348 Ibid., 80, and Höll, “Kleinstaaten im Entspannungsprozess”, 300.
cerned about the prior notification of mobilization activities, in contrast to Yugoslavia with its large standing army. Hanspeter Neuhold explains the growing difficulties in finding common N+N positions in Stockholm in the following terms:

As the CSCE process moved from peripheral to more essential aspects of security, cohesion with the [N+N] group became increasingly difficult because of the divergent interest and approaches of its members to different threat perceptions and ‘mixes’ between military efforts and preventive peace policies in their security strategies.\(^{349}\)

Given the variety of their geo-strategic positions, with Sweden and Switzerland being less exposed to Eastern military threats than Austria and Finland, which were situated on the “outskirts” of Western Europe or Yugoslavia, which found itself on the “doorstep” of Warsaw Pact territory, it is no surprise that a common position was difficult to come by. In the end, the N+N proposals at Stockholm concentrated on the criteria of “military significance” and on “adequate forms of verification” for CSBMs, putting particular emphasis on qualitative improvement of notification parameters, information requirements, and constraints on military activities.

Towards the end of the year 1984, the N+N were successful with a procedural proposal to install two formal working groups “to negotiate in detail the possibilities for a reduction of the risk of war in Europe”, but the stalemate at the CDE continued well into the year 1985. Although the Warsaw Pact members at long last stopped playing for time following new NATO proposals presented in January 1985, and though US President Reagan after his re-election in spring signalled readiness to consider the Soviet proposal of a treaty on the renunciation of force, it took yet another few months until real negotiations on substantial CSBMs finally set in in autumn of the year.\(^{350}\)

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On 29/30 April 1985, the foreign ministers of the N+N met for separate talks in Stockholm on the risk of war in Europe, where they also pondered the chances of bringing forward a rapprochement of positions with initiatives from their side at the CDE. On the occasion of this meeting, they agreed to augment their initial proposal SC.3 of March 1984 with concrete numbers regarding the parameters, in order to give new impetus to the negotiations on CSBMs.\textsuperscript{351} In the communiqué of the meeting, they welcomed the fact “that the Conference had now entered a phase of deepened and more active discussions on the basis of the various proposals presented at the Conference and called for an early transition to substantive negotiations”\textsuperscript{352}. To this end, the N+N also envisaged a twofold informal exercise designed to obtain clarification as to what could be the actual “material for negotiations” and establish whether an appropriate mechanism could be devised for the exploration of the areas of potential consensus at the CDE. With this initiative, for the first time in the CSBM talks in Stockholm, the N+N returned to their more “classical” dual-role approach at the CSCE, aiming to bring forward the negotiations with substantial proposals of their own as well as with procedural initiatives helping to overcome remaining differences between the blocs.

The timing of the N+N initiative was positively influenced by the arms control policy of the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. In the second half of the year 1985, the Soviet delegation in Stockholm quietly abandoned its political proposals (with exception of the non-threat-or-use-of-force principle) and began to address CSBMs in concrete terms. During a visit to Paris in the fall, Gorbachev accepted the idea of annual calendars of planned notifiable military activities “as proposed by the N+N”,\textsuperscript{353} and in October, East and West finally reached a gentle-


\textsuperscript{352} UMA, 13–4, ETYK Madrid: Seuraavassa otsikkokokouksen tänään 30.4.1985 julkistettu tiedonanto sekä siitä laatinamme epävirallinen suomennos; Olemme antaneet myös STT:lle.

\textsuperscript{353} In fact, the idea of annual calendars was originally part of the NATO proposal CSCE/SC.1, but in order to save face, it was obviously easier for Gorbachev to accept this proposition with reference to the “neutral” paper SC.3, wherein it was also contained. See Loibl, “Die Konferenz über Vertrauens- und Sicherheitsbildende Massnahmen und Abrüstung in Europa (KVAE)”, 98.
men’s agreement – Schenk speaks of an actual “deal” in the substance between Eastern and Western proposals\textsuperscript{354} – that laid the groundwork for the beginning of the drafting of a final document for the Stockholm meeting. These steps all occurred against the backdrop of the preparations for the first superpower summit in years, which was scheduled to take place between US President Reagan and Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev in November 1985 in Geneva.

With the improvement of superpower relations, the N+N were able to enter the most active phase of their common policy at the Stockholm meeting. On 15 November 1985, they introduced a revised proposal (CSCE/SC.7) hoping to provide new substantive input for the negotiations,\textsuperscript{355} and in December, the other participants agreed to a procedural proposal to form informal working groups under the coordination of the four neutral countries for the drafting of the texts. The N+N were optimistic that they could once again play an important role in bringing about the basis for a comprehensive final document of a CSCE meeting.\textsuperscript{356}

The five working groups (on renunciation of force, prior notification, observation, information, and verification) began work in January 1986, but, as Schenk writes, this partially led to a “neutralization” of the neutral delegations instead of augmenting their influence in the talks.\textsuperscript{357} Although the informal working groups remained in place as a quasi-permanent conference instrument until the very end of the Stock-

\textsuperscript{354} Schenk, “Die KVAE aus der Sicht der neutralen Schweiz”, 81.

\textsuperscript{355} Observers actually disagreed as to whether the N+N proposal SC.7 was to be considered a “compromise text” (Höll, “Kleinstaaten im Entspannungsprozess”, 301; and Höll, “Zusammenarbeit Österreich – Jugoslawien im multilateralen Rahmen”, 163), or whether it “rather reflected the specific military interests” of the group members (Lehne and Neuhold, “The Role of the Neutral and Non-aligned Countries at the Vienna Meeting”, 37). However, the account of Swiss delegation leader Schenk leaves little doubt that in reality, document SC.7 was first and foremost an internal N+N compromise reached after difficult discussions reflecting the individual group members’ interests, when in fact a document taking into account the interests of all participating delegations would have been needed at that point to be submitted as a draft for the concluding document to the conference. Schenk, “Die KVAE aus der Sicht der neutralen Schweiz”, 80f. Cf. Loibl, “Die Konferenz über Vertrauens- und Sicherheitsbildende Massnahmen und Abrüstung in Europa (KVAE)”, 99f.


\textsuperscript{357} Schenk, “Die KVAE aus der Sicht der neutralen Schweiz”, 81.
holm meeting in September 1986, according to the literature available, the N+N could not play a substantial role as honest brokers in the decisive phase of the negotiations. This had to do with two developments: due to the task of coordinating the working groups, the neutrals, on the one hand, were confined to an intermediary role, which required them to adopt a less pronounced profile with regard to their own intentions. On the other hand, the negotiations were gradually bipolarized and receded on a bilateral track between the governments in Washington and Moscow. The Stockholm conference was eventually transformed into a bilateral superpower transaction, and the N+N had little to say on the final deal negotiated between the two in the final weeks of CDE I.

The N+N only came into the center of attention again on one more occasion, when the military alliances, in their negotiations on on-site inspections from the air, briefly discussed a West German proposal to use inspection planes from states that were not members of a military alliance. The N+N welcomed this idea, and the four neutral states within a few days provided the conference with a concept for the deployment of such an airplane and declared their governments’ readiness to assume this task on condition of agreement of all participating states. The initiative, however, led nowhere, as the Soviets made clear their resistance to such an idea before it was even negotiated with them by the Western states. This was another illustration of the limited possibilities of the N+N to force their instruments upon the superpowers if these services were not desired – even if the N+N reacted quickly and unbureaucratically to incorporate new ideas and concepts in their CSCE policy.

The final breakthrough at the conference was achieved on 19 August 1986, when the Soviet head of delegation announced the Warsaw Pact countries’ readiness to accept mandatory on-site inspections of CSBMs, an announcement that removed all doubts that agreement


was now within reach. However, the exercise of the “stopping of the clocks” on the previously agreed final day of the conference of 19 September had to be repeated to allow for another few days to wrap up the final package for consensus on 22 September 1986.

In the end, the N+N as well as the smaller alliance member states could only give their consent to the parameters presented in the final document bilaterally defined by the superpowers. At least the Stockholm document, which was formally adopted on 19 September 1986, significantly improved the CSBMs also in the view of the N+N states by providing for

- the political obligation to abide by the provisions;

- obligatory notifications of military activities;

- lowered thresholds for the prior notification of military activities (13'000 troops or at least 300 battle tanks, if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments);

- a longer time-frame for the prior notification of military activities (42 days in advance);

- obligatory invitations of observers to military activities whenever the number of troops engaged amounts to or exceeds 17’000 troops;

- lower thresholds concerning activities of amphibious and airborne forces for notification (3’000 troops) and observation (5’000 troops);

360 On the significance of this announcement, see Reimaa, *Helsinki Catch*, 263. Lehne speaks of a “historic change in Soviet arms control positions”: Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, 26. In fact, summer 1986 saw a significant change of strategy in the Soviet negotiating position at Stockholm, which was mainly attributed to Gorbachev’s revised policy on negotiations with the US and his personal investment in the results of the meeting. Sarah Snyder, “The foundation for Vienna: A reassessment of the CSCE in the mid-1980s”, *Cold War History* (Vol. 10, No. 4, November 2010), 493–512, at 502f.

361 Ibid., 27.
• provisions of annual calendars of planned notifiable military activities;

• “constraining provisions” prohibiting notifiable military activities with more than 40’000 troops unless notified in the current annual calendar, or with more than 75’000 troops unless notified in the previous annual calendar, i.e. two years in advance; and

• for the first time in the history of modern arms control verification by compulsory on-site inspection with regard to military activities.362

Due to the improvements and the widened scope, these measures were seen as a “second generation” in the development of CSBMs, as they meant a concrete step forward from the “extremely modest, almost symbolic CBMs of the Final Act”363 in 1975. Nevertheless, their significance was probably more in the political realm than in the military field.364

The N+N states in the end were mostly content with the results achieved in Stockholm.365 However, with regard to the role they played at the conference, contemporary accounts leave no doubt that the N+N countries suffered from a marginalization in the final stages of the negotiations. This is mainly attributed to the fact that “the wish of the superpowers to maintain control over the negotiating process limited the scope for N+N mediation”.366 The Stockholm conference simply illustrated that contrary to the overall CSCE review meetings, the military alliances still regarded specific negotiations on military security their prerogative. At the same time, the accounts of neutral delegation members make it clear that never before and in no other field of the CSCE talks had it been so difficult to reach agreement among the N+N on

362 Heinz Vetschera, “From Helsinki to Vienna: The Development of Military Confidence- and Security Building Measures in Europe”, Österreichische Militärzeitschrift (6/2000), 711 – 20, at 712. The inclusion of the last clause also paved the way for the adoption of this principle in the INF Treaty signed a year later.

363 Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 27.

364 This opinion is based on an oral history roundtable discussion “The Creation of Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBM) in the 1970s and 1980s” with military experts of the neutral countries participating in the Stockholm Conference 1984 to 1986, held at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Vienna, 29 October 2009.

365 In particular, the exclusion of mobilization activities from the CSBM regime was considered a success by the neutral states with their militia-type forces.

common interests, which weakened their negotiating position in the CDE; the main reason for these difficulties being the diverging security interests of the members of the group resulting from their different geo-strategic positions.\textsuperscript{367}

3.2 THE NON-MILITARY FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS AFTER MADRID
The first two of the non-military meetings after Madrid, the Athens meeting on the peaceful settlement of disputes and the conference in Venice on Mediterranean questions, had been included in the agenda at the insistence of Switzerland and Malta, which had specific interests in these topics.

Switzerland had a long-standing project for a \textit{System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes} among CSCE states (SRPD, after its French acronym), which it had first introduced at the Dipoli talks in 1972, but no agreement on it had been found in the Helsinki Final Act, mainly because of the obligatory character of the system they proposed. In a separate expert meeting after Belgrade in Montreux 1978, they had presented a revised project, but still insisted on its obligatory character. The matter was again referred to a further round of expert talks at Madrid, but reservations about the project remained in East and West. The Athens Expert Meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (21 March to 30 April 1984) was a continuation of the previous expert meeting held in Montreux, and brought no substantial progress. The basic conflict between Western and N+N demands for the mandatory involvement of a third party in the settlement of dispute and Eastern insistence on consultations could not be solved. The experts, in the end, could only state their disagreement and recommend further discussions on the matter in Vienna. Because the initiative originated from one of their group members – with the other neutrals supporting it for reasons of solidarity –, the N+N never attained the role of a bridge-builder in these talks; rather, they remained part of one of the two opposing camps.\textsuperscript{368}


\textsuperscript{368} Roland Eggleston, “Athens Conference on Settlement of International Disputes Fails to Reach Agreement”, \textit{radio liberty research} (RL 178/84), 28 April 1984.
With regard to the Mediterranean talks, Malta had insisted on the inclusion of matters regarding security in the region since the beginning of the Helsinki process, but most other participating states wanted to prevent a spreading of conference subjects into the geographical areas of North Africa and the Middle East for the simple reason that this would overstretch the negotiations framework of the CSCE. After Madrid, the Venice Seminar on Economic, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation in the Mediterranean (16 to 26 October 1984), in which Egypt, Israel, and a number of representatives from international organizations participated together with the CSCE states, thus only discussed such non-controversial issues as environmental and transport cooperation, diseases affecting Mediterranean countries, the region’s cultural heritage and telecommunications. No real progress was achieved, except for its final report containing recommendations for greater cooperation in these fields. Overall, for most CSCE countries, both the Athens expert meeting and the Venice seminar had little more significance than “getting it over and done with”, and with Switzerland and Malta being the main proponents of the initiatives, there was little room for the N+N to act as mediators in these subject matters.369

Contrary to the meetings mentioned above, for many participants – especially in the West – the Ottawa Meeting of Experts on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (7 May to 17 June 1985) was concerned with the most crucial questions of the CSCE follow-up process. Agreement on the holding of the Ottawa meeting in the Madrid concluding document had been one of the concessions the Soviet Union had to make in order to secure Western support for the CDE. As it happened, the meeting on human rights was held at a time when negotiations in Stockholm were still stalled over Soviet intransigence. From the Western perspective, it was therefore primarily an opportunity to test the waters in the human rights discussion in the CSCE after the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev.370 After the Madrid meeting, Helsinki grassroots movements were in full swing, exerting considerable pressure and influence in Western CSCE participating states, as

370 Snyder, “The foundation for Vienna”, 497.
they regarded the Helsinki follow-up to be the strongest platform for advancing their cause on an official level of East-West diplomacy. After the Soviet clampdown on Eastern Helsinki monitor groups in the early 1980s, Western delegations now expected Gorbachev to take a number of steps on human rights issues, including granting exit visas for members of separated families and releasing dissidents from prison.

As an early Swiss report observed from the opening declarations of the various delegations, the expert meeting, however, did not yet substantially depart from the pattern of previous CSCE review meetings in Belgrade and Madrid. While a number of Western and neutral delegations condemned human rights violations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Eastern countries harshly reprimanded the West for interference in internal affairs. The Soviet Union, however, was applying a new tactics of “diverting answers”, which first dealt with the allegations, but then deviated the discussion to other issues and would usually end in a series of lengthy denunciations of Western misgivings, mostly violations of social rights and the right of work in the industrialized states.\textsuperscript{371} In fact, in Ottawa “the East for the first time [in the CSCE] went beyond a purely defensive posture on human rights and attempted a counter offensive”\textsuperscript{372} Interestingly, as Snyder has noted, the Soviet tactic at Ottawa of launching a counterattack on the West “tacitly conceded that one CSCE state could comment on the human rights situation of another, belying long-time Soviet opposition to discussion of human rights practices as interference in its internal affairs.”\textsuperscript{373} And as the quoted Swiss report above noted, some of the Eastern countries (Hungary, Poland) had, indeed, been taking steps – albeit small ones – after the last CSCE review meetings to adapt their national laws to Helsinki standards with regard to human rights and individual freedoms: “This should not be underestimated, as something was incorporated here

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\textsuperscript{372} Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 29; cf. Mastny, Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 30; Ghébali, La diplomatie de la détente, 109f.

\textsuperscript{373} Snyder, “The foundation for Vienna”, 497.
\end{flushleft}
into the Eastern law despite existing differences to the Western system that would potentially leave its mark on the long term.”

While one can argue that by accepting the holding of the Ottawa meeting, the Soviet Union and its satellite states had already taken a major step towards accepting the prominence of human rights in the CSCE, the meeting itself did not yet bring about a significant change in the human rights debate. Persisting ideological and political differences dominated the course of the meeting and soon rendered prospects for a substantive outcome illusory. The Eastern states countered the 15 Western and neutral delegations’ proposals for improvement of implementation of the human rights commitments of the Helsinki Final Act by submitting a large number (30) of new proposals themselves (mainly focusing on social rights and the right to work). Instead of trying to simply shut off the discussion by referring to the non-intervention principle as in previous CSCE gatherings, they now made a detailed discussion of the Western proposals impossible by “flooding” the agenda of the meeting. Thus, not much of the “new spirit” of Mikhail Gorbachev that Eastern delegates had mentioned off the record became visible yet in Ottawa – at least not in the view of Western participants.

The neutrals mostly stayed in line with the Western states at Ottawa; this approach found its expression in a proposal presented by the Swiss delegation for regular expert meetings on human rights issues following the Vienna review meeting. To secure the future evaluation of human rights standards in all participating states, the agenda for these meetings was already to be drawn up in Ottawa. The initiative was also to guarantee the continuation of CSCE talks after the Vienna review.

375 Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 29.
376 For an overview on the main aims of Western, N+N and Eastern proposals, see Ghébali, La diplomatie de la détente, 111–4.
The Swiss proposal, registered as CSCE/OME.2, was co-sponsored by Austria, Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Sweden, the other four N+N countries with a “Western outlook” in the human rights debate.\(^{380}\) Yugoslavia with its Socialist state model and Finland with its “special relationship” with the Soviet Union abstained from the initiative and submitted individual proposals focusing on cooperation and social rights instead.\(^{381}\) With a majority of members siding with Western aims, the N+N as a group were thus not very likely to become mediators in the Ottawa talks in the first place.

When the delegations attempted, at the beginning of June 1985 after three weeks of plenary debate and presentations of new ideas, to reduce the number of proposals by grouping similar initiatives for a first draft of a concluding document, the task of coordinating these activities fell to an (unidentified)\(^{382}\) experienced Finnish CSCE diplomat:

> In this situation – as a surprise to many delegations […] – a Finnish state secretary showed up [at the negotiations], who had already been tried and tested as a coordinator between the blocs and groups in Helsinki 1975. Without further discussion in the plenary, and thus obviously after previous agreement, he was given the task to reduce the different opinions to a common denominator. To this end he established a non-paper, which was drawn up as an addition of the previously compiled proposals. The list was organized alphabetically. Now negotiations on it could start.\(^{383}\)

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\(^{380}\) In addition, Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland had submitted a proposal on the “Dissemination of Information on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” (CSCE/OME.26, 31 May 1985); Austria individually presented a proposal on the “Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion and Belief” (CSCE/OMW.35, 3 June 1985).

\(^{381}\) Finland on “Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights” (CSCE/OME.3, 27 May 1985); Yugoslavia on “Minority Rights” (CSCE/OME.4, 28 May 1985), on “Implementation of Rights of Migrant Workers” (CSCE/OME.5, 28 May 1985), and on “The Role of Ethnic Groups in Participating States as a Factor of Cooperation between States” (CSCE/OME.6, 28 May 1985).

\(^{382}\) The source does not name the Finnish mediator in this particular instance, but it is likely that the person in question was either former Finnish head of delegation Jaakko Iloniemi or former delegation member Klaus Törmudd, the current head of department at the Finnish Foreign Ministry.

That the task of coordinating the activities for the establishment of a draft document was given to a Finnish representative was probably a consequence of the Finnish low-profile approach in the heated debates during the initial weeks of Ottawa. Finland had been hoping at the outset “for a sober and balanced discussion without unproductive confrontation followed by serious considerations of proposals serving as basis for eventual recommendations”. Also, as the same document makes clear, the Finnish foreign ministry’s main objective for Ottawa was to assure a “good outcome” from the meeting “for the sake of the promotion of human rights as well as the process as a whole”.

However, the negotiating process initiated with the Finnish non-paper of 4 June soon ran aground. Since no names were entered on the official list of speakers in the following two weeks, the chairman of the talks declared the session closed every morning after 45 seconds, but not without referring to the availability of another room for informal talks. Usually, NATO representatives and a number of Warsaw Pact delegates then receded to more private discussions. During this period, the Soviets obviously clamped down on the Eastern bloc as only the Soviet delegate Sergei Kondrashev, who was known to be the KGB representative in the delegation, now spoke in the official sessions, while the official head of delegation, Ambassador Sovinskji, receded to the background. The UK, the US, and Italy negotiated on behalf of the West, with the neutrals Switzerland and Austria occasionally intervening as intermediaries. Finally, on 11 June it became clear that – despite all “coffee breaks” providing for informal negotiations and internal group discussions – no compromise could be reached on the basis of the Finnish non-paper. After Kondrashev had several times repeated his conditions making clear that he was not willing to give in, the exercise had to be given up.

To most Western participants, it was obvious that the Soviet Union wanted no further discussion on human rights unless it could re-frame the (Western) conception of human rights to meet its own understanding. Under these circumstances, the proposal of the five N+N states on


individual human rights and fundamental freedoms, like all other Western proposals, fell victim to Soviet intransigence at the Ottawa meeting. As no solution for a concluding document had yet been found as of Friday, 14 June, and the conference was approaching its predefined final date of Monday, 17 June, the N+N made one last attempt to ensure that the talks had at least a minimal result. All nine N+N states together submitted a brief draft (CSCE/OME.49) containing a single operative recommendation, which stipulated that the Vienna meeting should consider convening a single additional expert meeting on human rights questions. But the East rejected even this extremely modest proposal in the end.

On Friday, 14 June at 6.45 p.m., the clocks in Ottawa had to be stopped once more in a CSCE meeting, and the delegates continued to negotiate in a time limbo. On Sunday night, 16 June at 10.15 p.m. the delegations were re-convened to the plenary room, but Kondrashev demanded yet another “coffee break, really only for five minutes”. The differences between the N+N short paper and an Eastern draft for a concluding document had been reduced to two words, but no breakthrough was achieved. The five-minute coffee break again lasted until midnight, and despite final attempts in the morning of the following final day, no agreement could be found. The meeting ended without recommendations for the Vienna review.

From this account of the final days and hours of the Ottawa meeting, it becomes clear that the N+N proposal OME.49 cannot necessarily be termed a compromise proposal. Rather, it was a last attempt to save
the most fundamental goal of all Western proposals, namely to safeguard the continuation of the debate on implementation of the human rights principles as stated in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. As in the parallel CSBM talks in Stockholm, the N+N (with exception of Yugoslavia and Finland) acted as demanders most of the time, and their late attempts to broker a minimal substantive result were frustrated by the lack of compromise on the part of the Eastern superpower.

Despite the non-result of Ottawa, the assessment of these negotiations by N+N delegates was not outright negative. They agreed with many of their Western colleagues that the first phase of the meeting in particular had been “useful” for making their voice heard on human rights violations in a number of participating states, as well as for exchanging opinions and clarifying views on new proposals for improving the situation. But their role as moderators and catalysts of the talks had by no means matched that of the N+N in the review meetings in Belgrade and Madrid before. To some extent, this had to do with the fact that at least the four neutrals in the specific discussions on human rights had a clearly defined point of view, which was ideologically deeply anchored in the Western point of view.

Next after Ottawa, a ceremonial event in Helsinki took place on 1 August 1985 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Final Act. But even this commemorative event ended without any concluding note or document – it was not even possible to issue a short common communiqué of all participating states on this occasion. Under these general circumstances, the prospects for the upcoming Budapest Cultural Forum (15 October to 25 November 1985) were not too promising, as fundamental differences between East and West still seemed insurmountable. The Cultural Forum was neverthe-


390 The idea for the tenth anniversary event was originally launched in the early stages of the Madrid meeting, at a time when continuation of the CSCE talks beyond the second review meeting was altogether unsure. The intention was to have at least some sort of an undisputed ceremonial event on the schedule for the Madrid follow-up. For the tenth anniversary event, see Reimaa, Helsinki Catch, 256–63.
less innovative in a number of ways. First of all, it was the first meeting in the framework of the CSCE that took place in a Warsaw Pact country. Furthermore, like its post-Belgrade predecessor, the scientific forum in Hamburg of 1980, it was open to non-diplomats, this time to “leading personalities in the field of culture”. About two-thirds of the roughly 900 participants were non-diplomats. A number of delegations were even headed by cultural personalities: The French, for example, had entrusted the position to the writer Regis Bastide, at the time the director of the Institut Français in Vienna. Yugoslavia had nominated Kole Casule, the president of the Macedonian authors’ syndicate, and Switzerland’s delegation was headed by Professor Jeanne Hersch, a former member of the UNESCO executive council.  

Another difference to previous CSCE meetings was the organization of the talks in Budapest: To avoid another open confrontation, it was agreed at the preparatory meeting to work out the concluding results without prior plenary debates. Thus, out of the record number of over 250 proposals, almost half were introduced in “informal” ways by individual delegates, groups of delegates, or delegations to the forum. It had also been agreed in advance that it would be the task of the N+N to establish a “shuttle diplomacy” between Warsaw Pact and NATO/EC delegations to draw up the basis for a concluding document. In the end, these informal consultations usually took place in smaller working groups, to which all three caucuses (Warsaw Pact, N+N, NATO/EC) had delegated a few representatives each. For the N+N, this meant that the role of mediators not only fell to them in the final weeks of the meeting, as in previous CSCE gatherings, but that they occupied a central place at least in the procedural and organizational aspects of the talks from the beginning. The Swiss and Austrian delegations were charged with setting up the agenda, whereas the Finnish and Swedish delegations established the organizational framework for the negotiations.

Despite these procedural precautions, the debates in Budapest were once more marked by the clash between East and West. The West was

392 Ghébali, La diplomatie de la détente, 357.
393 Lichem, “Das Budapester Kulturforum”, 119f.

particularly concerned with human rights aspects of culture, such as the freedom of cultural expression, the freedom of information, and uninhibited international contacts, whereas the East’s primary emphasis was on interstate cooperation stressing the primacy of societal interests. Although the efforts to preserve the wealth of ideas contained in the proposals presented by transmitting them to the Vienna meeting were quite serious, in the end the participating states did not succeed in reaching agreement on a concluding document.\textsuperscript{394}

The sheer number of proposals and their often diametrically opposed character made the task of elaborating a draft for a concluding document a particularly difficult undertaking for the coordinating N+N states from the beginning. Varying interests between diplomat and non-diplomat members of delegations complicated the task even further. Whereas the diplomats in East and West after the Ottawa experience seemed to attach importance to the signing of a concluding document at the end of Budapest for the sake of the CSCE process as a whole, the cultural personalities put more emphasis on seeing their specific concrete proposals on cultural cooperation (exhibitions, exchange programs, symposia) through. Hungary as a host showed a keen interest in a “positive result” of the Cultural Forum, and had therefore advocated the establishment of early informal consultations on a concluding document to allow enough time to mitigate remaining differences. Some of the Western delegations, however, refused to enter into such informal negotiations before the scheduled date on the agenda for this discussion in the final week of the talks. Hence, at the request of numerous delegations, the N+N once more set about to provide a first informal draft for the concluding document in a CSCE negotiation. After protracted internal N+N debates on the various proposals on the table, the Austrian head of delegation Walter Lichem drafted a text that was presented as an informal non-paper to the other delegations at the beginning of the final week of the conference.\textsuperscript{395}

The N+N non-paper tried to strike a balance between the more general ideas debated and the concrete project proposals presented at the

\textsuperscript{394} Cf. Lehne, \textit{The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe}, 31.  
\textsuperscript{395} Lichem, “Das Budapester Kulturforum”, 128f.
Cultural Forum. But the negotiations on the document, which were undertaken by the Austrian head of delegation on behalf of the N+N with the other delegations, proved to be extremely difficult. While all sides accepted the N+N paper as a basis for further negotiations, both West and East demanded far-reaching amendments, which made the adoption of a common concluding document very unlikely. The West qualified the N+N text as “not balanced enough and only insufficiently reflecting the real debates at Budapest”, while Eastern delegations called the same text “too Western”. An informal contact group instigated under the chairmanship of the Austrian delegation leader in the final days of the Cultural Forum did not lead to a rapprochement of positions either. Neither did the successful conclusion of the bilateral superpower summit between Reagan and Gorbachev at the same time in Geneva have any positive influence on the situation in Budapest. Instead, on the final day of the conference, both NATO and Warsaw Pact formally presented their own draft reports, thereby automatically ending the work of the informal contact group. It was now primarily the Hungarian host delegation that tried to save the substance of the talks by finding agreement on a short communiqué-style report to the Vienna meeting. But to everybody’s surprise, such a solution was vetoed by Romania. Officially, the Romanians declared that such formal reports would do nothing to further the development of the CSCE, but it was plain that the real cause for Romania’s obstruction was the delegation’s anger over criticism addressed to them by the host country for the treatment of the ethnic Hungarian minority in their state during the Budapest forum.

While the N+N efforts tobroker a final document mainly failed because the positions of the Soviet Union and the US left no room for maneuver, the last-minute attempt of Hungary at compromise foundered due to bilateral issues with neighboring Romania. It may be this specific reason for the non-result of Budapest that explains why many participants and observers still thought the Cultural Forum had brought about a positive experience:


Similar to the Ottawa meeting, the lack of a concluding document did not detract from the value of the forum which lay in the direct involvement of artists, writers, and other creative individuals and their contacts and discussions both inside and outside the meeting.\(^{398}\)

Most notably, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), the international umbrella organization of non-governmental human rights movements engaged in the CSCE process, had managed to hold a parallel forum bringing together Eastern dissidents and Western intellectuals at the time of the Budapest Cultural Forum. The “Symposium on the Independence of Writers”, which brought together such eminent personalities as Susan Sontag, Per Westberg, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Jiri Grusa, Pavel Kohout, and Vaclav Havel was meant to test Hungarian claims that private individuals would have freedom of assembly during the meeting. The Hungarian authorities under pressure from their Warsaw Pact allies prevented the IHF forum from taking place in its reserved conference rooms at the Intercontinental hotel, but tolerated the organization of the parallel forum in private apartments. The fact that the parallel forum was confined to private rooms, however, only drew additional media attention to the event. In the words of Stefan Lehne, the Austrian delegate to the subsequent Vienna meeting, this had the effect that the parallel forum in the end “had an impact on the international reform in Eastern Europe that equalled or even exceeded that of the official forum”.\(^{399}\) Some of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” seemed to have found its way to Budapest after all.

As for the performance of the N+N states in their role as catalysers and bridge-builders at Budapest, it was once again confirmed that they could only act in this capacity successfully if there was a basic willingness to compromise between the big powers, which provided for the necessary room for maneuver for a mediator. In the absence of such a basic willingness, their ability to influence the talks remained limited in

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the special meetings too, even as controversial plenary debates had been avoided by new procedural arrangements in Budapest.

The Cultural Forum had not only shown the prevailing ideological differences between Eastern and Western conceptions of human rights, but it had also underlined the increasing role of private persons and of non-governmental organizations in the CSCE process, a shift which likely had an effect on the decline of the classic mediator role of the N+N as well. At the same time, the risk of a breakdown of the Helsinki process had decreased, as all participating states obviously agreed that the exercise was worth continuing.\textsuperscript{400}

That the neutral delegates were still cautiously optimistic for the Berne Meeting of Experts on Human Contacts (15 April to 26 May 1986), the last of the non-military follow-up meetings before Vienna, was due to the fact that the human contacts provisions of Basket III were “at the very heart of the Final Act but are less loaded with ideological baggage than the human rights commitments of Principle VII”.\textsuperscript{401} The “more moderate” mandate for the Berne meeting therefore raised hopes for a more pragmatic and constructive discussion than in Ottawa.\textsuperscript{402} Leading up to the Berne meeting, Gorbachev had indeed already taken a number of steps on human rights issues, including granting exit visas for eight separated spouses and releasing Anatoly Shcharansky and other dissidents from prison.

The beginning of the talks in Berne was still marked by opposing positions of East and West. However, as illustrated by a report from Eugen Voss, who had joined the Swiss delegation as an NGO representative, unlike in Ottawa, the East soon ran out of arguments, and the Soviet delegate Yuri Kashlev at first could only cover his weakness by

\textsuperscript{400} Cf. Mastny, \textit{Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security}, 32. However, as Sarah Snyder has shown in a recent article based on new archival material, the arguably failed meetings in Ottawa and Budapest and the stalled discussions at the CDE in Stockholm in 1985 had in fact resurrected earlier internal debate about a US withdrawal from the CSCE. Snyder, “The foundation for Vienna”, 500.

\textsuperscript{401} Lehne, \textit{The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe}, 32.

emotional outbursts and accusations of a general nature. While most Western delegates were still puzzled by the new Soviet CPSU Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev and his politics of perestroika and glasnost, the Swiss noted a definite change in the atmosphere in the course of the meeting. By the penultimate week of the meeting in mid-May 1986, delegates from East and West were engaging in a serious and substantial dialog on 45 new proposals that were now on the table, and no longer just engaged in trench warfare along predefined lines over fundamental ideological positions as in Ottawa. Many delegations were also able to solve individual cases of family reunification, family visits, and bi-national marriages at the meeting, using formal and informal contacts alike.

New proposals in Berne were no longer introduced by blocs, but by individual delegations, with the formal support of various co-sponsors. Eastern delegations presented 22 proposals. Western states entered an almost equal number of 20. From the N+N side, Yugoslavia registered two proposals (on migrant workers and national minorities), and Austria-Switzerland submitted one (on family visits). For the first time, the delegations seemed ready to quit the bloc-to-bloc negotiation scheme in the CSCE with the N+N as a third party in between. This allowed the N+N states also to support individually other initiatives, such as a broadly supported proposal on the improvement of religious contacts.

406 For an overview of the various proposals and the main aims presented therein, see Ghébali, La diplomatie de la détente, 306ff.
407 CSCE/BME.43 and 44, both of 8 May 1986.
408 CSCE/BME.36, 5 May 1986.
co-sponsored by Austria, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein,\(^{409}\) or a Norwegian proposal on family reunions for minors supported by Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland.\(^{410}\)

Governmental efforts by Western and neutral states in Berne to promote compliance with CSCE commitments in Eastern states were matched by an equally active participation of non-governmental groups and organizations in the conference lobby. The question of “openness”, i.e., of the degree to which the public and the media should have access to the conference deliberations, had been a central political issue during the preparatory consultations for Berne.\(^{411}\) Unlike in Ottawa, where the sessions had been closed to the public, and media attention in consequence was rather low, the delegates this time had agreed to allow photographers to enter the conference hall at the beginning of each meeting for a few minutes to take pictures.\(^{412}\) Furthermore, delegates (including delegates from the East!) adopted the new practice of making copies of their statements available immediately to the journalists waiting in the lobby after their presentation, and active media work became a crucial element in Berne.\(^{413}\) Whereas the confidentiality of the talks had originally been a key factor for the successful conclusion of the 1975 Helsinki accords,\(^{414}\) with the balance slowly but surely tipping in favor of Western arguments in the mid-1980s, greater openness of the CSCE meetings clearly helped the aims and working methods of non-governmental actors.

Besides their direct access to the conference area, where they tried to win the delegations for their causes, the NGOs engaged in a number of activities on the side such as seminars, religious services, press conferences, or demonstrations to attract the attention of the media and poli-

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409 CSCE/BME.26, 2 May 1986, further sponsors were Italy, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Holy See, Ireland, Canada, Norway, Spain, the US, and Iceland.

410 CSCE/BME.6, 1 May 1986.


412 This had been the result of a compromise at the preparatory meeting between the West, who wanted the whole sessions to be accessible for the media, and the East, which insisted on the previous policy of confidentiality of the talks.


414 Fischer, Neutral Power in the CSCE, 330f.
tics. The biggest such event was the parallel “alternative conference” to the Berne meeting organized by the Internationale de la Résistance and the Sakharov Institute, which brought together émigré dissidents like Vladimir Bukovsky and Leonid Plyushch, as well as prominent supporters such as Yves Montand and Eugène Ionescu. Similar to the “parallel forum” in Budapest, the event attracted considerable public attention and probably had no small influence on the course of discussions behind closed doors in Berne.

These shifts in the basic conference constellation – no more strict bloc-to-bloc negotiations, a more constructive approach on the side of Warsaw Pact states, increasing influence of NGO and media work – left their mark on the role of the N+N states in the CSCE. Berne actually gave an idea of the changing role in the neutral delegations’ work in the CSCE during the intermediary years between Madrid and Vienna, which changed from their classic role of mediators and bridge-builders between East and West towards a cooperative role with like-minded individual states and NGO representatives.

The one classical task that was still assigned to the N+N as a group in the end was the establishment of a draft for the final document. In the light of the Ottawa and Budapest experiences, the neutrals, together with the Western states, had been skeptical at the outset of the Berne meeting as to whether it would be possible and advisable to aim at such a document. But with the impression of a growing willingness to make concessions on the Soviet side, the West during the meeting had changed its position with regard to this question. First attempts to arrive at the necessary compromises were made by establishing informal contact groups (NATO/EC, Warsaw Pact, N+N), but internal differences among the Western states as to who should participate in these talks

415 To get access to the Berne meeting interested NGOs had to find a CSCE delegation willing to act as their “sponsor”. Having found an official sponsor the NGOs were allowed to the lobby area as well as to the few public sessions in the conference hall. Out of 27 international NGOs that finally registered for the Berne meeting, six were actually parented by the Swiss delegation. AfZ, G2W, file “KSZE: Konferenzen, Expertentreffen – KSZE, Bern 2”: Executive Secretariat, “Merkblatt für Nichtsstaatliche Organisationen (NSO)”, 10 March 1986.


on their side delayed the implementation. Instead, Berne witnessed the invention of yet another CSCE negotiating mechanism with the establishment of the so-called “sounding group” on 20 May 1986, reuniting two Western (the Netherlands as the EC chair, and the US) and two Eastern delegations (the Soviet Union and Romania) to find out preferences and possibilities for concessions. The N+N were represented only on the margins of these talks with an observer. But because the US delegate went so far in the sounding group as to present concrete changes to the Western proposals without prior consultations of his own allies (not to mention the N+N), the experiment found a premature ending after just two sessions.418

This development played into the hands of the N+N, which had meanwhile – in an attempt to regain their traditional intermediary role between East and West – set up a first informal draft for a concluding document authored by Switzerland and Austria, including their own proposal for family visits.419 On the basis of this Swiss-Austrian draft, the N+N were able to present a non-paper to the other delegations on 22 May, at the first meeting of the East-West-N+N contact group, which grouped the entirety of proposals into four thematic corpuses.420 The contact group remained in session over the following days almost without interruption, and the active participation of all delegations as well as Eastern flexibility in the negotiations suggested that the work coordinated by the Austrian head of delegation, Ambassador Rudolf Torovsky, would eventually bear fruit.421

But in the final moments of the meeting in the early morning hours of Monday, 26 May, the predefined final date for the ending of the meeting, the success of the conference was once more in jeopardy, as the bottom line of possible concessions had been reached without agreement. Since Saturday, 23 May, the delegates had extended the time for discussions by stopping the conference clocks, but now time was defi-

418 Posch-Plassnik, “Das Berner KSZE-Expertentreffen über menschliche Kontakte”, 84.
In the morning hours of 26 May, the N+N once more summed up the progress made so far and supplemented a possible compromise formulation for the yet unresolved substantial questions. The drama that was now unfolding, was unprecedented even in the CSCE: The press had already arrived at the conference hall to follow the public concluding session, while the delegations still negotiated behind closed doors. The conference clock had to be stopped repeatedly by the hour, until finally the N+N proposal CSCE/BME.49 (officially dated 23 May) could be submitted to the other participants. At the last session of the contact group a few hours later, the Austrian coordinator asked for consensus, which was ultimately given also by the US and Romania, on condition of agreement of their governments back home.

The text of BME.49 was taken “ad referendum”, and while delegates took a much needed respite and started to talk to the press about the imminent agreement reached at the very last minute, within an hour, rumours started to swirl around the conference lobby that the US delegation had received instructions to ultimately refuse consensus. Everything fell to pieces again. In a desperate last attempt, the state secretary of the Swiss foreign ministry Edouard Brunner, an experienced CSCE diplomat himself, called the State Department in Washington to change its course of action. The concluding session of the meeting was adjourned yet once more – but to no avail. Out of the diplomatic chaos prevailing for the rest of the day, in the evening hours certainty gradually took hold that no more way out of the impasse could be found.

The decision by the White House to deny consensus had taken everybody by surprise. No one had really expected the US government to veto the solution found on the basis of BME.49. The main stumbling block for the US was the lack of an article on individual human rights for ethnic minorities in the concluding document that would implicitly have facilitated the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. While the domestic context certainly played an important role for the Reagan

422 The West had presented a final “position paper” (CSCE/BME.47, officially dated 23 May 1986), which stood against an Eastern draft report on the meeting from the Warsaw Pact states (CSCE/BME.48, 23 May 1986).
424 Ibid., 87; Cf. Swiss Press Agency (SDA), “Kein KSZE-Schlussdokument für Bern: USA verweigern als einziger Teilnehmer die Zustimmung”, 26 May 1986;
administration’s decision to deny consensus in Berne, it strongly upset US allies, and the US maneuver caused resentment among the participating diplomats.\textsuperscript{425} The Austrian head of delegation, Ambassador Torovsky, who had coordinated the final negotiations in Berne, called the US veto a “political accident” that unfortunately played into the hands of Soviet propaganda.\textsuperscript{426}

Although the Berne meeting thus became the third follow-up event in a row to end without agreement on a concluding document, many observers still qualified it a success: “The renewed willingness of the East to engage in negotiations on new humanitarian commitments as well as the solution of many individual cases were reasons to hope for productive work at Vienna.”\textsuperscript{427} This positive outlook on the Vienna review meeting was reinforced when, a few months later, the Stockholm Meeting on Military Confidence- and Security-Building Measures—held in parallel to Ottawa, Budapest, and Berne—formally ended with a substantive concluding document.

The significance of the non-military follow-up to Madrid between 1984 and 1986 is probably best summed up in the following assessment of Sarah Snyder:

Beyond the dialogue among the delegates and the first signs of progress toward resolving individual human rights and human contacts cases, the interim meetings also contributed substantively to the specific agreements reached in Vienna in that each side had a stable of previously formulated proposals to deploy at the review meeting. For example, in Vienna the NATO states drew upon their earlier efforts at Bern, introducing a proposal that focused on the right to emigrate and to return to one’s country that stipulated all CSCE states should issue their citizens passports and abolish the need to secure an exit visa. Similarly Austria and Switzerland submitted a proposal based on an earlier formulation, which laid out specific timetables to address those petitioning to travel abroad.\textsuperscript{428}

\textsuperscript{425} Snyder, “The foundation of Vienna”, 501; Cf. Lehne, \textit{The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe}, 33.

\textsuperscript{426} Höll, “Kleinstaaten im Entspannungsprozess”, 302.

\textsuperscript{427} Lehne, \textit{The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe}, 33.

\textsuperscript{428} Snyder, “The foundation of Vienna”, 503.
The Swiss delegation came to a similar conclusion already at the time of the holding of the Vienna review conference. Reporting from the early stages of the meeting that a number of the main proposals presented to the Ottawa and Berne meetings were on the negotiation table again, Swiss delegate Eugen Voss noted: “Seen from this perspective, the expert meetings had been worth the trouble, despite the fact they have ended without concluding documents.”\(^{429}\)

### 3.3 Outlook on the Vienna Meeting

The third CSCE full review meeting, which was held in Vienna between November 1986 and January 1989, took place against the background of highly dynamic developments in Eastern Europe and became a turning point in the European security talks. As illustrated in the preceding sections of this chapter, when the meeting in Vienna started, East-West relations were already improving, but the political constellation of the CSCE process, two antagonistic blocs and the group of N+\(N\) countries, still remained in place. When it ended, the Eastern bloc was disintegrating and the division of Europe was approaching its end. It was in this context that the N+\(\text{N}\), too, experienced a noticeable role change, which had been heralded by the emergence of an active “civil society” in several Eastern European countries during the first two CSCE follow-up meetings in Belgrade and Madrid, and with first traces of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” becoming visible in the Soviet CSCE diplomacy during the special meetings in the years 1984 to 1986.

In particular, the role of neutral mediators was no longer needed in the CSCE at the Vienna meeting to the same degree as before. While Madrid was the “heroic” phase of N+\(N\) bridge-building between East and West, the Vienna meeting took place in a very different, comparatively “unheroic” atmosphere:

East-West relations continued to improve throughout the conference. At no point was there a threat to the continuation of the negotiations, though it proved rather difficult to bring them to an end. Since the delegations of NATO and the W[arsaw]
T[reaty] O[rganization] enjoyed good working relations, there was hardly a need for the NNAs [neutral and non-aligned] to act as go-betweens.\textsuperscript{430}

Furthermore, internal differences complicated the N+N cooperation at Vienna. In particular, divisions within the group on military security issues and the uncertainty about the human dimension made the early drafting of a commonly sponsored concluding document impossible.\textsuperscript{431}

Thus, partly as a result of reduced group cohesion, partly as a consequence of the improved East-West climate and of the changing constellations at the conference, the erstwhile key role of the N+N as a coordinating and mediating third party was no longer in demand. Instead, this role was now often fulfilled by other actors in Vienna:

The Western and the NNA countries were often confronted with three or more separate Eastern views. Hungary and Poland, as the reform vanguard, made it clear from the beginning that they could accept most of the Western proposals. At times, they acted very similarly to NNA countries in attempting to mediate between the West and their most conservative WTO partners.\textsuperscript{432}

While individual N+N delegations still made significant contributions to the Vienna negotiations in Basket III in particular, the coordinating role of the N+N only gained significance again towards the very end of the negotiating process, when East and West once more thought the impetus of an N+N draft document might be helpful for the conclusion of the talks. This time it was less a classic bridge-building exercise, but the challenge in building consensus on a comprehensive draft lay in the unprecedented quantity and complexity of the negotiating material, the existence of a multiplicity of viewpoints and the emergence of many non-East-West issues in the drafting process.\textsuperscript{433}

\textsuperscript{430} Lehne/Neuhold, “The Role of the Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries at the Vienna Meeting”, 48.

\textsuperscript{431} Cf. Höll, “Zusammenarbeit Österreich – Jugoslawien im multilateralen Rahmen”, 167f.

\textsuperscript{432} Lehne/Neuhold, “The Role of the Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries at the Vienna Meeting”, 48.

\textsuperscript{433} Ibid., 49f.
Primary source material emanating from N+N state archives is not yet available for historical research on this period and the transitional phase following after the end of the Cold War, which led to the adoption of the “Charter for a New Europe” in 1990 in Paris as a new basic document for the work of the CSCE in the future. Hence, it makes little sense to go further into the details of the Vienna follow-up meeting here, as it would be impossible to add much to Stefan Lehne’s contemporary study published in 1991, which so far remains the best account of events of the third CSCE follow-up meeting. With a view to the overall argument made in this study about the N+N as an important lifeline to the Helsinki process in the late 1970s and early 1980s, this does not change anything in the author’s view, however, as with the Vienna meeting, the CSCE entered a new phase in its history in which the N+N no longer played the same crucial role for the existence and continuation of the negotiation process as before.

4 CONCLUSIONS

In his review of *Neutral Power in the CSCE*, Michael Cotey Morgan commented that “perhaps the most salient question [with regard to the role of the N+N in the European security talks] is a counterfactual one: Would the CSCE have turned out any differently had the neutrals simply sat quietly on the margins?”\(^\text{435}\) It is not the place to return to the pre-1975 phase of the Helsinki history here, but we may just take up the *what-if*-question for a final assessment of the role of the N+N states in the CSCE follow-up in the years 1975 to 1986 in order to measure their long-term contribution to the Helsinki process.

In analyzing the role of the N+N during the first two follow-up meetings in Belgrade, Madrid and at the CSCE special meetings preceding the Vienna review, the source material presented in this study clearly illustrates that the N+N played their most important part in the CSCE follow-up process in their position as go-betweens and catalysts of the negotiations between East and West. It has been the working hypothesis for this study that the N+N saved the European security talks from failure during these most critical years in the late 1970s and early 1980s and thereby provided an indispensable lifeline to the Helsinki process, which ultimately contributed to the demise of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

The findings of this study illustrate that despite initial hopes for a certain role change after 1975 (emphasizing the role as initiators and negotiators of their own proposals rather than the position as “honest brokers”), the N+N in the long run had to realize that their role in the CSCE process by and large continued to be determined by the state of relations between the two military alliances in East and West. The bloc constellation ultimately defined the parameters that set the framework of possible action of the N+N as an independent third group actor be-

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sidest NATO/EC and the Warsaw Pact countries in the CSCE. Within this externally defined leeway, the N+N deserve irrevocable credit for having consistently performed important services as bridge-builders for new ideas and as mediators of compromises in the CSCE. This was most crucial at the Madrid follow-up meeting in an atmosphere of tensely strained superpower relations, when the N+N with their mediatory efforts kept the Helsinki process alive under the most adverse international circumstances.

A number of questions were raised in the introduction to this study that helped guide the research for this study. In the following, a review of these points shall help to evaluate in greater detail the long-term contribution of the N+N in their role as neutral bridge-builders to the Helsinki process.

1) With respect to the question of the risk of a discontinuation of the Helsinki follow-up and a premature ending of the CSCE process in the years 1975 to 1986, it has become evident from the source material available for this study that at several instances at the end of Belgrade and during Madrid, the danger of a disruption of the CSCE was real; most visibly in the context of the confrontational human rights policy of the Carter administration, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at Christmas 1979, and the declaration of martial law in Poland in late 1981. Following the dramatic confrontation at the first follow-up meeting in Belgrade, the Soviet foreign ministry contemplated for the first time whether it was worth pursuing the negotiation process or whether the Helsinki decisions of 1975 should be considered a one-time success, but an exercise which should not be repeated in light of the stern accusations raised by the US regarding human rights issues. However, Brezhnev had invested his personal prestige in the CSCE from the beginning, and the Soviet government was apparently reluctant to terminate the process prematurely. The explanation for this is that it did not wish to impede the formation of a businesslike relationship with a new US administration,
which was about to be elected in November 1979. Well into the preparatory meeting for Madrid in summer 1980, it was uncertain, however, whether agreement on a timetable and an agenda for the next follow-up meeting could be reached in the face of Soviet stalling tactics, which declared it had no interest at all in holding the main meeting as long as the accusations from the US over Afghanistan and the unfolding crisis in Poland continued. This was one of the moments when the diplomatic creativity of the neutral delegates as mediators was desperately needed to provide a way out of the limbo in order to make the opening of the Madrid meeting possible at all. After the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981 (vigorously protested by the West at the CSCE), it was the Polish government that considered giving up participation in the Helsinki follow-up process for good, and the US, too, was hard to convince to stay at the negotiation table. Again, the threats of ending the CSCE process were serious, and it took the proposal for a recess by the N+N as well as further ensuing mediatory initiatives from their side over the summer of 1982 to get the negotiations going again. It was not until October 1982 that the danger of a disruption of the talks was definitely averted at Madrid. The N+N proposal for a longer recess was important, as it officially allowed the conference to be adjourned on procedural grounds, avoiding a worsening of the overall situation by stating political reasons for this decision. During the intermission, West German Foreign Minister Genscher played an important part in ensuring that the US would continue to participate at the CSCE, while N+N delegations provided the necessary exchange of information between the blocs during the eight months break. Another explanation why the negotiations in Madrid never did break off entirely before an agreement on a concluding document was reached in summer 1983 was that no country was ultimately willing to take the individual blame for a premature disruption of the talks and for ending the CSCE process altogether.

During the special meetings in Stockholm, Ottawa, Budapest, and Berne following the Madrid conference, the risk of a discontinuation of the Helsinki process clearly diminished. Only once more does there seem to have been serious internal debate in Washington about a US withdrawal from the CSCE. After the arguably failed meetings in Ot-
tawa on human rights and the Cultural Forum in Budapest, which took place against the background of stalled discussions at the parallel CDE in Stockholm in 1985, the White House once more considered such a step, but these considerations were never further expressed at the CSCE, and the Helsinki follow-up seems no longer to have been seriously in jeopardy after the initial year of Mikhail Gorbachev being in power in the Kremlin.

2) As for the instruments and means of the N+N for mitigating existing disputes between the military bloc powers, neutral bridge-building in the CSCE follow-up process took shape in a number of ways: The first was their offer to act as hosts of the follow-up meetings, a tradition continued from the original CSCE taking place in Finland and Switzerland. Generally, the significance of this role can be explained in the following words: “In periods of high tensions, each party tends to regard its consent to negotiate with its adversary on the latter’s territory as a sign of weakness. Under these circumstances, a neutral venue provides a face-saving device to all sides concerned.”

In this light, it was hardly a coincidence that the follow-up meetings were all held in neutral and non-bloc countries, and that the most important conference on a single issue area, part I of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe on CSBMs, took place in Stockholm.

In their capacity as bridge-builders at the follow-up meetings, the N+N primarily acted on the procedural level. In particular, they repeatedly served as “impartial” co-ordinators of informal groups at the CSCE meetings. This, again, was a continuation of their role in the original Helsinki negotiations, and despite its low-profile character, this task was no less political than the actual negotiations on the substance, which were led by the bloc powers. On the contrary, questions of timetables and agenda at the preparatory meetings, as well as the redactional work for the drafting of the concluding documents were of the utmost political significance, as the formal opening and conclusion of the respec-

436 Lehne and Neuhold, “The Role of the Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries at the Vienna Meeting”, 33f.

437 At the time of the opening of the Madrid meeting, Spain was not yet a member of NATO alliance, and was probably given the privilege of hosting the second follow-up meeting to strengthen and demonstrate its progress in the transition from a state under military rule by Franco to a democratic system.
tive meetings depended on it – and thus the continuation of the CSCE process as a whole. The following excerpts from a Swiss report already quoted in the Madrid chapter of this study serve as an illustration of the importance of and the demand for this role: When looking for a way out of the East-West stalemate at the end of the preparatory meeting in autumn 1980, “as usual in such CSCE situations all eyes would turn to the neutrals”, and “the Soviet delegation treated us separately and the US and other Western States claimed to be in dire need of an initiative from the neutrals to at least unblock the preparatory meeting.” In such instances, it was for the N+N to generate the language acceptable to all sides that could provide the basis for a way out of the impasse. The importance of the procedural initiative sponsored by the N+N has already been mentioned, which in early 1982 called for the adjournment of the meeting as a “cooling-off period”, in order to overcome the deadlock in the wake of the imposition of martial law in Poland. As mentioned above, the circumstances leading to this initiative make it clear that it was a political motivated maneuver disguised as a procedural proposal to make it more acceptable to all.

In short, when the bloc powers wished to continue the dialog after both sides had dug their heels deep into the ground of fierce ideological debates, they usually needed a third party to provide them with a face-saving solution. Face-saving was also an important aspect of N+N proposals in instances where they came to act as mediators on issues of substance. Such was the case, for instance, when the N+N tabled their compromise text CSCE/RM/39revised in Madrid, which paved the way for the adoption of a substantial concluding document in September 1983. That proposals submitted by the N+N were easier to accept as a basis for further negotiations than those of the opposite blocs is also illustrated by the fact that in 1985, Gorbachev was willing to agree to the idea for exchange of annual calendars of military activities at the CDE in Stockholm on the basis of a proposition by the N+N, whereas he had dismissed such a suggestion when it was previously presented by NATO in the CSBM talks.

Some of the long-standing N+N CSCE delegates were well aware that the military alliances needed the N+N at decisive moments in the

negotiations as an “impartial third party” precisely because of the face-saving value of their initiatives. Occasionally, N+N delegations therefore even tried to use their position by “going public” or calling on their foreign ministers to declare a proposal a “last offer” for mediation; unless it was accepted, the N+N would cease all their efforts at finding a solution to the problem, which would inevitably render the situation more complicated for the bloc powers. By applying such a maneuver, the Swiss and Austrian delegates Edouard Brunner and Franz Ceska managed to bring the preparatory meeting for Madrid to a timely conclusion. On other occasions, such “soft blackmailing tactics” did not work, however, or were not given the support of all members of the N+N group: For example, when Austrian Foreign Minister Pahr proposed that the presentation of an informal non-paper be made in Madrid in March 1981 on the level N+N foreign ministers to give it more political weight; or when Finnish President Koivisto decided to throw his personal prestige into the balance and wanted to push for an early acceptance of the N+N proposal CSCE/RM/39rev. before Easter 1983 together with the other N+N heads of state and government.

3) While neutral bridge-building was indeed in high demand by the big powers during Belgrade and Madrid, the intrinsic motivation of the N+N to act as catalysts of the talks still remains to be explained in more detail: First, the aftermath of the Helsinki summit 1975 and the preparations for the Belgrade meeting made it clear that during the negotiations of the Helsinki Final Act, the N+N had developed a deep commitment to the continuation of the CSCE in the form of periodic follow-up conferences. Regular future CSCE meetings were seen to be in their own interests as much as in those of Europe as a whole. For some of the N+N – in particular, the members of the group bordering the Iron Curtain (Austria, Finland, Yugoslavia) – the CSCE in itself became an element of stability, and thus assumed a fundamental importance in their national security policy throughout the remainder of the Cold War.

The second and almost equally important aspect of the motivation for working consistently for a continuation of the Helsinki process was the claim to legitimacy and prestige that the neutral states derived from
the CSCE by playing a useful role in European security affairs. The Helsinki process was the perfect platform for demonstrating their ability to transform the traditional mediating/bridge-building function of neutrality from the classic bilateral good offices policy into a multilateral framework of European East-West negotiations. In fact, the procedural rules and the decisionmaking by consensus in the CSCE provided the smaller European N+N states with a unique opportunity to enter into discussions with the military and political heavyweights in Europe on an equal footing.

Third, the N+N themselves had specific group interests in particular in Basket I (confidence-building measures) and III (human contacts, information), which they realized could most forcefully be introduced by making them part of their comprehensive compromise proposals submitted to the conference. Combining the role of initiators and bridge-builders may have prevented the N+N at certain points from defending their own proposals of substance more vigorously, but at the same time, they were thus able to ensure that their specific demands were not just swept under the carpet by the military alliances altogether.

4) The best way of analyzing the factors contributing to the success or failure of neutral mediation in the CSCE follow-up process is probably by comparing the two meetings of Belgrade and Madrid, where in the latter case, a substantial concluding document was achieved on the basis of an N+N draft proposal, whereas in the former, the same exercise led nowhere, and only the minimal result of a continuation of the negotiating process as such was secured in the end. Certainly, the timing of any mediating initiative as well as the “linguistic creativity” of those working in the direction of final compromises was crucial. But what Belgrade and Madrid demonstrated beyond the question of the general atmosphere prevailing at the negotiations – which could be more or less conducive to success, but was poor on both occasions cited here –, is the fact that there was only a chance for successful N+N mediation if there was something at stake for the big powers.

If there was no general willingness to compromise in East and West (or to put it more succinctly: in Washington and Moscow), the room for mediating activities from a third side remained extremely limited, even if the timing for such an initiative seemed right. On several occasions, the N+N learned the hard way that their means of influencing the
course of events remained narrowly defined by the superpowers’ overall willingness to enter into such discussions. That “material for negotiations” on both sides was required to make decisive breakthroughs possible is illustrated by the Soviet interest at Madrid in the convening of a new European disarmament conference, which offered the potential for a major East-West trade-off with the opening of new negotiations on military security against new commitments and specialized follow-up meetings on human rights and Basket III, which were the agenda priorities of the US and its Western allies at that time. At Belgrade, the Soviets had no similar ambitions, and Western demands for improvement of human rights standards simply fell on deaf ears in the East. Lehne and Neuhold noted another observation from the later CSCE special meetings that illustrates the possibilities and limitations of neutral mediation in the CSCE follow-up process, which points in the same direction:

A sobering lesson for third parties, which the NNAs had to learn again, is that they cannot force their well-meant services on the two blocs. Bridge-building in international conflicts requires an appropriate degree of “adversary partnership”. If relations between the opponents are too conflictual, the assistance of a third party is not wanted; if they are too good, it is not needed. For the NNAs, the CDE was a case in point (and not the only one). As long as the Conference was still overshadowed by the “New Cold War”, the members of NATO and the WTO were unwilling to move towards bridging the gulf between their positions as adopted at the outset. In the final phase, the representatives of the two superpowers negotiated directly with each other. The neutrals were originally invited by the FRG to make inspection aircraft available, but when they complied with this request their offer was brushed aside in order to accommodate the Soviet Union.439

What the N+N were able to do in order to strengthen their role as mediators was constantly to test the waters for potential compromises with the big powers. When the window of opportunity for mediatory initiatives opened, it was often left to the ingenuity of the N+N diplomats involved in the mediating activities to table a formula providing

439 Lehne and Neuhold, “The Role of the Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries at the Vienna Meeting”, 35.
a satisfactory solution to everyone. Notably, the heads of the Swiss and Austrian delegations, Edouard Brunner and Franz Ceska, proved to be skilful negotiators and repeatedly acted as “lubricants” for the stuttering motor of the conference until the international atmosphere in the mid-1980s changed to a more favorable situation for direct talks between East and West.

5) With the benefit of hindsight, the bridge-building/catalyst function of the N+N in the CSCE follow-up was particularly important in connection with the long-term effect of governmental and non-governmental Helsinki network activities on the regime changes in Eastern Europe. It is probably fair to say that without the continuity of the multilateral CSCE process at the diplomatic level, the transnational political movements advocating human rights would have lacked the necessary platform and media attention to stage their demands with regard to a change in the political system of the East at that critical period of the Cold War. Some of the N+N delegates seem to have understood this dynamic early on and invested consistently in keeping the “Helsinki grail”. Again, the names of Edouard Brunner and Franz Ceska stand out in this respect among the group of N+N representatives at Belgrade and Madrid. Theirs was a genuine conviction that if the European security talks became a long-term process engaging the East in a continuous exchange, it would only benefit Western ideas and would eventually help undermine the totalitarian regimes inside Moscow’s sphere of influence. While this expectation was true with regard to the Eastern European countries, it is still disputed today how much influence this factor had on the Soviet Union’s regime change.

It remains the fact that the most important long-term contribution of neutral bridge-building in the CSCE was the direct impact on the survival of the follow-up process itself, even if this was a minimal achievement only, as in the case of the Belgrade meeting. But as many proposals and new ideas that were introduced in vain at Belgrade and Madrid reappeared and could partially be implemented at later stages of the CSCE special meetings and in Vienna, the reaching of such minimal compromises on the continuation of the talks again gains significance over the long run.

6) The N+N as a group were by no means a homogeneous circle in the CSCE follow-up process from Helsinki to Vienna. Although their co-
operation became more regular and quasi-institutionalized in the wake of the Helsinki summit 1975, they remained a rather a loose coalition of states with similar interests that acted individually or as a group depending on the issues and positions at stake throughout the remaining period of the CSCE process. In organizational terms, they were a loose caucus with no standing institution or permanent secretariat. The N+N never formed a third bloc, as this would have explicitly violated the principles of neutrality. Instead, they continued to meet on an ad-hoc basis if a common position or joint action seemed advisable. The level of such meetings (foreign ministers, their deputies, CSCE diplomats, or military experts) was decided from case to case. At the same time, a certain hierarchy remained a defining feature of the N+N collaboration, with the four neutrals building the core of the group that often discussed the state of the situation among themselves exclusively first, before welcoming Yugoslavia as the lead non-aligned nation in Europe next, and including the rest of the non-aligned states only at the end of the internal deliberation process.

Regarding the mediating function of the N+N in the CSCE follow-up process, there existed a certain “natural” division of labor within the group, notably among the four neutral states: The Finns usually reflected the Soviet position with high accuracy, and the Swiss with their transatlantic outlook were considered the best informed on the Western camp, while the Austrians and sometimes also the Swedes acted as arbiters between these positions. This prefiguration of the conference structure was often useful in finding acceptable solutions for all sides, but as this study shows, it also provoked dissent within the N+N over how to proceed as a group. Such differences became evident towards the end of Belgrade as well as at the end of Madrid, when in both instances the draft documents for a conclusion of the meetings tabled by the N+N met with resistance on the part of the bloc powers. On both occasions, the N+N group risked losing cohesion over differences of strategy and approach on how to continue; at the heart of these debates was always the question of how much they could and should give up on their own proposals in order to find a compromise between the positions of East and West. Out of a similar constellation, the N+N found it increasingly difficult to define a common position when it came to their own inter-
ests in the CSBM talks in Stockholm; the internal discussions there ultimately resulted in a weakening of their standing in the negotiations.

In such instances, the different basic approaches to détente (“CSCE as a barometer of the state of East-West relations” vs. “CSCE as a driver of détente”) repeatedly surfaced within the group, with the Swiss and the Swedes usually taking the realist perspective and the Austrians and the Finns reflecting the optimist view. When it came to military topics, more specifically, a particular challenge was to accommodate the needs and fears of the different geostrategic locations and military systems (militia vs. standing army) represented by non-aligned Yugoslavia and the four neutrals.

7) This study has shown sufficiently the firm and consistent commitment of the N+N group to the CSCE follow-up in combination with their readiness to accept the intermediary position when the bloc powers sought compromise. It remains to be considered what would have happened if the N+N countries had just idly sat by on the margins of the Helsinki follow-up. Based on the findings from the source material presented in this study, it is argued here that the N+N, in fact, provided the conference with mediatory services that only this group of states could perform in the CSCE. This is not to say that in general, such bridge-building functions can only be performed by neutral/non-aligned states, but it is hard to imagine that any other single state or group of countries could have played this crucial role in the context of the heated ideological debates in which the Helsinki follow-up process took place. Had any of the smaller allied powers with a more independent profile (such as the Canada or Norway in NATO, or Romania in the Warsaw Pact) tried to assume this role, it would almost immediately have been caught in alliance entanglements. The author is therefore convinced that for the survival of the Helsinki process, “someone” had to perform the role of bridge-builder and catalyst of the talks, and that under the circumstances prevailing at the CSCE conferences in the years 1975 to 1986, the N+N were the only ones in a position to fulfil this task. Looking at the bigger picture, it is probably in this role at the CSCE that the N+N contributed most to overcoming the Cold War in Europe.

8) Finally, it is worth looking at the question of what the CSCE experience tells us about the role of the neutrals in the Cold War as a whole. First of all, the example of the Helsinki process illustrates that even the neu-
trals and non-aligned, which by definition tried to remain aloof from the superpower conflicts, were deeply connected and interlinked to the ups and downs of the ideological confrontations of the Cold War. They could have stayed on the sidelines of the CSCE by not participating – as the case of Albania illustrates –, but that would only have weakened their position in Cold War Europe. Not being able to rely on political and military might to secure their interests, they had every interest in sitting at the same table with the big powers in the CSCE and to try to inject their own ideas and ideals into the negotiations. In the context of an ideologically loaded global conflict, which threatened to narrow their room for maneuver and their claim to independence, the CSCE and its follow-up process was as much a chance as a challenge to their policies of neutrality and non-alignment. In particular, the issues debated in Baskets I and III at the CSCE negotiations forced them to adopt a standpoint on matters on which they had usually declined to take a public stand as neutrals in previous decades of the Cold War.

However, in the end, it was precisely because of the prevailing ideological and political differences of the bloc powers that the N+N came to play such an eminent role as bridge-builders between East and West in the CSCE during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In seeking and accepting the role as intermediaries in the CSCE, the N+N for once became important catalysts of key events in Europe, as the bridge-builder role they performed in the negotiations was literally indispensable for keeping the Helsinki process alive when superpower relations were particularly strained. At the same time, the CSCE is a good reminder of the fact that the influence of the N+N always remained dependent on and restricted to the room the superpowers and the bloc members allowed them for their foreign and security policy initiatives in the Cold War.
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6 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AfZ Archiv für Zeitgeschichte, Zürich
BAR Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, Bern
CBM Confidence-Building Measures
CDE Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CSBM Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSSR Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
EC European Communities
ETYK Euroopan turvallisuus- ja yhteistyökonferenssi
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
G2W Glaube in der 2. Welt
GDR German Democratic Republic
INF Intermediate Nuclear Forces
KSZE Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa
MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (talks)
N+N Neutral and Non-Aligned (states)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFU No First Use (principle)
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NWFZ Nuclear Weapons-free Zone
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SRPD Système de règlement pacifique des différends
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
UK United Kingdom
UMA Ulkoasiainministeriön Arkisto, Helsinki
UN United Nations
US United States
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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