XENOPHOBIA AND MIGRANTS

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Anti-Migrant Riots in Russia: the Mobilizing Potential of Xenophobia

Marlene Laruelle, Washington

Abstract

October’s ethnic riots in Biryulyovo, a working-class district in southern Moscow, can be seen as a turning point in the history of xenophobia in Russia. The watchdog group SOVA classifies violence against people identified as foreigners, which also includes legal Russian citizens of North Caucasian origin, as the third-most common type of violence in Russia. This comes after violence toward new religious movements (NRM) and people belonging to the LGBT community. However, the political significance of ethnic violence outweights that of actions against religious and sexual minorities, which remain marginalized and without the capacity to garner collective reaction. Ethnic violence is most important in terms of its role in reshaping Russia’s national identity, even if in this domain, the three categories of violence have followed similar trajectories. Religious, sexual, and ethnic minorities are explicitly excluded from the national community, which is implicitly defined by affiliation with Orthodoxy, moral values symbolized by heterosexuality, and Russian ethno-cultural identity.

The Opening of Pandora’s Box…

Violence with a racist character (I exclude here ethnic violence that happens in quasi-civil war situations, as experienced several times in the recent history of the North Caucasus) has been on the rise in Russia since the second half of the 2000s. It grew rapidly—from 219 attacks in 2004 (of which 50 were fatal) to 623 in 2007 (of which 93 were fatal)—with virtually no repressive or preventative responses from the Russian authorities. Then the situation changed in 2007. The ethnic riots in Kondopoga, Karelia, in the fall of 2006 emboldened nationalist movements, which celebrated them as the ‘awakening of the Russian people.’ The fact that they brought several thousand people into the streets worried the political elites. At the same time, the rise in skirmishes between skinhead groups and security forces in Moscow city and region resulted in the local authorities adopting a more repressive policy. They abandoned the laissez-faire attitude toward skinhead groups that prevailed among the special services and police, and improved the legal tools at their disposal—particularly Penal Code Article 282, which concerns incitement to interethnic hatred (razzhiganie mezhnatsional’noi roznii). Racist violence fell considerably in Moscow and St Petersburg, then in the rest of the country. Yet this drop should be interpreted with caution. Report of such incidents, especially among migrants who do not want to draw the attention of the policy, remains low and many acts of racist violence are still classified as hooliganism.

However, one category of violence replaced the other. Although skinhead violence (usually defined as small groups of radical youth beating up one or more victims) is officially in decline, interethnic skirmishes between young groups defined at “ethnic Russians” and “North-Caucasians” are on the rise. Larger incidents with xenophobic undercurrents are also on the rise. In 2010, around 5,000 nationalists with racist banners and chanting occupied Moscow’s central Manezh Square, an incident sparked by the killing of a soccer fan. In 2011 in Sagra, a small village near Yekaterinburg, locals forced Azerbaijani and gypsy mafia figures out of the town. And in 2013, following the murder of a “Russian” by someone identified as “Chechen”, a crowd of hundreds of people went to the Chechen district in Pugachev, a small town in the Saratov region, to brawl. This was followed by an unsanctioned rally demanding that the authorities ‘liberate’ the city from North Caucasians.

Biryulyovo is therefore not such an unusual case. It started as a settling of scores between a victim identified as ethnically Russian and a group of perpetrators identified as Caucasians, with public opinion fanning the flames. Using social media, groups of youths orchestrated street fights to settle scores, alongside looting nearby shops, especially those seen as belonging to ethnic minorities. However, the political atmosphere around Biryulyovo was markedly different, making this latest incident a particular turning point for several reasons.

First of all, it involved local residents—rather than just nationalist activists—taking to the streets. Not only does this confirm the xenophobic sentiments that prevail in Russia today, which are not new, but it also signals that citizens no longer necessarily condemn violence—and may even support it to some extent. It also suggests that xenophobic skirmishes are no longer confined to small provincial cities, but can also take place in the Moscow region, the political heart of Russia.

Secondly, although demonstrators denounce the fact that ‘migrants make the laws’ and ‘locals no longer feel at...
home’—two common formulations of xenophobic sentiments elsewhere in the world—they have also come to criticize corruption among security forces and municipal authorities. For many years Russian nationalism was seen as reinforcing the pro-Putin status quo. The anti-regime mobilizing potential of ethnic violence is thus relatively new, and perhaps has some roots in the earlier anti-Putin politicization of the Russian Marches of November 4, and the Sagra riots, during which the inefficiency of the security forces were publically denounced.

Thirdly, the riots in Biryulyovo could also be related to the inflammatory nature of the Moscow mayoral election campaign. Political authorities simultaneously condemned violence actions whilst legitimizing anti-migrant narratives resulting in a surge in racist violence: 2013 will be a record year since the previous peak in 2007. Sociological research has suggested that 40 percent of Russians surveyed say they support the Russian March, 70 percent express support for the statement ‘stop sending federal money to the North Caucasus’, and the same number would like to see migrants deported. These figures are even higher in Moscow, which historically has always been a multi-ethnic city, but one prone to xenophobia. The general atmosphere there is not only heavily anti-migrant, but also one opposed to newcomers coming from outside. The majority of Muscovites are in favor of tightening the registration system that would limit the ability of Russian citizens from other regions (of any ethnicity) to move to the capital city.

The Eurasian Union Against the Tide of Russian Society

In this context, the response capacity of the Russian authorities is limited and ambivalent. They have adopted a schizophrenic discourse on the migration issue. Indeed, there is no unity among the ruling elites towards Russia’s migration policy. The government and the presidential administration see the continuation of the 1992 agreement on visa-free travel for citizens of CIS countries as a sign of Russia’s pivotal role in Eurasia. More recently, they have also began to advocate the development of a Eurasian Union in which the citizens of member states would have freedom of movement, and have supported the accession to the Customs Union of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (two major sources of labor migrants) soon after that of Armenia. However, most politicians, members of United Russia, and officials at the local and regional level oppose such policies, instead calling for the introduction of a visa regime for citizens of Central Asian and South Caucasian states.

The Kremlin envisages several solutions in order to square this circle. One of them would be to distinguish the right to visa-free migration according to country. Members of the Eurasian Union would be privileged, but non-member CIS countries would lose their status—thus embarrassing two other major providers of migrants, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, which do not want to be involved in the Russian-led Eurasian Union project. However, this decision would require Moscow to recognize its reduced regional ambitions within the post-Soviet space and to be satisfied with a more limited role in countries that do not accept a greater degree of economic and political reintegration. It would also hurt Russia’s relationship with Kiev. Ukraine is not likely to ever join the Customs Union, yet it also has large migratory flows into Russia. However, this particular group of migrants does not arouse the ire of Russian public opinion, which continues to see Ukrainians as a “brother” people. Kazakhstan is also likely to raise objections to this decision, as Astana does not want to invest huge amounts of money and political energy to block migrants from its Central Asian neighbors in the name of a policy made in Moscow.

However, the Kremlin seems to have decided to make another distinction, not one by country, but by the migrants themselves. The stated goal is to welcome legal migrants and seek to integrate them, while pursuing the deportation of illegals. Yet this legal division cannot be carried out without fighting administrative corruption, in particular among the law enforcement agencies. It will shine an unwanted light on the total inefficiency of the Russian administration, which, in practice, is incapable of establishing a boundary between legal and illegal. The extortion of migrants, whatever their legal status, is part of police culture at all levels, the issuance of ‘real fake’ documents (nastoiahchie podlêki) is a well-known practice, and the businesses that employ migrants have no interest in normalizing their status. This distinction is therefore a populist ploy that the authorities use in order to curb the anti-regime mobilization potential of xenophobia and to remain in tune with the population. Moscow Mayor Sobyanin has aggressively implemented this strategy. He has organized and received media coverage for seven massive round ups of migrants (up to 1,200 migrants in August) and promises weekly raids of markets and some ethnic neighborhoods.

The Kremlin’s objective is to regain control of public opinion and to appear to be spearheading the fight against illegal migration—all the while calling for a greater Eurasian Union. However, this policy is destined for failure. First, anti-Putin political forces—whether classic nationalists or national-democrats like Alexei Navalny—have at least as much legitimacy, if not more, from their condemnation of migration. Second, the authorities will fail in changing the negative role played by a corrupt administration, which prevents any nor-
The authorities cannot avoid the confusion between these different issues. In the mind of the Russian public, migrants are seen as problematic regardless of their legal status. Associated tensions are above all due to complex processes of the ghettoization of the urban landscape, segregation on the job market, and a lack of social policies for greater cultural integration of the migrants into Russia (Russian language training, education for children, aid to community associations, etc.)

Conclusion
With approximately 13–14 million foreign migrants and a growing number of North Caucasians, in particular Dagestani, moving to other regions in search of a better life, Russia cannot afford a badly calibrated migration policy. This is becoming an issue on which the Putin regime may fail in terms of its popular legitimacy. Xenophobia is just the tip of the iceberg of a larger social malaise linked to socioeconomic transformations, a diffuse feeling that living standards are no longer on the rise, and a growing resentment of state’s systemic inefficiency on all levels, especially locally. Thus future debates on Russia’s national identity are likely to be increasingly shaped by its relationship to migration, rendering the prospects of a Eurasia under Russian leadership increasingly uncertain—and confirming the necessity of bringing forth major structural reforms of the Russian state.

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Figure 1: Right-Wing Violence 2004–2013


Natives, Foreigners and Native Foreigners—the Difficult Task of Coexistence in Russia

Jens Siegert, Moscow

Abstract

The violent clashes in Biryulyovo on 13th October, ignited by the murder of a “Russian” by a “foreigner”, is another example of the growing nationalism and xenophobia in Russia. This nationalism and the assertion that there are too many “foreigners” is utilised by both the regime and opposition figures, such as Aleksei Navalny, alike. The sources of this xenophobia are, however, much more complex than is often acknowledged, and indeed the terms of popular discourse is often confused, with “non-Slavic” Russians often regarded as “foreigners”. The complexity of the nationalist question in Russia is perhaps epitomised by the statement that “Russia was an empire for centuries and is now reluctantly faced with the task of becoming a nation state”.

The pattern is always the same. A “Russian” is killed somewhere in Russia by one or more persons of “non-Slavic” or alternatively “Southern”, “Caucasian” or “Central Asian” appearance, terms used widely by the public or even in official documents despite their intrinsic racism. In response, a disgruntled mob of “locals” make it known that they’ve finally had enough of foreigners and that it’s time to send them “home”. Demonstrations are held, followed by violent clashes, and shops and markets—the preferred stamping grounds of the “foreigners”—are laid to waste.

This was what happened in the small Karelian town of Kondopoga in 2006, in Moscow city centre on Manezh Square in 2010, in the central Russian town of Pugachev near the Volga this summer, and recently, on 13 October 2013, in the Moscow suburb of Biryulyovo. Events such as those in Biryulyovo are therefore fundamentally nothing new. In each of these cases the police immediately embarked on a whirlwind search for the perpetrator and managed to find one or more culprits, at record speed by Russian standards, with politicians at all levels up to the President promising tough punishments. After a relatively short time, everything always calmed down again. But after Biryulyovo, things are different.

Strange as it may sound, this stems from the protests of the winter before last and the political upheaval which has both resurrected and intensified them. The liberal protests of the past two years against electoral fraud, government despotism and corruption and the nationalist-tinged conservative protests, targeted ostensibly at the excessive number of “foreigners” but in reality at the state’s growing inability and reluctance to provide public services (which means that they are also anti-corruption protests), are two sides of the same coin. Putin’s system has not yet been seriously challenged, but a growing number of people no longer believe in its immovable stability or its capacity to solve the problems the country is facing. In other words, and as noted by Kirill Rogov: “The time of the equilibrium built on oil and apathy is over”. Politics has returned to the public arena. This applies not only to those demonstrating against electoral fraud in 2012, with whom I sympathise, but also many others whose political views I find abhorrent.

I cannot at this point provide a comprehensive and structured analysis of the problems which have led to these nationalist and xenophobic protests, but I will attempt a brief run-through of some of them. Hopefully this will suffice to reveal the magnitude of the problems, the enormity of the challenges and the difficulty involved in finding any answers.

My starting point will be the motto of my blog, which has appeared at the top right-hand corner of my homepage for the past five years: “Russia was an empire for centuries and is now reluctantly faced with the task of becoming a nation state.” According to its Constitution, Russia is a “multinational” state, or more accurately a multinational people as per the preamble. Yet no one knows what this is or how it is supposed to work. On the one hand the country boasts a single, unified citizenship, but on the other hand 21 of these “nations” are small states within a state, granted special—mainly cultural—rights, and anyone can choose to have their “nationality” included in their internal passport. The largest of the Russian “nations”, the ethnic Russians, are often referred to as the “elder brother” of the other smaller nations (a term first used by Stalin, hence the lack of sisters), but have no institutions of their “own” below state level. This is regarded as unfair or even degrading by many people who regard themselves as ethnic Russians. Attempts to argue that the state as a whole is dominated by ethnic Russians, with Russian as the manda-
tory official language and ethnic Russians being at a huge numerical advantage, accounting for around 80% of the population, regularly prove futile.

At the same time, in recent years the political leadership has invoked ever more strongly the dominance of an ethnic Russian majority culture and an accompanying “traditional” way of life. The main aim is to demarcate Russia from the “West” and “Western” ways of life, or in other words to defend the country against the impositions of the modern-day Hells Angels of individualisation, accountability and globalisation.

The Russian state, or Russian Federation, is therefore predominantly “ethnically Russian”, but chooses to lay particular emphasis on this at times when the political elite believes itself to be at risk. Yet this is a dangerous move, since it results in corresponding counter-movements in parts of the country in which the populace is predominantly not “ethnically Russian”. The liberal protests which started back in winter 2011/2012 have led to Putin playing the nationalist/traditional card on an increasingly regular basis. In this deliberately inflamed atmosphere, it is easy to predict the reactions to an event such as the murder of a young (ethnic) Russian in Moscow by someone with a “foreign appearance”. Protests by outraged and alarmed citizens, who are legitimately concerned for their own safety, intermingle with deeper-running resentment and a fundamental (and unfortunately often justified) mistrust of everything linked to the state, and in particular the police. Well-organised Russian nationalist groups, some of which have close ties to the Orthodox Church, take advantage of the situation by creating violent disturbances.

This makes Putin’s state somewhat reminiscent of Goethe’s sorcerer’s apprentice; spirits were summoned to relieve the burden of staying in power, but now no one can remember the magic word to banish them again. On top of that, the dangerous game of “We poor Russians against the nasty outside world” is a fine example of self-deception, since the most-hated (or feared) “foreigners” are not foreign at all, but come from the North Caucasus and have Russian passports.

For some time now, surveys have shown that it is Chechens, Dagestani and Ingushetians (all of whom belong to the “multinational people” referred to in the Constitution) who are most hated in the heartland of Russia, even more than migrant workers from Central Asia. The murders referred to at the beginning of this article were all committed by Russian citizens of North Caucasian origin, with the exception of Biryulyovo, the alleged perpetrator of which was Azerbaijani. The Russian state has responded to this problem by misrepresenting the situation: it has called for “illegal foreigners” to be tracked down—even the broadsheets now commonly use the term “nelegalny” in this context—and is not shy to use false statistics to support its case.

When Dagestani traders, or in other words Russian citizens, got mixed up in a market brawl with police officers during Moscow’s mayoral elections this summer, the police responded with raids on markets, building sites and factories. Over 3,500 foreigners, most of whom came from Central Asia and Vietnam and had nothing to do with the original fight, were detained in hastily erected camps. Dozens were later deported. The whole process was repeated following the murder in Biryulyovo in October, with 1,200 foreigners arrested within two days, and the deportation proceedings are still on-going.

Large swathes of the population—including the political opposition—are perfectly happy to go along with this misrepresentation. The foreigners from Central Asia or Vietnam are an easy target. Their status as legal residents is often genuinely questionable, and a veneer of civilisation and legitimacy can be gained from references to similar practices in the EU. Aleksei Navalny, the rising star of the opposition, has also hastily launched a petition for the introduction of compulsory visas for citizens of the CIS states. In defence of this move, he has stated that better regulation and control is needed in the field of labour migration because the wrath of the Russian population will otherwise continue to grow and violent outbursts such as those in Biryulyovo will soon be out of control. These arguments have made a deep impact, even in liberal circles, and it is unlikely that Navalny will have any problem collecting the 100,000 signatures he needs to force Parliament to examine the issue.

This is where things get tricky for President Putin, which is likely to be Navalny’s main motive and the reason why part of the liberal public is supporting him. Putin’s minions do indeed regularly talk about imposing restrictions and tightening up controls on migration, in particular from Central Asia, but compulsory visas do not gel in any way with Putin’s (foreign) policy plans, hence the express opposition he voiced in the only public statement he gave on the Biryulyovo disturbances. The introduction of compulsory visas would be the final nail in the coffin for Putin’s fervent endeavours to create a Eurasian Union, or even a preliminary customs union involving as many CIS states as possible (to date: Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Armenia). Compulsory visas would therefore be a major blow to Putin’s geopolitical ambitions in Central Asia and his goal of restoring Russia to something at least resembling a Great Power.

The current debate on compulsory visas is thus masking the much more fundamental problem of how to deal with the increasing alienation of the “nations” within the Russian Federation.
Russia. A more or less gradual process of ethnic segregation has been a long-standing feature of many ethnically-defined republics and regions, as can be seen most clearly in the North Caucasus. When the Soviet Union collapsed 22 years ago there were as many non-Chechens (primarily ethnic Russians) as Chechens living in Chechnya. Today, after two wars, the population is almost exclusively Chechen (95.3% according to the census in 2010). The same is true in Dagestan and Ingushetia, where the titular nations are also expanding at the expense of other North Caucasian ethnicities, i.e. a process of regional homogenisation can be observed. The share of ethnic Russians is also steadily dropping in the other republics of the North Caucasus region.

The North Caucasus is also the poorest region in Russia, which only survives on the strength of handouts from Moscow and because its residents, particularly young men, move to other regions of Russia to look for work. At the same time, the birth rate there is up to three times higher than in the Russian heartland, where ethnically homogeneous settlements of “non-ethnic Russians”, particularly those of North Caucasian origin, are gradually forming in the larger cities, heightening anxieties and tensions. The Soviet state controlled the ethnic composition of its population by means of housing allocations, but the residential market provides no such opportunities for the modern Russian state.

Vladimir Putin took power in 1999 with the promise of defending “Russia’s integrity”, and ensuring that the country remained a “single country”. To all appearances he has succeeded in this task; apart from a few terrorist groups, no one in the country is now calling for the independence of one or more of Russia’s constituent republics, thanks to the brutal methods of the Russian army and the terrorist tactics of the Chechen leader Kadyrov. Yet the fact that both sides have now distanced themselves to the point of hatred is a taboo subject, even though ignoring such problems only makes them worse and fuels the wrath.

Perhaps this unique Russian schizophrenia is best described by a saying which is making the rounds of the Russian-speaking Internet. It bears the heading “The two-headed Russian dream” (a reference to the two-headed eagle on the Russian coat of arms, which allegedly turns one head to the West and one to the East): “The Russians want two dreams to come true at the same time: for all non-Russians to be expelled from Russia and for themselves to move abroad.”

Translated by Joanne Reynolds

About the Author

Jens Siegert is the Director of the Moscow office of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. He is an expert on Russian domestic and foreign policy with a special focus on civil society issues. He previously worked as a journalist in Moscow.

For more of Jens Siegert’s analysis of contemporary developments in Russia, you can follow his Russland-Blog (in German) at <http://russland.boellblog.org/> and in the “Notizen aus Moskau” section of Russland-Analysen, available at: <http://www.laender-analysen.de/russland/>. English translations of some of his blog posting can be found on the Rights in Russia website, at <http://www.rightsinrussia.info/archive/comment/siegert/>
Russian Public Opinion on Migrants

Figure 1: What Are Your Feelings Towards Migrants from the Southern (Former Soviet) Republics in Your City or Village?

![Graph showing public opinion changes over time regarding feelings towards migrants from the Southern (Former Soviet) Republics.](http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti)

Source: representative polls of the Russian population conducted by the Levada Center, [http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti](http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti)

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Figure 2: In Your Opinion, What Should Be Done With Migrants from the Near Abroad (i.e. the Former Soviet Republics)?

![Pie chart showing public opinion on what should be done with migrants from the Near Abroad in 2006 and 2013.](http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti)

Source: representative polls of the Russian population conducted by the Levada Center, [http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti](http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti)
Figure 3: Do You Support the Slogan “We Have Fed the South Caucasus for Long Enough”?

Source: representative polls of the Russian population conducted by the Levada Center, <http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti>

Figure 4: What Do You Think, the Immigration of Which Groups Should Be Restricted? (Multiple Answers Possible)

Source: representative poll of the Russian population conducted by the Levada Center in October 2013, <http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti>
Figure 5: For Comparison: Would You Be in Favour of or Against the Idea to Restrict Residence and Employment Rights for People Coming from Other Regions of Russia?

- in favour of restrictions: 63%
- against restrictions: 27%
- do not know: 10%

Source: representative poll of the Russian population conducted by the Levada Center in October 2013, [http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionaloi-napryazhenosti](http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionaloi-napryazhenosti)

On the Biryulyovo Riots

Figure 1: Have You Heard About the Recent Mass Demonstrations, Pogroms and Clashes with Police in Moscow’s Biryulyovo District?

- yes: 77%
- no: 23%

Figure 2: What Do You Think, What Is the Main Reason for the Mass Expression of Discontent in Birlyulyovo? (in Percent of Those Who Know About the Disturbances in Birlyulyovo)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the murder of the inhabitant of the district Yegor Shcherbakov by one of the newcomers</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the corruption of law enforcement agencies and local authorities who “cover” illegal immigration</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provocative behavior of the migrants</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fear of and hostility against migrants</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>difficult situation in the district, conducive to crime</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social injustice and vulnerabilities of simple people</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weakness and incapability of the authorities</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poverty and lack of necessary facilities of the district</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>do not know</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 3: In Your Opinion, Did These Mass Demonstrations Start and Grow Spontaneously, Were They Provoked by Nationalists, Or Did They Grow With the Connivance of the Police? (in Percent of Those Who Know About the Disturbances in Birlyulyovo)

- they started and grew spontaneously: 43%
- they were provoked by nationalists: 21%
- they grew with the connivance of the police: 20%
- do not know: 7%
- everything taken together: 10%

Figure 4: In Your Opinion, Could Similar Events Take Place Where You Live? (in Percent of Those Who Know About the Disturbances in Birlyulyovo)

Source: representative poll of the Russian population conducted by the Levada Center in October 2013, <http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/sobytiya-v-zapadnom-biryulevo-v-predstavleniyakh-rossiyan>
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