Doctoral Thesis

Conflict actors in motion
Refugees, rebels and ethnic groups

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CONFLICT ACTORS IN MOTION:
REFUGEES, REBELS AND ETHNIC GROUPS

A thesis submitted to attain the degree of
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(Dr. sc. ETH Zurich)

presented by
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Abstract

Although refugees are victims of conflict and forced to leave their homes, they can cause negative externalities in asylum states, such as a disturbed ethnic balance and the diffusion of rebel networks. In order to avoid further aggravations of humanitarian crises, it is crucial to understand and control these mechanisms. This dissertation analyzes the mechanisms of how refugees trigger conflict and thereby contributes to the knowledge of conflict diffusion. The existing conflict literature has found a statistically significant correlation between civil conflict diffusion and refugees, but it fails to explain how refugees influence conflict. In contrast to previous research, the new theoretical approach to refugee-related conflict introduced in this dissertation considers ethno-nationalist preferences of refugee flows and asylum countries. Both transnational ethnic groups and refugee movements have been identified as important actors contributing to civil conflict spread, but the systematic effect of the ethnicity of refugees has so far been ignored. Therefore, I introduce a new quantitative dataset on the ethnicity of refugees with global coverage. The three quantitative chapters of this dissertation analyze the direction of refugee movements, the relationship between refugees and the population in the receiving state and the relationship between refugees and insurgent groups. Finally, the quantitative findings are complemented with qualitative evidence from the Kosovo refugee crisis in 1999.

In the first part of this dissertation, I theorize that the asylum destination of refugees is strongly determined by trans-border ethnic linkages. Building on qualitative research of migration that has found that migration movements follow well-defined trends, I assume that the direction of refugee movements is not random. I develop a theoretical model, which includes spatial, temporal and cultural pull factors, and conduct the first systematic examination of the flight direction of refugees. The results indicate that many ethnic refugee groups flee to nearby countries with ethnic kin populations and a history of accepting other co-ethnic refugees. Thus, sub-national refugee characteristics, such as ethnicity, are essential to understanding the movement patterns of refugee flows.

The second part investigates how the political power status of the local kin group affects the risk of conflict after a co-ethnic refugee influx. Ethnic kinship between refugees and the host population usually facilitates acceptance. However, qualitative studies have found that ethnic kin refugees can have a negative effect in multi-ethnic states, because they threaten ethnic stability. Further, we know very little about the systematic effect of ethnicity on security in refugee-receiving states. Therefore,
this dissertation examines the ethno-political logic of refugee-related conflict trigger mechanisms. Co-ethnic refugees of a politically marginalized group can upset the ethnic balance, cause a demonstration effect or diffuse weapons, skills and ideologies. Hence, kin refugees increase the motivation and opportunity of politically marginalized groups to revolt, and, at the same time, threaten the non-kin groups in the country, which endangers stability. The quantitative results provide empirical support for the hypothesis that excluded ethnic groups with kin refugees are particularly conflict-prone. Thus, this dissertation presents the first systematic test of refugee-related conflict and its ethnic component.

The third part analyzes how refugees can diffuse rebel networks, since transnational insurgents often operate from refugee settlements. I claim that this effect requires a shared group identity between refugees, rebel groups and an aggrieved host population. Establishing extraterritorial bases is a prominent insurgent strategy. Trans-border rebels are often associated with the presence of refugees, because they can hide and recruit among them. This dissertation contributes to the understanding of trans-border conflict actors by showing that co-ethnicity explains why refugee flows are associated with insurgent groups. Rebels and refugees are both likely to move to nearby countries with ethnic kin populations, suggesting that geographic location matters for conflict actors in motion. Furthermore, ethnic kin refugees increase a rebel group's opportunity to use settlements as shelters and to recruit among refugees due to their shared grievances and potential support. By analyzing ethnically identified insurgent groups worldwide, I find significant evidence of a higher risk of transnational rebel activity in nearby countries with trans-border ethnic linkages and kin refugees.

In summary, this dissertation contributes to the knowledge of transnational conflict diffusion processes by providing the first systematic theory of the causal mechanisms explaining refugee-related ethnic conflict in asylum countries. Although I claim that forced migrants are important actors in conflict spread processes, the results confirm that refugees do not randomly cause violence. Instead, refugees are only able to contribute to conflict when there are ethno-political tensions in the host state. Therefore, these findings contribute to improving the reputation of refugees by showing that they are often unfairly blamed for structural security issues.
Zusammenfassung


Der zweite Teil dieser Dissertation analysiert, wie der politische Status der lokalen ethnisch verwandten Gruppe über das Konfliktrisiko entscheidet, wenn Flücht-


Zusammenfassend leistet diese Dissertation einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Verständnis transnationaler Konfliktverbreitungsprozesse: Ein umfassender theoretischer Ansatz erklärt die kausalen Mechanismen, welche bewirken, dass Flüchtlin-
ge ethnische Konflikte im Asylland hervorrufen können. Obwohl diese Dissertati-
on argumentiert, dass Flüchtlinge wichtige Akteure in Konfliktverbreitungsprozes-
sen sind, bestätigen die Resultate, dass Flüchtlinge allein nicht zu Kriegen füh-
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1 Introduction

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Answering to the current Syrian refugee crisis, Lebanon refuses to establish refugee camps. Since the Lebanese government does not want formal camp settings, the Syrian refugees are spread across the country and only few live in improvisational camps close to the border. The bad experiences of the Palestinian refugee camps in the 1970s and 1980s have caused this skeptical attitude. The Palestinian refugees organized their resistance against Israel in Lebanon and played a major role in the Lebanese civil war. According to a survey, more than half of the Lebanese population fear that the Syrian refugees threaten the fragile national security and stability or challenge the dry employment market (Bolliger, 2013). Similarly, Guinea hosted several hundred thousand refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia in 2000, who living in camp settlements close to the border, suffered from cross-border attacks. The Guinean government blamed the refugees for these attacks and accused them of collaborating with rebel groups. Consequently, Guinea closed its border with Sierra Leone and let many refugees remain in limbo (Reilly, 2000).

The Lebanese and the Guinean government’s reaction to the massive influx of refugees are two random examples of the skepticism against forced migrants occurring all over the world. Due to security concerns, many states are reluctant to accept refugees without reservations. A better understanding of how and why refugees threaten the security of a host state is crucial in order to prevent such cases, and to convince host governments to assume their responsibilities in the international burden sharing of refugee crises. Therefore, this dissertation examines security consequences for refugee-receiving states, which so far have not been systematically explained.

Refugees are an almost inevitable consequence of violent conflicts and wars. At the end of 2011, approximately 14 million people had fled their home in search of refuge in another country (UNHCR, 2012b) and many more people were affected by forced migration in the past. Intra-state civil conflicts accounted for the majority of violent confrontations in the world since 1945 (Gleditsch et al., 2002) and remain to be the main cause of forced migrations (Weiner, 1996; Rubin and Moore, 2007; Martineau, 2010). Civil conflicts are fought between armed actors, the government and insurgent groups. However, civilians not participating in the fighting
also are important actors in conflict processes. The people as victims of violent ac-
tivities ultimately have to bear the burden and direct consequences of a war in their
country. Being forced to leave their home, crossing the country border and thereby
becoming refugees and as such a “transnational phenomenon” (Zolberg, Suhrke
and Aguayo, 1986, 151), civilian people give intra-state wars an international com-
ponent because asylum states have to react to refugee influxes.

Many conflicts cluster geographically (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008, 215), mean-
ing they span national boundaries and spread particularly to neighboring countries
(Sambanis, 2001; Gleditsch, 2007; Brown, 2010). A crucial mechanism causing
conflict diffusion, especially of ethnic conflict, are ethnic groups living across bor-
ders (Gleditsch, 2007; Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009; Cederman et al.,
2013). In addition to transnational ethnic linkages, Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006,
335) argued that population movements such as refugees are an “important mech-
anism by which conflict spreads”. Several authors point out that refugees contribute
to the spillover effect of conflict by causing negative externalities in their receiving
country: refugee movements entail economic challenges, spread weapons, offer
rebels recruitment opportunities and endanger the ethnic set-up (Whitaker, 1998;
Stedman and Tanner, 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Lischer, 2005; Salehyan
and Gleditsch, 2006). Lischer (2001), in a first quantitative analysis of refugee-
related violence, found that 15 percent of all refugee movements worldwide in the
1990s experienced some form of violence in the country of asylum. Thus, although
seeking sanctuary and peace, refugees often encounter difficult conditions in the
receiving state. For instance, the refugee crisis in the Great Lakes region in the
early 1990s made clear that refugees can become involved in conflict: perpetra-
tors of the genocide in Rwanda mixed with refugees in the Democratic Republic of
Congo and recruited within the refugee camps, which finally lead to the outbreak of

Being forced to leave their home country, refugees often seek asylum in neigh-
boring states (Schmeidl, 1997; UNHCR, 2010), due to their restricted means of
transportation and the desire to remain close to their country of origin (Crisp and
Jacobsen, 1998). Refugees are particularly found in those neighboring countries
that are ethnically or colonially linked to the sending state because there refugees
can rely on existing networks and lower assimilation costs (Newland, 1993; Moore
and Shellman, 2007). Hence, refugee-related negative externalities should espe-
cially affect neighboring countries linked by ethnic ties which already face an in-
creased risk of conflict spillovers. However, besides the finding that the propensity
of conflict increases when trans-border ethnic kin and refugee flows are present
(Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006 357), the ethnic background of refugee movements
has not yet been considered in comparative studies. Thus, the mechanisms of how refugees threaten security and stability in culturally linked host states, and thereby contribute to the diffusion of ethnic conflict, has not yet been analyzed. I claim that the ethnicity of refugees determines the direction of refugee movements, since refugees tend to follow ethnic ties, as well as the relationship between the refugees and the population in the asylum state, because co-ethnicity should facilitate integration, and the relationship between refugees and insurgent groups as the latter are more likely to hide or recruit among ethnic kin refugees. Therefore, this dissertation seeks to analyze the role of refugees in trans-border ethnic conflict diffusion processes and prompts the following three core questions: Where do refugees go? When do refugees trigger conflict in the asylum state? When do rebels hide or recruit among refugees?

Although I focus on refugees as a cause and not, as commonly seen, consequence of conflict, I want to emphasize that refugees are victims of conflict or persecution who were uninvolved in the acts of war and involuntarily live outside their home country. The vast majority of refugees never directly engage in political violence and most refugee settlements are of civilian nature. I do not claim that refugees alone trigger conflict. The findings presented in this dissertation yield evidence that the political context the refugees encounter in the receiving state explains why the negative effects in connection with hosting refugees can cause new violence. Understanding how refugee-related conflict diffusion mechanisms work and knowing when refugee situations in an asylum state might increase local tensions will help generate policy implications on how to avoid such subsequent crises. Thus, this dissertation contributes to the knowledge of refugee crisis management and how to improve the conditions of refugees that affect so many countries and, most of all, people in the world.

1.1 Overview of Subject of Research

This dissertation begins by giving an overview of previous research focusing on refugee-related conflict diffusion mechanisms in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 I present the definitions of the key concepts used and introduce my theoretical approach to conflict diffusion including refugee movements and trans-border ethnic kin. Chapter 4 presents the coding instructions, the description of the data collection and some descriptive statistics of the new quantitative dataset on the ethnicity of refugees. Information on the ethnic background of refugees is crucial to analyze the correlation between refugees and ethnic conflict. Also, problematic aspects of working with refugee data, such as limited data availability, are discussed. I then proceed by trying
to answer the three core questions with quantitative analyses using cross-national data on refugees and intra-state conflict. The direction of refugee movements will be analyzed in Chapter 5. I focus on the relation between refugees and the population in the asylum state and how refugees might disturb the ethnic balance in Chapter 6, and in Chapter 7, I examine how refugees expand rebel networks. Chapter 8 tests the main hypotheses supported in the quantitative chapters of the dissertation with an explorative case study of the refugees evolving from the Kosovo crisis in 1999. Chapter 9 closes with concluding remarks and policy implications.

The following paragraphs briefly introduce the three main research areas underlying this dissertation according to the core questions presented above.

**Refugee Flight Direction:** Refugees do not randomly leave their home state to any possible asylum country but they are pulled into certain directions (Morrison, 1993; Davenport, Moore and Poe, 2003; Neumayer, 2004; Iqbal and Zorn, 2007; Melander and Öberg, 2007). Previous studies argue that refugees traditionally flee along ethnic or colonial ties into neighboring countries because of existing networks and low assimilation costs (Newland, 1993; Schmeidl, 1997; Moore and Shellman, 2004, 2007). I suggest that cultural pull factors as well as spatio-temporal factors affect the refugees’ destination choice. First, trans-border movements such as refugee flows have strong incentives to relocate to non-distant and neighboring countries (Schmeidl, 1997; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Iqbal and Zorn, 2007; Melander and Öberg, 2007) because of feasibility and lower costs. Second, refugees are temporally dependent on previous refugee movements because past flows facilitate future flows, thanks to established transportation and information networks (Iqbal and Zorn, 2007; Rubin and Moore, 2007). Finally, refugees are pulled to countries with cultural and ethnic similarities. A conflict-affected transnational ethnic group is likely to seek refuge among its kin group across the border. Trans-border ethnic groups often feature established border-crossing networks such transportation or informations flows (Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Zhukov and Stewart, 2013), so that refugees will know about the current situation in a potential asylum country. Also, cultural similarities between refugees and the host population facilitate accommodation and integration.

I empirically analyze the number of ethnically identified refugee groups in all possible countries of asylum. The results support the assumption that refugees, whenever possible, follow trans-border ethnic linkages. These findings prove the salience of ethnic group membership among refugees and emphasizes the impor-
Refugees and the Local Population in the Host Country: One negative externality of a refugee influx is the possible disturbance of the ethnic balance in the host state (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). I argue that this mechanism is especially relevant for refugees that followed trans-border ethnic linkages because the presence of ethnic kin refugees strengthens a local group demographically and politically thereby challenging the other groups in the country. Based on the literature focusing on grievance-based explanations of civil war, that particularly large groups that are underrepresented or excluded from power are likely to challenge the government (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010), I argue that after a refugee influx, these politically marginalized ethnic groups might finally feel strong enough to demand more power. This situation, with intensified ethnic tensions, can escalate into a conflict. In addition, co-ethnicity between refugees and the host population, which often implies speaking the same language, facilitates the exchange of violent ideologies, thereby fostering a demonstration effect to which disaffected ethnic groups are more receptive. A group feeling underrepresented and consequently aggrieved is susceptible to military resources, skills and new information imported by refugees on how to challenge the government. Also, kin refugees of a powerless group are likely to receive less assistance, thus, increasing grievances and insecurity among the refugees (Crisp, 2000; Lischer, 2005).

Estimating the predicted probability of conflict onset at the ethnic group-level reveals that groups simultaneously lacking appropriate representation in central state politics and hosting co-ethnic refugees have an increased risk of experiencing conflict. Hence, in addition to structural explanations of grievances such as political exclusion, exogenous factors like a refugee influx influence civil conflict dynamics.

Refugees and Transnational Insurgent Groups: In Chapter 7, I concentrate on the negative effect that refugees diffuse rebel networks. Establishing extraterritorial bases in neighboring countries is a common strategy among rebel groups because they can hide from the jurisdiction of the home government they are challenging (Salehyan, 2007). Transnational rebels follow ethnic ties because border-crossing ethnic groups maintain networks and support each other. Hence, both refugee and rebel movements are affected by geospatial factors, explaining why they frequently appear in the same locations. Rebel groups spanning national boundaries are often associated with refugees because they hide, operate or recruit in refu-
1 Introduction

Thus, refugee movements attract transnationally active insurgent groups. I claim that ethnic kinship between rebels and refugees explains why rebels are often successful in recruiting among refugees. Ethnic kinship affects both the motivation and the opportunity for a rebel-refugee collaboration. A shared ethnic identity facilitates the use of the refugee settlement as a sanctuary because rebels can not be physically distinguished from refugees, and if the refugees support the insurgents’ aims, they could hide the rebels among themselves. Also, co-ethnic rebels can recruit among refugees based on shared grievances against the home government that the rebel group is opposing and which is responsible for the refugee outflow. In addition, the desire to return home might increase grievances among refugees which insurgents can utilize.

In order to analyze the postulated relationship between insurgent groups, trans-border ethnic linkages and co-ethnic refugee movements, I assess the predicted probability of transnational rebel presence in all neighboring countries of the insurgent’s home state. The empirical results indicate that transnational rebel groups are strongly affected by geo-spatial factors like distance, as well as by co-ethnic populations such as trans-border ethnic groups and refugee communities.

1.2 Key Contributions

This dissertation includes the following theoretical and empirical key contributions to the understanding of refugee movements and conflict diffusion processes along transnational ethnic linkages.

- A growing literature studies the spread of civil conflict (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009; Cederman et al., 2013), however, actual actors moving in or between different conflicts have received little attention. This dissertation contributes to the knowledge of conflict diffusion processes including transnational ethnic groups by focussing on the security implications of physically border-transgressing social actors such as refugees (Chapter 6) and transnational insurgent groups (Chapter 7).

- There has been little systematic work on the flight routes of refugees. While refugees are pushed out of their home and involuntarily leave their country of origin, their presence in asylum states is not entirely random. In Chapter 5, I draw on theories of migration movements and elaborate a theoretical framework for the direction of refugee flows contributing to a better understanding
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of refugee flight patterns. The finding that the majority of forced migrants tend to only travel short distances and particularly to host countries with cultural similarities makes future refugee crises more predictable and facilitates the planning and distribution of humanitarian aid.

• The main theoretical contribution of this dissertation is the development of a theoretical approach explaining conflict diffusion processes along trans-border ethnic linkages, including refugee movements. Previous studies found that refugees are a mechanism triggering conflict, an argument particularly put forward by Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006). However, the causal mechanisms explaining the correlation between refugees and the outbreak of conflict or war, such as the refugee-related disturbance of the ethnic balance or the diffusion of military resources and rebel networks, remain fairly understudied. By considering the ethnic characteristics of refugees, this dissertation takes a step forward and explains the suggested causal mechanisms and actually analyzes when and how refugees disturb the ethnic balance in an asylum state, as well as when refugees collaborate with insurgent groups. Thus, I provide the first systematic test of the statement made in the previous literature that refugees trigger conflict, concluding that the political situation in the asylum state determines the risk of refugee-related tensions.

• This dissertation introduces a new worldwide quantitative dataset on the ethnic group membership of refugees (Chapter 4) providing crucial information on refugees which is useful and applicable in many research and policy fields. The comparative literature on refugee movements has had a tendency to treat refugee groups from the same country of origin as unitary actors. However, on the contrary, refugee movements are often very heterogeneous in terms of political, cultural and social views and sub-national information on refugees such as ethnicity is important for many aspects of refugee flight processes. The ethnicity of a person, first, determines the risk of becoming a refugee, particularly in ethnic conflicts where certain groups are more targeted than others. Second, the ethnicity impacts the flight route and the destination choice. Finally, accommodation and integration propensities in the asylum state are affected by ethnic group membership.
2 Previous Research on Conflict Spread and Refugees

2.1 Regional Dimensions of Civil Conflicts

2.1.1 Trans-Border Ethnic Groups

2.1.2 Transnationally Active Insurgent Groups

2.2 Refugees as Conflict Trigger

2.2.1 Refugee Warriors

2.2.2 Refugees and Conflict in the Country of Asylum

2.3 Ethnicity in Refugee Studies

2.4 Chapter Summary

The present chapter reviews the literature on the spread of civil conflict focusing on trans-border ethnic groups, insurgents and refugees, and criticizes previous research of neglecting the ethnic group membership of refugees, which is surprising since ethnic identities have been proven crucial in conflict diffusion processes.

Traditional studies of civil conflict focus on either structural or agency-based domestic factors, such as elites or rebel groups, explaining the outbreak and duration of violence. The basic debate on internal factors determining the risk of intra-state conflict evolves around the issue of whether greed or grievance-based arguments better explain the outbreak of violence. Greed or opportunity based studies argue that violence occurs among parties with low opportunity-costs to fight (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) and when insurgency is an economically viable strategy (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, 589). In contrast, grievance or motivation based research claims that the conflict-risk is higher for groups with strong incentives to insurge due to political and ethnic marginalization, underrepresentation or economic exploitation (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011), which strongly increases grievances. Civilians have received comparably little attention, although they are the main victims of violence.

In addition to internal mechanisms, more recent research on civil conflict has shown that countries are interdependent: not only are country characteristics associated with the risk of conflict onset, external and international factors beyond the borders of a country are also significant in the risk of intra-state conflict. The main cross-border determinants of civil conflict identified in previous studies are neighboring states experiencing conflict (Sambanis, 2001; Murdoch and Sandler, 2002), third parties, such as foreign governments or regional great powers (Kathman, 2011), trans-border ethnic groups (Gleditsch, 2007; Forsberg, 2008; Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009; Cederman et al., 2013) and border-transgressing
actors such as insurgents and forced migrants (Lischer, 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Salehyan, 2007). This enlarged the focus in civil conflict research to the entire region and particularly neighboring states. Countries neighboring a country at war are more likely to experience a war themselves and this “neighborhood effect” (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006) especially applies to the spread of ethnic conflict (Sambanis, 2001, 275).

The following chapter, therefore, reviews existing ethno-political approaches to actors involved in the spread of civil conflict which are cross-border groups, rebel movements and refugee flows. The most important point of critique put forward is that while transnational ethnic kinship ties have been identified as important mechanisms along which violence diffuses, the ethnicity of actors such as rebels or refugee groups moving along these linkages has not yet been systematically examined.

2.1 Regional Dimensions of Civil Conflicts

The spatial clustering of civil conflicts and wars in some world regions is undisputed in the literature (Most and Starr, 1980; Wallenstein and Sollenberg, 1998; Ward and Gleditsch, 2002; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Tavares, 2009). However, a lively debate ensued about the causes for this spatial concentration of political violence. Some authors argue that the regional concentration of conflicts is due to systemic factors, such as poverty, which increase the risk of intra-state conflict and which also cluster regionally (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Whilst other authors state that conflicts cluster because they are contagious and diffuse particularly to neighboring countries (Hill and Rothchild, 1986; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Sambanis, 2001; Gleditsch, 2007; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Braithwaite, 2010; Brown, 2010). According to the latter approach, spillover mechanisms contribute to the spread of violence. The three main mechanisms identified as causing conflict diffusion are cultural connections, such as transnational ethnic linkages, transnational rebel groups, and civil social movements across borders, such as refugee flows. Although, in many cases those three factors cannot be distinguished.

This study adheres to this latter understanding of conflict clustering as a result of spillover processes due to the transnational interdependence of states. The last decades have seen an increasing global interdependence thanks to technological progress facilitating communication, transportation, finance and travel (Nye and Keohane, 1971, 332). Consequently, states easily observe interactions in and between other states (Schrodt and Mint, 1988, 218-219). However, the interde-
dependence among states is much rather regional than global because travel and transportation is always constrained by the costs of physical distance in terms of resources and time. Only communication and financial networks can have a feasible global coverage. Therefore, conflicts usually diffuse within the region to neighboring countries and not randomly across the globe, what several studies on intra-state conflict spread identified as “neighborhood effect” (Weiner, 1996; Sambanis, 2001; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Accordingly, Weiner (1996) identifies areas where conflicts cluster as “bad neighborhoods”.

When analyzing conflict diffusion across borders, the state border is a crucial concept. Country boundaries are “perhaps the most fundamental international institution in the modern state system” (Salehyan, 2007, 219) and are, thus, an important factor for any transnational process. However, very often borders were drawn arbitrarily by historical great powers and thus, do not match the settlement territories of identity groups. Country borders have different implications for state or non-state actors. While nation states’ activities are mostly confined to their national territory, non-governmental actors playing an important role in civil conflicts are not bounded by state borders (Nye and Keohane, 1971; Harpviken, 2012) and, thereby, contribute to the transnationalization of civil conflict. Borders define the state and the territory of the states’ authority. Hence, the sovereignty of the state lies within its border and its coercive power is restricted to that territory. Many non-state actors, however, such as civilians and armed groups, cross the permeable borders for a multitude of social, economic or political reasons.

This dissertation focuses on the phenomenon of transboundary non-state actors affected by violence who have received comparably little attention in conflict diffusion research, in contrast to trans-border kin groups or the more studied structural explanations. The following subsections, therefore, give an overview of the mechanisms responsible for conflict spillovers.

### 2.1.1 Trans-Border Ethnic Groups

Transnational ethnic linkages are a main factor contributing to the risk and direction of regional conflict diffusion. Several authors found that trans-boundary ethnic groups increase a country’s risk of civil conflict onset (Gleditsch, 2007; Forsberg, 2008; Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009; Cederman et al., 2013). Similarly, trans-border ethnic kin contributes to international disputes and armed conflict and war between states (Davis and Moore, 1997; Moore and Davis, 1998; Saideman, 2001; Woodwell, 2004; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006). A transnational ethnic group
is an ethnic group whose inhabited territory is split by an international border. For instance, the Kurds who live mainly spread among the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria are politically relevant minorities in all of these countries and are a classic example of a border-crossing ethnic group.

Earlier qualitative work on transnational identities and its impact on civil conflict is positioned within the field of nationalism and secessionism studies. Focusing on the Balkans, Weiner (1971) describes increasing identity tensions as a result of the interactions between an irredentist state, an anti-irredentist neighboring state and an ethnic group that lives in both countries. Along the same lines, referring to the newly independent states of former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Brubaker (1996) depicts a triadic nexus, where the combination of nationalizing states, minorities within them and national homelands with ethnic kin of the latter can lead to the escalation of a conflict. Several authors mention the particular mechanisms of support, imitation or solidarity in spreading conflict across trans-border groups. Horowitz (1985, 272) concludes that external support from transnational ethnic kin groups is crucial for the success of secessionist movements. However, a transnational ethnic kin group only offers support if it assumes prospects for success, because interference in a neighbor's intra-state conflict is associated with many risks (Horowitz, 1985, 273), Hill and Rothchild (1986, 717, 720) claim that conflict contagion runs along a "demonstration effect" through social learning and action, which is facilitated by ethnic similarities in neighboring countries. However, the impact of demonstration effects is strongly determined by who controls the local mass media (Hill and Rothchild, 1986, 733). Particularly aggrieved ethnic groups in countries with a conflict history and a polarized group structure are receptive to this diffusion effect (Hill and Rothchild, 1986, 725). Referring to trans-border ethnic group solidarity, Lake and Rothchild (1998) state:

"Ethnic ties and antagonisms frequently motivate countries to become involved in ethnic conflicts elsewhere. In this form of "ethnopolitik," co-ethnics in one state are propelled by feelings of solidarity with their ethnic kin in a second. This typically occurs between neighbors where ethnic groups span national borders" (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, 29).

However, besides theoretical assumptions, no study systematically tests these mechanisms of how ethnic kin groups influence each other.

More recently, a range of quantitative systematic work evolved on trans-border ethnic groups in intra-state conflict diffusion processes. Analyzing the risk of intra-state conflict for political minority groups coded with the global Minorities At Risk (MAR) dataset (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009), Gurr (1993, 189) found only
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weak but consistent effects of contagion or diffusion mechanisms along transnational identity linkages. In conformity with demonstration effect-based explanations of conflict spread, Saideman and Ayres (2000) argue that conflicts diffuse when groups observe successful insurgencies in other states and copy that behavior. Successful ethno-political rebellions diffuse through the international system by emulation from like-minded groups (Gurr and Moore, 1997, 1083). Similarly, Forsberg (2008, 286, 287) states that, since groups spanning boundaries observe each other, an ethnic group might challenge and attack the government after being influenced by a demonstration effect of the violence experienced by its foreign kin. Examining the international dimension of civil wars, Gleditsch (2007, 303) found that countries with many trans-border ethnic linkages have a higher risk of civil war. Ethnic groups spanning international boundaries have more opportunities for external support of their rebellion and this increases the chance that the country experiences a conflict (Gleditsch, 2007, 298). However, since Gleditsch’s (2007) study focuses on the country-level, he is not able to identify and test the suggested conflict diffusion mechanisms on the ethnic group-level. Assessing the impact of trans-border ethnic brethren on civil conflict, Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch (2009, 426) found that conflict is especially likely to spread in cases where relatively large politically marginalized or disadvantaged groups can count on the support of their ethnic kin from a neighboring state. In accordance with Horowitz’s (1985) success-constraint, it is suggested that “potential assisting trans-border kin groups [...] give serious consideration to power relations before deciding whether to get involved in a conflict across the border” (Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009, 404). Furthermore, Cederman et al. (2013) discovered that the size of transnational ethnic kin groups have a curvilinear effect on the risk of conflict, that is, neither very small nor very large transnational kin groups have a strong impact on violence.

All these studies prove the salience of ethnicity and the relevance of factors beyond the state border for the onset of civil conflict. However, earlier qualitative and later quantitative literature both fail to comprehensively measure the actual causal mechanisms because they do not systematically focus on the actors who move across borders and territories. While the fact that ethnic groups permanently settled across borders does to some extend explain conflict diffusion, as for instance, when a demonstration effect is carried out due to shared media, successful insurgency still depends on people who actually transgress borders. War capacities are much higher if transnational rebel groups bring weapons or skills into a country or if refugees provide opportunities for recruitment. Therefore, the following subsection focuses on transnational insurgent groups who directly contribute to conflict diffusion.
2.1.2 Transnationally Active Insurgent Groups

Transnational rebel groups have been identified as one of the actor-specific mechanisms of spreading conflict. Many insurgent groups span national boundaries because establishing extraterritorial bases is a widespread rebel strategy (Salehyan, 2007, 218) increasing opportunities to mobilize and exercise force. By operating from foreign sanctuaries, rebel groups diffuse a civil conflict beyond the borders of their home country, thereby affecting the host and home country and the relationship between the concerned states.

Why do insurgents operate transnationally? Salehyan (2007, 222) argues that rebels establish foreign hideouts because transnational bases offer rebels new opportunities, such as lower insurgency costs, better bargaining outcomes and facilitated attack of the target state from the neighboring country. The costs for the home government to repress transnational rebel activities are extremely high (Salehyan, 2007, 223), since the further away the government from its core territory the weaker it becomes (Boulding, 1964; Buhaug, 2010) giving the rebels an advantage in the foreign sanctuary. Controlling a territory and the people living in it considerably increases the opportunity for training and recruitment of insurgent groups (De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca, 2012). Hence, since authority over a territory is the “backbone” of many rebel movements (Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012, 610), violent non-state actors in countries with strong governments controlling the entire state can evade to foreign territories in order to increase their resource mobilization capacities. Particularly weak rebel groups must take advantage of anything that increases the loss of the gradient strength of their relatively stronger government and, thus, resort to bases in mountainous terrain or across borders (Buhaug, 2010, 110-111). Hence, rebel groups operate transnationally because, in contrast to the government, they can. This opportunity to mobilize abroad for their insurgency creates a bargaining space for the rebels. Salehyan (2007) further claims that transnationally active rebels complicate the negotiating environment of the competing parties in a civil conflict. First, transnational rebels introduce uncertainty because they operate beyond the control of the state and, consequently, the state lacks information. Second, transnational insurgents exacerbate commitment problems because they could hide resources across the border. Finally, border-spanning rebels complicate the bargaining environment by introducing a new actor: the host state (Salehyan, 2007, 226-227). A neighboring government is very unlikely to allow cross-border forays, and even if this was possible, entering a foreign territory is very costly, and, additionally, the home government is much less familiar with the population and the terrain in a foreign country (Salehyan, 2007, 223).
Where do rebels establish transnational bases? [Salehyan (2007) 224-225] states that insurgent groups are likely to become transnational and thereby diffuse a civil conflict if a part of the population of the origin country, such as migrants, diaspora or refugees, lives outside its borders. Chapter 7 will further elaborate and test the same argument, which applies to trans-border ethnic kin, because in this case the rebels have the opportunity to operate from the sanctuary among the kin group in the neighboring state where they can hide from the jurisdiction of the government they challenge in their home country. Also, weak or failed neighboring states without resources or capacities to control their territory are attractive for transnational rebels, as are possible host states that are hostile to the rebels’ home country.

In a follow up study, Salehyan (2008b) extends the focus on transnational rebels and international conflict. He finds that transnational rebels in neighboring states raise the probability of militarized interstate disputes, because extraterritorial rebel bases can spark hostilities between states. Providing sanctuary to rebels creates or exacerbates tensions between states, and may be used as a substitute for interstate warfare between rival dyads (Salehyan, 2008b, 64). Finally, Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham (2011) 719-729 find that rebel groups are more likely to receive external support if they have a transnational constituency, such as ethnic, linguistic, religious or ideological linkages, and if the supporting government is a rival of their home state.

Hence, the establishment of foreign sanctuaries is an attractive strategy for insurgent groups giving them advantages vis-à-vis the government that they are challenging, and particularly affects weak neighboring states hosting refugees (Salehyan, 2007, 241). Besides major studies by Salehyan (2007) on the impact of transnational rebel groups on civil conflict, and Salehyan (2008b) on international conflict, insurgent groups operating from foreign sanctuaries have received comparably little scientific attention, although they are a global phenomenon as many empirical examples demonstrate. This dissertation contributes to the literature on cross-border rebel activity and builds on these existing studies that particularly examine the reasons why insurgents operate from foreign shelters. Analyzing where trans-border rebels are most likely to establish bases, and taking ethno-political preferences of rebel groups and co-ethnic refugee movements into account, improves on existing findings and increases the knowledge of the patterns and direction of conflict diffusion. Since transnational hideouts may increase fighting opportunities, they are a promising strategy. Thus, rebels usually voluntarily transgress borders and actively diffuse conflict. In contrast, although often associated with the expansion of rebel networks, refugees involuntarily flee to other states, because
they are forced to migrate, and only passively spread conflict by introducing negative externalities to their host state, as will be reviewed in the next subsection.

### 2.2 Refugees as Conflict Trigger

Refugees as a “transnational phenomenon” by crossing international borders (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1986, 151) is another actor-specific mechanism by which civil conflicts can spread to other states. Several authors point out that refugee movements, although being the consequence of violent conflict, might entail negative consequences for their receiving country, the sending country and the relationship between the two countries (Whitaker, 1998; Stedman and Tanner, 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Lischer, 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). The following negative effects are commonly attributed to refugee influxes:

- **Economic burden**: Refugee flows often inflict economic disruptions because refugees need to be provided with space, shelter, food and health services (Weiner, 1993; World Development Report, 2011). This might result in a competition over scarce resources between refugees and the host population. Large refugee influxes especially imply economic pressures for the host state (Goldstone, 2002; Martin, 2005). Such economic competition can result in increased criminality (Baez, 2011, 391). For instance, the Jordanian government is currently concerned that the sudden high influx of refugees from Syria is exacerbating the country’s already severe economic problems (Phillips, 2013).  

- **Pressures on public health**: A refugee influx might entail negative public health consequences such as the outbreak of diseases. Food and land scarcity can result in environmental degradation, unsafe drinking water and challenged health care facilities (Baez, 2011, 391). Baez (2011, 406) mentions the example of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi who chopped thousands of trees in the Kagera region of Tanzania for personal and commercial purposes, resulting in local children having to travel much longer and dangerous distances in search of wood.

- **Disturbance of the ethnic balance**: Refugees can threaten the cultural identity and imperil the ethnic balance of the asylum state, that is the political equilibrium of ethnic groups living in a country (Newland, 1993; Weiner, 1993; Loescher and Milner, 2004; Adamson, 2006; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). A high number of refugees changes the composition of people populating the
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Asylum country (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, 25), which is particularly important in multiethnic states with already existing tensions. For instance, in the late 1970s, “Malaysia was upset by the high percentage of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam amongst the recent boat [refugees], the acceptance of whom could disturb Malaysia’s delicate internal ethnic balance between Malays and Chinese” (Stein, 1979, 717).

- **Expansion of rebel networks**: Some refugee movements entail the expansion of rebel networks because refugee camps can be used by insurgent groups as sanctuaries or to recruit fighters among the refugees (Barber, 1997; Lischer, 2003; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Salehyan, 2007). This might ultimately cause the sending country to attack the asylum state if it perceives these refugee-rebels as a threat (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, 25). For example, in 2008, armed members of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) fighting against the Sudanese government infiltrated refugee camps in Chad and heavily recruited among the ethnic Zaghawa refugee population (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2009).

- **Diffusion of military resources**: As another mechanism, refugees can diffuse military resources which are defined as including weapons, combatants, skills, techniques and ideologies. For instance, refugees might carry weapons when they cross state-borders (Mogire, 2004, 5), or they acquire weapons while in asylum and store them for future use, as did refugees from Burundi in Tanzania (Nahm, 2006, 226-227). Furthermore, refugee camps can be used for the storage and trafficking of small arms (Weiner, 1993; Muggah and Mogire, 2006). Refugees may also import ideologies that encourage the opposition in the host country (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006, 343). Stein (1979, 717) for instance, argues that Thailand feared that the refugees from Cambodia “were predominantly Khmer Rouge who might be a subversive element in the Thai border provinces”.

However, how the refugees’ ethnic background impacts these negative mechanisms has not been systematically considered in the studies that will be reviewed in the following subsection. The ethnicity of refugees is likely to affect their impact on the ethnic balance as well as if and how refugees collaborate with transnational and local insurgent groups in the host state. Therefore, by including ethnicity, this dissertation offers a first systematic test of the above suggested negative externalities of refugee movements and thereby contributes to the understanding of refugee-related security issues.
2 Previous Research

2.2.1 Refugee Warriors

The literature on the motivations and opportunities of refugees to become active violent actors will be described in this subsection. The phenomenon of refugee militarization is defined as “the involvement of groups of refugees in militaristic activities, including political violence, armed resistance, military training, explicit support for combatants, storage and diffusion of weapons, and / or military recruitment” (Lebson, 2013, 2). Addressing the problem of defining militarized refugees, Mogire (2006, 143) argues that “according to UNHCR, the concept of militarized refugees is itself oxymoronic - refugees who carry arms are no longer described as such but rather as ‘foreign combatants’ or armed criminals”, because the UNHCR pursues a strictly civilian nature of refugees. Compared to other international migrants, refugees are more likely to engage in conflict due to their experiences of violence and aversion against their home government (Weiner, 1993, 107). Lebson (2013, 5) argues that “the acts of war, expulsion and exile that led to asylum-seeking are inherently politicizing. By seeking asylum in a foreign country, groups are engaging in political behavior and become political entities”, facilitating the militarization of refugee groups. Refugee militarization research claims that the phenomenon of refugee warriors depends highly on the reasons to why and how people became refugees.

Defining refugees simultaneously as victims and political actors, Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo (1989, 275, 278) study “refugee warrior” communities with political structures and engagement in violent activities directed towards the refugees’ home state. The political aims of refugee warriors are recapturing the homeland, changing the regime or securing a separate state (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1989, 275). Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo (1989, 30, 269) distinguish three refugee categories with decreasing incentives to militarize, which Lischer (2005, 19) extends with the propensity for violence of each refugee-type. First, refugees who were politically active and fled a defeat in civil war only return home after the establishment of a new government or a military victory. They have a strong political organization that often grows during the exile and they are likely to cause further conflict. Second, refugees who belong to a social or cultural group that was oppressed by the home state and thus, fled group-based persecution, only return home when their safety is guaranteed. Although these refugees have a weak initial organization, this may grow in exile as they have a moderate propensity for violence. Third, refugees who were affected by violence not intentionally directed at them, fled war, chaos or deprivation, and return home as soon as peace is reestablished. These refugees are loosely politically organized and are unlikely to cause violence.
2 Previous Research

In opposition to these studies, Adelman (1998, 51-52) states that the reason why refugees become warriors must be distinguished from the reason why people become refugees. He argues that refugee warrior communities emerge if the host state fails to manage the refugee crisis. Gerdes (2006a, 44) emphasizes the role of the host state as a decisive factor, because militarized refugee populations are mostly found in unstable countries with strongly informal politics. Muggah and Mogire (2006, 1, 8), with evidence from Sub Saharan Africa, found that the storage and trafficking of weapons particularly affect protracted long-term camp settlements. Similarly, Lebson’s (2013) theoretical approach to refugee militarization includes exogenous structural factors like political opportunities and resource mobilization capacities as well as endogenous explanations such as political and economic motivations.

This dissertation builds on these studies and examines the host country determinants for refugee-related conflict diffusion. While a broad literature, based on rich in-depth case studies, analyzes the incentives and capacities for refugee militarization, we still know little about the underlying patterns of ethno-nationalist preferences of refugee groups and how these affect the probability of militarization and conflict.

2.2.2 Refugees and Conflict in the Country of Asylum

Besides refugee militarization where refugees actively interfere in violent events, Lischer (2001) and Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) more systematically examined refugee-related security implications in the host country. Lischer (2001) conducted a first quantitative analysis of refugee-related violence and detected that approximately 15 percent of the refugee groups between 1987 and 1998 were involved in violence. Lischer (2005, 12) distinguishes five types of refugee-related violence:

- Attacks between the sending state and the refugees
- Attacks between the receiving state and the refugees
- Ethnic or factional violence among the refugees
- Internal violence within the receiving state
- Interstate war or unilateral intervention

The probability of refugee-related conflict depends, as stated above, on the origin of the refugee movement, because refugees who fled group-based persecution or a defeat in a civil war are more likely to militarize (Lischer, 2005, 19). In addition, the capability and willingness of the host state to accommodate the refugees
and prevent militarization determines whether a conflict emerges (Lischer, 2005, 29), as well as the presence of undifferentiated humanitarian aid that can be misused by insurgent groups (Lischer, 2005, 42). Some governments are unwilling to prevent militarized refugee camps if they can use the refugees as a leverage against foreign enemies (Stedman and Tanner, 2003, 3, 189), against internal challengers (Gerdes, 2006b, 15-16), or as shields for military activity (Sammut, 2001, 55). In these cases, refugees are used as a resource that can prolong conflicts and threaten security (Stedman and Tanner, 2003, 3). Johnson (2011) analyzes attacks on refugee camps, arguing that demographic characteristics are the determinant factor. Focusing on African refugee camps, he finds that large camps hosting many young male refugees have a higher risk of being attacked (Johnson, 2011, 43). In addition to having a small sample size, which covers only three years, he does not examine who attacks the camps. Furthermore, his research framework excludes the majority of refugees who live in settlements other than traditional camps.

Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) claim that refugee flows are a mechanism underlying the diffusion or spillover effects of civil wars because

“refugees can change the ethnic composition of the host state; exacerbate economic competition; bring with them arms, combatants, and ideologies that are conducive to violence; and mobilize opposition directed at their country of origin as well as their host country” (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006, 338).

Conducting a first systematic quantitative test of the correlation between refugee flows and violence in the asylum state, Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006, 360) find that refugees from neighboring countries can increase the risk of intra-state conflict. However, they do not consider the ethnicity of the refugees and are, consequently, missing an important refugee characteristic impacting the refugees’ relation to the host population. In a sensitivity model, they discovered that ethnic kin in combination with refugees in a neighboring country increases the probability of civil war (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006, 357), but they do not analyze whether the refugee movement belonged to the corresponding transnational ethnic group. My dissertation strongly builds on Salehyan and Gleditsch’s (2006) findings of conflict diffusion, including refugee movements, and tries to improve the understanding of the causal processes of refugee-related conflict trigger mechanisms by considering the ethnic composition of refugee flows beyond the country level.

In addition to the security consequences of refugees for the host state, which are the focus of this dissertation, negative externalities of refugee movements also affect the refugees’ home country and the relationship between the refugee send-
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ing and receiving state. With regard to the refugee sending state, previous studies suggest that refugees can prolong civil conflicts in their origin country (Salehyan, 2007), make a peace-agreement more difficult (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000), and make peace less stable, thereby contributing to the re-occurrence of conflict (Derouen and Barutciski, 2007). Furthermore, refugee movements can deteriorate the relations between the country of origin and the country of asylum. Salehyan (2008a, 790-791) found that refugees increase the risk of militarized interstate disputes in country-dyads experiencing refugee movements. Kathman (2011, 18) argues that as refugee numbers rise, third parties become more likely to intervene in a civil conflict.

2.3 Ethnicity in Refugee Studies

Despite a general agreement in the literature that trans-border ethnic linkages and ethnic group membership influence conflict diffusion processes, the ethnicity of refugees has not yet been systematically analyzed. This is surprising since refugees have been identified as a mechanism contributing to the regional spread of conflict. Criticizing previous research of having an exclusive focus on either the causes or the characteristics of forced displacement, Lischer (2007, 134) emphasizes that refugee groups are not “an undifferentiated mass”. I follow this claim and consider sub-national ethnic identities of refugee groups allowing me to assess the ethno-political logic of refugee-related conflict triggers.

Several qualitative case studies emphasize the salience of more fine-grained refugee characteristics such as their ethnicity, age or gender, particularly with regard to the refugees’ impact on the host state and the local ethnic set-up. Ethnic group membership determines how the refugees are perceived in the asylum country. Generally, governments and populations are more receptive to co-ethnic refugees, and kin refugees are less likely to cause conflict, as has been put forward by Jacobsson (1996, 669) and Newland (1993, 86). However, refugees can increase tensions if the ethnic kinship of the refugees and the host population concerns an aggrieved minority group and when the refugees disturb a delicate ethnic power balance in the host state (Newland, 1993, 86, 87). However, Newland (1993) does not empirically test these assumptions. Based on the “sons of the soil”-argument of Weiner (1978), according to which conflicts evolve around territorial disputes between native inhabitants and immigrants or more recent settlers (Fearon and Laitin, 2011), Goldstone (2002, 13-14) states that conflict is likely when an ethnic group migrates into an area that is considered homeland by another group and challenges the dominance of the latter. For instance, refugees from Bangladesh caused conflict in
northeastern India because they ousted the indigenous population (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006, 344). Loescher and Milner (2004, 12-14) also found that the presence of refugees exacerbates inter-communal tensions, shifts the power balance and causes grievances. In ethnically or religiously divided societies, the fragile balance can be threatened by a refugee influx. Besides presenting the case of the Kosovar Albanian refugees in Macedonia as an example of where refugees indirectly accelerated an internal conflict, they conduct no empirical analysis. Focusing on state capacity as a determinant of the risk of refugee-related violence, Adamson (2006, 117) assumes that the problem of refugees exacerbating ethnic tensions is especially prominent in weak or failing states. These states are unable to control their borders and thus, are open to refugees who increase pressures on already weak institutions.

Lebson (2013, 3) argues that surprisingly few studies on refugee militarization consider ethnic characteristics, albeit in civil conflict research, endogenous factors such as ethnicity or nationalisms play a considerable role. He suggests including ethno-nationalism and exclusionist wars targeting certain groups as leading political motivations for refugee militarization (Lebson, 2013, 6,7) and tests these mechanisms with rich qualitative case studies, especially focusing on the Palestinian refugees in Jordan (Lebson, 2012).

This dissertation will complement these qualitative studies on refugee ethnicity and conflict risk with a more systematic theoretical approach and a large-N analysis.

### 2.4 Chapter Summary

In summary, the civil conflict literature agrees that border-crossing actors such as transnational ethnic groups or refugee movements contribute to the regional diffusion of violence. However, besides Lischer’s (2001) work on refugee-related violence and Salehyan and Gleditsch’s (2006) research, quantitative studies have thus far tended to ignore the security implications of refugees for their country of asylum, be it either directly through refugee militarization or rebel recruitment, or indirectly by affecting policies or groups. In addition, despite interesting case-based research documenting the impact of the refugees’ ethnic group membership on their relation to the host population, due to a lack of data, no study has yet systematically considered the ethnicity of refugees. Thus, we still know little about the general relevance of the refugees’ group identity for security questions. The following section therefore presents my theoretical approach to refugee-related conflict diffusion,
2 Previous Research

including ethno-nationalist preferences of the refugee group and the population in
the asylum state.
3 Theoretical Overview: Refugee-Related Conflict Diffusion along Transnational Ethnic Linkages

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This section presents a new theoretical approach to security issues related to refugee flows, which in contrast to previous research, includes ethno-nationalist preferences of refugee movements and asylum countries. Group identities such as the ethnic affiliation are crucial for refugees as they first, might determine whether or not a person becomes a refugee, because often certain ethnic groups are targeted in civil conflicts. Second, ethnicity has relevance for the flight direction of refugees since migrants often follow cultural and ethnic ties to other countries. Finally, the ethnic group membership of refugees affects integration propensities and the relation to the host population in the asylum state as well as the risk of refugee militarization. Figure 3.1 schematically illustrates the process and consequences of refugee movements along trans-border ethnic linkages, with the underlined terms representing the empirical chapters of this dissertation.

Before outlining my theoretical approach to conflict diffusion including refugees and trans-border ethnic linkages, in the following subsection, I introduce the definitions of the key concepts used in this dissertation.
3 Theory

Figure 3.1: Process and Effect of Refugee Flow along Trans-Border Ethnic Linkages

3.1 Definitions

3.1.1 Refugee

According to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is:

“a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR, 2007a, 17).

Simplified, a refugee is a person who had to leave his country of origin because of conflict or persecution. Due to insecurity, violence or conflict, refugees break ties with their home country and seek protection from another state (Hein, 1993, 44). It is important to note that “no one chooses to be a refugee” (UNHCR, 2012a), thus, in contrast to other migrants, refugees were forced to leave their home. Same as refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) had to leave their homes involuntarily due to persecution or violence, but they crossed no international state border (Mooney, 2005, 9) because they were either not able or not willing to do so. Focusing on conflict diffusion across state borders, I will not include internally displaced people in my analysis, although they have been produced by the same causes as refugees. A forced migrant becomes a refugee when he crosses the country border, but that person may have been in transit in his home country for a longer time,
so that many refugees have previous experiences as internally displaced people. A person having applied for asylum in the host country but not having received formal recognition as a refugee yet is an *asylum seeker* (Warziniack, 2013, 1047).

Weiner (1993, 98) states that forced migration flows “not merely happen, they are made to happen” by governments. Refugees mostly emerge during times of political change (Weiner, 1993, 95), either during regime collapse (Melander and Öberg, 2006, 144) or reorganizations of political communities (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1986; Davenport, Moore and Poe, 2003). Furthermore, lack of political freedom and oppressive regimes are major sources of refugee emigration (Schmeidl, 1997; Moore and Shellman, 2004). The most important cause of refugee flows is political violence occurring during ethnic, religious or tribal wars or genocides (Wood, 1994; Weiner, 1996; Schmeidl, 1997). Gerdes (2006a, 4) argues that refugees involuntarily become important actors in civil conflicts “once violent confrontations have turned them into refugees”.

Despite the prevalent perception of refugees as a homogeneous caseload of poor people living in crowded tent settlements, refugee shelters show a great variety; from the prominent overcrowded and huge camps such as Dadaab in Kenya to very small and dispersed refugee settlements. In addition, the majority of refugees worldwide reside not in camps but in urban areas and in private accommodations (UNHCR, 2010). The widespread idea that refugee camps are closed entities has been disproved by many reports from the UNHCR and other refugee-related organizations. Often people move in and out, for instance to collect firewood or visit the next village. Also, it is common that families of warring factions reside in camps (UNHCR, 2012b). Thus, women and children stay in camps while men participating in insurgencies visit them there occasionally. In particular, younger men have been reported to leave the camps in order to join rebel movements, which the UNHCR does not impede as long as it is voluntary and does not affect children (UNHCR, N.A.).

Having witnessed military operations (Kunz, 1973, 137), conflict or persecution in their home country, refugees likely have a political opinion they might want to express (Lebson, 2013). Consequently, refugees are active social agents (Jacobsen, 2000, 18). Nevertheless, refugee groups are heterogeneous in terms of political, social and economic views. Furthermore, it is important to note that the refugee identity is temporal, albeit with great variety, lasting from a few days, over generations, or to lifetimes (Large, 2013).
3.1.2 Ethnicity

*Ethnicity* is a broadly used but disputed concept in social sciences. Therefore, I here clarify my understanding of the term ethnicity and how I use it in this dissertation. Weber (2010) refers to ethnic communities as artificially built “human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists” (Weber, 2010, 20).

Also Horowitz (1985, 17-18) emphasizes the constructivist nature of ethnicity by stating that “an ethnic group is based on a perceived common origin, skin color, general appearance, religion, language or a combination thereof”. Similarly Cederman (2010, 3) defines an ethnic group as “a cultural community based on a common belief in a putative descent”. Ethnic group membership can be based on different markers with varying relevance in different political scenarios, such as a common language, religion or physical features, but it does not include tribes or clans (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010, 13).

The constructivist approach to ethnicity that informs this dissertation suggests that individuals have multiple ethnic identities. Ethnic groups are constructed and can be reconstructed when individual identifications change (Bayar, 2009, 1634). According to the constructivists, ethnicity is primarily a framework for social organization (Newland, 1993, 83) and thus, interaction unifies people as ethnic groups (Bayar, 2009, 1643). Consequently, civil conflicts and wars increase interaction among people belonging to the same targeted group and thereby facilitate the endogenous development of ethnic group awareness (Vorrath and Krebs, 2009, 1). Lischer (2005, 22-25) and Lebson (2013, 4, 5) argue that the group-based persecution and the experience of flight strengthen the ethnic identity of a refugee group and create strong social and politicized units among them. Thus, ethnic identifications are particularly relevant for refugees, compared to people not having been affected by conflict. Refugees are strongly aware of their ethnic group membership, particularly when fleeing from ethnic conflict or ethnic persecution, therefore, ethnicity is very important in refugee research.

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1 In addition to constructivism, the main theoretical approaches to the concept of ethnicity, respectively ethnic conflict, are primordialism and instrumentalism. The primordialists assume that ethnicity is built around similarities and that it is fixed and unchangeable once constructed. The instrumentalist framework regards ethnicity as a political and economic resource. Ethnicity is a tool that individuals, groups and elites use to reach a certain aim (Bayar, 2009; Lake and Rothchild, 1998).
3 Theory

While focusing on macro-level based communities of people unified as ethnic identity groups, the heterogeneity within ethnic groups must nevertheless be acknowledged. Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010, 13) claim that ethnic groups might be hierarchically nested, meaning they comprise several levels of differentiation which are unequally relevant. For instance, members of an ethnic group based on a shared language may have different religious faiths, such as the ethnic Russians who are either orthodox or atheists, apart from different social values and political opinions that can be found in any ethnic group. Also, individual perceptions of ethnic group membership might vary strongly and different people may feel more or less related to their ethnic group. This heterogeneity within ethnic groups also applies to ethnic refugee groups. Referring to diaspora groups but similarly applicable to refugee movements, Koinova (2009, 2) states that “diasporas are not homogeneous entities. They are comprised of different generations of migrants, genders, organizations, and powerful individuals, all of whom often have opposing interests and speak for the diaspora with different voices. At different moments, diasporas can include some individuals or groups that advocate radical activism for the homeland, while others are opposed or ambivalent about it.”

Furthermore, ethnic group membership rarely corresponds to state borders, which often were arbitrarily drawn, and many ethnic groups can be found in more than one country. However, the perception of being a community and the loyalty towards other group members are not restricted by country borders (Davis and Moore, 1997; Saideman, 2002). Thus, people are interested in, and care about, their kin with shared identity across the border. These transnational ties affect regional politics, either positively in terms of information exchange, trade, common interests, or negatively, resulting in conflict spillover processes. Therefore, ethnic linkages are salient for most countries of the world.

3.1.3 Conflict Diffusion

As substantiated by empirical patterns, many civil conflicts display a regional dimension due to spillover mechanisms (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008). Hence, we need a conceptual clarification of what is meant by conflict and its diffusion.

Civil conflicts are violent incompatibilities between the government of a state and one or more political non-state parties, with both sides using armed forces, taking place within the borders of a country (Gleditsch et al., 2002, 618-619). Most of the armed conflicts since the end of World War II have been such intra-state wars (Gleditsch et al., 2002, 624), in contrast to the less frequently occurring in-
terstate wars involving different countries. Scholars typically distinguish between ethnic or identity and non-ethnic, so-called ideological conflicts (Sambanis, 2001, 262). A civil conflict is considered ethnic when at least one involved party aims to achieve ethno-nationalist self-determination, end ethnic discrimination, obtain language and cultural rights, change the ethnic balance, or achieve ethno-territorial autonomy (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009, 326). Sambanis (2001, 275) found that in particular ethnic conflicts often start as a cause of contagion or diffusion of a neighboring conflict. Thus, diffusion mechanisms are particularly salient for ethnic conflict onsets. When transnational ethnic groups are present, ethnicity as a crucial factor in civil wars has influence beyond state borders (Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009, 433).

Conflict diffusion refers to the spillover of a civil conflict from one state to another. The terms spread, diffusion, contagion and spillover are used here synonymously. Building on the conflict spread conceptualizations of Most and Starr (1980, 933), Lake and Rothchild (1998, 23) and Elkins and Simmons (2005, 36), I define a civil conflict as spatially diffused if the outbreak of civil conflict in one state is at some part caused by a temporally previous intra-state conflict in another country. Hence, conflict diffusion is a chain of at least two events - the onset of civil conflict in country \( i \) at time \( t - 1 \) and the consequent onset of civil conflict in country \( j \) at time \( t \).

This dissertation claims that trans-border ethnic ties, refugees and insurgent groups are the explanatory factors for successful conflict contagion. In order for diffusion mechanisms to operate, interaction between groups or states must occur (Brown, 2010, 54), which is strongly associated with geographic proximity (Most and Starr, 1980, 934). Conflicts break out not due to external shocks only, of which a conflict or war in a neighboring state is considered, but internal structural factors, such as the lack of state capacity (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) or political exclusion (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010), always impact the risk of conflict. Conflict diffusion occurs as a result of the combination of both internal and external conflict-increasing characteristics. Hence, this dissertation analyzes conflict diffusion as an actor-related process which is influenced by transnational linkages.

\[ \text{Conflict} \text{ } \text{Country } i, t-1 \rightarrow \text{Conflict} \text{ } \text{Country } j, t \]

\[ ^2 \text{Most and Starr (1980, 933) define “positive spatial diffusion” as “the process in which the occurrence of a new war participation in a nation increases the likelihood that other nations will experience subsequent war participations”. Lake and Rothchild (1998, 23) describe ethnic conflict spread when a conflict in one country increases the probability of a conflict in another country or when external forces participate in an internal conflict. Elkins and Simmons (2005, 36) focus on civil conflict diffusion “across space”.} \]
Having defined the major concepts, I now proceed by depicting the theoretical logics of refugee movement direction and refugee-related conflict spread along trans-border ethnic connections.

### 3.2 The Logic of Refugee Flight Patterns along Transnational Ethnic Linkages

Empirical evidence suggests that refugees have the tendency to go where they have some sort of connecting point, such as to family members or ethnic kin (Bundesamt für Migration, 2013, 2). Thus, the direction of forced migrant movements is strongly affected by kinship ties. Since no systematic theory explains the flight routes of refugee movements, this dissertation introduces a new theoretical approach to the direction of refugee movements, which then may lead to the consequent logic of refugee-related conflict diffusion, including trans-border ethnic ties, presented in the next subsection.

Refugees are a subcategory of the broader concept of migrants. Forced migrants emigrate due to push factors such as violence or persecution, while other migrants at least to some part voluntarily leave their home. For instance, working migrants try to evade poverty and seek wealth in another country. Thus, while different migrants have many motives influencing their decision to dislocate, the single reason why refugees migrate is violence. Refugees typically move in larger groups, compared to other migrants who travel more individually, and very often come from poor countries (Stark, 2004, 325). Consequently, refugees have a stronger orientation or even political activism towards their home country compared to voluntary migrants. Colic-Peisker and Walker (2003, 345-346) mention the refugee’s dual and differentiated orientation towards home and host country and claim that refugees feel strongly attached to their home state but acknowledge that their situation in the asylum state is safer. Besides these differences between refugees and other migrants, theories of diaspora or transnationalism, which try to explain migration logics, also apply to refugee movements (Wahlbeck, 2002, 234). Crisp (1999a, 6) emphasizes that the process of refugee migration is affected by transnational social networks. The reason therefore is that migration costs are lower if refugees can follow past refugee movements or long-term migrants from a particular country of origin (Neumayer, 2004, 164). Hence, cultural ties to co-ethnics who either are long-term residents or emigrated previously function as a pull factor for refugees.

Several qualitative studies have investigated how cultural ties affect the flight direction of refugees and have discovered that forced migrants are often found in
neighboring countries linked by ethnic or colonial ties (Newland, 1993; Schmeidl, 1997; Moore and Shellman, 2007). Although pushed out of their home state and thus, involuntarily leaving, refugees have incentives to follow linkages to politically relevant ethnic kin groups residing in other countries. Therefore, I distinguish between the causes and the direction of flight, as I will put forward in Chapter 5. While refugees are forced to leave and therefore have little impact on the decision to move or not, they can still consider positive incentives or opportunistic reasons when deciding where to flee.

I claim that refugees follow ethnic ties for several reasons. First, cultural bonds are associated with established information networks thanks to communication technologies (Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Zhukov and Stewart, 2013). Information can spread very quickly either through personal interaction such as phone calls, or written exchange between family members in different locations, or through shared broadcast media consumed by different nationalities speaking the same language. As a consequence of this shared information, people and potential refugees often have some form of information and knowledge of the political, the economic and, most relevant for forced migrants, the security situation in countries with cultural linkages. Thus, cultural bonds create an informational advantage for forced migrants. Second, cross-border ethnic linkages entail existing transportation networks (Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Zhukov and Stewart, 2013), such as established and maintained streets or public transport which the refugees can and know how to use, decreasing the costs of flight. Third, flight costs are lower for people with knowledge of the area that has to be crossed and settled, which is more likely to be the case in the land of co-ethnics. Some forced migrants cannot travel openly and have to use hidden tracks and be very careful as they might be further persecuted. Also, many host states refuse to accept refugees so that they have to cross the border illegally and try to remain undiscovered to avoid repatriation. Familiarity with the territory is an advantage in such dangerous situations. Fourth, refugees can expect a higher degree of acceptance, tolerance towards them and general support from ethnic kin groups in the host country (Weiner, 1993 105). Refugees in camps will be exposed to less hostilities if they are co-ethnics of the local population, and the same applies to refugees in urban settlements. Also, co-ethnic refugees have higher chances of being hosted in private accommodations and receive some form of informal help, making them less reliant on international organizations and humanitarian agencies. People belonging to the same ethnic group often show border-crossing loyalty to each other and “constituents will care most about those with whom they share ethnic ties” (Saideman, 2002 32). Finally, cultural ties imply lower assimilation costs and better integration opportunities thanks to a common
3 Theory

language, religion and habits. Forced migrants without registration in the asylum state due to fear from expulsion by the host government are less at risk of being detected if they have co-ethnics among whom they can hide. Jacobsen (2005, 15) points out that “when the local community accepts refugees, they are better able to hide from authorities, face fewer security threats, and are more able to pursue livelihoods”.

Hence, if forced migrants have a destination choice, refugees should have strong reasons to relocate to countries with cultural similarities. Besides linkages to local residents in the asylum state, refugees are also pulled to countries with relevant co-ethnic migrants such as previous refugee movements and long-term migrants such as diaspora groups. Thus, refugee flows are temporally dependent on earlier migration movements (Stark, 2004; Iqbal and Zorn, 2007; Rubin and Moore, 2007), and refugees relocate to places where other co-ethnics have gone to before. The reasons therefore are the same as described above. Earlier migrants establish informational networks, transportation routes and consequent knowledge of the territory decreasing the flight costs. Earlier migrants might help their newly arriving kin find accommodation and thereby facilitate their assimilation. Also, relief infrastructure such as camp facilities or health assistance is already organized, making a “refugee route […] more inviting” (Stark, 2004, 328).

Previous research on refugee movements has unanimously emphasized geography, that is distance between countries of origin and asylum, as a determinant factor for refugee flight (Schmeidl, 1997; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Iqbal, 2007; Iqbal and Zorn, 2007; Melander and Öberg, 2007). Many refugees flee by restricted means (Schmeidl, 1997, 296) and are, thus, dependent on spatial proximity. Empirical evidence suggests that the vast majority of refugees reside in countries contiguous to their home state. Hence, they remain in the troubled regions (Bundesamt für Migration, 2012; UNHCR, 2012b). The access to a possible host country is determined by geographic factors. The flight costs are higher in terms of travel and time in rough terrain, such as mountains or deserts. Similarly, obstacles like large bodies of water cannot be crossed easily, which was an issue in the Great Lakes refugee crisis where flight directions during the Rwandan genocide were heavily impacted by the fact that the refugees were unable to cross Lake Kivu. Further, I claim that political factors also impact the accessibility of a state because forced migrants often have to rely on porous borders to enter a country. Thus, the capacity of a potential asylum state, whether it is either willing to accommodate refugees or unable to control its borders, determines the flight routes of forced migrants.
These spatial factors affect the logic of refugee movements along trans-border ethnic linkages because ethnic kinship ties are almost exclusively found in regionally concentrated countries. In particular, neighboring states are connected by border-crossing groups. However, although linkages to co-ethnics in the asylum state have many advantages for refugee groups, explaining why refugees are often found in these countries, forced migrant flows along border-transgressing ethnic ties also cause negative externalities which are elaborated in the next subsection. In particular, ethnic kin refugees in multi-ethnic states might threaten stability.

3.3 The Ethno-Political Logic of Refugee-Related Conflict Trigger Mechanisms

Before examining the negative externalities of a refugee influx, I want to emphasize that migrants, whether forced or voluntary, entail several positive effects for the host state. First, immigrants are a resource, constitute human capital and often bring intelligence, knowledge and new skills. For instance, “in Guinea, refugees brought new agricultural techniques to bear on vacant land, introducing swamp land rice. In Nepal, refugees have introduced new ways to cultivate the cash crop cardamom” (Large, 2013). Second, refugees can increase economic activities thanks to stimulated local markets through higher demand, job opportunities, increased development because of the influx of resources from international humanitarian assistance and improved infrastructure (Baez, 2011; Large, 2013). For example, during the Kosovo crisis, the UNHCR made agreements with local businesses in Albania to produce blankets or asked local bakeries to bake bread (UNHCR, 1999). Refugees can have a positive impact on the welfare and local economy of the host state. Third, forced migrants contribute to the cultural diversity of the asylum state. Since refugees successfully escaped from violence, they often comprise of groups of active and innovative people (Refugee Council of Australia, 2010).

Besides these positive externalities, refugee movements can have several negative effects, including increased economic pressures, public health issues and environmental degradation. Moreover, refugees might cause security problems such as ethnic tensions, increasing xenophobia and rebel network expansions, which have been described in more detail in Section 2.2. Despite the difficulties and tensions involved in emergent refugees crises that particularly apply to affected neighboring countries, many asylum states do not suffer from these negative effects. The theoretical approach introduced here includes sub-national ethnic information on forced migrants, in order to explain the logic of refugee-related conflict diffusion based on the above mentioned negative externalities. The new framework to examine
refugee-related conflict diffusion combines the ethnic nature of refugee movements and ethno-politics of the asylum state. My main theoretical claim is that refugee-related conflict trigger mechanisms depend on the ethnic characteristics of refugees and how these relate to ethnic power politics in the host state.

Refugees are newcomers in the asylum state, but they may encounter an ethnic kin group. If refugees flee along transnational ethnic connections, two scenarios could apply: the refugees’ co-ethnics are either in power or marginalized in the host state’s governmental politics. Thus, refugees can flee along symmetric and asymmetric transnational ethnic linkages. Symmetric ties refer to transnational ethnic groups that have the same access to power in both countries. For instance, the Kurdish refugees from Turkey who are situated in Iraq fled along symmetric ties because in both countries the Kurds are a marginalized ethnic minority. Asymmetric ties describe ethnic linkages where the transnational ethnic group is in power in one country but marginalized in the other. For example, the ethnic Serbs who fled from Croatia to Serbia constitute a refugee movement along an asymmetric ethnic connection. Therefore, I distinguish three refugee types.

1) Ethnic kin refugees of politically marginalized groups who are more likely to be perceived as a threat to internal stability and increase tensions.

2) Refugees with ethnic linkages to a politically powerful group who are welcomed and adequately accommodated.

3) Refugees without ethnic ties to the country of asylum who might be seen with suspicion, treated as foreigners and increase xenophobic feelings in the host society (Korobkov, 2007, 183), but unlikely impact domestic politics.

Figure 3.2 displays the scenarios following a refugee movement along symmetric (1) and asymmetric (2) ethnic linkages, and refugees without ethnic connections (3) to the asylum state. For the sake of completeness, symmetric and asymmetric ties could operate in reverse, if the refugee group has a politically powerful status in the country of origin. However, the relevance of the refugees’ political status at home should not be overestimated since refugees have crossed state borders due to violence or persecution and thus, enjoyed no appropriate political situation before their flight, irrespective of their ethnic group’s access to state power.\(^3\)

\(^3\)Descriptive evidence suggests that approximately 60 percent of all ethnic refugee groups were politically excluded before their flight, and 40 percent had representatives with access to state decision making at home.
The acceptance and the treatment of refugees with ethnic connections to the asylum state depends on the relation between the refugees’ kin group and other ethnic groups in the country. In general, ethnic kinship facilitates integration thanks to similar language, religion and habits, or even family bonds. But it may cause tensions and violence when refugees enter into a fragile set-up with several competing ethnic groups. Hence, ethnic kinship raises the receptiveness of refugees among group members in the host country and facilitates integration, but, paradoxically, it also reinforces pressures if the country is populated by more than one ethnic group. Accordingly, the consequences of a refugee influx are different depending on whether the refugees are ethnically related to a group that has power over the state or to a minority group, in that the latter case is more likely to cause problems. A group’s political status, that is exclusion or inclusion in the state government, is a major reason for conflict-involvement since groups that are excluded or included in the central decision making have different incentives or motivations to either improve their influence on state politics or keep their status quo (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). Co-ethnic refugees of an already conflict-prone political minority imperil the political stability because the refugee-related conflict diffusion mechanisms are more likely to come into action. I claim that the risk of conflict
Theory

contagion depends on internal structural factors in the target state, such as exclusionary policies, and exogenous factors, such as ethnic kin refugees. If these factors are simultaneously present, they can accelerate conflict dynamics.

Thus, refugee-induced conflict diffusion depends on the political situation in the host state. The remaining subsections introduce the four main refugee-related conflict trigger mechanisms and explain the mode of operation of each mechanism, which strongly depends on ethno-politics in the asylum country.

- Disturbance of the ethnic balance
- Demonstration effect
- Diffusion of military resources
- Expansion of rebel networks

The different mechanisms are not mutually exclusive but often occur simultaneously. Further, I differentiate between indirect and direct mechanisms. Refugees indirectly trigger conflict when they upset the ethnic balance or influence a demonstration effect, meaning they do not actively participate in violent activities. Refugees are directly involved in conflicts caused by diffused military resources or rebel networks, because they actively participate in the insurgencies. However, the distinction between the either direct, active and voluntary, or indirect, passive and involuntary conflict-involvement of refugees is often unclear, as I will further elaborate below.

3.3.1 Disturbance of the Ethnic Balance

This subsection explains how the refugees' ethnic relation to the host population affects the risk of increased instability and a disturbed ethnic balance. The ethnic balance describes the political equilibrium of ethnic groups living in a country. A high number of refugees entering a country changes the composition of people populating it, which is particularly important in multiethnic states. Co-ethnic refugees can support their local kin by raising the number of people belonging to the concerned ethnic group and thereby strengthening the group's demographic and, consequently, their political position. Ethnic tensions may especially arise when immigrants possess ethnic ties with minorities in the host country (Salehyan, 2008a, 790). In particular, politically excluded groups are aggrieved and they might finally feel strong enough to demand more power after a refugee influx. For instance in Russia, the internally displaced Chechen people who fled to areas traditionally inhabited by Chechens in the extremely multiethnic republic of Dagestan intensified
the existing problem of Chechens in Dagestan, which was mainly about territorial claims (Halbach, 1999, 20). The Chechens attained a stronger bargaining position, due to the influx of Chechens into Dagestan. Hence, the Chechen IDPs disturbed the fragile ethnic balance of Dagestan (Halbach, 1999, 18). An already tense ethnic situation can escalate due to a co-ethnic refugee influx of a marginalized group because it challenges the dominance of the ethnic groups in power, and increases the likelihood of clashes between the refugees, their ethnic kin group and the ethnic groups in power (Goldstone, 2002, 13-14). For example, Shia fighters in Iraq killed almost 200 Palestinian refugees in 2006 because they associated these refugees with the Sunni insurgency (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2007). While a minority group feels strengthened by ethnic kin refugees, at the same time, the majority group is likely to feel threatened by a large influx of minority kin refugees who challenge their political predominance. In the 1970s, Malaysia feared that the influx of ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam would threaten the delicate balance between Malays and Chinese (Stein, 1979, 717). Similarly, Pakistan refused to host Bihari refugees who could disturb the ethnic balance in the Sind province (UNHCR, N.A.). Also, existing conflicts between local ethnic groups may be transmitted to refugees, as in the case of the Somali refugees in Kenya, who suffered from the same discrimination as the local ethnic Somali population (UNHCR, N.A.). Furthermore, the large influx of Somali refugees to Kenya increased resentments and hostilities against Kenyan ethnic Somalis (Kagwanja and Juma, 2008, 223).

In addition to the presence of co-ethnic refugees and the political power status of the refugees’ kin group, the conflict risk depends on the size of the refugee group (Weiner, 1993, 105). A delicate ethnic balance can only be disturbed by a high number of co-ethnic refugees. Larger refugee flows have a greater impact on the receiving country, especially refugee flows considerably affecting either the ratio of refugees to the host population or the ratio of the ethnic kin group to the other groups in the host country. When, for example, more than a million Rwandan Hutu refugees entered Zaire in 1994, Tutsis there resorted to violence against the Hutus, because they were threatened by the changing demographics (Hartman, 2009). Besides the size of the refugee group, the size of the refugees’ kin group has to be considered when analyzing the risk of conflict, because large excluded or underrepresented groups are more likely to challenge the government (Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009, 423). Refugees only cause a disturbed ethnic balance if their kin group reaches a critical demographic size. An ethnic group must perceive itself as strengthened enough to claim better representation, thanks to increased demographic power and the opportunity to challenge or threaten other groups thereby.
Thus, by upsetting the ethnic balance, refugees do not directly intervene in host politics but influence the behavior of local groups. Similarly, refugees can inspire resident kin groups to use violence through a demonstration effect.

### 3.3.2 Demonstration Effect

Refugees threaten the security by displaying a demonstration effect on their local kin population. Being a visible sign of political opportunities, refugees may inspire groups in the host country to become active and demand more political power. Migrants often import new skills, ideas and ideologies, increasing the host population’s learning opportunities (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Hartman, 2009). These new ideologies could encourage the opposition in the host state (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006, 343). Furthermore, becoming aware of the possibility of having to flee, a group could preemptively demand more power before other groups do the same (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, 26). Thanks to a common language, ethnic kinship facilitates the exchange of information, for instance on the costs of violence or the chances of winning armed struggles. Hence, refugees are most likely to impact co-ethnic groups. The Lebanese Muslim population that resorted to force in demanding more political representation after the civil war outbreak between Lebanese Maronites and Palestinian refugees, were among others influenced by a demonstration effect of the clashes between the Palestinians, who belong to the same religious group, and their own government (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006, 345). Groups that are excluded from power are likely to be aggrieved and thus, more receptive to new ideas on how to possibly challenge the government. Hence, refugees who are ethnic kin of a powerless group cause conflict if they indirectly support their kin by impairing them. This can result either in clashes between different ethnic groups in the asylum state, or in attacks of the receiving country’s government on the refugees.

### 3.3.3 Diffusion of Military Resources

As a direct mechanism, refugees can actively spread military resources, particularly “when the refugee flow is composed of civilians as well as active and ex-combatants, former soldiers, police and other militias” (Mogire, 2004, 21). First, refugees might carry weapons when they cross state-borders contributing to the diffusion of small arms (Mogire, 2004, 5). After having lost home and livelihood op-
opportunities, a portable firearm might be the last valuable possession (Mogire, 2004, 46). Although refugee settlements are predominantly civilian, weapons are occasionally kept and trafficked in them (Muggah and Mogire, 2006, 8), as empirical evidence from Burundian refugee camps in Tanzania in the 1990s suggests (Mogire, 2006, 152-153). Second, refugees can become active in violent activities in the host state as combatants and supporters of local rebel groups, such as the Rwandan Tutsi refugees who aligned with the insurgents in the Mulelist uprising in Zaire in the 1960s (Gerdes, 2006a, 39). Or the Somali refugees who collaborated with the Somali separatist movement in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in the recent two decades (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006, 343). Similarly, refugees can fight for the host government, like the Rwandan refugees who supported the government of Museveni in the Ugandan war in the 1980s (Gerdes, 2006a, 39). Again, the size of the refugee influx is important for this mechanism because larger groups offer more potential fighters (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010, 11) and because a certain number of people are necessary to be capable of organization (Tilly, 1978, 98). Finally, since forced migrants import new knowledge, this information might also contain skills and techniques on how to successfully use violence and challenge the government. For example, the host population could learn that suicide attacks can be effective in harming an opponent group and thus, copy such behavior.

Voluntary refugee militarization, including the diffusion of arms or participation in combat activities, has to be distinguished from refugee manipulation where forced migrants are coerced into supporting violent conflict (Terry, 2002; Stedman and Tanner, 2003; Mogire, 2004). Refugees are likely to voluntarily share their arms and knowledge with ethnic kin groups with whom they have a cultural connection (Weiner, 1993, 109). As stated earlier, co-ethnics often show loyalty and attentiveness to each other (Davis and Moore, 1997; Saideman, 2002). It is, thus, likely that co-ethnic groups pursue similar aims fostering collaboration. Ethnic similarities facilitate the exchange of goods thanks to a common language, shared norms or habits and mutual trust. Refugees are more likely to support an ethnic kin group by providing manpower, compared to the lower probability of collaborating with a random group. This means refugees fight alongside their ethnic group and support their internal struggles.

Due to their exclusion or perceived underrepresentation and consequent grievances, political minority groups are more receptive to military resources which can be used to improve their status. A governmental ethnic kin group could also be receptive to the diffusion of military resources in order to strengthen its political predominance (Gerdes, 2006b, 12), which, however, is unlikely to cause the outbreak of new violence. Hence, the mechanisms that refugees trigger conflict by display-
ing a demonstration effect because of shared ideologies or by diffusing military resources are more likely to affect dissatisfied ethnic kin groups in the receiving state. Political exclusion and discrimination affect refugee-related conflict trigger mechanisms in two ways. On the one hand, due to grievances, the local ethnic kin group is more receptive to bellicose ideas. Consequently, the diffusion of military resources is more likely. On the other hand, co-ethnic refugees of a political minority are expected to receive less support and assistance from the host government increasing grievances among the refugees which foster rebel-refugee-collaboration. This effect will be theoretically explained in the next subsection.

3.3.4 Expansion of Rebel Networks

Refugees can trigger a conflict by expanding rebel networks (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006, 339). This mechanism overlaps with the previous one, but it differs from refugee-related spread of military resources that here refugees actively collaborate with rebel groups from their home country, or on their own initiative found insurgent movements. Rebel groups are sometimes associated with refugee movements because they appear in the same locations in foreign countries.

Rebels and refugees are likely to cooperate if they are co-ethnics. First, refugees often have grievances against the home government that expelled them. These aversions unify the refugees with rebel groups fighting against the home state authorities. Hence, refugees and rebel groups are likely to have a common interest, which facilitates collaboration. Groups act collectively when they share interest as a result of advantages or disadvantages compared to other groups (Tilly, 1978, 98). Rebel groups can more easily recruit a large number of refugees when they belong to the same ethnic group, have a common identity and thus, are also likely to have shared aversions against their home government (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008, 440). Second, refugees might even establish insurgent movements on their own initiative in order to overthrow the home government that expelled them. For instance, the Palestine Liberation Organization was founded by refugees from Palestine whilst in exile (Szajkowski and Degenhardt, 2004, 375). Third, rebel groups that pursue ethno-political aims, in particular can resort to their ideology to address co-ethnic refugees collectively and recruit among them. For example, the Kurdistan’s Worker’s Party recruited among Kurdish refugees in North Iraq in the 1990s, causing highly militarized refugee settlements (Marcus, 2007).

The incentives and opportunities of insurgent groups to establish transnational bases will be elaborated in Chapter.

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Fourth, the desire to return home also increases grievances on which rebels can build and fosters support of a rebel group challenging the home regime, because a victory over the government could allow the refugees to return. The uncertainty of livelihood opportunities associated with refugee status and war-related exile can be used by rebel groups to influence and radically socialize refugees (Harpviken, 2013). Fifth, shared ethnicity facilitates the use of the refugee settlement as a sanctuary because rebels cannot be physically distinguished from refugees, and if the refugees support the rebels’ aims, they hide the rebels among themselves. If refugees and rebels are mixed, it is often impossible to distinguish between them and the insurgents can benefit from the humanitarian assistance provided in refugee camps (Barber, 1997; Terry, 2002). Finally, many insurgents have family ties to forced migrants in cases where men fight and the rest of the family resides in refugee settlements (UNHCR, 2012b; Mogire, 2004). Hence, a collective ethnic identity determines the relationship between refugees and rebels because an association between these two transnational actors is much more likely if they are ethnic kin.

Referring to ethno-politics in the asylum country, the chances of a rebel network expansion through refugees are higher if they are co-ethnics of a politically excluded group. First, the political context determines the accommodation of the refugees. The willingness and capability of the receiving state to support the refugees are important factors for refugee security (Lischer, 2005, 18-19). A host government is more willing to support ethnic kin refugees or generally refugees who do not challenge their dominance, while other ethnic refugee groups receive less assistance. The lack of assistance and neglect from the host government increases discontent and grievances among refugees and is one of the main sources of insecurity and violence among refugees (Crisp, 2000, 70). The host government can also determine whether or not to allow humanitarian agencies to assist the refugees. For refugees living in settlements, that are insecure and poorly equipped, the opportunity costs of fighting or joining a rebel group are lower. Participating in an insurgent movement might offer young refugees self-esteem, payment and more security. Rebel organizations are an alternative to a desperate life in a refugee camp (Salehyan, 2009, 40-41). The approach emphasizing economic viability as the main explanation for conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, 589) supports the view that insufficiently assisted refugee situations are dangerous because such camps give rebels the opportunity to recruit among the refugees. Second, the host government has less power in territories of other ethnic groups, particularly if the latter enjoy some form of local autonomy or live in remote areas far away from the cap-

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5Refugee-related violence is likely to emerge in camps that share the following features: located in remote areas, low level of development, weak rule of law, overcrowding, restriction of rights, limited access to livelihoods, inadequate levels of aid (Crisp, 2000, 70).
3 Theory

Buhaug (2010). Thus, the host administration has fewer capacities to control or prevent rebel presence and recruitment among refugees in these areas. Finally, aggrieved local kin groups might themselves launch an insurgency, providing a basis for trans-border ethnic rebel collaboration, including refugee movements. Marginalized co-ethnic groups are likely to encourage the local or foreign rebels’ aim to overthrow the government by either tolerating their presence, supporting their activities or joining the uprising (Mogire, 2004, 28).

3.3.5 Overview of the Ethno-Political Logic of Refugee-Related Conflict Trigger Mechanisms

Table 3.1 gives an overview of the four main mechanisms of how refugees trigger violence and the consequent risk of conflict, depending on the refugees’ relation to the host population.

Table 3.1: Ethnic Scenarios after a Refugee Influx

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disturbance of ethnic balance</th>
<th>Refugees are ethnic kin of marginalized group</th>
<th>Refugees are ethnic kin of group in power</th>
<th>Refugees have no ethnic kin in host country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High influx strengthens marginalized group demographically and politically, challenges group in power</td>
<td>High influx strengthens group in power demographically and politically</td>
<td>No impact on political power balance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstration effect</td>
<td>Kin group receptive to new ideologies</td>
<td>Kin group not receptive</td>
<td>No systematic sharing with certain group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion of military resources</td>
<td>Kin group receptive, used against government</td>
<td>Kin group receptive, used to strengthen position</td>
<td>No systematic sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of rebel networks</td>
<td>Refugees and local co-ethnics more likely to collaborate with transnational insurgents</td>
<td>Refugees and local co-ethnics less likely to collaborate with transnational insurgents</td>
<td>No systematic collaboration between transnational insurgents, refugees and host population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Conflict spread | Likely | Unlikely | No systematic risk |

3.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter outlined a new theoretical framework explaining refugee-related conflict diffusion along trans-border ethnic linkages. Starting from defining the key
3 Theory

concepts of refugees, ethnicity and conflict diffusion, I theorized that ethnicity influences the logic of refugee flight patterns. First, the asylum destination of refugees is strongly determined by trans-border ethnic linkages. Refugees tend to flee along cultural ties, which results in many refugees finding an ethnic kin population in the host state. Second, the political power status of the refugees’ local co-ethnics determines then the risk of conflict as a consequence of the refugee influx. Co-ethnic refugees of a politically marginalized group might disturb the ethnic balance and thereby threaten stability. Finally, refugees might diffuse rebel networks and military resources, which again requires a shared group identity between refugees, rebel groups and an aggrieved host population. My theoretical approach suggests that refugees are important actors in conflict diffusion processes. Further, I claim that refugee-related conflict trigger mechanisms strongly depend on ethno-political realities in the receiving country. The next chapter introduces the new data on the ethnicity of refugees and transnational ethnic groups that will be used to empirically test the theory.
4 New Data

4.1 Quantitative Data on the Ethnicity of Refugees

This subsection is partially based on collaborative work with Heidrun Bohnet.

The previous section introduced a new analytical framework to approach refugee movements and security consequences for host states, including ethno-political components. The direction of refugee movements and the risk of refugee-related violence in the receiving country relies on the ethnic background of refugee groups. Hence, ethnicity is central to the theoretical approach presented in this dissertation, and data on the ethnic group membership of refugees is needed to test the suggested mechanisms of refugee flight patterns and conflict diffusion. For instance, the composition of ethnic Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats among the refugees fleeing from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s was crucial. Therefore, I here review the existing UNHCR refugee data, introduce the project and the aim of the data collection on the ethnicity of refugees, present the coding instructions, show descriptive statistics of the new dataset used in this dissertation and address problematic aspects of quantitative refugee data. Finally, the last part of this chapter introduces the EPR-TEK dataset which records trans-border ethnic linkages.

At the end of 2011, more than 14 million people registered as refugees (UNHCR, 2012b; UNRWA, 2010), of which more than 80 percent resided in countries neighboring their home state (UNHCR, 2010), the states of first asylum. In the quantitative literature, these refugees have often been regarded as a homogenous mass (Stein, 1981; Lischer, 2007). It is frequently forgotten that they are composed of different ethnicities and identity groups. Several qualitative case studies have demonstrated that ethnicity is important to approach refugee movements (Newland, 1993; Jacobsen, 1996; Lischer, 2005; Lebson, 2012), but no attempt yet has been made to systematically collect data on the ethnicity of refugees. Until now, no systematic dataset exists on the ethnic composition of refugee flows, although the
refugees’ ethnicity is, among other factors, a determinant for becoming a refugee (Petersen, 1958, 261). The risk of victimization is not uniform across the population of a country (Moore and Shellman, 2006, 619). Hence, the ethnic group membership of forced migrants impacts the chances of obtaining refugee status, is crucial in the planning of refugee settlements to prevent ethnic rivalries, and is important to achieve successful local integration, as shown by researchers and policy-makers.

Although recent years saw an increase in quantitative refugee studies that focus either on the push and pull factors causing refugee outflows (Davenport, Moore and Poe, 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Iqbal and Zorn, 2007; Warziniack, 2013) or the consequences of a refugee influx in host countries (Lischer, 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Salehyan, 2008a), qualitative case analysis is still predominant within the refugee field. I argue that a stronger focus on comparative quantitative refugee information is crucial to understand the causes and consequences of refugee movements as a global and recurring phenomenon (Stein, 1981, 320) and to draw general conclusions. Also, Crisp (1999b) states that “it is almost impossible to [...] write about refugee-related issues without some reference to statistics”, because the first question asked is often: “How many people have been displaced?” Due to the lack of cross-national quantitative refugee data, previous studies have several limitations. Empirical refugee data provided by the UNHCR or USCRI either focus on the country of asylum or the country of origin, but do not offer more disaggregated information at the sub-national level. However, refugee groups are composed of different nationalities and ethnicities and because of that they can have different effects on host countries and differ in their direction of flight. For example, the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya shows high ethnic volatility, being host to many nationalities, such as Sudanese and Somali, and different ethnic groups, for instance the Sudanese Dinka and Didinga (Pini, 2008).

Both policy-makers and scientists benefit from more detailed information on the ethnic background of refugees, as was stated by Hovy (2000, 4):

“One of the main data limitations during the Kosovo crisis was origin. As most asylum countries record only the nationality (country of citizenship) of the applicant, few countries were able to distinguish Kosovar asylum-seekers from other citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). [...] Information [...] on the ‘ethnic origin’ [...] would in fact have been required. [...] The importance of sub-national information on origin is likely to increase.”

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Thus, “facts and figures are vital to UNHCR for planning and preparedness” (UNHCR, 2013a). With a newly collected global dataset on the ethnic background of refugees, this dissertation contributes to the emerging quantitative literature in refugee research by increasing the knowledge of sub-state refugee characteristics.

4.1.1 Existing Quantitative Refugee Data

Forced displacement occurs in almost all regions of the world and is a global phenomenon. Therefore, quantitative data with global coverage helps address and analyze the refugee phenomenon in a comparative manner. Since the 1960s to date, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in this regard is the main organization offering a broad range of empiric refugee data, such as annual data on refugee numbers in hosting or sending countries, as well as dyadic data on refugee movements between two countries with almost global coverage (UNHCR, 2010). The UNHCR is concerned with refugees, asylum seekers, returnees as well as stateless persons, and in some instances, internally displaced persons (IDPs) referring to those groups as “persons of concern”. Their data consist mainly of stock numbers based on the country level as well as limited data on the number of new arrivals. The United States Committee for Refugees (USCRI) also provides data on refugee numbers in countries of asylum or countries of origin, but neither systematically collects data on the ethnicity of refugees. Information on Palestinian refugees can be obtained from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA, 2010). Although these agencies also offer some information on the ethnicity of refugees in their annual reports, they do not systematically collect data on it.

The UNHCR provides demographic data on the refugees’ sex and age, as well as data on the number of refugees per settlement. However, they do not systematically collect data on the ethnicity of refugees. In many cases, the UNHCR and other international organizations are well aware of the ethnic background of the refugees. For instance, the ethnic group membership of refugees strongly affects settlement planning because ethnic compatibility between earlier refugees or with the local population can hinder ethnic tensions and decrease security issues (Chalinder, 1998, 51). However, for security or political reasons this ethnicity data is often not easily publicly available or restricted to a small geographical region. Consequently, besides ethnic information on the qualitative level, only limited disaggregated refugee data is available, presenting no global coverage. The ethnic background of a refugee group can be a very sensitive issue, which is the reason why the UNHCR is often unwilling to publish such information, particularly if the
refugees were targeted on ethnic grounds at home and are thus, scared or unwilling to share this information. As a result, I ensure that the data recorded for this dissertation is anonymous and will only be used in an aggregated manner.

Graph 4.1 illustrates the number of refugees worldwide between 1975 and 2011. Towards the end of the Cold War and during the early 1990s, a clear peak can be observed. Since then, refugee numbers slightly decreased but remain constant on a high level, currently above 14 millions. Thus, a considerable amount of the world's population is or was directly or indirectly affected by forced migration.

**Figure 4.1**: Number of Refugees Worldwide (UNHCR and UNRWA Data)

4.1.2 The Ethnic Composition of Refugee Flows Dataset (ECORF)

So far, all quantitative forced migrant studies have neglected the ethnic group membership of refugees and thus, fail to meet the complexity of most refugee situations. It is important to assess the refugees’ ethnicity because very often refugee status is given to people on a group basis rather than as individuals (Helton, 1983; Alexander, 1999; Goodwin-Gill, 2008). The UNHCR (1992) states that
“while refugee status must normally be determined on an individual basis, situations have also arisen in which entire groups have been displaced under circumstances indicating that members of the group could be considered individually as refugees. In such situations, the need to provide assistance is often extremely urgent and it may not be possible, for purely practical reasons, to carry out an individual determination of refugee status for each member of the group.”

Hence, it is very useful to know from which national sub-group refugees come from.

The refugees’ ethnicity matters for various reasons: First, ethnic group membership might determine whether a person becomes a forced migrant. This particularly applies to ethnic conflicts where a certain ethnic group is targeted. Second, the direction of refugee movements is affected by their ethnic group membership. Third, ethnicity determines how a refugee is received in the asylum country, as for instance cultural similarities with the host population facilitate integration, and refugee status is often provided on ethnic group grounds. Hence, I argue that refugee movements should not only be analyzed on the country-level, but also on a more disaggregated sub-national ethnic group-level. To fill this empirical and theoretical gap in refugee studies, I introduce a new cross-national quantitative dataset on the ethnic composition of refugee flows (ECORF). Quantitative data on the ethnicity of refugees improves the understanding of refugee movements and will be useful for assessing trends and risks in refugee crises. Refugee groups are often not homogeneous but consist of several ethnic groups. Many countries receive refugee flows from several countries that are ethnically heterogeneous. For instance, in 2009, Kenya hosted refugees from Ethiopia belonging to the Oromo, Amhara or Tigre ethnic group as well as refugees with different ethnic backgrounds from Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Consequently, an ethnic group might host kin refugees from more than one country, like the Kurds in Iraq that received kin refugees from Turkey and Iran simultaneously.

Within each country-dyadic refugee movement, we systematically tried to identify up to three of the largest ethnic groups and indicated their share of the total refugee flow. Dyadic information on refugee movements between countries of asylum and countries of origin, as well as the sizes of the refugee movements were obtained from the UNHCR (2010) and the UNRWA (2010). Although information on the ethnicity of refugees is not provided directly by the UNHCR as they do not

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7The data was collected by Seraina Rüegger, Heidrun Bohnet and Nadja Schloss in the project "Refugee Flows and Transnational Ethnic Linkages", a co-operation between ETH Zürich and the University of Geneva, and funded by the Swiss Network for International Studies (SNIS).
systematically record data on the ethnicity of refugees, it was nevertheless possible to collect information on the ethnicity of refugee groups relying on reports and qualitative country assessments from the UNHCR, USCRI, several NGOs, conflict narratives and news articles.

We used the group list of the most recent version of the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR-ETH) dataset (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010) as a source to identify ethnic groups living in a refugee sending country. The EPR-ETH dataset identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups in a country and records the level of access to state power by their representatives. The EPR-ETH coding distinguishes between eight different political power statuses: Groups with access to the government are either monopoly, dominant, senior or junior partners. Groups who are excluded from state decision-making are recorded as either powerless or discriminated, or have regional or separatist autonomy (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010, 100-101). Groups not claiming representatives at the national level are considered irrelevant. The EPR-ETH coding is time-variant, meaning that ethnic identifications, access to power and general political relevance can change over time. The EPR-ETH database thus provides annual information. In some cases, refugees belonged to a politically irrelevant ethnic group that is not recorded in the EPR-ETH dataset, however we also included these groups in our refugee dataset.

We collected the ethnicity data only for refugee flows that consisted of at least 2,000 refugees per year between neighboring countries or countries within close proximity of each other, that is a maximal distance of 950 km between their borders. Information on borders was obtained from CShapes (Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch, 2010). While our dataset particularly covers first refugee movements but not secondary flows to third states, we still include 80 percent of all refugees worldwide (UNHCR, 2010). The 950 km threshold is arbitrarily chosen, but conventionally used in social movement and conflict diffusion studies. Also, we assume that the vast majority of refugees are unable to cross distances longer than 950 km due to their restricted means of transportation. Within this framework, we are able to provide worldwide information on the ethnic background of refugees covering the years 1975 through 2009. The size of refugee movements as well as the ethnic composition of refugee flows between country-dyads can change over years. Therefore, our dataset is time-variant and records annual shiftings. This temporal variance is very important, for example in the case of Rwandan refugee outflows which alternated between Hutus and Tutsis. Countries that became independent after the beginning of our sample, for instance the former Soviet countries, appear in the dataset according to their independence. The UNHCR treats Namibia as an independent country before 1990, although we added Namibian refugees before
1990 to South Africa. Furthermore, the UNHCR distinguishes between Tibetan and Chinese refugees, but we counted them all as being from China. Also, the UNHCR records refugees from East Timor in Indonesia before its independence but those people were strictly speaking IDPs. Information on refugees from Palestine, who were coded as ethnic Arabs, was obtained from the UNRWA (2010), because the UNHCR has no direct mandate for this refugee caseload.

Precise numbers of refugees from each ethnic group were unavailable. However, organizations working with refugees, like the UNHCR, USCRI or national Refugee Councils such as the Danish or Norwegian Refugee Council, often indicate approximate numbers, estimations or at least evidence such as: “more than 31,000 [people] from Afghanistan, mostly Hindus, fled to India during the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s” (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2009). Thus, we were able to at least indicate whether a certain ethnic group within a refugee flow was dominant, a majority or a minority. If the source indicated one of the following key words: vast majority, almost all, mostly, mainly, more than 75 percent, the group was coded as dominant. Majority groups were referred to as: more than 50 percent, more than half and so on. A group was recorded as minority if the source said: some, few, less than half.

Table 4.1 displays the main variables collected in our dataset on three examples. Further, coders were asked to specify the source of their coding and to indicate on a three-point scale their security about the coding. Also, we record the cowgroupid of each identified politically relevant ethnic refugee group, as obtained from EPR-ETH. This allows the merging of the refugee data with other datasets of interest, for instance conflict data or the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR-ETH) dataset, which will be applied in the following empirical chapters.

The ratio of refugees belonging to a certain ethnic group and the entire refugee flow is estimated as either being dominant, majority or minority because exact numbers are seldom available. Although not fine-grained, these categories permit to estimate the absolute size of each ethnic refugee group. I applied the rule that if the refugee flow consisted of one dominant ethnic group, then I multiplied the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of asylum</th>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of refugees</th>
<th>Largest ethnic group</th>
<th>Share of largest ethnic group</th>
<th>2nd largest ethnic group</th>
<th>Share of 2nd largest ethnic group</th>
<th>3rd largest ethnic group</th>
<th>Share of 3rd largest ethnic group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>21'000</td>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>DOM</td>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>MIN</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>MIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>700'000</td>
<td>Sunni Arabs</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>MIN</td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>MIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>21'018</td>
<td>Tigrinya</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>MIN</td>
<td>Kunama</td>
<td>MIN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
size of the refugee movement, i.e. the number obtained from the UNHCR, by the factor .95, since there is confidence that at least 95 percent of the flow belong to the concerned group. If there was one majority ethnic group within the refugee flow, I multiplied it by .65. If several ethnic groups were identified within a refugee movement, whereas the coding rules allowed for maximally three ethnic groups, the multiplying factors were readjusted according to the rules displayed in Table 4.2. The total share is mostly below 1 in order to account for uncertainty. These shares were defined according to the approximately 50 cases with precise information of the ethnic refugee group sizes: Dominant ethnic groups comprise on average 92 percent, majority groups 59 percent and minorities 19 percent of the refugee movement. For example, as depicted in Table 4.1 Ethiopia hosted 21'018 refugees from Eritrea in 2008, the majority of them were ethnic Tigrinya, the first minority was ethnic Afar, and the second minority was ethnic Kunama. According to these rules, the Tigrinya caseload constitutes 12'611 persons (0.6 * 21018), the Afar 6'305 (0.3 * 21018) and the Kunama 1'051 (0.05 * 21018).

The ECORF dataset can be summarized and described as follows: 3’129 country-dyad-years in the UNHCR dataset qualified for the ethnicity coding; that is a country-dyadic refugee movement consists of minimally 2’000 refugees and the countries are contiguous or in a maximal distance of 950km from each other. We identified 516 different ethnic refugee groups from 189 countries of origin constituting 5’197 ethnic refugee group-years of which we estimated the size. Of those 1’895 (36 percent) belong to the category dominant, 939 (18 percent) are a majority and the remaining 2’363 (46 percent) are a minority. The average ethnic refugee group-year, calculated according to the previously presented estimation rules, consists of 60’000 refugees, and the median ethnic refugee group size is 7’000, while four groups constitute more than a million people: the Hutu from Rwanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1994 - 1995), the Palestinians in Jordan (1992 - 2009), the Somali in Ethiopia (1979 - 1980) and the Pashtun from Afghanistan in Pakistan.
(1980 - 2009). Approximately 60 percent of the identified relevant dyadic refugee movements are ethnically homogeneous, that is they are composed of one dominant ethnic group with only small additional minority ethnic groups. The remaining 40 percent are either composed of a majority with one or two minorities or several minority ethnic groups. Thus, not pursuing a disaggregated approach to refugees would clearly underestimate the ethnic complexity of refugee movements. Some 3'955 (76 percent) ethnic refugee groups were politically relevant in their country of origin, among those 57 percent were excluded and had no access to state decision making, and 43 percent were included in the government at home.

4.1.3 Limitations of Quantitative Refugee Data

Same as any data count of individuals, quantitative data on refugees claiming global coverage and generalization has to be regarded and used with some precautions. First, data on refugees is not very reliable, particularly when aggregated to the country-level and thus, neglecting individual incentives and backgrounds. Not all refugees register, many people seeking refuge remain invisible (Polzer and Hammond, 2008, 419) and the available numbers are often only estimated, which is indicated by the rounding off to the nearest thousand in the UNHCR dataset. The registration procedure is difficult to organize because at the immediate arrival in the host country, most refugees have much more urgent needs such as the provision of water or health assistance (Crisp, 1999b). Later on, refugees might not want to stay in line, like they did before at the border, just to receive a paper. Qualitative evidence suggests that refugees are usually poorly informed about the host’s legal policies and that their main aim is to reach safety and not have refugee status (Day and White, 2002, 20). Also, many refugees illegally cross borders and do not stay in camps where they could be registered later (Crisp, 1999b). During eminent refugee influxes, host governments and international organizations often agree that it is “more important to let people cross into safety […] than to delay people in insecure conditions in order to fulfill bureaucratic requirements” (Ball, 2000, 38). Despite this impreciseness, quantitative annual refugee data is still very useful to provide the big picture of refugee events and trends.

Second, another issue related to refugee statistics is the fact that different parties have different incentives to over or underestimate refugee figures (Oucho, 2006, 137). Home governments, on the one hand, may perceive refugees as “political failure” and argue for low numbers. Host states and international help organizations, on the other hand, may inflate refugee numbers in order to receive more resources (Crisp, 1999b). Different perceptions of forced migrants may result in
different definitions of who should be counted as a refugee, resulting in incomparable refugee figures (Havinga and Böcker, 1999, 48). Thus, political interests may manipulate refugee statistics (Crisp, 1999b).

Third, the numbers provided by the UNHCR are end-year figures meaning they represent the number of refugees living in a country on December 31 and not the annual maximum. Thus, forced migrants arriving and returning in the same year are not recorded, which is fundamental for conflicts with a short duration. For instance, Macedonia hosted more than 300,000 Albanian refugees during the Kosovo crisis in spring 1999, although only 21,000 are coded in the UNCHR dataset. Hence, the actual refugee numbers are highly underestimated and seasonally biased. I considered to control for conflict duration, that is conflicts that last more than a year produce more refugees, or the end date of the conflict, because the UNHCR dataset probably reports more refugees from conflicts ending at the end of the year. However, I decided against using such corrected figures because this could lead to more biased results, with only better estimated numbers of refugees caused by conflict, but still underestimated sizes of refugees caused by violent persecution or threat of persecution or conflict. Also, short and long-term refugees affect their sending and receiving countries differently: long-term refugees have more severe impacts, but short-term movements also indicate great challenges for host countries and refugee organizations.

Fourth, the UNHCR provides stock data of the number of refugees currently residing in an asylum country and does not systematically indicate the number of new arrivals or returnees nor net flows. However, several authors calculated annual net numbers of forced migrants by subtracting the observation of the previous year from the current year in order to be able to identify annually varying push factors producing refugees.8

Fifth, there are no precise numbers of ethnic refugee groups and our categorical coding is based on descriptions such as "many refugees" or "few refugees". These terms and descriptions may have different meanings in different contexts (Cohen, 2013, 466-467). However, it is unlikely that very large ethnic refugee groups are not mentioned in any report or described as small ones. Thus, although the three point scale is rough and the numbers are approximately estimated, the dataset still allows to cross-nationally compare ethnic refugee group shares. Also, as explained in section 3.1.2, ethnicity is a disputed concept and ethnic group membership can

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8Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003) analyze the net stock of refugees finding that threats to personal integrity are the main cause of refugee movements, particularly to democratic countries, while Moore and Shellman (2004) used net outflow figures concluding that violent behavior has a substantial impact on refugee numbers.
not always be categorized. Thus, it is important to highlight that the recording of ethnicity is very sensitive. Furthermore, refugee groups sharing an ethnic identity may still be heterogenous because of other factors, such as the age, wealth or political position.

Finally, some country-years are missing in the UNHCR dataset. In several countries, the UNHCR started collecting data on refugees in the earlier 1960s, but the refugee dataset only has global coverage starting from the end of the 1980s when interest rates increased. Also, in some countries of asylum, we were not able to determine the ethnic composition of the refugee flows due to a lack of information. The countries concerned are Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia. Thus, these countries have to be excluded from the analyses using the ECORF dataset. From the total 3’129 relevant country-dyad-years we were able to code 2’836. Thus, approximately nine percent of the relevant country-dyad-years are missing in the dataset, which is a low value given the difficulty to find reliable refugee sources. The missing observations are not systematical and equally distributed across space and time, although they slightly tend to be concentrated temporally in earlier years and spatially in Asia, and stem from the following causes: First, the UNHCR as well as all other organizations dealing with refugees improved their data management over the years so that more recent reports offer broader information; not just with regards to ethnicity but also more precise sizes or locations of refugee groups. Second, in some cases the ethnicity of the refugees was not named in any report because it was not salient. Third, ethnic group membership is sometimes difficult to determine. Finally, in cases where the ethnicity is a delicate and disputed issue, humanitarian organizations might avoid mentioning it in order not to further complicate the conflict. However, I assume that these cases are still covered by less impartial news agencies, because ethnicity is inherently important in conflict and refugee research.

As I rely on the UNHCR, besides these shortcomings, to provide broad and encompassing refugee data, I cannot overcome these limitations. Although I stress the need for a sub-national refugee-focus, the data used can not cover individual refugee experiences. Moreover, I still analyze forced migrant movements on the macro-level in order to be able to conduct a quantitative global comparison.

### 4.2 Data on Trans-Border Ethnic Kin (EPR-TEK)

The previous subsection has introduced the new dataset on the ethnicity of refugees. To test the mechanisms of refugee-related conflict diffusion along transna-
tional ethnic linkages, further data on an ethnic group’s trans-border connections is needed. In the following, I introduce the Transnational Ethnic Kin (EPR-TEK) dataset (International Conflict Research Group, ETH Zürich, 2011), that based on the EPR-ETH group list, records all ethnic groups living in more than one state.

Although transnational interdependences based on border-transgressing ethnic linkages are acknowledged in social sciences, ethnic kin groups residing in more than one country have received systematic scientific attendance only recently, as has been reviewed in Chapter 2.1.1. Quantitative data on transnational ethnic groups helps assess international dimensions of civil conflicts. While Gurr (1993), Gurr and Moore (1997) and Davis and Moore (1997) rely on international constituencies of the MAR dataset to examine trans-border influences on conflict propensities, Gleditsch (2007), Forsberg (2008) and Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch (2009) apply different preliminary records of the trans-border connections identified in the EPR-ETH database. Analyzing the risk of conflict for trans-border ethnic groups, Cederman et al. (2013) present the first application of the EPR-TEK data introduced here.

Among all ethnic groups recorded in the EPR-ETH dataset, we first tried to nominally identify those present in more than one country. Since some ethnic groups are named differently in different languages or states, we further relied on area-specific knowledge of the coders. Each transnational ethnic group was assigned with an exclusive TEK group code. Thus, each TEK group code stands for one group but can be found in several countries, depending on the settlement distribution of the ethnic group. In the constructivist EPR-ETH coding, ethnic groups were divided into periods when the political status or self-identification of at least one group in the country changed. The TEK group code was indicated in each period, but the EPR-TEK coding itself is non-constructivist. We coded groups as trans-border kin if they have the same name or any common objective marker. For instance, Italians and Swiss Italians are a transnational ethnic kin group. Some groups might, despite their shared name, language and religion, identify themselves as different groups, such as the Hindus in different countries; but we coded these groups as co-ethnics. Transnational ethnic connections are time-invariant and primordially coded, nevertheless, the data shows temporal variance according to changing ethnic identifications and relevances in the EPR-ETH coding.

Table 4.3 displays an example of the EPR-TEK coding for the Azeri ethnic group that lives spread across the borders of Azerbaijan, Iran, Georgia and Russia. In

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9The data was collected by Nils-Christian Bormann, Michael Bürge, Charlotte Fiedler, Omar Kassab, Seraina Rüegger and Manuel Vogt.
some cases the group field in the EPR-ETH database does not list a single ethnic group but an umbrella group combining several ethnic sub-groups to one overarching category. For instance, in Mali the “Blacks” umbrella group includes ethnic Mande, Peul, Voltaic and others. An umbrella group can have up to three transnational ethnic connections that are indicated in the fields $tek_1$, $tek_2$ and $tek_3$. The example in Table 4.4 shows that the Northerners in Cote d’Ivoire are an umbrella group with five TEK connections: The Mande (TEK group code 407) are ethnic kin of the Malinke in Guinea, the Mandingo in Liberia and the Mande in Mali; the Voltaic/Gur (TEK group code 420) are ethnic kin of the Gur in Burkina Faso and the Voltaic in Mali.

Among the 817 politically relevant groups in the EPR-ETH database, more than half, a total of 418 groups, have at least one TEK connection to another country. Hence, while most countries are linked by transnational ties to other states, only 15 countries worldwide do not have any cross-border connections, for instance New Zealand, Norway or Nigeria. Thus, the fact that the vast majority of countries of the world are affected by border-transgressing ethnic groups proves the importance of regional factors and the relevance of the EPR-TEK dataset. Some ethnic groups are spread across a multitude of states, such as the Arabs, Russians or Roma. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 display the settlement areas of politically relevant ethnic Albanians and ethnic Kurds in 2009 (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011; Weidmann, Kuse and

Table 4.3: Example of EPR-TEK Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>country</th>
<th>from</th>
<th>to</th>
<th>group</th>
<th>size</th>
<th>cowgroupid</th>
<th>$tek_1$</th>
<th>$tek_2$</th>
<th>$tek_3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Azeri</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>37301000</td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Azeri</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>63004000</td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Azeri</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>37205000</td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Azeri</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>36509000</td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4: Example of EPR-TEK Coding of Umbrella Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>country</th>
<th>from</th>
<th>to</th>
<th>group</th>
<th>size</th>
<th>cowgroupid</th>
<th>$tek_1$</th>
<th>$tek_2$</th>
<th>$tek_3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Northerners (Mande and</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>43703000</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>420</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Voltaic/Gur)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Malinke</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>43801000</td>
<td>407</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Mandingo</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>45003070</td>
<td>407</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Gur</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>43901000</td>
<td>420</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Blacks (Mande, Peul, Voltaic</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>43201000</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
which are both found in several countries and are, thus, typical transnational ethnic groups.

Figure 4.2: Majority Settlement Areas of Politically Relevant Ethnic Albanians

Figure 4.3: Majority Settlement Areas of Politically Relevant Ethnic Kurds

4.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter introduced the comparative datasets that will be used in the following empirical analyses. The newly collected dataset on the ethnicity of refugees (ECORF) disaggregates country-dyadic refugee movements to the ethnic group-
level and provides global information on the ethnic composition of refugee movements covering the years 1975 through 2009. The state of cross-national refugee data and several issues and limitations of quantitative refugee data were discussed. Furthermore, I presented the dataset on trans-border ethnic groups (EPR-TEK) which records all ethnic groups living in more than one country. Both data projects rely on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR-ETH) dataset enumerating all politically relevant groups worldwide and can be combined with other datasets containing ethnic information.
5 Quo Vadis? The Direction of Refugee Movements

5.1 Introduction

Afghanistan is currently the largest refugee producer in the world, with 2'585'605 refugees (UNHCR, 2013b). Of those, 1'701'945 fled to Pakistan, 840'451 to Iran and 9'161 to India and several Western states. Other countries in the proximate region, such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan or China host no significant number of Afghan refugees. In 2012, 1'136'143 people escaped Somalia. Neighboring Kenya hosts almost half of the Somali caseload: 517'666 refugees. The remaining Somali refugees are settled in Yemen (204'685), Ethiopia (185'466), Djibouti (19'426), and some are found in other African and Western countries (UNHCR, 2013b). These two examples demonstrate that refugee figures strongly differ between asylum states. Why are refugees from the same country of origin unequally distributed among possible asylum states? Having shown that refugees may trigger conflict in their asylum state by implying negative externalities, knowledge of the flight patterns of forced migrants will help predict which countries have a higher chance of hosting refugees and, consequently, are more at risk of refugee-related violence. A better understanding of the destination choice of refugees facilitates the planning and organization of the allocation of aid resources and assistance for
refugees and refugee-receiving candidates. By knowing the destination of forced migrations, states can distribute humanitarian assistance more efficiently.

Although many qualitative case studies explain destination patterns of refugees coming from a particular country of origin or residing in a particular country of asylum, only a few quantitative studies address the flight direction of forced migrants. No study has yet systematically considered the impact of ethnicity on the direction of refugee flight. Thanks to the new dataset on the ethnicity of refugees, I am able to assess the direction of refugee movements and test the widespread assumption that refugees often flee along transnational ethnic linkages to countries with fellow group members. This is the first study that systematically considers the effect of ethnic identities on refugee destination choices. Thereby, this chapter contributes to the knowledge of refugee flight trends.

Focusing on absolute refugee numbers, refugees who fled along transnational ethnic linkages make up 46 percent. Furthermore, 80 percent of the refugees between 1975 and 2009 relocated to a neighboring or a country in proximity to their home state and among these, 58 percent found ethnic kin in the country of asylum. Thus, refugees who flee along border-crossing ethnic linkages constitute a considerable share of the total refugee caseload, as is displayed in the cross Table 5.1, consisting of annual ethnic group-country-dyads.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Ethnic Linkage</th>
<th>Refugee Flow</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>33'997</td>
<td>3'991</td>
<td>37'988</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(92.58%)</td>
<td>(68.32%)</td>
<td>(89.25%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2'725</td>
<td>1'851</td>
<td>4'576</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7.42%)</td>
<td>(31.68%)</td>
<td>(10.75%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36'722</td>
<td>5'842</td>
<td>42'564</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \( \chi^2 = 3100, p = 0.000 \)

This chapter analyzes the direction of refugee movements, in order to assess these descriptive findings statistically. I predict that the flight destination of refugees is not random, but that refugees are also pulled by specific factors into a certain host country. Using a pull factors approach including spatio-temporal features, I found strong empirical support that refugees indeed flee along transnational ethnic linkages. These, however, are conditional on the size of the kin group in the country of asylum, the distance between the host country and the country of origin, as well as the direction of flight of earlier refugee movements.
5 The Direction of Refugee Movements

The chapter proceeds as follows: First, I review existing approaches to migrant and refugee movements, where most findings are from qualitative regional studies. The theoretical section draws on logic derived from general migration models and extends it to a systematic approach explaining forced migration patterns. The hypotheses are quantitatively tested using the new dataset on the ethnicity of refugees. I estimate the predicted number of ethnic refugees in all possible countries of asylum with negative binomial hurdle models and the results are subject to several robustness checks. After examining the empirical results, the chapter discusses the consequences for refugee-related security issues.

5.2 Literature Review: Patterns of Voluntary and Forced Migrations

The movement of people within geographical space is an old and global phenomenon (Stein, 1981; Castles, 2003; Gallagher, 2002). Hence, a rich literature addressing many aspects of migration is available. While the destination choice of voluntary migrants has been broadly analyzed, patterns of forced migrants have received less attention, although many mainstream migration theories equally apply to refugees, and throughout “human history flight has been an important form of migration” (Petersen, 1958, 261). The following section reviews the existing literature on migration patterns with particular focus on the flight direction of refugees.

5.2.1 General Migration Trends

 Refugees are a form of migrants and, thus, theory explaining migration destination choices also applies to them. The process of migration, which is defined as a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence (Lee, 1966; Mafukidze, 2006), includes two main stages: the decision to migrate and the direction of migration, while a set of obstacles can intervene (Dorigo and Tobler, 1983; Roseman, 1983). Since most people and groups of people tend to be sedentary (Petersen, 1958; Lee, 1966), they remain so unless they have either a positive or negative reason to leave (Petersen, 1958, 258). Thus, the decision to migrate is a reaction to push factors in the place of residence or pull factors in another location. Potential migrants evaluate the gain versus the cost and risk of relocating (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2013, 5), and when the balance of negative and positive factors at home is in favor of move, they do so (Lee, 1966, 51).

 Having decided to relocate leads to the question of where. Frequently, migrants have only a few alternative destinations (Roseman, 1983, 154), and the migrants’
socio-economic resources are major deciding factors (Van Hear, 2004, 2). Still, some locations are more attractive than others and identifying “such attributes is useful for both explaining and predicting migration patterns” (Fotheringham et al., 2000, 392). The attractiveness of a place is relative (Fotheringham et al., 2000, 394) and migrants often compare their current status to conditions at another location (Dorigo and Tobler, 1983; Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2013). Refugees facing conflict at home likely perceive any safe place as more attractive. Migrants are attracted by access to amenities and social and cultural similarities, like a shared language, better employment opportunities or environmental advantages, such as a better climate (Dorigo and Tobler, 1983; Roseman, 1983; Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2013). Many authors emphasize that distance impacts destination choices because migrants are deterred by long distances (Ravenstein, 1885) which increase the cost and time of travel (Dorigo and Tobler, 1983, 2), and obstacles like mountains, rivers or rainfall, which is particularly relevant for migrants with few socio-economic resources, such as refugees (Petersen, 1958; Van Hear, 2004).

The factors that determine destination patterns differ between first or pioneer migrants, and migrants that followed established routes, but this distinction has yet to be explicitly put forward by researchers. My study contributes to the understanding of migration patterns by analyzing how refugee flows are determined by previous forced migration. Early work on migration already stressed that migration processes impact future migrations (Ravenstein, 1885, 199) and that many migration flows follow well-defined streams and already established transportation routes (Lee, 1966, 54), generating a path dependency (Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath, 1996, 910). Migrants create social networks connecting their place of residence with their old home. Consequently, future migrants often choose destinations based on such ties, either on the micro-level of family and friends (Roseman, 1983, 155, 157), or because of macro-level factors such as shared cultural practices, labor recruitment or travel agencies (Koser, 1997, 594).

The following subsection reviews the specific literature on refugee flight destination, which again addresses the above presented mechanisms on general migration patterns.

### 5.2.2 Refugee Flight Trends

In contrast to other migrants, initial push factors matter much more to refugees than pull determinants. Still, several authors argue that many principles of non-forced migration theory also apply to refugees (Riddle and Buckley, 1998; Havinga and
Böcker, 1999; Castles and Loughna, 2003). Castles and Loughna (2003, 21) state that “asylum-seekers may have a degree of control over where they go and how they travel”. Therefore, the following section provides an overview of the literature on refugee migration processes.

Refugees are forced to leave, thus, “given the choice, they would stay” (Stein, 1981, 322). Several authors mention different stages of the refugee experience, basically consisting of the factors causing the flight and the flight itself (Stein, 1981; Koser, 1997; Moore and Shellman, 2006). Since refugees are forced to migrate, the question arises whether or not they have a choice in leaving or remaining in their home country. Scholarship differs on this issue. Some authors claim that refugees are passive migrants dependent upon institutional forces and thus, have no choice in their decision to flee or their destination (Petersen, 1958; Day and White, 2002; Robinson and Segrott, 2002). Other researchers state that even if flight is immediate and there are few choices of destination, some form of refugee decision-making process exists (Riddle and Buckley, 1998; Robinson and Segrott, 2002; Castles and Loughna, 2003). Moore and Shellman (2006, 599) argue that “when faced with extraordinary circumstances, people still make choices”. Based on various pre-flight scenarios, the literature distinguishes between “anticipatory” and “acute” refugees (Petersen, 1958; Kunz, 1973). Anticipatory refugees leave the country before the situation worsens, have time for preparation and retain some decision-making power (Petersen, 1958; Kunz, 1973). Acute refugees, who are often in large groups, arise from great political changes, go to nearby countries and have no time to plan their departure or decide on a destination (Kunz, 1973; Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Robinson and Segrott, 2002; Castles and Loughna, 2003). However, even acute refugees suffering from war or persecution can choose between staying or fleeing (Schaeffer, 2010, 2), and in the latter case between becoming IDPs or leaving the country (Moore and Shellman, 2006, 599). I build on the studies claiming that refugees make choices in the direction of their flight. Hence, not only push factors, making people leave their home, but also pull factors, drawing the refugees in a certain direction, influence flight processes. An exclusive focus on push factors is too short-sighted, as argued by Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003).

Given that refugees have some choice, where do they go? Comparing refugee and IDP numbers, (Moore and Shellman, 2006, 605) found that the IDP status is generally preferred over refugee status. Similarly, Day and White (2002, 22) argue that people try to stay as near to their home as possible, until moving further away is the only possibility. Due to their acute situation, lacking resources and restricted means of transportation, many refugees settle in nearby countries. Almost
all authors emphasize geographical proximity as a determining factor for flight patterns (Schmeidl, 1997; Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Robinson and Segrott, 2002; Castles and Loughna, 2003; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Iqbal, 2007; Iqbal and Zorn, 2007; Melander and Öberg, 2007). Nevertheless, forced migrants do not randomly go to the nearest place, but still consider “conditions and opportunities in both sending and receiving areas” (Castles and Loughna, 2003, 21). Havinga and Böcker (1999, 55) argue that spatial proximity explains why refugees go to a first country of asylum, but do not explain why they proceed to third states. However, I elaborate in the theoretical subsection that distance alone does not resolve flight patterns to countries of first asylum.

Due to this misconception, few studies analyze first asylum country destination choices (Iqbal and Zorn, 2007; Rubin and Moore, 2007; Melander and Öberg, 2007; Moore and Shellman, 2007; Warziniack, 2013), yet many researchers do focus on refugee flight to industrialized western countries (Koser, 1997; Riddle and Buckley, 1998; Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Day and White, 2002; Castles and Loughna, 2003; Neumayer, 2004). More than 80 percent of the worldwide refugee caseload settle within their region of origin in countries of first asylum, thus, the logic of refugee flight to non-distant countries has not received adequate attention so far. Although comparatively few refugees seek asylum in western countries (Czaika, 2009), a rich literature on refugees in industrialized countries is available. Many acute refugees first flee to the nearest place and from there decide and plan their final destination (Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Day and White, 2002; Czaika, 2009). However, host governments and international organizations usually decide whether refugees should be resettled to third countries (Riddle and Buckley, 1998, 240). The factors explaining settlement patterns to developed countries will be reviewed in the following section and equally apply to refugees in first host states. Previous research highlights four major pull categories: agency, politics, economic and environmental resources and social networks.

- **Agency:** Developed countries are difficult to reach due to long distances, restrictive entry politics and the refugees’ lack of resources and knowledge of travel opportunities. Therefore, many refugees must rely on networks of human smugglers and traffickers (Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Day and White, 2002; Gallagher, 2002; Robinson and Segrott, 2002; Castles and Loughna, 2003; Chatelard, 2003; Warziniack, 2013). Often these “travel agents” decide on the asylum destination and the refugees themselves do not have much decision-making power (Robinson and Segrott, 2002; Castles and Loughna, 2003).
• **Political pull factors:** When fleeing violence and persecution, refugees have incentives to relocate to places offering more secure institutional conditions, such as peace, public order, rule of law and democracy (Castles and Loughna, 2003; Iqbal, 2007; Iqbal and Zorn, 2007). Prevailing opinions also assume that favorable asylum policies attract refugees. Countries with no visa restrictions and few immigration controls are more accessible (Robinson and Segrott, 2002; Schaeffer, 2010), but several qualitative studies yield evidence that refugees have very little knowledge about policies in the asylum country (Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Day and White, 2002; Robinson and Segrott, 2002).

• **Economic and ecological pull factors:** Once they have left their home, refugees consider, as do other migrants, economic pull factors, such as better standards of living or employment opportunities (Castles and Loughna, 2003; Morrison, 1993; Neumayer, 2004; Moore and Shellman, 2006; Schaeffer, 2010). Another prevailing opinion supposes that many economic migrants pretend to be asylum seekers (Castles and Loughna, 2003, 1). However, in contrast to voluntary migrants, refugees have to leave their home country even if the economic situation abroad is inferior (Czaika, 2009, 3). Also, favorable ecological conditions such as water abundance pull refugees (Warziniack, 2013, 1046).

• **Social networks:** Practically all authors agree that refugees use social networks in facilitating their flight (Hein, 1993, 49). I distinguish between cultural networks based on colonial or ethnic linkages and networks evolving from previous migration flows and diaspora.

1) **Cultural pull factors:** Refugees traditionally flee along ethnic linkages into neighboring countries or along past colonial ties (Schmeidl, 1997; Day and White, 2002; Robinson and Segrott, 2002; Schaeffer, 2010), because of existing networks, facilitated travel and low assimilation costs (Newland, 1993; Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Moore and Shellman, 2007). For instance, asylum-seekers from the Democratic Republic of Congo tend to go to Belgium, while Nigerians appear to favor the United Kingdom (Castles and Loughna, 2003, 21). Stein (1981, 12) states that

> “the ethnic community eases the shock of adjustment and transition for the refugees. It lessens the danger of social and personality disorganization, and it provides a group identity and a network of relationships, associations and institutions. It allows the refugee to function while gradually assimilating.”
Other than broad qualitative evidence for refugee flight patterns along cultural networks, no comparative study provides support for this logic and the ethnic group membership of refugees, which should explain flight sequences along ethnic linkages, has not been systematically considered. The subsequent analysis produces the first quantitative evidence for the claim that refugees follow trans-border ethnic ties.

2) **Previous migration:** Even more than permanent cultural linkages, most authors stress previous migration movements in determining refugee flight directions (Koser, 1997; Faist, 1998; Riddle and Buckley, 1998; Crisp, 1999a; Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Castles and Loughna, 2003; Neumayer, 2004; Moore and Shellman, 2006; Iqbal and Zorn, 2007; Melander and Öberg, 2007; Rubin and Moore, 2007). Entertaining strong linkages with their home country, earlier migrations create transnational networks (Faist, 1998; Czaika, 2009), which raises the following implications: First, many refugees follow family and friendship ties and use informal contacts (Riddle and Buckley, 1998; Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Day and White, 2002). Second, immigrants often send remittances, lowering the flight costs for future refugees or the costs upon arrival (Koser, 1997; Van Hear, 2004). Third, acute refugees can ask for advice and support from previous migrants, thereby having informational advantages (Day and White, 2002, 25). Finally, transportation networks are likely to exist (Iqbal and Zorn, 2007; Rubin and Moore, 2007). Because of such path dependencies, for instance, many asylum seekers from Eritrea are received in Switzerland, while neighboring Austria hosts a high number of refugees from Chechnya, however, few Eritreans flee to Austria and few Chechens to Switzerland (Bundesamt für Migration, 2012; Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2012).

Havinga and Böcker (1999, 57) and Robinson and Segrott (2002, 5) both raise the issue that while individual destination choices might seem random, often depending on friend and family linkages, clear trends at the group perspective can be identified, such as cultural and colonial ties, information flows, travel opportunities and characteristics of the host state. Thus, refugee flight patterns differ between micro and macro-level viewpoints.

Few quantitative studies address refugee figures and pull factors determining flight destinations: Iqbal and Zorn (2007) analyze the probability of forced migration between country-dyads including both push and pull factors, but neglect cultural connections, the size of the refugee movements and limit their focus to African re-
5 The Direction of Refugee Movements

Refugees. Melander and Öberg (2007) include refugee numbers in their analysis but only consider push factors. While Iqbal and Zorn (2007) and Rubin and Moore (2007) find that refugees relocate to where other refugees have gone to before; Melander and Öberg (2007, 165) argue that previous refugee flows negatively impact future flows. Their explanation is that those refugees most willing to flee are the first to leave, which generates a selection effect over time as the remaining population in the sending country will be very unwilling or unable to relocate. Thus, time seems to matter, but no agreement exists on its systematic effects on refugee movements. Hence, a large gap in the quantitative refugee literature exists on pull factors in general, as well as models that include both push and pull factors. Further, no study has included quantitative sub-national refugee characteristics, such as ethnicity. The widespread assumption that refugees follow trans-border ethnic linkages has, thus, never been systematically tested. My study on the direction of refugee flows to countries of first asylum will contribute to the understanding of global forced migration trends by including ethnic characteristics of refugee groups.

Having reviewed existing approaches to refugee destination choices, the following section introduces a new theoretical model explaining the flight direction of ethnic refugee groups.

5.3 Spatio-Temporal Pull Model of the Direction of Refugee Movements

Chapter 3.2 explained the ethno-political logic of refugee flight patterns. This section complements the approach to refugee movements along trans-border ethnic ties with a comprehensive theoretical model explaining the direction of refugee movements. Besides push factors such as violence and persecution occurring during conflicts producing forced migrants, I argue that only a model including pull factors with characteristics of the country of asylum accounts for the complexity of refugee movement patterns and can answer the question of where refugees go. In addition, both spatial and temporal factors intervene in refugee flight processes. Figure 5.1 schematically illustrates the theoretical assumptions put forward in this subsection.

5.3.1 Spatial Factors

Descriptive evidence suggests that the majority of refugees reside in countries contiguous to their home state (UNHCR, 2010). Hence, forced migrants are dependent
on spatial proximity. Forced migrants have incentives to flee short distances and settle in neighboring countries for the following reasons: First, many refugees have restricted means of transportation, thus, nearby safe havens are more feasible to reach. Forced migrants initially arrive in border areas and are often unable to move further (Schmeidl, 1997; Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998). Second, the further away a location, the more time it takes to get there and the higher are travel costs. Finally, many refugees refuse to travel further from their home country because of their desire to return to their place of origin as soon as possible and to maintain connections with the home state (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998, 29).

Civil conflicts, which are responsible for the majority of refugees, often do not affect an entire country, but only certain regions and ethnic groups. This particularly applies to territorial land disputes (Walter, 2003). Many ethnic groups are not evenly distributed across their country but are concentrated in particular territories and cities (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011). Consequently, the risk of becoming a refugee is not equal for all groups living in a country (Petersen, 1958, 261), for example if an ethnic group is not politically involved or targeted in a conflict, or if the group does not live in the conflict-affected territory. Arguing that spatial proximity increases the risk of receiving a refugee influx, thus, leads to the assumption that the countries most attractive to refugees are those that border the settlement territory of an ethnic group involved in conflict. Hence, forced migrants do not randomly spread out to their home country’s neighbors, but, depending on where an ethnic group lives, distance determines resettlement patterns among the set of contiguous states. The neighboring countries that border an ethnic group’s settlement area and territories within neighboring countries which are near the border are particularly likely to pull asylum seekers. Hence, the first hypothesis states:

**Hypothesis 5.1:** Refugees are more likely to flee to countries of asylum that are in proximity to their settlement territory in the home state than to more distant countries.
5.3.2 Cultural Pull Factors: Trans-Border Ethnic Linkages

Further, having decided or being pushed to leave their home country, cultural linkages to ethnic kin pull refugees towards countries of asylum. Trans-border ethnic linkages are strongly correlated to spatial proximity, because kinship connections are mostly found in regionally concentrated and contiguous territories. The approach to the logic of refugee flight along border-crossing ethnic ties has been elaborated in the theoretical section 3.2 and is briefly summarized here.

Forced migrants tend to seek refuge with those sharing their ethnicity in foreign countries, since this often leads to informational advantages and a higher chance of acceptance in the asylum state (Stein, 1981; Newland, 1993; Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Moore and Shellman, 2007). First, ethnic kinship ties facilitate the exchange of information because of a shared language. Border-crossing ethnic groups often have information networks consisting of shared media or personal interactions (Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Zhukov and Stewart, 2013). These networks provide refugees with knowledge of the security situation in the possible asylum state. Thanks to an informational advantage, refugees are likely to possess knowledge of the geographic area of their ethnic brethren, which decreases flight costs. Communication across borders is physically dependent upon routes and accessibility, thus, many transnational ethnic groups feature transportation networks ready for use by refugees in acute emergency situations. In addition, co-ethnics might have insider knowledge on transportation facilities or hidden tracks, providing them with an advantage vis-à-vis a rival government.

Second, refugees will likely be accepted among their co-ethnics (Weiner, 1993, 105), because ethnic groups often show loyalty to each other, even across borders (Davis and Moore, 1997; Saideman, 2002). Due to this lower risk of xenophobic hostilities, co-ethnic refugees are more comfortably accommodated. Kin refugees might also be hosted in private accommodations among co-ethnics (UNHCR, 1999). This informal help makes refugees with local ethnic brethren less dependent on international organizations and humanitarian aid. Co-ethnic refugees have lower assimilation costs in the host society because they usually know the language, belong to the same religious group or are familiar with habits and customs. Also, having a similar physical appearance to host country citizens may facilitate assimilation in asylum countries suffering from problems of xenophobia and racism. This also gives kin forced migrants better opportunities to hide from malevolent authorities, from either the home or host country (Jacobsen, 2005, 15). Finally, thanks to a shared language, religion or customs, kin refugees are more likely to integrate if they remain in the asylum state for an extended period of time. Compared to
refugees with no cultural linkages, co-ethnics have easier access to education and employment opportunities. Hence, refugees are pulled to potential asylum states with cultural similarities. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

**Hypothesis 5.2:** Refugees are more likely to flee to countries with ethnic linkages than to countries without ethnic linkages.

### 5.3.3 Temporal Factors: Go with the Flow

Finally, refugees are temporally dependent on previous migration movements (Stark, 2004; Iqbal and Zorn, 2007; Rubin and Moore, 2007). Past flows facilitate and decrease the cost of future flows because of established transportation networks, including official routes and illegal human smuggling agents, which connect the country of origin with the possible country of asylum (Lee, 1966; Koser, 1997). Also, former and future migrants exchange information (Roseman, 1983; Faist, 1998; Day and White, 2002), increasing this group's knowledge of the territory. Further, earlier refugee crises imply an already established infrastructure of aid in the host state, such as camp facilities and medical assistance (Stark, 2004, 328). In addition, earlier settlers often provide assistance to newly arriving refugees (Koser, 1997), such as sharing information on how to apply for refugee status or how to find accommodation. Previous migration flows include earlier refugees but can also consist of other types of migrants like economic migrants, diaspora or individual family ties. Those left behind in a first refugee wave will likely follow the direction of previous refugee movements if they choose or are forced to leave their country of origin. Particularly acute refugees who lack financial and social resources to organize their departure are likely to draw on experiences of earlier settlers and any rapidly available flight options (Day and White, 2002, 25).

However, I claim that the assumption that forced migrants randomly follow any previous emigration from their home country is too general to capture the mechanisms of refugee flight processes. Crisp (1999a, 6) and Wahlbeck (2002, 234) argue that transnational social networks, which are often based on trans-border ethnic connections, affect refugee migration. Thus, only refugee groups able to resort to border-crossing kinship ties will be affected by transnational networks. The above mentioned exchange of information between former and future refugees depends on a common language. Co-operation and assistance between earlier and later refugees also depends on a shared group identity and loyalty. In contrast, ethnic alien forced migrants are less likely to maintain connections to other identity groups in the home state and should, therefore, not systematically pull non-ethnic
country fellows. Furthermore, forced migrants seeking refuge and security have no rational reason to follow the outflow of a competing ethnic group from the home country, as this may spread the existing rivalry and conflict across the border to the asylum state. Thus, migration cycles depend on ethnic group membership and are not homogenous within countries. Assuming that pull factors are conditional on time, that is previous ethnic kin refugee movements, I state the following third hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 5.3:** Refugees are more likely to flee to countries with previous co-ethnic refugee movements than to countries without previous co-ethnic refugee movements.

### 5.4 Analysis

To assess the direction of refugee movements, I analyze all possible countries of asylum of an ethnic refugee group and try to identify the factors pulling the refugees towards a certain destination. I define possible countries of asylum as all countries located in proximity, that is a maximal distance of 950 km to the refugees’ country of origin. The 950 km threshold is arbitrary, but I assume that 950 km is a feasible distance to cross with restricted means, such as car, bus or train, as is often the case for refugees. Hence, the *unit of analysis* is directed ethnic group-country-dyad-years, where the origin country in the dyad produces ethnically identified refugees. Since I disaggregate refugee movements to the ethnic group-level, directed country-dyad-years may appear up to three times in the dataset. For instance, ethnic Azande and ethnic Dinka fled from Sudan to the Central African Republic simultaneously. Thus, my sample includes all years with refugee outflows. In order to focus on pull factors, I only analyze countries producing refugees, thereby controlling for most push factors.

Figure 5.2 depicts the dyadic data-structure. As a clarifying example, Figure 5.3 illustrates the outflow of ethnic Acholi from Uganda in 1984. According to the sampling rules the first observation would be ethnic Acholi Uganda-Sudan in 1984, the second observation Acholi Uganda-Ethiopia, the third observation Acholi Uganda-Kenya, and so on. Supporting the hypotheses, the majority of Acholi refugees escaped to Sudan that borders their settlement territory and hosts a local ethnic Acholi minority. The other neighboring countries of Uganda received comparatively few Acholi refugees, or none as in the case of Zaire.
5.4.1 Operationalization and Descriptive Statistics

**Dependent Variable:** The dependent variable measures the number of refugees belonging to the same ethnic group moving within a country-dyad. That is the count of co-ethnic refugees from the same country of origin within the same country of asylum in each year. I use the newly compiled dataset introduced in Section 4.1 to identify ethnic refugee groups and their sizes. Since the original refugee numbers provided by the UNHCR (2010) are end-year figures, I do not need to lag the independent variable as I am able to clearly identify the causal mechanisms that produced the refugees as a temporal function. It should be noted that conflicts
and consequent refugee movements are rare events, thus, most countries neither produce nor host refugees.

**Independent Variables:** The main explanatory variable indicates whether or not a refugee group is connected by ethnic linkages to the possible country of asylum. Hence, we need to know if the country of origin and the possible country of asylum are linked by ethnic ties. Therefore, I use the Transnational Ethnic Kin (EPR-TEK) data presented in Chapter 4.2 that enumerates all politically relevant ethnic groups that are present in more than one state. The binary variable is coded 1 for all country-dyads where the refugee group is affected by ethnic linkages and 0 for those without.

I consider the spatial dimension of refugee movements by controlling for the minimal distance between the home and the host country (Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch, 2010), because refugees are more likely to relocate to neighboring countries. To be more precise, as suggested in hypothesis 5.1, I also include the minimal distance between an ethnic group’s settlement territory and the possible country of asylum. Data on settlement zones of ethnic groups was obtained from the GeoEPR dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011).

To account for the temporal dependence of refugee flows, that is the assumption that refugees follow previous ethnic kin refugee movements, I measure the years with refugees within a dyad. Further, considering duration dependence, I use natural cubic splines of years with no co-ethnic refugee movement with three knots (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998).

**Control Variables:** I include several control variables to test alternative explanations of refugee movement patterns. I distinguish between ethnic group or country-level factors. The following variables account for group-related pull factors: First, two dummy variables were created indicating whether the EPR-TEK link of the refugees concerns a politically powerful or powerless group in the country of asylum, because refugees are also pulled by political factors. That is, refugees tend to flee to countries with a better political performance. Information on the political status of ethnic groups is drawn from the EPR-ETH dataset. I distinguish between politically excluded and included groups (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010, 100-101). Second, to account for the fact that refugees usually flee to countries with a large number of politically relevant ethnic groups, I use a variable indicating whether there are at least two ethnic groups with more than 100,000 members in the host country.
ethnic kin population, because a larger population can more easily absorb the influx of people (Iqbal, 2007, 108) and thus, refugees there experience facilitated accommodation and integration, the relative size of the ethnic kin group is included. Data on group sizes is taken from EPR-ETH. Third, since "people walk away from, not toward violence" (Moore and Shellman, 2006, 619), refugees try to avoid violent situations in their asylum state and thus, only flee towards ethnic kin groups who do not experience conflict themselves. I include two dummy variables of whether the kin group or the country of asylum experiences conflict. In order to avoid reverse causality, since refugees are also a possible cause of conflict (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006), I lagged these variables by one year. Data on conflict incidences was obtained from UCDP/PRIO. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002, Version V.4_2010) records all instances of civil conflicts and wars with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths. Information on ethnic group involvement in conflict is drawn from the ACD2EPR dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012) and the NSA dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009b).

At the country-level, I account for political and economic pull factors. For these variables, the difference between the sending and the receiving country is used, and not the information of the refugee-receiving country alone. This is because refugees are usually strongly orientated towards their country of origin and compare their current status to other places (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2013, 11). I include the difference in the share of excluded population between the host and the origin country given by EPR-ETH. I assume that refugees move towards host countries with a high share of people included in state politics, that is, where the political performance is fair and better than in the origin country. As an alternative measurement of the political performance of a host country, the difference in the X Polity IV index (Vreeland, 2008) between the host and the source country is included. I claim that refugees flee to countries that are more democratic than their country of origin. However, a curvilinear relationship between the X Polity IV value of the host country and the number of refugees could also be considered, because anocratic or weak states are less able to secure their borders and, thus, could receive more refugees (Adamson, 2006). Also, economic pull factors affect the refugees’ destination choice. Refugees, seen as rational utility maximizers, should flee to wealthier countries than their home country, because poor countries have less capacities to accommodate refugees, since providing shelter and food depends on financial and natural resources. Therefore, the difference in the logged and one year lagged annual gross domestic product (PPP adjusted real per capita GDP) between the host and the source country is included. GDP data are taken from several sources (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Gleditsch, 2008; Heston, Summers and
5 The Direction of Refugee Movements

Aten, 2011; World Bank, 2011). However, a low GDP and medium X Polity IV value as proxies for low state capacity and consequent accessibility of a state could also lead to more refugees, because forced migrants often have to rely on porous borders to enter a country. Thus, the capacity of a potential asylum state, whether it is either willing to accommodate refugees or unable to control its borders, determines the flight routes of forced migrants. Further, I control for the population size (logged) of the country of asylum, because, as mentioned above, more populous countries can more easily absorb a high amount of refugees. Population data are taken from Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2011). Since several studies found that asylum policies do not impact the refugees’ destination choice (Day and White, 2002; Schaeffer, 2010; Castles and Loughna, 2003) and because no quantitative data is readily available, I do not control for refugee policies of possible host states.

Although I mainly focus on pull factors, I consider the push mechanism violence and control for the severity of the conflict that produced the refugees by including the (logged +1) number of battle deaths provided by Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) in the country of origin. A severe conflict is likely to produce more refugees. Usually unarmed people become refugees, therefore, I control for the impact on civilians by including the roughly estimated annual number of civilians intentionally killed, as obtained from the genocide/politicide indicator from the Political Instability Task Force (2012) consisting of 11 categories (0, 0.5, 1, ... 5) (Political Instability Task Force, 2009). A high level of hostilities and fatalities usually generates massive refugee flows (Kathman, 2011). Both severity dimensions are only available for the country-level and do not distinguish between targeted ethnic groups.

Table 5.2 displays the descriptive statistics of the variables.

5.4.2 Regression Analysis

The dependent variable, the number of ethnic refugees, is a count variable with over dispersion and an excessive amount of zero-observations. Figure 9.1 in the appendix demonstrates that the distribution of the number of ethnically identified refugees is highly right-skewed even when focusing on non-zero observations exclusively. The strongly zero-inflated count of refugees is because most dyads do not experience refugee movements. Refugees often do not flee to all possible coun-

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11 I use the variable bdeadhig indicating the high estimate of annual battle fatalities, because refugees not only flee from direct violence but also the threat thereof. Thus, although possibly overestimated, these figures reflect the threat and rumors of violence and persecution.
The Direction of Refugee Movements

Table 5.2: Summary Statistics, Refugee Flight Direction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of ethnic refugees</td>
<td>7503.906</td>
<td>77299.667</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3108675.5</td>
<td>42517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational ethnic linkage</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance (logged)</td>
<td>5.192</td>
<td>2.478</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.002</td>
<td>34758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flow years</td>
<td>1.006</td>
<td>3.837</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>42564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables, group-level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK group size</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK group conflict (lagged)</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK group in CoA included</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK group in CoA excluded</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables, country-level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbor</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict in CoA (lagged)</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population in CoA (logged)</td>
<td>9.388</td>
<td>1.447</td>
<td>5.432</td>
<td>14.096</td>
<td>40605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_X Polity IV</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>5.063</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_GDP (logged)</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>1.136</td>
<td>-3.574</td>
<td>4.841</td>
<td>39171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_Exclusion</td>
<td>-0.139</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>39798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle deaths (logged)</td>
<td>3.963</td>
<td>4.156</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.206</td>
<td>42981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian deaths</td>
<td>0.478</td>
<td>1.195</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42613</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

tries of asylum due to structural explanations, for example when the two countries are non-contiguous and do not have any cultural linkages or established networks of exchange. To test the hypotheses I apply a hurdle model with negative binomial distribution and country of origin-clustered robust standard errors. A hurdle model is appropriate if the binary zero and non-zero observations and the count of non-zero observations, that is when the “hurdle is crossed”, in the data are generated by two different processes (Mullahy, 1986, 345). This is the difference between the more often used zero-inflated count model, where two different processes generating the zero observations are assumed. In the present analysis, we only have one process generating zeros because I reduced the sample to relevant directed dyads with possible countries of asylum.

The two data generating processes can be modeled separately. Consequently, the hurdle model contains two parts (McDowell, 2003, 178): I use logit for the binary outcome of whether any refugees are present. The count of ethnically identified refugees is governed by a zero-truncated negative binomial distribution. The number of refugees $r_{o,a}$ from country of origin $o$ in country of asylum $a$ is based on a vector of variables specific to the country of origin $A_o$, a vector of variables specific to the country of asylum $B_a$, and a vector of variables comparing the asylum to the origin country $C_{a-o}$. The vectors of the estimated coefficients are defined as $\gamma$ and $\beta$, the error terms are $\xi_{o,a}$ and $\varepsilon_{o,a}$. $E$ specifies the expected conditional mean of refugees.
As described in Warziniack (2013, 1040), the specification of the two-step hurdle model can be expressed as follows:

\[
\ln \left[ \frac{\Pr(r_{0,a} > 0 | A_o, B_a, C_{a-o})}{\Pr(r_{0,a} = 0 | A_o, B_a, C_{a-o})} \right] = \gamma_0 + A'_o \gamma_0 + B'_a \gamma_0 + C'_{a-o} \gamma_{a-o} + \xi_{o,a} - \sigma_0
\]  

(1)

\[
\ln [E(r_{0,a} | r_{0,a} > 0)] = \beta_0 + A'_o \beta_0 + B'_a \beta_0 + C'_{a-o} \beta_{a-o} + \epsilon_{o,a}
\]  

(2)

Table 5.3 shows the results of the regression models. The first part displays the zero-truncated negative binomial regression model of the count of refugees greater than zero, while the second part depicts the binary logit regression for zero or non-zero refugees. Since we have two different processes generating ethnic refugees, the two equations include a different set of explanatory variables. The main independent variable in the first model measures whether or not the refugees have transnational ethnic linkages to the country of asylum. In the second model, the logged distance between an ethnic group’s settlement territory and the possible country of asylum is added. The Polity control variable is omitted in the third model because of many missing values resulting in a higher number of non-zero observations. In the fourth model, the refugees’ TEK linkages are disaggregated according to whether they affect politically included or excluded ethnic groups. Model five includes an interaction term of the distance between an ethnic group’s settlement area and the possible country of asylum with the presence of trans-border ethnic ties. In all models, I tested for over dispersion of the data with the parameter \( \alpha \), which was positive and significant, confirming that the observations are over dispersed and that they follow a negative binomial, and not a poisson distribution.

The first model confirms the assumption that refugees move along transnational ethnic linkages: Country-dyads where the refugees produced in the origin country have trans-border ethnic ties to the possible country of asylum receive significantly higher numbers of refugees than those country-dyads without ethnic linkages. Thus, pull factors matter and the second hypothesis that refugees are pulled by ethnic ties is supported. Temporal factors have a strong impact on the count of refugees: the number of refugees within a dyad is positively and significantly affected by previous refugee movements, yielding evidence for the third hypothesis. Similarly, neighboring countries observe a higher predicted count of refugees compared to the other countries in the sample, which are within a maximal distance of 950km, so that the assumption that spatial factors matter is supported. Further, the bigger the kin group compared to other ethnic groups in the host country, the higher the predicted number of co-ethnic refugees. Also, the total population size of the possible host country has a positive and significant effect on refugee flows. Thus,
### 5 The Direction of Refugee Movements

Table 5.3: Regression Results, Number of Ethnic Refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Count</strong></td>
<td>0.938***</td>
<td>0.779***</td>
<td>0.744***</td>
<td>0.543*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.252)</td>
<td>(0.252)</td>
<td>(0.270)</td>
<td>(0.317)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transnational ethnic linkage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>–0.129***</td>
<td>–0.112**</td>
<td>–0.136***</td>
<td>–0.157***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distance (logged)</strong></td>
<td>0.068***</td>
<td>0.065***</td>
<td>0.062***</td>
<td>0.060***</td>
<td>0.060***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEK group in CoA included</td>
<td>0.482*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK group in CoA excluded</td>
<td>0.407</td>
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<td>TEK # Distance</td>
<td>0.193**</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEK group size</td>
<td>1.546+</td>
<td>1.524**</td>
<td>1.635**</td>
<td>1.931***</td>
<td>1.594**</td>
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<td>(0.827)</td>
<td>(0.763)</td>
<td>(0.861)</td>
<td>(0.559)</td>
<td>(0.724)</td>
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<td>TEK group conflict (lagged)</td>
<td>–0.582</td>
<td>–0.472</td>
<td>–0.439</td>
<td>–0.332</td>
<td>–0.639*</td>
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<td>(0.473)</td>
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<td>Conflict in CoA (lagged)</td>
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<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.069</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.197)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_Exclusion</td>
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<td>(0.269)</td>
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<td>D_X Polity</td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
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<td>D_GDP (logged)</td>
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<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.191</td>
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<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
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<td>Population in CoA (logged)</td>
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<td>0.214**</td>
<td>0.211***</td>
<td>0.194*</td>
<td>0.213***</td>
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<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battle deaths (logged)</td>
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<td>0.122***</td>
<td>0.122***</td>
<td>0.135***</td>
<td>0.118***</td>
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<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
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<td>Civilian deaths</td>
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<td>0.152</td>
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<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
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<td>(0.110)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neighbors</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.265)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>5.873***</td>
<td>6.963***</td>
<td>6.957***</td>
<td>7.248***</td>
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<td>(0.872)</td>
<td>(0.891)</td>
<td>(0.850)</td>
<td>(0.860)</td>
<td>(0.899)</td>
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**Binary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transnational ethnic linkage</td>
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<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.239</td>
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<td>(0.197)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict in CoA (lagged)</td>
<td>0.149</td>
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<td>(0.160)</td>
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<td>(0.190)</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neighbors</td>
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<td>(0.222)</td>
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<td>Distance (logged)</td>
<td>–0.368***</td>
<td>–0.368***</td>
<td>–0.368***</td>
<td>–0.368***</td>
<td>–0.368***</td>
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<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>–0.727***</td>
<td>1.860***</td>
<td>1.860***</td>
<td>1.860***</td>
<td>1.860***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.204)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations         | 39463         | 34444         | 34444         | 34444         | 34444         |
| Non-zero observations| 3927          | 3561          | 3968          | 3968          | 3968          |
| AIC                  | 88551.068     | 80469.750     | 89548.286     | 89590.128     | 89463.481     |

*Standard errors in parentheses (clustered on country of origin).
Cubic splines of no flow years not shown.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
refugees are particularly pulled by large co-ethnic groups. However, against expectations, conflict-involved kin groups do not deter forced migrants. As a push factor, the number of battle-related deaths in the home country significantly increase the number of refugees within a dyad. The magnitude of civilian deaths, however, has no significant effect. The remaining control variables accounting for political and economic pull factors do not have a significant impact.

The second part displaying the binary model of refugee presence reveals that trans-border ethnic ties increase a country’s chances of hosting refugees. However, the probability of refugees is mainly determined by spatio-temporal factors, for example, neighboring dyads are more likely to observe refugee movements. Hence, distance matters and refugees, due to their restricted means of transportation, usually relocate to neighboring countries. Further, the probability of receiving refugees significantly increases with every year the dyad observed refugees. Thus, temporal dynamics are important because refugees follow previous forced migrants. The chances of hosting refugees decrease with the ongoing absence of refugee movements, and refugee-producing conflicts are less likely to break out after longer times in peace.

Instead of the binary variable measuring whether the country of origin and the possible country of asylum are neighbors, in Model 2, the logged minimal distance between an ethnic group’s settlement territory and the possible host country is added in order to test the first hypothesis. The coefficient is negative and significant. Hence, the farther away a country is from the region where a group lives, the lower the predicted number of refugees, which further confirms the relevance of spatial proximity in refugee flight studies. The effect of trans-border ethnic ties on refugee figures remains positive and significant when controlling for the distance. However, the logit model reveals that precise spatio-temporal features alone account for the risk of hosting refugees, because the coefficient for trans-border ethnic ties becomes insignificant.

In Model 3, I excluded the control variable measuring the difference in the Polity value between the countries of origin and asylum because of the many missing values. Now we have an increased number of non-zero observations, that is, directed dyads experiencing a refugee movement. Again, ceteris paribus, the predicted number of refugees is higher in country-dyads where the refugee group has ethnic linkages, where the distance between the group’s settlement territory and the asylum state is short and where there were earlier refugee flows. Figure 5.4 displays the difference in the average predicted count of ethnically identified refugees for countries with and without trans-border ethnic ties.
To test the claim that refugees consider the political status of their kin groups, in Model 4, the main explanatory variable is divided into two binary variables measuring, (1) whether the transnational ethnic kin group of the refugees is politically powerful or not, and (2) whether or not it is excluded from central decision making. The assumption that refugees flee towards politically powerful ethnic kin groups is supported, however, with a 10 percent error margin. This suggests that refugees not only consider cultural similarities in their destination choice, but to a lesser degree also consider political arguments. However, political exclusion does not significantly deter refugees. Much more EPR-TEK groups are politically excluded than included, and refugees, if they are not naturalized, will not have political rights in the country of asylum and, thus, political opportunities play a less important role, particularly in the short-term.

Assuming the effect of cross-border cultural linkages to be conditional on the distance, in Model 5, I added an interaction term of ethnic kin links and the logged distance. The single coefficients neither change signs nor significance. The interaction covariate is significant which, however, does not necessarily lead to significant results. Figure 5.5 shows the first difference in the mean predicted number of refugees between dyads that are linked by ethnic ties and that are not as a function of increasing distance. The gray area depicts the 95 percent confidence interval. While trans-border ethnic ties do not significantly affect the count of refugees in con-
5 The Direction of Refugee Movements

Figure 5.5: Interaction Effect of Transnational Ethnic Ties and Distance (logged) on Refugee Numbers

tiguous states, transnational ethnic ties significantly increase the predicted number of refugees in countries that are more distant from the home territory of an ethnic group. The binary logit regressions of Models 3, 4 and 5 reveal that the probability of hosting any refugees mainly depends on the distance to a possible host country and previous refugee movements. A Wald test of the full count model compared to a restricted model without trans-border ethnic kin confirms that including transnational ethnic linkages produces a better fit to the number of refugees.

5.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis

As a robustness check of the results supporting the hypotheses that refugees travel short distances and follow ethnic ties and previous refugee movements, I calculate four additional models displayed in Table 5.4.

Model 6 includes dummy variables for the region of the country of origin in order to correct for unit-specific heterogeneity. They comprise America (baseline category), Europe, Subsaharan Africa, North Africa, the Middle East, West Asia and South East Asia. The partially significant coefficients for the world regions reveal
5 The Direction of Refugee Movements

Table 5.4: Robustness Checks, Number of Ethnic Refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transnational ethnic linkage</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.604***</td>
<td>0.731***</td>
<td>−0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.295)</td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.268)</td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK group size</td>
<td>1.148***</td>
<td>1.529***</td>
<td>1.812***</td>
<td>1.542***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.614)</td>
<td>(0.583)</td>
<td>(0.655)</td>
<td>(0.405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK group conflict (lagged)</td>
<td>−0.360</td>
<td>−0.393</td>
<td>−0.441</td>
<td>−0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.534)</td>
<td>(0.435)</td>
<td>(0.573)</td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict in CoA (lagged)</td>
<td>−0.020</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.047</td>
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<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_Exclusion</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>−0.440***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.269)</td>
<td>(0.240)</td>
<td>(0.273)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_GDP (logged)</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.134</td>
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<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population in CoA (logged)</td>
<td>0.207**</td>
<td>0.190**</td>
<td>0.214***</td>
<td>0.207***</td>
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<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
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<td>Battle deaths (logged)</td>
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<td>0.110***</td>
<td>0.129***</td>
<td>−0.013</td>
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<td>(0.029)</td>
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<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
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<td>Civilian deaths</td>
<td>0.161*</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>−0.049</td>
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<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance (logged)</td>
<td>−0.139***</td>
<td>−0.109***</td>
<td>−0.135***</td>
<td>−0.379***</td>
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<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flow years</td>
<td>0.043***</td>
<td>0.052***</td>
<td>0.063***</td>
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<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0.727**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa (Subsahara)</td>
<td>0.880***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (North)</td>
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<td>Middle East</td>
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<td>(0.588)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia (West)</td>
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<td>Asia (South East)</td>
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<td>No flow years</td>
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<td>7.289***</td>
<td>6.623***</td>
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<td>(0.954)</td>
<td>(0.818)</td>
<td>(0.848)</td>
<td>(0.681)</td>
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Binary

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transnational ethnic linkage</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.239</td>
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<td>(0.267)</td>
<td>(0.270)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict in CoA (lagged)</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.094</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
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<td>Distance (logged)</td>
<td>−0.368***</td>
<td>−0.372***</td>
<td>−0.368***</td>
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<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
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<tr>
<td>No flow years</td>
<td>−3.019***</td>
<td>−3.059***</td>
<td>−3.019***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.860***</td>
<td>1.851***</td>
<td>1.860***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 34444 34343 34444 33842
Non-zero observations 3968 3909 3968
AIC 89629.424 87836.151 87342.607 8460.506

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered on country of origin).
Cubic splines of no flow years not shown.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
that there are regional differences, and the impact of border-crossing ethnic connections on the predicted count of ethnic refugees becomes insignificant. However, the positive and significant effect of the size of the trans-border kin group on the number of refugees withstands. In an additional model, that is not displayed here for lack of space, I included country dummies for the 69 countries of origin that produced refugees instead of the regional dummies in order to control for country-specific differences in the variance of error term. However, this does not affect the significance of the main explanatory variables.

The seventh model is estimated for ethnic refugee movements consisting of less than 100'000 refugees only. It excludes the observations above the 98.5th percentile and allows to control for whether the outliers with high numbers of refugees, over one million, have strong leverage on the results. The coefficient for ethnic linkages is still positive and significant with a 5 percent error margin, which is a consequence of the smaller number of observations. Similarly, the size of the TEK group is positive and significant with low standard errors.

In Model 8, I use different estimations of the refugee figures presented in Table 4.2. Numbers of ethnic refugee groups have to be handled with care because they are estimated according to whether the coders identified the group as dominant, majority or minority within a refugee movement. Thus, I recalculated the absolute ethnic refugee group sizes with more conservative numbers in order to prevent the risk that the real refugee sizes are overestimated. I multiplied the absolute size of the country-dyadic refugee flow, as obtained from the UNHCR (2010) and UNRWA (2010), with the factor 0.75 for dominant ethnic refugee groups, 0.5 for majority groups and 0.05 for minorities. Those multipliers are the lowest values still in accordance with the coding instructions of the ethnicity of refugees dataset. Yet, using these restricted refugee group sizes, does not change the results.

Model 9 estimates the probability of receiving ethnic kin refugees with a simple logit model. Consistant with the second part of the hurdle models, the dependent variable is binary (1 for country-dyads with refugees and 0 without) but I include all explanatory variables used in the count equations. In contrast to the count models, countries where refugees find ethnic kin have no significantly higher probability of hosting those refugees. But the coefficient for the relative size of the EPR-TEK group is positive and significant. Thus, larger ethnic groups have a higher probability of hosting any co-ethnic refugees. Again, time dynamics and space affect the chances of receiving refugees. Since most countries never or seldom host refugees, I also estimated the same model with a rare events logit (King and Zeng, 82).
5 The Direction of Refugee Movements

and complementary log-log regression, but, besides minor changes in the standard errors, the results remain the same.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter examines the direction of refugee movements to countries of first asylum. Qualitative evidence suggests that many refugees follow cultural linkages and try to seek refuge among trans-border ethnic kin (Newland, 1993; Schmeidl, 1997). Comparative studies mainly focus on the different push factors producing refugees. Only a few authors systematically analyze pull mechanisms, finding that refugees tend to be drawn to democratic and wealthy states and that they are highly affected by spatio-temporal measures, that is distance and previous migrations. This study provides the first quantitative test of the qualitative results that refugee movements follow transnational ethnic linkages. The analysis of the suggested causal logic combining refugee destinations and border-crossing group identities is important because it increases the knowledge of refugee flight destinations and, consequently, facilitates the planning and distribution of humanitarian assistance during refugee crises. Furthermore, the view is supported that refugees are not passive victims but active social agents who make decisions. Hence, this study contributes to the understanding of the relevance of ethnicity to refugee movement patterns.

Drawing on migration theory and assuming that refugees and voluntary migrants have common characteristics (Crisp, 1999a; Wahlbeck, 2002), I claim that refugees are not only affected by so-called push factors, such as violence and persecution in the country of origin, but also pull factors impacting the direction of the refugee movement. Hence, forced migrants do not leave their homes for random host states. Consequently, I introduce an ethno-political pull model with spatio-temporal features to approach the complexity of refugee flight processes. I hypothesize that, first, refugees seek asylum in countries as close as possible to their ethnic group’s settlement territory, second, refugees follow cross-border ethnic networks, and finally, refugees move along similar patterns as earlier refugee movements belonging to the same ethnic group. The statistical results indicate that refugees move along transnational ethnic connections, because countries that are linked by ethnic ties to a refugee group have a higher predicted count of refugees than those countries without these ethnic ties. Thus, although forced to leave their country of origin due to violence or persecution, refugees are not only affected by push factors but do also consider cultural pull factors directing them towards certain countries of asylum. Ethnic linkages provide established transportation networks facilitating flight, and ethnic commonalities with the host population facilitate accommodation.
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and integration. Also, I discovered that possible host countries where the refugees’
kin group is relatively large have a higher predicted count of refugees. The causal
mechanism behind is that refugees are pulled by larger co-ethnic groups who have
better capacities to absorb the influx. In addition, larger groups provide more bases
for formal and informal networks attracting forced migrants.

Further, confirming earlier quantitative and qualitative studies, all models reveal
a strong spatial dependence of refugee movements: Refugees are more likely to
move to neighboring states, in particular, to those possible countries of asylum that
are closely located to the settlement area of the concerned ethnic group. Finally,
refugees often follow previous refugee or migration movements and existing net-
works of flight. Hence, the results support the claim that temporal mechanisms
affect refugee flows. However, focusing on ethnic refugee groups, in contrast to
the country-level approach of previous studies (Moore and Shellman, 2004, 2006,
2007; Iqbal and Zorn, 2007), I did not find significant evidence that refugees are
pulled by other political or economic factors. Governments refusing to host refu-
gees, thus, falsely raise fears that refugees seek wealth only. To conclude, the
results confirm that many ethnic refugee groups flee to kin groups in neighboring
countries, suggesting that sub-national refugee characteristics such as ethnicity are
essential in order to understand the direction of refugee movements. The refugees’
diffusion effect and their relation to the host community will be analyzed in the next
chapter. Knowing the flight trends of forced migrants allows stakeholders to be bet-
ter prepared in future refugee crises. The results are, thus, important for furthering
the knowledge of useful and sustainable distribution of humanitarian aid.
6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has highlighted that many refugee groups flee along transnational ethnic linkages. Consequently, refugee movements are often culturally connected to the population in the asylum state. Empirical evidence from previous studies suggests that border-transgressing groups such as transnational kin groups or forced migration movements contribute to the regional diffusion of civil conflict (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Gleditsch, 2007; Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009; Cederman et al., 2013). Refugees may trigger conflict in the asylum state by increasing ethnic tensions, deteriorating the economic situation or expanding rebel networks (Whitaker, 1998; Stedman and Tanner, 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Lischer, 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). But the simultaneous presence of trans-border ethnic kin and refugee flows, which are both assumed to increase the risk of conflict, has yet to be analyzed. We know little about the role of the refugees’ ethnic group identity within conflict diffusion processes. I claim that refugees fleeing along cultural linkages intensify the contagious effect of conflict. Having local ethnic kin, refugees are most likely to cause a disturbed ethnic balance in the host country and share violent ideas or military resources with the local co-ethnic population.
Many empirical examples from different regions of the world demonstrate how refugees increased ethnic instability in the receiving states. Thus, I claim that refugee-related violence is a global phenomenon requiring a comparative analysis. For instance, the massive influx of Afghan refugees into the Balochistan province of Pakistan in the 1980s disturbed the ethnic balance (Yousuf, 2010). Palestinian refugees were less welcomed in Lebanon compared to Syria or Jordan because the Lebanese government feared that the refugees would disturb the delicate ethno-religious balance (Khalil, 2011). In Iraq, approximately 170 Palestinian refugees were killed by Shia rebel groups who associated the Palestinians with the larger Sunni insurgency (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2007). Further, in Zaire, the local Tutsis were overwhelmed by the influx of more than one million Hutus and “mobilized opposition to the Mobutu government, which was seen as siding with the Hutus against the Tutsis” (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006, 347). In Kenya, the local repressed Somali minority faced even more hostility after the large influx of Somalis refugees (Kagwanja and Juma, 2008, 223). Also, whether justified or not, many potential host countries anticipate that a refugee influx could threaten their ethnic balance and try to close their borders. However, besides these examples, the cases of refugees spreading conflict are rare. Fortunately, most refugee crises proceed more or less peacefully and the vast majority of refugees does not engage in violence. A better understanding of refugee-related violent events should, therefore, increase awareness and knowledge of how to prevent or respond to such conflicts in host states. Hence, this chapter seeks to explain if and how refugees increase the risk of conflict for co-ethnic groups in the country of asylum.

In order to analyze the impact of kin refugees on ethnic groups, this study draws on the new dataset containing global information on the ethnicity of refugees. By combining transnational ethnic linkages and the presence of refugee movements, this analysis contributes to the emerging literature on transnational actors affecting civil conflict. Further, the causal mechanisms of how refugees spread conflict will be elaborated and tested, since the current theoretical and empirical gap in the literature on refugees as a conflict trigger remains unresolved. It is crucial to assess if and how refugees increase the motivation and opportunity for groups in the asylum country to fight. Additionally, the quantitative analysis on the sub-national ethnic group-level allows for a profound disaggregation of the internal and external causes of why a group experiences conflict. Unwinding the causes of refugee-involvement in conflict will also help generate policy implications of how to anticipate and react to these types of situations.
I begin by briefly discussing the existing literature on civil conflict diffusion and the role of refugees in conflict spread processes. I then present my theoretical arguments on how refugees facilitate the involvement in conflict of co-ethnic groups in the country of asylum, whereas the political power status of the refugees’ ethnic kin group and the refugee figures play a major role. The literature has been broadly reviewed in Chapter 2 and the main theoretical arguments have been presented in Chapter 3. Both are briefly summarized here. To examine the assumed correlation between co-ethnic refugees and the outbreak of violence, I conduct logistic regression models with the onset of conflict at the ethnic group-level as the dependent variable and the presence of co-ethnic refugees as the main explanatory factor. The empirical results suggest that ethnic kin refugees of a politically excluded ethnic group increase the risk of conflict-involvement. Further, I find evidence that larger co-ethnic refugee movements fuel civil conflict. Thus, refugees do not per se trigger conflict in the asylum state, but they do if they arrive in an already tense political context due to exclusionary policies towards certain ethnic groups.

6.2 Literature Review: Ethnic War, Conflict Diffusion and Refugee Flows

Most conflict researchers agree that an exclusive focus on the country experiencing civil conflict is too narrow to explain the outbreak, duration or termination of violence, and that regional external factors have to be considered as well (Hill and Rothchild, 1986; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Sambanis, 2001; Gleditsch, 2007; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Braithwaite, 2010; Brown, 2010). Hence, civil conflict processes are affected by internal and external mechanisms. According to this logic, if refugees as external factor actually trigger civil conflict in the asylum state, they only do so in combination with dangerous internal factors. However, the link between domestic structural factors and refugees as intervening element has received relatively little attention in conflict literature. Before introducing the new theoretical framework explaining how refugees increase the incentives and opportunities of groups to rebel, and supplementing Chapter 2, I review existing research on civil war and refugees.

Early macro-level research on motivations to fight starts with Gurr’s (1968) theory of relative deprivation. This psychological approach suggests that grievances arise due to a gap between people’s expectations and their actual living conditions and capabilities, resulting from comparing themselves to others. Within a rationalist framework, Posen (1993, 104) argues that ethnic conflicts emerge due to a security dilemma when a country lacks a strong government, which is particularly salient to
multi-ethnic states. Ethnic groups resort to violence due to a lack of information and a collective fear of violence or discrimination. Focusing on socio-economic inequalities, Horowitz (1985) distinguishes between backward and advanced groups. Comparing themselves to other groups, backward groups start violence more frequently due to perceived inequalities and consequent grievances. The mechanism of comparison increasing grievances in particular applies to refugee groups who spatially contrast their situation with other groups in the asylum state and temporally with their own status before the flight. More recent grievance-based literature argues that exclusionary policies towards certain ethnic groups increase the risk of conflict, because groups that are excluded from central level decision-making have particularly strong incentives for rebellion (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010).

Opportunity-based scholars basically assume that rebels are greedy and elites manipulative. Rebellion as a form of collective action is costly (Lichbach, 1990). Consequently, the risk of insurgency depends on low opportunity-costs, which according to Fearon and Laitin (2003) are found in poor, weak and unstable countries. Stewart (2008) argues that economically underprivileged groups are more easily mobilized for an insurgency. Further, in order to act collectively, groups must be able to do so through recruitment and popular support, available resources and a shared identity (Tilly, 1978). Ethnic identity is, thus, a useful mean to mobilize masses and overcome collective action issues (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Kaufman, 2006). Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 589) claim that rebel leaders start insurgencies in order to gain power or wealth. Thus, rebel leaders are entrepreneurs who misuse popular discontent for their own purposes. Similarly, Gagnon (2006) states that incumbent elites instrumentalize ethnic mass grievances and ethno-nationalist social movements in order to stay in power.

Newer explanations of civil conflict place a particular emphasis on external factors from beyond the borders of a country. First, trans-border ethnic groups have been identified as an external conflict-determinant (Gleditsch, 2007; Forsberg, 2008; Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009; Cederman et al., 2013). Ethnic groups subjected to exclusionary policies with transnational constituencies increase the risk of conflict diffusion (Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009, 303). Also, conflict affected groups may imply a demonstration effect on foreign ethnic brethren (Forsberg, 2008, 286, 287). Second, the risk of civil conflict increases due to border-transgressing conflict-affected actors (Lischer, 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006) such as transnational insurgent groups or migration movements. Rebel groups increase their opportunities to recruit and exercise force by establishing foreign bases (Salehyan, 2008b), thereby contributing to conflict diffusion. Often, transnational rebel groups are typically associated with forced mi-
Refugees, Ethno-Politics and Security in the Asylum State

gration movements (Salehyan, 2007, 241). Refugee settlements offer rebel groups sanctuary and recruitment possibilities (Barber, 1997; Lischer, 2003; Salehyan, 2007). In addition to this diffusion of rebel networks, refugees may trigger conflict in the asylum state due to negative externalities such as the spread of military resources, a disturbed ethnic equilibrium or economic and health pressures. These mechanisms have been put forward by several authors (Whitaker, 1998; Stedman and Tanner, 2003; Moore and Shelman, 2004; Lischer, 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). However, besides quantitative studies by Lischer (2001) and Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006), the security consequences of refugees for the asylum country have not been systematically assessed. Neither has the ethnic identity of refugee groups been considered in any comparative studies, although researchers agree that ethnic inequalities have an impact on the outbreak and diffusion of civil conflict. Therefore, the theoretical approach introduced in Chapter 3 includes ethno-nationalist preferences of refugees and the population in the host state to explain the logic of refugee-related conflict spread.

Qualitative analysis yields evidence that the effect of the refugees’ ethnic group membership in the country of asylum can be positive or negative. I refer to this as the ethnicity paradox. While state authorities welcome ethnic kin refugees because they strengthen their superior position towards both internal challengers and foreign regimes, at the same time, they are often reluctant to accept kin refugees of minority groups (Jacobsen, 1996; Newland, 1993). As shown in Chapter 5, ethnic kinship raises the receptiveness of refugees among group members in the host country and facilitates integration, but, paradoxically, it also reinforces pressures if the country is populated by more than one ethnic group. Refugees can destabilize their host country if they are kin of a discontent minority group and can disturb the ethnic power balance. Thus, ethnic linkages do not necessarily have a positive effect. The consequences of a refugee influx are varied depending on whether the refugees are ethnically related to a group that has power over the state or to a minority group, in which the latter case is more likely to cause problems.

Assuming that refugees are an underlying mechanism of conflict diffusion, particularly in combination with transnational ethnic linkages, refugee group characteristics, such as their ethnic group membership, play a crucial role. This has yet to be scientifically analyzed and no data on the ethnicity of refugees has been collected, so the causal mechanisms remain unclear. To fill this gap, the following subsection introduces a new theoretical approach to refugee-related ethnic violence in the country of asylum.
6.3 Theoretical Model of Refugee-Related Ethnic Conflict Diffusion

Chapter 3.3 presented the four main mechanisms explaining refugee-related ethnic conflict: (1) disturbed ethnic balance, (2) demonstration effect, (3) diffusion of military resources and (4) expansion of rebel networks. The first three factors directly affect groups in the host state and will, thus, be further analyzed in this chapter. When arriving in masses, refugee may disturb the equilibrium of ethnic groups living in a country. Such an upset to the ethnic balance threatens the stability of the asylum state. Further, refugees are basically living proof of political opportunities, either negative or positive, in another country and as such imply a demonstration effect on the host population which could promote armed activities. Having experienced conflict, refugees are likely to be aggrieved and, consequently, willing to share violent ideologies with the host population. Forced migrants always import new ideologies, skills and goods. If these imports include weapons or knowledge on how to successfully challenge the government, refugees spread military resources. Also, refugees can support local host groups by fighting for them. The severity of these negative externalities of refugee communities depends on the ethnic kinship between the refugees and the host population as well as on the ethno-political power constellation in the asylum state. In particularly, politically marginalized ethnic groups are impacted by negative factors associated with kin refugees.

This section extends the ethno-political logic of refugee-related conflict trigger mechanisms in the refugee-receiving state to a theoretical framework including both incentives and opportunity structures of ethnic groups for rebellion. So, I elaborate on why refugee-induced conflict triggers increase incentives and opportunities to fight and how this relates to ethnic identities. Thus, this theoretical approach answers two questions: How do refugees make people want to rebel? How do refugees make violent strategies possible and viable? Table 6.1 displays the suggested relation between the mechanisms through which refugees trigger conflict and increased grievances or opportunities for an insurgency. These negative effects of refugees rely further on ethno-politics in the host state and the size of the refugee group.

6.3.1 Ethnic Kin Refugees as Conflict Trigger

While the negative externalities of refugee movements in principle apply to all host countries independently of the refugees’ ethnicity, kinship between the refugees and a part of the population in the receiving country increases the risk that these
mechanisms will come into action. Groups are more likely to interact or support each other when they share a language and historical bonds (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006, 343). Hence, shared ethnic group membership between refugees and the host population can increase the risk of conflict onset. Co-ethnic refugees affect the motivation and opportunity of local kin to rebel in several ways.

Co-ethnic refugees increase grievances among their co-ethnic hosts by, first, displaying a demonstration effect. The import of new knowledge that goes along with the influx of new people may increase disaffection of local groups. Due to a common language and mutual trust, forced migrants are most likely to interact with co-ethnics in the host state, thus facilitating communication and exchange. New information on political opportunities and living conditions in other countries can increase grievances if local groups consequently compare themselves to groups in other places that are perceived to have higher standards of living. According to Horowitz’s (1985) approach, groups assess their status in relation to others, and start a rebellion if they perceive themselves as disadvantaged. The refugee-related demonstration mechanism increases these comparison opportunities, which can result in grievances. Second, grievances might also arise when the local co-ethnic host is confronted with the suffering of the trans-border kin refugees. Ethnic identity groups usually show loyalty to each other across borders (Davis and Moore, 1997; Saideman, 2002), so when co-ethnics become forced migrants due to violence and persecution, cross-border kin may become aggrieved because of such violent treatment. These grievances confer to the asylum state if the authorities are incapable or unwilling to support the refugees, and may equally lead to involvement of the group in the foreign civil conflict in order to support their co-ethnics.

Kin refugees increase conflict opportunities and the possibility of collective action by ethnic groups when they, first, diffuse military resources such as weapons and skills, which they are most likely to share with co-ethnics in the asylum country. Second, refugees augment the population of a country, and could provide manpower to rebel groups. Available armory and a larger recruitment base increases the possibilities of local actors to initiate an insurgency or to repress challengers.
Third, co-ethnic refugees demographically strengthen an ethnic group, possibly shaping their decision to choose violent over non-violent strategies. Thus, conflict opportunities may increase through changing ethnic group constellations due to refugee inflows. Fourth, refugee crises decrease political stability. As external shocks, refugee inflows may lower the state’s capacity (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006, 531), if the government is preoccupied with the crisis and cannot countervail internal challengers, such as the massive inflow of Kosovar refugees in Macedonia that demanded all the government’s resources. Hence, refugee crises offer a window of opportunity for local groups to attack the state or each other. Finally, by implying severe economic pressures, refugees can threaten stability.

Having elaborated on the different mechanisms of refugee-related conflict diffusion and how they affect opportunities and motivations to fight by showing that, especially with ethnic kinship among refugees and a group in the country of asylum, refugees might operate as conflict trigger, I derive the first hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 6.1:** Ethnic groups with kin refugees in their country have a higher risk of conflict than groups without kin refugees.

### 6.3.2 The Political Status of the Refugees’ Ethnic Kin Group

The intensity and impact of the negative mechanisms related to refugees strongly depends on ethnic power politics in the host state. That is, whether the refugees fled along symmetric or asymmetric ties, as described in Chapter [3.3](#). Symmetric ties between refugees and trans-border ethnic kin groups refer to situations where the later are excluded from the government, while asymmetric ties describe linkages between refugees and a powerful group. Refugees are more likely to cause conflict if they enter into a politically tense environment with a fragile stability. A group’s political status, that is exclusion or inclusion in the state government, is a primary explanation of conflict-involvement since groups that are excluded or included in central level decision-making have different incentives and motivations to either improve their influence on state politics or maintain their status quo. Particularly large disaffected groups are at risk of challenging the government and thereby causing conflict (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). Co-ethnic refugees of an already conflict-prone political minority can disrupt political stability, because they can intensify grievances among their co-ethnics and increase their opportunities to apply violence, which will be explained in the following section.

Kin refugees reinforce grievances among their politically marginalized co-ethnic groups in the asylum state through, first, the mechanism of a disturbed ethnic bal-
ance. Co-ethnic refugees increase the size of their kin group, so that these gain demographic and political leverage. Larger excluded ethnic groups contribute to political inequalities in the host state, particularly when the population share of disaffected to powerful groups changes in favor of the latter. The perception of unequal treatment, underrepresentation or political exclusion is a major cause of grievances. The mechanism of refugees triggering conflict by upsetting the ethnic equilibrium is not salient in mono-ethnic states nor for large and powerful ethnic kin groups, however its impact is significant for groups subjected to exclusionary policies. Second, already aggrieved ethnic groups are more receptive to a demonstration effect based on shared violent ideologies. The awareness of other, possibly better, political representation and opportunities elsewhere and the comparison to their own situation increases grievances among marginalized groups. The demonstration effect, where a group updates its beliefs by learning new political options is, thus, most likely to affect an ethnic kin group that is excluded from the government. Finally, co-ethnic refugees of a challenging minority are usually less welcomed by the state authorities and receive less assistance compared to other refugee groups. This increases grievances among the refugees themselves, as well as among their allegiant local kin when facing inequality. Further, this lack of assistance gives way to economic inequalities when the political elite is unwilling to share resources with a different ethnic refugee group. Consequently, the refugees, their co-ethnic group and other groups in the country may fight over resources.

Co-ethnic refugees also provide opportunities for excluded co-ethnics to challenge the government. First, constituting a higher share of the country population due to co-ethnic refugees, an excluded group might finally feel strong enough to initiate an insurgency. However, an already powerful governmental ethnic group has no rational reason to start violence solely due to increased group size. Thus, co-ethnic refugees particularly increase an aggrieved group’s possibility to fight by disturbing the ethnic balance. Second, aggrieved ethnic groups have incentives to use weapons or manpower for their own claims against the government, hence, they are amenable to diffused military resources and support by co-ethnic refugees, which then increase their opportunity to fight.

In addition to increasing political demands of aggrieved co-ethnics, kin refugees simultaneously threaten the governmental groups. For instance, the ethnic Macedonian majority government on several occasions expressed its concern that the Kosovar Albanian refugees endanger the fragile ethnic balance between local Albanian and Macedonians (Milner, 2000, 29). This means that the non-kin popula-

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12 The UNHCR tries to equally distribute aid among different refugee groups.
tion feels challenged by the refugees who increase the leverage of another ethnic group. Consequently, the powerful groups could increase pressures and exclusionary policies on the refugees’ kin. Hence, repression in the asylum state could to some extent be endogenous to refugee inflows. Furthermore, I claim that refugees without local ethnic kin do not impact domestic ethnic politics. Co-ethnic refugees having fled along asymmetric ties to a powerful group do affect the ethnic set-up. However, by strengthening the position of the governmental group with their presence, these refugees are unlikely to cause conflict. Hence, refugees moving along symmetric linkages have the strongest impact on their excluded kin groups in the receiving state, leading to the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 6.2:** Politically excluded ethnic groups with kin refugees in their country have a higher risk of conflict than politically excluded or included groups without kin refugees.

### 6.3.3 The Size of the Ethnic Refugee Group

In addition to the presence of co-ethnic forced migrants and the political power status of the refugees’ kin group, the refugees’ impact on conflict depends on the size of the influx. All refugee-related conflict trigger mechanisms are more effective when the refugee group is large.

The motivation to fight relies on a large refugee influx with a strong impact on the ethnic balance and, consequently, increases inequalities between co-ethnic excluded groups and other powerful groups. Large refugee flows are more likely to endanger the host state’s economy because pressures on resources emanate from a high number of people seeking assistance and often emerge within huge refugee settlements (Martin, 2005, 332). Thus, particularly large refugee settlements cause economic pressures, which can result in grievances among the refugees and their local co-ethnics when humanitarian assistance is insufficient and causes horizontal socio-economic inequalities. The opportunity to rebel is also dependent on large co-ethnic refugee groups of marginalized groups. Large refugee groups have more opportunities to diffuse military resources. Refugee crises, including huge and sudden refugee inflows, exert the most severe pressures on the political stability of the host state. Hence, large refugee caseloads are most likely to open the window of opportunity to decreasing stability and state capacity for local groups to attack the government. The same applies to more severe economic degradation after massive refugee inflows, resulting in decreased state capacity. Therefore, I derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6.3: The larger the number of kin refugees, the higher the risk of conflict for politically excluded ethnic groups.

Besides the size of the refugee group, the size of the refugees’ kin group must be considered when analyzing the risk of conflict, because large excluded or underrepresented groups are more likely to challenge the government (Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009, 423). Refugees disturb the ethnic balance if their kin group reaches a critical demographic size. An ethnic group must perceive itself as strengthened enough to claim more representative power due to its increased demographic leverage, and thereby have the opportunity to challenge or threaten other groups.

Fearing that refugees threaten stability, governments may be reluctant to admit refugees into their territory. Consequently, strategic thinking averts possible instances of refugee-related conflict spread resulting in an endogeneity bias. However, empirical evidence suggests that the vast majority of countries admit refugees because, first, the state is bound to do so since it signed the UN Refugee Convention, which obliges its signatory states to assist every refugee according to the principle of nonrefoulement (UNHCR, 2007a, 32), second, the country is forced to do so by a third state, or third, the country is unable to secure its borders.

6.4 Analysis

To examine the relationship between conflict and refugees, the hypotheses are tested with logistic regression models with the onset of conflict as the dependent variable. The unit of analysis is the ethnic group-year. Thus, I separately assess the annual probability of conflict onset for each ethnic group in a country. To control for duration dependence, natural cubic splines of peace years are used with three knots (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998). The standard errors are country-clustered. Focusing on external conflict-determinants interacting with domestic explanations of civil conflict, the analytical models include several spatial lags. Although conflicts cluster and some world regions experience more conflict and wars than others, at a global perspective, conflict is a rare event. Consequently, focusing on all refugee-receiving countries worldwide, conflict caused by refugees occurs very rarely. Nevertheless, those relatively few events of refugee-related conflict spread are important to the understanding of refugees’ role in conflict diffusion processes (King and Zeng, 2001, 693). The spread of conflict due to the direct diffusion of military resources or indirect demonstration effects could, in fact, be triggered without the presence of refugees when transnational ethnic kin groups live in the affected
countries. Although refugees are not required for the spread of military resources and a demonstration effect, they can intensify an already expanding network of weapon and knowledge diffusion. Refugees can accelerate the information flow when they cross borders. Therefore, it is crucial to account for situations where only border-crossing ethnic groups are present but no refugees, and vice versa, in order to avoid selection bias. This allows the model to establish if a refugee influx contributed to conflict onset or other factors were more central.

6.4.1 Operationalization

**Dependent Variable:** The dependent variable measures if an ethnic group experiences conflict onset in a given year. Conflict data is drawn from the ACD2EPR dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012) which identifies rebel groups with ethnic claims or recruitment along ethnic lines within the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009b). The NSA dataset provides information on rebel groups involved in conflicts coded in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict (ACD) dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002, Version V.4, 2010) which records all instances of civil conflicts and wars with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths. The ACD coding defines an armed conflict “as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state” (Gleditsch et al., 2002, 618-619). If a conflict began during an ethnic group-year, the dependent variable was coded one, and if not, zero. Ongoing conflict years were dropped.

**Independent Variables:** To test hypothesis 6.1, the first independent variable refers to the refugees’ ethnic group membership. Using the ethnicity of refugees (ECORF) dataset, a dichotomous variable was created indicating whether or not a group hosts co-ethnic refugees. Since the original UNHCR data provides end-year figures, the variable is lagged one year in order to account for temporal dependence.

Hypothesis 6.2 assumes the impact of kin refugees to be conditional to the power status of a group. Hence, the second independent variable is an interaction term of the political status of each group with refugee presence. Information on the political power of the ethnic groups was obtained from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR-ETH) dataset (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). I distinguish between politically *included* groups with power at the national level, which are the groups
that, according to EPR-ETH, are coded as either monopoly, dominant, senior or junior partner, and excluded ethnic groups without access to state power, which have one of the following EPR-ETH statuses: powerless, discriminated, regional or separatist autonomy (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010, 100-101). Excluded ethnic groups are more likely to experience conflict (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). Monopoly and dominant groups control the political power alone and thus cannot challenge themselves, that is the government, and therefore groups with this status have been excluded by previous analyses (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010, 104). Nevertheless, I include all politically relevant ethnic groups in my research.

To test hypothesis 6.3, I include the estimated absolute number of refugees belonging to an ethnic group, based on the information of whether a refugee group is a minority, a majority or dominant within the flow between two countries and the according calculation rules presented in Table 4.2. Since this count variable is highly right-skewed, as most ethnic groups do not host any kin refugees, the variable is logged, after having added 1, and one year lagged. Many countries received refugee flows from several countries that consist of several ethnic groups. For instance, in 2010, Syria hosted refugees from Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan, as well as Palestinian refugees. Consequently, an ethnic group might have kin refugees from more than one country, like the Kurds in Iraq who received kin refugees from Turkey and Iran simultaneously. The single refugee group sizes were summed if an ethnic group received kin from more than one country in one year.

Control Variables: Several control variables account for alternative explanations of the outbreak of conflict. I distinguish between group-level and country-level properties, internal systemic factors associated with country or group characteristics, and external factors that increase the contagious effect of conflict. The following variables control for group-level features. In addition to political exclusion or inclusion, I control if the group was downgraded recently, meaning it had a politically powerful position but lost it during the last two years, which may increase grievances. Further, the relative size of the group compared to the groups which have access to central state power is added, because large excluded groups have an increased risk of conflict (Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009). Also, the war history of the ethnic groups is considered by including a dichotomous covariate measuring whether the group participated in previous conflicts. Earlier conflicts explain current tensions and consequent reoccurring war.
To control for whether a group has transnational ethnic constituencies, the relative size of the transnational ethnic group(s) compared to the groups in power in the country of asylum is included according to the EPR-TEK dataset. This variable is consequently zero for all groups without cross-border ethnic linkages. Cederman et al. (2013) find that the relative size of EPR-TEK groups has a curvilinear effect on conflict, meaning that middle-sized transnational ethnic kin groups increase the risk of conflict, so the squared relative EPR-TEK size is included. Further, I control if a transnational ethnic kin group is currently involved in a conflict (lagged one year).

The following variables control for country-level properties: to account for the fact that refugees generally increase the risk of conflict (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006), the lagged natural log of the number of refugees in the thousands (after having added 1 to the base) that the country hosted in the corresponding year is included. I also calculated the total number of refugees in the asylum state minus the number of kin refugees of the corresponding ethnic group. Further, I control for any ongoing conflicts in the neighboring countries of each state. This variable is one year lagged. Sambanis (2001, 275) found that countries neighboring a country at war are likely to experience an ethnic war, and ethnic conflicts often start as the result of contagion or diffusion of a neighboring conflict. To consider systemic explanations of conflict, the wealth of a country is assessed with the logged annual gross domestic product (PPP adjusted real per capita GDP). Poor countries have a higher risk of civil war due to a lack of state capacity (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, 88) and consequently, might also have less capacity to accommodate refugees, since providing shelter and food depends on financial and natural resources. Finally, a covariate measuring the size of the country population (natural log) is included. As with wealth, a higher population size is associated with a greater risk of conflict (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006, 524). Population and GDP data are taken from several sources (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Gleditsch, 2008; Heston, Summers and Aten, 2011; World Bank, 2011).

6.4.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table 6.2 depicts the statistical summary of the variables used in the following analysis. 158 conflict onsets are recorded for the 24,451 group-years included in the analysis, among those 22 group-years experienced a conflict onset while also receiving kin refugees, as is shown in cross Table 6.3. Table 6.3 demonstrates that conflict onset is a rare event and that most groups do never experience a conflict.

13Table 9.1 in the Appendix lists these cases.
### Table 6.2: Summary Statistics, Ethnic Conflict in the Refugee Host Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict onset</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic kin refugees</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded group</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. kin refugees (logged)</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>2.113</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14.95</td>
<td>25461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables, group-level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative group size</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downgraded</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years</td>
<td>15.378</td>
<td>10.058</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War history</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK conflict</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative TEK size</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative TEK size squared</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables, country-level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (logged)</td>
<td>8.06</td>
<td>1.259</td>
<td>4.764</td>
<td>11.344</td>
<td>26111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
<td>10.05</td>
<td>1.923</td>
<td>5.432</td>
<td>14.096</td>
<td>26173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. refugees (logged)</td>
<td>2.594</td>
<td>2.408</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.210</td>
<td>23738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. non-kin refugees (logged)</td>
<td>2.568</td>
<td>2.399</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.210</td>
<td>23411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbor conflict</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $\chi^2 = 31.275$, $p = 0.000$

### Table 6.3: Ethnic Kin Refugees and Conflict Onset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Onset</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>23'186</td>
<td>1'107</td>
<td>24'293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(99.42%)</td>
<td>(98.05%)</td>
<td>(99.35)%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.58%)</td>
<td>(1.95%)</td>
<td>(0.65%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23'322</td>
<td>1'129</td>
<td>24'451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $\chi^2 = 31.275$, $p = 0.000$
It also shows that receiving kin refugees significantly affects the risk of conflict. Groups that do not receive kin refugees have a lower likelihood of conflict. There is a 1.37 percentage point difference between the two: while 1.95 percent of the group-years with kin refugees saw conflict break out, only 0.58 percent of group-years without kin refugees also had conflict.

### 6.4.3 Results and Discussion

Table 6.4 shows the logistic regression results with the estimated risk of conflict onset for ethnic groups. The first model displays the control variables only. The variables concerning a group’s transnational ethnic connections and the political status of a group are of particular interest. The dichotomous variable measuring the existence of ethnic kin refugees is added in the second model. The third model includes an interaction term of kin refugees and political exclusion because, as stated in Hypothesis 6.2, I assume that the impact of kin refugees is conditional on the political status of a group. In the fourth model, I added the size of the kin refugees, and the fifth model is estimated with an interaction term of the co-ethnic refugee size and political exclusion.

The baseline Model 1 confirms several results from previous studies: politically excluded and recently downgraded ethnic groups are significantly more likely to experience conflict. Past conflict experience yields the same effect. Also, group-involvement in conflict appears to be more likely in poor countries. Conflict-affected transnational kin groups positively and significantly affect the likelihood of conflict. Hence, the results support the assumption that conflicts spread along ethnic linkages. The positive coefficient for the relative TEK size and the negative coefficient for the squared TEK size are in accordance with earlier results (Cederman et al., 2013) indicating that middle-sized EPR-TEK groups have the highest impact on conflict diffusion, although the coefficients are not significant, probably due to a smaller sample size because this analysis includes fewer annual observations than Cederman et al.’s (2013) study. Interestingly, the coefficient for conflict in a neighboring state is small with a high standard error. Thus, the idea that conflicts randomly diffuse to neighboring states is not supported. Countries neighboring a country at war do not per se have a higher risk of conflict. Causal mechanisms theoretically explain the contagious effect of conflict, and this is, according to my theoretical framework, whether or not an ethnic group’s trans-border kin is involved.

---

14 Since $r^2$ should not be calculated if expected values are low, I used Fisher’s exact test to avoid the concerns of small expected values. The expected value of receiving kin refugees and experiencing conflict is especially low, with 7.7. However, also this tests reveals significant differences.
### Table 6.4: Logistic Regression Results, Ethnic Conflict in the Refugee-Receiving Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict onset</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic kin refugees</td>
<td>0.742*** (0.268)</td>
<td>0.357 (0.545)</td>
<td>0.584*** (0.229)</td>
<td>0.351* (0.177)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. kin refugees (logged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.065** (0.024)</td>
<td>0.016 (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees # excluded</td>
<td>0.508 (0.515)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. kin refugees # excluded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.075 (0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. refugees in CoA (logged)</td>
<td>0.088 (0.061)</td>
<td>0.073 (0.065)</td>
<td>0.071 (0.065)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.046 (0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. non-kin refugees in CoA (logged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.044 (0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK conflict</td>
<td>0.679** (0.286)</td>
<td>0.396 (0.303)</td>
<td>0.371 (0.304)</td>
<td>0.339 (0.321)</td>
<td>0.304 (0.319)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative TEK size</td>
<td>1.546 (1.451)</td>
<td>0.679 (1.426)</td>
<td>0.726 (1.428)</td>
<td>0.665 (1.427)</td>
<td>0.726 (1.425)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative TEK size sq.</td>
<td>−1.737 (1.577)</td>
<td>−0.830 (1.571)</td>
<td>−0.879 (1.578)</td>
<td>−0.730 (1.549)</td>
<td>−0.791 (1.547)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbor conflict</td>
<td>0.031 (0.439)</td>
<td>0.032 (0.442)</td>
<td>0.031 (0.444)</td>
<td>0.071 (0.396)</td>
<td>0.072 (0.397)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded group</td>
<td>1.301*** (0.285)</td>
<td>1.326*** (0.293)</td>
<td>1.242*** (0.313)</td>
<td>1.163*** (0.272)</td>
<td>1.049*** (0.288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downgraded</td>
<td>1.712*** (0.582)</td>
<td>1.707*** (0.586)</td>
<td>1.710*** (0.588)</td>
<td>1.709*** (0.570)</td>
<td>1.704*** (0.574)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative group size</td>
<td>−0.060 (0.474)</td>
<td>−0.117 (0.505)</td>
<td>−0.112 (0.504)</td>
<td>−0.032 (0.424)</td>
<td>−0.022 (0.426)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (logged)</td>
<td>−0.250*** (0.076)</td>
<td>−0.231*** (0.078)</td>
<td>−0.232*** (0.078)</td>
<td>−0.184*** (0.075)</td>
<td>−0.185*** (0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
<td>−0.035 (0.118)</td>
<td>−0.039 (0.121)</td>
<td>−0.038 (0.120)</td>
<td>−0.011 (0.124)</td>
<td>−0.009 (0.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War history</td>
<td>1.606*** (0.309)</td>
<td>1.645*** (0.307)</td>
<td>1.657*** (0.307)</td>
<td>1.578*** (0.300)</td>
<td>1.598*** (0.300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years</td>
<td>−0.065 (0.080)</td>
<td>−0.027 (0.079)</td>
<td>−0.023 (0.079)</td>
<td>0.031 (0.079)</td>
<td>0.038 (0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 1</td>
<td>−0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>−0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>−0.000 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 2</td>
<td>0.002 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>−0.000 (0.002)</td>
<td>−0.000 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 3</td>
<td>−0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>−0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>−0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>−0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>−0.000 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−3.767*** (1.197)</td>
<td>−4.020*** (1.198)</td>
<td>−3.977*** (1.202)</td>
<td>−4.809*** (1.162)</td>
<td>−4.768*** (1.159)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations                        | 19731              | 19717              | 19717              | 19690              | 19690              |
|χ²                                    | 422.984            | 515.122            | 613.924            | 351.976            | 453.488            |

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
in a conflict and the presence of kin refugees. This leads to the conclusion that instead of diffusing randomly, which is somehow atheoretical, conflicts spread along ethnic lines and within ethnic linkages mostly through refugee flows, as will be demonstrated in Model 2. Thus, conflicts spread across borders, but only if ethnic ties are present and particularly if refugees move along these linkages. Furthermore, the total (logged) number of refugees in a state has no significant effect on the probability of conflict on the ethnic group-level, which contradicts Salehyan and Gleditsch’s (2006) country-level finding that refugees in general increase the risk of violence. Thus, refugees do not randomly cause conflict in the asylum state. They only contribute to conflict if they have linkages to an ethnic group, as will be shown in the following models.

The results in Model 2 suggest that a group that receives kin refugees has an increased chance of experiencing an ethnic conflict \textit{ceteris paribus}: the logit coefficient is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. This supports Hypothesis 6.1 that ethnic kin refugees can act as a conflict trigger. Interestingly, the coefficient for whether an EPR-TEK group is involved in conflict, significant in Model 1, loses its explanatory power if the kin refugee variable is added. Hence, although transnational ethnic connections are an important mechanism of conflict diffusion, within cross-border linkages refugee flows are more powerful in explaining the spatial contagion of conflict. Since refugees are mostly, per definition, produced during times of conflict or violence, the transnational ethnic kin group of the refugee-receiving group is likely to be affected by conflict and such conflict is most likely to spread along with refugee movements.

In Model 3, the coefficient for the interaction term of kin refugees and political exclusion is insignificant, but this does not necessarily lead to insignificant results. Figure 6.1 shows the difference in the probability of conflict onset between hosting and not hosting kin refugees for politically excluded and included groups with the other covariates held at mean. While the difference between receiving or not receiving kin refugees is not significant for politically included groups, the difference for excluded ethnic groups is significant at the five percent error level. Thus, the impact of kin refugees on the probability of conflict is only significant for disaffected ethnic groups. The generally lower risk of conflict of included ethnic groups is not affected by kin refugees. This supports Hypothesis 6.2 that the particular combination of ethnic kin refugees and political marginalization increases the risk of conflict.

As specified by Hypothesis 6.3 Model 4 includes a variable measuring the number of ethnic kin refugees a group hosted to test the assumption, that besides the
mere presence of ethnic kin refugees, their size plays an important role. A large number of refugees increases both incentives and opportunities of local co-ethnic groups to start an insurgency. The causal mechanism behind this is that a politically excluded ethnic group that is demographically supported by kin refugees gains political leverage and this challenges the other groups in a country. The covariate controlling for the total number of refugees in a group’s country now includes the non-kin refugees only, since co-ethnic refugees are counted in the variable measuring the number of kin refugees already. The left side of Figure 6.2 illustrates the effect of exclusion and inclusion as a function of increasing co-ethnic refugee numbers on the predicted likelihood of conflict outbreak with 95 percent confidence intervals. The right side displays the difference between groups that have previously experienced conflict and groups without a war history. Both variables are indicators for a generally higher risk of conflict. The plots show that groups become more conflict-prone when receiving many co-ethnic refugees. The conflict-risk increases with the (logged) number of kin refugees hosted and the difference between excluded and included ethnic groups is significant, although not for very large refugee flows due to fewer observations. Groups who experienced a conflict earlier have a significantly higher risk of conflict with increased refugee numbers compared to groups who have always lived in peace. This lends support to the claim that refugees particularly trigger conflict if they arrive in already tense political environments. Hence, refugees may be dangerous to groups with reoccurring conflict incentives.

As an alternative specification, I calculated the relative refugee size, that is the number of refugees as a share of their ethnic kin group, instead of the absolute figures. The relative size yields very similar results to the absolute size.
Figure 6.2: Net Effect of Political Status and War History on Predicted Probabilities of Conflict Onset with Increasing Ethnic Kin Refugee Numbers

Since the effect of kin refugees is conditional on the power status of an ethnic group, as suggested in Hypothesis 6.2, I included an interaction term for the number of kin refugees and political exclusion in Model 5, which similarly to Model 3, when plotted, reveals that the difference in the effect of the number of kin refugees is only significant for politically excluded groups.

Comparing the Wald $\chi^2$ for all models indicates that the addition of the term for kin refugee presence improves on the baseline model. Hence, the disaggregated term for whether a group receives ethnic kin refugees makes a significant contribution. I analyzed the predictive power of my models calculating a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) plot that compares the correctly and falsely predicted positive outcomes of whether or not a group experienced a conflict onset. The baseline model, including the control variables, has an area only beyond the ROC curve of 78 percent. The second model includes refugee-related covariates, which are whether an ethnic group receives kin refugees and whether any refugees are present in the group’s country. This model performs better in predicting conflict onset, with an area beyond the ROC curve of 81 percent. Thus, accounting for refugees improves the share of correctly predicted conflict onsets.
6.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis

To check the robustness of my findings, based on Model 2 of Table 6.4, I estimated several additional models displayed in Table 6.5. First, conflicts are rare events: among the 24,451 group-years in the sample only 158 experienced a conflict onset. So, in Model 6, I use rare events logit as proposed by King and Zeng (2001), which corrects the standard errors accordingly. But the results do not differ from the simple logit model.

The second sensitivity check in Model 7 includes a nominal variable indicating the world region, which are North or Southern Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and the West as baseline category in order to control for unit-specific heterogeneity of the error terms. Particularly the refugee crises in the Great Lakes region in Central Africa fostered the scientific interested in refugee-involvement in conflict, thus, it is crucial to control for whether the results claiming global application are biased by regional factors. However, the impact of the refugee variable remains positive and significant when controlling for the world region. Hence, the phenomenon of refugees as conflict triggers is not restricted to Africa.

Third, I examined whether refugees have a different impact on ethnic territorial and governmental conflicts. Any violent confrontation between the government and an organized ethnic rebel group causing at least 25 annual battle-deaths and where the incompatibility is gaining control over the whole country, i.e. state power, is considered an ethnic conflict over governmental power. The reason for territorial conflicts is a power dispute over a certain territory in a state (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Using a multinomial logit model that disaggregates the dependent variable into territorial and governmental conflict, the results change slightly because the refugee variable only remains significant for the onset of governmental conflict. Assuming that refugees strengthen an ethnic kin group politically and demographically, this varying impact of refugees on conflict types is not surprising. A strengthened, more confident ethnic group with perceived legitimacy for its claims is likely to demand more power on the national level, and a governmental conflict as a possible consequence.

Finally, I used different estimations of the refugee sizes included in Model 5 of Table 6.4. The number of ethnic refugee groups has to be handled with care because it is estimated according to whether the coders identified the group as dominant, majority or minority within a refugee movement. Thus, I used more conservative numbers to estimate the absolute ethnic refugee group figures in order to prevent the risk of numbers being overestimated. Same as in a robustness check in Chap-
Table 6.5: Sensitivity Analysis, Ethnic Conflict in the Refugee-Receiving Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 6 Rare event</th>
<th>Model 7 World regions</th>
<th>Model 8 Terr. conf.</th>
<th>Model 9 Gov. conf.</th>
<th>Model 9 Ref. size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic kin refugees</td>
<td>0.749***</td>
<td>0.806***</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.730**</td>
<td>0.595***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.268)</td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
<td>(0.532)</td>
<td>(0.335)</td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. kin refugees (conservative)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.067***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. refs in CoA (logged)</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.167*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
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<td>(1.451)</td>
<td>(1.854)</td>
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<td>Relative TEK size sq.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(1.593)</td>
<td>(2.113)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Asia</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.816)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>(1.197)</td>
<td>(1.950)</td>
<td>(1.467)</td>
<td>(2.197)</td>
<td>(1.124)</td>
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Observations: 19717, 19717, 19830, 19690

χ^2: 520.031, 563.290, 767.121, 305.423

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Cubic splines of peace years not shown.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
I multiplied the absolute size of the country-dyadic refugee flow, as obtained from the UNHCR (2010) and UNRWA (2010), with the factor 0.75 for dominant ethnic refugee groups, 0.5 for majority groups and 0.05 for minorities. However, despite using these restricted lagged and logged refugee group sizes, the effect of kin refugees on conflict onset is similarly positive and significant.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that refugee movements along transnational ethnic connections are an important mechanism of conflict diffusion. Refugees can trigger conflict in the asylum state because they cause economic distress, diffuse military resources, expand rebel networks, display a demonstration effect to the local population and disturb the ethnic balance. I presented a new theoretical framework explaining how refugee-related conflict trigger mechanisms increase both the motivations and the opportunities for co-ethnic groups in the host state to rebel. The negative externalities of ethnic kin refugees strongly rely on the ethno-politics in the asylum state, because refugees only trigger violence in already tense political situations.

I used new data on the ethnic composition of refugee movements and updated group-level conflict data to conduct a disaggregated large-N analysis. There is strong empirical support that large ethnic kin refugee movements increase the risk of conflict if the refugees’ ethnic kin group in the country of asylum is excluded from state power, since here the mechanisms by which refugees cause conflict are most likely to come into action: upsetting the ethnic balance, implying a demonstration effect and diffusing military resources. Thus, the ethnicity influences the role of refugees in conflict diffusion processes. The results demonstrate that ethnic kin refugees are the missing causal link in civil conflict literature focusing on cross-border ethnic ties and refugees: the diffusion of violence is most likely when refugees fleeing along ethnic connections spread the conflict from their country of origin to their country of asylum, by affecting their politically excluded ethnic kin group that is receptive to military resources, violent ideas and an upset ethnic balance.

Qualitative research emphasizes the salience of ethnicity in refugee studies and its possible negative effects in the host state, depending on the refugees’ relationship with local ethnic groups (Newland, 1993; Jacobsen, 1996; Lischer, 2005). However, scholarship has failed to systematically assess the impact of the refugees’ group identity. The lack of comparative refugee studies focusing on ethnicity is caused by the difficulty of obtaining data and the political sensitivity of research.
questions dealing with ethnicity in conflict situations. This dissertation tried to overcome both issues. My study improves previous country-level research on refugee-related conflict diffusion (Lischer, 2001; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006), because the comparative analysis of ethnically identified refugee groups yields evidence that forced migrants do not randomly cause conflict in neighboring host states, but only in connection with political exclusion affecting local co-ethnic groups. Thanks to the new data on ethnicity, we gained knowledge on refugee-related conflict trigger mechanisms. The main finding is that refugees increase the risk of conflict in already unstable states. Hence, refugees alone cause no violence, they only have the potential to when combined with host states’ exclusionary policies. These results enhance the perception of forced migrants by showing that refugees are unfairly made to be scapegoats for domestic tensions which are the asylum state’s “fault”.

Despite the findings that refugees may cause conflict, I nonetheless want to emphasize that the vast majority of refugees are victims who do not engage in violence. I do not want to vilify refugees. The lack of adequate assistance and opportunities for an early return home are major causes of refugee-involvement in conflict. Often, governments feel threatened by an influx of refugees with kinship ties to a challenging minority and, consequently, are reluctant to accommodate these refugees, which in turn engenders a vicious cycle fostering violence. Hence, as a policy implication resulting from this study, I suggest that governments and international organizations offer refugees appropriate assistance to impede the emergence of grievances.
7 Uninvited Guests: Transnational Rebels and Refugees

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined how refugees affect the risk of conflict for ethnic groups in the asylum state. The mechanisms that make kin groups of refugees more conflict-prone are a disturbed ethnic balance, a demonstration effect and diffused military resources. This chapter focuses on refugee-related rebel network diffusion as another negative externality of refugee flows in the host country.

Numerous examples from various world regions substantiate a connection between rebel and refugee groups; some of the most well-known cases are listed below: Over a million Rwandan Hutu refugees became militarized in the Democratic Republic of Congo and invaded Rwanda in the 1990s (Lischer, 2005). The presence and mobilization activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon led to attacks and massacres in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by Lebanese Christians during the Lebanese civil war (Shiblak, 1997, 268-269). The Palestine Liberation Organization militarized in Jordan in the 1960s (Lebson, 2012). In Pakistan, Afghan Pashtun refugee militarization was supported by U.S. anti-communist policies (Lischer, 2005, 55). Nicaraguan Contras found shelter and recruited in refugee camps in Honduras (Salehyan, 2009, 129). The Western Sahara Polisario insurgent movement operated from refugee camps in Algeria (Leb-
son, 2012, 21). Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India received military assistance to fight against their home state (Lebson, 2012, 21).

Based on such observations, a growing literature studies the consequences of refugee movements and concludes that refugees can trigger conflict by diffusing rebel networks (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). But this mechanism has not been explained nor quantitatively tested yet, and thus, the reason for which refugees and rebel groups frequently appear in the same context remains unclear. Therefore, this chapter analyzes if and how refugees spread rebel networks and thereby diffuse violence across borders. Although ethnic linkages have been proven salient for conflict diffusion, quantitative researchers have tended to ignore the ethnic group membership of refugees and insurgent movements. This is surprising because both groups have been identified as possible conflict triggers. By considering the ethnicity of border-crossing actors, this study improves the understanding of transnational conflict diffusion processes.

As stated previously, many civil conflicts have a transnational dimension because external state governments, third parties or border-crossing ethnic kin groups interfere (Checkel, 2013, 1). In addition, local conflict actors operate transnationally. First, fighters cross borders. Rebels often move to neighboring countries to hide from the government they are fighting against for training reasons or to receive weapons, equipment and shelter (Salehyan, 2007). Second, civilians cross borders. People moving out of their country during conflicts are mostly refugees who flee violence and persecution. Hence, there are two different transnational actor-dimensions: violent non-state actors and civilians. Although the motivations of these two movements are different - rebels diffuse violence and refugees flee from violence - they have the same origin, which is civil conflict. In addition, sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between rebels and refugees, since the former have strong incentives to hide among the latter and benefit from the humanitarian aid intended for refugees (Barber, 1997). Claiming that insurgents tend to establish extraterritorial bases in countries where they find local ethnic kin and refugee settlements, as put forward in Chapter 3.3.4, the ethnic identity of rebels and refugees must be considered. Ethnic kin populations will be more receptive to diffused military resources. Similarly, both local ethnic groups and refugees are more likely to support a co-ethnic insurgent movement. Thus, this dissertation contributes to the knowledge of rebel-refugee collaboration as it is the first quantitative study that includes ethno-nationalist preferences of insurgent groups and refugees.

This chapter is organized as follows: first, I review the existing literature on border-crossing conflict actors, such as transnational rebels and refugees as ex-
Transnational Rebels and Refugees

7.2 State of the Art: Actors in Transnational Conflict Diffusion Processes

Trans-border ethnic kin groups, transnational rebel movements and refugees are the three main actors identified in previous research as causing civil conflict diffusion into neighboring countries (Hill and Rothchild, 1986; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Sambanis, 2001; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Gleditsch, 2007; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Salehyan, 2008b; Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009; Cederman et al., 2013). These non-state actors play an important role in the transnationalization of civil conflict. Since they have the opportunity to cross country borders, they are more flexible than state governments, who are mostly confined to their national territory (Nye and Keohane, 1971; Harpviken, 2012). Chapter 2 reviewed existing research on border-crossing conflict actors, therefore this chapter briefly summarizes the literature on transnational rebel activity and refugees.

Most scholars agree that civil conflicts spread along cross-border ethnic connections (Gleditsch, 2007; Forsberg, 2008; Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009; Cederman et al., 2013). A country sharing cultural, linguistic, religious or ethnic similarities with a neighboring country experiencing civil war is more likely to be affected by conflict spillovers. Ethnic groups spanning national borders often show attentiveness, loyalty and solidarity to each other which facilitates several mechanisms of conflict diffusion (Davis and Moore, 1997; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Saideman, 2002). First, ethnic ties often cause third state interventions. Insurgent groups with transnational constituencies are more likely to benefit from external support (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2011). In particular, trans-border groups without political power (Nome, 2012 19-20) or with ethnic ties to powerful actors abroad are likely to receive external assistance (Saideman, 2002), possibly...
resulting in an expansion of the conflict. Medium-sized ethnic groups especially increase violent behavior of kin groups elsewhere (Cederman et al., 2013). Second, ethnic groups may start a conflict due to a demonstration effect illustrated by conflict experiencing foreign kin. Cross-border groups often learn from each other and also imitate violent behavior (Hill and Rothchild, 1986). Ethno-nationalist uprisings contain contagious ideologies, likely to be emulated by co-ethnics (Horowitz, 1985; Brubaker, 1996). Groups subjected to exclusion or discrimination are most likely to be affected by violent experiences of trans-border ethnic kin (Hill and Rothchild, 1986, 717, 720), and thus, have a higher risk of conflict (Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009, 432). Successful insurgencies have the highest potential of being emulated (Gurr and Moore, 1997; Saideman and Ayres, 2000). Finally, transnational kin groups offer sanctuaries to border-crossing movements, which are regarded as transporters of civil conflict. Transnational rebel groups and forced migrants are both likely to find safe havens among foreign co-ethnic groups. Gurr (1993, 175) detected conflict diffusion processes along transnational ethnic linkages because “political activists in one country can readily obtain sanctuary and support from their transnational kindred.”

In contrast to transnational social movements, be they either insurgents or civilians, transnational ethnic groups are permanently settled across state borders but do not physically transgress them on a large scale. Transnational ethnic groups also differ from refugee and rebel groups because the latter two are the direct result of violent conflict. Although permanently settled trans-border kin groups outnumber social groups in motion like refugees or transnational insurgents, cross-border social movements deserve greater attention since they play important roles in transnational conflict diffusion processes. Besides major studies by Salehyan (2007) on the impact of transnational rebel groups on civil conflict, and Salehyan (2008b) on international conflict, rebel groups operating from foreign sanctuaries have received comparably little scientific attention. This is surprising because more than half of all rebel groups worldwide since 1945 have used extraterritorial bases (Salehyan, 2007). While I do not examine the likelihood of rebellion in the home state in this study, which commonly depends on “motivation, a common cause, the ability to mobilize and exercise force and the expectation of success” (Buhaug, 2010, 109), a foreign sanctuary can increase a rebel group’s opportunity to mobilize and exercise force. Salehyan (2007, 218) states that “the use of external sanctuaries is one of the most common strategies employed by rebel groups to evade state repression.” Insurgent groups establish foreign bases because it lowers the costs of rebellion, provides a better bargaining position and facilitates the attack on the home government (Salehyan, 2007). For the home government it is extremely difficult and costly
to repress a rebel group operating from a foreign sanctuary because its power is restricted to state territory. Thus, rebel groups operate transnationally because, in contrast to the government, they can.

Since rebel activities in foreign countries are a widespread phenomenon and a promising strategy, they deserve closer attention. For both affected home and host countries it is important to know where rebel groups go. Salehyan (2007, 224-225) argues that there are three conditions that make extraterritorial bases feasible for rebels. The first is relevant populations who reside abroad, such as diaspora, migrants and refugees. The second is weak or failed neighboring states without resources or capacities to control their territory. A lack of state capacity is a main determinant for increasing territorial control by rebel groups (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoefll, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). The third is host states that are hostile to the rebels’ home country. In a binary regression, Salehyan (2007, 241) finds that rivals, refugees and weak neighbors are positive and significant predictors of extraterritorial rebel bases. However, the insurgent group’s ethnic background and its ethnic ties to refugees and other countries which could affect the incentives and opportunities to establish extraterritorial sanctuaries has yet to be considered, leaving space for further investigation. Hence, the issue of why rebels work transnationally has been analyzed in previous studies, but the question of where rebels go remains unanswered. By including group-level information such as ethnicity in the assessment of transnational rebel activity, this chapter contributes to the understanding of how rebel leaders decide where to locate their extraterritorial bases.

While rebels voluntarily transgress borders and actively diffuse conflict, refugees involuntarily move to other states because they are forced to flee. Refugees hope for an early peace and the possibility to return home (UNHCR, 2012c). However, due to their particular situation, refugees are likely to become aggrieved because the experience of violence and forced expulsion increases their motivation to oppose the home regime (Weiner, 1993; Crisp, 2000; Salehyan, 2007). Also, refugees develop grievances if they are unable to return home due to an on-going conflict, ethnic persecution, changing ethno-politics in their home country, or destruction and looting of their property (Derouen and Barutciski, 2007, 216). Thus, forced displacement provides a basis for grievances which rebel groups may utilize. Besides flight-based grievances against the home government that increase the risk of refugee militarization (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1989, 275, 278), the host state’s refugee policies also determine the risk of refugee-related violence or refugee manipulation (Adelman, 1998; Sammut, 2001; Stedman and Tanner, 2003; Lischer, 2005; Gerdes, 2006b; Muggah, 2006). However, the role of how ethnic
characteristics of refugee movements affect the host state’s migration policies has not yet been analyzed.

Many insurgent movements find safe havens in refugee camps in neighboring countries where they can hide from the government they are challenging, misuse humanitarian aid and recruit among refugees. For instance, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was founded by Tutsi refugees in Uganda and operated from refugee camps in Uganda and Burundi (Lischer, 2011). The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) recruited among Kurdish refugees in Iraq (Marcus, 2007), and refugee camps in Pakistan were sites of mobilization for Taliban-related groups in the 1980s (Adamson, 2006, 177). Hence, the diffusion of rebel networks is one mechanism of refugee-related conflict spread (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). Mogire (2004, 26) mentions three advantages of refugee camps for rebels. First, “refugee camps have protected status under international law, from which combatants illegally benefit”. Second, “refugee camps attract humanitarian assistance that provides guerrillas with an economic resource independent of external patrons.” Third, “refugee camp structures provide mechanisms through which a guerrilla movement can control the civilian population and legitimize its leadership.” However, apart from Lischer’s (2001) and Salehyan’s (2007) research, the systematic relationship between rebels and refugees remains understudied. No quantitative study has explicitly disentangled the association of rebel and refugee groups. Empirical evidence suggests that, besides widespread grievances, many refugee movements remain peaceful and, hence, the circumstances under which refugees would cooperate with rebel groups have yet to be identified.

To summarize, besides the widespread assumption that refugees diffuse rebel networks, the often simultaneous appearance of transnational insurgent groups and refugees has been neither theoretically nor empirically explained. This study fills this gap and explains the causal connection between refugee movements and rebel groups. Therefore, the following theoretical section emphasizes the importance of physically moving actors as a conflict-spillover mechanism by elaborating how transnational rebel groups and refugee flows collaborate and mutually reinforce each other.

7.3 Theory: Refugee-Related Transnational Rebel Activity

The claim that refugees spread rebel networks presents two challenges. First, the direction of the causal connection has to be assessed. Do refugees expand rebel networks, do refugees flee independently along the same routes as rebel groups,
or do both refugee and rebel movements follow transnational cultural or political linkages to neighboring countries because of existing networks? Second, if refugees indeed induce diffusion of rebel activity, the context in which an association of rebels and refugees occurs has to be determined. From a global perspective, most refugee movements remain peaceful. Thus, we need to better understand if and how refugees become subversive and so-called rebelgees? The main argument proposed in this study is that ethnic kinship between rebels and refugees explains, first, why the two often appear in the same locations, and, second, why rebels are often successful in recruiting among refugees. Although the salience of ethnicity (Horowitz, 1985) is emphasized in many conflict studies, previous research has largely ignored ethnic kinship between rebels and refugees.

A rebel group is conceptualized as an organized non-state group using violence against the incumbent government (Gleditsch et al., 2002, 618 - 619). A rebel group is defined as transnational if it has physical presence in more than one state (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009a; Harpviken, 2012). Transnational rebel activity refers to any kind of presence in another country ranging from some troops located abroad to extensive extraterritorial bases (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009a). Transnational activity is a dynamic process (Harpviken, 2012, 212), and some insurgent groups do not maintain extraterritorial bases throughout the entire period in which they are challenging the home government.

Figure 7.1 schematically illustrates the rebel-refugee nexus that will be theoretically decomposed in the following analysis. I assume rebel network expansion
after a refugee influx to be conditional on the triadic relationship between co-ethnic refugees, rebels and the population in the neighboring host country. Since both refugees and insurgent groups move among contiguous states and contribute to the regional clustering of civil conflict, spatial distance is significant in the theoretical approach to trans-border conflict processes. Furthermore, the ethnicity of a rebel group is not only important in combination with refugee movements, but also for the insurgents’ relation to the host state. Thus, there are two different, but presumably correlated, processes responsible for rebel network expansion: transnational ethnic ties and refugee flows. Hence, the following theoretical framework of transnational rebel patterns considers, first, the role of geography, second, the rebel group’s transnational ethnic ties and third, the relation between rebels and co-ethnic refugees in the asylum state, which is also conditional on the rebels’ and refugees’ connection to the host population.

### 7.3.1 Limited Areas of Operation: Rebel Groups and Refugees Face Distance Constraints

Geographic location is important when focusing on trans-border movements such as refugee flows and rebel groups, because both have strong incentives to relocate to neighboring countries (Newland, 1993; Schmeidl, 1997; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Salehyan, 2007). The neighboring countries that border their ethnic group’s settlement area and areas within neighboring countries which are near the border are particularly concerned. The costs which increase with distance are the main reason why insurgent groups and forced migrants tend to travel short routes only.

Transnational rebel bases are often established close to country borders because traveling further increases transportation costs and decreases the feasibility to attack the home state (Salehyan, 2007). Further, the host government has the least control in border areas, particularly if they are remote and far away from the capital (Buhaug, 2010). This gives local and transnational rebel groups more freedom of movement. Therefore, I derive the following first hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 7.1:** The probability of transnational rebel activity is higher in proximate countries.

Chapter 5 demonstrated that distance and general accessibility between countries of origin and asylum are determinants of refugee flight. In addition, refugee camps are often located in bordering areas. However, refugee camps close to the country of origin frequently lack security (Crisp, 2000; Corsellis and Vitale, 2005).
because they are more easily attacked by the home state (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998, 29), such as Turkish camps hosting refugees from Syria in 2012 (MacFarquhar and Arsu, 2012). Despite the insecurity, refugee settlements are often established in areas close to borders, because forced migrants are either unable or unwilling to move further (Schmeidl, 1997; Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998). Another reason is that host governments intentionally place refugee settlements in frontier zones in order to avoid exchange and possible conflict with the local population (Chalinder, 1998) or to instrumentalize the refugees and provoke the neighboring regime (Gerdes, 2006b). Militarized camps that base rebel groups attacking the neighbor country are a “useful foreign policy instrument for serving their national interests” (Stedman and Tanner, 2003, 9).

For instance, qualitative evidence from Iraq supports the claim that rebel groups are likely to establish trans-border hideouts in nearby countries. In Iraqi Kurdistan, which is contiguous to the Kurdish settlement area of Turkey, the international community established a shelter and no fly zone in approximately half of the territory to protect the Kurdish population in Iraq after the Golf War in 1991. However, the area was not only a refuge for Iraqi Kurds and people fleeing from Turkey, but also a sanctuary for Kurdish rebel groups from Turkey, particularly the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (Lebson, 2012, 21).

Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that transnational ethnic linkages, which are theorized to be very important in rebel network spread processes, as will be explained in the following subsection, affect most countries in the world but are primarily restricted to non-distant and neighboring countries (International Conflict Research Group, ETH Zürich, 2011).

7.3.2 Hoping for Hospitality: Rebel Groups and Transnational Ethnic Ties

Similar to temporary “relevant populations” such as diaspora, migrants and refugees who make rebels more likely to establish extraterritorial sanctuaries (Salehyan, 2007, 224-225), trans-border ethnic kin permanently settled in another country also increases the risk of a foreign rebel presence. Hence, I theorize that border-crossing rebels often move along transnational ethnic linkages. Rebels follow ethnic networks because ethnic kin in another country implies cultural bonds, established information networks, established transportation networks such as well maintained streets, and possible support form the local kin population due to common interests and mutual trust. These factors decrease the costs of the insurgency and increase the rebel group’s bargaining position due to international support and le-
Transnational Rebels and Refugees

gitimacy and, therefore, facilitate an attack on the home state. Support by the local kin group is either ideological, that is the extraterritorial rebel bases are not actively supported but at least tolerated, financial or practical. Ethnic similarities between foreign rebels and part of the host population imply that the host government is unable to physically distinguish between rebels and civilians. Alternatively, if the insurgents are kin of governmental groups, the latter might directly protect them. The costs for the insurgents’ home government to repress the trans-border rebel activities are even higher when rebels mix with local kin, as the home government cannot distinguish between them either, and attacking a foreign ethnic group would result in an expensive international conflict.

As a result, the sanctuary and recruitment activities of transnational insurgent groups are successful only if the host country is reluctant or incapable to disable such activities. Thus, rebel groups should have strong incentives to establish cross-border bases in countries with ethnic kin groups. Therefore, I state the second hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 7.2:** The probability of transnational rebel activity is higher in countries where the rebels have ethnic ties to the local population.

The fact that the PKK had already operated from the Kurdish territories in Iraq before the massive influx of refugees from Turkey beginning in the early nineties (Marcus, 2007) provides evidence that transnational rebel groups follow ethnic linkages.

Both refugees and rebels often move along transnational ethnic linkages, which explains why rebels and refugees appear in the same context. Refugees follow cross-border ethnic ties for the same reasons as previously explained for rebel groups: Ethnic kin in another country implies cultural bonds, established networks of information, exchange and transportation, which decrease the costs of flight and the consequent accommodation in the host state. Further, refugees may consider long-term integration possibilities.

### 7.3.3 The Rebelgee Phenomenon: Refugees and the Establishment of Transnational Rebel Bases

Just as ethnic kinship with the local population increases the rebel group’s advantages vis-à-vis the government, cultural commonalities with refugees in the host state are useful to the rebel group. Rebels and refugees are more likely to cooperate if they are co-ethnics, because ethnic kinship affects both the motivation
and the opportunity for rebel-refugee collaboration. Due to grievances against the home government after being forcibly expelled, refugees have incentives to collaborate with rebel groups or to establish new insurgent movements. Thus, refugees and rebels fighting for ethno-nationalist claims against the home regime share a common enemy. Dissatisfaction may increase when refugees are unable to return home, which also fosters support of the insurgents. Kin refugees provide recruitment opportunities for transnational insurgents thanks to a shared identity and common grievances. Shared ethnicity also allows rebels to use a refugee camp as a hideout.

Further, I claim that such active and voluntary rebel-refugee collaboration must be distinguished from passive and involuntary rebel presence among refugees. Not all refugees support rebel activities. Refugees are forced to flee because of war or violent conflict (Wood, 1994; Schmeidl, 1997), and rebel groups often are involved in, or even responsible for, the conducted violence. Thus, rebel groups, no matter whether they pursue ethno-nationalist aims, may be responsible for the refugee outflow. Hence, rather than collaborating with rebel groups, refugees could have, on the contrary, incentives to not support the rebels, which makes a cessation of their activities and peace more likely. Most refugees primarily want to live in peace and return home (Stein, 1981, 322). Thus, tensions between refugees and rebels are likely, particularly if the rebels operate from refugee settlements without endorsement from the camp population. A lack of support and clashes between refugees and transnational rebel groups become more likely if the ethnic group in the home country, before becoming refugees, showed little support for the insurgents’ activities. If a camp lacks adequate control, the rebels have the opportunity to forcibly recruit among refugees, and as a result the refugees are associated with rebel groups involuntarily. Besides, refugees may passively be connected with rebel groups if rebels use poorly secured camps as sanctuaries, hide among the kin refugees and benefit from the shelter, food supply and health assistance offered in camps by international organizations (Barber, 1997; Lischer, 2003).

Hence, ethnic kinship determines the relationship between refugees and rebels because an association between these two transnational actors is much more likely if they are co-ethnics. Therefore, the third hypothesis states:

**Hypothesis 7.3:** The probability of transnational rebel activity is higher in countries hosting ethnic kin refugee movements.

In Iraqi Kurdistan, it was only after the creation of the safe haven and the establishment of two large refugee camps that the PKK recruited among the Kurdish refugees on a grand scale, which resulted in highly militarized camps. Conse-
quently, Turkey invaded North Iraq in March 1995 to destroy the cross-border rebel bases (Marcus, 2007, 309). In addition, many humanitarian organizations, above all the UNHCR, which established and supported the refugee camps, had to withdraw from the camps because of the strong refugee militarization that endangered their personnel.

### 7.3.4 Transnational Rebels, Refugees and Ethno-Politics in the Host State

Neither all refugee movements nor all transnational ethnic kin groups collaborate with rebels. Instead, I argue that transnational rebel activity is conditional on the political power status of their ethnic kin group, that is, whether the local co-ethnic group has access to state decision-making or is powerless. Politically marginalized groups are more likely to increase the risk of transnational rebel activity in connection with refugee presence for several reasons. First, aggrieved marginalized ethnic groups have a higher risk of conflict (Cederman, Buhaug and Rød, 2009; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010) and, thus, give more support for domestic and foreign violent rebel activity (Mogire, 2004, 28). Also, co-ethnic rebel activity, especially victories, in a neighboring state can spur their own motivations for violent actions (Hill and Rothchild, 1986; Gurr and Moore, 1997; Saideman and Ayres, 2000). Second, marginalized ethnic groups usually receive less financial support from the state government due to a lack of access to decision-making and distribution of state goods. Consequently, co-ethnic refugees of a powerless group often suffer from a lack of assistance, which increases grievances and the opportunity for refugee militarization. Above all, young men without employment opportunities and dissatisfied long-term refugees in protracted situations are at risk of joining a rebel group (Crisp, 2000; Loescher and Milner, 2004). Finally, governments are less likely to control the territory of powerless groups. This lack of control, particularly in combination with local support, increases the opportunity for rebel activities and recruitment in refugee camps or among the local population.

Thus, local ethno-politics affect the refugee-related rebel network expansion. Therefore, I derive the following fourth hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 7.4:** The probability of transnational rebel activity is higher in countries hosting ethnic kin refugee movements and where the rebels have ethnic ties to a politically excluded group.

This argument is supported by the case of Iraqi Kurdistan. Claiming their own nation state, the Kurds experienced different conflicts in the past and present. In 1995, Iraq hosted an estimated total of 37'000 Kurdish refugees, 23'000 from Iran and
14,000 from Turkey. While the Kurds in Iraq were politically discriminated against during the 1980s, from 1991 until 2002 they had a separatist autonomy in the region of Kurdistan. The situation in Iraqi Kurdistan was complex; in addition to the fighting between the government and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), intense non-state conflicts between the PUK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) were ongoing. Due to these internal tensions, the Iraqi government was reluctant to assist the Kurds including the Kurdish refugees. The conflict over power in northern Iraq between the PUK and KDP was further fueled by the increased presence of PKK that operated from the safe area and the refugee camps; since PKK supported PUK, tensions between the PKK and KDP increased and the KDP criticized the PKK for establishing military bases inside Iraqi Kurdistan (Washington Post, 1999).

7.4 Analysis

In order to quantitatively test my hypotheses with respect to the establishment of extraterritorial rebel bases, I assess which neighboring countries have a higher probability of hosting trans-border rebel groups. The unit of analysis is directed ethnic group-state dyads. I analyze the subset of ethnic groups involved in civil conflict in neighboring country-dyad-years, because conflict involvement is a precondition for rebel activity and refugee outflows. Information on neighboring countries and settlement areas of ethnic groups is drawn from CShapes (Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch, 2010) and GeoEPR (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011). Data on conflict experiences is provided by the ACD2EPR dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). Conflict is an important precondition and predictor of both transnational rebel activity and refugee movements. Figure 7.2 illustrates the innovative non-standard unit of analysis which facilitates the analysis of each year and neighboring country in which an ethnically identified rebel group is most likely to establish transnational sanctuaries. The example displayed in Figure 7.3 shows in gray the neighboring countries of Iraq which are possible host countries for rebel groups fighting in the name of the Sunni Arabs in 2005, one of the politically relevant ethnic groups in Iraq. They are Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. The analysis focuses on neighboring country-dyads because the risk of a transnational rebel presence applies almost exclusively to such dyads. Among the 320 ethnically identified rebel groups, 131 groups had bases in other countries (41 percent), but

\[16\] In Iraq, the Kurds constitute 17 percent of the population, with approximately 3.4 million people.

\[17\] For instance, the Iraqi Sunni Arab rebel groups were the Ansar Al-Sunnah Army, the ISI/Jama at Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad and the RJF/Al-Jaysh al-Islami fi Iraq.
among them only 4 percent were present in non-contiguous countries. The years covered are 1975 to 2009 because data on ethnically identified refugee groups is available for this period. I use logistic regression models to estimate the propensity of transnational rebel activity.

### 7.4.1 Operationalization

**Dependent Variable:** The establishment of a rebel base in a neighboring country is the outcome of interest. Data on extraterritorial rebel activity is drawn from the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009b). The NSA dataset provides information on rebel groups involved in conflicts coded in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict (ACD) dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002, Version V.4_2010), indicates the name of the foreign countries where rebel groups are present and distinguishes between the presence of some troops and extensive rebel bases. I do not consider the intensity of the extraterritorial rebel presence since the NSA coding does not allow the determination of which country the distinction between low and high rebel presence applies. The ACD2EPR dataset identifies rebel groups with ethnic claims or recruitment along ethnic lines within the NSA dataset and assigns them to the according ethnic group in the EPR-ETH dataset. Hence, the binary dependent variable indicates whether or not an ethnic group has a rebel presence in a neighboring country. Following the ACD coding rule that a conflict between the government and a violent non-state actor must produce at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year, only active rebel groups are coded. Ongoing years with transnational rebel activity were dropped. A rebel group with ethnic claims does not necessarily enjoy support from the ethnic population. Further, several rebel groups with different ideologies and goals might fight in the name of the same ethnic group (Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012), and clashes between co-ethnic rebel groups are possible because shared ethnic identity does
not require homogeneity in terms of political views or social values. When focusing on ethnicity, it is important to note that this study includes ethnically identified insurgent groups only, and not rebel movements that pursue non-ethnic ideological aims.\footnote{Non-ethnic rebels use extraterritorial bases as well. Preliminary empirical evidence, which is not shown or further elaborated in this dissertation, suggests that their transnational presence is mainly determined by spatial proximity to the home state.}

**Independent Variables:** First, to account for the importance of geography, I include the logged distance between the group’s settlement territory and the neighboring countries of the ethnic group’s home state. Geocoded data on ethnic groups was obtained from the GeoEPR dataset. Rebels and refugees prefer to cross over to countries neighboring their group’s settlement area than to countries neighboring their home country only, which particularly applies to large countries. For instance, it is unlikely that a Chechen refugee flees the over 2’000 km linear distance to China, a neighboring country of Russia, and it is also unfeasible that Chechen rebels establish transnational bases in China. Since group settlements and country borders are time-variant, the number of countries bordering a group’s territory was

![Figure 7.3: Example of Unit of Analysis: Possible Destination Countries for Sunni Arab Insurgent Groups from Iraq](image)
calculated for each year. The distance was calculated for ethnic groups with a defined settlement area only and groups coded in GeoEPR as nomadic, dispersed or urban (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011, 7) are excluded from the subsequent analysis. Border-crossing ethnic ties to a neighboring country are the second independent variable. Assuming transnational rebel bases to be conditional on ethnic ties to the host country, I control if the ethnic group has transnational ethnic linkages to the concerned neighboring country. Data is provided by the Transnational Ethnic Kin (EPR-TEK) dataset. The third independent variable measures the presence of refugees in a neighboring country with the new ECORF dataset. A binary variable indicating if ethnic refugees moved to a neighboring country is used. The variable is lagged one year in order to control for temporal dependence. Finally, I distinguish between politically excluded and included foreign ethnic kin groups as obtained from the EPR-ETH dataset.

Control Variables: Transnational rebel activity is determined by group features and the rebels’ home and host countries alike, therefore, I control for the following set of variables concerning either the group-level or the home or host country. First, I control for characteristics of the ethnic group that explain a higher risk of experiencing conflict and consequently establishing transnational rebel bases and sending out refugees. I again distinguish between politically powerful and marginalized ethnic groups. In addition, the relative size of the group is included, because larger groups can naturally produce more refugees. Also, I control for the intensity of the conflict that the ethnic group experiences by including a binary variable indicating whether or not the conflict reached 1’000 battle-related deaths in a given year as obtained from the ACD. Further, the war history of the group is considered. Second, in the country of origin, I include the logged annual number of battle-related deaths, which is a significant predictor of high refugee numbers. Many battle deaths might equally be a reason that rebels leave the country, or as counterfactual, battle deaths could increase due to gained rebel strength after having become transnational. Thus, while the causality is unclear, the severity of a conflict either way seems to impact transnational rebel activity. Moreover, the GDP (PPP adjusted real per capita GDP, logged and lagged) is included (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Gleditsch, 2008; World Bank, 2011), because poor countries are associated with a higher risk of conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) and consequent refugee or rebel movements. Third, in order to account for the assumption that rebel groups are drawn into certain countries and deterred from others, neighboring country-level factors are assessed: I include the number of neighboring countries and the state capacity in the neighboring country is mea-
Transnational Rebels and Refugees

assured by GDP (logged and lagged), because weak states unable to control their territory are more likely to attract rebel groups (De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca, 2012, 591, 592). Also, the quality of the dyadic relationship between sending and receiving countries is considered by controlling whether they are rivals. Data on rivals is provided by the updated strategic rivalry dataset (Thompson and Dreyer, 2011). Governments are more likely to support a transnational rebel group challenging a foreign enemy or rival. Finally, to control for duration dependence, natural cubic splines of years without extraterritorial rebel activity are used with three knots (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998).

Table 7.1 displays the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the subsequent analysis.

Table 7.1: Summary Statistics, Transnational Rebel Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational rebel activity</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees (lagged)</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK linkages</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK excluded</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK included</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance (logged)</td>
<td>3.521</td>
<td>3.003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.481</td>
<td>7276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables, group-level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group size</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>7338</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>0.768</td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict intensity</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War history</td>
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<td>0.997</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No TNR years</td>
<td>16.341</td>
<td>9.742</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables, country-level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (logged, lagged)</td>
<td>7.503</td>
<td>1.126</td>
<td>4.764</td>
<td>10.225</td>
<td>7288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle deaths (logged)</td>
<td>3.064</td>
<td>4.093</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.206</td>
<td>7366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. neighbors</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.135</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7366</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control variables, neighbor country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP in neighbor</td>
<td>7.655</td>
<td>1.122</td>
<td>4.764</td>
<td>11.001</td>
<td>7346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7366</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.4.2 Results

Table 7.2 shows the results of the logistic regression models. Standard errors are clustered on the home country of the ethnic groups in conflict. The first model investigates which ethnic groups in which neighboring countries have the highest probability of establishing transnational rebel bases by focusing on the distance between the ethnic group’s settlement territory and the foreign country. The second
model includes the binary variable for trans-border ethnic linkages. The third model incorporates the refugee variable. In the fourth model, the TEK covariate is disaggregated to linkages to excluded and included ethnic groups. In the fifth model, I interacted refugee presence with TEK linkages to powerless or powerful groups.

In the first model, the variable measuring the logged distance between the group’s settlement area and the possible neighboring host country accounts for the importance of spatial factors. As suggested in Hypothesis 7.1, the distance has a negative and significant effect on the risk of trans-border rebel activity. The likelihood of a transnational rebel presence decreases as the distance between an ethnic group’s settlement territory and the neighboring country increases. Both rebel groups and refugees have limited transportation opportunities. Refugees have restricted means of transportation, that is they often travel by public transport or even by foot and are thus unable to cross large distances. Rebel groups may have access to transportation, but they cannot travel freely within their country and are often forced to travel on hidden paths or at night. Thus, distance matters for both of them. Precedent conflict involvement of a group has a significant negative effect on transnational insurgent activity, probably because ethnic groups with conflict experience can more easily draw on resources and established hideouts within their home country. The positive and significant coefficient of the TEK variable in Model 2 reveals that ethnic groups are more likely to establish transnational rebel bases in countries where they find ethnic kin groups. Hence, Hypothesis 7.2 is empirically supported. In Model 3, the refugee variable is positive and significant lending support to Hypothesis 7.3 because the probability of transnational rebel activity is higher when co-ethnic refugees are present. Figure 7.4 displays, based on Model 3, the mean predicted probability of transnational rebel activity for groups with and without ethnic kin and refugee presence in the neighboring country. The graph includes 95 percent confidence intervals. Countries where refugees and ethnic kin groups are found have the highest risk of cross-border rebel activity. The probability is significantly smaller in countries without refugees or trans-border kin.

In the fourth model, I distinguish between transnational linkages affecting politically powerful and powerless ethnic groups in the neighboring country, compared to the baseline category of no ethnic ties, as suggested in hypothesis 7.4. Only excluded EPR-TEK groups significantly increase the risk of extraterritorial rebel bases, which supports Hypothesis 7.4, however there is a 10 percent error margin. The causal mechanism is that politically powerless groups share more grievances, which foster the acceptance and endorsement of violent activities. In contrast, cross-border linkages to politically powerful ethnic groups do not affect the risk of a transnational rebel presence. Hence, the positive and significant effect of transna-
## Table 7.2: Regression Results, Transnational Rebel Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational rebels</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>TEK</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>TEK status</td>
<td>Interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>−0.302***</td>
<td>−0.261***</td>
<td>−0.252***</td>
<td>−0.268***</td>
<td>−0.274***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK linkages</td>
<td>1.010***</td>
<td>0.864**</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.335)</td>
<td>(0.352)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK excluded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.572*</td>
<td>0.793**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.326)</td>
<td>(0.392)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK included</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>1.759***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.508)</td>
<td>(0.498)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>1.010**</td>
<td>1.128***</td>
<td>2.119***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.470)</td>
<td>(0.479)</td>
<td>(0.415)</td>
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<td>Refugees * TEK excluded</td>
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<td>Group size</td>
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<td>−0.891</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.165)</td>
<td>(1.080)</td>
<td>(1.161)</td>
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<td>(1.308)</td>
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<td>0.262</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.473)</td>
<td>(0.450)</td>
<td>(0.451)</td>
<td>(0.451)</td>
<td>(0.430)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict intensity</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>0.617</td>
<td>0.586</td>
<td>0.603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.708)</td>
<td>(0.693)</td>
<td>(0.687)</td>
<td>(0.681)</td>
<td>(0.716)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle deaths</td>
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<td>−0.011</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
<td>−0.015</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
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<td>0.011</td>
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<td>0.183</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.268)</td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
<td>(0.286)</td>
<td>(0.302)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>−0.023</td>
<td>−0.046</td>
<td>−0.059</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
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<td>GDP in neighbor</td>
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<td>−0.399</td>
<td>−0.446</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.302)</td>
<td>(0.298)</td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(0.276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival</td>
<td>0.632</td>
<td>0.697*</td>
<td>0.616</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>0.615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.433)</td>
<td>(0.412)</td>
<td>(0.432)</td>
<td>(0.432)</td>
<td>(0.419)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War history</td>
<td>−0.971**</td>
<td>−0.959**</td>
<td>−1.255**</td>
<td>−1.275**</td>
<td>−1.263**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.441)</td>
<td>(0.416)</td>
<td>(0.504)</td>
<td>(0.509)</td>
<td>(0.492)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>−0.621***</td>
<td>−0.733***</td>
<td>−0.730***</td>
<td>−0.765***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 1</td>
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<td>−0.009***</td>
<td>−0.011***</td>
<td>−0.011***</td>
<td>−0.012***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
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<td>0.007***</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
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<td>Spline 3</td>
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<td>−0.002</td>
<td>−0.003*</td>
<td>−0.003*</td>
<td>−0.003*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
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<td>2.053</td>
<td>1.938</td>
<td>2.009</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(2.174)</td>
<td>(2.233)</td>
<td>(2.249)</td>
<td>(2.260)</td>
</tr>
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<td>5748</td>
<td>5675</td>
<td>5675</td>
<td>5675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χ²</td>
<td>237.145</td>
<td>252.909</td>
<td>462.203</td>
<td>455.160</td>
<td>627.802</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Figure 7.4: Net Effect of Transnational Ethnic Linkages and Refugees on Predicted Probability of Transnational Rebel Activity

Due to transnational ethnic ties on cross-border rebel activity in the previous models is driven by marginalized transnational ethnic groups. However, this significant effect might be caused by the much higher number of excluded than included EPR-TEK groups worldwide.

Assuming that the effect of refugees on rebel groups is conditional on ethnic ties to an aggrieved powerless group in the neighboring country, I added an interaction term of refugee presence and different trans-border linkages in the fifth model. Based on this model, in Figure 7.5, I plot the first differences of the marginal effect of kin refugees on the probability of transnational rebel activity between groups having ethnic connections to an excluded or included group and groups lacking these ethnic ties in the concerned neighboring country. The spikes show the 95 percent confidence intervals. Interestingly, the effect of kin refugees is positive and significant in countries without trans-border ties, insignificant when local kin groups have no access to state power, and negative and significant in neighboring states with powerful ethnic brethren. Hence, while connections to an excluded ethnic group increase the risk of transnational rebel activity ceteris paribus, as has been found in Model 4, this effect is not further affected by kin refugees. However, the presence of co-ethnic refugees positively and significantly impacts the difference in the risk of
extraterritorial rebel bases for neighboring countries without such cross-border linkages. Thus, both refugees and trans-border ties to an excluded groups increase the risk of extraterritorial rebel bases, but against expectations, independently of each other.

To examine the predictive power of my models, I calculated a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plot shown in Figure 7.6 comparing the correctly and falsely predicted positive outcomes of whether or not a group establishes transnational rebel bases. The baseline model includes the control variables only, and not the variables on transnational ethnic connections of a group or any refugee-related indicators. This model has the lowest predictive power, with an area beyond the ROC curve of 83.6 percent. The distance between an ethnic group’s settlement territory and the neighboring country is added in the second model, improving the rate of correctly predicted outcomes. The area under the curve constitutes 88.7 percent. The third model, including variables on border-crossing linkages and refugees, again improves on the baseline model and the model’s area under the curve is 90.3 percent. Thus, spatial distance, trans-border ethnic connections and refugees are strong predictors of the establishment of rebel bases and improve the share of correctly predicted transnational rebel bases.
7.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis

To check the robustness of my findings, I conducted several tests, displayed in Table 7.3 based on Model 3 of Table 7.2. First, Model 6 incorporates dummy variables for the world regions, with the Western world as baseline category, in order to control for regional heterogeneity. The positive and significant effect of refugees and trans-border kin does not change. However, interestingly, all regional indicators are significantly negative when compared to Western countries which is explained by the fact that the only two rebel groups in Western Europe, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, used transnational sanctuaries. In an additional model, which is not shown, I used a dummy variable for each sending country instead of the world region, in order to control for country-specific differences in the variance of the error term, and the results do not change.

Second, in Model 7, I recalculated the models without the most influential cases, that is refugee movements larger than 285'807 refugees (95% quantile), and without the smallest refugee movements consisting of less than 2'000 refugees. The positive impact of refugee movements on the establishment of rebel bases remains
### Table 7.3: Sensitivity Analysis, Transnational Rebel Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational rebels</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional dummy</td>
<td>No outliers</td>
<td>Group proximity</td>
<td>Group neighbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
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<td>−0.258***</td>
<td>−0.416**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEK linkages</td>
<td>1.003***</td>
<td>0.928***</td>
<td>0.938***</td>
<td>1.087***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.356)</td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.349)</td>
<td>(0.369)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>1.057**</td>
<td>0.830</td>
<td>0.977**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.484)</td>
<td>(0.510)</td>
<td>(0.488)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees (no outliers)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.685**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.336)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group size</td>
<td>−0.876</td>
<td>−0.508</td>
<td>−0.953</td>
<td>−1.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.207)</td>
<td>(0.505)</td>
<td>(1.060)</td>
<td>(1.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
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<td>0.065</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.449)</td>
<td>(0.287)</td>
<td>(0.518)</td>
<td>(0.573)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.661)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
<td>(0.597)</td>
<td>(0.596)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. neighbors</td>
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<td>−0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP in neighbor</td>
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<td>−0.412</td>
<td>−0.255</td>
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<td>(0.141)</td>
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<td>(0.230)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Rival</td>
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<td>0.675***</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.374</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.404)</td>
<td>(0.235)</td>
<td>(0.349)</td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War history</td>
<td>−1.238***</td>
<td>−0.982***</td>
<td>−0.880**</td>
<td>−0.895**</td>
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<td>(0.462)</td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
<td>(0.417)</td>
<td>(0.425)</td>
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<td>−0.625***</td>
<td>−0.633***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>−0.009***</td>
<td>−0.010***</td>
<td>−0.010***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.007***</td>
<td>0.008**</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>−0.002**</td>
<td>−0.002*</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
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<td>North Africa</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.556)</td>
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<td>Sub Saharan Africa</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.424)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Eastern Europe</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Latin America</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.660)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>−4.192***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.405)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>1.862</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(3.278)</td>
<td>(1.097)</td>
<td>(2.043)</td>
<td>(2.047)</td>
</tr>
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<td>5748</td>
<td>2540</td>
<td>1801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>653.914</td>
<td>305.211</td>
<td>242.131</td>
<td>173.306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.

** p<0.1, *** p<0.05, **** p<0.01
positive and significant at the five percent error level. With this specification, the conflict intensity significantly increases the chances of cross-border rebel presence. Further, rival dyads have a higher chance of observing trans-border rebel movements. However, wealthier neighbors have a significantly lower risk of hosting transnational rebels.

Third, to account for spatial dependences, Model 8 adjusts the unit of analysis to relevant dyads of group settlement polygons and countries that are not further than a distance of 100km from each other. Model 9 includes contiguous dyads only resulting in a smaller sample size. As a matter of feasibility rebels and refugees are likely to move towards countries neighboring their group’s regional base. For instance, possible host countries for the Chechen ethnic group are Georgia (distance 0 km) and Azerbaijan (distance 84 km) in Model 8, and only Georgia in Model 9. Since state borders and group settlement areas are time-variant, the Chechens, to use the same example, have only Georgia and Azerbaijan as possible receiving countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Before, no independent country was within proximity of Chechen inhabited territory, i.e. Chechnya. The geographically adjusted units of analysis yield fewer observations for two reasons. First, the number of possible host countries for most groups is reduced. Second, landlocked groups without a border within 100km of their territory are not included in the analysis because they do not have any dyadic relationships. This is somewhat problematic because these groups also produce refugees and although the establishment of extraterritorial rebel bases is less feasible, it is not unlikely. Also, rebels fighting in the name of landlocked groups would to some extent benefit from sanctuary in another state. The 100 kilometer threshold in Model 8 was chosen in order to not too drastically reduce the sample size and because 100 km is still a feasible distance to travel with restricted means and from which to launch attacks. However, for the same reasons as in the main models in Table 7.2, I expect transnational rebel bases to primarily affect contiguous countries. While in the proximity model the impact of refugees on transnational rebels remains significant at the ten percent error level only, the effect of co-ethnic refugees and trans-border ethnic kin groups is positive and significant when exclusively focusing on countries that are contiguous to the ethnic group’s territory.

In addition, since most ethnic groups never experience conflict and few ethnically identified rebel groups establish extraterritorial bases, I estimated the same models with rare events logit regressions (King and Zeng, 2001), and the results, which are not shown, remain virtually the same. Also, I estimated the probability of transnational rebel presence with standard errors clustered on the conflict instead of the country, and the results do not change here either.
7.5 Conclusion

This chapter systematically examined the rebelgee phenomenon, that is the claim that transnational violent rebel groups are temporally and spatially associated with refugee movements. As a result of this study, we gain insight into how refugees, in combination with transnational insurgents, contribute to the regional clustering of civil conflicts and increase its neighborhood effect. Previous research substantiated the theory that the establishment of foreign sanctuaries is an attractive strategy for insurgent groups since it places them at an advantage vis-à-vis the government they are challenging and negatively affects unstable neighboring states hosting refugees (Salehyan, 2007, 2008b). However, little is known about the impact of kinship ties on rebels. I claim that transnational rebel bases depend on linkages to cross-border ethnic groups and co-ethnic refugee settlements. Thus, this study elucidates the scope and motivation that contribute to the decision of rebel groups fighting for ethno-nationalist aims to establish foreign hideouts.

New sub-national data on the ethnicity of refugees and ethnically identified violent non-state actors was used to examine the risk of transnational rebel activity. Applying directed ethnic group-country-dyads of conflict experiencing ethnic groups as an innovate unit of analysis, I estimated the chances of cross-border rebel presence for each possible destination country. The results yield strong empirical evidence that transnational rebel activity is more likely in countries with co-ethnic refugee inflows because refugee settlements give rebels the possibility for recruitment and shelter. The statistical findings further suggest that the establishment of extraterritorial rebel bases is conditional on transnational ethnic linkages to the potential host country. Trans-border ethnic kin, as refugees, increases the rebels’ opportunities. Disaggregating between politically included and excluded transnational kin groups further reveals that especially the latter attract foreign co-ethnic rebel movements. The effect of co-ethnic refugees on cross-border expansion probabilities of rebel groups is positive, significant and robust across various specifications. Hence, the analysis suggests that the ethnicity of rebels and refugees matters. Transnational rebel groups are likely to be found in the same context as ethnic kin refugees since they have similar travel and information networks. Further, quantitative evidence indicates that the risk of trans-border rebel activity depends on the distance between the insurgents’ territory of origin and the possible neighboring host country, because the propensity of rebel presence decreases with distance.

The results contribute to the yet little elaborated literature on transnational civil conflict actors and confirm previous studies that intrastate conflicts are not self-contained but contagious. In particular, civil conflicts affect neighboring countries.
with cultural similarities (Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009), due to conflict-
induced social movements such as border-crossing insurgent groups (Salehyan, 2007) and refugees (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). My study improves on these
previous results by including ethno-nationalist preferences of rebels and refugees,
which allows me to perform a more in-depth examination of the causal link between
insurgent and forced migration movements.

While this study already employs a group-level approach to refugee commu-
nities and violent non-state actors by including their ethnic group membership in
the analysis, future research could further assess sub-national information such as
age and gender characteristics of refugees, because the suggested rebelgee phe-
nomenon is most likely to apply to younger male refugees. Moreover, the location of
transnational rebel bases in combination with geo-referenced refugee settlements
deserves closer attention. Finally, destination patterns of ethnically identified trans-
border insurgents could be compared to non-ethnic rebel groups, because the lat-
ter also have strong reasons for establishing foreign bases; in fact approximately
40 percent of these groups have done so (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan,
2009b).
8 Qualitative Evidence from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis

8.1 Introduction

While the preceding three chapters examined different aspects of conflict diffusion with large-N studies, in this chapter I use a qualitative approach to identify the causal mechanisms and evaluate whether the hypotheses supported by the quantitative results hold after a qualitative examination. I conduct an explorative case study with evidence from the Kosovo refugee crisis. The Kosovo case is selected, because in connection with the refugees’ perilous impact on the ethnic balance in the host country, the Kosovar Albanian refugees in Macedonia are often mentioned as the key example. For instance, Loescher and Milner (2004) and Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) state that the influx of an estimated 300’000 ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo to Macedonia in 1999 led to growing tensions between the majority ethnic Macedonians and the minority ethnic Albanians, culminating in a civil conflict in 2001. However, the situation of the refugees who emerged during the Kosovo crisis is complex and thus, deserves a detailed analysis. If, as stated, the Kosovar Albanian refugees diffused the conflict to Macedonia, why did the situation in Albania with a higher number of Kosovar refugees remain calm? Furthermore, Kosovars not only fled to Macedonia and Albania but also to Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Western European countries such as Germany and Switzerland. Among the Kosovar refugees there were not only Albanians, but Serbs, Roma and other minorities as well. And most importantly, the conflict in Macedonia broke out after almost all refugees had returned home. Furthermore, since refugees are assumed to facilitate the expansion of rebel networks (Stedman and Tanner, 2003; Gerdes, 2006b; Salehyan, 2007), the question arises whether there was a connection between the movement of refugees and insurgents from Kosovo. Not only did the Kosovar refugees move along cross-border ethnic ties but, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) also. The KLA was a key actor in the Kosovo conflict and, after 1999, expanded to the Serbian valleys of Preshevë, Medvegjë and Bujanoc and to
Macedonia, where the National Liberation Army (NLA) was founded. Besides, the KLA received most of its arms from Albania, used northern Albania as a training ground, and the Kosovar Albanian diaspora gave financial support.

Thus, this chapter covers three dimensions: First, I examine the direction of the refugee outflow from Kosovo because the quantitative results in Chapter 5 provide evidence that refugees flee along cultural and ethnic linkages. Second, the relationship between the refugees from Kosovo and the host populations is analyzed. I test the hypothesis that ethnic kin refugees of a politically marginalized ethnic group threaten the stability of the asylum state by disturbing the ethnic balance, to which the results of Chapter 6 lend support. Finally, in order to qualitatively complement Chapter 7, I study the relationship between the forced migrants and transnational activities of the KLA. The qualitative approach used in this chapter allows to analyze the causal mechanisms in-depth and assess whether the hypotheses and quantitative results of the previous chapters are supported by the Kosovo case.

This chapter begins with an explanation of the qualitative method used, and I will also justify the case selection. Then, I briefly recapitulate the main theoretical arguments concerning the flight route of refugees and the circumstances under which refugees might act as a conflict trigger by either disturbing the ethnic set-up in the host state or collaborating with insurgents groups. I claim that refugees alone do not cause conflict but that the political context which refugees encounter in the asylum state increases the risk of refugee-related violence, that is particularly the political power balance in the host state. Qualitative evidence from the Kosovo crisis provides support to the theoretical assumptions of refugee-related conflict diffusion patterns. The chapter closes with concluding remarks.

8.2 Method and Case Selection

The quantitative methods used in the previous chapters of the dissertation established that there is a statistically significant relation between refugee movements and trans-border conflict diffusion processes. However, the causal mechanisms require further explanation as to why this case study of the Kosovo refugee crisis tries to trace the suggested causality. To test the main hypotheses supported in the quantitative chapters of the dissertation, I conduct an explorative case study of the refugees evolving from the Kosovo crisis in 1999. The Kosovo case is selected because it offers an interesting example to analyze the causal processes of conflict diffusion along transnational linkages. The Albanian ethnic group lives in several
countries and territories\textsuperscript{19} of which most experienced an influx of Kosovo Albanian refugees. A great variation in the outcome of the refugee crisis in terms of consequences and time can be observed as some situations remained peaceful while others saw violence. Moreover, the violent outcomes show some variance over time, as the conflict first spread to mainland Serbia in 2000 and then to Macedonia in 2001. In the following chapter I will, thus, analyze the direction of the refugee flows from Kosovo, their impact on the host state as well as the role of the KLA.

Although quantitative research is crucial to draw generalizable conclusions, comparative studies on refugees also demonstrate the limitations of refugee data. First, refugee figures are unreliable because some refugees do not register and the available numbers are often only estimates. Second, the annual counts provided by the UNHCR are end-year figures, meaning they represent the number of refugees living in a country on December 31 and not the annual maximum. Thus, refugees that arrive and return in the same year are not recorded, like in the Kosovo case where the peak of the crisis started and ended in 1999. However, on the case-level, the UNHCR provides detailed daily counts. Third, due to lacking information on the sub-national level, quantitative research mostly focuses on country-units. Since Kosovo was not an independent country, people from Kosovo were rarely registered as Kosovars but rather as people from Yugoslavia or later Serbia and Montenegro or Serbia only. Thus, precise numbers on either Kosovar refugees or Kosovar immigrants and diaspora are unavailable (Sharani et al., 2010, 26). Finally, more in-depth and sub-national information is crucial for the understanding of refugee movement patterns. For instance, where are refugees located within a country, were Kosovar Albanian refugees concentrated in Albanian populated areas or spread among entire Macedonia? Also, distinct information for Montenegro, then part of Serbia, is lacking.

Despite the widespread assumption that Kosovar Albanian refugees disturbed the ethnic balance in Macedonia (Ortakovski, 2001; Bellamy, 2002; Loescher and Milner, 2004; Williams and Zeager, 2004; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006), no qualitative study focuses on the security implications of the refugees fleeing from Kosovo. This chapter contributes to filling this gap in the literature. The situation was complex, since Kosovars not only fled to Macedonia and Albania but also Montenegro and other countries, and not only Albanians left Kosovo but also ethnic Serbs and Roma. The latter two ethnic groups in particular, did not return to Kosovo after the

\textsuperscript{19}The Albanians are the majority in Albania (95\%) and Kosovo (92\%). Politically relevant Albanian minorities are found in Macedonia (25\%), Montenegro (5\%) and south-eastern Serbia (1\%) (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). Figure\textsuperscript{4.2} displays these settlement territories. Further, smaller Albanian minorities historically live in Greece, Italy, Bulgaria and Turkey. The most important Albanian diaspora communities reside in Germany, Switzerland and the United States (Sharani et al., 2010).
conflict. Therefore, I analyze the broad variation in the outcome and consequences of the influx of Kosovar refugees in the different receiving countries and territories.

Figure 8.1 shows Kosovo and its neighboring countries, indicating the major cities and towns that will be referred to in the following analysis and displays the main settlement territories of ethnic Albanians in gray.

8.3 The Flight Direction of the Refugees from Kosovo

Claiming that refugees do not randomly leave their home state to any possible asylum country, in Chapter 5, I developed a spatio-temporal pull framework to explain the destination patterns of refugee movements. The assumption that refugees flee to countries that are culturally linked, closely located and where other refugees went before has been supported by the results of the quantitative analysis of all refugee movements worldwide. Here, these findings are assessed with the flight patterns of the refugees from Kosovo. Thus, I expect that the number of Kosovar Albanian refugees is significantly higher in asylum countries that are connected by ethnic ties, that are in proximity and that hosted Kosovar migrants in previous years.
The refugee outflow precedes the repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo under Milošević’s regime in the 1990s that culminated during the NATO air raid of Serbia in spring 1999. During the ethnic cleansing campaign by the Serb forces, with the aim to expel the Albanian population, up to 863’000 ethnic Albanians left Kosovo (OSCE, 1999). The majority of refugees departed from Kosovo between March and June 1999. Many of them, however, quickly returned after Milošević’s capitulation and the subsequent establishment of the KFOR protection in Kosovo. During and after the NATO intervention, many ethnic Serbs and Roma also fled Kosovo, who in contrast to Albanians mostly did not return (UNHCR, 2000a). Most Albanian refugees from Kosovo did not have a choice in their flight direction as they were expelled by the police, paramilitary groups and the federal army who “forced them to leave their city or village under the threat of death” (Médecins Sans Frontières, 1999). Ball (2000) states that the outflow of people from Kosovo was so massive because it was planed by centralized Serbian policies and not because people individually decided to flee. The Serbian forces deported the Albanian population to border posts, in trains or buses, or along appointed routes either in private vehicles or by foot (UNHCR, 1999; Médecins Sans Frontières, 1999; Ball et al., 2002). Consequently, all neighboring countries of Kosovo, which also happen to have ethnic Albanian populations, hosted Kosovo Albanian refugees. OSCE (1999) estimates that 90 percent of the refugees stayed within the region.

Albania hosted approximately half of the refugees fleeing from Kosovo. During the NATO air campaign roughly 445’000 Kosovar refugees arrived in Albania (UNHCR, 2000b), most of whom were ethnic Albanians. Other minorities in Kosovo such as Serbs and Roma did not have incentives to flee to Albania, and those few that went to Albania did not register or indicate their ethnic background, due to fear of problems with other refugees or state authorities (UNHCR, 2000a). Already in the 1990s, after Albania’s democratization and during the Balkan wars, some Kosovar immigrants lived in Albania (International Crisis Group, 1998b, 3). Thus, exchange between Albania and Kosovo existed, although modest in comparison to Macedonia. During Communist times, Albania was isolated and had closed its borders since 1948, so that Albanian ethnic kin on each side of the Albanian-Yugoslav border had little contact until the transformation in the 1990s. Albania maintained a policy of open doors towards the refugees and thus did not reject any refugees. The vast majority of refugees lived in private accommodations and the remaining caseload in collective centers or camps (UNHCR, 2000a, 322). Almost all Kosovar refugees immediately returned to Kosovo after the peace agreement was signed in June 1999. The UNHCR (2000a) describes the repatriation of the refugees to Kosovo as “massive and spontaneous” and mentions three main causes for the
sudden return of most refugees. First, the refugees wanted to regain their place of origin and recover their properties. Second, due to the poor security and economic conditions in Albania. Finally, political motivations to reconstruct the Kosovo province.

Macedonia received approximately 360’000 refugees during the peak of the Kosovo crisis. The majority of refugees were ethnic Albanians, but considerable numbers of ethnic Serbs, Roma and other minorities from Kosovo also arrived in Macedonia. Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia were more interlinked with each other than with those in Albania because they share a common Yugoslav “historical, economic and cultural experience” (Judah, 2001, 8-9). Also, Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia and northern Albania share a common Gheg cultural background, as opposed to the Tosk leading elite in Albania and southern Albania. The internal Yugoslav border between Kosovo and Macedonia was passable and family ties existed (International Crisis Group, 2004, 19). The Macedonian Albanians offered solidarity to their Kosovo kin, but the ethnic Macedonian majority who had more political power as senior partners in the government was partially reluctant to house the high number of Kosovan refugees. In addition to camps, more than half of all refugees were staying with local Albanian host families (UNHCR, 1999), particularly in north-western Macedonia (Rekacewicz, 2000b), which is the traditional settlement area of ethnic Albanians. However, very few ethnic Macedonian families hosted refugees (Shogren, 1999). Similar to the refugees in Albania, almost all Kosovan refugees immediately returned to Kosovo after the end of the NATO intervention. The ethnic Roma and Serbs from Kosovo had less intentions to return due to the deterioration of their security situation in Kosovo.

Montenegro hosted approximately 70’000 people from Kosovo who officially were called internally displaced persons (IDPs) and not refugees, since both Kosovo and Montenegro were parts of Serbia in 1999. Besides the majority ethnic Albanians, many ethnic Serbs, particularly from northern Kosovo, and members of the Roma minority were among the refugee movement. Montenegro experienced two different refugee waves: the first one, comparable to Albania and Macedonia, consisted of mainly ethnic Albanians that fled Kosovo during the time of the NATO air raid. The second refugee influx comprising mostly ethnic Serbs and Roma occurred after the NATO campaign had ended (UNHCR, 2000a, 339). The refugees from Kosovo were concentrated in three main areas: in private accommodations and some camps in Ulqin, where the local Montenegrin Albanian population lives, in Rožaje, close to the Kosovo border, either in collective centers or in private houses, and in private accommodations in Podgorica. Generally, the refugees from Kosovo stayed in those areas in Montenegro where they found ethnic kin. Approximately
half of the ethnic Albanian refugees only passed Montenegro in transit to Albania (UNHCR, 2000a, 339). The Kosovar Albanians returned immediately in June 1999, but the ethnic Serbs and Roma that arrived in turn in Montenegro were not able to return to Kosovo after a few weeks or months. While the Serbs either found accommodation among kin in Montenegro or benefited from facilitated integration in mainland Serbia, the ethnic Roma refugees faced more difficulties. Since the Roma minority in Montenegro suffers from widespread discrimination, the Roma refugees did not receive appropriate assistance, and due to a lack of integration possibilities still to date, live in formal or informal settings with sub-standard conditions (UNHCR, 2007b).

Further, Bosnia and Herzegovina received a relevant number of Kosovar refugees: approximately 22,000 Kosovars arrived during the NATO air strike (UNHCR, 2000b, 235). Greece received approximately 5,000 Kosovar refugees who were relocated from overcrowded camps in Macedonia (Suhrke et al., 2000, 36). Greek authorities refused to accept more refugees under the UNHCR's humanitarian evacuation program because Greece already hosted economic immigrants from Albania (Suhrke et al., 2000, 38). Also Turkey, Italy and most Western European countries, particularly those with a Kosovar diaspora, hosted Kosovar refugees (UNHCR, 2000a, 357). Many refugees fled to third states where they had family members and contact to diaspora communities consisting of earlier working migration movements (Sharani et al., 2010). Evidence from individual interviews suggests that, whenever possible, refugees from Kosovo tried to follow family ties into other countries, which brought some forced migrants as far as to Australia. Aggregated to the macro-level, this supports the assumed flight patterns along kinship ties and precedent migration movements.

However, the vast majority of refugees from Kosovo stayed in the region (OSCE, 1999; UNHCR, 1999, 2010) and thus, did not travel long distances. The UNHCR played a major role in determining where the refugees are located because they, same as Western governments, wanted the forced migrants from Kosovo to stay in the region. Considering the regional context of the Balkan wars in the 1990s, Western asylum countries refused to host massive refugee groups again, as was the case a few years ago. Thus, the aspired policy of burden-sharing among possible asylum states applied predominantly to neighboring countries (Barutciski and Suhrke, 2001, 96). Although deported by Serb forces to border posts not always being allowed to take the most direct route (Médecins Sans Frontières, 1999), in general, people from municipalities in western parts of Kosovo fled to Albania and more people from southern Kosovo or the capital went to Macedonia (Ball, 2000). Since almost all refugees returned to Kosovo immediately after the end of the war,
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and the major refugee crisis lasted for some months, temporal dependences cannot be observed. However, in cases where families were separated during the flight, they often followed each other in order to be reunited in the asylum state, so some refugees relocated from Macedonia or Montenegro to Albania (UNHCR, 1999).

How does the movement of Kosovar refugees comply with the suggested theoretical logic of refugee flight along trans-border ethnic ties and the statistical results found in Chapter 5? To summarize, the international community’s interest to keep the refugee caseload within the Balkans, as well as individual preferences to follow family ties, both strongly determined the flight patterns of the Kosovar refugees. Nevertheless, evidence from the Kosovo refugee crisis supports the claim that refugee movements follow ethnic ties. Although the refugees were deported by Serb forces, they found asylum in neighboring countries with ethnic kin population, in particular in Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro, and often stayed there in private accommodations of local co-ethnic families.

8.4 The Impact of the Kosovo Refugees in Countries with Ethnic Kin Populations

Refugees increase the chance of violence if they enter into a fragile set-up with already present political tensions. Refugees sharing ethnic group membership with the local population in the host country are at risk of disturbing the ethnic balance, either by causing a demographic shift or changing political power relations. Furthermore, kin refugees may cause a demonstration effect or diffuse military resources and thereby threaten security. The ethno-political logic of refugee-related conflict diffusion, introduced in Chapter 3, predicts aggrieved ethnic groups that are either excluded from state power or underrepresented in the government to be receptive to these refugee-related negative externalities. The quantitative results of Chapter 6 yield evidence that, while aggrieved ethnic groups already have a higher risk of participating in a civil conflict, the predicted probability of conflict further increases if the group simultaneously hosts co-ethnic refugees. The following subsection thus elaborates how the main asylum countries of the Kosovo refugees reacted differently to the massive influx, depending on the current political conditions of the time.

In Macedonia, the Macedonian Albanians offered solidarity to their Kosovo kin, but the ethnic Macedonians refused to house the high number of Kosovar refugees. The Macedonian government feared that the Albanian refugees would destabilize the country and upset the delicate ethnic balance between Macedonians and Albanians (Barutciski and Suhrke, 2001) 108-109), who against some expectations,
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always remained peaceful during the Balkan wars (Ortakovski, 2001, 25). For instance, the concern that the flood of Kosovar Albanian refugees “threaten to destabilize Macedonia’s ethnic balance”, was expressed by the Macedonian Deputy Foreign Minister at the UNHCR emergency meeting on the Kosovo crisis in Geneva on April 6 (Milner, 2000, 29). However, this problematic aspect was not only mentioned by Macedonian authorities, but also by international organizations, such as the UNHCR Director for Europe, Anne Willem Bijleveld: “We are concerned that the massive influx in Macedonia could upset its ethnic balance to an extent that the country could fall into turmoil or into a civil war” (Sabeva, 1999). The Macedonian authorities closed the border to Kosovo on several occasions for some days and let the refugees remain in limbo (UNHCR, 1999; Williams and Zeager, 2004). Only after the international community offered wide scale financial and organizational assistance for the refugee accommodation, was the Macedonian government willing to host the refugees (UNHCR, 1999; Rhode, 1999). Macedonia had severe economic problems before the huge refugee influx due to the cessation of trade and investment with Yugoslavia and the lack of adequate international recognition as a result of the dispute with Greece over the name “Macedonia”. The UNHCR raised its expenditures from 95’000 U.S. dollars in 1998 to 42 million U.S. dollars in 1999 (UNHCR, 2000a, 352). Thanks to the UNHCR’s humanitarian evacuation program, from the 360’000 refugees, 96’000 were voluntarily relocated from the overcrowded camps to third countries, whereas again at the Macedonian government’s urging (UNHCR, 1999; Suhrke et al., 2000).

The question of whether or not to accommodate the Kosovar refugees led to strong political tension between the majority ethnic Macedonians and the minority ethnic Albanian governmental representatives. In particular, these tensions increased grievances among the local Albanians. The Macedonian Albanians wanted to give sanctuary to all refugees and feared that the Macedonian majority urges to “deport the refugees to third countries in order to send them as far from Kosovo as possible and make their return home more difficult” (Mehmeti, 1999). Several reports provide evidence that Kosovar Albanian refugees had been verbally and physically abused by Macedonian security forces (Amnesty International, 1999; The Economist, 1999). In April 1999, “the Macedonian Government came close to falling […] when the ethnic Albanian minority party threatened to walk out. The party’s leader said he made the threat because of what he said was poor treatment of Kosovar refugees by the mainly Slav security forces” (BBC News, 1999). Thus, the “cold welcome” given to the Kosovar refugees by the Macedonian authorities (The Economist, 1999) caused a demonstration effect to the local Albanians, which increased dissatisfaction, by witnessing the inappropriate treatment of their kin. The
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majority of refugees in Macedonia stayed in private homes, particularly among ethnic Albanian families in western Macedonia, that showed loyalty and support to their trans-border ethnic kin group (UNHCR, 1999; Amnesty International, 1999; Dietrich and Glöde, 2000). Across the border, “lines of cars of Macedonian Albanians [were] waiting to pick up Albanians from Kosovo and take them to their homes” (Mehmeti, 1999). The remaining refugees were accommodated in camps and centers spread all over the country (UNHCR, 2000a, 349).

Although most refugees returned to Kosovo in 1999, the neighborhood effect of the Kosovo crisis is often mentioned as a cause for the ethnic violence that broke out in Macedonia in summer 2001 (Ortakovski, 2001; Bellamy, 2002; Loescher and Milner, 2004; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Dyrstad et al., 2011). The high number of Kosovar refugees, constituting almost 20 percent of the Albanian population, certainly increased economic pressures that would have brought Macedonia at the edge of collapse, and caused a strong temporary demographic shift. But international financial aid, especially from the UNHCR and NATO, decreased the burden of providing refugee assistance. The ethnic balance and group sizes are a strongly disputed issue in Macedonian politics. While the Albanians claim to constitute approximately 30 percent of the population, the Macedonians insist that the Albanians account for approximately 20 percent only (Levinson, 1998, 54-55) and consequently, because positions are distributed according to proportional rules, the Albanians feel underrepresented in governmental institutions (Reka, 2008, 55). Thus, refugees increasing the number of ethnic Albanians further heightened tensions already prevalent between Albanians and Slavs in Macedonia.

The Kosovo refugee crisis had two main impacts in Macedonia: First, the refugees implied a demonstration effect on their brethren in Macedonia by making them more aware of ethno-nationalist ideologies. Grievances among the local Albanians increased due to the unwelcoming treatment of the refugees by the Macedonian authorities. This increased support for Albanian nationalism and thus, promoted the rise of the NLA a year afterwards. The exchange between local Albanians and refugees was facilitated by the fact that the majority of refugees stayed among local host families in private accommodations. Second, the high number of Kosovar Albanian refugees increased fear among the ethnic Macedonian majority of the destabilization of the already tense ethnic balance.

The internal situation in Montenegro was comparable of Macedonia, both shared an Albanian minority vis-à-vis a Slav majority and the experience of a refugee influx from Kosovo. However, no rebel activity was observed and no consequent conflict occurred. This peaceful outcome complies with the theoretical assump-
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tion that only relatively large refugee groups of relatively large kin groups increase the risk of conflict. The ethnic Albanian refugees had no impact on the ethnic balance in Montenegro, although they were kin of a politically marginalized group because, first, the Albanian minority in Montenegro is relatively small and assimilated, they constitute approximately six percent of the Montenegrin population, and ethnic tensions were minimal (International Crisis Group, 2004, 20), so that there was no fire where refugees would have added fuel. The political claims of Montenegrin Albanians are moderate in comparison to Kosovo or Macedonia since they do not demand territorial autonomy or independence, never boycotted elections, and there has been no evidence of armed rebellions or terrorist activities (Bieber, 2002; Šistek and Dimitrovova, 2003). Even ethnic parties play a less important role in Montenegro (International Crisis Group, 2004, 20). Rather, the Albanians in Montenegro demand to play an active role in the political life (Boga and Wolff, 2011, 3) and in fact, were conducive to the successful vote over independence from Serbia in 2006 (Boga and Wolff, 2011, 2). Second, the influx of kin Albanian refugees was smaller compared to Macedonia or Albania and ethnic Albanian refugees were counterbalanced by the ethnic Serb and Roma refugees, who also found local kin in Montenegro, so that the final impact on the ethnic set-up was almost even on both sides.

Albania hosted the majority of the refugee caseload and was dependent on international help from the United Nations, governmental organizations and NGOs to manage the influx. Concerning the impact of the refugees on the ethno-political balance in Albania, the Kosovar Albanian refugees were all ethnic kin of the political monopoly group, explaining why Albania, although having hosted most Kosovar refugees and transnational KLA bases, did not experience conflict spillovers. There was the opportunity for an insurgency in Albania because of the availability of weapons, a weak central government unable to control most parts of the country, many refugees, who imply negative externalities, and the KLA training camps and the local support existed in the country, particularly among the Ghegs in the North. However, the theoretical logic of refugee-related trigger mechanisms suggests that politically marginalized ethnic groups have a higher risk of refugee-related conflict and the Albanians in Albania had a monopoly position in the government so that no grievances existed on which local or foreign insurgencies could have been built.

The UNHCR and other authorities organized assistance for refugee-host families or maintained refugee accommodations. The UNHCR expanded its expenditures in Albania from 670,000 U.S. dollars in 1998 to almost 60 million U.S. dollars in 1999 (UNHCR, 2000a, 325). Thus, the high number of Kosovar refugees would have put immense pressure on the already weak Albanian economy, but thanks to interna-
tional financial support, the mechanism that refugees increase economic tensions and thereby increase instability, was averted. Since Kosovo borders northern Albania, most refugees arrived in the Northeast in the Kukës County. The Albanian government and the UNHCR agreed on relocating the refugees from there for security reasons. The area was close to the border, that is close to the war zone, which might have exacerbated camp insecurity (Jacobsen, 2000, 10). The area close to the border was generally insecure because the Albanian government had less power in the mountainous territory that partially fell under the KLA control (International Crisis Group, 1998b, 17). Consequently, Kosovar refugees were distributed among the twelve Albanian prefectures (Rekacewicz, 2000a). The International Crisis Group (1998b) argues that the internal political division between Tosks and Ghegs was another reason for the relocation of the refugees towards central and southern Albania. The two main parties in Albania, the Socialist and the Democratic party, received different regional support. While the Tosks voted mainly for the Socialist party, the Ghegs in contrast supported the Democratic party. Thus, the Tosk Socialist governmental elite feared that the Gheg refugees would impact the political balance in favor of the Democrats (International Crisis Group, 1998b, 8). Since Albanian citizenship was based on *ius sanguinis*, any ethnic Albanian, whether or not from Albania, was able to naturalize (International Crisis Group, 1998b, 3). Thus the refugees, if unable to return to Kosovo, could have had an impact on the -not as suggested ethnic but- political balance in Albania.

To summarize, evidence from Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania supports the hypotheses and findings of Chapter 6 that the risk of civil conflict increases for politically aggrieved ethnic groups hosting a large number of kin refugees. However, it must be emphasized that not refugees alone cause conflict. Ethnic groups strongly aggrieved due to political exclusion or underrepresentation are a necessary precondition for the onset of war. In such unfavorable political contexts, a refugee influx can seriously threaten stability. The unwelcoming treatment of ethnic Albanian refugees by the Macedonian government, fearing the refugees would endanger stability, increased the perception among Macedonian Albanians that they are second class citizens. Therefore, the Kosovar refugees and, importantly, the Macedonian government’s reaction to the refugee influx, paved the way for more popular support for ethnic Albanian nationalism that was pursued by the NLA. Hence, the Kosovar refugees displayed a demonstration effect on their brethren in Macedonia by making them more aware of their issues related to underrepresentation and lack of influence in state politics. The exchange between local Albanians and kin refugees was facilitated by the fact that the majority of refugees stayed among local host families in private accommodations.
8.5 Trans-Border Activities of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)

In Chapter 7 I argue that ethnic kinship between rebels, refugees and the local population in the asylum state explains, first, why insurgent groups and forced migrants frequently appear in the same context, and second, why rebels are often successful in recruiting among refugees. Thus, refugee-related rebel network expansion is conditional on the triadic relationship between co-ethnic refugees, rebels and the population in the neighboring host country. Refugee movements and insurgent groups are affected by geospatial factors because both have strong incentives to relocate to border areas in neighboring countries. Further, insurgents and refugees are more likely to cooperate if they are co-ethnics because ethnic kinship affects the motivation and the opportunity for rebel-refugee collaboration. The results of the quantitative analysis of all ethnically identified insurgent groups and refugee movements worldwide support the hypothesis that the probability of transnational rebel activity is higher if co-ethnic groups and ethnic kin refugee movements are present. Since not only Kosovar refugees moved along transnational ethnic linkages to neighboring countries, but also insurgent groups with ethno-nationalist Albanian claims, I analyze the expansion of the KLA rebel network in the following subsection, in order to subsequently assess possible analogies between refugee and rebel movement patterns.

The growth of the KLA and Albanian resistance in the later 1990s was accompanied by the escalation of Serb repression and attacks in Kosovo in the second half of 1998 (Heinemann-Grüder and Paes, 2001, 15), which finally led to an international intervention led by the NATO air campaign that caused the Serbs to withdraw from Kosovo, indicating a success for the KLA (Perritt, 2008, 130-131). At its height the KLA had a strength of an estimated maximum of 20’000 fighters (Khakee and Florquin, 2003; Gleditsch, Cunningham and Salehyan, 2012). Bellamy (2002, 130) describes the presence of the KLA in the southern Balkans as a loose armed transnational network spanning Kosovo, Macedonia, southern Serbia and Albania. The core of the KLA, UÇPMB and NLA is small and consists partly of the same people that went from one conflict to the next (Bellamy, 2002) and thereby diffused nationalist ideologies. I distinguish three phases of KLA activity: First, the KLA in its beginnings operated in Kosovo, conducted skirmishes and attacks and undertook preparatory activities in Albania (Mulaj, 2008; Perritt, 2008). Second, the peak of KLA activity was during the war in Kosovo where it was also successful in drawing international attention, finally leading to independence from Serbia. Third, KLA branches operated in the Presheva valley and Macedonia after the Kosovo conflict, thus, those two conflicts are cases of conflict diffusion. The transnational network of
ethnic Albanian rebels had, however, different aims in different territories. While the KLA in its origin Kosovo explicitly fought for independence from Serbia, the UÇPMB in Serbia was more discordant as some again pursued independence from Serbia and future unification with Kosovo, and others demanded a better position of Albanians within Serbia. Finally, in Macedonia the majority of the rebels called for better representation of Albanians in the Macedonian government, that is “for human rights of the Albanians in Macedonia and constitutional reforms” (Daskalovski, 2004, 61). Moreover, not all Albanian nationalists supported the KLA and several rivaling rebel organizations were founded in the 1990s (Heinemann-Grüder and Paes, 2001, 10-11).

Albania played an important role in the KLA’s rise, with the year 1997 as a turning point. Before 1997, the KLA occasionally used northern Albania to build training camps for fighters (Perritt, 2008). Military training in neighboring kin states serving as safe haven is a common insurgent strategy (Salehyan, 2007). The Albanian government did not openly support a Kosovar insurgency but tacitly let the KLA use Albanian territory (International Crisis Group, 1998b). After the pyramid banking schemes in Albania collapsed in the beginning of 1997, the country entered in total chaos with almost no law and order. This had several consequences for Kosovo. In the course of anarchy, the government lost control over parts of northern Albania (International Crisis Group, 1998b, 1). The situation was aggravated by the fact that the newly elected government was Tosk dominated and had generally lesser influence in the mountainous Gheg territories (International Crisis Group, 1998b, 4). Thus, more than ever, the KLA was able to establish training grounds in the ungoverned territory in northern Albania (International Crisis Group, 2004, 6) and to prepare military operations. The most important consequence of Albania’s implosion was the sudden availability of a great amount of weapons (International Crisis Group, 1998b; Khakee and Florquin, 2003; International Crisis Group, 2004). During the chaos, the Albanian army was dissolved and their entire armory was unprotected, so that several hundred thousand small arms were looted and sold. This solved the KLA’s initial problem of a lack of arms (Khakee and Florquin, 2003). With these new opportunities, the KLA had gained an advantage, and due to the collapse of Albania, it was capable of seriously challenging the Yugoslav forces.

As a consequence of the war and the Serbian defeat in Kosovo, a demilitarized "Ground Safety Zone" was established in south-eastern Serbia, where neither the Kosovo Force (KFOR) nor the Yugoslav forces were allowed to enter. Intentionally built as a buffer-zone between mainland Serbia and Kosovo at the end of 1999, the former KLA members and local ethnic Albanians, inspired by the success of their ethnic kin in Kosovo, started to establish bases in the “power vacuum” (Judah,
They launched attacks against Serbian police posts in the municipalities of Preshevë, Medvegjë and Bujanoc (Oschlies, 2001) in south-eastern Serbia, where a significant ethnic Albanian population lives. The insurgent group consisting of 1500 to 1700 persons called itself “Presheva, Medvegja and Bujanoci Liberation Army” (UÇPMB) following the KLA’s naming. Former KLA fighters participated in the UÇPMB and Kosovo served as a supply base, a place for recruitment and safe haven (Heinemann-Grüder and Paes, 2001). Approximately 15 people died during the one and a half years of fighting and more than 1'000 ethnic Albanians fled to the then KFOR-controlled Kosovo. The insurgency ended in spring 2001, when NATO allowed the Yugoslav forces to return to the Ground Safety Zone.

Suffering from the same discrimination and repression by the Serb forces, as their kin in Kosovo had previously suffered, grievances as a base for nationalism and insurgency were strong among the ethnic Albanians in the Presheva valley. The UÇPMB fought for an irredentist unification of the Presheva valley with Kosovo. However, support by the local population for the violent activities was rather weak (Churcher, 2002). Although the situation in the Presheva valley shared many similarities with Kosovo, the international community did not intervene because the Presheva Albanians are only small in numbers and live on the territory of mainland Serbia. Churcher (2002) distinguishes the Albanian rebels in Presheva from those in Kosovo because they were not an unified movement but organized in several “local village defence forces” and thus, a common goal was not elaborated. No Kosovar refugees fled to the Presheva valley. Yet, the KLA members crossing the Kosovo-Serbia border within the ethnic Albanian majority territory were responsible for the spread of the conflict from Kosovo to south-eastern Serbia by encouraging and supporting their local kin. Heinemann-Grüder and Paes (2001) state that “the creation of UÇPMB was not so much an indigenous movement, but rather imported violence from [...] forces in Kosovo.” Although tensions in southern Serbia decreased after the UÇPMB surrendered in May 2001, the southern Balkan soon experienced another insurgency when Albanian nationalism awoke in Macedonia.

During the Kosovo conflict, Macedonia was used by the KLA for fund-raising and recruitment. Ethnic Albanians from Macedonia participated first in the KLA and later in the UÇPMB fighting (International Crisis Group, 1998a; Heinemann-Grüder and Paes, 2001). Before 1999, “Macedonia effectively sealed its borders to cross-border militant activity” (Gleditsch, Cunningham and Salehyan, 2012), but Albanian nationalist insurgents appeared in Macedonia after 1999. The group called itself the “National Liberation Army” (NLA), having in Albanian the same acronym, UÇK, as the KLA in Kosovo, and used symbols and uniforms similar to the KLA. Former KLA insurgents were among the founding members of the NLA.
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Inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia were tense but peaceful since independence in 1991, and the Albanian minority was included in state power as a junior partner. However, several unresolved issues caused grievances among the Albanians, including the status of Albanians in the Macedonian constitution and particularly the number of Albanians living in Macedonia, which provided a fertile ground for nationalist rebel activities (Bellamy, 2002, 124). In early 2001, the NLA began carrying out mostly unorganized attacks against Macedonian forces, quickly escalating into wider violence during spring of the same year. In particular, north-western Macedonia was affected. Consequently, the relations between Albanians and Macedonians deteriorated, and between 70 and 250 people died during the armed clashes (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005). The insurgency ended with the Ohrid Agreement in August 2001, where the Macedonians made several provisions towards the Albanian minority, for instance constitutional changes to improve the status of the ethnic Albanians, and the NLA consequently disarmed.

In contrast to the Kosovo crisis, where the aim of all Albanian parties was independence from Serbia, the majority of Macedonian Albanians disapproved independence from Macedonia but demanded better political representation (Daskalovski, 2004, 61). Thus, while in Kosovo a territorial conflict occurred, a power dispute between the government and an ethnic group over a certain territory, Macedonia displays an example for an ethnic governmental conflict, where the government and an organized ethnic insurgent group contest control over the state. Structural differences explain the various goals of Albanian nationalism in the two countries. While in Kosovo the Albanians are territorially concentrated and constitute a clear majority, the Albanian minority in Macedonia is more diffused. Some municipalities in north-western Macedonia are dominated by Albanians, the area where most of the fighting took place in 2001 (Dyrstad et al., 2011, 371), but additionally many Albanians live in the capital Skopje and other areas of Macedonia. Therefore, Albanian claims for autonomy or separatism from Macedonia would have been less reasonable. Despite structural differences between Kosovo and Macedonia, the Kosovo conflict and the KLA insurgency had several impacts on the NLA’s emergence in Macedonia as a neighboring country with ethnic kin linkages:

- The KLA displayed a demonstration effect on local Macedonian Albanians: The efficient and successful use of force (Bellamy, 2002, 131) against the Serbian governmental forces that finally brought international attention and intervention inspired Macedonian Albanians to radicalize and join the “KLA-branch” NLA in order to improve their political position by the same violent means.
The KLA and later the UÇPMB used Macedonia for fund-raising, to install weapon caches (Heinemann-Grüder and Paes, 2001, 19) and Macedonian Albanians were recruited to join the fighting in Kosovo, respectively southern Serbia (Ortakovski, 2001, 40). When the core area of fighting shifted to Macedonia, the NLA insurgents in turn used Kosovo as a save haven where they recruited additional fighters and obtained armory. Thus, a widespread diffusion of military resources occurred.

Former KLA fighters who were also active in the UÇPMB insurgency now fought alongside NLA rebels (Hislope, 2003). Thus, individual people building the base of ethnic Albanian insurgent activity contributed to the spread of violence.

The diaspora of ethnic Albanians living in the Western countries played an important role in the KLA’s rise through immense financial support (Koinova, 2012). The overall financial contributions to the KLA amounted to approximately 75 to 100 million U.S. dollars and came predominantly from private individuals in Germany, Switzerland and the United States (Perritt, 2008, 88, 90). Besides money, the Albanian diaspora was involved in supplying and sending equipment and weapons to Kosovo, and some diaspora men joined the KLA fighting (Koinova, 2012, 13).

To summarize, evidence from Albania, Serbia and Macedonia partially supports the results of Chapter 7 that the risk of transnational rebel activity is higher in countries with ethnic kin and simultaneous refugee presence. While the KLA had all its extraterritorial presence in countries with transnational ethnic linkages, there is no relationship between refugee presence and transnational KLA activity. The majority of refugees returned to Kosovo after the NATO air campaign had ended and thus, no simultaneous presence of refugees and rebels in a neighboring country was observed. In the Presheva valley, the KLA successor, the UÇPMB, induced a conflict against the Serb governmental forces without Kosovar refugees having previously fled to this region. This confirms the assumption that conflicts spread along transnational ethnic linkages without the simultaneous presence of refugee movements.

8.6 Conclusion

Ethnic group membership influences the role of refugees in conflict diffusion processes. The case study of the Kosovo crisis investigates the causal mechanisms of how refugees flee along trans-border ethnic linkages and consequently impact
Evidence from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis

the asylum state. Since quantitative data on refugees has several limitations, for instance, the UNHCR only offers end year figures and numbers are often estimated, qualitative case research provides a valuable alternative to highlight the complexity of a refugee crisis including several ethnic refugee groups and many receiving countries and territories. The case of the Kosovar Albanian refugees in Macedonia is mentioned in several studies as the key example for a disturbed ethnic balance due to massive refugee inflows that culminated in local civil violence. However, the Kosovo refugee crisis deserves greater scientific attention because Kosovar Albanians fled not only to Macedonia but also to Albania, Montenegro and many other countries. Furthermore, besides the Kosovar Albanians, Kosovar Serbs and other minorities were also forced to flee.

Arguing that refugee outflows are not random but that refugees often flee to countries with cultural similarities and particularly ethnic kin groups, the ethnic background of a refugee group is relevant because it determines to which possible asylum state refugees are most likely to go. As conflicts often spread along transnational ethnic linkages, refugees moving within such cultural connections and causing negative externalities are important actors in conflict diffusion processes. I emphasize that refugees alone do not trigger conflict. The political context the refugees encounter in the asylum state determines whether the negative effects of refugee movements evolve into violent conflict. First, I assume that refugees are most likely to disturb the ethnic balance in the host country if they are co-ethnics of an already aggrieved local minority group. Second, I suppose that insurgent groups follow trans-border ethnic ties, similar to refugee movements, and that co-ethnicity with the local population or refugees facilitates rebel recruitment. While these claims have been statistically evaluated in the precedent chapters of this dissertation, the results of the explorative case analysis of the Kosovo refugee crisis also support the hypotheses.

The refugees from Kosovo followed transnational ethnic linkages and most refugees found asylum in countries with local ethnic kin. Although the refugees were deported to the borders and thus, did not have a choice where to go, within the asylum states they mostly stayed in areas with co-ethnic populations. In Macedonia, the refugee influx was followed by the emergence of a insurgent network and a consequent civil conflict, because the local ethnic Albanians were unsatisfied with their political representation and the high refugee number impacted the ethnic balance. However, in contrast to conclusions of other studies, I did not find a direct link between the refugees from Kosovo and the civil conflict in Macedonia. In Albania, although the KLA established rebel bases, and many refugees from Kosovo entered, no conflict broke out because the Albanians there enjoy a political monopoly.
status. Montenegro, where a smaller Albanian minority lives, also having hosted Kosovar refugees, did not experience rebel activity or conflict. In the southern Serbian Presheva valley an Albanian nationalist rebel insurgency broke out without a previous refugee movement, indicating that conflicts might diffuse along ethnic linkages without refugees. The two different types of conflict which were present in the region: the territorial conflict in Kosovo and the governmental conflict in Macedonia, further suggests that conflict spillovers do not necessarily result in the same incompatibility.
9 Conclusion

9.1 Summary of Key Contributions

This dissertation contributes to the knowledge of refugee flows and their role in conflict diffusion processes along trans-border ethnic linkages in several ways. First, I criticize earlier research of refugee-related conflict processes of insufficiently examining the causal mechanisms of how refugees increase the risk of conflict, and I develop a theoretical approach explaining the ethno-political logic of refugee-related conflict diffusion. Hence, my theory improves on earlier work by providing the first theoretical model of refugees and security in the asylum state that includes the ethnicity of refugees. This increases the understanding of refugee movements and, consequently, allows stakeholders to address humanitarian crises more efficiently. Second, in order to be able to test the theoretical assumptions on refugee-ethnicity, this dissertation introduces a new quantitative dataset that provides global informa-
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Conclusion on the ethnic composition of refugee flows. This is the first systematic data collection on the ethnicity of refugees. Third, three quantitative chapters answer the three core questions of the different aspects of refugee-related conflict diffusion: Chapter 5 investigates the direction of refugee movements and finds that refugees often flee along trans-border ethnic linkages. Chapter 6 focuses on the ethno-political security implications of refugee groups in the asylum state, and Chapter 7 analyzes how refugee groups are associated with transnationally active insurgent groups. Finally, Chapter 8 complements the quantitative results with qualitative evidence from the Kosovo refugee crisis in 1999.

Recent years have seen an increase in quantitative studies aiming to explain the mechanisms of why civil conflicts diffuse. However, besides studies by Lischer (2001), Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) and Salehyan (2007, 2008), the literature has largely ignored combatants or civilians moving between different countries and conflicts and thus, fostering the spread of violence. This dissertation focuses on the security implications of border-transgressing social actors, such as refugees and transnational rebels. The main theoretical contribution is the development of an approach explaining conflict diffusion processes along trans-border ethnic linkages, including refugee movements and rebels. I use the ethnicity of refugees and the ethno-political situation in the host state to examine if and how refugees destabilize their host country. There are four causal mechanisms of refugee-related conflict: First, refugees disturb the ethnic balance in the asylum state. Second, refugees display a demonstration effect on the host population. Third, refugees diffuse military resources, such as weapons, skills and ideologies. Fourth, refugees expand rebel networks. The effect of these factors depends on the ethnicity of the refugee group and the ethno-political context in the host state. Providing the first systematic theoretical explanation of refugee-related conflict diffusion, I claim that conflict is most likely in already unstable states where the ethnic kin group of the refugees suffers from political marginalization, since co-ethnic refugees increase the motivation and opportunities of such groups to revolt. Thus, refugee-related violence depends on structural factors in the asylum state.

The new ECORF dataset provides global information on the ethnicity of refugees and allows the testing of these theoretical claims. Although several authors emphasize that refugee movements from the same country of origin consist of heterogeneous groups, quantitative scholarship has not yet extended its focus beyond the country-level. The new dataset contributes to a better understanding of refugees because the ethnicity is salient throughout all stages of the flight process. First, ethnic group membership determines the risk of becoming a forced migrant, because many civil conflicts target different ethnic groups unequally. Second, the
Conclusion

ethnicity affects the flight patterns of forced migrants. Third, governments often grant asylum status based on group membership and not to individuals, so ethnicity impacts access to receiving states. Finally, ethnic group identities determine the migrants’ relationship to the population in the host country. Thus, the new dataset supplies researchers and policy makers with more in-depth knowledge on global refugee patterns.

The main argument is that ethnic kinship between refugees and politically excluded groups in the asylum state increases the risk of conflict. Hence, we need to know how likely it actually is that refugees find ethnic kin groups in the host state. Qualitative evidence suggests that refugees flee along ethnic or colonial ties into neighboring countries because of existing networks and low assimilation costs. Further, quantitative studies have found that refugees do not leave their home state for any potential asylum country, but that they are pulled to certain directions. Although the literature agrees that a refugee presence in asylum states is not random, there has been no systematic research on the flight routes of refugees that includes ethnicity. Drawing on theories of voluntary migration movements, I develop a theoretical model of refugee flight direction along transnational ethnic ties. Although refugees involuntarily flee their country of origin, I assume that once they have left home, refugees follow the same patterns as other migrants; Refugees choose their destination based on spatial, temporal and cultural determinants. First, refugees go to proximate, in particular neighboring, countries because of accessibility and lower costs. Second, refugees follow previous forced migrants, in particular co-ethnic refugees, because of established transportation and information exchange networks and established humanitarian aid facilities. Third, refugees seek asylum among trans-border ethnic kin, also due to established networks of transportation, information exchange and expected support. The empirical findings based on the data on refugee-ethnicity and trans-border ethnic groups support these hypotheses. This study confirms that ethnicity is an important concept in refugee research and contributes to a better understanding of the logic of refugee flight. Knowing that most refugees flee to neighboring states with kin groups and previous forced migrants allows stakeholders to react more efficiently to future refugee crises and distribute humanitarian help accordingly. Further, finding that refugees tend to follow ethnic ties proves the relevance of the consequent analysis of the ethno-political context of refugee-related insecurity in asylum countries.

Focusing on the negative effects of refugees in asylum states, I investigate the risk of conflict for ethnic groups in refugee-receiving countries. I claim that the negative externalities of refugee inflows are particularly relevant when refugees flee along transnational ethnic connections. The presence of co-ethnic refugees
of a local group increases the size of the latter, and this might challenge other
groups in the country. In particular, kin refugees of a politically excluded minor-
ity increases this group’s political leverage, which simultaneously threatens more
powerful groups Thus, kin refugees of marginalized groups have a stronger impact
on the ethno-political equilibrium in the host country. A common language, shared
habits and cultural bonds facilitate interaction between co-ethnic groups as com-
pared to alien groups. Hence, a demonstration effect is most likely to affect kinship
groups. Similarly, by often showing border-crossing loyalties, co-ethnic groups are
likely to exchange or share military capacities. I found that a group feeling un-
derrepresented, and consequently aggrieved, is receptive to new resources, skills
and information, which increases their opportunity and motivation to challenge their
government. The empirical results suggest that groups that simultaneously lack ap-
propriate access to state politics and host kin refugees have the highest risk of ex-
periencing a civil conflict. Therefore, this study contributes to the knowledge of the
external factors beyond the borders of a country that increases the risk of conflict.
While structural factors are important determinants of grievances and subsequent
violence, international mechanisms, such as refugees, impact internal security and
stability as well.

The third quantitative chapter analyses the connection between refugees and
rebel groups, as another negative mechanism associated with forced migrants is
the assumption that refugees diffuse rebel networks. Descriptive evidence sug-
gests that almost half of all insurgent groups worldwide were active in foreign coun-
tries (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009b). Extraterritorial bases provide
insurgent groups with strategic advantages such as hideouts from the state author-
ities they are combating, increased bargaining power and increased recruitment
opportunities. Transnational rebels are often associated with refugees because
they hide, operate or recruit in refugee settlements, but we still know very little on
the prevailing expansion patterns of transnational rebel groups. In addition to geo-
spatial factors, I highlight that the ethnic background of rebel groups determines
where they establish foreign bases. First, rebels follow cross-border ties, because
of networks and support from the local population, particularly if the latter is also dis-
affected. This explains why refugees and rebels often move to the same locations.
Second, I maintain that co-ethnicity between rebels and refugees increases pos-
sibilities for collaboration. Ethnic kinship allows rebels to use refugee settlements
as shelter and to recruit among refugees due to their common grievances. Using
new data on ethnically identified non-state actors, the risk of border-transgressing
rebel activity in connection with refugees and ethnic kin groups is estimated. The
results yield statistical evidence that insurgent movements are likely to operate from
proximate territories populated by co-ethnics and refugee communities. Hence, this chapter improves the knowledge of the strategies of transnationally active violent non-state actors.

The quantitative results are further confirmed by qualitative evidence from the Kosovo refugee crisis. Several authors view the civil conflict in Macedonia in 2001 as a result of the war and consequent refugee crisis in Kosovo in 1999, because the massive refugee influx destabilized the local ethnic power balance. Therefore, this case is selected for an explorative investigation. Kosovar Albanians fled not only to Macedonia but also to Albania, Montenegro and many other countries. Further, besides the Kosovar Albanians, Roma, Serbs and other minorities were forced to flee. Complementing this dissertation’s statistical findings, the Kosovar refugees fled along transnational linkages. Since the refugees were deported by Serbs and forced to the borders, they disprove the choice-argument. However, most stayed in territories of co-ethnics in neighboring host countries, particularly Albania and Macedonia. The case in Macedonia supports the importance of the ethno-political context in refugee-receiving countries. Since its independence Macedonia has suffered from ethnic tensions between the majority Macedonians and the minority Albanians. After the Kosovo crisis, a border-transgressing insurgent network was established and a civil conflict broke out as a reaction to the underrepresentation and dissatisfaction of the local Albanians. Despite the Macedonian government’s fear that the refugees would threaten the ethnic balance, the refugees from Kosovo were not directly involved in the conflict in Macedonia because the vast majority of them had returned home before the violence erupted. In contrast, Albania hosted approximately half of the refugee caseload as well as trans-border KLA bases, and did not suffer from tensions after the refugee crisis because the Albanians in Albania have a political monopoly position. Montenegro experienced neither rebel activity nor conflict after having hosted kin refugees because the Albanian minority there constitutes six percent only and has, thus, little political leverage. However, Albanian nationalist insurgents expanded to southern Serbia, where no refugees were present, indicating that conflicts also diffuse along ethnic linkages without refugees. The qualitative examination improves the understanding of the causal mechanisms linking refugees and conflict by highlighting that refugees alone do not cause violence, but that refugee crises can intensify previously existing political tensions.
9 Conclusion

9.2 Limitations and Extensions

Despite its theoretical and empirical input to conflict diffusion processes, this dissertation has several limitations, which offer scope for future research. The following subsection begins by discussing the problematic aspects of the concept *ethnicity*. Then, I elaborate the issues related to quantitative data of conflict actors. Finally, I suggest directions for future research beyond the impact of refugees on conflict onset.

First, when explaining refugee-related conflict risks with ethno-political arguments, one must consider that ethnicity is a constructed concept. I define ethnic group membership based on either common linguistic, religious or somatic features, but people identified as co-ethnics are often heterogeneous in terms of language, religion or social and political views. The constructivist approach to ethnicity that informs this dissertation acknowledges that ethnic identities are fluid and changeable. However, individual people are still counted in aggregated categories. While the annual coding of the refugee ethnicity data tracks the dynamics of changing identifications, some people or even groups cannot easily be categorized. As a concrete example: to which ethnic group do children of inter-ethnic couples belong? Moreover, ethnicity is a highly disputed and often politically misused concept. In ethnic conflicts targeting particular groups, providing information on the ethnicity of refugees might put these people in further danger. Therefore, UNHCR is very cautious in publishing information on ethnicity, besides case-based evidence that sub-country-level knowledge can improve humanitarian aid provision.

Due to these problematic aspects, and because data is difficult to code and obtain, the numbers of ethnic refugees are only estimates and are possibly imprecise. In addition, conflict-related count data can be unreliable because the various warring parties have different motivations to either over or underestimate refugee figures. Besides these shortcomings, quantitative refugee data is nevertheless salient for the study of global forced migrant processes. Since examining conflict risks at the ethnic group-level elucidates the mechanisms fostering refugee-related conflict, a future approach should take geo-spatial information on the location of refugee settlements into account, whether the refugees are concentrated in camps or live in urban areas, and whether they live in territories of disaffected ethnic kin groups.

Furthermore, the quantitative data aggregated to the ethnic refugee group-level does not examine individual experiences of flight. In order to avoid the perception of undifferentiated refugee groups accused of triggering violence, I want to emphasize again that refugees are civilian victims who suffered persecution or violence in their
home country. Most refugees never engage in violence neither in the country of origin nor in the country of asylum.

Finally, while this dissertation focuses on conflict diffusion, future research could examine the impact of ethnic refugee movements and border-transgressing insurgent groups on the intensity and duration of conflict, as well as how they affect peace agreements and reoccurrence of violence. For instance, the focus on the groups in the refugee-receiving countries in Chapter 6 could be extended to a dyadic analysis of refugee-sending and receiving countries and ethnic groups respectively, and how refugees affect conflict in both directions. Also, the causes of refugee-related civil conflict in the asylum country could be further disaggregated in order to determine whether the refugees, the ethnic kin group or the government initiated the violence.

9.3 Policy Implications

This dissertation shows that refugees are no passive victims but active social actors. As a negative consequence of conflicts, refugees can influence negative externalities in asylum states. However, when addressed correctly, these adverse effects can be limited and thus, should not deter state governments from opening their borders to refugees. Responding to the three main questions posed in Chapter 1 - Where do refugees go? When do refugees cause conflict in the asylum state? When do refugees collaborate with rebels? - with theoretically and statistically supported findings, leads to the following policy implications.

First, knowing the direction of refugee movements allows for improved and more efficient planning in emergency situations and organizing the support of potential asylum states. Most refugees prefer to stay close to their country of origin to maintain connections with their home state in order to return home when peace is established. Thus, it is important that the international community assists the countries of first asylum in the conflict experiencing region. However, as an alternative, refugees could be relocated voluntarily to third states more willing to accept them. This alleviates the burden of countries of immediate first asylum.

Second, situations with inappropriate assistance cause grievances among refugees destabilizing the host state; for instance, a political majority group may be unwilling to accommodate minority kin refugees. Hence, the host state, with help from international organizations, should provide enough assistance to meet the refugees’ needs, which, although costly, will secure internal security in the long-term. Appropriate refugee assistance and adequate control mechanisms in camp set-
tlements also decreases opportunities for forced recruitment and manipulation of refugees. Security in camps can be improved by establishing large camps away from bordering areas which are known to be the most conflict-prone and the most easily accessed by warring factions of the home state. Further, refugees need opportunities for employment and self-sustained living as an effective alternative to joining a rebel group. Knowledge of the relationship between rebels and refugees decreases the risk that innocent refugees are forcibly recruited and exploited by subversive groups. The UNHCR pursues a strict policy of impeding refugee instrumentalization by militaries, particularly since the disastrous events during the Great Lakes crisis in the 1990s. However, more recent incidences, such as Syrian refugee camps in Turkey that provide shelter to the Free Syrian Army (Letsch, 2013), demonstrate that refugee militarization is still a problem. Hence, more knowledge on the causes of refugee-related insecurity contributes to a clearer distinction between civilians with rights for humanitarian assistance and armed groups.

Finally, host states could decrease the risk of external shocks caused by refugees which threaten internal stability by avoiding exclusionary policies and institutionalizing some sort of power-sharing agreement on the national level. This is important not only because political marginalization is a primary reason for refugee-producing civil conflicts and wars, but also because disaffected ethnic groups render more support to transnational rebel groups which also threaten the security of the host state. In particular, states in bad neighborhoods, that have a higher risk of receiving refugees, will be less vulnerable to the negative externalities associated with forced migrants if they establish political structures which promote domestic stability.

Thus, to end with a concrete example, how should Lebanon react to the Syrian refugee influx threatening its fragile political and economic stability? Closing borders is neither an ethical nor feasible option. The international community should pursue a strategy of assisting both the refugees and the population in the asylum country, as the latter may have the same needs as refugees, in order to avoid both grievances among the refugees and tensions between the refugees and the local population. Dahi (2013) writes that the “crisis in Lebanon cannot be solved through humanitarian assistance alone. The refugees are too many and too desperate, and they are likely to stay for too long. The solution must come through a combination of investment in longer-term development and attention to immediate humanitarian needs.” In addition, local leaders can contribute to the acceptance of forced migrants in host communities by not falsely accusing the refugees of causing tensions and thereby increasing ethnic polarization and destabilization.
References


References


References


References


References


Figure 9.1: Histogram of Size of Ethnically Identified Refugee Groups
Table 9.1: Ethnic Groups with Kin Refugees and Conflict Onset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Country of refugee origin</th>
<th>Estimated refugee number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>4'165</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>375'017</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>Somali (Ogaden)</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Indigenous people</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>44'884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Tuareg</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>12'350</td>
</tr>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>38'146</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>Toubou</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1'900</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tajiks</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>1996</td>
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<td>Burundi, Rwanda</td>
<td>60'927</td>
</tr>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>Djibuti</td>
<td>17'100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>1998</td>
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<td>Angola</td>
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<td>Albanians</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>2'493</td>
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Table 9.2: Ethnic Groups with Transnational Rebel Activity and Refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start year</th>
<th>Group name</th>
<th>Rebel group(s) name</th>
<th>Neighbor country</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>TEK link</th>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Tigry</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Khmer</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
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<td>URNG</td>
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Abbreviations

ACD  Armed Conflict Dataset
COA  Country of Asylum
COO  Country of Origin
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
ECORF Ethnic Composition of Refugee Flows
EPR  Ethnic Power Relations
ETA  Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and Freedom
ETH  Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
FRY  Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GeoEPR Geo-referenced Ethnic Power Relations
IDP  Internally Displaced Person
IRA  Irish Republican Army
JEM  Justice and Equality Movement
KDP  Kurdistan Democratic Party
KFOR Kosovar Forces
KLA  Kosovo Liberation Army
MAR Minorities At Risk
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NLA National Liberation Army
NSA Non-State Actor
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
PRIO Peace Research Institute Oslo
PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
ROC Receiver Operator Characteristics
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
TEK Trans-Border Ethnic Kin
UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UCPMB Ushtria Çlirimtare e Preshevës, Medvegjës e Bujanocit, Presheva Medvegja and Bujanoci Liberation Army
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
US United States
USCRI United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants