Doctoral Thesis

Ethnic mobilization, equality and conflict in multi-ethnics states

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Summary

What are the effects of ethnic mobilization on ethnic equality and conflict? Most of the existing literature has seen ethnic mobilization as harmful to democracy and peace. In contrast, this study argues that the effect of ethnic political parties and civil society organizations depends on the type of multi-ethnic society at hand. Based on a theoretical and empirical analysis of the link between different ethnic markers and ethno-political inequality, this study develops a typology of “ranked” and “unranked” ethnic systems. Ranked systems are defined as countries characterized by the dominance of a European or European-descendant group over other groups perceived to be racially distinct. The latter are based on other ethnic cleavages, such as language, and are characterized by more equal ethnic group relations without a historically determined hierarchy. The study argues that the patterns and effects of ethnic mobilization should differ significantly between these two types of multi-ethnic societies. It tests this claim with both quantitative and qualitative methods, combining statistical analyses with four case studies based on field research. Empirically, it presents two new datasets on ethnic and trans-ethnic civil society organizations in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. The empirical analyses reveal four main findings. First, ethnic group mobilization follows different motivations in ranked and unranked systems. Second, ethnic parties increase the risk of ethnic dominance and violence in unranked systems. Third, the processes of mobilization, inequality, and conflict in unranked systems often follow a vicious or virtuous cycle. Fourth, in ranked systems, ethnic parties and civil society organizations increase the level of peaceful collective action only. Yet, they enhance ethnic equality by empowering historically marginalized groups. The case studies reconstruct the mechanisms by which ethnic organizations influence equality and conflict. The study concludes by discussing both the theoretical and practical implications of these results.
Zusammenfassung

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M.V.
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Introduction

On the 21\textsuperscript{st} of January 2000, a popular uprising, backed by junior officers of the army, toppled Ecuador’s elected President Jamil Mahuad, replacing him with a three-man “Junta of National Salvation” before the high command of the military restored order. One of the three members of the ephemeral junta was Antonio Vargas, president of the indigenous organization CONAIE and thus leader of Latin America’s arguably most powerful ethnic movement. Indigenous organizations were in the midst of the political upheaval of those days, after they had been fighting for the rights of these historically marginalized ethnic groups for decades and became a major political force in the 1990s. Soon after the tumultuous events of January 2000, the indigenous-based political party Pachakutik scored a major electoral victory in the local and regional elections of May 2000, ensuring indigenous groups a hitherto unmatched level of political power in various regions of the country.¹

Just about one month before the ousting of Mahuad in Ecuador, on December 24, 1999, a seemingly very similar incident had occurred in the West African state of Côte d’Ivoire. A mutiny of disaffected soldiers was utilized by former General Robert Gueï, who had previously been removed from the army command, to take power in a \textit{coup d’état}. This event constituted the first act of force against democracy and peace in a country that had come to be seen as a haven of political stability in that region. Yet, it also constituted the first escalation of the ethno-political competition in the country that in the preceding years had become increasingly intense and increasingly violent. Gueï hailed from an ethnic group that – like other ethnic groups in the country – had become politically marginalized under the deposed president. Yet, instead of rectifying the existing grievances, he continued with the politics of exclusion, preparing the ground for the bloody civil conflicts that were soon to come.²

Ethno-political mobilization, as described in these two examples, has become a defining characteristic of post-World War II politics (Gurr et al. 1993; Horowitz 1985; Olzak 2006; Wimmer 2002; Young 1976). At first view, these examples from two completely different world regions both seem to confirm the common notion of its dangerous effects. Scholars have often viewed these ethnic movements with fearful eyes (Horowitz 1985; Huntington 2004; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Radu 2005; Reilly 2006; Schlesinger Jr. 1992). Yet, the ground – in the form of empirical evidence – on which this fear rests, is still shaky. This study analyzes the effects of ethnic mobilization in different parts of the world, and under different configurations of inter-ethnic

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¹ See Gerlach (2003, 163-203) for a detailed description of the events in January 2000; Becker (2011) for the rise of Ecuador’s indigenous movement; and Becker (2011, 71), Ospina (2006), Ospina, Santillana and Arboleda (2008), and Van Cott (2008) regarding indigenous political power at local and regional levels.

² See Bouquet (2011, 38-9, 287-8) about the December 1999 coup; Crook (1997) about the increasing violence of political competition; and Langer (2005, 40-2) for Gueï’s exclusionary politics.
relations. Concretely, the study seeks answers to the question: *What are the effects of ethnic mobilization on ethnic equality and ethnic conflict?*

Most of today’s states are multi-ethnic, resulting in what has been termed a “state-to-nation imbalance” (Miller 2007, 2). In the modern world, dominated by the principle that “ethnic likes should rule over ethnic likes” (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 92), democratic politics in these states are often fraught with conflict or unleash powerful exclusionary mechanisms against ethnically defined “others”, ranging from tyrannical repression to murderous ethnic cleansing (Mann 2005). Moreover, where economic resources are scarce and connected to the state, as in many post-colonial countries of Africa and Asia, ethnicity commonly forms the main basis for political alliances, patronage and the distribution of resources (Brass 1985; Chandra 2004; Horowitz 1985; Lemarchand 1972; Wimmer 1997; Zolberg 1968). At the individual level, ethnicity is less susceptible to re-identification or re-organization than other social identities (Bartolini 2000; Kaufmann 1996; Sambanis 2008). Even in advanced industrial economies, ethnic identities remain sticky (Cederman 2001). Accordingly, while the vast majority of armed conflicts since World War II have been intra-state wars (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010, 503), many of them were ultimately rooted in ethno-nationalism and ethnic grievances (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 1994; Gurr et al. 1993; Petersen 2002; Wimmer 2004).

Hence, in a very fundamental way, this study is about the equal and peaceful co-existence of different groups in multi-ethnic states. Beyond their superficial similarity, Côte d’Ivoire and Ecuador represent two very distinct ways in which ethnicity shapes patterns of political power and conflict in such countries. Indeed, they could serve as actual epithets for the two sides of the main theoretical argument advanced in this study. To put it in a nutshell, I argue that the effects of ethnic mobilization depend on the type of multi-ethnic society at hand.

Let me describe the basic distinction made in this study in generalized terms. In one type of multi-ethnic society, ethnicity is embodied in historical power hierarchies characterized by the dominance of one group over others. In the other type, ethnicity constitutes the politically relevant cleavage between different groups that meet each other on a relatively equal footing. Hence, while in the former type ethnicity serves as a tool of permanent oppression, in the latter it forms the basis of fierce competition. The former type is characterized by an “equilibrium of inequality”, the latter by ethno-nationalism and a struggle over hegemony in which the patterns of political inclusion and exclusion are relatively fluid over time. In the words of Horowitz (1985), I call these two types of multi-ethnic societies “ranked” and “unranked” ethnic systems.

Due to its particular history of colonial conquest and slavery, of all ethnic markers, race lends itself best to the creation of such stable and firm ethnic hierarchies that are characteristic of ranked societies. If ethnic differences are used by state-building elites to exclude specific groups from access to political power (Tilly 1998), race is the most useful marker for this pur-
pose because European racist ideologies provide a “logical” reason to keep non-European groups excluded. The ongoing political and economic dominance of the West has made its exclusionary force more powerful than the sheer ethno-demographic tyranny resulting from the conjunction of nationalism and democracy (Mann 2005). Hence, I consider as ranked ethnic systems those countries in which European or European-descendant groups live together with “racial others”.

As a result of the distinct ethno-political constellations, the effects of ethnic mobilization differ significantly between ranked and unranked ethnic systems. In the competitive environment of the latter, where the dangers of ethno-nationalist competition loom large and the capacities for violent action are relatively evenly distributed, strong ethnic mobilization should have a negative effect on both ethnic equality and the prospects of peace. The conflict risk is greatest if ethnic mobilization coincides with a situation of ethnic exclusion, because for full-blown civil conflicts to break out and be sustained, motivational factors – in the form of grievances – need to be present. In contrast, ethnic organizations should have a more direct effect on small-scale violence.

Because of the profound ethnic inequalities and the minor role of ethno-nationalism in these societies, I expect ethnic mobilization to take a mostly peaceful course in ranked ethnic systems. Moreover, rather than causing inequality, it promotes the political empowerment of historically discriminated groups and thus enhances ethnic equality.

In addition to this structural argument that links historical ethno-political constellations to distinct patterns and outcomes of ethnic mobilization, this study focuses on ethnic organizations as the agents driving this mobilization. I present an integrated view of political parties and civil society organizations, conceptualizing them as more or less institutionalized elite networks. Both of these two types of organizations serve as instruments of organizational power which help to advance ethnic claims, mobilize people, and orchestrate collective action.

The existing literature on ethnic organizations has mainly focused on ethnic political parties. Scholars have analyzed the political representation of ethnic minorities in Europe (Bochsler 2011; De Winter and Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002; Gordin 2002; Spirova and Stefanova 2012), the emergence of ethnic parties in Latin America (Madrid 2012; Van Cott 2005), and processes of ethnic outbidding and radicalization in non-Western developing countries (Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2006). Some scholars working on democratization have also warned against the ethnicization of civil society in newly established democracies (Diamond 2000, 200; Gellner 1991, 133; Gyimah-Boadi 1996). However, while this literature has extensively described the main characteristics and workings of ethnic organizations, it is very much divided
between different regional areas and research fields. As a consequence, systematic empirical evidence of the effects of such organizations is rare.\(^3\)

On the other hand, empirical studies of ethnic conflict are often only loosely connected to this literature on ethnic organizations (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 2000b; Gurr et al. 1993; Østby 2008; Stewart 2008a). While they have made major advances with regard to the theoretical conceptualization and empirical measurement of ethnic grievances (see esp. Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Gurr et al. 1993; and Stewart 2008b), the important mobilizational processes between grievances and conflict remain understudied. Furthermore, these works have not taken into account how different degrees of inequalities might condition the dynamics of ethnic politics. This study does not challenge the well substantiated link between ethnic inequalities and ethnic conflict. However, it identifies ranked ethnic systems as a subtype of multi-ethnic countries in which extreme inequality leads to the opposite outcome: ethno-political stability.

In contrast to previous works about ranked and unranked systems (Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001; Hechter 1978; Horowitz 1985, 21-36; Mason 2003), this study presents a globally applicable typology of the two types of ethnic systems, based on an explicit, theoretically grounded definition, focusing on political inequalities, and backed by systematic empirical evidence. It examines the effect of ethnic mobilization on outcomes of ethnic equality and conflict in both types of systems, in three analytical steps, moving down from a global comparison to the more detailed quantitative analyses of two particularly meaningful regions, and finally to the examination of single cases, based on field research. In addition to the structural relationships, the study also examines the specific role of ethnic organizations in the causal processes, in an attempt to shed light on the “mobilizational black box” in between the measured or alleged ethnic grievances and the observed political outcomes.

The methodological approach employed in this study combines the power of abstraction and generalization of quantitative research with the contextual precision and analytical depth of qualitative studies on the basis of a detailed theoretical argument – what Lieberman (2005) has termed “nested analysis”. Moreover, the global coverage, spanning diverse world regions, provides a very solid basis to arrive at generally valid insights. On the empirical side, the study presents two new datasets on ethnic civil society organizations in Latin America, and ethnic and trans-ethnic civil society organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The study proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 starts with a discussion of the existing literature on ethnicity, ethnic mobilization, and ethnic conflict. The rest of the chapter lays out the structural part of my argument in more detail and presents empirical evidence that racial differences between European or European-descendant groups and so-called “racial others” indeed result in

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\(^3\) Notable exceptions are Basedau et al. (2011); Birnir (2007); Chandra (2012); Ishiyama (2009); Madrid (2012, 165-78); and Varshney (2001).
the most profound ethnic inequalities, while other cleavages, such as religious or linguistic divisions, usually result in more equal and fluid group relations. The list of ranked ethnic systems in the fourth section of the chapter is based on this empirical evidence and the underlying theoretical considerations. The chapter ends with a discussion of various possible challenges to my argument.

Chapter 2 focuses on the actor-centered part of the argument and the causal mechanisms. It discusses the functions that ethnic parties and civil society organizations fulfill and which, in their basic form, apply to unranked as well as to ranked systems. The chapter then proceeds to systematically outline the causal mechanisms linking these ethnic organizations to distinct outcomes in the two types of multi-ethnic societies, due to their different ethno-political constellations. The chapter ends with formulating testable hypotheses.

The empirical part of the study tests these hypotheses with both quantitative and qualitative methods. It consists of five different chapters. After describing in detail the methodological approach and the data used in this study, Chapter 3 provides a systematical comparison between ranked and unranked ethnic systems regarding various key variables of interest at the global level. This dichotomous comparison shows, first, that the ranked ethnic systems identified in Chapter 1 have a significantly lower conflict risk, confirming the notion of an equilibrium of inequality, and second, that ethnic party mobilization has different roots in the two types of ethnic systems.

The last part of the chapter reveals that in unranked systems ethnic parties help ethnic groups to achieve and maintain political dominance. Moreover, they are also associated with a higher risk of ethnic conflict at the country level, especially under conditions of simultaneous ethnic exclusion. In contrast, in ranked ethnic systems, I find no evidence of a systematic relationship between ethnic parties and dominance on the one hand and civil conflict on the other. Yet, strong ethnic parties are correlated with high levels of peaceful ethnic group protest. The analysis also reveals that historically marginalized groups with ethnic parties are more likely to achieve political empowerment than those without ethnic parties.

Chapter 4 focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa, a region consisting almost completely of unranked systems, while in the literature it is often associated with civil conflicts driven by factors other than ethnicity. It uses the dataset on ethnic and trans-ethnic civil society organizations and additional data on small-scale social conflict to refine the global analyses. The results indicate that there is a cumulative effect of high trans-ethnic cooperation over time, decreasing ethnic conflict risk in the long-term. Furthermore, in line with the theoretical argument, they confirm that ethnic parties exert a more direct effect on small-scale violence, especially electoral violence, than on full-blown ethnic conflicts. Overall, the ethno-political dynamics detected in this
particular subsample mirror those at the global level of unranked systems. Additionally, the chapter discusses the crucial role of ethnic parties in various examples of African conflict cases. The comparative case study of Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon in Chapter 5 analyzes the relationships between elite networks in political parties and civil society and patterns of ethnic mobilization, equality and conflict in more depth. It focuses on the causal role of ethnic and trans-ethnic organizations, which the statistical analyses by themselves cannot reveal, and shows how on the one hand, ethnic organizations exacerbated the ethno-political competition, provoked a situation of ethnic exclusion and finally helped mount an ethnically motivated rebellion in Côte d’Ivoire, while strong trans-ethnic organizations mitigated group competition in Gabon and promoted ethnic inclusion and peace. The historical characteristics of elite networks in the two countries are identified as the decisive factors in the causal chain, unleashing opposing cycles of spiraling competition and violence in one case and of a mutually reinforcing effect of trans-ethnic cooperation and ethnic inclusion in the other.

Chapter 6 moves the analysis to Latin America, the hotbed of racially divided societies, to analyze the dynamics of ethnic mobilization in ranked systems in more detail. Drawing on my new dataset about ethnic civil society organizations in the region, the main finding of this chapter is the positive effect of both ethnic parties and these organizations on ethnic equality, promoting the empowerment of historically marginalized ethnic groups. Secondly, the chapter examines the impact of intra-ethnic cleavages along linguistic and/or religious lines within these groups. The evidence however, is mixed as there is no linear effect of such fragmentation on the likelihood of empowerment, but instead a distinct influence on the different steps in a gradual process of political advancement. Finally, while ethnic parties increase the level of peaceful ethnic group protest, I find no evidence of a systematic link between ethnic parties and any kind of conflict or political upheaval.

Comparing ethnic mobilization processes in Guatemala and Ecuador, Chapter 7 reconstructs the causal mechanisms linking strong ethnic organizations to political empowerment in ranked ethnic systems. The qualitative design also allows me to examine in more detail how intra-ethnic cleavages obstruct this empowerment and how reluctant state elites capitalize on these divisions to maintain the historical ethnic hierarchy. The analysis shows that although linguistic and (to a lesser extent) religious divisions have been important factors in both countries, they are only one of several intra-ethnic fault lines debilitating ethnic mobilization. Importantly, there is no evidence that the political turmoil which has coincided with the rise of the ethnic movement in Ecuador – expressed, for instance, in the events described at the beginning of this Introduction – is causally linked to the latter.

The concluding chapter summarizes all empirical results in light of the theoretical argument, relates them back to the existing literature, and discusses open questions and promising routes
of future research. I conclude that racist ideologies born in the era of colonialism continue to shape today’s ethnic hierarchies wherever the former colonizers live together with groups perceived to be racially distinct. While there are certainly other important differences among multi-ethnic countries, the distinction between such racially divided ranked societies and unranked systems is highly relevant both for academic research and practical policy making because it decisively shapes our thinking about ethnic organizations. The results of this study reveal clear differences in how ethnic mobilization evolves in the two types of societies and how ethnic organizations influence the equal and peaceful co-existence of different groups in these states.
PART I: THEORY

This first theoretical chapter will focus on the structural argument of the study. It first discusses the existing literature on ethnicity, grievances, ethnic mobilization and conflict, identifying the achievements of these studies and outlining how I aim to contribute to and improve on them. The second section constitutes the core of this chapter, as it explains my distinction between ranked and unranked systems. After substantiating my theoretical argument with systematic empirical evidence, I present a global list of ranked ethnic systems. The fifth section argues that due to the distinct ethno-political constellations, the patterns and effects of ethnic mobilization differ significantly between these two types of multi-ethnic countries. The chapter concludes by addressing various possible challenges to my argument.

1.1. From Grievances to Conflict: Ethno-nationalism, Ethno-political Competition, and Ethnic Mobilization

When analyzing the effects of ethnic mobilization on conflict or peace, ethnic exclusion or inclusion, we need to be able to answer several questions at once. How is ethnicity linked to collective grievances and violent conflict? How do ethnic groups – in principle, nothing more than mere social categories – become collective political actors? And under what circumstances is this collective action possible and leads to the stipulated outcomes?

In the first section of this chapter, I will review how the existing literature has answered these questions and identify what I believe to be its major shortcomings. I argue that the civil war literature has not sufficiently examined the important processes of collective action and group mobilization between ethnic grievances and conflict – resulting in what I call a “mobilizational black box”. Too often, these scholars’ arguments are only loosely connected to the literature that has focused on ethnic organizations able to foment ethnic collective action. This body of the literature is in turn plagued by geographical and disciplinary fragmentation and a lack of systematic empirical research on the effects of such organizations.

Ethnic Identity, Grievances, and Conflict

Ethnicity is usually understood as a person’s most basic identity, related to such traits as language, religion, skin color and other phenotypical features believed to be innate (Horowitz 1985, 51-2). Based on such observable, descent-based markers, ethnic groups are seen and/or see themselves as communities of a shared culture and common ancestry (Horowitz 1985; Weber 1976b). Ethnic cleavages are often considered more profound or are more easily mobilized and,
hence, are more conflict-prone than other social cleavages (see e.g. Kaufmann 1996; Sambanis 2008). As Bartolini (2000, 21) has pointed out, for example, class divisions are more likely to be transcended through individual or group mobility than ethnic cleavages which are prone “to survive over time and to encapsulate their respective communities”. Sambanis (2008, 11-6) has referred to these specific features of ethnic identity as stickiness and visibility. Thus, although it is just one possible way of people’s identification and social organization (Chandra 2006), ethnicity seems to be less malleable than other social identities and thus, less susceptible to re-identification or re-organization.

The literature on ethnic politics suggests two paramount mechanisms that link ethnicity and ethnic mobilization to civil conflict: ethno-nationalist ambitions, and ethno-political competition over access to the state and its material and symbolic resources (Brass 1985; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gellner 1983; Horowitz 1985; Mann 2005; Weiner 1971; Wimmer 2002). Due to the conjunction of nationalism and democracy in the modern world, ethnicity has become directly linked to political legitimacy.⁴ The French Revolution transferred political authority from absolutist rulers to the people: the “nation”. Although the term originally referred to a strictly political or legal concept designating a political community of citizens, the power of nationalist ideas made the demos become equated with an ethnically defined community (Brubaker 1992; Gellner 1983; Mann 2005), giving rise to the idea that “ethnic likes should rule over ethnic likes” (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 92).

However, since the state system cannot accommodate all potential nations, most of today’s states are multi-ethnic (Gellner 1983, 2; Linz and Stepan 1996, 30), resulting in what has been termed a “state-to-nation imbalance” (Miller 2007, 2). Under these conditions, the hegemonic ethno-nationalist aspirations of ethnic groups have often unleashed powerful exclusionary mechanisms against ethnically distinct population segments (Mann 2005). In addition, the expansion and growing power of centralized state apparatuses – themselves very much linked to the cultural medium of language⁵ – institutionally sanctioned inequalities between state-building groups at the center and minorities in peripheral areas (Hechter 1975; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).⁶

Therefore, the parallel processes of state and nation building have often resulted in ethnic inequalities, reflecting Tilly’s (1998) account of how categorical distinctions are used by organized groups to create durable boundaries and exclude others from access to resources, opportun-

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⁴ Nationalism can be defined as a principle of political legitimacy which holds that “the political and the national unit should be congruent” and that “ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones” (Gellner 1983, 1).
⁵ See Weber (1976a) for an historical account of how diverse, polyglot populations were unified to a more or less homogenous state-people by means of universal education and military mobilization.
⁶ Hechter (1975) argues that if political inequalities between the dominant ethnic group and the minorities overlap with economic inequalities between the center and the periphery, the marginalization amounts to a situation of “internal colonialism”.

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ties, and (political) power. Such inequalities may then cause widespread ethnic grievances among the affected groups which prepare the ground for ethno-political mobilization and violent resistance (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Gurr 2000b; Gurr et al. 1993; Petersen 2002; Wimmer 1997). Furthermore, if marginalized groups can count on ethnic kin groups in neighboring states, the dangers of spiraling irredentist conflict loom large (Weiner 1971).

In developing and/or post-colonial countries, where institutions are weak, and economic opportunities are scarce and closely connected to the state, ethnicity often forms the main basis for political alliances, patronage networks, and the distribution of the state’s resources (Bates 1974; Brass 1985; Chandra 2004; Diamond 1988; Gurr 1968; Horowitz 1985; Lemarchand 1972; Wimmer 2002; Woods 1994). In this environment, ethnic leaders in the government and state bureaucracy act as guardians of ethnic groups in a kind of “protectoral” system (Jackson and Rosberg 1984, 193). Through networks of ethnic clientelism, they channel the resources of the central state all the way down to local villages in exchange for political support which links the well-being of ordinary group members to the fate of their leaders (Bratton 1989, 414; Jackson and Rosberg 1984; Lemarchand 1972; Wimmer 1997). Again, under such competitive conditions, the exclusion of specific ethnic groups from access to the state works as a trigger for discontent among elites and the ordinary population of the affected groups (Gurr et al. 1993; Horowitz 1985; Wimmer 1997).

Apart from the material stakes, Horowitz (1985) has drawn our attention to the socio-psychological aspect of this group struggle, namely to what he called an “invidious group comparison” juxtaposing backward and advanced ethnic groups in a country. Selfinterested political elites can use these feelings in pursuit of their own career aspirations against opponents of different ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985, 225-6). Scholars from the instrumentalist tradition have often focused on this point, emphasizing the role of ethnic entrepreneurs who manipulate ethnic fears amongst the population to their own benefits (De Figueiredo and Weingast 1999; Gagnon 1994-1995; Lake and Rothchild 1996). Moreover, although the ideology is often less strongly developed in this environment, ethno-nationalist ideas imported by colonialism have nevertheless influenced the political imagery and provide a widely accepted script for ethnic group claims, that can easily be exploited by group leaders.8

Accordingly, scholars working on multi-ethnic countries in the post-colonial world have often talked of an ethno-political struggle over access to the state and its material and symbolic resources (Brass 1985; Horowitz 1985; Wimmer 1997). This idea will also become important for my own argument, as we shall see below. However, as I will explain in more detail in the next sections of this chapter, instead of generalizing the notion of an ethno-political struggle to all mul-

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7 See also Gurr (1968) who coined the term “relative deprivation” to describe individuals’ and groups’ perception of political and economic inequalities.
8 On the influence of European ethno-nationalist ideas on the colonial administration in Africa and Asia, see e.g. Anderson (1991), Posner (2005), and Vail (1989).
ti-ethnic countries, my own theoretical argument relates it to one specific type: unranked ethnic systems, composed of a priori equal groups without any predetermined historical hierarchies between them.

In sum, both ethno-nationalism and ethno-political competition produce grievances which may foster the political mobilization of underprivileged groups and eventually lead to violent ethnic conflicts. Ted Gurr and his research team were among the first to systematically analyze ethnic grievances and their connection to group mobilization and ethnic conflict. The Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset provides measures of discrimination against ethnic minorities, these groups’ voiced grievances, and their levels of political mobilization and rebellious activities (Gurr et al. 1993; Gurr and Moore 1997). The results of this research showed ethnic discrimination to produce collective grievances that in turn spur group mobilization and increase the risk of ethnic conflict (Gurr 2000b; Gurr et al. 1993).9 However, the sample of ethnic groups in this dataset remains incomplete since it does not include majority groups (which usually constitute the target point of minority political mobilization) and politically relevant minority groups that are not considered “at risk”, which may lead to flawed conclusions about the patterns of ethnic politics in multi-ethnic societies in general (Hug 2003).

The more recent Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset provides a more comprehensive database on politically relevant ethnic groups, including majority and “state-controlling” groups (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). This has fostered new research that has corroborated the effect of inequalities and grievances on ethnic conflict (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012), adding to the results of other authors working with alternative data on ethnicity and ethnic inequalities (Birnir 2007; Østby 2008; Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009; Stewart 2008b).

However, while this research convincingly links inequalities to conflict, it tells us much less about the mobilizational processes in between these two variables. Although many of these studies do refer to theoretical and empirical works on ethnic mobilization and collective action, these references are usually not translated into systematic empirical examinations of the relevant processes and actors. Hence, it seems that a “mobilizational black box” exists between grievances and conflict in most of this literature.10

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9 For a more recent study on religious discrimination, in particular, and ethnic conflict based on the MAR data, see Fox (2000).
10 Some authors, drawing on the MAR dataset, have specifically focused on the importance of mobilization processes between grievances and ethnic conflict. Scarritt and McMillan (1995), for example, found that both non-violent protest and rebellion by ethnic groups in Africa in the 1980s correlated most strongly with the degree of group mobilization. Lindström & Moore (1995) asserted that ethnic grievances only have an indirect effect on protest and rebellion by spurring group mobilization which in turn affects these two variables. However, both of these studies relied on the operationalization of ethnic mobilization in the MAR dataset, which due to its behavioral nature, comes dangerously close to the dependent variables it is supposed to explain. Furthermore, they still do not focus on the role of ethnic organizations in these mobilizational processes.
In order to better understand the mechanisms behind this relationship and how ethnic groups become collective political actors, we need to focus more closely on the role of elites and organizational actors, who translate ethnic grievances into political actions, be they peaceful or violent. Indeed, the following sections of this chapter will also show that ethnic mobilization does not necessarily lead to conflict or violence, depending on the type of multi-ethnic society.

**The Translation of Grievances into Political Action: Agents of Ethnic Mobilization**

Empirical evidence suggests that grievances alone are not enough to spur collective action in the form of (violent or peaceful) ethnic mobilization. As Olson (1965) taught us, ethnic groups first need to overcome the free rider problem that always affects processes of collective action. In this respect, ethnically based organizations are crucial. They are often able to solve the free rider problem through the distribution of private rewards and resources, such as jobs, money or political power (Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum 1982). As Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum (1982, 422-4) argue, ethnic organizations may be formed explicitly for the purpose of defending group interests if certain leaders can privately benefit from this enterprise. More frequently, however, ethnic lobbying and mobilization emanate from private goods organizations established to provide other services to the group but which subsequently serve to mobilize group members. Evidence from indigenous mobilization in Latin America suggests that community organizations such as local churches, development aid organizations etc. indeed constituted important vehicles to launch ethnic collective action (Becker 2011; Lucero 2008; Yashar 2005). With increasing success, ethnic organizations were able to distribute significant private rewards in the form of jobs (either in the state bureaucracy or funded by foreign development aid agencies) to sustain the mobilization process.11

Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum (1982, 424) also explicitly discuss the role of ethnic political parties in this context and the types of private rewards – such as jobs in the government – they are able to distribute. It is noteworthy in this sense that several of my interview partners in Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon – outside observers and party leaders alike – openly admitted that the motivations to join political parties in their countries of both the cadres and the rank-and-file members are mainly material.12

Hence, ethnic organizations must be seen as critical for mobilization processes. They act as catalysts of collective action. Moreover, from a methodological perspective, the focus on organizational actors helps us to avoid the problem of analytical “groupism”. When focusing exclusively on the ethnic group per se as a unit of analysis, one runs a certain risk of reifying these

1 The self-interest of leaders of such indigenous organizations was an issue that was often emphasized in my interviews in Guatemala and Ecuador both by unsympathetic state officials and critical outside observers, as well as by rival group leaders.

1 Interviews 2012-7-23; 2012-8-2; 2012-9-4-III; 2012-9-14.
groups and attributing power of agency to mere social categories (Brubaker 2004). In recent years, efforts have been made in the literature to go beyond the focus on groups by considering their explicit relations to such diverse types of political actors and organizations as rebel groups (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012); political parties (Birnir 2007; Birnir and Satana 2013; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Hug 2013 (forthcoming); Chandra and Wilkinson 2008; Hug 2010; Szöcsik and Zuber 2012; Vogt 2012); and non-state actors (Gleditsch et al. 2011). Yet, the precise working and effects of these organizational actors are still poorly understood.

This study attempts to provide a more general theoretical framework to analyze the role of ethnic organizations in mobilization processes – and their links to outcomes such as peace, conflict, and equality –, focusing on two types of organizations in particular: political parties and organizations of the politically oriented civil society.\(^{13}\) Extant literature has often focused on the former as the main vehicles of ethnic mobilization (e.g. Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2006). However, this literature is very much divided along geographical lines. Scholars of ethnic parties in Western and Eastern Europe are usually concerned with the political representation of ethnic minorities in their “host” states, such as the Turks in Bulgaria, the Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia etc., and with ethno-regionalist parties in countries such as Belgium (Bochsler 2011; De Winter and Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002; Gordin 2002; Sorens 2005; Spirova and Stefanova 2012). In some ways, this follows the Rokkanian notion of the center-periphery cleavage between a state-building majority group and ethnically distinct regions of a country (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

In Latin America, ethnic parties – and the academic literature about them – are a more recent phenomenon. Only in the last two decades did indigenous and (to a much lesser extent) Afro-Latino parties participate in elections (Madrid 2012; Van Cott 2005). It has been argued that these ethnic “advocates” may improve the situation of historically marginalized peoples and thereby enhance democracy in the region (Lucero 2008; Madrid 2005; Sieder 2002; Van Cott 2007; Yashar 2005, 300-8). In particular, Madrid (2012, 162-84) argues that while the populist policies of the region’s two most important indigenous parties (the MAS in Bolivia, and the Pachakutik in Ecuador) have weakened political institutions, their ethnic agenda has actually had a favorable effect on the quality of democracy by increasing indigenous political representation and reducing ethnic inequality and discrimination.\(^{14}\) By contrast, certain other voices have commenced to denounce ethnic parties in Latin America as being instruments of ethnic exclusion and hatred (see e.g. Radu 2005). Most notably, Peruvian writer and Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa claimed that indigenous movements would sooner or later drag the region to barbarism (see Olmos 2003).

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1. The latter can be defined as the conglomerate of the various voluntary organizations and associations between the private and the public sphere that autonomously organize and articulate their material and normative interests vis-à-vis the state (Merkel and Lauth 1998, 7).

2. For a more critical assessment of the Pachakutik case in Ecuador, see Mijeski and Beck (2011). For the effect of ethnic parties on local politics in Bolivia and Ecuador, see Van Cott (2008).
These negative perceptions of ethnic parties are the norm in the literature on non-Western developing countries. They are seen as champions of narrow group interests that sharpen the social conflict lines, and disintegrate society with exclusivist, polarizing appeals. Mechanisms of ethnic outbidding should promote radicalization and turn political competition into a zero-sum struggle between different ethnic groups, especially under conditions of competitive majoritarian elections (Bakwesegha 2004; Horowitz 1985; Huntington 1991; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2006; Rothchild 2004; Wimmer 1997). Hence, in this important part of the literature, ethnic parties are generally believed to both harm the quality of democracy and increase the risk of violent conflicts.

Ethnic movements in the sphere of civil society have usually been analyzed by a different strand of the literature. However, the conclusions that are drawn regarding the effects of these movements and organizations are very similar. Scholars have argued that especially in newly established democracies and developing countries, civil society is often structured along ethnic lines what fuels ethnic competition and may lead to violent ethnic conflict (Belloni 2008; Diamond 2000, 200; Gellner 1991, 133; Gyimah-Boadi 1996; Mann 2005, 21).

Some authors have viewed the role of ethnic parties in a more positive light. On the one hand, Chandra (2005) argues that if multiple dimensions of ethnicity are institutionalized preventing any single cleavage to become paramount, ethnic parties have a stabilizing effect on democracy. Birnir (2007), on the other hand, argues that if group representatives have access to government, ethnic parties contribute to stability by reliably collecting their groups’ votes and, thus, reducing the system’s volatility. Similarly, some scholars have pointed at the potential of civil society organizations to build “bridging social capital” in multi-ethnic societies, i.e. bonds of interpersonal trust and understanding between members of different ethnic groups (Merkel and Lauth 1998; Varshney 2001). However, a multitude of studies has cast serious doubts on the socialization potential of civil society associations.

**Preconditions for Ethnic Mobilization**

The emergence and success of these ethnic movements and organizations – i.e. their ability to translate collective grievances into political action – are assumed to depend largely on the political-institutional conditions present; what the literature has generally labeled “political opportunity structures”. The term refers to the formal and informal political conditions that collective

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15 Originally, the argument about civil society’s socialization function was put forward by Putnam (1993) in a more general context that was unrelated to the issue of inter-ethnic relations. According to this argument, through their participation in civil society associations citizens learn public civicness and democratic attitudes which are responsible for a society’s level of social capital, that in turn influences the functioning of democratic institutions. Critics have argued quite convincingly that on the one hand, the micro-level correlation between associational membership and individual norms and values depends on an effect of self-selection (Hooghe and Stolle 2003; Sønderskov 2010), and that on the other hand, political and institutional conditions have an independent, prior effect on the development of social capital (Belloni 2008; Booth and Bayer Richard 1998b; Edwards 2004, 89; Hooghe and Stolle 2003; Huysseune 2003; Muller and Seligson 1994; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Tarrow 1996).
actors encounter during their mobilization process – including the institutional environment of 
the respective state, existing cleavages, elite alliances etc. – and which provide positive or nega- 
tive incentives for collective action by shaping people’s expectation for success (McAdam, 
principal components of the political opportunity structures: the national cleavage structures, 
the institutional make-up of the state, the prevailing strategies of state elites in dealing with 
social movements, actors, and demands, and the availability of influential allies.16

The literature on the emergence and success of ethnic parties has mainly centered on institu- 
tional factors, above all the electoral system (see e.g. Birnir 2004; Bogaards 2003, 2007; 
Horowitz 1985; Huber 2012; Lijphart 2004; Reilly 2001; Reynal-Querol 2002; Reynolds 1995a; Rice 
and Van Cott 2006; Van Cott 2005). While integrationists like Horowitz (1993, 2002) and Reilly 
(2001) claim that majoritarian systems – in particular, the Alternative Vote (AV) system – lead to 
less ethnic politics, consociationalists – who favor proportional representation (PR) systems – 
expect the opposite (Lijphart 2002, 2004).17 In addition, geographical factors, such as ethnic 
groups’ settlement patterns, are also assumed to influence the political opportunity structures 
for ethnic parties (Huber 2012; Ishiyama 2012; Muñoz-Pogossian 2008).

Studies on ethnic movements in the realm of civil society have focused mostly on civil liberties, 
respect for associational autonomy, and thus, on changes in the democratic constitution of a 
state (Barany 1998, 2002; Fox 1994; Gellner 1991; Lucero 2008; Marx 1998; McAdam 1982; Yashar 
2005). Yashar (2005), for example, explains the emergence of ethnic movements in Latin Amer- 
ica with a combination of “capacity” (existing civil society networks) and political opportunity in 
the form of increased political associational space available from the late 1970s onwards.18 Oth- 
ers have emphasized the importance of influential allies in both the national and inter- 
transnational political arenas (Brysk 1996; Rappaport 2005).

However, some scholars have also noted that even before such political opportunity structures 
come into play, the emergence and success of ethnic mobilization is decisively shaped by pro- 
cesses of group identity formation. Before it can be represented politically, the very identity of 
the ethnic group needs to be constructed. Here again, ethnic organizations and their mobiliza-
tional strategies are crucial (Lucero 2008; Lucero and García 2007; Vermeersch 2006). Hence, besides the external opportunity structures, organizational, representational and identity-constructing processes and strategies within movements must also be regarded as determining factors for successful mobilization (Vermeersch 2006, 41).

In summary, the existence of collective grievances, processes of identity formation, and the political opportunity structures are crucial for ethnic organizations to initiate and impel group mobilization. But what does the literature say about the effects of such organizations?

**Empirical Studies on the Effect of Ethnic Mobilization**

As we have seen above, a majority of scholars have emphasized the negative effect of ethnic mobilization on both the quality of democracy and political stability. However, systematic empirical evidence for this claim is rare. Regarding the link between ethnic parties and civil conflict, Birnir (2007) shows that under conditions of exclusion from executive power, the conflict potential of ethnic group representatives increases significantly. However, her analysis also includes non-ethnic parties as representatives of ethnic groups and, above all, only focuses on democracies with electorally active ethnic groups. Thus, the question whether systems with no ethnic parties are less conflict prone is not addressed.

Chandra (2012) does not detect any effect of electoral ethnicization on the risk of democratic breakdown and violent conflicts. Ishiyama (2009), relying on the MAR dataset, finds a correlation between ethnic parties and both protest and communal conflict, but attributes the latter effect to a mechanism of reverse causality in which ethnic parties result from preexisting high levels of ethnic tension. However, the use of the inherently restricted MAR sample does not allow to test the relationship between the electoral mobilization of dominant groups, the marginalization of minorities, and the onset of conflict – which the author explicitly refers to in his theoretical considerations (Ishiyama 2009, 58). Moreover, the use of an ordinal measurement of communal conflict is problematic as it conflates different forms of ethnic violence and may thus obscure the link between ethnic parties and specific forms or levels of violence within this ordinal scale.

Regarding ethnic parties’ effect on the quality of democracy, Basedau et al. (2011) do not find any correlation between the high ethnicization of electoral politics and low levels of democracy in their sample of eight Sub-Saharan African countries. In his analysis of the effect of indigenous parties on democracy in Bolivia and Ecuador, Madrid (2012, 165-78) finds that they have

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1 As Marx (1998, 19) points out, group identity formation is a "prerequisite for mobilization".
20 Especially since the author does not show how the ethnic party variable affects each step in the ordinal scale in his model. Nevertheless, Ishiyama’s (2009) work does again emphasize the paramount link between ethnic exclusion and conflict. Access to executive power turns out as the single most important structural factor to explain both protest and communal conflict. Likewise, Birnir’s (2007) results mentioned above imply that ethnic exclusion increases the risk of ethnic conflict.
improved ethnic representation in both of these countries, and increased the political participation, satisfaction with and support for democracy among indigenous people in Bolivia.

Systematic evidence on the effects of ethnic civil society movements is even scarcer. Focusing on local politics in India, Varshney (2001) reports that where civil society networks are formed along ethnic lines, communal violence is more likely. On the other hand, there is some anecdotal evidence of a positive role of trans-ethnic civil society networks in maintaining or rebuilding peace (Sisk and Stefes 2005, 295, 308-9; Straus 2012; Varshney 2001) and strengthening democracy in divided societies (Krznaric 1999; Wilkinson 2000). Finally, Wimmer’s (2002) analysis of multi-ethnic state formation in Switzerland suggests that in the early days of nation-state building, trans-ethnic civil society organizations may serve as a bulwark against the ethnicization of the state.

A major shortcoming of existing studies on ethnic mobilization and collective action discussed so far – besides the lack of systematic empirical evidence on its effects – is their marked fragmentation along lines of regional expertise and academic discipline. Scholars have focused mainly on issues specific to their own regions. Moreover, most studies have examined ethnic mobilization in either electoral or non-electoral politics. For their part, empirical studies on ethnic civil conflict have not taken into account how different degrees of inequalities might condition the dynamics of ethnic politics (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 2000b; Østby 2008; Stewart 2008a). Concretely, they have not distinguished between countries characterized by changing, relatively unstable patterns of ethnic inclusion and exclusion, and countries that have experienced enduring, historically determined forms of ethnic dominance and subjugation that manifest themselves in firm and stable ethnic hierarchies.

I argue that the effects of ethnic mobilization depend on the type of multi-ethnic society at hand. Concretely, I argue that when analyzing the nature and effects of ethnic politics, we need to distinguish between two types of societies which differ from each other in the degree and persistence of inter-ethnic inequalities. Using the terms of Donald Horowitz (1985), I call them “ranked” and “unranked ethnic systems”. Put concisely, while the former are systems of ethnic dominance and subjugation, the latter are composed of a priori equal groups, i.e. without any predetermined, rigid political hierarchy between them. This means that whereas the patterns of political inclusion and exclusion in unranked societies are fluid and changing over time, ranked ethnic systems are not only characterized by high degrees of inequality but also by a

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1 There are, of course, exceptions to this trend. See, for example, Van Cott (2005) and Vermeersch (2006), although they are again restricted to specific geographical areas.

2 Note that although I use Horowitz’ terms in my theoretical argument, my definition of ranked ethnic systems is more specific, explicitly referring to systems of racial dominance. Moreover, in contrast to Horowitz, I focus more on political inequalities between ethnic groups, as I will explain below.
very stable ethnic hierarchy. One ethnic group monopolizes political power, dominating all other groups in the country.

**Ranked Versus Unranked Systems: The Existing Literature**

This distinction is of course not entirely new. Horowitz (1985, 21-36) discussed differences between ranked and unranked ethnic systems on the first pages of his seminal work, stating that the two types of multi-ethnic societies differ “in their origin, structure, operation, and disintegration” and that this might have “far-reaching consequences for ethnic conflict” (Horowitz 1985, 36). In his view, the distinction between “ranked” and “unranked” ethnic systems “rests upon the coincidence or noncoincidence of social class with ethnic origins” (Horowitz 1985, 22). Ranked ethnic systems always contain a dominant and subordinate group(s), while in unranked ethnic systems – which can be seen as “incipient whole societies” (Horowitz 1985, 23) – the question of group superiority is not settled. Ethnic conflict in ranked ethnic systems “has a class coloration” and “takes the form of a social revolution” (Horowitz 1985, 30).

Hence, Horowitz' notion of ranked ethnic systems is very closely linked to patterns of socioeconomic inequality. This is in line with other scholars who have analyzed ethnic stratification (Hechter 1975, 1978; Nielsen 1985; for an overview see Olzak 1983). Hechter (1975, 1978), for example, coined the term “internal colonialism” for societies marked by a cultural division of labor, i.e. a pattern of structural discrimination in the occupational and other social spheres based on ethnic identity. Political hierarchies in terms of unequal access to state power are somewhat neglected in these accounts of ranked ethnic systems. More recent work in the field, however, has pointed to the paramount relevance of political inequalities for inter-ethnic relations (Gurr 2000b; Gurr et al. 1993; Petersen 2002; Stewart 2008a; Wimmer 1997). Furthermore, apart from the references to historical processes of conquest (1985, 29), overlapping settlement patterns (1985, 29-30), and a broad statement that “[o]n a global scale, ethnic subordination is on the decline” (1985, 32), Horowitz also remains rather vague regarding the origins of ranked ethnic systems, their evolution, and their link to historically developed hierarchies on the global level. Although he does discuss the changes and continuities within different cases, he does not address the question of which types of ethnic hierarchies are particularly persistent. This is not surprising since Horowitz (1985, 36) explicitly focuses on unranked ethnic systems in his work.

Subsequent works on ranked ethnic systems have largely borrowed from these authors but have paid more attention to political inequalities in terms of access to state power. Mason (2003) elaborately describes the different forms of inter-ethnic relations in ranked and un-

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23 More precisely, Hechter (1975, 1978) argued that the structuring of capitalist labor relations along ethnic lines, and the exploitation of peripheral ethnic groups by economically advanced groups from the state center leads to “internal colonialism”. In this Marxist-inspired view, ethnic identity tends to be seen as secondary to class identity and as possibly declining as a consequence of economic development (Olzak 1983, 360). The empirical events seem to have proven this notion wrong (Cederman 2001; Gurr 1994; Olzak 2006; Wimmer 2004).
ranked ethnic systems, and the different patterns of grievances, mobilization and political violence they give rise to. Nevertheless, his case studies on Sri Lanka and Rwanda do not seem to reflect this theoretical distinction very well. As the author himself notes, in both Sri Lanka and Rwanda colonial practices created ethnic hierarchies favoring minority groups which were quickly inverted after independence. In fact, the subsequent patterns of ethno-political competition described by Mason in both cases seem to resemble his characterization of unranked systems.

Focusing exclusively on Sub-Saharan Africa, Blanton, Mason, and Athrow (2001) argue that while the direct, assimilationist style of colonial rule of the French created ranked ethnic systems with profound inequalities between more and less assimilated groups, British strategies of “divide and rule” created unranked and more competitive systems. As a consequence, potentially aggrieved groups in former French colonies lack the capacity for collective action, which should make these states less prone to ethnic conflict than former British colonies. While this study emphasizes important theoretical issues, such as the relationship between structural group relations and both mobilizational capacity and violence, the distinction between ranked and unranked ethnic systems within Africa and its link to colonial practices is much less convincing.

First, the empirical reality suggests a much more balanced pattern of inter-ethnic relations in Sub-Saharan Africa, with regard to both socio-economic and political inequalities. Francophone Senegal and Gabon, for example, were characterized by highly equal ethno-political relations after independence. In the case of Gabon, political preeminence even moved to the hands of a politician from an ethnic group that was marginalized during colonial rule. In contrast, the former British colony of Sudan slid into a system of ethnic dominance almost directly after independence. Similarly, both Ghana’s and Nigeria’s northern ethnic groups were as marginalized in socio-economic terms as the northern groups in France’s former colonies of Côte d’Ivoire and Mali. In fact, the authors’ own descriptive statistics are far from conclusive. Only two out of five indicators of ethnic stratification differ significantly between French and British colonies. Secondly, if the degree of ethnic mobilization is a function of capacity, then this should also apply to militant mobilization. However, according to the descriptive statistics, French colonies actually experience higher levels of militant mobilization, which contradicts the idea that these colonies are characterized by a mobilization-inhibiting ethnic stratification.

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1. For Senegal, see e.g. Creevey, Ngomo and Vengroff (2005); and Diouf (1994). For Gabon, see e.g. Gardinier (1997); and Gardinier and Yates (2006).
2. Interestingly, the economic indicators are not significantly different – which of course is problematic for an argument that ultimately rests on Horowitz’ conception of ranked ethnic systems. Also, the group violence indicators provide contradictory evidence. While British colonies do experience higher levels of intergroup conflict, their scores on the militant mobilization and rebellion scales are actually lower (although the latter result is not statistically significant).
Most importantly, however, the authors do not offer any empirical evidence for their main theoretical claim that hegemonic groups produced by French colonial practices remained dominant after independence, subordinating other ethnic groups. The link between colonial privilege and post-colonial dominance at the group level is completely left out from the empirical analysis. Overall, the evidence for a systematic difference regarding ethnic hierarchies within Africa is not convincing even if we exclusively focus on that region and omit the global comparison. The next sections of this chapter will show that such intra-African differences are almost completely eclipsed once we focus on the complete universe of multi-ethnic countries.

In summary, to arrive at globally generalizable conclusions about the effect of ethnic mobilization in different systems of inter-ethnic relations, we need a more precise theoretical definition and empirical distinction of ranked systems. In the next sections, I will argue that racist ideologies resulting in European conquest and colonization of large parts of the world form the crucial ideological fundament of ranked ethnic systems, and that racial differences between European or European-descendant groups and “racial others” are connected to the most persistent ethnic hierarchies, expressed in stable systems of ethnic dominance and subjugation.

**A Final Word on the Concepts of Race and Ethnicity**

There is a large body of literature discussing the relationship between the two concepts of ethnicity and race. The former is sometimes equated with more “superficial” identity features such as culture, dress, language, etc. (cp. e.g. Harris 1995; Tilley 2005, 50-9; van den Berghe 1974), while race has been seen in the past as possessing a more fundamental biological anchor – a notion that formed the basis of scientific racism (Hale 2006, 28-30; Wade 2010, 8-23), as we will see below. Moreover, some scholars have used ethnicity and race for distinct types of groups (e.g. indigenous versus African-descendant groups in Latin America, or different white subgroups versus African Americans in the United States of America) (cp. Tilley 2005, 50-9; Wimmer 2013, 8).

However, there are good reasons to treat race as a subtype of ethnicity. Most importantly, both are socially constructed identity categories that involve “a discourse about origins and about the transmission of essences across generations” (Wade 2010, 20). Being socially constructed categories, both are unstable, i.e. malleable, and contextual (Wade 2010, 18-9, 38-9). As a consequence, in most of the political science literature, it has been common to treat race as one

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26 The authors argue that the higher mean autocracy score of the Francophone states “indicate a very severe concentration of power and lack of political competition” (Blanton, Mason, and Ahow 2001, 484). But evidently, dictatorships or authoritarian regimes can also be multi-ethnic in nature (as, for example, in Ghana’s various military regimes, or in Omar Bongo’s Gabon), or dominated by previously underprivileged ethnic groups (as in Togo from 1967 onwards). Hence, the higher level of autocracy in Francophone states does by no means prove the continuation of ethnic privilege induced by French colonial practices.

27 For an overview, see Wade (2010), and Wimmer (2013, 7-9).
possible basis of ethnic identity, besides, for example, religion or language (see e.g. Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Chandra 2011; Fearon 2003; Horowitz 1985; Wimmer 2013).

In the present study, I will adopt this approach as it allows me to place emphasis on what is common to all of these identity categories: the usage of observable markers “believed to be innate” (Horowitz 1985, 52) to create perceptions of groupness based on common ancestry. As we will see below, race is certainly a very particular subtype of ethnicity – one that evokes a long, globally lived history of conquest and slavery. Nevertheless, by directly comparing it to other such markers of “ancestry”, we can more clearly detect the unique effect of race on social and political hierarchization. Or, rephrasing Wimmer (2013, 9), treating race as a subtype of ethnic identity “allows us to see how much it matters by situating [it] in a comparative horizon” [emphasis in the original].

My theoretical argument consists of both a structural element and a more explicit focus on political actors and the causal mechanisms underlying the postulated relationships. The rest of this chapter lays out the structural part of the argument: how racial differentiations have served to create stable ethno-political hierarchies, based upon the permanent political subordination of groups believed to be racially inferior. The theoretical claims will be backed by a systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between different ethnic markers and the degree of inter-group inequalities, leading me to an empirical classification of ranked ethnic systems at the global level. Finally, before I turn to the precise causal mechanisms in Chapter 2, I will discuss a few potential challenges to my argument.

1.2. Race and the Hierarchization of Groups

Walking along the row of paintings in the Casa de la Libertad (House of Freedom) in Sucre, Bolivia, depicting all of the country’s presidents since independence, is a rather remarkable experience. At the very end of the row, after 79 European-looking white faces, the picture of Evo Morales stands out drastically. Morales, elected in January 2006, is Bolivia’s first president from the indigenous majority population after more than 180 years of the country’s independence. In the United States of America (USA), Barack Obama became the first black president after more than 200 years of democratic rule. Still in 2010, only about 16% of the elected deputies in the US House of Representatives were of African American, Hispanic, Asian American or American Indian origin compared to these groups’ approximate 34% share of the American population. In the Senate, the discrepancy is even larger (Vickers and Isaac 2012, 31, 282).

These observations vividly illustrate the main argument advanced in this section: If ethnic differences are used by organized elites to create boundaries and exclude others from political power (Tilly 1998), race is the most useful marker for this purpose because the natural inferiority of non-European groups propagated by racist ideologies provides a “logical” reason to keep
these groups excluded. The European racial paradigm – erected in the era of colonization and slavery – continues to shape the political (and social) hierarchies in those countries where European or European-descendant groups live together with “racial others”. These are thus the societies that I define as ranked ethnic systems.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will explain this argument – which constitutes the main theoretical idea of my study – in more detail. Examining the link between different ethnic cleavages and the degree and persistence of inter-group inequalities, I will also present empirical evidence supporting my argument. But before we proceed, let me clarify a few key terms that I will use throughout this study. As Wade (2010, 12-4) has pointed out, the particular meaning of race as a type of ethnic identity stems from its crucial role in the history of European colonization of the world. According to this perspective, I define race as *different phenotypical appearances that have become relevant as social categories through colonial history*.

With regard to inter-ethnic inequality, two points need to be emphasized: first, my argument refers strictly to the group level, i.e. to inequalities *between groups* (what has elsewhere been termed “horizontal inequalities” (Stewart 2008b)). Second, it focuses on *political* inequalities, i.e. the imbalances between different groups in a given state regarding the access to state resources and to the political institutions that regulate and govern society. Such political inequalities between groups are usually reflected by the *selective* inclusion of leaders from specific groups in the governing institutions and the exclusion of leaders representing other groups. From this perspective, ethnic inequality reaches its peak with the dominance of one ethnic group over all others. Reversely, ethnic *equality* means the absence of such ethnic dominance and exclusion.

The typology of ranked and unranked multi-ethnic societies only refers to countries in which ethnicity has become politically relevant, i.e. where political actions or discourse at the national level have at least partly become organized on the basis of, or framed according to, ethnicity. Equally, this typology assumes that more or less clearly identifiable ethnic groups already exist, and focuses less on why and how the boundaries between them were drawn (Wimmer 2013).28 However, it does say something about how different ethnic markers have resulted in more or less hierarchized group relations.

*The Invention of Race and the Ideological Fundament of Ranked Ethnic Systems*

The first phase of European colonialism was initiated by Spanish and Portuguese overseas explorations and the subsequent conquest of new territories, particularly in the Americas. It coincided with the unification of the Spanish kingdom which in turn spurred the “ethnic purifica-
tation” of the Iberian Peninsula and the consolidation of the Spanish “nation”. The Moors were pushed out of the kingdom’s territory, Jews were expelled, converts persecuted, dark-skinned Christians were marked as “blacks”, and the first Spanish grammar was published (Mann 2005, 45-8; Whitten 1999, 58).

While the Spanish nation became ethnically and religiously demarcated and unified, colonialist expansion led to the encounter, or intensification of contact, with peoples from other parts of the world. In this process, the markers of physical difference, such as skin color, that differentiated Europeans from these peoples, rapidly became causally linked to the disparate levels of economic and technological development of the different world regions. European military and technological superiority was attributed to a natural superiority of the white, European people itself over other “races”. Or, as Whitten (1999, 48) puts it, moral sanctions were imposed on human beings by placing them into natural spaces.

The hierarchical categorization of peoples into different “races” was as much a result of colonial expansion as it was an ideological driving force by justifying conquest and the enslavement of “more primitive” peoples as a civilizing mission. This first phase of colonialism, in which the English, Dutch, and French soon followed the Iberian pioneers, was characterized by a process of extensive and lasting migration and colonial settlement in the new territories, producing such settler colonies like the USA, South Africa, and the Latin American countries. It was also coupled to the height of European slave trade with millions of Africans being forcefully brought to the Americas, mostly as plantation workers. The social and political hierarchies developing in these new societies therefore reflected a race-based caste system composed of the white rulers, the subjugated aboriginal populations and – in the case of the Americas – the imported African slaves and their descendants (Marx 1998; Pitt-Rivers 1994; Wade 2010; Wagley 1994; Whitten 1999).

The independence of these settler colonies did not represent the liberation of the suppressed peoples from their oppressors but was instead a project of political emancipation of criollo elites from their mother countries, in order to enjoy full authority over their “possessions” (cp. e.g. Anderson 1991; Martínez Peláez 1998). The racially defined elites of European descent stayed in the new states and continued to be politically, economically and culturally dominant, forming the new nation-states upon their visions of racial supremacy (Marx 1998; Stavenhagen 1992; Taracena et al. 2009; Tilley 2005; Vickers and Isaac 2012; Wade 2010, 31-2; Whitten 1999).

Consequently, the social and political hierarchies of these societies remained unaffected by independence. The patterns of boundary-drawing, the precise content of the racial categories,

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* The term *criollo* was used in Spanish colonies to designate the descendants of the Spanish conquerors and settlers who were born in the colonies. In the social hierarchy they ranked below the *peninsulares* (those born in Spain). Despite this specific origin, the term seems to be equally suitable for second-generation European elites in non-Spanish settler colonies.
and the mechanisms of exclusion varied considerably between the different settler states (Gotkowitz 2011; Marx 1998; Pallares 2007; Pitt-Rivers 1994; Wade 2010, 26-33; Wagley 1994). While the USA and South Africa, for instance, became characterized by a relatively sharp distinction between white and black populations, most of Latin America adhered to the ideology of *mestizaje* that promoted a gradual whitening – and therefore “bettering” – of the population (Gotkowitz 2011, 18-23; Marx 1998; Tilley 2005, 190-217; Wade 2010, 31-2; Whitten 1999). Nevertheless, all these different racial regimes were (and still are) based on a belief in the natural supremacy of the white, European race.  

The scientific racism of the 19th century undergirded these imagined racial classifications with pseudo-scientific, evolutionary arguments about a process of natural selection in which stronger races would prevail and eventually subordinate the weaker ones. Scientific racism hierarchically ordered humankind into different racial types separated by innate, biological differences. Again, the notion of the natural supremacy of the white Europeans as the “fittest” race served as the justification for European imperialism and further colonial conquest (cp. Wade 2010, 8-11).

Contemporary social science dismisses the validity of racial differentiation, considering races to be social constructions (cp. Wade 2010, 12-4). Nevertheless, the end of scientific racism did not imply the end of racist ideologies. Racial hierarchies are often carried on today under the more socially acceptable guise of cultural distinction, what has been labelled in the literature as “cultural racism” (Bonilla-Silva 2003; Hale 2006; Taguieff 1987). Referring to the case of Guatemala, Hale (2006, 19-20, 28-31) describes how the established political and economic hierarchies are perpetuated under the banner of multiculturalism, emphasizing cultural differences between indigenous and non-indigenous (in Guatemala called “ladino”) people, but without making reference to notions of biologically determined inferiority or superiority. Evidence from other countries, such as Israel or Hungary, show a similar pattern: while openly racist ideas have become socially unacceptable, stereotypes about the supposed cultural inferiority of racially different “others” (Arabs, Roma etc.) are still widespread (Henry et al. 1997; Vermeersch 2006, 21-2). As Goldberg (2006, 338) puts it, race has been “buried alive”.

Thus, racist ideologies constitute the ideological fundament of ranked ethnic systems. The racial classifications they created have survived deep into the present and continue to determine the political and social hierarchies in many countries of the world.

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1. Cp. Whitten (1999, 57) who rightly states that the idea of *mestizaje* has always implied the mix of the white race’s “civilized” traits with the “savage” or “barbaric” traits of the Amerindian and black races. In Stutzman’s (1981, 45) words, *mestizaje* became in practice an “all-inclusive ideology of exclusion”.

The Persistence of the European Racial Paradigm and the Perpetuation of Inequalities

Due to the ongoing political and economic dominance of the West, the socially relevant racial categories are still those that were created in the context of European colonialism. This is not to say that racist ideologies do not exist among other groups and in other countries. Arab slave trade, for example, was also steered by racial prejudices against black Africans (Lewis 1992a). Nevertheless, no other region has had the political and economic power to project and impose its own vision of racial order upon the rest of the world as an “hegemonic paradigm” (Whitten 1999, 56). Through globalized conquest and slavery, the European paradigm and its particular group categorization were firmly engrained in all corners of the world.

As a consequence, the marginalization of groups that are perceived to be racially distinct from European(-descendant) groups continues in the former settler colonies of the first phase of colonialism (Antón Sánchez 2011, 77-83; Gotkowitz 2011; Mann 2005, 70-110; Marable 2007; Marx 1998; Stewart 2008a). In many of these countries, ethnic identity and social class have become overlapping identities, resulting in virtual ethno-classes (see e.g. Gotkowitz 2011, 17; Tilley 2005, 48, 58).

At the beginning of this section, we have seen two examples – the USA and Bolivia – in which the historical racial barrier has been partly broken after centuries of almost complete political exclusion. The slowness of (very modest) change in the ethno-political power distribution is characteristic for these countries. It also took the Australian electorate over 100 years to elect the first self-identifying Aboriginal person to the House of Representatives in 2010. In Guatemala, during the last legislature from 2008 to 2011, only 17 out of 158 parliamentarians were of indigenous origin (Misión indígena de observación electoral 2008, 160) although indigenous groups constitute a slight demographic majority. In the government, indigenous politicians – if included at all – are usually confined to the post of the minister of culture and sports. In Ecuador, the first self-identifying indigenous parliamentarian was elected in 1984 (Becker 2011, 50-1), and the first indigenous person to hold a regular portfolio in the government was Luis Maldonado, appointed as minister of social welfare in 2001. In Hungary, no Roma person has ever held a regular cabinet post.33

At the same time, members of these permanently excluded groups suffer from a dramatic ethnic bias in the distribution of economic resources. Three fourths of the indigenous population in Bolivia lived in poverty in 2002 as opposed to about half of the non-indigenous population (Jiménez Pozo, Landa Casazola, and Yáñez Aguilar 2006, 48-9). In the USA, poverty rates in 2008 were more than three times higher among African Americans and Hispanics than among whites (Vickers and Isaac 2012, 27). In Australia, the unemployment rate among Aboriginal people is three times higher than that among whites (Vickers and Isaac 2012, 28), while in Hungary

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33 Personal communication with Prof. Levente Salat (Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj, Romania).
it is estimated that about half of the whole Roma population was unemployed in the 1990s (Vermeersch 2006, 25-6). Official Guatemalan government figures from 2006 show the poverty rate among the indigenous population to be more than twice as high as that among non-indigenous people (Congreso de la República de Guatemala 2009, 2). At the same time, the ladino-dominated parliament consistently channeled state investments in education, health, infrastructure, and agriculture to those municipalities with the lowest indigenous population shares (B’aqtun 2004, 7-10). Likewise, the poverty rate among Ecuador’s indigenous people is more than twice as high as that of whites and mestizos (Antón Sánchez 2011, 78).

Of course, racial hierarchies are not only maintained because of the persistent weight of the European racial paradigm, but to a large degree also because of tangible material benefits for the privileged group – both at the elite and the mass level. The racist ideology once served to justify the seizure of the new territories’ lands and to force large masses of people into unpaid or cheap labor, allowing for the unrestrained enrichment of European elites. Today, European-stemming elites still enjoy a monopoly of economic and political power without having to fear the competition of counter elites, thanks to the clear racial hierarchy.

Lower-class members of the dominant group for their part (for example, poor Whites in the USA, poor ladinos in Guatemala etc.) are still better off than lower-class (or even elite) members of the historically oppressed groups thanks to their ethnic – cultural, linguistic – connection to the “owners” of the state (Wimmer 1997). Hence, they have both a psychological and a material interest in distancing themselves from the “inferior” members of the subordinated group(s) and in maintaining the ethnic hierarchy. In short, the historical outcome of dominance and subordination in these “racially divided” countries is maintained both by persistent racist ideologies and by tangible material interests.

**Language, Religion, and the Competitive Structure of Unranked Systems**

Let me highlight the particularity of race – i.e. of the European racial classification – once more by contrasting it with the history of other ethnic markers. Clearly, language and religion can be and have also been used to exclude specific groups from citizenship and political power at the level of the nation-state, as we have seen in the previous section of this chapter (Brubaker 1992; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gellner 1983; Mann 2005; Wimmer 2002). However, it is much less clear, in the case of different languages or religions, which language or religion is

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34 See e.g. Mann (2005, 70-110), and Vickers and Isaac (2012, xii) regarding Australia and the USA; Martínez Peláez (1998), Pérez-Brignoli (1989), and Taracena et al. (2009) regarding Guatemala; Gerlach (2003, 26-9) for Ecuador; and Marx (1998) regarding Brazil. There is also some evidence that the indigenous people of the Americas only became represented as a fundamentally different human type when they resisted the regimes of forced labor that the colonialists intended to impose on them (Whitten 1999, 59-60). This is a clear example of the purposive manipulation of racial boundaries for material aims.

35 See Better (2008). Cp. also Rigoberta Menchú’s thoughts on the relation between poor ladinos and indigenous people in Guatemala (Burgos 2000, 145, 193-4); and Hale’s (2006) study of ladino racial ideologies in Guatemala with the indicative title “Más que un Indio – More Than an Indian”.

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superior and hence, there is more inter-group competition and no clear hierarchy.\textsuperscript{36} Let me explain this part of the argument in more detail.

Due to the historical processes of nationalism and state-building, language has become closely linked to the concept of nation (Anderson 1991; Brubaker 2012; Deutsch 1953; Gellner 1983).\textsuperscript{37} Key economic developments, such as industrialization and print-capitalism, and the early dominance of certain languages (like French or English) led to linguistic assimilation and/or to the suppression of other languages and dialects (like Breton, Welsh etc.) in Western Europe (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Mann 2005; Weber 1976a). However, with the rise of nationalism, linguistic minorities have become legitimized to perceive themselves as (at least potential) nations with equal rights to those of all other nations – rather than as different classes within the same society. Put differently, while racist ideologies legitimize ethnic hierarchies and inequalities, nationalism promotes competitive relations between different language groups claiming to be sovereign nations. Consequently, linguistic differences – i.e. states with different linguistic groups – should be particularly prone to non-hierarchical, i.e. unranked, inter-ethnic relations.

While language has been used to classify people into nations, religion divides them into communities of belief which often compete over hegemony, i.e. over different interpretations of the true faith. We can trace the competitiveness of both types of inter-group relations back to crucial historical developments: to the religious wars in Europe of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century which eventually resulted in the creation of a multitude of more or less homogenous, more or less equal ethnoreligious units (Mann 2005, 48-54), to what for a long time was a relatively equal struggle over hegemony between Christians and Muslims – expressed, for instance, in the religious crusades of the Middle Ages and the power and expansion of the Ottoman empire –, as well as to the imperial competition between linguistically defined European nations. In contrast, there is no comparable competitive element in the history of race. As we have seen above, the concept was first invented by Europeans to explain the technological backwardness of other groups, and then to justify their political subordination and economic exploitation. In short, race has been used to rank human beings in hierarchically ordered “species”.

The historical development of the states that were born out of late colonialism in Africa and Asia confirms this contrasting juxtaposition. Focusing mostly on the extraction and cultivation of primary commodities, this second main phase of colonization, starting in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} centu-

\textsuperscript{36} However, if one language within a society is chosen as state language and hence equated with progress (such as French in France), while other languages (like Basque or Breton) are equated with peripheral backwardness, there might be elements of a ranked system as well. This situation comes close to the conditions of “internal colonialism” described by Hechter (1975).

\textsuperscript{37} Spain is an excellent example of this process. As we have seen above, early Spanish nationalism was actually very much linked to an idea of “purity of blood” in terms of religion and phenotype (or race). However, with the birth of modern nationalist models in the period of industrialization, impelled by the ideas of the French Revolution, the different linguistic groups (like Catalans, and Basques) developed their own ethno-nationalisms which have become paramount in political terms.
ry, involved relatively little physical settlement of Europeans in the conquered territories. To control the subjugated indigenous populations, the colonialists turned to policies of “divide and rule”, consciously fostering linguistic, religious, and tribal distinctions within them – or even inventing them, if necessary (Mamdani 1996; Posner 2005; Vail 1989). In this process, existing cultural communities were turned into self-conscious ethnic groups (Clark 2008, 124-5; Jacquin-Berdal 2002, 67; Posner 2005, 31-6; 43-52; Vail 1989, 11-16).

The independence of these resource colonies in the 20th century and the departure of the colonial rulers marked the transformation of racially ranked societies to congregations of “separate subsocieties” (Horowitz 1985, 36), assembled within a common political territory. Despite certain favoritism of the colonialists towards specific groups, they all share the same history of subjugation under European rule – which has laid the groundwork for the basically non-hierarchical group relations after independence. Moreover, since the state apparatus imported by the colonialists is not historically linked to any of these groups, none of them can legitimately (or convincingly) claim to be the state-people. As a result, in the wake of independence, these a priori equal groups often became engaged in a struggle over control and “ownership” of the state (Brass 1985; Horowitz 1985; Wimmer 1997). Therefore, inter-ethnic relations in these countries tend to be very competitive as well.

Moreover, both language and religious groups usually contain consolidated political elites: state bureaucrats, intellectuals, religious authorities etc. which due to their cultural resources (above all, education and knowledge), seek and often obtain access to political power across group boundaries, i.e. beyond their own communities. In this process, these elites frequently compete with leaders of other such groups over positions of power. To be sure, oppressed racial groups also contain their own elites, but their acknowledgment as such across ethnic lines, and their social and political status within the larger society usually depend on their adhesion to the dominant culture.38

In short, societies characterized by linguistic and religious cleavages can be seen as unranked ethnic systems. They are composed of a priori equal groups without any historically determined, rigid political hierarchy between them.

**Definition**

The history of colonial conquest, slavery and racial discrimination reveals that the very concept of race – despite its changes over the course of history – is inseparably linked to the creation of firm ethnic hierarchies because this is the historical ballast it carries. Hence, almost by definition, race has become linked to profound inter-group inequalities that go beyond temporary political exclusion. If ethnic differences are used by state-building elites to create boundaries

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and exclude others from access to political power (Tilly 1998), race is the most useful marker for this purpose because the natural inferiority of non-European groups propagated by racist ideologies provides a “logical” reason to keep these groups excluded.

As emphasized above, this racial hierarchization of groups was a decidedly European project which still resonates wherever the former colonizers live together with groups that are perceived to be racially distinct. Thus, I define ranked ethnic systems as countries characterized by the dominance of a European or European-descendant group over other groups which are perceived to be racially distinct. They exhibit two fundamental characteristics: first, profound ethnic inequality resulting in a clear-cut group hierarchy. Secondly, this hierarchy is extremely stable, i.e. there is hardly any change in the distribution of political power over time.

1.3. Empirical Validation of the Argument: The European Racial Paradigm and Present-day Ethno-political Inequalities

Having provided a detailed theoretical explanation for why we should link a specific ethnic marker (European race) to a particular type of multi-ethnic society (ranked ethnic systems), I will now present empirical evidence that confirms my argument. So far, I have referred to three different types or dimensions of ethnic identity: language, religion, and race. Before we empirically examine their connection to ethno-political inequalities, let us have a look at their respective frequency and geographical distribution. To this purpose, I determine for each country its main ethnic cleavage, based on the politically relevant ethnic groups present and their linguistic, religious, and racial identities. By “main ethnic cleavage” I mean the one ethnic dimension along which a country’s ethnic groups differ the most. I rely on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR-ETH) dataset (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010), and on the new EPR-Cleavages dataset composed by Bormann (Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt 2013).

EPR-ETH lists all politically relevant ethnic groups, and their access to executive state power, for each country with a population of at least 500,000. Ethnic groups’ access to state power is assessed based on the position of the political leaders representing these groups, focusing explicitly on executive power. This is measured using an ordinal scale ranging from “discriminated” to “monopoly power”, with a broad distinction between politically included (i.e. those with access to executive power) and excluded groups. Importantly, since the list of politically relevant ethnic groups in EPR-ETH may change over time, the data allows us to take into account changes in the politically relevant ethnic boundaries in a given country. This study uses the

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1. Ethnic groups are considered “politically relevant” if at least one political organization has claimed to represent its interests at the national level or if its members are subjected to state led political discrimination (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 99).
2. For example, new groups may become politically relevant (according to the definition of EPR-ETH), or – on the contrary – certain ethnic categories may lose their political relevance over time. For example, Maasai identity only became politically relevant in Tanzania when the group started to raise its voice at the national level against its politi-
updated version of the data which is available from ETH’s GROWup website and covers all years from 1946 to 2009. Appendix I presents the dataset in more detail.

The new EPR-Cleavages data are based at the group level and consider three different dimensions of ethnicity: language, religion, and race/phenotype (or “bio-geographic” origin). Since members of one and the same group may speak different languages and practice different religions, the dataset records the largest linguistic and religious sub-segments (maximum three) of each group, and their relative sizes (as a share of the total group population). Importantly, the identification of the linguistic segments focuses on the group members’ mother tongues and does not take into account bilingualism. In the case of phenotype, these sub-segments indicate miscegenation by denoting up to three different bio-geographic origins of a given ethnic group.

The detection of the main cleavage of a country starts at the group level by determining for a given ethnic group whether it differs from each of the other groups in the same country on a given ethnic dimension. Doing this for all three ethnic dimensions, and for all groups in the country, I can add up the number of inter-group differences for each ethnic dimension in the country as a whole. The main cleavage, then, is simply defined as the one dimension with the highest number of such differences. Hence, if a country is defined as racially, linguistically or religiously divided here, it does not follow that it is not characterized by any other ethnic differences at all. Usually, countries exhibit some differences along all three dimensions of ethnicity. Nevertheless, in most cases it is possible to identify one dimension along which a country’s ethnic groups differ the most. Appendix II explains the construction of the indicator in detail and provides a list of all countries and their main ethnic cleavages.

**Frequency and Regional Distribution of Different Ethnic Cleavages**

In all of the following analyses, I focus on current states, excluding defunct states such as South Vietnam, German Democratic Republic etc. This leaves us with 132 states where ethnicity has been politically relevant according to the EPR-ETH dataset. Since the main ethnic cleavage is determined based on the time-variant list of politically relevant groups in EPR-ETH, as expected, economic, and cultural marginalization. Groups may also split into different, politically relevant sub-groups under specific socio-political circumstances or, reversely, lower-level ethnic categories may become politically relevant as parts of an overarching umbrella category. For instance, while politics in the Central African Republic were long characterized by the antagonism between two broad ethnic clusters – Riverine and northern groups –, ongoing power struggles between elites made ethnic sub-categories more relevant. Similarly, whereas the Apartheid system in South Africa drew the politically relevant boundaries between different racial groups, ethno-linguistic differences within the group of black Africans (for example, between Xhosa and Zulu) have become increasingly important in post-Apartheid South Africa. EPR-ETH accounts for these shifting ethnic boundaries by adapting its country lists of politically relevant groups over time.

- The dataset uses bio-geographic origin to capture the notion of race, employing such regional categories as European, Amerindian, Sub-Saharan Africa, Oceania etc. These categories indicate a group’s belonging to broadly defined territories which all occupied a particular position within the European “racial paradigm” (Whitten 1999).
- As Figure 1-1 and Table 1-1 below show, in a few countries religion and language seem to be equally important.
plained above, it may change over time. This is the case in three African states: Liberia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. To account for these changes, I include two different observations for each of those countries in the analysis, where the first periods are all characterized by a racial cleavage, and the second periods by a linguistic one. This raises the number of observations to 135.

Figure 1-1 shows the frequency of the different cleavage types by world region, indicating the number of countries that fall into each cleavage category in the different regions. For example, in Asia and the Pacific, fourteen countries are mainly linguistically divided; in two countries religion constitutes the main cleavage; one country is mainly racially divided; and in three countries, groups differ equally along the linguistic and religious dimension.

Figure 1-1: Regional distribution of ethnic cleavage types

![Diagram showing regional distribution of ethnic cleavage types]

Notes: Numbers refer to country observations. Based on the EPR-Cleavages dataset (Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt 2013). See Appendix II for individual country classifications.

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*Zimbabwe and South Africa were characterized by racist Apartheid systems until 1979 and 1993, respectively. Liberia was a settler colony established by freed slaves from the United States of America who subjugated the African peoples indigenous to the area of the newly created state, based on a belief in their own supremacy due to their exposure to Western culture. This pseudo-racial dominance lasted until 1980 when the last president of the Americo-Liberian dynasty of the True Whig Party was killed in a coup d’état. Hence the two different periods for these three countries are: Liberia 1946-1980, and 1981-2009; Zimbabwe 1965-1979, and 1980-2009; and South Africa 1946-1993, and 1994-2009.*
We can see that overall, linguistic cleavages are the main material of ethnic difference in multi-ethnic states. Only in Latin America and the Caribbean is language trumped by race. This clearly reflects the region’s history as the hotbed of colonialism where European settlers, the subjugated indigenous peoples and the imported African slaves and their descendants came to form new societies which are unique in their racial diversity. Not surprisingly, in the Middle East and Northern Africa, religion plays an important role. Furthermore, in seven countries religion and language seem to be equally important for ethnic differences. These are Albania, Cyprus, Iraq, Yemen, Mongolia, Bhutan, and Bangladesh.

Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union states, as well as Sub-Saharan Africa are the two regions most clearly dominated by linguistic differences. Six country observations in Sub-Saharan Africa are characterized by a racial cleavage. Apart from the three cases of Liberia (until 1980), Zimbabwe (until 1979), and South Africa (until 1993) discussed above, these racially divided countries are Mali, Mauritania, and Madagascar. While the former two are inhabited by a mix of Arabic and African groups, the latter is characterized by a division between the lighter-skinned Merina of Asian-Pacific origin who reside in the central highlands, and the darker-skinned Côtiers of the coast who are of African origin (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). The three mainly racially divided states in the West are the former British colonies of the United States of America, Australia, and New Zealand. In Eastern Europe, Hungary is characterized by the division between the titular Hungarians and the Roma people who are held to be racially distinct from the European population (cp. Vermeersch 2006, 14-6).

The only two states in Latin America and the Caribbean which the data show to be mainly linguistically divided are Peru and Bolivia, both hosting a variety of different indigenous groups, which to a large extent have maintained their original languages. However, many indigenous people in these countries are bilingual, which is not reflected in the EPR-Cleavages data. More importantly, both countries are typical European settler colonies which have long been dominated by a white, European-descendant elite (Madrid 2012, 165; Mallon 1992; Thorp and Paredes 2010). Hence, in the following I will include them in my group of racially divided countries.45

In summary, linguistic differences are the most frequent and politically relevant cleavage type in the modern world. This is not surprising given that language has been central to the processes of state- and nation-building (Anderson 1991; Brubaker 2012; Deutsch 1953; Gellner 1983), and that there are many more languages than states available to accommodate them (Gellner 1983). Most racial cleavages are found in countries where Europeans or European-descendants live together with racially distinct others, and among them all but Hungary are former settler colonies. The only countries in which race is the main ethnic cleavage but no European(-descendant) group is politically relevant are Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana in the Americas.

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Note that this “manual” change does not influence the results of the following analyses in any significant way. The results would be about the same, were these two states to be counted as mainly linguistically divided countries.
Mali, Mauritania, and Madagascar in Sub-Saharan Africa, Libya in Northern Africa, and Fiji in the Pacific. In the following analysis, I treat these two different types of racially divided countries as separate categories.46

**Ethnic Cleavages and Ethno-political Inequalities: Country-level Evidence**

Is there a systematic link between the type of ethnic cleavage and the degree of ethno-political inequality? According to my theoretical argument and my definition of ranked ethnic systems, racially divided countries with European(-descendant) groups should be characterized by both significantly higher inequalities and more stable hierarchies than all other types of multi-ethnic societies.

I will examine this claim first from a country-level perspective. Table 1-1 compares the different cleavage categories with regard to the degree and persistence of ethnic inequality, based on the power-access codings from the EPR-ETH dataset. As a proxy for the degree of inequality, I measure for each country its longest period of one-group ethnic dominance, i.e. the longest period in which one single group was either politically dominant or held monopoly power. As a proxy for the stability of the ethnic hierarchy, I measure the frequency of ethnic power shifts in each country, i.e. the number of years (relative to all country years) in which a change in the set of the politically included ethnic groups took place.47 While the first variable refers to the occurrence of ethnic power-sharing and thus to the degree of equality, the latter tells us something about the stability of the hierarchies, namely how often the identity of the group or set of groups with access to state power changes over time.

The table shows the mean values of these indicators for the different cleavage categories. As mentioned above, I expect racially divided countries with European(-descendant) groups to exhibit the longest periods of one-group dominance and the lowest frequency of ethnic power shifts.

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46 Note that I include Liberia’s first period (1946-1980) in the category of “racial cleavage with European(-descendant) group” for the following reasons. As mentioned above, until the coup d’état in 1980, Liberia was a settler colony of freed slaves that established a system of pseudo-racial dominance, denying citizenship rights to the indigenous African peoples and imposing a system of forced labor on them. This situation resembled the European-created settler colonies in three crucial aspects: first, the subjugation and economic exploitation of indigenous peoples by an allochthonous group emigrating (or, in this case, returning) from a European-dominated country; second, the belief of cultural superiority due to the exposure to European or “white” culture in the southern United States; and third, the establishment of an American-style political system that consisted in formal democratic rules while de-facto excluding indigenous Africans. Importantly, this does not bias the results in favor of my theoretical argument. In contrast, the 35 years of one-group dominance in Liberia’s first period are below the mean and median value of the other countries in this category.

47 This indicator is based on a dummy variable constructed from the population share of included ethnic groups in EPR-ETH. Whenever this value changed from one year to another, the variable was coded as 1; if there was no change, as 0. Subsequently, I calculated the ratio of years with such power shifts to all country years. Hence, a country value of 0.10, for example, means that the set of included groups changed in 10% of all years in this country.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cleavage type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Consecutive years of one-group ethnic dominance (Mean)</th>
<th>Mean size of largest group (% of total population)</th>
<th>% country years with ethnic power shifts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race with European (-descendant) group</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race without European (-descendant) group</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language &amp; religion</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers in column 2 refer to country observations. One-group ethnic dominance, mean size of largest group in country, and frequency of power shifts based on EPR-ETH. The latter is based on a dummy variable constructed from the population share of included ethnic groups. Whenever this share changed from one year to another, the variable was coded as 1; if there was no change, as 0.

The results confirm these expectations. The median value of one-group dominance in racially divided countries with European(-descendant) groups is more than twenty years higher than in any other category, and more than four times as high as in linguistically divided countries. They also experience much fewer ethnic power shifts than any other type of multi-ethnic country. Hence, the country-level analysis confirms that these are indeed the countries that, due to their profound inequalities and stable hierarchies, are most fittingly defined as ranked ethnic systems.

In contrast, linguistically divided countries and racially divided countries without European(-descendant) groups seem to be the least unequal societies. On the one hand, the much shorter periods of one-group dominance, on average, indicates that these countries are characterized by a relatively high degree of ethnic power-sharing and equality. On the other hand, the comparatively high frequency of ethnic power shifts is a sign that the set of included groups changes over time and, thus, other groups do not permanently remain excluded. The striking difference between the two “racial” categories also confirms the notion that racist ideologies

---

1. Note that by themselves, the low values on the one-group dominance variable merely indicate that there is some power-sharing occurring. If we consider the sole dominance of one ethnic group as the peak of ethnic inequality (see my definition above), then this situation is clearly preferable over a situation of no power-sharing at all. Yet, it is still possible that a given cluster of groups permanently excludes one or more other group(s). However, the ethnic power shifts indicator shows that the set of groups that are included in these power-sharing arrangements does change over time in linguistically (and also religiously) divided countries, and racially divided countries without European(-descendant) groups.
are still most consequential in the former European settler colonies. Religiously divided countries and, especially, those characterized by both religious and linguistic divisions appear to be in the middle of the two poles when it comes to the duration of one-group dominance. However, religion is associated with much more frequent ethnic power shifts, giving it a more unranked and competitive character. Yet the question remains whether there is a particular inequality-producing effect of overlapping religious and linguistic cleavages. I will come back to this issue in the group-level analysis below.

There are two potential caveats against these results. For one thing, racially divided countries tend to be more ethnically homogenous overall. As column 5 of Table 1-1 shows, the single largest group in racially divided countries with European(-descendant) groups is usually larger than the largest groups in the other cleavage categories. This is due to two historical processes. First, as mentioned before, many of these countries are settler colonies and hence, feature a long history of ethnic oppression (and often genocide) that began long before 1946, the starting date of the EPR-ETH dataset, and which led to a significant numerical decimation of racial minorities. Second, this ethnic domination also produced a significant amount of pressure for assimilation to the dominant culture. Therefore, in such racially divided settler colonies, oppressed groups had a great incentive to give up their ethno-racial identity.49

This is of importance for the theoretical argument made here for it seems quite plausible that in countries with larger majority groups, minorities find it harder to achieve some political power. Hence, it is possible that the relationship between European racism and inequality is spurious, and that the demographic structure of the population is the real cause of the persistence of inequality.

A cross-sectional Poisson regression analysis using dummy variables for all cleavage types and controlling for the size of the country’s largest group shows that the latter is indeed a powerful predictor for ethnic inequality at the country level. Importantly, however, racially divided countries with European(-descendant) groups still experience significantly longer periods of one-group ethnic dominance than any other cleavage category (results not reported here).50 Therefore, the effect of race seems to be independent of the demographic structure, meaning that it goes beyond what Mann (2005, 3) has described as the democratic but tyrannical rule of an ethnic majority group. The power of the European racial paradigm allows even minority groups to rule tyrannically by excluding the “primitive” or “savage” racial others from the national community of citizens (cp. Vickers and Isaac 2012, 72-3). South Africa’s segregationist order during Apartheid is probably the most striking example of this mechanism (see Marx 1998).

---

49 Cp. e.g. Madrid (2012, 78) for the case of Ecuador, and Marx (1998, 163) for Brazil. A particularly striking example of such assimilationist pressure, exerted by the state, is described by Tilley (2005) for the case of El Salvador.

50 The Poisson model used the 135 countries as observations, and the number of years of one-group dominance as dependent variable. In order to compare the European race cleavage with all other cleavages, four dummy variables for each of the other cleavage categories were included in the model. They all exhibit negative coefficients with highly significant p-values (p=0.000).
A second counter-argument could be that this correlation on the aggregated level might merely be an artifact. Remember that I define ranked ethnic systems as countries characterized by the dominance of a European(-descendant) group over “racial others”. However, the country-level analysis does not definitely tell us whether European identity is really linked to political dominance. In order to validate this, we need to move down to the group level.

**Ethnic Identities and Ethno-political Inequalities: Group-level Evidence**

Is there a systematic relationship between a group’s ethnic identity and its access to political power? To answer this question, I draw again on the EPR-ETH and EPR-Cleavages datasets. First, on the basis of the latter, I identified groups which are distinct from all other groups in their country on one of the three ethnic dimensions – what we could call “ethnic outsiders”. Hence, a “racial outsider” is an ethnic group that is racially distinct from all other groups in its country, while a “linguistic outsider” is different from all other groups in terms of language. This was done in the same way as explained above, namely by comparing each ethnic group to all other groups in the same country on these three dimensions. Within the racial outsider category, I also specifically identified European(-descendant) racial outsiders. Secondly, I calculated the longest period of political dominance that a given ethnic group has experienced between 1946 and 2009, according to EPR-ETH. If the theoretical argument holds, we would expect European racial outsiders to experience significantly longer periods of political dominance than any other category.

The 132 states are composed of 784 politically relevant ethnic groups. Among these, 135 are racial outsiders, 34 of which are of European origin. Furthermore, there are 88 religious outsiders, and 516 linguistic outsiders. A simple comparison of the mean duration of political dominance that European racial outsiders enjoyed between 1946 and 2009 shows a rather dramatic picture. On average, they are politically dominant almost eleven times longer than other ethnic groups (36.7 years compared to 3.4 years; two-tailed t-test, $p=0.000$). In contrast, linguistic outsiders are significantly less politically dominant than other groups (3.1 versus 8.4 years; two-tailed t-test, $p=0.000$). Finally, there is no significant difference between religious outsiders and all other groups regarding years of political dominance (5.3 versus 4.8 years; two-tailed t-test, $p=0.79$).

---

1. Again, this includes both EPR power statuses of “monopoly” and “dominance”.
2. Again, Americo-Liberians were counted as European-descendant racial outsiders, based on the arguments outlined above. The Roma groups which are listed as half European and half South Asian in the EPR-Cleavages dataset were counted as non-European racial outsiders here because they are held to be racially distinct from the rest of the European population (cp. Vermeersch 2006, 14-6).
3. Note that some groups are not distinct from all other groups on any of the three dimensions. These groups form the baseline of comparison in Figure 1-2. In contrast, other groups are distinct on more than one dimension. For example, a group might be both religiously and linguistically distinct from all other groups in its country. In this case, the group is included in both the linguistic and religious outsider categories. This allows me to compare the effect of each ethnic marker on the political power status “neutrally”, i.e. without making any subjective judgment about the group’s “true” ethnic identity.
How do these different “ethnic outsiders” compare with each other in terms of their political status, once we control for the influence of group size? The left side of Figure 1-2 shows the results of a Poisson regression model calculating the expected number of years of political dominance for each of the ethnic outsider categories, while holding the group size variable constant at its mean. The right side shows the results of an analogous model that uses the number of years of discrimination (as defined in EPR-ETH, see Appendix I) as dependent variable.54

Figure 1-2: The influence of ethnic group identity on political dominance and discrimination

Notes: Based on two cross-sectional Poisson regression models at the ethnic group level, with years of political dominance and discrimination as dependent variables, respectively, and controlling for group size. (The latter correlates positively with political dominance and negatively with discrimination.) The four “outsider categories” were included as dummy variables. Baseline of comparison are those groups which are not distinct from the rest of the groups in their country on any of the three ethnic dimensions. Only politically relevant ethnic groups included (as recorded in the EPR-ETH dataset). Expected values calculated with simulation methods using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000), holding the group size variable constant at its mean (about 19% of total country population).

The figure offers five main conclusions. First, European(-descendant) racial outsiders experience significantly longer periods of political dominance than any other ethnic outsider category (or groups that are not ethnically distinct on any dimension).55 Second, they are the only groups that on average experience longer periods of dominance than of discrimination. Third, the negative difference between dominance and discrimination in the case of other racial outsiders is striking. This points at the close link between groups’ racial identity and their political status,

1 These models are analogous to the country-level Poisson model above, using the 784 ethnic groups as observations, and the number of years of one-group dominance and of discrimination, respectively, as dependent variables. All ethnic outsider categories were compared to those ethnic groups that are not distinct from the other groups in their country on any of the three dimensions.

5 Note that the difference between European(-descendant) racial outsiders and religious outsiders is statistically significant ($p=0.000$).
and illustrates the predominant position that European(-descendant) racial outsiders continue to assume in their home countries to this day. It is not racial differences per se which create inequalities but the co-existence of European or European-descendant groups with racially distinct others.

The fourth and fifth observations concern the two other ethnic dimensions. Interestingly, linguistic outsiders exhibit about the lowest values for both dominance and discrimination. This further supports the notion that linguistic differences are most often connected to unranked ethnic systems. Religion is again somewhat in between race and language. Religious outsiders are more likely than linguistic outsiders to be either dominant or discriminated for long periods of time. Hence, religion seems to create more inequality than language but less than race. Like at the country level, the difference between European racial outsiders and religious outsiders in terms of political dominance is statistically significant. Moreover, when it comes to discrimination, religious outsiders are far away from the values of non-European racial outsiders.

In addition, two other empirical findings make it seem more appropriate to associate religious cleavages with unranked ethnic systems. First, as we have seen above, when it comes to changes in the set of included groups, religiously divided countries are much more similar to linguistically divided ones than to those I have defined as ranked systems which hardly ever experience changes in the power distribution. Secondly, the additional analyses in section 1.6 will reveal that the degree of inequality in religiously divided countries very much depends on the demographic balance. The larger the size of the country’s largest group is, the longer the political dominance lasts – whereas ethnic inequality in racially divided countries with Europeans is completely independent of the demographic constellation. Thus, in contrast to race, there is no inherent connection between religion and inequality.

What about the possible effect of overlapping religious and linguistic cleavages that seemed to come to light in the country-level analysis? To examine this issue more closely, I identified specifically those ethnic groups which are both linguistically and religiously distinct from the rest of the groups in their country (N=50). Yet, when we compare them to all other ethnic groups in the dataset, we do not find any statistically significant differences – neither in terms of political dominance (6.1 versus 4.8 years; two-tailed t-test, \( p=0.55 \)) nor of discrimination (5 versus 6.4 years; two-tailed t-test, \( p=0.50 \)). Hence, the group-level analysis does not suggest a particular inequality-producing effect of overlapping religious and linguistic cleavages.

Summing up the results, racial differences between European(-descendant) groups and “racial others” are indeed connected to the most profound ethno-political inequalities in today’s multi-ethnic states. The fact that this finding holds irrespective of the demographic conditions shows that the ongoing political effect of European racism goes beyond the sheer ethno-demographic tyranny that Mann (2005) referred to as the result of the conjunction of national-
ism and democracy. Therefore, while previous studies have addressed the topic of ranked ethnic systems mostly from a socio-economic view and on the basis of specific cases or within specific regions (Blanton, Mason, and Athrow 2001; Hechter 1975; Horowitz 1985; Mason 2003), the empirical evidence confirms my claim that from a universal perspective, and focusing on the political hierarchies, the concept is most appropriately applied to those countries in which European or European-descendant groups have politically subordinated other groups perceived to be racially distinct.

This is not to say that (temporary) ethnic hierarchies may not exist in other multi-ethnic countries. They are certainly not void of ethnic exclusion or even discrimination; in contrast, quite often specific groups will be temporarily shut out from access to political power when the balance of the ethno-political struggle tips in favor of other groups. However, the crucial point is that this exclusion is usually not stable, as the balance of power swings forth and back, and different groups become included or excluded over time. Hence, the patterns of inclusion and exclusion in such unranked systems are more fluid over time. If we envision ethnic group relations as a continuous bargaining game over political power (see e.g. Jenne 2007)\(^5^6\), new rounds of negotiation which possibly result in new power constellations are far more frequent in unranked than in ranked systems. In the latter type, the racially defined “others” remain politically excluded over long periods of time by European(-descendant) groups whose political, economic, and cultural dominance impedes a redistribution of political power. Therefore, what sets ranked ethnic systems apart is the rigidity of the ethnic hierarchy and the stability of exclusion over time.

Importantly, a fixed hierarchy on the group level does not mean that individuals are never able to cross ethnic boundaries in ranked ethnic systems. In contrast, it has often been argued that in certain societies, particularly in Latin America, individuals can climb the social ladder by changing their ethnic identity (Freyre 1986; Marx 1998; Pitt-Rivers 1994; Wade 2010, 39; Wagley 1994). Nevertheless, while individuals of subordinate racial groups may achieve personal advancement, the hierarchy of racially defined groups is usually maintained. As Barth (1969, 9-10) argues, “boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them.” Hence, my argument refers strictly to the group level.

Having laid the theoretical foundations and corroborated them with empirical evidence, the next section will now implement the typology, providing a list of those countries that are considered ranked ethnic societies according to my definition.

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\(^5^6\) Note that Jenne (2007) uses the term in the specific context of majority-minority relations.
1.4. Ranked Ethnic Systems: An Empirical Identification

As stated above, I define ranked ethnic societies as countries characterized by the dominance of a European or European-descendant group over other groups which are perceived to be racially distinct. In practice, with just two exceptions that I will discuss below, these are the 25 racially divided countries with European(-descendant) groups of the corresponding category in Table 1-1 above.

The first exception concerns New Zealand which I do not include in my list of ranked ethnic societies, although it is mainly characterized by racial differences. The EPR-ETH dataset identifies the non-European Maori and Pacific Islanders as politically included throughout the country’s history. Hence, in this case the racial divide between European-descendants and “racial others” has not led to the pronounced ethno-political hierarchy that is part of my definition of ranked systems.

In contrast, I have included Israel because it constitutes a settler state that has long been politically dominated by European stemming Jews, politically excluding (or even discriminating) the Arabic population. I will discuss this case in more detail in section 1.6 below. As a result, I arrive again at a total number of 25 ranked ethnic systems, which are listed in Table 1-2, along with the respective dominant and subordinated groups.

The third column of the table shows the time periods during which the countries can be considered ranked ethnic societies. The period ends when at least one group that is racially different from the dominant European group has achieved some political power at the level of the central state, according to EPR-ETH. Such events can be interpreted as a sign that the group hierarchy has become less rigid. We can see that although these hierarchies are extremely stable in ranked ethnic systems, the political empowerment of historically marginalized groups is not impossible. In the USA and Bolivia, for example, individuals representing the African American and indigenous populations, respectively, were democratically elected as heads of state. In other cases, such as Liberia and Zimbabwe, the changes occurred more violently.

The time period indicated for Israel is debatable. While the Arab (or Mizrahi) Jews became politically included in the government from 1977 on, the political discrimination of the Muslim Arabic population has continued. Finally, it should be noted that in certain countries, such as Panama, Colombia, or Ecuador, sub-state autonomy regimes for previously marginalized indigenous peoples were enacted while the power structures at the level of the central state have remained intact.

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1 Note that in the case of Cuba, the period ends in 1959 because EPR-ETH considers ethnicity as politically irrelevant in the country after Fidel Castro’s rise to power.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Settler colony</th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Dominant group</th>
<th>Subordinate group(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-2008</td>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>Latinos, African Americans, Asian Americans, Arab Americans, American Indians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-1959</td>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>Blacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples, Afro-Mexicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Guatemalans</td>
<td>Mayas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Hondurans</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples, Garifuna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Salvadorans</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Nicaraguans</td>
<td>Afro-Nicaraguans, Miskitos, Sumus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Costa Ricans</td>
<td>Afro-Costa Ricans, indigenous peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Panamanians</td>
<td>Afro-Panamanians, Ngobe-Bugle, Choco, Kuna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Colombians</td>
<td>Afro-Columbians, indigenous peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1970-</td>
<td>Venezuelans</td>
<td>Afro-Venezuelans, indigenous peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Ecuadorians</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples, Afro-Ecuadorians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Peruvians</td>
<td>Quechua, Aymara, Afro-Peruvians, indigenous peoples of the Amazon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1978-2002</td>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>Afro-Brazilians, indigenous peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-2005</td>
<td>Bolivians</td>
<td>Quechua, Aymara, Guarani and other eastern indigenous groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Paraguayans</td>
<td>Tupi-Guarani and other indigenous groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Chileans</td>
<td>Mapuche, other indigenous peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Argentineans</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2006-</td>
<td>Uruguayans</td>
<td>Afro-Uruguayans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>Roma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-1980</td>
<td>Americaliberians</td>
<td>Indigenous Peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1965-1979</td>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>Africans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-1993</td>
<td>Afrikaners</td>
<td>Blacks, Coloreds, Asians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1946-7: English Speakers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1948-1976</td>
<td>Ashkenazi Jews</td>
<td>Palestinian and Israeli Arabs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1946-</td>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>Aborigines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Time periods based on the EPR-ETH dataset which starts in 1946.

* Ethnicity considered politically irrelevant in EPR-ETH before the indicated start year.
The table also shows that Hungary is the only ranked ethnic system that is not a former settler colony. The country is characterized by the ethnic divide between the titular Hungarian group and the Roma minority believed to be a historical diaspora from northwestern India (Vermeersch 2006, 13-6). For centuries, the Roma have lived at the margins of Hungarian society and been affected by targeted measures of forced assimilation, socio-political discrimination, or even large-scale persecution due to their origin and lifestyle (Vermeersch 2006, 47-8).

It is important to note that Hungary is not the only country with a discriminated Roma minority in Europe. In fact, the EPR-ETH dataset counts sixteen Eastern and Western European states with politically excluded or discriminated Roma populations. However, these are mostly linguistically (or religiously) divided societies in which the main ethnic cleavage runs between different linguistically or religiously defined European groups, for example between Spanish, Catalan, and Basque speakers in Spain, or Romanians, Hungarians, and Germans in Romania. Hence, in these countries the dynamics of ethnic politics are characterized by the relations between these European groups – for example, Basque and Catalan autonomy movements in Spain – while the racial difference between them and the Roma minority constitutes merely a secondary cleavage. As a result, these countries do not fulfill my definition of ranked ethnic systems.58

What does this distinction between ranked and unranked multi-ethnic societies mean for our analysis of ethnic mobilization? In the next section, I will direct my attention to this central question of my argument.

1.5. The Differential Effect of Ethnic Mobilization

I define ethnic mobilization as all efforts of collective action made by ethnic groups and their leaders in order to achieve political goals for themselves qua ethnic groups. This includes the formulation, aggregation, representation, and vindication of ethnic group interests. Ethnic mobilization may take place in both electoral and non-electoral spheres of political action, organized by single leaders or organizational actors, such as political parties and civil society organizations.

Consequently, ethnic mobilization finds its expression in the alignment of political parties and civil society organizations according to ethnic boundaries. High ethnic mobilization means that the strongest parties and organizations are led by mostly mono-ethnic circles representing the interests of specific ethnic groups. Low ethnic mobilization is characterized by strong trans-ethnic political parties and civil society organizations, composed of an ethnically diverse leader-

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58 Note that a similar pattern is found in Canada. Despite the presence of Amerindian groups, the country’s main ethnic cleavage is linguistic, with the relations between English and French speakers being the defining feature of Canadian ethnic politics.
ship. Of course, the state is not neutral in this context. It is often ethnically biased, acting in favor of the group by which it is controlled and thus, often creating inequalities and grievances that are at the roots of ethnic mobilization (see Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr et al. 1993; Horowitz 1985).

I argue that the effects of ethnic mobilization differ significantly between ranked and unranked ethnic systems. This is so because the two main factors that link ethnicity to conflict – ethno-nationalism, and ethno-political competition – can frequently be found in unranked ethnic systems but are usually absent in ranked systems. Moreover, there are systematic differences regarding the capacity for rebellion between the two types of multi-ethnic societies. In the following, I will explain this part of my argument in more detail. In short, I argue that the different ethno-political constellations of ranked and unranked systems influence the goals of ethnic mobilization, and the capacity of groups to engage in violent collective action. Motivations and capacity in turn condition the effect of mobilization on both ethnic equality and ethnic conflict. Table 1-3 summarizes the argument in a schematic, idealized manner. There is of course considerable variation regarding the ethno-political dynamics within both types, which I will address in the next section. Also, the differences between the two types are not always as clear-cut in reality as they are presented here. Nevertheless, for the sake of precision, it helps to analyze the different types of multi-ethnic societies in this idealized fashion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of multi-ethnic society</th>
<th>Role of ethnicity</th>
<th>Who mobilizes?</th>
<th>Goals of ethnic mobilization</th>
<th>Capacity for violence</th>
<th>Effect on equality</th>
<th>Effect on conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unranked system</td>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Excluded and included groups</td>
<td>Political hegemony, ethno-nationalism</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranked system</td>
<td>Permanent oppression</td>
<td>Excluded groups</td>
<td>Emancipation, end of discrimination</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(no effect)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At this point, I will only superficially address the role of ethnic organizations in my argument. We can think of them as instruments of organizational power which help to advance ethnic claims, mobilize people, and orchestrate collective action. The precise causal mechanisms by which these organizations translate specific grievances into outcomes of ethnic equality or inequality, conflict or peace, will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Furthermore, institutional, political and geographical factors often act as intervening variables in mobilization processes within both ethnic systems. The empirical analyses of this study will look more closely at the specific influence of democracy, in the sense of formal democratic institutions and civil liberties which scholars often consider the basic necessary conditions for effective ethnic mobilization (Barany 1998, 2002; Fox 1994; Gellner 1991; Marx 1998; McAdam 45
As mentioned previously, the literature has also extensively deliberated on the role of the electoral system (see e.g. Birnir 2004; Bogaards 2007; Horowitz 1985; Huber 2012; Lijphart 2004; Reilly 2001; Reynolds 1995a; Van Cott 2005), and of groups’ geographic settlement patterns (Huber 2012; Ishiyama 2012; Muñoz-Pogossian 2008) – both of which shape the possibilities of ethnic collective action. Moreover, the presence of a dominant party that unites elites from all relevant ethnic groups in a country under a common political roof may also limit ethnic mobilization, simply by radically restricting the electoral chances of ethnic “flank parties” (Horowitz 1991, 167). However, a detailed discussion of these issues would go beyond the scope and aim of this study which focuses on the structure of inter-ethnic relations rather than on the institutional context.

Who Mobilizes and Why?

Let me start with the questions of who – i.e. which groups – should be likely to mobilize in the two different systems, and why? This depends on the role that ethnicity plays in these systems.

As explained above, while in ranked ethnic systems, ethnicity (in the form of race) has been used as a tool of permanent oppression, in unranked systems it is used as an instrument for competition over political hegemony.

Since unranked societies do not exhibit any historically predetermined ethnic hierarchy, different groups and their elites feel prompted to seek more power for themselves. Access to, or exclusion from, the state and its political and economic resources affects both elites and ordinary group members. The former seek political power, employment or lucrative business contracts through the state. However, their position in the bureaucratic hierarchy also matters for the rank and file of the group since most material benefits of the state are channeled to the population through mechanisms of patronage along ethnic lines (Bratton 1989, 414; Chandra 2004; Lemarchand 1972; Wimmer 1997, 2002). The result is often the fierce ethno-political struggle over access to the state and its material resources – over inclusion and exclusion – that has been described elsewhere (Brass 1985; Horowitz 1985; Wimmer 1997). Importantly, this struggle involves both elite and rank-and-file members of the group and therefore, there is a sense of intra-group solidarity and between-group competition within both social strata (Horowitz 1985; Posner 2005; Vail 1989).60

We can see this pattern in the linguistically divided states of Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, and in religiously divided countries like Iraq, Syria or Lebanon, as much as in racially divided societies without European(-descendant) groups such as Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago. The

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59 Horowitz (1991, 167) defines “flank parties” as “ethnically based parties surrounding a multiethnic coalition”, pursuing a more extreme ethnic agenda than coalition parties.

60 See Vail (1989, 14) on how this mechanism worked during colonialism: the bourgeoisie had “a duty to improve their own social and economic positions ‘for the good of the tribe’”.

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ethno-political dynamics are often quite similar in these very different countries and resemble
the allegory of the continuous bargaining game introduced above. The ethnic contenders find
themselves in repeated rounds of negotiation over the distribution of political power in which
they attempt to capture the largest possible “piece of the cake” in terms of political authority,
state revenues, jobs, infrastructure etc.

Of course, the precise forms of this bargaining game depend largely on the institutional
framework in which it takes place. Generally speaking, in democratic regimes, elections are one
of the main focal points of competition. But there is an important difference between the institu-
tionalized ethno-regional polarization between Flemings and Walloons in Belgium, and the
militant power struggle between Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurds in Iraq, or Baoulé, Northerners, Kru,
Agni and others in Côte d’Ivoire. Somewhere in between these poles we could locate the cur-
rent political machinations between nationally minded Ukrainians and Russian speakers
in Ukraine, and the sometimes violent electoral competition between the East Indian and Afri-
can-descendant groups in Guyana. However, the common characteristic of all these examples
is the fluidity of the ethnic power structure that requires (and encourages) repeated rounds of
negotiation (or competition). Hence, the differences regarding the precise forms of this negoti-
ation are eclipsed by the crucial contrast to ranked systems in which there is a historically fixed
system of ethnic dominance, and redistributions of power are very infrequent.

Moreover, as shown above, unranked systems often fall prey to the dangers of ethno-
nationalist aspirations. Especially if a specific group is unlikely to achieve political power within
the current state, the desire to create a separate sphere of autonomous political power – what
is usually called separatism – will grow.61 The powerful ideology of nationalism provides the
ideological justification for this enterprise. Oftentimes, different ethno-nationalisms clash with
each other in multi-ethnic states and create or exacerbate the ethno-political competition de-
scribed before. The recent history of Spain is a case in point. The country has become locked
into a struggle between different ethno-nationalisms with Spanish centralists pushing for a
unitary state and society, and Basque, Catalan and other linguistic minorities struggling for
self-determination. Albanians in Macedonia and the former Yugoslavia, and the Kurds in Tur-
key, Iraq and other countries are also prominent examples. In short, ethno-political competi-
tion, and ethno-nationalist aspirations are the typical motivations for ethnic mobilization in
unranked systems.

Hence, in these societies, we would generally expect a higher level of ethnic mobilization over-
all, as groups form their own vehicles of mobilization in order to build up political strength. This
applies both to politically included and excluded groups. As stated above, while the ethnic hier-
archies in unranked systems are more fluid over time, temporary political exclusion is not un-

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61 See Gellner’s (1983, 57-61) insightful story about the fictive country of Ruritania.
common as the constant ethno-political struggle may always produce temporary winners and losers. Excluded groups may form ethnic organizations, such as ethnic parties, as a reaction to their situation with the intention to increase their political leverage and gain or recover power. Oftentimes, these are elite enterprises that combine personal (career) ambitions with group aspirations. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, ethnic organizations have always been used by elites to create an image of political strength based on their ethnic constituencies (see e.g. Woods 1994). The larger, more cohesive, and more organized this constituency is, the higher its political leverage, and the more likely it is to (re-)gain political power.

For the same reasons, included groups also have an incentive to form ethnic organizations in unranked systems as a means to consolidate their position. Hence, we would not only expect a higher level of ethnic mobilization overall in unranked societies, but also a rough balance between included and excluded ethnic groups regarding the level of mobilization. The result is often an ethnicized political party system, as we find it in countries as diverse as Belgium, Togo, Lebanon, or Fiji.

This is not to say that ethnic mobilization is ubiquitous and cooperation improbable in these societies. In fact, my data show that even in unranked systems, only about one fifth of all national votes in parliamentary elections commonly go to ethnic parties, for instance (see Chapter 3.2). As I will explain in more detail below and in the next chapter, the behavior of elites is critical for ethnic relations in these states. My main point here is simply that due to their formation and structure, unranked ethnic systems possess a natural inclination to ethno-nationalist competition.

In contrast, in ranked ethnic systems it is usually only the excluded ethnic groups – those which have been historically marginalized – which mobilize politically around issues of ethnicity. First, the historically dominant European(-descendant) groups do not need ethnically-based organizations as instruments of power because their grip on power is still virtually unchallenged. Therefore, secondly, they are mostly concerned with intra-group political battles, either along class or ideological lines. Overall, thus, we should expect a much lower level of ethnic mobilization in ranked ethnic systems.

There might also be a difference regarding the locus of mobilization. The profound inter-ethnic inequalities often prevent historically marginalized groups from independent, equal participation in conventional electoral politics which are usually governed by the traditional power structures. Hence, alternative ways of ethnic collective action, for example through civic or popular movements, often appear to be a more promising strategy for such groups. Although ethnic parties have emerged in some Latin American countries and elsewhere, the more common pattern are ethnically exclusionary party systems as in the USA, Australia, Mexico, and many other ranked societies.
The goals of mobilization of historically marginalized groups – whether this occurs through political parties or, more often, through alternative channels in the realm of civil society – can be summarized under the general term of political emancipation: concretely, the end of racial discrimination and a fairer distribution of political, economic, and cultural resources. If groups are not only historically marginalized but also small in size, the goals may also include some form of autonomy over local affairs. In contrast to unranked systems however, this is not the ethno-nationalist aspiration to create a new, separate state but rather an attempt to carve out limited spaces that are protected from the overwhelming power of the dominant group.62

Hence, whereas in unranked systems ethnic group mobilization often aims at political hegemony over other contenders and/or the creation of separate states bound to specific ethnic groups, as illustrated by the examples above, historically discriminated groups in ranked systems generally strive for emancipation and/or protection. This becomes evident in numerous case studies on different countries from South Africa and Australia to the USA and Bolivia (Lucero 2008; Madrid 2005; Marx 1998; Tuck 2010; Van Cott 2005; Vermeersch 2006; Vickers and Isaac 2012; Yashar 2005).

Again, as in the case of unranked systems, the goals of mobilization in ranked societies are similar for both elite and rank-and-file members of the groups. Educated elites strive for personal advancement but are confronted with the historical barriers of racism. Their struggle has often been decisive for mobilization processes in historically ranked societies (Becker 2011; Marx 1998; Mijeski and Beck 2011; Stavenhagen 1992; Wade 2010, 114). At the same time, ordinary members of these marginalized groups suffer the most from the existing ethnic inequalities. Apart from the unequal distribution of poverty, they are also politically subordinated to ordinary members of the dominant group due to the latter’s ethnic – cultural, linguistic – connection to the “owners” of the state (Wimmer 1997). Therefore, the struggle for emancipation and against racial discrimination involves both elite and rank-and-file members of historically marginalized groups in ranked societies.

Mobilization, Equality, and the Capacity for Rebellion

So far, we have seen how the different ethno-political constellations influence the motivations of ethnic mobilization in ranked and unranked systems. Yet, the role that ethnicity plays in these two types of multi-ethnic societies also determines the capacity of groups to engage in violent collective action. Concretely, violence and ethnic conflict is not only more dangerous but also more costly in material terms than peaceful mobilization. Hence, even if the motivations for violent conflict are present, potential rebels need the material resources to buy weapons and munitions, organize military training etc., while also coping with high economic opportuni-

ty costs (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Keen 1998). The more equal group relations are, the more evenly distributed are these resources, and the more level should the playing field be in terms of capacity for violent group rebellion. In contrast, the historical hierarchy in ranked ethnic systems entails an extremely unequal distribution of both political and economic resources (cp. Mason 2003, 89-90).

Accordingly, I argue that systematic differences between ranked and unranked systems with respect to these two factors – the motivations of mobilization, and the capacity for rebellion – condition the effect that ethnic mobilization has in the two types of multi-ethnic societies. Hence, this argument combines the literature on ethnic grievances (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 2000b; Petersen 2002; Stewart 2008a) with that on opportunities as causes for conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003) – although the latter is conceptualized somewhat differently here as the power distribution between ethnic groups.

In the competitive environment of unranked systems where the dangers of ethno-nationalist competition loom large and the capacities for violent action are relatively evenly distributed, strong ethnic mobilization should have a negative effect on both ethnic equality and the prospects of peace. Ethnic elites and their followers are tempted to shut out their rivals from other groups and create systems of ethnic dominance in their desire to ensure the largest possible piece of power for themselves or to protect their rule (Horowitz 1985, 294). Examples of this mechanism can be found, for instance, in Guyana (after the electoral victory of the Indo-Guyanese dominated People's Progressive Party (PPP) in 1992), and Trinidad and Tobago, but also in the rule of the *Front patriotique rwandais* (Rwandan Patriotic Front, FPR) in post-genocide Rwanda.

These attempts at the monopolization of political power may additionally be fuelled by a spiral of mutually reinforcing mobilization and outbidding both between and within groups. Radical factions of groups may force moderate elites to pursue a more exclusionary ethno-nationalist approach which in turn impels elites of other groups to follow suit (cp. Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Resembling the situation of a security dilemma, groups fear that one of their rivals will gain exclusive control over political power and preemptively seek to install themselves as dominant groups (Mason 2003, 87).

Hence, intentionally or unintentionally, ethnic mobilization in unranked ethnic systems will often result in a decrease in ethnic equality, as the above Table 1-3 asserts. Again, the link between ethnic mobilization and dominance might be moderated by the institutional framework in unranked systems. Functioning democracies like Belgium are less likely to see ethnic dominance despite high-level ethnic mobilization. Nevertheless, overall, the competitive ethnic mo-
bilization in unranked systems should increase the risk of ethnic dominance and exclusion, *ceteris paribus*, and thereby decrease ethnic equality.

As the examples of Rwanda and similar cases also show, ethnic exclusion resulting from ethno-political mobilization can easily lead to violent conflict by creating grievances within excluded populations that may eventually produce violent reactions (Ishiyama 2009, 58). Ethnic mobilization is also likely to increase the risk of ethnic conflict itself by hardening ethnic boundaries and exacerbating competition. Thus, if elites engage in large-scale political mobilization along ethnic lines in unranked systems, the risk of ethnic conflict increases, as is asserted in Table 1-3.

This leads us back to the critical role of elites in unranked ethnic societies. Some of the examples brought forward above (such as Guyana or Ukraine) show that unranked ethnic systems may avoid ethnic conflict despite a certain level of ethno-nationalist competition. If we regard trans-ethnic cooperation between elites as the opposite of ethnic mobilization, we can identify a continuum of elite behavior that ranges from ethnic cooperation (expressed by the existence of strong trans-ethnic organizations) to ethnic competition (strong ethnic organizations). The relationship between ethnic mobilization and conflict explained above also implies that the more trans-ethnic cooperation we find in an unranked society, the less prone to ethnic exclusion and conflict it should be. Hence, as has been pointed out by prominent voices before (Lijphart 1977, 2004), the cooperative or competitive behavior of elite actors is critical to maintain stability and peace.

In contrast, in ranked ethnic systems, as stated above, historically marginalized groups usually mobilize for the goal of political emancipation. There is some empirical evidence from case studies that these efforts have been partly successful (Anderson 2007; Barany 1998; Becker 2011, 57-9, 142-9; Hooker 2005; Madrid 2012, 175-8; Tuck 2010; Van Cott 2000, 2001; Vermeersch 2006; Yashar 2005). However, the high degree of inequality makes a complete reversal of the ethnic hierarchy – i.e. the political dominance of formerly marginalized groups – very unlikely. On the contrary, the partial reduction of the long-standing imbalances of political power between dominant and subordinated groups enhances ethnic equality overall in ranked societies, as Table 1-3 proposes.

What about the effect of ethnic mobilization on conflict in ranked ethnic systems? Madrid (2005) argues that political violence, too, should decrease as suppressed groups acquire alternative means to express their grievances. However, if these ethnic representatives become rad-

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63 Cp. Horowitz’s (1985, 291) argument about ethnic parties: "[8]y appealing to electorates in ethnic terms, by making ethnic demands on government, and by bolstering the influence of ethnically chauvinistic elements within each group, parties that begin by merely mirroring ethnic divisions help to deepen and extend them.”

64 Zimbabwe seems to be the only exception to this general trend as, according to the EPR-ETH dataset, the formerly dominant Europeans have recently become politically marginalized in Mugabe’s authoritarian regime. In Liberia, the Americo-Liberians also suffered a severe backlash after the military overthrow of William Tolbert (Ballah and Abrokwa 2003). However, their dominant socio-economic position has ensured them a quick return to political center stage, both under Charles Taylor (who is half Americo-Liberian) and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (who was brought up within the Americo-Liberian elite).
icalized, political conflicts may turn violent as well (cp. Horowitz 1985, 30-2). Nevertheless, because of the long history of ethnic oppression and the minor role of ethno-nationalism in ranked systems I expect ethnic mobilization to take a mostly peaceful course in these societies.

First, the gap of power between historically dominant and marginalized groups in ranked systems is usually so wide that conflict is unlikely. Decades (or even centuries) of oppression and subordination have led to such an unequal distribution of the political and socio-economic instruments of power (material resources, access to the coercive machinery of the state etc.) that armed resistance of subordinated groups is – although not impossible – very difficult. As Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012, 1310) put it, “the very poverty of the have-nots militates against a successful insurrection.”

Moreover, the “revolutionary” drive (Horowitz 1985, 30) of ethnic mobilization in ranked systems is relatively easily mitigated by the selective co-option of elites of mobilized groups into the spheres of political power. The latter’s material incentives to be co-opted and to sacrifice collective struggles in favor of individual advancement are very high in ranked systems. At the same time, because of the political, economic, and cultural oppression, the elite of subordinated groups is usually very thin. Hence, co-opting a handful of leaders can already have a huge impact on these groups’ mobilizational capacity. This is why in contrast to unranked systems, in such historically unequal settings, even the inclusion of token members in positions without real power is often enough to deflect ethnic tensions.

Nevertheless, as we have seen in the previous section, in some cases historically marginalized groups have attained a measure of real political power, either at the national or the sub-state level, which has led to cracks in the established hierarchy. Yet, the position of dominant groups is usually so privileged that even in this case, competition is not as intense as in historically unranked societies. In short, the wide gap of power between dominant and subordinated groups deprives the latter of the capacity for sustained ethnic rebellion. Group relations in ranked systems are thus characterized by what we could call an “equilibrium of inequality” in which historically oppressed groups have not only been deprived of access to state power but also of the very means to violently challenge this situation.

Related to this issue of group hierarchy is Mann’s (2005, 56-7, 69) observation that social classes’ interdependence restrains political conflicts and violence. As stated above, while in unranked systems ethnic groups can be thought of as “separate subsocieties” (Horowitz 1985, 36), in ranked societies they resemble ethno-classes. Hence, for this reason, too, the latter should be less prone to conflict. In an interview with the author, an indigenous leader and academic in Ecuador, for example, pointed at rural indigenous communities’ historical role as the country’s main food producers, and the consequential economic interdependence of indigenous people

65 Cp. also Mason (2003, 89-90).
and mestizos, to explain why ethnic conflict is unlikely in his country despite increased ethnic mobilization.66

Secondly, virulent ethno-nationalism is also unlikely to emerge from racially constructed groups because nationhood is usually linked to language, not to race (Anderson 1991; Brubaker 2012; Deutsch 1953; Gellner 1983). Claims for political sovereignty are typically made on behalf of all people who speak a certain language (or less often who practice a certain religion) but hardly ever on behalf of all people of a certain skin color or hair texture.67 Furthermore, subordinated groups usually lack a strong bourgeoisie which historically has been the driving force of ethno-nationalism (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983).68 Even if these groups speak their own languages, different from the dominant European group’s language, such as in Hungary, Australia, South Africa or many Latin American countries, rather than becoming a basis for ethno-nationalism, they are conspicuously neglected. Precisely because of the history of colonization, subordinated groups’ languages are still marked by the stigma of cultural backwardness, an image upheld not only by the dominant population but often also by these groups’ own elites.69 In fact, not only the language but also the ethnic identity as a whole carries a social stigma so that group members are often hesitant to even identify as members of such a historically subordinated group (see e.g. Mijeski and Beck 2011, 45; Vermeersch 2006, 19).70 This makes ethnic mobilization in racially divided countries less susceptible to ethno-nationalism and thus, less conflict-prone.

The structural argument made so far can be summarized as follows (see Figure 1-3). European-guided racial classification has created ranked ethnic systems where ethnicity is used to permanently subordinate racial others.71 Overall, ethnic mobilization in these societies is less frequent than in unranked systems. However, when it occurs it should increase the chances of empowerment of these oppressed groups, enhancing ethnic equality without increasing the risk of conflict. In contrast, linguistic and religious differences have most often led to unranked

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66 Interview with Ariruma Kowii, 2013-4-11.
67 There are, however, exceptions to this general trend. Lomnitz (2011), for example, shows how the Mexican nation became imagined in a racial way in distinction to the neighboring “white” United States. However, this racialized foundation of nationhood was actually promoted by the dominant white/mestizo groups in Latin America, and not by the politically mobilizing indigenous or African-descendant population (see e.g. Stavenhagen 1992; Tilley 2005; Whitten 1999). The Arab struggle for an independent Palestinian state is clearly the most notable exception to the general trend. In Latin America, Bolivian Aymara leader Felipe Quispe has called for an indigenous state (Madrid 2012, 44), while the Nation of Islam in the USA has also envisioned the creation of a pan-racial homeland. These latter two projects have not found much popular support, however.
68 I am indebted to Pablo Ospina (Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Quito, Ecuador) for pointing this out to me.
69 Interview with Ariruma Kowii, 2013-4-11. Often this reluctance to speak their own languages also applies to ordinary members of historically oppressed groups. In Australia for example, only about one out of eight Aboriginal people still speaks an Aboriginal language at home (Vickers and Isaac 2012, 21). In Hungary, only 20% of the Roma population speak a Romani dialect (Barany 1998, 313). As a consequence, while these individuals on average are most likely to be less proficient in the European language than members of the dominant group, they cannot (or do not) take refuge in their own language. This not only abates ethno-nationalist sentiments but is also a factor in the perpetuation of political and economic inequalities in these countries.
70 See also Marx (1998), Mijeski and Beck (2011), and Vermeersch (2006) regarding the difficulties to politically mobilize stigmatized, historically subordinated ethnic groups.
71 It is important to repeat here that this permanent oppression (or subordination) is qualitatively different from the temporary political exclusion that often occurs in unranked ethnic systems as well.
societies in which ethnicity serves as the basis of group competition. The latter is exacerbated by ethno-political mobilization with negative effects on both ethnic equality and peace.

Figure 1-3: The structural argument
1.6. Possible Counter-arguments

Before I turn to the precise causal mechanisms linking ethnic mobilization to the postulated outcomes, I will discuss a few potential challenges to my argument. They can be grouped into four general themes: the definitional criteria used to distinguish between the two types of multi-ethnic societies, the question of within-category variance and outliers, the group-level approach to ethno-political inequalities, and the causal assumptions regarding the importance of this typology for the analysis of ethnic politics.

Alternative Explanations for the Origins of Ranked Systems

First, some obvious counter-arguments could be made against my definition of ranked ethnic systems. Two questions in particular need to be addressed here. Why should we focus specifically on race? And why should the presence of European or European-descendant groups be a necessary condition for ranked systems? I have already discussed some of the earlier conceptualizations (and what I believe to be their shortcomings for the purpose of my global study) in the literature review above. But one type of ethnic systems that scholars have referred to as of typically ranked nature (see e.g. Williams 1994, 64) has not been addressed yet, and that is caste societies. India would be the most prominent example of such a society but it underlines the fact that castes have become less relevant for political hierarchies in the last decades.

Ever since independence and the drafting of the constitution, Indian political leaders have made an effort to include the so-called “Scheduled Castes and Tribes” in political institutions. This began with the appointment of Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar from the Mahar caste to the post of Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee and his political collaboration with the country’s first prime minister Nehru, and it implied far-reaching measures of affirmative action, including quotas in educational institutions, the state bureaucracy, in parliament and state assemblies. At the top-level of state power, the country has been characterized by high levels of ethnic inclusion since independence (Guha 2007, 377-86). Hence, while in social interactions the ideology of caste hierarchy might still be upheld, it would be difficult to classify India as a ranked ethnic system with regard to ethno-political equality.

If traditional caste systems do not assume this role, an alternative explanation for the emergence of ranked ethnic systems could focus on the phenomenon of the nation state, rather than on race and racist ideologies. The processes of nation-state building – i.e. the extension of direct rule by a centralized state apparatus, and the connection of this state to a dominant titular (or core) ethnic group – often led to the political marginalization of culturally distinct populations in peripheral areas (Gellner 1983; Hechter 1975; Wimmer 2002). It is noteworthy that racial discrimination in Latin America took place within the context of intense nation-building processes steered by criollo elites (Stavenhagen 1992; Taracena et al. 2009; Tilley 2005; Wade...
Furthermore, in some prototypical nation states such as France, Poland, Greece, Albania, and several of the new states in Eastern Europe, such as Latvia and Estonia, we can observe profound and lasting ethno-political inequalities that come close to those of the ranked ethnic systems of my definition. The same pattern can also be found in China where the Han Chinese constitute the politically dominant core ethnie of the state, as well as in Thailand and Japan. Nevertheless, I believe there are at least four good reasons to discard the nation state as an equally powerful explanation for the generation of ethnic hierarchies. First of all, if we leave aside the settler-colony type for a moment, almost all countries with a state-building titular group are linguistically divided countries in Europe and, less often, Asia. This is not surprising since most European states became religiously “cleansed” between the 15th and 17th centuries (cp. Mann 2005, 45-54), and the processes of nation-state building have been closely connected to linguistic “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991). Consequently, most of the minorities in these states are also linguistic outsiders (e.g. Russians in Latvia and Estonia, Corsicans in France, Germans in Poland, Greeks in Albania etc.). Although the conjunction of nationalism and democracy once worked against them (cp. Mann 2005), the very same nationalist principle now helps them to legitimize their ethnic claims. Based on the widely accepted norm that “ethnic likes should rule over ethnic likes” (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 92), they are able to portray themselves as autonomous nations with nation-like political rights.

Indeed, the history of both integrationist and segregationist minority rights – born in the context of the Treaty of Westphalia, and the League of Nations, respectively – is most closely linked to the protection of linguistic (and, to a lesser extent, religious) minorities and their right to self-determination (Jenne 2007, 19-23). This significantly improves what has been termed the “discursive opportunity structures” (Jenne 2007, 11) of linguistic minorities. While nationalist ideology is a two-way street – legitimizing oppression as much as revolt –, racism is a dead end for the historically subordinated peoples. Hence, titular groups and minorities in nation states meet each other on a more equal footing than the “master groups” and the “racial others” in former settler colonies and elsewhere.

Moreover, as the above mentioned examples show, many of these minorities are ethnically connected to and thus, enjoy the political protection of another nation state. This certainly improves their political standing within their “host” state and tames the latter’s discriminatory
force (cp. Jenne 2007, esp. 23). In contrast, even though transnational connections exist between subordinated groups of different ranked countries, almost none of them command their own nation states. In other words, while many of the linguistic minorities in prototypical nation states possess external support, subordinated groups in racially divided countries are also globally powerless. This is another reason why relations between titular group and minorities in nation-states tend to be more competitive than the group relations in what I call ranked ethnic systems.

Characteristically, when linguistic minorities raise their voice, they often do that in the form of separatist or irredentist claims, based on the aforementioned segregationist minority rights. The Tibetans in China, the Corsicans in France, and the Basques in Spain and France are only a few prominent examples for this. Indeed, some of these nation states (China, Spain and Italy, for instance) already enacted regimes of regional autonomy for their linguistic minorities decades ago.

Thirdly, the titular group in these nation states often constitutes an overwhelming demographic majority and, consequently, minorities are very small. As we have seen above, group size is a powerful predictor of political inclusion and exclusion. Hence, ethno-political inequality in nation states might simply be a function of the demographic balance and not the consequence of targeted discrimination. Let us examine this point in more detail. The results of section 1.2 revealed that the length of European(-descendant) groups’ political dominance and the degree of these countries’ inequalities do not hinge on the sizes of the racial groups. In contrast, in several nation states that contain more sizeable minorities, the latter have become included in the governing institutions of their host states. This is the case, for example, in Bulgaria with the Turkish minority that makes up about 10% of the population, with the Albanians in Macedonia (about 25%), the Hungarians in Slovakia (about 10%) during the period between 1998 and 2006, the Serbs (about 32%) in the new republic of Montenegro, the Russians in Moldova (about 21%) etc.

While these examples can hardly be seen as more than anecdotal evidence, a more rigorous test confirms my point. In an additional analytical step, I examined the effect of the size of the largest group in a country on the length of one-group ethnic dominance for all cleavage categories separately. Figure 1-4 reveals that the effect of the variable is positive and significant in linguistically and religiously divided countries. The larger the majority group is, the more pro-

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This might partly be due to fear of irredentism (cp. Weiner 1971).

Exceptions are the Arabs in Israel, the African population in Zimbabwe and South Africa during Apartheid, and (to a lesser degree) the Latinos in the USA. However, precisely this last example highlights that the same historical processes responsible for the creation of ranked societies have also created marked hierarchies between states. Those with a European historical heritage, such as the USA, are usually unaffected by demands for minority rights by potential protector states from other world regions.

This was done in five separate cross-sectional Poisson regressions with the number of years of political dominance as dependent variable. Each model included the countries of the respective cleavage category as observations, and estimated the effect of the size of the largest group on the length of dominance.
found are the inequalities in these countries.\textsuperscript{78} This mirrors Mann’s (2005, 3) notion of an ethno-demographic tyranny in which a majority ethnic group “can rule ‘democratically’ but also tyrannically”.

In contrast, the same effect is negative (although statistically insignificant) in the case of racially divided countries with European(-descendant) groups. This is in line with the results presented in the above section 1.2. Hence, while the effect of European racism functions independently of the demographic structure, in the so-called nation states – which in general are linguistically divided countries – inequality clearly depends on the demographic balance between the titular group and the minorities. In other words, there is no \textit{intrinsic} connection between nation states and ethnic inequality.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1-4.png}
\caption{Cleavage type and the effect of demography on ethnic inequality}
\end{figure}

Notes: Based on separate cross-sectional, bivariate Poisson regression models for each cleavage type, with years of one-group dominance as dependent variable, and the size of the country’s largest group as independent variable. Each model included only those countries which are part of the corresponding cleavage category (identical to Table 1-1 in section 1.2). Confidence intervals calculated with simulation methods using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

Finally, it seems appropriate at this point to refer back to the empirical results presented earlier in this chapter. If nation states produced ranked ethnic systems, then we should be able to see empirical evidence for that not only in the settler-colony type but also in the linguistically divid-

\textsuperscript{78} This finding remains robust if we exclude the linguistically divided countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from the analysis.
ed countries of Eurasia. However, this is not the case. If we limit the linguistic cleavage category of Table 1-1 in section 1.2 to European and Asian countries, the average values of inequality do increase somewhat but are still far from the levels of racially divided countries with European(-descendant) groups.79

Furthermore, Figure 1-2 also shows that in comparison with all other ethnic groups, linguistic outsiders are neither more likely to be politically dominant nor discriminated. At this point, one could object that because some of the linguistically divided countries in Eastern Europe are very young, the dependent variable of years of one-group dominance will automatically be lower. However, using a relative version indicating the ratio of years of one-group dominance to the total number of relevant country years does not change the results, neither at the country nor at the group level. Hence, although some nation states have produced profound ethno-political inequalities, the general empirical pattern clearly identifies racially divided countries with European(-descendant) groups as ranked ethnic systems.

The empirical results also emphasize the particular role of Europeans in forming these systems of racial dominance and subjugation, as my definition of ranked systems postulates. Figure 1-2 showed a dramatic difference between European and other racial outsiders in terms of access to political power. This result is strengthened further once we unpack the umbrella category of “other racial outsiders”. Figure 1-5 below shows the expected duration of political dominance in years for European, Asian, and African racial outsiders, plus a residual category composed of groups of Amerindian, Arab, and Oceanic origin.80

We can see that European(-descendant) racial outsiders experience significantly longer periods of political dominance than any other racial outsiders (or racial “equals”). In contrast, there are no significant differences between the other racial categories in terms of access to political power, which reveals the unique link between European racism and ethnic hierarchies. As argued above, once we take the European(-descendant) groups out of the ethno-political “equation”, the racial hierarchy becomes blurred: no other racial group has had comparable political, cultural, and economic resources to dominate others. This is why racially divided countries without European presence, such as Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Fiji, and Madagascar are among the most ethno-politically equal countries with relatively short periods of one-group dominance, as Table 1-1 tells us. Thus, it is not racial differences per se which create ranked ethnic systems but the co-existence of European or European-descendant groups with racially distinct others.

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79 The mean length of one-group ethnic dominance in Eurasian linguistically divided countries is 23.9 years, the median length 19 years. The average ratio of country years with ethnic power shifts is 0.03 – more than seven times higher than in racially divided countries with European(-descendant) groups.

80 The calculation is based on the same procedure as in Figure 1-2 above.
Figure 1-5: Racial group identity and political dominance

Notes: Based on a cross-sectional Poisson regression model with years of political dominance as dependent variable, the mentioned “racial outsider” categories as dummy variables, and group size as control variable. Baseline of comparison are “racial equals”, i.e. those groups which are not racially distinct from the rest of the groups in their country. Only politically relevant ethnic groups included (as recorded in the EPR-ETH dataset). Expected values calculated with simulation methods using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000), holding the group size variable constant at its mean.

Variation and Outliers in the Unranked Category

Of course, as stated above, the distinction between ranked and unranked systems is not as clear-cut in reality as it is portrayed here. There is considerable within-category variance and, as is always the case with theoretical typologies, some cases escape the neat classification. In the following, I will address this second theme of potential criticism, by discussing this variation and some of the most prominent outliers. I will start with the category of unranked systems where we find several cases of ethnic dominance that would seem to justify their designation as ranked societies. Apart from the nation-state type of countries discussed above, the most obvious examples are the Philippines, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Morocco, Sudan, and Algeria which have experienced periods of one-group ethnic dominance similar to those in ranked ethnic systems (see Table A 3 in Appendix II). In the following, I will briefly discuss the patterns of dominance and exclusion that we can observe in these outlier cases, and explain, in my view, why they should not be regarded as historically determined ranked systems.

The Philippines might be the most interesting example, and perhaps the one coming closest to a ranked ethnic system. The country has long been dominated by the group of Christian low-landers – those Filipinos who converted to Christianity during Spanish colonial rule. They had
been at the center of colonial activity, and benefited most from colonial education and infrastructure investment. Forming also the overwhelming demographic majority (about 86% of the total population), it is not surprising then that in the wake of independence, they took over the state from the Spanish (and later American) rulers. Political power in the Philippines has been concentrated in their hands ever since, at the expense of the country’s other ethnic groups. One of these groups is the Muslim Moro, which long resisted Spanish colonial rule and were never really incorporated into the colonial empire. However, this also meant that they remained on the sidelines of the dominant Spanish-Catholic colonial culture on the basis of which the independent Philippine state would later be built.

Another excluded group consists of the descendants of the original habitants of the archipelago, who were also able to resist colonization and maintain their traditional ways of life but partly at the cost of isolation from development. In this way, they are not unlike certain indigenous groups in Latin America (e.g. in Panama, Colombia or Venezuela). Finally, there is also an ethnic Chinese minority that suffers from widespread, virulent anti-Sinicism. Hence, in the case of the Philippines, we find diverse elements of dominance by a core ethnic group defined by colonial history and religion, and of religious and racial discrimination. However, it is also important to state that the Muslim Moro group has enjoyed a certain degree of regional autonomy ever since the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARRM) in 1989 and thus, for over twenty years. Therefore, while the marginalization of the country’s indigenous peoples and the Chinese community resembles the characteristics of a ranked ethnic system, the (demographically unequal) struggle between Muslims and Christians comes closer to the unranked type of inter-ethnic relations.

Arab political dominance over Berber groups in the authoritarian regime of Algeria, and in the kingdom of Morocco (which additionally has occupied the territory of Western Sahara since 1976, suppressing the local Sahrawi population) constitutes another example of an exceptionally rigid ethnic hierarchy within the category of unranked countries. Egypt for its part is a typical example of religious discrimination in which the Christian minority depends on the benevolence of the Muslim-based regime, while the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is ruled by a royal elite rooted in the Transjordanian group, which is culturally distinct from the Palestinian Arabs who have remained excluded from the nation (Nasser 2005). Indonesia has always been dominated by its largest ethnic group, the Javanese, which is more than four times larger than the second largest group (according to EPR-ETH). However, the coding of the Javanese group as politically dominant during Indonesia’s entire history obscures somewhat the fact that the country also enacted far-reaching regional autonomy for other ethnic groups, both before and after Suharto’s military dictatorship. Finally, Sudan has been characterized by a series of nar-

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rowly based dictatorships and the discrimination of black Africans in the south by Arabic groups.

All of these examples highlight the fact that long-standing ethnic exclusion may also occur in unranked ethnic systems, based on other ethnic markers than racial differences created by Europeans. However, a more scrupulous analysis reveals that whereas the Philippines, and perhaps Egypt, come close to ranked systems, there are at least two crucial nuances that distinguish the aforementioned cases from the racially divided countries defined as ranked ethnic systems here.

One is the long-standing existence of regional autonomy regimes in many cases. This is true for Indonesia, for Sudan during certain time periods, and even for the Philippines. We have already observed this pattern above in certain nation states such as Spain, Italy, or Mongolia (for the Kazakhs). In contrast, with partial exceptions (American Indians in the USA, Kuna in Panama, and perhaps the Atlantic Coast in Nicaragua), the idea of autonomy is a much more recent phenomenon in ranked ethnic systems, and usually much more local in its dimension (e.g. in Colombia and Panama). While there is no absolute difference between ranked ethnic systems and the outlier cases discussed above on this point, we can nevertheless recognize a clear tendency. Hence, the autonomy “escape hatch” is much more realistic for excluded groups in unranked than in ranked systems.

But even more importantly, most of these outlier cases are highly undemocratic systems. They are either dictatorships or authoritarian regimes (Indonesia under Suharto, the Philippines under Marcos, Sudan under Omar al-Bashir and other military rulers, Egypt under Mubarak, Algeria, but also Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Myanmar, and Ethiopia under the Derg regime), or kingdoms (Morocco, Jordan, but also the former Amhara empire in Ethiopia). In the former, real political power is usually confined to a very small clique around the ruler, sometimes just his nuclear family; in the latter it is exclusively tied to members of a royal family. In both cases, political exclusion does not really occur along ethnic lines but rather along family or clan lines. It also affects the ruler’s own ethnic group since the vast majority of it has no realistic chance of attaining positions of political power.

In contrast, one of the most striking characteristics of ranked societies is the fact that their systems of ethnic dominance and subjugation continue or have always perfectly worked under

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1. In fact, an analysis of the EPR-ETH group-level dataset reveals that politically excluded ethnic groups in unranked ethnic systems are much more likely to exert political control at the sub-state level – what is labeled “regional autonomy” in the dataset – than excluded groups in ranked ethnic systems. Regional autonomy for excluded ethnic groups is observed in about 28% of all country years in unranked systems compared to about 11% in ranked systems. This difference is statistically highly significant (two-tailed t-test, p=0.000).

2. There is an important distinction between the two concepts of clan and ethnic group. Clans (or tribes) strictly defined are a less complex type of socio-political organization in which common ancestry is conceived in purely genealogical terms, whereas ethnic groups are based on socio-cultural characteristics and refer to an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991) that explicitly goes beyond the immediate family and kinship (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, 325; see also Jacquin-Berdal 2002, 60-1).
conditions of democracy. As Chapter 3.2 will show, ranked ethnic systems actually display higher values of formal democracy than unranked systems. The ethnic exclusion in supposedly exemplary democracies such as the USA, Australia, and Israel are vivid examples. In Latin America, the return to democratic rule has not automatically led to a change in the ethno-political power structures, as the case studies of Guatemala and Ecuador below will confirm. Often, racism has created structural political, economic and cultural inequalities that keep the “racial others” at the bottom of society and excluded from the sites of political power (Bonilla-Silva 2003). The only real exception to this pattern is South Africa, where despite continuing economic inequalities, democracy has put an end to the historical ethno-political hierarchy.\(^84\)

Hence, the fundamental difference then between ranked ethnic systems and these outliers in the unranked category is that the hierarchies of the former seem to remain unaffected by – and indeed become smoothly integrated into – democratic forms of rule. This might also tell us something about the role and effect of democracy in ranked and unranked multi-ethnic countries. While in the latter, especially in the form of simple majoritarian procedures, democracy often stimulates ethno-nationalist competition, in ranked systems it constitutes just another tool used by the ruling group to institutionalize ethnic dominance and oppression.\(^85\)

**Variation and Special Cases in the Ranked Category**

Having discussed variation and outliers in the unranked category, I will now examine the set of ranked ethnic systems in more detail. It could be argued that the subsumption of very diverse countries under this common term obscures relevant differences between these countries’ ethno-political regimes.\(^86\) Indeed, the precise content of racial categories, the patterns of boundary-drawing, and the mechanisms of exclusion have varied over time, across space, and between groups (Gotkowitz 2011; Marx 1998; Pallares 2007; Pitt-Rivers 1994; Wade 2010, 26-33; Wagley 1994). With regard to African-descendants in the Americas, for example, some scholars have argued that there is a significant difference between the segregationist, legally enforced racism in the USA and the more graduated, fluid racial hierarchies in Latin American countries, such as Brazil, which supposedly provide more leeway for individual social mobility (Degler 1971; Freyre 1986; Tannenbaum 1946).

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*In Zimbabwe and Liberia, too, the historical ethno-political hierarchy has been overcome. Yet, democracy has had to fight an uphill battle in these countries.*

* Cp. Vickers and Isaac (2012). That majoritarian democracy may exacerbate the zero-sum power struggle among ethnic groups is a common argument in the literature on politics in multi-ethnic countries in general (see e.g. Bakwesegha 2004; Gurr 1994; Horowitz 1985; Rothchild 2004). In contrast, my argument is that this is a specific characteristic of unranked ethnic systems. However, as discussed in the previous section, with the example of Belgium, if democratic institutions are strong enough, they are usually well able to regulate and channel this ethnic competition. It could also be argued that in unranked multi-ethnic countries, a more “secure” form of democracy than simple majority rule is necessary. This is the main claim of consociationalists (Lijphart 1977, 2004). However, a detailed discussion of this topic would go beyond the scope and aims of this study (for an overview see Horowitz 2002; Lijphart 2002; Reilly 2001).

* I would like to thank Pablo Andrade (Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Ecuador) for drawing my attention to this issue.
However, the notion of a more lenient form of racism in Latin America has become increasingly challenged in the literature (Antón Sánchez 2011; Marx 1998; Telles 2006; Whitten 1999). Rather than a question of the degree of discrimination, the difference might be described more appropriately as one between “targeted”, i.e. legal, and “diffuse”, i.e. informal, racial discrimination. Nevertheless, these differences have certainly affected processes of identity formation and ethno-political mobilization of African-descendant groups in different countries and regions. Pallares (2007) notes, for example, that where racial discrimination rested on segregation (USA, South Africa) subordinated groups fight for equality and against racial differentiation; in contrast, where discrimination rested on invisibilization (Latin America) they struggle for differentiation and visibility in order to avoid exclusion.87

There are also important differences in the patterns of ethnic exclusion between Amerindian and African-descendant groups within the Latin American region. During the colonial period, “indio” was a specific, institutionalized,taxpaying identity category within the colonial order which explicitly distinguished between the república de españoles and república de indios. Although economically exploited as laborers and tributaries, indigenous people were at least officially not slaves.88 On the other hand, African-descendants only possessed a specific census category to the extent that they were slaves. Free blacks did not fit into this scheme and were lumped together with others in a residual category. Moreover, while the Amerindians were treated as a collectivity by the colonial state, black rights were awarded on an individual basis. This led to a consolidation of indigenous group identity on the one hand, and to the destruction of black group consciousness on the other (Gotkowitz 2011, 13; Wade 2010, 26-9). The same pattern continued after independence, with indigenous people being seen as a special collective category while blacks were “invisibilized” as a group (Gotkowitz 2011, 16; Wade 2010, 33-5). Hence, the mechanisms of exclusion affecting African-descendant groups in Latin America today are somewhat different from those affecting indigenous groups.

This has also shaped the way these groups conceive of their aims of mobilization. Traditionally, indigenous mobilization has been more closely connected to the protection of ancestral territories and to the issue of natural resource exploitation, while African-descendant groups have focused more on an equal-opportunity agenda (Healey 2009; Helg 1995; Sawyer and Gomez 2012b; Van Cott 2000, 47, 96, 276; Wade 2010, 127-8).89 Nevertheless, as the case study of Ecuador will show, although the mobilization processes of Afro-Ecuadorians and indigenous people in that country have occurred mostly on separate paths and based on different strategies, some

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88 The “New Laws of the Indies”, issued by King Charles V of Spain in 1542, prohibited the enslavement of Amerindians.
89 Political claims of African-descendant groups have changed in more recent years, however, and moved closer to traditionally indigenous demands for cultural and territorial rights. See e.g. Anderson (2007), and Hooker (2005) regarding Afro-Latino communities and autonomy in Central America, particularly in Honduras. See also Van Cott (2000, 47, 86) on Afro-Columbian land struggles in the Pacific Coast region of Colombia.
of their concrete political goals are very similar, namely the fight against poverty, the improvement of health conditions within the communities, and multi-cultural education.90

In academic research, indigeneity is often treated as an ethnic category, defined by cultural signifiers, and blackness as a racial one, defined by phenotype (see e.g. Harris 1995; van den Berghe 1974). However, as Wade (2010, 38-40) rightly points out, this ignores the fact that the category of “indio” emerged as an integral part of the colonizers’ racial system and thus constitutes as much a racial identity as does the category of “blacks”. Moreover, at the individual level, both black and indigenous identifications are malleable. With regard to the comparative purposes of this study, there is certainly no reason why the discrimination of indigenous and African-descendant groups should not be treated from the same basic theoretical and empirical perspective. After all, the roots of this discrimination are the same. Moreover, as Whitten (1999, 55) asserts, the “division of labor according to race” that often marks academic works (i.e. a specific focus on either indigenous or African-descendant groups) follows the very same ideological paradigm that constructed these social categories in the first place.

In addition to these “inter-racial” differences, the treatment of indigenous people also varied considerably between different Latin American countries, depending on their number but also on the countries’ economic history. In Guatemala, for example, the lack of a strong mining sector, the dependence on forced indigenous labor for the agricultural export economy, and the large demographic size of the indigenous groups meant that a system of harsh ethnic oppression was maintained and all attempts at national integration – the theoretical goal of the liberal ideologues – were overridden by more pragmatic economic considerations (Martínez Peláez 1998; Pérez-Brignoli 1989; Taracena et al. 2009). In contrast, the bifurcated economic system in Ecuador – consisting of the export-oriented coastal region and the hacienda system in the highlands – and the constant political rivalries between the regional elites resulted in a less severe system of ethnic discrimination.91 There is also the case of Panama, which under specific historical circumstances, granted local autonomy to the indigenous Kuna group as early as 1938 (Van Cott 2001).

Finally, as mentioned above, Israel stands out from the set of ranked ethnic systems as the only country that is not a mainly racially divided society.92 In this case, the subordinated groups are neither former slaves nor the typical indigenous groups we find in other settler colonies but rather a Muslim Arabic population that became locked up in a state built by European-

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90 Cp. also Antón Sánchez (2011). Note that in the case of Ecuador, the protection of ancestral territories is also a highly relevant issue for Afro-Ecuadorians, above all in the coastal region around Esmeraldas. Discrimination in the realms of housing and the labor market are specific Afro-Ecuadorian concerns that are not on the agenda of indigenous organizations.

91 I am indebted to Pablo Andrade (Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Ecuador) for drawing my attention to this point. For a good overview over Ecuador’s political and economic history, see Gerlach (2003).

92 This is partly due to the sub-division of Jews into different, politically relevant groups of origin in the EPR-ETH dataset, but also to the fact that Jews and Arabs also differ on the linguistic and, of course, the religious dimension. As the only non-settler colony, Hungary is another somewhat unique case in my set of ranked systems. See the discussion in section 1.4 above.
stemming Zionists. However, despite important nuances, there are three decisive characteristics that justify Israel’s inclusion in the category of ranked societies.

First, the process in which the state was created bears resemblance to earlier incidents of colonization (for example, in South Africa). A continuous stream of European-stemming settlers to a foreign territory (in this case its supposedly God-given Holy Land) resulted in the establishment of a state in the midst of a racially distinct population which subsequently became part of it as second-class citizens, dominated by foreign rulers. Although this territory was initially under third-party (i.e. British) control, and the immigration also involved Arab Jews, from the very beginning the ethno-political hierarchy was clearly marked by the dominance of European-stemming Ashkenazi Jews and the marginalization of the existing Muslim Arabic population (and later of the Arabs living in the occupied territories of West Bank and the Gaza strip).

Second, Zionism was born in a time still heavily influenced by European imperialist ideas of racial supremacy. The attitudes of leading Zionists towards Arabs, including Arab Jews, seem to reflect these ideologies (Prior 1999, 14-5; Rodinson 1973; Shohat 2003; Thomas 2009, 4-5, 15, 21). Shohat (2003, 50), for example, argues that the Mizrahi Jews became trapped in the “lethal binarisms of savagery versus civilization, tradition versus modernity, East versus West, and Arab versus Jew” of the dominant Zionist discourse. Still to this day, images of Arab inferiority and a discourse of conquest are widespread in Israeli politics and society.93

Third, the politics of ethnic exclusion of Arabs have become neatly integrated into a system that is said to be the Middle East’s only real democracy (Thomas 2009, 23; Shelef 2010, 155-164). In this the country very much resembles other settler colonies, like Liberia before 1981 and the Latin American countries, while the ethnic oppression in the occupied territories shares characteristics with the Apartheid system in South Africa. Thus, although European conquest in this case occurred later and in a different context, the consequences for the affected Arab people – being converted into refugees or second-class citizens in their ancestral territory – are conspicuously similar to the situation of other subordinated groups in my set of ranked ethnic systems.

As mentioned above, the classification of Israel as a ranked system becomes more debatable after the inclusion of the Mizrahi Jews in the government from 1977 on – which makes ethnic exclusion seem to hinge more on a religious antagonism against Muslims.94 It is precisely this religious element which has given the Israeli-Arab group relations a more competitive character than is usually observed in ranked systems. Earlier European settler colonialism implied large-scale Christianization – and thus, also an ideological subordination (cp. Mann 1986, 22-4) – of the conquered people, largely depriving later generations of the means to challenge the settlers’ military and economic hegemony through “transcendent social cooperation” (Mann

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94 See, however, Shohat (1992) who contends that Arab Jews are still discriminated within Israeli society.
1986, 519). In contrast, the somewhat “incomplete” conquest of Palestine by Jewish settlers, based more on military than on ideological power (Thomas 2009), provides the subordinated Arab people with a powerful morale – religion – to challenge the established ethnic hierarchy. Hence, the old structures of dominance and subjugation are being supplemented by the dynamics of a struggle between different communities of belief. This is the most significant difference between Israel and other ranked ethnic systems.95

What we can conclude then from this examination of within-category variation is that despite these differences, all of these ranked societies constitute regimes of ethnic oppression by European(-descendant) groups dominating conquered, racially distinct populations, based on more or less explicit beliefs in their own racial supremacy. Hence, while the exact goals of mobilization may differ between different subordinated groups in different places and different points in time, the overarching commonalities are the existence of racial discrimination as the fundamental roots of grievances, and the aim to overcome this discrimination, in whatever form it exists.

From a methodological standpoint, it is important to note that a typology that spans such diverse countries in all regions of the world provides a much more solid basis to arrive at generally valid insights. While the particular local context always matters, the specificities of each single case should not deter us from seeking to uncover the general patterns and recurring mechanisms that link causes to outcomes in all these different cases. This approach is also an attempt at overcoming the geographic and disciplinary fragmentation characterizing the literature on ethnic mobilization. In the end, the fundamental question addressed in this study – the peaceful and egalitarian co-existence of different groups in multi-ethnic states – is a decidedly global question that affects most countries of the world, independent of their geographical location, and which therefore should be analyzed from a global perspective as well.

**Group-level Inequality versus Individual Mobility**

But when focusing on relations between ethnic groups, are we really looking at the right social units to analyze political inequalities? How do the issues of porous group boundaries and individual mobility affect the argument? There is no doubt that individuals are often able to cross ethnic boundaries. In Latin America, and the USA, for instance, outstanding individuals from marginalized indigenous or African-descendant groups, such as Benito Juárez in Mexico, have occupied high political offices over the course of history.

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95 For these reasons, I will also try an alternative classification as unranked system in the statistical analyses of the period 1990-2009 in Chapter 3.3, and check how this affects my results. However, due to the country’s conflictive history, if anything the inclusion of Israel in the ranked category should bias the results against my theoretical argument.
Nevertheless, apart from being purely personal achievements that were not reflected in an improving of the political or socio-economic position of the groups (cp. Becker 2011, 45), these individuals generally achieved elite recognition by not making any ethnic (or racial) group claims (Helg 2012). The hierarchy of groups persisted, and historically subordinated groups remained at the bottom of the social ladder (Marx 1998; Pitt-Rivers 1994; Vickers and Isaac 2012; Wade 2010; Wagley 1994). As a consequence, individuals of these groups have on average significantly lower chances of gaining access both to positions of political power and to the material resources that are distributed through them. The examples cited in section 1.2 clearly testify to this fact. Hence, all the empirical evidence we have seems to confirm Barth’s (1969, 9-10) basic argument that “boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them”. And as long as ethnic group membership has a decisive (even if not deterministic) impact on individuals’ likelihood of obtaining access to state resources and to the political institutions that govern society, ethnic group relations are key to political equality or inequality.

**Challenges to the Causal Logic of the Argument**

Some scholars have seen fluid group boundaries as something specific to Latin America (Degler 1971; Freyre 1986; Madrid 2012; Tannenbaum 1946). Even more, this supposedly characteristic feature of Latin American societies has been used to explain the low levels of ethnic conflict in the region, despite recent ethnic mobilization (Madrid 2012). If this is true, then my argument about the differential effect of ethnic mobilization in different types of multi-ethnic societies would be misguided in its attempt to provide a more general, global typology. This constitutes the fourth potential challenge to my theoretical argument.

Madrid (2012, 187-9) argues that in Latin America’s ethnically mixed societies, the fluid group boundaries decrease ethnic polarization. This is mirrored in a preponderance of multi-ethnic or ethnically inclusive organizations and government agencies, which in turn reduces ethnic conflict. However, this argument rests on two basic premises which do not seem to withstand a more scrupulous analysis: that group inequalities and polarization are overcome by miscegenation (*mestizaje*), and that ethnic boundaries are more rigid in other regions (e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa or Eastern Europe). First, as we have already seen above, ethnically stratified distributions of political and economic power have remained intact for centuries in Latin America, almost completely immune to certain individual-level mobility. Neither did large-scale *mestizaje* and the dramatic decline in indigenous ethnic self-identification (Madrid 2012, 4, 18-23, 78-80) change the fact that people with Amerindian or African phenotypical features – even if “converted” into *mestizos* – generally continue to face discrimination in these “pigmentocratic” societies (Edmonds-Poli and Shirk 2012, 19).
Moreover, the notion of ethnically inclusive organizations and government agencies are contradicted by the empirical reality. As repeatedly stated above, both the state apparatuses and the most powerful societal organizations in Latin America have historically been of a markedly exclusionary character (see e.g. Enloe 1978; Stavenhagen 1992) – as the author himself actually notes at various points (Madrid 2012, e.g. 165). Indeed, the profound inter-ethnic inequalities in these countries could be seen as a (less visible) sign of ethnic polarization. Hence, there is probably not less ethnic polarization in Latin America than, for instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa; there is only less ethnic competition – precisely because inequalities are so deep.

Second, it is also doubtful whether the much-cited fluidity of ethnic boundaries is really unique to Latin America. In fact, the same argument can be made about group boundaries in unranked ethnic systems. Scholars have long argued that ethnic identities in general are socially constructed and, therefore, malleable to a certain extent, and that individuals generally possess multiple, and multi-layered, descent-based attributes – “repertoires of identities” in the words of Posner (Posner 2005, 11) – that may even be instrumentally adapted to political circumstances (see e.g. Barth 1969; Horowitz 1985, 65; Posner 2005; Wimmer 2013). Hence, there is no reason to believe that at the individual level, other ethnic markers are less easily overcome or lead to less ethnic ambiguity. In fact, some scholars have argued that because individuals are capable of and have incentives to learn new languages, it is linguistic differences which do not lend themselves well to the creation of firm ethnic boundaries (Laitin 1998, 2000). It is also noteworthy that several of my interview partners both in Gabon and (post-ethnic conflict) Côte d’Ivoire pointed at the process of ethnic mixture in their countries due to the frequency of intermarriages. Hence, there is good reason to believe that ethnic boundaries are as easily crossed by individuals in other world regions as in Latin America, and in unranked systems as much as in ranked societies. The crucial point, however, is that in the former, a change of ethnic identity means nothing more than that. By contrast, in ranked ethnic systems this change implies an ascent (or descent) in the social hierarchy, precisely because the groups – i.e. the racial categories – have historically been ordered in a hierarchized fashion.

Thus, the crucial reason for Latin America’s lower level of ethnic conflict is not low ethnic polarization due to ethnic mixing and blurred group boundaries – but rather the lack of ethnic competition due to the ethnic hierarchization, i.e. the steep inequalities between groups. It is indicative in this sense that ethnic mobilization in the USA – a society traditionally associated with fixed racial boundaries (Freyre 1986; Marx 1998) – has not led to any violent conflict either. Therefore, in contrast to Madrid (2012), I argue that it is the historically determined ethno-racial hierarchy in Latin American countries and other ranked ethnic systems – and the resulting wide

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96 Interestingly, Madrid (2012, e.g. 20, 22, 165, 186) repeatedly refers to these inequalities himself in his book. As with the issue of ethnically inclusive organizations and government agencies, this seems to be somewhat contradictory.

97 Interviews 2012-8-2; 2012-8-15; 2012-9-14; 2012-9-28.
gap of political and socio-economic power between groups – which makes violent conflict more unlikely.

Finally, it could also be objected that in the countries classified as ranked societies here, ethnicity simply plays a less important role in politics, and that this is the reason for their lower conflict rate. Indeed, in the standard academic literature on ethnic conflict, many of the countries defined as ranked ethnic systems here have been conspicuously absent (Gurr et al. 1993; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Young 1976). However, this would mean to ignore the politically stratifying role that ethnicity has always played in these countries, the ethnicization of the state that occurred during state building, and the large-scale ethnic mobilization we have witnessed in the last decades (Barany 1998; Enloe 1978; Marx 1998; Stavenhagen 1992; Tilley 2005; Tuck 2010; Van Cott 2005; Vermeersch 2006; Vickers and Isaac 2012; Wade 2010; Yashar 2005).

The case studies below underline these points very clearly. Ethnicity is of high political relevance in both types of multi-ethnic societies. But while in ranked ethnic systems, ethnicity (in the form of race) has been used as a tool of oppression and is not seen as a source of violent conflict, in unranked systems it is used as an instrument for competition while being considered a latent danger for peace.

The next chapter will discuss in detail how ethnic mobilization – expressed through and promoted by ethnic political parties and civil society organizations – leads to the postulated outcomes.

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1. Notable exceptions are Cleary (2000), and Wimmer (2002). A completely contrasting argument is advanced by Guelke (2012) who argues that in what he calls "horizontally divided countries" composed of dominant and subordinate groups – and, in particular, in societies with settlers and natives – ethnic divisions are especially prone to lead to violent political conflict. However, since Guelke focuses on conflict resolution, he only picks conflict cases and thus, his results suffer decisively from a selection on the dependent variable.

2. In fact, as discussed in the case studies below, when asking my interview partners about future threats to political stability in their countries, ethnic mobilization was one of the issues most frequently mentioned in Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon but almost never invoked in Guatemala and Ecuador.

What role do ethnic organizations – both in political and civil society – play, and how do they influence ethnic equality and peace? As stated above, I define ethnic mobilization as all efforts of collective action made by ethnic groups and their leaders in order to achieve political goals for themselves *qua* ethnic groups. This includes the formulation, aggregation, representation, and vindication of ethnic group interests.

So far, I have mostly referred to ethnic group relations in a structural sense, focusing on unequal access to state institutions and resources and on the roots and consequences of mobilization, and only superficially addressed the role of organizations in ethnic collective action processes. This makes the argument vulnerable to the criticism of reifying ethnic groups (cp. Brubaker 2004). Hence, in this chapter I will discuss in more detail how ethnic groups become political actors through specific agents of mobilization which are able to impel processes of collective action. I first specify more clearly what I mean by ethnic mobilization before discussing how it works and what functions ethnic organizations fulfill. From their general functions I then deduce the causal mechanisms that link ethnic mobilization to equality or inequality, peace or conflict in ranked and unranked ethnic systems.

2.1. A More Precise Conceptualization of Ethnic Mobilization

Ethnic mobilization may take place in both electoral and non-electoral spheres of politics, organized by single leaders or – more frequently – organizational actors, such as political parties and civil society organizations. While the former are obviously closely connected to group representation in democratic political systems, the latter have also become increasingly important for political interest representation in recent decades, both in Western European democracies (Kriesi 1993; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004), and other world regions (Lucero 2008; Marx 1998; Tuck 2010; Van Cott 2005; Vermeersch 2006; Vickers and Isaac 2012; Yashar 2005).

The boundaries between the political system and civil society are usually blurred. First, civil society organizations are vulnerable to co-option by political parties. Second, especially in emerging democracies, political and civil society actors can often not be clearly distinguished from one another (Gyimah-Boadi 1996, 125; Pouligny 2005, 500). And third, strong, independently acting civil society organizations may also move organically from grassroots activism to strategies of electoral politics (Becker 2011, 208).

How strong the protagonism of civil society in ethnic mobilization processes is compared to political parties, depends very much on the size of the space that the political system and the
state apparatus occupy within society.\textsuperscript{100} Indeed, the regional analyses and case studies in this dissertation will show that while in Latin American states – especially during times of neoliberal state-shrinking\textsuperscript{101} – civil society actors have been very influential forces of ethnic mobilization, in Sub-Saharan Africa, overwhelming, control seeking state apparatuses have given hardly any space to independent civil society mobilization (cp. Gyimah-Boadi 1996).\textsuperscript{102} Thus, political parties and their elites are the decisive engines of ethnic mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, ethnic mobilization also varies in its degree of institutionalization. Where politics are highly personalized, ethnic mobilization will be mirrored mostly in informal networks among elites. In countries with strong, consolidated institutions (in both civil and political society), formal organizations are more important.

In light of these realities, it does not seem appropriate to analyze these types of organizations separately and try to disentangle the effects of one side on the other. Instead, I present an integrated view of parties and civil society organizations, conceptualizing them as different expressions of the same basic phenomenon: more or less institutionalized networks of political and economic elites who compete over resources.

Elite networks unite different political leaders in a web of personal interactions and relationships. They can be seen as a form of social organization that facilitates communication and interaction among its members of which one important aspect is the common membership in formal organizations (Moore 1979, 674). Scholars have argued that the effects of such sustained personal interaction are a high level of interpersonal trust, value consensus (regarding political ideologies), and a strong coincidence of interests – generally summarized under the term of elite “integration” (what can be translated as high cohesiveness). An integrated elite in turn should be characterized by high solidarity and little conflict (Giddens 1975; Moore 1979; Putnam 1976). More recent studies have also shown that processes of political collective action often follow existing networks (see e.g. Bearman 1993; Zelizer and Tilly 2006).

Hence, personal networks among elites define common interests and therefore, political alliances. If these networks are formed along ethnic lines, political alliances, too, are constructed according to ethnic divides. In contrast, where elite networks transcend ethnic boundaries, political alliances also tend to be trans-ethnic (Wimmer 2002, 241-9; 2013, 96-7).\textsuperscript{103} According to the above arguments, such trans-ethnic networks should also be a remedy against the low lev-

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\textsuperscript{100} I am indebted to Pablo Dávalos (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador, Quito, Ecuador) for drawing my attention to this point.

\textsuperscript{101} On the opportunities that neo-liberal regimes and policies offered to ethnic movements in Latin America, see Lucero (2008), and Yashar (2005).

\textsuperscript{102} This applies to civil society in general but, of course, is also true for ethnic civil society mobilization specifically. Cp. Bratton (1989, 411) who writes that the African state looks like a “veritable Kilimanjaro” in a “lilliputian environment”.

\textsuperscript{103} Wimmer (2002) has argued, for instance, that in the early periods of nation-state building, the reach of elite networks often defined the (ethno-)national boundaries, i.e. the boundary between nation and minority.
els of trust that often characterizes inter-group relations in multi-ethnic societies. This dovetails with a more general argument about elite cooperation – and specifically with regard to ethnically divided countries: trans-ethnic elite cooperation – and the stability of democracy that has been made in the literature (Lehmbruch 2003; Lijphart 1977, 2004; Prewitt and Stone 1973).

From this point of view, then, ethnic mobilization can be thought of as political collective action rooted in mono-ethnic elite alliances. It is mirrored in the alignment of political parties and civil society organizations according to ethnic boundaries. These organizations – which are both expressions and catalysts of a country’s inter-ethnic relations – constitute the main actors in my theoretical argument. High ethnic mobilization means that the strongest organizations are led by mostly mono-ethnic circles representing the interests of specific groups. The opposite of it is political collective action rooted in trans-ethnic elite alliances, mirrored in high trans-ethnic cooperation within both political parties and civil society. In this case, the organizations are composed of an ethnically diverse leadership. In the words of Bogaards (2007), we could call such organizations “aggregative” organizations.

To identify these parties in the empirical reality, I define an ethnic party as a party that represents the interests of (a) specific group(s) to the exclusion of others or receives its support overwhelmingly from (a) specific group(s) to the exclusion of others. Hence, this definition combines identification criteria at both the elite (agenda of party leaders) and mass level (behavior of voters). In the case of ethnic civil society organizations, the support criterion is obviously inadequate. Instead, I rely on the agenda criterion to identify such organizations, i.e. whether a given organization represents the interests of (a) specific group(s) to the exclusion of others.

As mentioned above, the state itself – which constitutes the main target of ethnic mobilization – is not neutral in this context. It is often ethnically biased, acting in favour of the group by which it is controlled. This means that, according to the previous theoretical considerations, there is an important difference between ranked and unranked systems regarding the role of the state. In ranked systems, the state is historically tied to the dominant European(-descendant) groups, completely captured by the latter, and functioning as an instrument of their power (Enloe 1978; Wimmer 1997). In unranked systems, there is no clear, historically pre-determined “owner” of the state (Horowitz 1985; Wimmer 1997).

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104 Cp. Fearon and Laitin (1996) regarding the problem of asymmetric information in inter-group relations and how this affects the level of trust between members of different ethnic groups.

105 Note that Bogaards uses the term referring to the institutional context that produces such trans-ethnic organizations. However, I believe that the organizations can themselves be called aggregative since due to their trans-ethnic composition, they are often able to aggregate the interests of different ethnic groups of the population into broader coalitions, as we will see below.

106 Note that since in Sub-Saharan Africa, organizations that make explicit ethnic claims are usually outlawed, I had to rely on the ethnic composition of organizations as a more implicit signal (see Chapter 3.1). This corresponds with the identification of ethnic parties in this region based on voter support, for the same reasons.
2.2. The Functions of Ethnic Organizations

Having specified what ethnic mobilization is in my view, I will now discuss in more detail how it works. Chapter 1.5 argued that the effects of ethnic mobilization depend on the type of multi-ethnic society. Because there is no predetermined hierarchy in unranked ethnic systems, they are prone to ethno-nationalist competition. Moreover, the capacity for violent action is very evenly distributed between the different groups. In this context, strong ethnic mobilization is harmful both to ethnic equality and to the prospects of peace. By contrast, in ranked ethnic systems the ethnic mobilization of historically marginalized ethnic groups is not only less problematic regarding the risk of conflict, but it also increases these groups’ chances of achieving political empowerment. In the following, I will specify this argument by linking it to the role of ethnic organizations in processes of collective action.

From the general literature on political parties, social movements, and collective action, we can deduce the functions that both ethnically based parties and civil society organizations may fulfill (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Beyers 2004; Binderkrantz 2005; Booth and Bayer Richard 1998b; Epstein 1967; Jenkins 1995; Kriesi, Tresch, and Jochum 2007; Mijeski and Beck 2011; Sartori 2005; Schattschneider 1942; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004). They can be summarized in four main points relevant to my argument about ethnic mobilization. First, both ethnic parties and civil society organizations aggregate and represent political interests (and identities) both at the elite and the mass levels. Thus, they structure political conflicts along ethnic group boundaries, eclipsing other potentially relevant cleavages.

Second, they also structure the public political discourse along ethnic lines, advancing institutionally backed ethnic claims – what is usually called agenda setting. Following Sartori (2005, 24), and combining these first two points in one term, we could call such organizations “channels of expression”. They represent the people “by expressing their demands”. But the institutional weight of organizations make these demands more forceful (Sartori 2005, 25).  

Third, these organizations orchestrate ethnic collective action. They are not only able to solve the free rider problem through the distribution of private rewards and resources (Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum 1982), their organizational structures provide a link between elites and followers, i.e. the rank and file of the population. This facilitates the mobilization of large numbers of people along ethnic lines.

Finally, ethnic parties in particular serve as instruments to capture and defend state power in the name of, or in favor of, specific ethnic groups. By feeding ethnic interests and demands into the political system and coupling them with the electoral process, ethnic parties structure the

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107 Note that Sartori (2005) makes this point with regard to political parties only. However, it seems reasonable to me to extend his argument to other organizations in the realm of civil society, which aggregate and represent popular interests and demands.
distribution of power and resources along ethnic lines. Importantly, capturing political power for oneself often implies excluding others from access to it. As a result, the political competition between ethnic parties produces winners and losers that are defined along the lines of ethnic groups (cp. Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2006; Rothchild 2004).

We can summarize these four functions by giving each of them a generic label which we then can use to specify the causal mechanisms that link mobilization to the outcomes of interest in both ranked and unranked systems. I will call them the interest aggregation, the propaganda (or agenda setting), the mass mobilization, and the power seizure functions. The next sections focus on the precise mechanisms we can deduce from these general organizational purposes.

2.3. Causal Mechanisms in Unranked Systems

As repeatedly stated before, in the competitive environment of unranked systems groups are engaged in a struggle over the distribution of political power in which ethno-nationalist parties serve as instruments of organizational strength. Concretely, they may shape the power balance in two ways. First, they may help groups create regimes of ethnic dominance, marginalizing other ethnic groups, possibly even precluding them from their own peaceful electoral mobilization. Although these regimes usually do not have the perseverance of ethnic domination of ranked systems, the organizational power of ethnic parties may still serve to effectively tip the balance in favor of specific groups and create a temporary ethnic hierarchy. This was the case, for instance, in Sierra Leone when the Mende-based SLPP came to power in 2002. In an environment of highly ethnicized electoral politics, the SLPP used its clear victory in the 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections to exclude other parties from access to government power leading to a temporary dominance by the Mende group and a sense of marginalization among the northern Temne and Limba groups (Davies 2002, 12). In this case, a strong ethnic party serves as an instrument of political suppression by capturing state power in favor of specific ethnic groups and protecting it against other contenders.

In other cases, an ethno-nationalist party of minor strength, only representing an extremist faction of the group, may exert enough pressure to force more moderate elites to follow an ethnically exclusionary course. In Slovakia, for example, the electoral strength of the nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) correlates rather strongly with the political dominance of the

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1 Regarding the exclusion of other political parties from executive power, see also the Human Rights Reports by the U.S. Department of State for the years of 2002 to 2005: [http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/](http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/) (accessed October 28, 2013). Regarding the ethnicization of Sierra Leone’s electoral politics, see e.g. Hayward (1984), Kandeh (1992, 2008), and Ndumbe (2001).

2 This mechanism comes close to what Horowitz (1985), and Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) have termed “ethnic outbidding”.
titular Slovaks and the exclusion of the Hungarian minority before 1998 and after 2006.\textsuperscript{110} In Latvia and Lithuania, right-wing parties, such as Fatherland and Freedom (Latvia) or the Homeland Union (Lithuania), capturing around 10% to 20% of the national vote have championed ethno-nationalist politics and thus, supported the political exclusion of the Russian and other minorities. Thus, in the case of unranked systems, we can subdivide the power seizure function of ethnic parties into a monopolization and an outbidding mechanism both of which lead to a decrease in ethnic equality.

Moreover, there are at least four ways in which ethnically based parties and civil society organizations can be linked to ethnic violence in unranked ethnic systems. First, in a purely correlational way, ethnic organizations can simply be an expression of the existing ethnic competition – perhaps stemming from a previous violent conflict – which is perceived as a zero-sum game between different ethnic groups and which at the slightest trigger can escalate into violence. In this case, the organizations themselves do not play a causal role in the process leading to violence but are a mere reflection of the degree of ethno-political competition in an unranked society which by itself correlates with the probability of conflict.\textsuperscript{111}

Secondly, however, there is also a direct causal relationship between ethnic organizations and violent ethnic conflict. Ethnic organizations are likely to increase the ethno-political competition by themselves, by hardening ethnic boundaries through propaganda and institutional discipline and hence, reinforcing the zero-sum behavior of ethnic contenders (Horowitz 1985, 291). Thus, the interest aggregation and propaganda mechanisms are closely related, leading to the formation of cohesive ethno-political blocs (cp. Wimmer 1997). This effect works both in the top-down and bottom-up directions. On the one hand, ethnic organizations have a signaling effect on the rank and file of the population, indicating that political competition and the distribution of resources are determined by one’s ethnic identity. In this way, they link individual political preferences of ordinary people to ethnicity. On the other hand, they meld these individual interests into ethnic group demands and feed them into the political system, structuring political conflicts along ethnic lines.

An important aspect of the aggregation mechanism is the system of ethnically based patronage, which is particularly prevalent in developing countries with scarce resources (Chandra 2004; Lemarchand 1972; Wimmer 1997). The more resources are distributed along ethnic lines, the fiercer the ethno-political competition should become, and the more likely is a violent escalation. Hence, ethnic organizations – both political parties and civil society organizations\textsuperscript{112} –

\textsuperscript{110} For instance, after the SNS won 12% of the national vote in the 2006 elections, the previously included Hungarian party was not invited into the new government anymore. As a consequence, Slovaks have had a monopoly over state power since 2007, according to EPR-ETH.

\textsuperscript{111} Note that for the quantitative analyses below, this means above all that we need to control for previous conflicts in a country when estimating the effect of ethnic mobilization on both ethnic equality and conflict.

\textsuperscript{112} For a description of the role of ethnic associations – thinly disguised as “home-town associations” – in channeling economic resources to ethnic constituencies during the PDCI one-party rule in Côte d’Ivoire, see Woods (1994).
also exacerbate competition in unranked systems due to their tendency to promote ethnic cli-
entelism.

Third, from the monopolization mechanism described above, we can also deduce an indirect causal relationship between ethnic organizations and conflict that works through ethnic exclusion. If a dominant ethno-nationalist party is used to marginalize other ethnic groups, ethnic mobilization also lays the ground for strong grievances within excluded populations, which may eventually produce violent reactions (Ishiyama 2009, 58). Previous empirical studies have already shown that political exclusion along ethnic lines significantly increases the risk of violent ethnic conflict (Birnir 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 2000b; Gurr et al. 1993; Petersen 2002; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). We could call this link the exclusion-grievances mechanism in which ethnic groups rebel because of their political marginalization by ethnic parties of other ethnic groups.

Simultaneously, in this situation ethnic organizations of the excluded group(s) may also play a crucial role in the process of transforming these grievances into collective action. As an instrument of counter-mobilization, they fulfill their function as vehicles of mass mobilization, which will be discussed below. This means that the concurrence of ethnic mobilization and ethnic exclusion should result in a particularly explosive situation.

In contrast, trans-ethnic elite cooperation within political or civil society binds together elites from different ethnic groups by creating common political interests that transcend ethnic boundaries (Sisk and Stefes 2005, 299; Wimmer 2002). This should diminish the elites’ disposition to engage in violent confrontations in unranked ethnic systems. Trans-ethnic elite cooperation also influences the attitudes and behavior of the rank-and-file members of the groups. On the one hand, it sends a strong signal to ordinary group members that inter-group conflict is not a realistic option. On the other hand, trans-ethnically based organizations structure and aggregate individuals’ interests in an ethnically bridging way (Sisk and Stefes 2005, 298). This should all mitigate ethno-nationalist competition. Hence, while ethnic organizations harden ethnic boundaries and fuel ethnic grievances, trans-ethnic organizations promote cooperation.

As a result, the more trans-ethnic elite cooperation we find in an unranked society, the less likely should both ethnic exclusion and ethnic conflict be.

Finally, ethnic organizations are also connected to violence in an instrumental way. Their organizational structures serve as tools to mobilize large masses of people in situations of ethnic tension, since they usually command large numbers of followers and link ethnic leaders to the rank-and-file members of their respective groups. This mobilizational capacity makes violence

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2. The importance of trans-ethnic cooperation constitutes one of the core arguments of consociationalists (Lijphart 1977, 2004). However, while this mainly refers to the cooperation between different ethnic parties, trans-ethnic organizations are actually expressions of within-organization cooperation. With regard to political parties, Bogaards (2005) has coined the term “consociational party” for this type of organizations.
more feasible. Thus, the mass mobilization mechanism should be very important for the relationship between ethnic mobilization and conflict in unranked ethnic systems.

Given the high stakes of elections in unranked ethnic systems – as the most obvious “rounds of competition” –, they represent a particularly critical moment of ethnic tension in which the risk of an escalation of ethnic competition into violence – merely because it is feasible – is pervasive. The ethnically based electoral violence in Guinea in late 2010, northern Nigeria in 2011, Kenya in 2007-2008, and other countries – and the prominent role ethnic parties have played in these instances – testify clearly to this notion (see e.g. Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999; Bekoe 2011; Bouquet 2011; Gutiérrez-Romero 2012; Smith 2010).115 As two African political scientists recently observed, party affiliation and mobilization along ethnic lines promotes a vision of elections as a competition of “us versus them” which increases the risk of violence (Nasong’o and Amutabi 2013).

In summary, based on the general functions of ethnic organizations I have identified several causal mechanisms by which these organizations are linked to ethnic inequality and conflict. While the monopolization and outbidding mechanisms link ethnic parties to increased inequality in unranked systems, the aggregation and propaganda mechanisms, the exclusion-grievances mechanism, and the mass mobilization mechanism link ethnic organizations to outcomes of violent group conflict. Of course, some or all of these mechanisms might be present simultaneously. Figure 2-1 summarizes the argument made so far, adding these causal mechanisms to the structural argument expressed in Figure 1-3 of Chapter 1.5. For reasons of simplicity, I focus here exclusively on the link between ethnic mobilization and inequality/conflict, leaving the effect of trans-ethnic cooperation aside.

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115 See also Laakso (2007) for earlier examples of electoral violence due to ethnicized party competition, such as in Kenya during the 1990s and in Tanzania.
Figure 2-1: Ethnic mobilization in unranked societies. Causal processes
The bold squares denote the variables that can be observed in the empirical reality, the rounded squares the assumed causal factors and mechanisms. I am focusing here on the causal effect of ethnic mobilization. By structuring political interests along ethnic lines (both at the elite and mass levels), ethnic organizations increase ethno-nationalist competition. But as stated above, in some cases strong ethnic organizations may also simply be the observable expression of already existing competition, which implies correlation instead of causation. In the context of this ethno-nationalist competition, ethnic parties may lead to systems of ethnic dominance and exclusion by monopolizing state power. This inequality in turn produces grievances that increase the risk of ethnic conflict. At the same time, through their mobilizational capacity, ethnic parties and civil society organizations also increase the risk of violence directly. Hence, there is both a direct and an indirect effect of ethnic mobilization on ethnic conflict. As stated above, ethnic conflict may produce further ethnic mobilization. This may result in a vicious cycle of ethnic mobilization, exclusion, conflict, and increased mobilization. But it also means that, reversely, trans-ethnic cooperation may produce a virtuous cycle of ethnic inclusion, peace, and increased cooperation.

Importantly, the figure also implies that there is a difference between small-scale ethnic violence and full-blown civil war. While in the context of fierce ethno-political competition, the mobilizational capacity of ethnic organizations and their polarizing propaganda are often enough to spur small-scale violence, such as electoral violence, full-blown ethnic civil conflicts are less frequent. In contrast to spontaneous or more or less isolated acts of violence, organized ethnic rebellions require planning, financing, and – above all – the recruitment of large numbers of (usually) men who are willing to fight. Hence, for such purposive, enduring ethno-political violence to break out and be sustained, additional motivational factors need to be present.

These motivational factors are usually found in widespread grievances among elites and the population. If the ethno-political competition results in the exclusion of specific groups from access to the state and its material benefits, with tangible negative consequences for both elite and rank-and-file members of the group, it may create the necessary popular support for armed mobilization and rebellion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr et al. 1993; Horowitz 1985; Wimmer 1997, 2002). In this scenario again, ethnic organizations may fulfill their function as vehicles of mass mobilization in the hands of the excluded group(s), as described above, facilitating collective action and allowing for the organization of planned, systematic political violence. Drawing upon the subjectively felt grievances, the organizational structures and the links to the rank and file of the ethnic group facilitate the activation of the necessary support base and the formation of a viable rebel force. Thus, formerly peaceful mobilization of a group is transformed into military mobilization, using the same logistics and organizational structures.

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116 Cp. also Lindström and Moore (1995) who found that grievances help foment ethnic group mobilization.
allowing rebellions to take off. This is why we should expect the outbreak of full-blown ethnic conflicts to be the result of a concurrence of ethnic mobilization and ethnic exclusion, as illustrated in Figure 2-1.

2.4. Causal Mechanisms in Ranked Systems

In ranked ethnic systems, ethnic parties and civil society organizations function in a very similar way as in unranked systems but with completely different effects, due to the distinct ethnopolitical constellation, aims of mobilization, and capacity for violent action we find in these countries. Again, the political leverage that such organizations create through their ability to aggregate and represent individual interests, their mobilizational resources, and their discursive weight serve to advance the specific interests of ethnic groups. In the case of ranked systems, as was discussed in more detail in Chapter 1.5, these organizations act as political advocacy organizations that promote the interests of historically marginalized groups.

As pointed out above, the state in ranked societies has historically been controlled by the European(-descendant) elite. However, ethnic parties of historically marginalized groups may be able to capture some political power – for example, certain positions within the state bureaucracy or seats in the legislature – and exercise it to their advantage. If they gain enough electoral strength, ethnic parties can induce favorable legislation through the conventional institutional channels, i.e. in the parliament or government. Thus, the power seizure mechanism should increase the chances of historically marginalized groups of achieving political empowerment, linking ethnic parties to increased ethnic equality in ranked systems.117

However, due to the profound inter-ethnic inequalities, which work against an equal participation in conventional electoral politics, alternative ways of ethnic collective action through civil society organizations are often more promising for these groups. Social movements in the realm of civil society facilitate the integration of actors and their interests into public politics, which so far have been excluded, underrepresented or simply absent (Jenkins 1995; Tilly 2004, 139-43). They often use tactics of contestation and protest, but also of targeted negotiation vis-à-vis state institutions, such as ministries or the parliament, to advance their interests. The literature on political interest groups (see e.g. Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Binderkrantz 2005; Kriesi, Tresch, and Jochum 2007) usually refers to these patterns of contestation and negotiation as indirect vs. direct advocacy or, as Beyers (2004) calls it, voice vs. access.

The organizational resources of ethnic civil society movements are crucial for both strategies. By aggregating the interests of the individual group members, they can build up the necessary

117 Moreover, as Madrid (2005, 167) has argued with respect to indigenous parties in Latin America, ethnic parties in ranked systems might also be able to pressure other parties to become more ethnically inclusive regarding both their agenda and their composition.
power to lobby the relevant state institutions and other political parties. Through their agenda setting power, they are able to advance ethnic claims and influence the public discourse, both in the national political arena and vis-à-vis inter- and non-governmental organizations at the supranational level, which may then pressure state governments (cp. Brysk 1996). Hence, the aggregation and propaganda mechanisms should make the ethnic demands of marginalized groups more powerful in the political arena, thus increasing the chances of empowerment.

Finally, by bringing together large numbers of followers and providing an institutional link between elites and the rank and file of the group, they are able to mobilize people and stage large-scale popular protests. The last decades have seen ethnic civil society organizations being able to mobilize large masses of people from historically subordinated groups to demand political changes in ranked ethnic systems (Barany 1998; Becker 2011; Marx 1998; Olzak 2006; Tuck 2010; Van Cott 2000; Vermeersch 2006; Yashar 2005). The mass mobilization mechanism should therefore also be of high relevance in ranked ethnic systems. Yet, due to the existing ethno-political conditions, it should be linked to an increase of ethnic equality as it promotes the rights and interests of historically discriminated groups.

As the case studies on Guatemala and Ecuador below will confirm, the strategies of mobilization and lobbying often go hand in hand. One indigenous Maya leader in Guatemala described this to me in the following way: “If there is no pressure, they never listen to you. (…) As the government realizes that there is a lot of organizational power that is protesting, what they say is: ‘Let’s go to the negotiating table, let’s talk and find a solution to the problems!’”

If trans-ethnic cooperation promotes ethnic inclusion and peace in unranked systems, why should trans-ethnic organizations not also be able to facilitate the empowerment of historically marginalized groups in ranked systems? Again, the answer lies in the fundamentally different ethno-political power structures of the two types of societies. The firm political and socio-economic hierarchies in ranked systems, rooted in centuries of racial oppression, are directly translated into the organizational environment, meaning that they are reproduced within the existing organizations. Hence, the interests of the historically marginalized groups are often not only neglected by the traditional political parties (see e.g. Frymer 1999; Madrid 2012, 165; Vickers and Isaac 2012, 144-7, 197) but also by the organizations of the general civil society – which reflects the same power structures and cleavages that characterize the political arena (Diamond 2000, 200; Rueschemeyer 2004).

In Latin America, for instance, ethnic hierarchies were reproduced even in those organizations that were generally sympathetic to the plight of indigenous and African-descendant people, such as leftist parties, unions, and revolutionary movements (see e.g. Becker 2011; Gerlach 2003;

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1 Cp. Mijeski and Beck (2011, 31), for a particularly clear example of this mobilizational capacity of ethnic organizations in Ecuador.
2 Interview 2011-4-29.
Lucero 2008; Velásquez Nimatuj 2008). Thus, as Edwards (2004, 80-2), and Rueschemeyer (2004, 86-7) have argued in a more general context, strong and autonomous pressure groups are critical for the promotion of the interests of historically marginalized ethnic groups in ranked societies.

Accordingly, I expect those groups which are represented by strong ethnic parties and/or civil society organizations to have a higher chance of political empowerment. However, if group mobilization becomes fragmented along ideological, political-partisan, religious, or personal lines, its political strength declines considerably. Usually, these divisions are reflected in an organizational fragmentation with different elites and organizations struggling over leadership and legitimate group representation (see e.g. Barany 1998; Becker 2011; Van Cott 2000).

Besides leadership struggles, intra-ethnic cleavages are often a driving force behind such fragmentation. They may increase problems of collective action and hinder mobilizational processes. Moreover, oftentimes they also reflect historical intra-ethnic rivalries between different subgroups – predating the period of subjugation – which continue to simmer below the political dominance of the racial oppressors and hamper the formation of a united political front. Such internal divisions may then be actively promoted by reluctant state elites in their attempts to weaken ethnic movements and resist change, for example by co-opting certain leaders and/or pitting different factions against each other.

Therefore, among marginalized ethnic groups in ranked systems, I expect those groups that are internally fragmented along linguistic and/or religious lines to be less likely to achieve political empowerment than more homogenous ones. Figure 2-2 summarizes my argument regarding ethnic mobilization in ranked ethnic systems. Again, the causal mechanisms are embedded into the structural argument expressed in Figure 1-3 of Chapter 1.5.
2.5. Hypotheses

The following testable hypotheses are proposed based on the theoretical arguments presented in this and the previous chapter. They can be grouped into three pairs. In line with the two central dependent variables of the argument, the first two pairs refer to the consequences of ethnic mobilization for ethnic equality and ethnic conflict, respectively. In addition to these main hypotheses, the third pair addresses the trans-ethnic and intra-ethnic dynamics of collective action processes. Since the theoretical argument assumes a positive impact of cohesive ethnic mobilization in ranked ethnic systems overall, the focus there is on political divisions within ethnic groups undermining this cohesiveness. In contrast, in unranked systems I expect a negative effect of ethnic group-based mobilization on ethnic equality and peace. Thus, the third hypothesis in this case is concerned with the effect of political alliances between ethnic groups, bridging such cleavages.

H1a: Ethnic mobilization in unranked systems harms ethnic equality by increasing the risk of ethnic dominance and exclusion.

H1b: Ethnic mobilization in ranked systems enhances ethnic equality by promoting the political empowerment of historically marginalized ethnic groups.

H2a: Ethnic mobilization increases the risk of ethnic conflict in unranked ethnic systems.

H2b: Ethnic mobilization in ranked ethnic systems does not increase the risk of ethnic conflict.
H3a: Trans-ethnic elite cooperation decreases the risk of ethnic conflict in unranked systems.
H3b: Intra-ethnic fragmentation decreases the likelihood of the political empowerment of marginalized groups in ranked ethnic systems.

The next five chapters will test these hypotheses empirically. After a short discussion of methodology and the data used, I will start with the quantitative analyses at the global level. The subsequent Chapters 4 to 7 will then focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, respectively.
PART II: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3. Global Analysis

This chapter will test the proposed hypotheses at the global level. After some explications about the methodological approach applied in this and the following empirical chapters, I start with a systematic comparison of ranked and unranked ethnic systems. As explained in Chapter 1, I define ranked societies as countries characterized by the dominance of a European or European-descendant group over other groups which are perceived to be racially distinct. We will see that the two types of multi-ethnic societies differ from each other not only in terms of conflict-proneness but also in their levels of democracy, and patterns of ethnic mobilization. The rest of this chapter will analyze in more detail how ethnic mobilization affects ethnic equality and the risk of conflict in both ranked and unranked systems.

3.1. A Word on Data and Methodology

This study draws on both quantitative and qualitative methods. The research design takes on the form of a pyramid symbolizing the step-wise procedure from the theoretical argument to the country-level case studies (see Figure 3-1). Guided by the theoretical considerations outlined above, the empirical study consists of various analytical steps which move down from the global level to the quantitative analyses of two regions considered to be theoretically particularly meaningful, and finally to the examination of single cases, while simultaneously gaining in depth and precision. While the large-n statistical method allows us to verify the general validity of the argument and the presence of the assumed relationships, the qualitative analyses present evidence of the proposed causal mechanisms in the actual course of events in specific cases. Expanding quantitative models with case studies may also help mitigate potential measurement problems resulting from the inevitable distance between empirical proxies and theoretically significant variables (Sambanis 2004, 259-60).
The regions chosen for the intermediate analytical step between the global analyses and the case studies correspond to the two distinct types of multi-ethnic societies identified in my theoretical argument, and can thus be considered especially fruitful for the validation of the argument. This part of the study reduces the number of cases while simultaneously increasing the level of precision with additional indicators of my main variables. On the one hand, Sub-Saharan Africa is the world region that, besides Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union states, is most clearly dominated by linguistic differences and, hence, the most obvious representative of unranked ethnic societies, as we have seen in Chapter 1.3. At the same time, it also constitutes a least likely scenario for the ethno-political dynamics stipulated in my theoretical argument, given that a large part of the academic literature on civil violence has dismissed ethnicity as an explanatory variable and instead emphasized state weakness, lootable natural resources, and warlord politics as the main causes of civil conflicts in this region (see e.g. Addison, Le Billon, and Murshed 2003; Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Ellis 1998; Le Billon 2001; McGowan 2005; Reno 1998; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). However, my empirical results will confirm that ethno-political dynamics are very important for the prospects of peace in this
region. On the other hand, the region of Latin America lends itself best to a more detailed and profound analysis of ranked ethnic systems due to its unique ethnic composition consisting mainly of different racial groups.

As King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 43) teach us, “social science should be both general and specific.” This methodological design attempts to follow this precept by combining the power of abstraction and generalization inherent in quantitative research with the contextual precision and analytical depth of qualitative studies on the basis of a detailed theoretical argument – what Lieberman (2005) has termed “nested analysis”. Moreover, the global coverage, spanning diverse world regions, provides a very solid basis to arrive at generally valid insights and uncover recurring mechanisms across these manifold contexts. While we can never do full justice to all specific details of the “full blooming and buzzing reality” of these different contexts (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 43), my approach attempts to build and describe a model of ethnic relations in ranked and unranked ethnic systems that provides the necessary simplification without losing its descriptive precision. In the following, I should like to elaborate on some of the choices made regarding methods and data that are relevant for all empirical chapters.

Operationalization of Key Variables and Data Sources

The quantitative part relies on regression analyses, and on data from different sources or from my own data collection efforts. To measure patterns of ethnic inclusion or exclusion – i.e. ethnic equality or inequality – I rely on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR-ETH) dataset introduced in Chapter 1.3. As explained before, the dataset records ethnic groups’ access to political power over time from 1946 to 2009, based on group leaders’ de facto access to executive government power expressed through an ordinal scale of power statuses.

The conflict data stem from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset (ACD) where a conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility over government or territory between two parties of which at least one is the government of a state, resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Conflicts were classified as ethnic according to ACD2EPR. In this data project, rebel organizations are linked to ethnic groups based on two criteria: recruitment of fighters from a particular ethnic group, and public claims on behalf of the group. If these criteria are both fulfilled, a rebel organization and the corresponding conflict are coded as ethnic (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). Finally, to compare the levels of formal democracy, economic development, and the size of different countries, I draw on the standard Polity index by Gurr,

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1 I added one manual change to the ACD conflict data. While the dataset classifies the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States as an intrastate conflict, I did not include it in my sample of civil conflicts. Note also that a two-year termination restriction is applied to the conflict episodes included in the ACD dataset. This means that while according to the ACD coding rules, a conflict episode ends in a given year if there is no conflict-related activity in the next calendar year, the two-year termination restriction determines that a conflict episode is only considered terminated if there is no conflict-related activity in the following two calendar years. This serves to prevent an inflation of conflict episodes and, thus, conflict onsets.
Jaggers, and Moore (1989), a GDP per capita variable from the Penn World Table, version 7.0 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011), and an indicator of absolute country population drawn from the same source.

As explained at lengths in the theory part, I conceptualize ethnic mobilization as occurring both in electoral politics and within the realm of civil society. Due to data limitations, at the global level I operationalize ethnic mobilization exclusively with the strength of ethnic political parties. The more fine-grained approach in the regional analyses of the subsequent chapters, however, also allows me to take civil society networks into account, drawing on newly collected data on ethnic civil society organizations in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. These data are described in detail in the corresponding chapters of the study.

Scholars have found it difficult to settle on a common definition of the term “ethnic party”. This has been one of the main reasons for the difficulty to identify such parties on the ground. In his classical work, Horowitz (1985) names the purpose of a party and the distribution of party support as the decisive criteria. He describes an ethnic party generally as “identified with the cause of the ethnic group it represents”, its overall mission being “to foster the interests” of this group (Horowitz 1985, 296). Similarly, Gunther and Diamond (2001) identify ethnic parties based on their purpose, electoral and political goals, and program. They contend: “The principal goal of the ethnic party is not any universalistic program or platform, but rather to secure material, cultural, and political benefits and protections for the ethnic group in its competition with other groups” (Gunther and Diamond 2001, 23). Subsequent works have used more or less similar criteria to define and identify ethnic parties: party support and party agenda (Reilly 2006, 813), composition/membership and agenda (Van Cott 2005, 3); and agenda and mobilization strategies (Chandra 2005, 236; Madrid 2012, 6). Ethnic parties may represent more than one ethnic group but what is important is that these interests are championed to the exclusion of other groups (Chandra 2005, 236). Hence, just like ethnic groups themselves are always relational (cp. Barth 1969; Horowitz 1985, 50, 66), ethnic parties also define themselves in opposition to outsiders.121

Chandra (2011) argues convincingly that even when settling on a given definition, different indicators used to classify actual political parties will eventually lead to different results. Hence, it is important to be transparent about the definitional criteria one uses to identify ethnic parties, and about the sources of the information on the basis of which the judgments are made. For the purposes of this study, I chose a pragmatic approach to classify ethnic parties that is partly inspired by Chandra. Because parties that make explicit ethnic claims in their program are constitutionally banned in many countries of the world, the explicit party agenda is not a helpful

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1 For a deviating notion on this, see Madrid (2012) who explicitly distinguishes between inclusive and exclusionary ethnic parties.
indicator at the global level. We need a broader definition that is more lenient and allows us to detect ethnic parties in different contexts based on more implicit signals. This leads me to the definition introduced above in which for the purposes of operationalization, an ethnic party is defined as a party that represents the interests of (a) specific group(s) to the exclusion of others or receives its support overwhelmingly from (a) specific group(s) to the exclusion of others. This broad definition is able to accommodate explicit and implicit campaign messages, party name, and party votes all as possible signals of ethnic identity and, hence, includes most of the indicators proposed by Chandra (2011).

Ethnic parties were identified based on five main sources: the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009); qualitative information from EPR-ETH; Birnir (2007) and Birnir and Satana (2013); Szöcsik and Zuber (2012); and Van Cott (2005). In many cases, this information was underpinned by additional country-specific sources. The “manual” procedure of classification that this processing of multiple sources made necessary also ensured that the ethnic parties identified by these different sources actually met my own definition and, if this was not the case, allowed me to make the appropriate changes. Appendix III lists all parties that were classified as ethnic.

The strength of ethnic parties was operationalized as their vote share in national elections to the lower chamber of parliament. Logically, the values remain constant in the years between elections. With the exception of Latin America, these data on electoral ethnic mobilization are available from 1990 on only. The longer history of multi-party democracy in Latin America allowed me to collect data on ethnic parties in that region for the whole period from 1946 to 2009 and, thus, expand the sample period for the corresponding analyses.

*Methodical Approach and Case Selection*

Importantly, following the stipulated causal mechanisms and the corresponding hypotheses, I use different levels of analysis when predicting the effect of ethnic mobilization on equality and peace. In the case of ethnic equality, the causal mechanisms describe how ethnic organizations serve as a means to capture state power, facilitating the political emancipation of historically marginalized groups in ranked systems while possibly leading to (temporary) dominance.

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1. Even more problematically, patterns of ethnic party bans might differ significantly between different regions which would lead to a systematic bias in the data. Moroff (2010), for example, shows that explicit ethnic claims are constitutionally banned almost everywhere in Africa. Apparently, this is not the case in Latin American and (Eastern) Europe.

2. Information on election results was drawn from African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/index.html (accessed May 16, 2013); the Parline database of the Inter-Parliamentary Union: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp (accessed May 16, 2013); Psephos – Adam Carr’s Election Archive: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/ (accessed May 16, 2013); the European Election Database: http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/ (accessed May 16, 2013); and Nohlen (1999, 2005a, 2005b). If information on the vote share of parties was not available, I used instead the share of seats in the lower chamber of parliament, in percentage of total seats, to measure ethnic party strength. However, this only affected a handful of cases, representing a minor percentage of all observations.
of specific groups in the competitive environment of unranked systems. Thus, these mecha-
nisms refer clearly to the group level. In contrast, my argument regarding ethnic peace is a sys-
temic argument. It is the interaction of the ethno-political mobilization of dominant and/or
excluded groups, and the interaction between this mobilization and ethnic exclusion, which
should increase the risk of conflict in a country. Hence, these hypotheses need to be tested at
the system, i.e. the country, level.

The qualitative part relies mainly on field research carried out in four countries in both Latin
America and Sub-Saharan Africa: Guatemala, Ecuador, Côte d’Ivoire, and Gabon. Over 150 in-
depth interviews with state officials (including several state ministers and an Ecuadorian ex-
president), political party leaders, parliamentarians, media representatives, and civil society
leaders serve to reconstruct the causal mechanisms that underlie the statistical relationships
found in the quantitative part (cp. Lieberman 2004, 2). Or, in other words, the field research
makes sure that the interpretation of the statistical results is in line with the reality on the
ground – i.e. with how the relevant political actors and observers in the pertinent countries
perceived the events in question and their own actions. This information from primary sources
was complemented by a vast amount of country-specific secondary literature.

The selection of cases is guided by the goal of assessing the strength of my model by testing its
proposed causal mechanisms (Lieberman 2005, 437, 444). Within the type of unranked socie-
ties, comparing Côte d’Ivoire with Gabon allows me to contrast a conflict case with a control
case that has a remarkably similar ethno-political and economic history but has never experi-
enced any ethnic conflict. This constellation thus comes close to a most-similar case study that
does not only allow for the testing of hypotheses but also sheds light on the causal mechan-
nisms between the causal factor of interest and the outcome (Gerring 2007, 131-3).

The case of Guatemala serves to analyze the political mobilization of a historically subordinated
ethnic group – the Maya – whose struggle for empowerment is still ongoing. Hence, it is well
suited to document, on the one hand, how ethnic organizations vindicate ethnic interests and
may influence state politics in ranked societies, and on the other hand, how this ethnic mobil-
ization is hampered by intra-ethnic divisions within the subordinated group. While this analysis
offers us important insights about the causal mechanisms working towards and against politi-
cal empowerment, it does not tell us anything about the consequences for ethnic peace once
this empowerment is (at least partly) achieved.

Ecuador again is a particularly fruitful case with regard to this second issue as it has seen Latin
America’s arguably strongest indigenous movement that has significantly improved the politi-
cal situation of the country’s historically marginalized ethnic groups (Becker 2011; Lucero 2008;
Madrid 2012, 175-8; Van Cott 2001; Yashar 2005). At the same time, however, this movement’s
organizations and leaders have experienced widely different degrees of political inclusion and
exclusion within the last decade, ranging from participation in the government to outright opposition. This allows me to examine within the context of one single case – in the form of a “longitudinal comparison” (Gerring 2007, 160-4) – how ethnic organizations’ strategies and different state reactions affect ethnic peace in ranked ethnic systems.

My interview subjects in all four countries were either central actors in, or close observers of, the key political processes under examination. After an initial contact with the pertinent institutions and/or individuals, the snowball method was used to identify further relevant interview subjects until the interviews did not unveil any new information (cp. Tansey 2007). The small number of interviews in each country and target group does not allow us to speak of a representative survey. But the non-probability sampling procedures applied here, which targeted the relevant actors involved in the specific processes of interest, should ensure that the gathered information can adequately reproduce these processes and thus detect the causal mechanisms that link the explanatory factors to the observed outcomes (Tansey 2007).

This enterprise takes on the form of “process tracing” (Gerring 2007, 173-5, 184; Van Evera 1997, 64-6) in which the cause-effect link is divided into smaller steps which are then examined – i.e. verified or rejected – in the light of the empirical evidence. This evidence may stem from the sequence and structure of events or from the testimonies of the involved actors as in the case of elite interviews (Van Evera 1997, 65). The model is confirmed in a particular case if the evidence fits the assumptions of the causal path, i.e. there is evidence for all links of the postulated causal chain (Gerring 2007, 185; Van Evera 1997, 64-5).

3.2. Equality, Conflict Propensity, and Patterns of Ethnic Mobilization: An Empirical Comparison of Ranked and Unranked Systems

How do ranked and unranked ethnic systems empirically differ from each other regarding the key variables of interest of this study? Chapter 1.5 has argued that unranked systems should exhibit higher levels of ethnic mobilization overall due to their competitive nature, and that for the same reason, politically included and excluded groups should be equally likely to mobilize. Moreover, the extreme inter-group inequalities should make ranked societies more stable and less conflict-prone overall. In this first empirical section, I test these assumptions and other differences between the two types of multi-ethnic societies based on the quantitative data at hand. The section consists of two parts. First, I examine systemic factors at the country level while subsequently, I show what this means for patterns of group status and mobilization.

* Note that for reasons of confidentiality, all interview subjects in Guatemala, Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon (and some in Ecuador) were ensured anonymity. (Many interview subjects in Ecuador explicitly wished to be cited with their name.) In these cases, I will refer to the interviews using the “function” of an interviewee (e.g. “outside expert”, “political party leader” etc.) and the date of their occurrence. All interviews are listed (either anonymously or with name) according to country and target group/function (“outside expert”, “political party leader” etc.) in a separate List of Interviews at the end of this study.
Ethnic Conflict, Democracy, and the Equilibrium of Inequality: Systemic Differences

Table 3-1 shows the average frequency of ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts in both types of ethnic systems. As can be seen in the third column of the table, ranked ethnic systems are much less likely to experience violent ethnic conflicts than unranked systems. The general ethnic conflict risk is four and a half times higher in the latter. In ranked systems, just about 0.5% of all country years are characterized by an onset of ethnic conflict. This is in complete accordance with the theoretical argument. In an environment of high ethnic competition, as in unranked multi-ethnic societies, we would expect a higher risk of violent escalation overall. In contrast, the rigid, stable ethnic hierarchies and the highly unequal distribution of political and socio-economic power in ranked systems result in what I have earlier called an “equilibrium of inequality”, making violent ethnic conflict in these societies very unlikely.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic system type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Ethnic conflict onsets/year 1946-2009</th>
<th>All conflicts onsets/year 1946-2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unranked ethnic systems</td>
<td>5261</td>
<td>.027 (.002)</td>
<td>.043 (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranked ethnic systems</td>
<td>1291</td>
<td>.005 (.002)</td>
<td>.027 (.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6552</td>
<td>.023 (.002)</td>
<td>.04 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-tailed t-test</td>
<td></td>
<td>p&lt;0.001</td>
<td>p&lt;0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers refer to country years. Conflict data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset. Classification of ethnic conflicts according to ACD2EPR. See previous section regarding data sources.

One obvious caveat against this conclusion, however, could be that in ranked ethnic societies where class and ethnicity usually overlap, civil violence may often take on the form of a class conflict without explicit ethnic claims being advanced. Indeed, in Latin America – where most of my ranked ethnic systems are located – ethnic mobilization often occurred within the framework of a leftist class struggle and only in the last decades of the 20th century took a decidedly ethnic turn (Yashar 2005). Hence, the fourth column of Table 3-1 compares the risk of civil conflict in general – including all conflicts recorded in the dataset – between the two types of ethnic systems. It reveals that while this considerably increases the conflict frequency in ranked ethnic systems (to about 3% of all country years), unranked systems still exhibit a significantly higher conflict probability.

Note that in this and the following table, I coded countries as ranked during the time periods specified in Table 1-2Table 1-2 in Chapter 1.4 (including Israel). However, the basic differences are the same if a time-constant coding of ranked societies is used – which clearly points to the lasting influence of the ethnic structure on the political situation of these countries.
This apparent immunity of ranked systems to ethnic conflict is even more clearly exposed if we combine the sample and use a logit regression analysis to model ethnic conflict onset between 1946 and 2009. I first show a “standard” model of ethnic conflict onset, including many of the traditionally used explanatory variables, such as ethnic exclusion, GDP per capita, country population, level of democracy, and previous conflicts. I then introduce a dummy variable for ranked ethnic systems. If the argument of the equilibrium of inequality holds, we would expect this variable to have a negative effect on conflict onset, despite – or, in fact, precisely because of – the high levels of ethnic exclusion we find in these countries.

Table 3-2 summarizes the findings. The results of Model 3.1 mirror those of the existing literature with regard to, for example, ethnic exclusion, population size, GDP per capita, and war history (see e.g. Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Collier and Hoeflfler 2002, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Sambanis 2001; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Hence, while ethnic exclusion, earlier conflicts, and large populations increase the risk of ethnic conflict, greater economic development is associated with a lower risk overall.

What happens if we add the ranked system dummy to the analysis? Model 3.2 reveals that the variable indeed has a significantly negative effect on conflict risk. All other variables behave the same as in the standard model, including the ethnic exclusion dummy. Thus, while exclusion generally increases the risk of ethnic conflict onset, ranked ethnic systems – characterized by long-term ethnic exclusion – are less likely to experience ethnic conflict. This result provides strong support for the argument made in 1.5 that precisely because of the extreme degree and persistence of exclusion, subordinated groups have been deprived of the means to violently challenge their marginalization. Overall, by adding information about the type of multi-ethnic society, the quality of the statistical model (measured by the AIC value) is slightly improved, which also testifies to the relevance of this theoretical distinction.

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126 I use a simple dummy variable as proxy for ethnic exclusion in these models, indicating whether there is at least one politically excluded ethnic group in the country. If the relative size of all excluded groups is used instead, the results are similar, although the effect of the variable is weaker. As in all country-level regressions below, the unit of analysis is the country year, and the standard errors are clustered on the countries. Ongoing years of conflict are coded as missing. The latter, and the missing values on some of the control variables, are responsible for the lower number of observations in these analyses compared to that reported in Table 3-1.

127 I use a time-variant coding of ranked systems for this variable, according to the time periods specified in Table 1-2 in Chapter 1.4. However, this finding holds if we use a time-constant classification of ranked and unranked systems. Again, this points to the lasting influence of the ethnic structure on patterns of ethno-political conflict in these countries.

128 Model 3.2 has a lower AIC value than Model 3.1. The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is an indicator of the relative quality of a statistical model compared to alternative models for a given set of data. Weighing the goodness of fit against the complexity of the model, it offers an estimate of the information that is lost when a given model is used to predict the data-generation process. Hence, models with lower AIC values are preferable.
Table 3-2: Ethnic system type and ethnic conflict onset. Regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3.1</th>
<th>Model 3.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic exclusion dummy</td>
<td>.80** (.31)</td>
<td>.89** (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranked system dummy</td>
<td>– (.31)</td>
<td>-.97* (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity index (lagged)</td>
<td>-.01 (.02)</td>
<td>-.00 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size (logged)</td>
<td>.21* (.08)</td>
<td>.18* (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (lagged, logged)</td>
<td>-.23* (.10)</td>
<td>-.20* (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calendar year</td>
<td>.02*** (.01)</td>
<td>.02* (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years</td>
<td>-.11* (.05)</td>
<td>-.11* (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years (quadratic)</td>
<td>.00* (.00)</td>
<td>.00* (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years (cubic)</td>
<td>-.00 (.00)</td>
<td>-.00 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War history</td>
<td>.17*** (.05)</td>
<td>.18*** (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.49.21*** (13.56)</td>
<td>-.40.40*** (14.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5371</td>
<td>5371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-389.87***</td>
<td>-387.48***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors, with clustering on countries, in parentheses.

* $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$, + $p \leq 0.1$

What can we say about the development of democracy in these two types of multi-ethnic societies? Interestingly, Table 3-3 shows that the very unequal ranked ethnic systems have significantly higher values of formal democracy on average, according to the Polity IV dataset.\(^{129}\) Hence, the racial hierarchy erected in these societies is highly compatible with formal rules of democracy. This issue has already been broached in Chapter 1.6 above where I have referred to the most obvious examples of this phenomenon: the USA, Australia, Israel and many Latin

\(^{129}\) Note that due to missing observations in the Polity dataset, the number of observations is slightly lower for this variable. The result is robust if we use the Freedom House indicators of political rights and civil liberties which are available from 1972 on.
American countries. Even South Africa exhibits a value of 4 on the Polity index in all years from 1948 to 1989, i.e. during the worst years of the Apartheid regime.

Table 3-3: Ranked and unranked systems. Differences in levels of democracy and ethnic mobilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic system type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Polity index 1946-2009</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Vote share ethnic parties 1990-2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unranked ethnic systems</td>
<td>5173</td>
<td>-0.61 (.10)</td>
<td>1681</td>
<td>.22 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranked ethnic systems</td>
<td>1285</td>
<td>2.68 (.19)</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>.01 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6458</td>
<td>.04 (.09)</td>
<td>2053</td>
<td>.18 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-tailed t-test</td>
<td>p=0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>p=0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers in columns 2 and 4 refer to country years.

Let us examine the effect of democracy on ethnic exclusion in ranked and unranked systems more closely by looking at the temporal development of these variables in the two types of multi-ethnic societies. Figure 3-2 compares their mean scores on the Polity index and their mean levels of ethnic exclusion, according to EPR-ETH, over time. The latter is measured as the relative size of all excluded groups as a fraction of the size of all politically relevant groups. The difference between the two types of ethnic systems regarding the effect of democracy is striking. In unranked systems, the exclusion curve is an almost perfectly symmetric reflection of the democracy curve, meaning that whenever democracy has been deficient in these countries, ethnic exclusion has been high, and vice versa. Hence, the trend towards authoritarianism beginning in the late 1950s led to a significant increase of the levels of ethnic exclusion, while democratization at the end of the Cold War was automatically followed by a sharp decrease of exclusion. It seems thus that in unranked systems, democratic institutions do promote ethnic inclusion. Indeed, when comparing the historical average values of ethnic exclusion and democracy of unranked countries between 1946 and 2009, we find a statistically significant negative correlation between the two variables ($r=-0.39; p=0.000$). This means that countries that have had higher average levels of democracy during this period have experienced lower degrees of ethnic exclusion overall.130

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130 I calculated for each country its mean levels of democracy and exclusion for the period from 1946 to 2009. I then used these single historical country values as observations to measure the correlation between the two variables both within the group of unranked countries and among ranked countries. The negative relationship between democracy and ethnic exclusion in unranked systems remains robust in a multivariate analysis. The Polity variable has a significant negative effect on the level of ethnic exclusion, even when controlling for the size of the largest ethnic group in the country, and previous levels of ethnic exclusion (in the form of a lagged dependent variable). In contrast, in ranked systems, the relationship between the variables is positive but statistically insignificant.
In contrast, in ranked ethnic systems, the exclusion curve runs almost parallel to the democracy curve over the first four to five decades after World War II. The clearest expression of this is the further increase in the degree of exclusion that accompanied the rise of democracy in the 1980s. Only from the first half of the 1990s on has ethnic exclusion steadily declined in ranked ethnic systems. Hence, the positive influence of democratic institutions on ethnic inclusion has been much slower to develop in these historically hierarchical societies. Indeed, if we consider the whole time period from 1946 to 2009, the correlation between the historical average levels of democracy and ethnic exclusion is not significantly different from zero ($r=0.08; p=0.72$). And
still in 2009, ranked ethnic systems have a slightly higher level of ethnic exclusion despite the much higher level of formal democracy.

This discrepancy between democracy and the degree of ethnic inclusion in ranked ethnic systems over long periods of time certainly says something about the validity of the standard democracy measures which are almost completely based on procedural criteria without paying attention to the issue of ethnic exclusion. But more importantly, it points to the comfortable coexistence of modern, liberal, often majoritarian democracy and pervasive ethno-political inequalities in societies that are historically dominated by European(-descendant) groups. This is what Vickers and Isaac (2012) have termed “democratic racism”. The long-term ethnic exclusion in ranked ethnic systems has thus been very much institutionally embedded. As a consequence, these systems have often projected an image of order compared to the sometimes chaotic worlds of unranked societies. However, this order was and still is often based on a highly exclusionary, even racist ethnic hierarchy.

We can detect several strategies by which such profound ethno-political inequalities can be maintained under conditions of democracy. For one thing, existing ethnic hierarchies are often concealed – and thereby reinforced – with political discourses referring to individual liberties and the legal equalities supposedly guaranteed by a “color-blind” constitution. Consider the following two statements from my field interviews in Guatemala, the first made by a ladino member of the Committee for Indigenous Peoples of the Congress, and the second by a member of the former Guatemalan government.

[I]n some way, the Congress mirrors the racism and discrimination that exists in Guatemala. (...) Sometimes they even argue that it’s not necessary to draft laws in support of indigenous people because we are all indigenous in Guatemala or there is no discrimination in Guatemala.

I haven’t seen any situation of exclusion or discrimination or racism on the part of the state in the last ten years. (...) [The indigenous question needs to be addressed] through the definition of state policies – but not for indigenous people, state policies for all Guatemalans. For we cannot have a discriminatory state. As state I have the obligation to say that before the Constitution we are all equals. That’s what the Constitution says. We are all equals. So what I have to do is defining state policies of education, health, food security, economic development, everything, so all those

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1 For a discussion of the problems associated with such a narrow focus on formal democratic procedures in measures of democracy, and an attempt to include the dimension of ethnic exclusion, see Bormann, Vogt and Cederman (2012).
2 Interview 2011-6-16-I.
who want to get ahead have the possibility. Because sometimes they also say: ‘We have to establish the indigenous university! We have to establish the indigenous TV channel! We have to create...!’ No. We are all part of Guatemala! (...) If we only think of the indigenous, I believe we would even be violating the Constitution.133

This argumentation perfectly mirrors the discourse of a liberal universalism that emphasizes individual liberties, the role of individual merits and achievements, and a “color-blind” legal framework (the constitution) that guarantees universal equality independent of one’s ethnic identity. Following the claims made by Huntington (2004) and (less forcefully) by Schlesinger Jr. (1992) for American society, ethnic group rights are portrayed as a danger to liberal democracy which is used as a rhetorical shield to block the promotion of ethnic equality. At the same time, the structural inequalities in socio-economic terms – e.g. with regard to education, but also to infrastructure in the territories predominantly populated by historically marginalized groups – that have evolved from the often centuries-long oppression help to perpetuate the political inequalities (Better 2008; Bonilla-Silva 2003).

Both statements also show how state elites are able to deny the very possibility of racism due to the existence of a formal democratic regime. Indeed, the persistence of ethnic inequalities despite democracy is often held against historically marginalized groups. If the situation of these groups has not even improved under conditions of democratic equality, it is argued, it might really be their own fault (Helg 2012; Vickers and Isaac 2012, 33-9). Finally, elites in ranked ethnic systems eager to maintain the status quo have often drawn on a discourse of “reverse racism”. The ethnic mobilization of historically marginalized groups (or even certain state policies that actively promote ethnic equality) are portrayed as divisive, and dangerous for the national unity and stability of the country (Hale 2006; Paschel and Sawyer 2008, 199; Vickers and Isaac 2012, 36). In sum, the figures in Table 3-3 provide further evidence for the extremely stable ethnic hierarchies in countries where European or European-descendant groups have subordinated other groups perceived to be racially distinct. Concretely, they make clear that these hierarchies are not only immune to the demographic conditions present in a country but also to its context of democratic institutions.

The last column of the table also confirms that overall, ethnic mobilization – at least in electoral politics – is much more widespread in unranked ethnic systems than in ranked systems.134 National vote shares of ethnic parties are more than ten times higher in the former type. Again, this is in line with the theoretical argument that emphasizes the competitive character of unranked societies which often become drawn into a maelstrom of ethno-nationalist aspirations

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1 Interview 2011-6-4.
2 Since these data are only available from 1990 on, the number of observations is naturally much lower.
and ethnic competition over political hegemony. The group-level dynamics of these contrasting ethnic systems will be analyzed next.

Patterns and Motives of Ethnic Mobilization: Differences at the Group Level

According to the theoretical argument, we would expect a rough balance between years of political inclusion and exclusion for all ethnic groups in unranked systems, as changes in the power distribution are much more frequent than in ranked systems where European(-descendant) groups continue to dominate politics. Furthermore, we would also expect instances of ethnic mobilization to be more or less equally distributed between excluded and included groups in the former type, whereas in ranked systems it should be above all excluded groups which politically mobilize against their marginalization. The upper part of Table 3-4 shows the average exclusion history for ethnic groups in unranked systems as well as for European(-descendant) groups and the subordinated “racial others” in ranked systems. Technically speaking, I calculated for each ethnic group the ratio of years in which it was politically excluded during the whole period from 1946 to 2009, and then averaged these group values for all three categories. Hence, this variable tells us something about how frequently the different types of ethnic groups become politically excluded on average.

The result confirms our expectation. A typical group in an unranked ethnic system is excluded just about half of all years, and the other half of the years politically included. This supports the notion that the ethnic hierarchy in unranked systems is rather fluid, as the balance of power swings forth and back, and ethnic groups get in and out of government. In contrast, there is a clear bifurcation in ranked ethnic systems. As expected, the historically dominant European(-descendant) groups almost never became politically excluded, while the historically marginalized “racial others” only seldom achieved political power at the level of the national executive. On average, they were politically excluded in almost 80% of the years in which they were listed in the dataset.

The lower part of Table 3-4 analyzes the patterns of ethnic party formation within the period from 1990 to 2009. Such “onsets” of electoral mobilization are generally very infrequent both in ranked and unranked systems. Nevertheless, focusing on the question which groups mobilize in the two types of multi-ethnic societies, we do see a significant difference in the expected direction. Whereas in unranked systems included and excluded groups have about the same likelihood of ethnic party formation, in ranked systems it is usually excluded groups that mobilize electorally. This result supports the notion that the aims of mobilization are different in the two ethnic systems, as argued in Chapter 1.5. While in unranked systems both excluded and

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135 This is simply the relative number of exclusion years compared to all group years between 1946 and 2009. For example, if an ethnic group has an exclusion ratio of 0.20, this means that it was politically excluded in 20% of all years during this time period. The table shows the average values by category.
included ethnic groups prepare for the permanent competition by forming ethnically based organizations, in ranked systems ethnic mobilization is mostly about the struggle of historically marginalized peoples to achieve political emancipation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic system type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Ratio of excluded years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1946-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unranked ethnic systems</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>.54 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranked ethnic systems:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European-descendants</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.02 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranked ethnic systems:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;racial others&quot;</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>.79 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>.54 (.02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic system type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Frequency of ethnic party formation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1990-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unranked ethnic systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Included groups</td>
<td>3721</td>
<td>.011 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded groups</td>
<td>4200</td>
<td>.009 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7921</td>
<td>.010 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-tailed t-test: N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranked ethnic systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Included groups</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>.002 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded groups</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>.008 (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1526</td>
<td>.005 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-tailed t-test: p&lt;0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers in upper part of table refer to ethnic groups. Numbers in lower part refer to group years from 1990 to 2009. Ratios for each category reported with standard errors in parentheses.

Let us examine these patterns of mobilization in more detail, moving from a bivariate to a multivariate analysis. In the following, I use logit regression models to predict ethnic party formation in both ranked and unranked ethnic systems within my sample period (1990-2009). The dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a group becomes electorally mobilized by forming its own ethnic party, and 0 otherwise. Thus, we could call these models
“onset models” of ethnic party formation. The unit of analysis is the group year, and I cluster the standard errors on both the country and the ethnic group dimensions to control for unobserved factors at both levels. There are 87 instances of ethnic party formation in my sample, affecting just over 1% of all group years.

The models include a series of explanatory variables both at the group and the country level which are supposed to capture different general explanations of ethnic mobilization, linked to my theoretical argument. At the group level, I use the ordinal variable of power statuses from EPR-ETH that denotes the level of group leaders’ access to executive state power, and a “downgraded” dummy indicating whether the group has experienced a decrease in its power status during the previous three years. While these two variables could be associated with collective grievances, the third and fourth group-level variables attempt to measure mobilization capacity: relative group size (as a percentage of the total country population), taken from EPR-ETH, and a dummy variable indicating whether a group is geographically dispersed or migrant, based on the GeoEPR-ETH dataset (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011). Larger groups should be more likely to form ethnic parties due to their larger potential pool of followers while geographic dispersion should lower groups’ capacity of collective action.

At the country level, I include two indicators of the degree of the existing ethno-political competition: on the one hand, a conflict history variable that counts the number of previous ethnic conflicts in a country, and on the other hand a dummy variable that indicates whether another ethnic group in the same country already has an active ethnic party (value of 1) or no other ethnic party exists in the country (value of 0). The latter variable should tell us whether ethnic group mobilization is spurred by the mobilization of other groups in the kind of mutually reinforcing (or spiraling) ethno-political competition we would expect to observe in unranked systems. I additionally control for the level of democracy (Polity index), economic development (the logged GDP per capita variable), logged absolute population size, and the calendar year.

Consequently, ongoing years of party existence after the party was formed are coded as missing (as is common in conflict onset models). Note that politically irrelevant groups (as defined by EPR-ETH) are excluded from the sample. Such unobserved factors may lead to correlation between the observations of an individual unit across time. In this particular case, such correlation may exist both within a given country and within an ethnic group. However, when using the common single-dimension clustering, we can only adjust the standard errors for the correlation either within the country or within the ethnic group. As a solution to this problem, Thompson (2011) proposes a technique to adjust standard errors for simultaneous correlation along two dimensions. Note that all results presented here are robust to the use of a logistic regression for rare events data (King and Zeng 2001).

I also tested downgraded variables indicating a decrease within one, two, and five years. The results are essentially the same. GeoEPR-ETH codes groups as geographically dispersed when group members do not inhabit any particular city or region (without being migrant), and as migrant when group members often change location like, for example, nomadic groups (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011, 7).

I use a lagged version of the variable in the present analyses. However, the results are about the same if the non-lagged version is used instead. See previous section for the sources of these data.
Since a country’s level of democracy and economic productivity might be affected by incidents of ethno-political mobilization, I lagged the Polity and GDP per capita variables by one year.\textsuperscript{143}

I first estimate a joint model that includes all ethnic groups in the dataset, from both ranked and unranked countries. Subsequently, I run the same models for the ranked and unranked samples separately and compare the results, in order to detect systematic differences between the two types of multi-ethnic societies. Overall, we would expect the competition variables to perform much better in the unranked sample, while grievances should play a more important role in ranked systems.

Table 3-5 reveals that this intuition and the causal argument behind it are largely correct. The results of the joint Model 3.3 in the second column indicate that when looking at the complete universe of ethnic groups, all these different explanations seem to be of some importance. While the grievances approach receives support from the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the power status variable, both competition variables (previous conflicts and other ethnic parties) also exert a statistically significant effect in this combined sample. The same is true for group size and geographic dispersion, the two proxies measuring mobilization capacity. Finally, groups in larger countries seem to be less likely to electorally mobilize.

Against the background of these general patterns, Models 3.4 and 3.5 examine the differences between ranked and unranked systems in terms of ethnic party formation, by splitting the population of ethnic groups into separate samples.\textsuperscript{144} The first observation concerns the competition variables. While in the unranked systems sample in Model 3.4 they behave almost identically as in the joint Model 3.3, their effect disappears completely in the ranked systems sample of Model 3.5. The effect size of the “other ethnic party” dummy is much smaller in the latter, and the coefficient of the previous conflicts variable even turns negative. Hence, the degree of ethno-political competition is not a good predictor of ethnic party formation in this type of multi-ethnic society. The opposite is true for unranked systems. The more ethnic conflicts have previously occurred in a country, the more likely it is for groups to form ethnic parties in order to compete over political power. If other ethnic groups in the country are already mobilized, the likelihood of mobilization increases additionally.

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\textsuperscript{143} Summary statistics for all independent variables, both at the group and the country level, can be found in Appendix I.

\textsuperscript{144} Note that the downgraded variable had to be dropped from the ranked systems Model 3.5 because in ranked ethnic systems, a downgraded ethnic group has never formed an ethnic party. This is mainly because incidents of downgrading are extremely infrequent within the very stable environment of this type of countries.
Table 3-5: Ethnic mobilization at group level. Regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3.3</th>
<th>Model 3.4</th>
<th>Model 3.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint sample</td>
<td>Unranked systems</td>
<td>Ranked systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group power status</td>
<td>-.21*</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-1.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ordinal)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downgraded within last 3 years</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group size</td>
<td>1.26*</td>
<td>1.09*</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.60)</td>
<td>(.63)</td>
<td>(2.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic dispersion</td>
<td>-.91*</td>
<td>-.90*</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.40)</td>
<td>(.44)</td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous ethnic conflicts in country</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>-.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(8.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic party in country (lagged)</td>
<td>1.46***</td>
<td>1.55***</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.31)</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity index (lagged)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (lagged, logged)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(8.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
<td>-.21*</td>
<td>-.22*</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calendar year</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>41.45</td>
<td>38.47</td>
<td>-30.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(38.66)</td>
<td>(41.50)</td>
<td>(136.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>7123</td>
<td>5837</td>
<td>1286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-428.77***</td>
<td>-380.67***</td>
<td>-43.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors, with clustering on both countries and ethnic groups, in parentheses.
* p <= .05, ** p <= .01, *** p <= .001. + p <= 0.1

Finally, when it comes to grievances, the behavior of the group status variable reveals further systematic differences between the two types of multi-ethnic societies. In Model 3.4, the effect of the variable is not significantly different from zero. Importantly, the standard error of the estimated coefficient remains identical to that in the joint Model 3.3, implying that this differ-
ence is not due to the smaller sample size. Hence, grievances – proxied by power status – are not systematically linked to ethnic mobilization in unranked ethnic systems. This is not to say that ethnic exclusion is not important there. As we have seen in Table 3-4 above, most ethnic groups in unranked systems are politically excluded in at least half of their “life time”. However, precisely because the balance of power swings forth and back in this unstable environment of constant ethnic competition, all ethnic groups – excluded and included alike – have an incentive to form ethnically based organizations as a tool of organizational strength. Therefore, it is the requirements of competition that compel groups to mobilize and form ethnic parties in unranked ethnic systems.

In contrast, in Model 3.5, groups’ power status is by far the most important predictor of ethnic mobilization. The effect size of the variable is very high, and despite the much smaller sample size, we can reject the null hypothesis with a reasonable degree of confidence. Hence, less access to state power is associated with a higher probability of ethnic party formation, implying that grievances are highly relevant to explain groups’ electoral mobilization in ranked societies.

Summing up, a systematic empirical comparison of ranked and unranked societies shows that the distinct inter-ethnic relations are indeed associated with very different structural conditions and patterns of ethnic mobilization. Ranked societies are significantly less conflict-prone. Adding these results to those presented in Chapter 1.3 above, we can conclude that the stable ethnic hierarchies of ranked societies are associated with an “equilibrium of inequality” in which historically oppressed groups have not only been deprived of access to state power but also of the means to violently challenge this situation. Despite the inherent inequality in ranked systems, both ethnic and other conflicts are much less frequent there than in unranked systems. This stable ethnic hierarchy has become very much institutionally embedded, as the higher average democracy values of ranked systems show.

In contrast, the patterns of ethnic exclusion are more fluid in unranked systems where the typical ethnic group is as often politically excluded as it is included. In this competitive environment, violent inter-group conflict is more frequent. As a result of these different structural conditions, ethnic party mobilization – although not completely absent – is much less widespread in ranked societies. When it occurs, it tends to be rooted in grievances as underprivileged groups form ethnic parties to achieve political emancipation. In contrast, ethnic party mobilization in unranked systems is linked to ethno-political competition – previous conflicts and other groups’ mobilization –, and to mobilizational capacity, rather than to grievances.

Having analyzed the different patterns and goals of mobilization in the two types of multi-ethnic societies, the next section turns to the consequences of this mobilization, the core of this study.
3.3. The Consequences of Ethnic Mobilization: The Impact of Ethnic Parties on Equality and Conflict in Ranked and Unranked Systems

This section analyzes the impact of ethnic mobilization in the two types of multi-ethnic societies. It consists of two main parts. The first part looks at the ethnic group level and shows how ethnic parties help groups in unranked systems to establish regimes of ethnic dominance and, thus, decrease ethnic equality, while in ranked systems they serve to improve equality by empowering historically marginalized groups. The second part focuses on the conflict risk at the country level. It shows that in the competitive environment of unranked societies, ethnic party mobilization may lead to violent ethnic conflict. This is almost never the case in ranked societies.

3.3.1. Ethnic Mobilization and Equality

Ethnic inequality is most pronounced when one ethnic group becomes politically dominant and excludes all other groups from access to state power. The previous chapters have shown that this is the standard situation in ranked ethnic systems. In contrast, in unranked societies the struggle over political hegemony is at the very heart of the ethno-political competition. Hence, although one-group ethnic dominance does usually not last in these countries, it is nevertheless a constant possibility as groups and their leaders attempt to capture the largest possible "piece of the cake", and may preemptively seek to install themselves as dominant groups to preclude the hegemony of rival groups (Horowitz 1985, 294; Mason 2003, 87).

In the previous chapters, I have argued that ethnic parties as instruments of organizational strength may help capture and defend state power in the name of, or in favor of, specific ethnic groups. In the competitive environment of unranked systems, thus, they should increase the risk of ethnic dominance, as argued in hypothesis H1a. In contrast, hypothesis H1b expects ethnic parties to lead to the empowerment of historically marginalized groups in ranked systems, improving ethnic equality overall. In the following, I test these claims empirically, starting with the unranked systems sample before moving to the analysis of ranked societies.145

Results for Unranked Systems

I employ a logit regression model at the ethnic group level to examine whether the electoral mobilization of ethnic groups increases their probability to achieve and maintain ethnic dominance in unranked systems. Hence, my dependent variable in Model 3.6 is a “dominance dum-

---

145 Note that among the 25 countries I have defined as ranked ethnic systems, no electorally mobilized group has ever achieved political dominance. Hence, running a joint analysis of all ethnic groups in the dataset does not produce any additional information. Naturally, the effect of the ethnic party variable gets weaker and its level of significance decreases (results not reported here).
my” that takes the value of 1 when an ethnic group is either politically dominant or has a monopoly over state power, as defined in EPR-ETH, and 0 otherwise. The sample includes all group years from 1990 to 2009. In countries without a functioning multi-party democracy, the ethnic party variable was coded as missing. About 9% of all group years are characterized by dominance.

My main explanatory variable in Model 3.6 is an ethnic party dummy indicating whether a group has an active ethnic party. By “active” I mean those parties which have participated in the current or last legislative election at the national level and won any number of votes above 0. To reduce problems of endogeneity and reverse causality, I lag the variable by one year and also include a lagged dependent variable in the model. Other important predictors of ethnic dominance might be the relative size of the group and its previous involvement in violent ethnic conflicts. The latter is measured with an ordinal variable counting the number of previous ethnic conflicts that a group was involved in. At the country level, I control for the level of democracy (measured by the Polity index), the calendar year, and the presence of ethnic parties of other ethnic groups in the country. The results are summarized in the second column of Table 3-6.

We can see that ethnic parties indeed increase the chances of groups to achieve and maintain political dominance in unranked ethnic systems. The effect of the variable is positive and statistically significant. Even more important, however, is group size. Not surprisingly, the larger an ethnic group, the more likely it is to achieve and maintain political dominance. This reflects the results presented in Chapter 1.3. Hence, group size seems to be much more important for political dominance than for the explanation of electoral mobilization itself.

Democracy seems to play an important countervailing role by operating against ethnic dominance in competitive systems. This confirms the findings of the previous section, which revealed a clear negative relationship between formal democracy and the degree of ethnic exclusion at the country level in unranked ethnic systems. Again, the example of Belgium invoked in previous chapters is indicative. Despite high levels of ethnic mobilization, the country’s democratic tradition and strong institutions tame the ethno-political competition and help maintain the balance between Flemings and Walloons. Similar patterns can be observed in the new state of Montenegro and in India (although in the latter case, ethnic parties are much weaker). In Benin, the successful democratic transition has also helped channel the historically fierce ethno-regional struggle into more institutionalized forms of competition.

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146 The unit of analysis is the group year, and I cluster the standard errors on both the country and the ethnic group dimensions. Again, politically irrelevant groups are excluded from the analysis. Note that the number of observations is considerably higher than in the analyses of ethnic party formation in the previous section because in the latter models, ongoing years of party existence (after its formation) were treated as missing.

147 I will discuss the issue of endogeneity in more depth below.
### Table 3-6: Mobilization and ethnic equality. Regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 3.6</th>
<th>Model 3.7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic group dominance</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ethnic empowerment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unranked systems</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ranked systems</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominance (lagged)</td>
<td>8.20***</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment (lagged)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>8.70***</td>
<td>(1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic party dummy (lagged)</td>
<td>.70*</td>
<td>(.33)</td>
<td>1.85*</td>
<td>(.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group size</td>
<td>4.76***</td>
<td>(.46)</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>(2.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict history of group</td>
<td>-1.84*</td>
<td>(.46)</td>
<td>-1.34*</td>
<td>(.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity index (lagged)</td>
<td>-.06*</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>.48*</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calendar year</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic party in country (lagged)</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>(.32)</td>
<td>-.69</td>
<td>(.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>15.71</td>
<td>(65.71)</td>
<td>-227.12*</td>
<td>(128.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>7703</td>
<td>863</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-172.88***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-67.75***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors, with clustering on both countries and ethnic groups, in parentheses.

*p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001. * p ≤ .1

**Results for Ranked Systems**

In ranked ethnic systems, no electorally mobilized group has ever achieved political dominance, according to EPR-ETH. This is so because, as Appendix III shows, ethnic parties were almost only
formed by the historically oppressed “racial outsiders”. Therefore, it is safe to say that ethnic mobilization is not linked to the establishment of ethnic dominance in ranked systems.148

Does mobilization have an effect on the balance of political power and on ethnic equality at all in these societies? Do ethnic parties contribute to an improvement of these marginalized groups’ political situation? To answer these questions, I examine the effect of ethnic party mobilization on political empowerment within the sample of historically subordinated groups in ranked systems.149 If we think of empowerment as inclusion into executive state power at the national level, the answer to the above questions – at least in this global population of countries – seems to be “no”. Using a logit regression model to explain ethnic inclusion at the national level, as defined by EPR-ETH, indicates that ethnic parties do not have a significant influence (results not reported here).

However, if we broaden the concept of empowerment and use a dependent variable that accounts for both national and sub-state power, the picture changes dramatically. Model 3.7 in Table 3-6 uses a logit regression model to explain such incidents of empowerment in ranked ethnic systems, including the same explanatory variables as in Model 3.6 for the unranked systems sample. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if a subordinated group is either included in the central government or enjoys regional autonomy, as defined by EPR-ETH. Overall, about a fourth of all group years in this sample is characterized by this broader notion of empowerment. The third column of Table 3-6 summarizes the estimation results.

We can see that if we account for the achievement of political power at the sub-state level, ethnic parties do have a positive impact on subordinated groups’ political situation in ranked systems. The existence of a party increases the probability of achieving (and maintaining) political inclusion or sub-state power by about 7%. Hence, ethnic mobilization in ranked ethnic systems might indeed contribute to more ethnic equality overall. Most other independent variables in Model 3.7 behave similarly as in Model 3.6. The significant effects of the democracy and time trend variables seem to confirm the picture at the country level, described in section 3.2 above, which implied a positive influence of democracy on ethnic inclusion in ranked societies in more recent years. Furthermore, previous conflicts that a group was involved in seem to obstruct effective mobilization. This applies to group mobilization in both types of societies although in both models, this result – in contrast to the rest of the presented results – is not robust to regression models for rare events data.

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148 Again, this is also the reason not to estimate a joint model with the combined sample. When working with the same variables, the effect of the ethnic party dummy simply gets weaker and less significant. Using an interaction term of the ethnic party variable with a ranked/unranked dummy does not help because a value of 1 still predicts the non-occurrence of dominance perfectly. (If the interaction term equals 1, this means that the group is from a ranked system and has an ethnic party.) Hence, the effect of the variable cannot be estimated.

149 Restricting the sample to the subordinated groups brings the number of observations down to 863 group years in the following statistical analysis.
**Additional Analyses**

Before we can conclude that ethnic parties lead to political dominance in unranked systems and to empowerment in ranked systems, we need to come back to the issues of endogeneity and reverse causality. Because of the economic resources that emanate from it, holding a dominant political position may make it easier for ethnic groups in unranked systems to successfully establish ethnic parties. Likewise, historically marginalized groups in ranked systems might have greater opportunities to form their own parties once they have attained political empowerment. While in these cases, ethnic parties may still help maintain the situation of dominance and empowerment, respectively, the temporal sequence would imply a causal effect different from my argument.

Figure 3-3 counts the number of ethnic party formations within the sample period by power status category for both ranked and unranked systems.\(^{150}\) We immediately see that in the former type, ethnic parties are almost never formed by dominant groups; there are only nine such instances. If we exclude these cases from Model 3.6, the ethnic party variable still exerts a positive effect on the dependent variable of political dominance but loses its statistical insignificance (\(p=0.17\)). This indicates that the combined effect of ethnic parties on both the achievement and conservation of political dominance is more important overall. Or in other words: the variable does a better job in explaining the incidence of ethnic dominance than its initiation.

Among ranked countries, even if we count South Africa still as such in 1994, there are only two instances of ethnic party formation under conditions of empowerment (the Asians in South Africa and the indigenous people in Venezuela). I again ran the regression Model 3.7 of Table 3-6 without these cases. In this case, the effect of the ethnic party variable becomes even stronger and more significant.\(^{151}\)

Hence, we can conclude that ethnic parties do increase the likelihood of political dominance and empowerment, respectively. While overall, the effect on empowerment in ranked systems seems to be stronger than that on inequality in unranked systems, from the fundamental perspective of comparison (and beyond the precise level of statistical significance) there is a marked difference between the two types of multi-ethnic societies. In ranked countries electorally mobilized groups have never become dominant during the sample period, whereas within the competitive environment of unranked systems ethnic parties correlate positively with the installation and persistence of one-group ethnic dominance.

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\(^{150}\) In line with the statistical analysis above, I focus on subordinated groups only in the ranked systems sample. Note that in the present as well as the subsequent chapters, I count the few instances of “separatist autonomy” within the “powerless” category.

\(^{151}\) Moreover, in the case of ranked systems, this result is additionally bolstered by the mobilization onset Model 3.5 of the previous section 3.2 which already revealed a significant negative effect of group status on ethnic party formation. This also speaks against the idea that empowerment leads to party formation.
Finally, in Chapter 1.6, I discussed the special case of Israel whose designation as a ranked system after the inclusion of the Mizrahi Jews in the government is at least debatable. Therefore, I tested Models 3.6 and 3.7 with an alternative classification of Israel as an unranked system. Not surprisingly, the effect of the ethnic party variable in ranked systems becomes stronger and more significant if Israel is excluded from the sample. All other results remain essentially the same. Hence, if we re-classify the one country defined as ranked that comes closest to the characteristics of unranked systems, the results are even more supportive of the theoretical argument.
In short, the first part of the empirical analysis about the effects of ethnic mobilization confirms the corresponding hypotheses. Mobilization increases the likelihood of one-group ethnic dominance in unranked systems, putting ethnic equality at risk (hypothesis H1a). In contrast, in ranked ethnic systems no electorally mobilized group has ever achieved political dominance. Instead, the ethnic mobilization of historically marginalized groups increases their chances of achieving political empowerment which contributes to a more equal society (hypothesis H1b). Let us move now to the country level and see how ethnic mobilization affects patterns of conflict and peace in ranked and unranked societies.

3.3.2. Ethnic Mobilization and Conflict

My hypotheses predict ethnic mobilization to increase the risk of ethnic conflict in unranked societies, while in ranked systems there should be no systematic link between ethnic mobilization and violence. The section starts with the statistical analysis of unranked systems. It then discusses the mobilization-conflict nexus in these countries in more detail, on the basis of the true positive predictions, before moving to the ranked systems sample.

_Mobilization, Exclusion, and Ethnic Conflict in Unranked Systems_

I use logit regression models to test these claims. My dependent variable is the onset of ethnic conflict, using the ACD2EPR classification of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset. The unit of analysis is now the country year, and the standard errors are clustered on the countries. As above, the analysis focuses on the period from 1990 to 2009. Due to missing observations on some of the independent variables, especially on the ethnic party strength variable in countries without multi-party democracy, the sample of unranked ethnic systems is reduced to 1323 observations. Overall, there are 32 ethnic conflict onsets within this sample (about 2.4% of all country years).

In these country-level models, my main independent variable is the total share of votes of all ethnic parties in the last legislative election at the national level. This indicator reflects the degree of ethnic electoral mobilization in a given country year. To measure the effect of ethnopolitical inequality on conflict, I include a dominance dummy indicating whether any ethnic group in the country is either politically dominant or has a monopoly over state power (as defined by EPR-ETH). Basically, this is an aggregated version of the group-level indicator that was used as the dependent variable in the foregoing analyses. Additionally, I use an indicator of the degree of ethnic exclusion which denotes the relative size of all excluded groups as a fraction of the size of all politically relevant ethnic groups. Apart from my main explanatory variables, I

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*Country years in which ethnicity is coded as politically irrelevant in EPR-ETH were excluded from the analysis. As we are interested in the causes of onset, country years with ongoing ethnic conflicts were also dropped.*

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control for the level of democracy, absolute population size, economic development, the calendar year, and a country’s conflict history (i.e. the number of all previous conflicts)\textsuperscript{153}, as introduced in the previous analyses. Finally, I use a cubic spline in ethnic-peace years to account for temporal interdependence of the data (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).

How does ethnic party mobilization affect the risk of conflict in unranked ethnic systems? Model 3.8 in Table 3-7 provides first results. They reveal that the degree of ethnic party mobilization in a country seems to be related to the risk of ethnic civil conflict although the effect of the variable does not reach the conventional levels of statistical significance ($p=0.08$).

Figure 3-4 examines the effect of ethnic mobilization on conflict more closely by graphing the simulated probabilities of ethnic conflict onset in this sample, along with the 95\% confidence interval, for various levels of ethnic party strength, while holding all other variables of Model 3.8 constant at their mean or mode.\textsuperscript{154} It shows that the effect seems to become particularly pronounced at very high values of the variable although these simulated probabilities display a considerable degree of uncertainty.

Besides ethnic party strength, three other variables turn out statistically significant in Model 3.8: the calendar year, population size, and the conflict history of the countries. Thus, there is an overall declining trend of ethnic conflicts since 1990 if we control for other factors (cp. Gurr 2000a). Meanwhile, larger countries are likely to experience more conflict simply because there are more agents that could rebel (Hegre and Sambanis 2006).

The conflict history finding is more significant as it points to the self-reinforcing spiral of ethnic violence in unranked systems in which previous incidents of conflict increase the risk of future conflict. Recall that in the preceding section 3.2, we have already seen that previous ethnic conflicts in a country spur the mobilization of groups. However, the results of Model 3.8 in Table 3-7 show that this ethnic mobilization of groups also has an independent effect on conflict occurrence even if we control for previous conflicts. Combining these results, it is easy to see how ethnic mobilization in unranked systems leads to the kind of vicious cycle portrayed in Figure 2-1 in Chapter 2. On the one hand, mobilization may lead to ethnic dominance, and on the other hand, it increases the risk of violent conflict. Such incidents of ethnic violence in turn result in increased ethno-political mobilization with all its negative consequences.

\textsuperscript{153} In the present analyses, this includes ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts alike. If a count variable of previous ethnic conflicts only is used instead, the results remain about the same. See Appendix I for summary statistics of all independent variables.

\textsuperscript{154} The simulated probabilities and their confidence intervals were calculated with Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).
Table 3-7: Mobilization and ethnic conflict in unranked systems. Regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unranked systems</th>
<th>Ethnic conflict onset, 1990-2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share ethnic parties (lagged)</td>
<td>1.18* (0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic dominance dummy</td>
<td>-0.31 (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative size of excluded groups</td>
<td>-0.16 (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity index (lagged)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size (logged)</td>
<td>0.27* (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (lagged, logged)</td>
<td>-0.24 (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calendar year</td>
<td>-0.08* (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years</td>
<td>0.04 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years (quadratic)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years (cubic)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War history</td>
<td>0.26*** (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic exclusion dummy</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share ethnic parties *Exclusion dummy</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share ethnic parties *Size of excluded groups</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>158.60* (80.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-124.13***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors, with clustering on countries, in parentheses.
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, + p ≤ .1
Interestingly, none of the ethno-political inequality variables is significant in this standard model at the country level. Hence, neither ethnic dominance nor large excluded population segments seem to increase the risk of ethnic conflict by themselves. However, in my theoretical argument, I have made the case that, at the system level, it should be the concurrence of ethnic exclusion and mobilization that is particularly dangerous because for such purposive political actions as ethnic rebellions to take off and be sustained, widespread popular grievances need to be present in order to mobilize a feasible fighting force.

Hence, to test this proposition we need to model the interaction effect of exclusion and mobilization, as is done in Models 3.9 and 3.10 of Table 3-7. Model 3.9 uses a simple exclusion dummy variable that indicates for each country year if there is at least one politically excluded ethnic group in the country, and interacts it with the ethnic party strength variable. Instead, the dominance dummy and the excluded group size variables are dropped. Otherwise, the model is identical to the standard Model 3.8.

The results confirm the theoretical argument. Without ethnic exclusion, ethnic party mobilization does not exert a significant effect on the risk of ethnic conflict. The mean effect is even negative but, as Figure 3-5 shows, it cannot be precisely estimated. Hence, without widespread ethnic grievances due to exclusion, the outcome of ethnic mobilization varies considerably. In contrast, if a politically relevant ethnic group is excluded from access to state power the effect
of ethnic parties is positive and highly significant ($p<0.01$). Thus, under conditions of ethnic exclusion, the stronger ethnic parties are, the higher the risk that the country will experience an ethnic conflict. Importantly, the interaction effect of exclusion and mobilization is clearly stronger than the effect of ethnic mobilization alone, as estimated in Model 3.8.

**Figure 3-5: Effect of ethnic party strength on ethnic conflict risk, conditional on ethnic exclusion**

![Graph showing the effect of ethnic party strength on ethnic conflict risk.](image)

**Notes:** Based on Model 3.9 of Table 3-7. Interaction of ethnic party variable with ethnic exclusion dummy. All other variables held constant at their mean.

At what level of ethnic exclusion does mobilization become particularly dangerous? Model 3.10 uses the continuous exclusion variable of Model 3.8 which denotes the relative size of the excluded groups, and interacts it with the ethnic party strength variable (while again holding all other variables constant at their mean). To interpret these results, we need to graphically display the conditional effect of ethnic party mobilization for the whole range of values of the exclusion variable. Figure 3-6 shows that the conflict-fueling effect of ethnic mobilization in

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*As we are using a dummy variable the results are relatively straightforward to interpret. If there is no ethnic exclusion (i.e. the dummy takes the value of 0), the effect of ethnic party strength is given by its own coefficient. If there is ethnic exclusion, we need to add the coefficient of the ethnic party variable to the coefficient of the interaction term, and calculate the confidence interval. The latter was done again with the help of simulation methods based on Clarify. Again, all other variables were held constant at their mean.*
unranked systems already becomes statistically significant at an exclusion value of about 30% of the relevant population.\footnote{156}

Figure 3-6: Effect of ethnic party strength on ethnic conflict risk, conditional on excluded population

![Figure 3-6](image)

Notes: Based on Model 3.10 of Table 3-7. Interaction of ethnic party variable with relative size of excluded ethnic groups. All other variables held constant at their mean.

But what can these results tell us about the substantial role of ethnic parties in unranked ethnic systems within the causal chain depicted in Figure 2-1 of Chapter 2? To what degree do they have an independent effect on the conflict risk in unranked systems? Or, alternatively, do they merely reflect existing ethnic antagonisms resulting from previous conflicts? To answer some of these questions, the following analysis focuses more closely on the mobilization-conflict nexus in unranked systems.

**True Positive Predictions and the Mobilization-Conflict Nexus in Unranked Systems**

We have seen in Model 3.8 of Table 3-7 that previous ethnic conflicts indeed significantly increase the risk of future conflicts. Earlier in this chapter we have already seen that past conflicts spur the mobilization of groups. Hence, the presence of ethnic parties might just be a reflection of existing ethnic tensions rather than a causal factor by itself. The statistical analyses of this

\footnote{156 All control variables in these two interaction Models 3.9 and 3.10 behave more or less the same as in Model 3.8. Note that all three models are completely robust to the use of a logistic regression for rare events data (King and Zeng 2001). Additionally, to account for a possible long-term effect of ethnic mobilization, I used an “historical average” mobilization variable instead of the simple one-year lag which records for each country year the average of ethnic party strength of all foregoing years. The results show that the two variables have the same effect in all models.}
temporally restricted sample cannot definitively resolve this question. Nevertheless, there are some clear hints that ethnic parties play an independent causal role.

For one thing, their effect on ethnic conflict risk in unranked systems is independent of previous conflicts, as all global models have confirmed. Further evidence is provided by a closer analysis of the true positive predictions. Eighteen ethnic conflict onsets within the sample period from 1990 to 2009 are preceded by ethnic party mobilization. Table 3-8 lists these cases, along with the ethnic groups involved in the conflict, according to ACD2EPR, and identifies those cases which had already experienced earlier periods of conflicts with the same groups involved.157

Table 3-8: Conflict onsets with previous ethnic party mobilization in unranked systems, global sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Onset year</th>
<th>Ethnic group(s) involved</th>
<th>Previous conflict episode</th>
<th>Ethnic parties before 1st episode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Catholics in N. Ireland</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Basques</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Ossetians (South)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Ossetians (South)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Tuareg</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Toubou</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Northerners, Southern Mande</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Ijaw</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Lari/Bakongo</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Cabindan Mayombe</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Mohajirs</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Mohajirs</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Baluchis</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Dalits (Hill &amp; Tarai), Adivasi/Janajati</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can see that a little more than half of these onset cases were preceded by earlier periods of the same conflict. Nevertheless, a closer historical analysis reveals that in almost all of them (eight out of ten cases), ethnic parties already existed before the first conflict period. Only the Tuareg conflict in Niger and the rebellion of the Baluchis in Pakistan broke out before any ap-

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Some countries have experienced different conflicts with distinct ethnic groups involved. In order not to mix these observations but to be able to disentangle the temporal sequence of ethnic mobilization and conflict within single conflict processes, the table focuses on multiple conflict episodes of the same conflict.
parent ethnic party mobilization (at least as recorded in my data). In some cases, ethnic parties existed within a single-party regime that served to monopolize political power in the hands of specific groups producing the very grievances within the excluded population that would later contribute decisively to the occurrence of violent conflict.

This is true for the MRND in Rwanda in 1990, and the RPP in Djibouti in 1991 which were dominated by the ethnic Hutu and Isaas groups, respectively (Orth 2001, 81-2; Schraeder 1993). It is also true for the MPLA-dominated regime in Angola prior to the 1991 conflict outbreak which clearly favored the Mbundu-Mestiço group (James 2004, xxviii-xxxv; Luansi 2001). In fact, all these three groups are coded by EPR-ETH as having monopoly power in the years before conflict outbreak – a fact which powerfully illustrates how ethnic parties may help create systems of ethnic dominance that eventually provoke violent revolts of excluded rival groups. Therefore, this analysis confirms that in most instances ethnic mobilization preceded the outbreak of ethnic conflict. At the same time, it highlights again the particularly dangerous consequences of a concurrence of ethnic mobilization and exclusion.

Ethnic Mobilization, Conflict, and Institutional Instability in Ranked Ethnic Systems

Now let us turn our attention to the ranked systems sample for which my hypothesis expects to find no systematic link between ethnic mobilization and conflict. Since there are only two ethnic conflict onsets in ranked ethnic systems between 1990 and 2009 (in Mexico in 1994, and in Israel in 2000), I will not estimate a regression model. Instead, Table 3-9 examines the bivariate relationship between ethnic party mobilization and conflict.

It reveals that most country years are characterized by peace and no electoral mobilization of ethnic groups. In one conflict case, Israel, ethnic groups were electorally mobilized before (several Arab political parties, but also ethno-religious Jewish parties); in the other case, Mexico, there were no ethnic parties participating in elections. Several country years (e.g. in Ecuador and Bolivia) are characterized by ethnic mobilization but no conflict onset. Hence, there is no obvious link between mobilization and conflict in ranked systems. Indeed, a Fisher’s exact test with the two variables turns out insignificant ($p=0.41$).

However, in ranked societies where class and ethnicity usually overlap, ethnic conflict might actually take on the form of a class conflict without explicit ethnic claims being advanced. Yet, even if we consider all conflicts listed in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset, there are still only four onsets in ranked ethnic systems between 1990 and 2009. And again, the bivariate relationship between ethnic party mobilization and conflict onset is statistically insignificant.
Hence, ethnic mobilization in ranked societies does not seem to be linked to any kind of civil violence.¹⁵₈

Table 3-9: Ethnic mobilization and civil conflict in ranked ethnic systems, 1990-2009. Table of frequencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic conflicts</th>
<th>Ethnic party exists</th>
<th>No ethnic parties</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(50%)</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No conflict</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(23%)</td>
<td>(77%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(23.1%)</td>
<td>(76.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic party exists</th>
<th>No ethnic parties</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25%)</td>
<td>(75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No conflict</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19.4%)</td>
<td>(80.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19.4%)</td>
<td>(80.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Independent variable lagged by one year. Only country years included in which ethnicity is coded as politically relevant in EPR-ETH. Years of ongoing conflicts coded as missing. Fisher’s exact test provides a value of \( p = 0.41 \) for the relationship between ethnic party mobilization and ethnic conflict onset. For ethnic party mobilization and all civil conflicts, Fisher’s exact test gives a value of \( p = 0.58 \).

However, by measuring the degree of conflict in ranked ethnic systems exclusively with a civil conflict variable, we risk aiming at the wrong target. As we have seen, violent ethnic conflicts are extremely infrequent in these societies due to the “equilibrium of inequality” discussed above. Since the whole conventional political system in ranked societies is usually dominated by the elites of the European(-descendant) group, ethnically motivated challenges by marginalized groups may instead often express themselves in anti-system revolts which lead to severe institutional upheavals. Hence, in the following I use an alternative dependent variable that measures exactly such instances of “institutional instability”.

I draw on Fearon and Laitin (2003) who operationalize political instability as a change on the Polity IV index of three points or more in a single year. There are ten incidents of institutional instability in my global sample of ranked ethnic systems between 1990 and 2009 (affecting 2.4% of all country years). In Model 3.11 of Table 3-10, I rely on the usual logit regression model to explain the occurrence of such events.¹⁹⁹ The explanatory variables included are more or less the same as those in Models 3.8 to 3.10 in Table 3-7 for the unranked systems sample. Since

¹ I again tried an alternative classification of Israel as unranked system but the basic results remained identical. This confirms that the general relationships detected in these global statistical analyses are not overly sensitive to the coding of particular cases.

² Again, these results are robust to a logistic regression model for rare-events data.
ethnic dominance is a defining feature of ranked systems, I replace this variable by a lagged empowerment dummy variable.\footnote{As in the case of the dominance dummy, this is an aggregated version of the group-level indicator used in the preceding analyses to model the effect of ethnic mobilization on ethnic equality. It is coded as 1 if at least one subordinated group of the country is either included in the central government or enjoys regional autonomy.}

Table 3-10: Mobilization, institutional instability, and non-violent protest in ranked systems. Regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 3.11</th>
<th>Model 3.12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instability</td>
<td>Protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest (lagged)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share ethnic parties (lagged)</td>
<td>-1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment dummy (lagged)</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative size of excluded groups</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity index (lagged)</td>
<td>-0.60*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size (logged)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (lagged, logged)</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calendar year</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War history</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-65.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(155.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-30.49***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors, with clustering on countries, in parentheses.

* \( p \leq 0.05 \), ** \( p \leq 0.01 \), *** \( p \leq 0.001 \), + \( p \leq 0.1 \)

The results show that the effect of the ethnic party strength variable is not significantly different from zero. Hence, ethnic mobilization cannot be systematically linked to institutional upheavals in ranked ethnic systems. In fact, the only variable that turns out statistically significant
in this model is the Polity index. Not surprisingly, more democratic countries are less likely to experience such instances of institutional instability.

Does this mean that ethnic mobilization remains completely ineffective in ranked ethnic systems? Chapter 1.5 has argued that in these highly unequal societies ethnic mobilization should take a mostly peaceful course because the historically marginalized groups lack the capacity for sustained ethnic rebellion. Hence, what is the effect of mobilization on non-violent forms of ethnic collective action?

Since grievances are widespread in ranked systems, but the capacity for violent action is lacking, we would expect strong ethnic mobilization to result in higher levels of non-violent collective action. Model 3.12 in Table 3-10 tests this claim, using the indicator of ethnic group protest from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Since this variable is measured with an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 5, I use a double tobit regression model with a lower and upper limit adapted to this range.

The results reveal that the strength of ethnic parties indeed has a highly significant positive effect on the level of protest. This seems to point at the instrumental role of parties and their organizational apparatuses in the organization of peaceful collective action in ranked ethnic systems. We can also see that although these societies are defined by ethnic exclusion, the level of this exclusion does make a difference in this case. The larger the excluded population segments, the more ethnic protest we can expect.

Hence, ethnic grievances as well as mobilization capacity are crucial to explaining the degree of non-violent protest against state power in ranked ethnic systems. The positive (and weakly significant) coefficient of the population variable seems plausible as in larger countries there are simply more agents who could protest. Interestingly, economic development (measured by GDP per capita) seems to increase the level of protest as well. This could be interpreted as empirical support for the observation of many qualitative scholars that the emergence of a middle class within historically oppressed groups was vital to their mobilization processes (Becker 2011; Marx 1998; Mijeski and Beck 2011; Stavenhagen 1992; Wade 2010, 114). Nevertheless, since the MAR protest data only cover the period until 2006, these results have to be interpreted with caution.

---

161 The MAR variable explicitly refers to non-violent protest, and at the most includes riots as the “spontaneous escalation of an otherwise nonviolent protest” (Minorities at Risk Project 2003, 88). It is thus very well suited to measure the level of peaceful collective action by ethnic groups. To aggregate the group-level data to the country level, I used the highest group-level value recorded in MAR for each country year. The modal value of ethnic group protest in this sample is 3. Note that since the MAR dataset only ranges to 2006, there are numerous missing observations.

162 Note that an Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) Regression model is not efficient in this case since it predicts values above and below the limits of this censored scale. Nevertheless, a robustness test using OLS produced essentially the same results as Model 3.12.

3.4. Conclusion

Summing up, this chapter has empirically confirmed that there are systematic differences in the dynamics of ethnic politics in ranked and unranked societies. The profound inter-group inequalities in the former are associated with a significantly lower conflict risk. Hence, while inequalities between ethnic groups are generally associated with a higher risk of ethnic conflict, as numerous studies have shown (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 2000b; Østby 2008; Stewart 2008a), this kind of historically determined, extremely profound inter-ethnic inequality produces the exact opposite: ethno-political stability.

I have argued that this is so because historically oppressed groups are not only deprived of access to political power but also of the very means to violently challenge their exclusion – a situation I have labeled “equilibrium of inequality”. This stable oppression is often very well embedded into formal democratic procedures and institutions in which universal equality is discursively cultivated while structural inequalities are maintained. These results add to the academic works on grievances and ethnic conflict by identifying a subset of cases in which their probabilistic hypotheses do not hold, and by providing a theoretical explanation of why this is so.

Moreover, the distinct structural conditions lead to different patterns and aims of ethnic mobilization in the two types of multi-ethnic societies. While in unranked systems, ethnic mobilization of groups is spurred by the degree of ethno-political competition – previous violent conflicts in the country and the mobilization of other groups – and by mobilizational capacity (group size and geographic concentration), in ranked systems grievances, proxied by groups’ power statuses, seems to be the most important factor.

These different patterns and aims in turn condition the effects of ethnic mobilization. The results of this chapter have shown that mobilization in unranked systems may not only lead to, or maintain, regimes of (temporary) ethnic dominance but also increases the risk of ethnic conflict. Regarding the former result, it should be noted again that the effect is more robust when we do not only look at how ethnic parties help achieve dominance but also how they help maintain it. Nevertheless, there is a clearly positive relationship between ethnic party mobilization and the incidence of ethnic dominance at the group level, as asserted in hypothesis H1a.

Regarding ethnic conflict risk, it is important to remember that this effect works independently of the conflict-fueling effect of previous violence and is even stronger under conditions of ethnic exclusion. Indeed, a closer analysis of the true positive predictions among the conflict cases shows that ethnic mobilization usually preceded the first episodes of violence and that often times it was precisely under conditions of one-group ethnic dominance – facilitated by strong ethnic parties – that the conflict broke out first. Together with the result regarding the mutual-
ly reinforcing effect of ethnic mobilization in these countries, this finding illustrates the process in which ethnic parties foment the ethno-political competition in unranked systems until a violent escalation.

Hence, the analysis lends support to hypothesis H2a about the link between mobilization and conflict in unranked systems, but also points to the important role of ethnic exclusion as a magnifier of the destructive force of ethnic mobilization. This also constitutes preliminary support for the exclusion-grievances mechanism proposed in the theoretical argument according to which ethnic parties may lead to ethnic exclusion and, thus, to collective grievances which eventually trigger the violent revolt of excluded groups. In contrast, ethnic party mobilization is not linked to any kind of civil violence or institutional instability in ranked ethnic systems, confirming hypothesis H2b. It does however lead to higher levels of non-violent ethnic protest, at least in the period up to 2006. Thus, while ethnic parties also have an instrumental role in facilitating political collective action in ranked societies, subordinated groups’ lack of capacity usually prevents this action from turning violent.

The next chapters attempt to refine these results with a more fine-grained operationalization of ethnic mobilization, including the role of civil society networks and organizations, and with a more detailed qualitative validation through in-depth case studies based on field research and secondary sources. I start with ethnic mobilization in unranked systems, focusing on the region of Sub-Saharan Africa, and the cases of Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon. These analyses are subsequently contrasted with the dynamics of ethnic mobilization in ranked systems in the following chapters.

The present chapter zooms in on a first subset of the global sample: Sub-Saharan Africa. This region is well suited for an analysis of unranked ethnic systems since it is mainly characterized by linguistic differences, as shown in Chapter 1.3. At the same time, it also serves as a particularly hard test for my theory since scholars and journalists alike have long argued that civil violence in this region is unrelated to ethnicity and ethnic grievances but instead originates largely from widespread poverty, state weakness, and lootable natural resources which make conflicts economically profitable and attractive for greedy warlords (see e.g. Addison, Le Billon, and Murshed 2003; Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Ellis 1998; Le Billon 2001; McGowan 2005; Reno 1998; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). In this sense, the region constitutes what could be called a “least likely case” for the observation of the ethno-political mechanisms described in my argument (Gerring 2007; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Nevertheless, whatever its causes, scholars do agree in that Africa is one of the world regions most affected by civil violence (Bakwesegha 2004, 54; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Gurr 1994, 350). Hence, this region also has a very high practical relevance for my study.

Apart from the least-likely scenario, the effects of our main variables of interest (and their statistical significance) might also be affected by the much-reduced sample size. Yet, on the other hand, this regional focus allows me to refine my operationalization of ethnic mobilization, taking into account networks and organizations within the realm of civil society. Moreover, it also provides me with the opportunity to examine the effect of ethnic mobilization on different forms of small-scale violence.

Remember that the theoretical argument outlined in Chapter 2 predicts the effect of ethnic parties to be stronger – or more immediate – for events of small-scale violence than for full-blown rebellions. One particular type of such small-scale violence is electoral violence. Although usually of a more limited and more spontaneous nature than ethnic civil conflicts, electoral violence is directly related to the ethno-political competition so prevalent in unranked systems.

As stated above, elections are the main focal points of the power struggle in democratically governed countries, representing particularly tense moments of inter-ethnic relations. Hence, ethnic parties’ violence-fueling effect should be particularly noticeable during election times. Thanks to a unique dataset on small-scale violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, including electoral violence, the regional analyses also allow me to test these more specific parts of my theoretical argument.

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164 For a journalistic account of these mechanisms, see e.g. Kaplan (1994).
165 Civil war-like death tolls as in Kenya’s 2007 or Nigeria’s 2011 elections are clearly an exception (cp. Straus and Taylor 2012).
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section employs quantitative methods to show that strong ethnic parties are associated with both the incidence of ethnic dominance at the group level, and a higher risk of ethnic civil war at the country level under conditions of ethnic exclusion. It also reveals that civil society organizations that can be considered trans-ethnic seem to lower the risk of conflict. The second section validates these relationships based on a closer analysis of various conflict and non-conflict examples from the region. The third section focuses on small-scale violence showing that the violence-fuelling effect of ethnic parties is more direct in this case than with regard to full-blown ethnic rebellions, and that they have an especially strong effect on both the risk and the level of violence during election times. The causal links between elite networks, ethnic mobilization, exclusion or inclusion, and conflict or peace will then be examined in more detail in a comparative case study of Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon in the following chapter.

4.1. Quantitative Analyses

The first part of this chapter examines the effect of ethnic mobilization on ethnic equality and peace in Sub-Saharan Africa in a quantitative framework. After presenting the additional data used in these analyses, I examine the link between ethnic party mobilization and one-group dominance at the group level. The focus then moves to the country level and the effect of ethnic mobilization on the risk of ethnic conflict.

Additional Data for the African Analyses

One particular question with regard to the African sample concerns the treatment of South Africa. In contrast to Liberia and Zimbabwe, the country is still in the process of transforming itself from a ranked ethnic system into a society with more equal ethno-political relations (Horowitz 1985; Marx 1998). Hence, I exclude South Africa from all following empirical analyses which exclusively focus on unranked systems.166 This leaves us with a total of 817 country years and 4608 group years between 1990 and 2009.167

In addition to the variables used in the foregoing global analysis, this chapter introduces a novel dataset on ethnic mobilization and trans-ethnic cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa within...
the realm of civil society. It covers 42 African states from independence to 2009 and is based on information from the “Directory of African NGOs” of the United Nations’ Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA). The directory lists a large number of non-governmental organizations for each country, based on written surveys conducted by the Office between 1999 and 2004. Based on the founding years and the languages used by the organizations (as stated in the OSAA surveys), I constructed three different time-variant count variables: the number of all organizations in each country and year, the number of “mono-ethnic” organizations, and the number of “trans-ethnic” organizations. Putting these counters in relation to the population size, we get three different density variables indicating the number of mono-ethnic, trans-ethnic, and all civil society organizations per 100,000 people for each country.169

I consider those organizations as mono-ethnic that only use one indigenous African language in their work. In contrast, trans-ethnic organizations are those which either use two or more different African languages of politically relevant ethnic groups included in the EPR-ETH dataset or exclusively rely on the colonial language of the country. These organizations can thus be expected to unite elites and members of different ethnic groups in a country while mono-ethnic organizations’ membership should be mainly limited to one specific ethnic group.171

Two additional issues need to be addressed when measuring ethnic mobilization (and trans-ethnic cooperation) within civil society in this way. First, a higher number of ethnic (or trans-ethnic) organizations per 100,000 people by itself may also just reflect a more active civil society in general. Various authors have highlighted the positive consequences of a strong civil society for the functioning of democracy (Booth and Bayer Richard 1998a; Booth and Bayer Richard 1998b; Diamond 2000; Merkel and Lauth 1998; Stolle and Hooghe 2003, 239). This issue has consequences for both the ethnic and the trans-ethnic variants of my indicator if they are simp-


169 Note that the UN-OSAA website changed its layout – whereby large parts of the survey have become unavailable to the public – before I was able to code the variable at the group level. Requests to the Office via e-mail remained unanswered. Hence, the (trans-)ethnic civil society indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa are only available at the country level.

170 Colonial languages are assumed to fulfill a unifying function after countries' independence from European powers. "Lingua franca" languages that are spoken by all politically relevant ethnic groups in a country (such as Arabic in Djibouti, or Swahili in Tanzania and Kenya) are also included in this category, since they effectively perform the same unifying function as a former colonial language. This also applies to Pigin English in Nigeria. However, those "lingua franca" languages that can be clearly associated with specific EPR groups within a given country (such as Lingala and Swahili with Equateur and Kivu/Katanga groups, respectively, in the DRC, or Arabic with Muslim groups in Eritrea) were counted as languages of politically relevant groups. In the case of Cameroon, organizations were only counted as trans-ethnic if they use both former colonial languages. Accordingly, Pigin was only associated with the Anglophone groups in the Cameroonian case. In the case of Ethiopia, which was only colonized for a very short time, no unifying colonial language could be coded.

171 As mentioned above, explicit ethnic claims – from political parties and other organizations alike – are outlawed almost everywhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. Hence, looking at organizations' membership constitutes the most reasonable proxy of ethnic collective action within civil society in the region. Furthermore, as we have seen in Chapter 1.3, most African countries are characterized by linguistic divisions. Thus, although this focus on language use ignores possible religiously based organizations, the indicator should be well suited to capture mono-ethnic and trans-ethnic civil society organizations. Only Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Madagascar do not exhibit any linguistic divisions. In these cases, the variable was coded as missing. However, as explained below, this does not significantly affect the statistical analyses as for various other reasons, most of these observations would be coded as missing anyways.
ly used by themselves. In the case of the former, the negative effect of ethnicization may be concealed by the contradictory effect of the general level of civil society development. In the latter case, it would be impossible to isolate the particular contribution of the trans-ethnic composition. Hence, in order to identify the specific effect of ethnic or trans-ethnic civil society organizations, we need to control for a country’s general strength of civil society in our models. I do this by adding the total density indicator as a control variable.

Secondly, compared to political parties the influence of civil society organizations should be more apparent in the long run. While both political parties and civil society organizations can be conceptualized as institutionalized networks of elites engaged in political collective action, the former are more powerful vehicles of organization. For one thing, whereas ethnic parties are by definition involved in political activism – through their participation in elections, campaigns etc. –, civil society organizations often constitute more latent vehicles of collective action: they may or may not be active. Depending on their resources and other characteristics, some of them have a constant presence in politics while others are only activated in specific instances (Gyimah-Boadi 1996; Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Hooghe and Stolle 2003). Furthermore, through their direct connections to political power and possibly to state resources, political parties often have an immediate effect on the course of politics. In contrast, collective action in the realm of civil society usually requires considerable time to build up political strength and even more to gain influence in the spheres of power (Belloni 2008; Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Hooghe and Stolle 2003; Posner 2004a). Hence, the causal mechanisms of ethnic mobilization described in Chapter 2 should work more slowly in the case of civil society networks and activism, making their cumulative long-term effect more important than its impact in the short run.

How can we account for this in the empirical analyses? A simple one-year lag of the civil society indicators will not do justice to this long-term effect. For example, if in a given country year various organizations are simultaneously established, the organizational density value will jump up. Yet, in reality these organizations – although formally existing – will often not have any political influence yet. In contrast, consider a situation in which the same organizations have been present for several years. Even if they are fewer in numbers in a given year, their longer existence and previous experience should make them politically more effective.

Hence, we need a way to take into account the “accumulated” strength of civil society mobilization when estimating its effect in any given country year. This can be done with a cumulative version of the civil society variable which adds to each country-year value the cumulated values of all previous years.\(^{172}\) Instead of just looking at the value of one particular year (and testing the link between that value and the dependent variable), this indicator reflects the complete histo-

\(^{172}\) Consider the following example: In year 3, country X displays a value of 0.5. In years 1 and 2, the country had values of 0.4 and 0.7, respectively. The cumulative value of year 3 in this case would be 1.6 (0.4+0.7+0.5).
ry of mobilization. It is thus better able to capture this long-term effect of ethnic civil society in which political strength is built up slowly over time. Therefore, the following country-level analyses use the cumulative versions of all three civil society indicators.

**Ethnic Mobilization and Dominance**

The analysis starts at the group level in order to analyze patterns of ethnic mobilization and its effect on ethnic (in-)equality in Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 4-1 displays the absolute and relative frequencies of ethnic party formation between 1990 and 2009 by power status category. It offers two main insights into ethnic mobilization in Africa. First, there have been almost no ethnic party formations by dominant groups. The only three cases concern the Tutsi in Rwanda, the Mbundu-Mestico in Angola and the Kabré in Togo. This is important for the following analysis of the consequences of ethnic mobilization as it may say something about the causal sequence between party formation and ethnic dominance.

**Figure 4-1: Political conditions of ethnic mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa**

Notes: Black bars denote absolute number of instances in which a group formed an ethnic party, operationalized here as the first participation of a given ethnic party in national-level election. Grey bars show relative number of these instances, as a percentage of the total frequency of a given power status category. Thus, a relative value of 2 in the “discriminated” category means that in 2% of all discrimination years in the African sample, an ethnic party was formed.
Secondly, the relative frequency of ethnic party formation remains remarkably similar across the different power status categories. This confirms the theoretical case made in Chapter 1.5 – and the results from the global analyses in Chapter 3.2 – that the intense ethno-political competition of unranked ethnic systems stimulates the political mobilization of ethnic groups irrespective of their political position. Indeed, there is no statistically significant difference in the frequency of ethnic party formation between included and excluded groups. Both categories experience “onsets” of party mobilization in about 2.2% of all group years on average (two-tailed t-test, \( p = 0.90 \)).

How does this electoral mobilization of ethnic groups affect patterns of ethnic equality in Sub-Saharan Africa? Hypothesis H1a states that in unranked ethnic systems, ethnic parties enable groups to install and maintain regimes of ethnic dominance, leading to the exclusion of other groups and thus decreasing ethnic equality overall. Model 4.1 in Table 4-1 tests this claim for the Sub-Saharan African sample with the same methodological approach as in the global analysis of Chapter 3.3.1 above. A logit regression model is used to estimate the effect of ethnic parties on the incidence of ethnic dominance, relying on the same dominance dummy as dependent variable, indicating whether an ethnic group is either politically dominant or has a monopoly over state power, as defined in EPR-ETH.\(^173\) Overall, just about 4% of all group years are characterized by dominance, testifying again to the extremely unranked character of African societies. Table 4-1 summarizes the results.

At first view, the African analysis mirrors the global picture. Ethnic party mobilization and group size are the two most important explanatory variables in Model 4.1 (apart from the lagged dependent variable). The only major difference to the global results is the insignificance of the effect of the democracy variable, which indicates that in Sub-Saharan Africa authoritarian regimes do not necessarily promote ethno-political inequalities.

Hence, just like in the global sample of unranked systems, ethnic parties are positively associated with regimes of one-group ethnic dominance in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, when looking at the precise causal sequences in these cases, the effect of ethnic parties on the initiation of ethnic dominance seems more questionable in the African subsample. There are clear examples of this mechanism, such as that of the Mende in Sierra Leone in 2002 described before.\(^174\) Even more striking is the case of the renewed dominance of the Isaa group in Djibouti from 2003 onwards, after the RPP attained absolute control over political power in parliamentary elections held under a distortive majoritarian system (Yasin 2010, 206). However, in the cases of

\(^{173}\) The unit of analysis is again the group year, and I cluster the standard errors on both the country and the ethnic group dimensions to control for unobserved factors at both levels. Politically irrelevant groups are excluded from the analysis. Therefore, and due to the missing observations on the ethnic party variable in countries without multi-party elections, the number of observations drops to 2705. I use the exactly same explanatory variables as in Model 3.6 of Table 3-6 in Chapter 3.3.1. Note that all results are essentially the same if logistic regressions for rare events data are used (King and Zeng 2001).

\(^{174}\) See Chapter 2.3.
the Tutsi in Rwanda, the Mbundu-Mestico in Angola and the Kabré in Togo, it is more difficult to disentangle the precise causal sequence between party formation and dominance. Indeed, if we drop these cases from the analysis, the effect of the variable is still positive but loses its statistical significance.

Table 4-1: Mobilization and ethnic dominance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 4.1</th>
<th>Ethnic group dominance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominance (lagged)</td>
<td>7.78***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lagged)</td>
<td>(.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic party dummy</td>
<td>.66*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lagged)</td>
<td>(.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group size</td>
<td>3.58***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lagged)</td>
<td>(.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict history of group</td>
<td>-.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity index (lagged)</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calendar year</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic party in country (lagged)</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>133.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lagged)</td>
<td>(93.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-81.03***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors, with clustering on both countries and ethnic groups, in parentheses. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001.

Hence, ethnic party mobilization might be less important for ethnic equality in Africa than in the global sample of unranked systems. At the same time, we have to keep in mind that the statistical relationships might also generally be less robust due to the reduced sample size. What seems to be clear is that in the African subsample, too, ethnic parties have a positive ef-
fect on the incidence of ethnic dominance, which confirms their role as effective tools of ethno-political competition. The logical implication of this, however, is the exclusion of other ethnic groups from access to political power. Thus, although weaker than at the global level, these results tend to support hypothesis H1a, which stated that ethnic mobilization decreases ethnic equality in unranked ethnic systems.

**Mobilization, Exclusion, and Ethnic Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa**

Let us now turn to the analysis of ethnic conflict at the country level which also allows us to consider the role of civil society organizations in unranked systems. Again, the methodological approach mirrors that of the global analyses, relying on logit regression models with ethnic conflict onset as the dependent variable, focusing on the period from 1990 to 2009. Overall, there are 24 ethnic conflict onsets within this time period, resulting in a clearly higher ratio of affected country years than in the global sample (over 4%). I first use the same explanatory variables as in the global sample, and subsequently add the civil society indicators to the models.

Model 4.2 in Table 4-2 shows that ethnic parties by themselves are not associated with a higher risk of ethnic conflict in Africa. The effect of the variable is not significantly different from zero. Hence, overall, ethnic mobilization in electoral politics seems to be less important in Africa than in the global sample of unranked systems with regard to organized, large-scale ethnic violence. Likewise, ethnic grievances by themselves (measured by ethnic exclusion) do not play any role in this country-level analysis. In fact, none of the variables in this basic model has a significant effect on ethnic conflict risk. But again, due to the region’s least-likely scenario and the almost three times smaller sample size, the effects of the ethnicity and ethnic mobilization variables are likely to be weaker and statistically less significant in these analyses.

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1. The unit of analysis is the country year, and the standard errors are clustered on the countries. Again, country years with ongoing ethnic conflicts, and those in which ethnicity was not politically relevant, according to EPR-ETH, were excluded from the analysis. Together with the missing variables on the ethnic party and civil society variables, this reduces the number of observations considerably.

2. Note that I do not use the ethnic dominance dummy in the African analyses as the variable does not add any explanatory power to the models, and because the latter – due to the civil society measures – already consist of a very large number of variables compared to the number of observations. This omission does not significantly change the effects of any other independent variables in the models.

3. I alternatively used the relative size of the discriminated population and the size of the single largest excluded group as proxies for ethnic grievances. Neither of them showed a statistically significant effect in any of the models here.
Table 4-2: Mobilization and ethnic conflict onset in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2009. Regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4.2</th>
<th>Model 4.3</th>
<th>Model 4.4</th>
<th>Model 4.5</th>
<th>Model 4.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independence - 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share ethnic parties (lagged)</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.71)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(.72)</td>
<td>(.75)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic civil society strength</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-ethnic civil society strength</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.32*</td>
<td>-27*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall strength of civil society</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- .49***</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative size of excluded groups</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>-2.98**</td>
<td>-.82</td>
<td>-.88</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.96)</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity index (lagged)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size (logged)</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.28)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (lagged, logged)</td>
<td>-23</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>-42</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.30)</td>
<td>(.31)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
<td>(.46)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calendar year</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years (quadratic)</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.00</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years (cubic)</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War history</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(.28)</td>
<td>(.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share ethnic parties *Size of excluded groups</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.37**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>96.48</td>
<td>97.10</td>
<td>32.71</td>
<td>-3.01</td>
<td>-142.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(118.35)</td>
<td>(116.42)</td>
<td>(161.36)</td>
<td>(184.12)</td>
<td>(62.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>1349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-56.75</td>
<td>-55.40*</td>
<td>-47.42***</td>
<td>-46.93***</td>
<td>-130.96***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors, with clustering on countries, in parentheses.

* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001. * p ≤ .1
Furthermore, the theoretical model expects the effect of ethnic parties on ethnic conflict risk to be particularly pronounced when they coincide with ethnic exclusion, thus combining mobilizational capacity with grievances within the excluded groups. In order to account for this interaction effect, Model 4.3 multiplies the continuous exclusion variable with the ethnic party strength variable in the same way as was done in the global analysis. Otherwise the model is identical to Model 4.2. Again, we need to plot the conditional effect of ethnic party mobilization for the whole range of values of the exclusion variable to interpret these results. Figure 4-2 confirms that the independent conflict-fueling effect of ethnic mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa is slightly weaker than in the global sample of unranked systems. At an exclusion value of about 40% of the relevant population, the effect becomes statistically significant.

Figure 4-2: Effect of ethnic party strength on ethnic conflict risk in Africa, conditional on excluded population

Notes: Based on Model 4.3 of Table 4-2. Interaction of ethnic party variable with relative size of excluded ethnic groups.

We can thus conclude that overall, the effect of ethnic party mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa follows the pattern at the global level, although it is somewhat less pronounced. Besides the smaller sample size, this might also stem from the fact that political institutions in general, including political parties, are weaker in Africa than elsewhere in the world which may somewhat reduce their influence and organizational capacity (cp. Bratton 1989) – at least with regard to the organization of such systematic, large-scale violence as ethnic rebellions. Neverthe-
less, the combination of ethnic mobilization and exclusion forms an equally potent recipe for violence in Africa as at the global level, as will be discussed in more detail below.

Let us now turn to the role of civil society organizations. Model 4.4 of Table 4-2 introduces the ethnic civil society variable, accompanied by the indicator of overall civil society strength. The results show that an ethnicized civil society tends to be associated with a higher ethnic conflict risk but the effect is not statistically significant ($p=0.20$). In contrast, the general civil society variable is negative and highly significant. From this, we could conclude that a strong, well-developed civil society in general serves as a bulwark to ethnic conflict.

However, the next Model 4.5 qualifies this finding. It uses the trans-ethnic civil society variable instead of the ethnic one, while still controlling for civil society strength in general. We can immediately see that this changes the picture. The trans-ethnic variable has a weakly significant negative effect on ethnic conflict risk while the effect of the latter loses its significance completely (although still pointing in the “right” direction). This implies that more than the overall strength of civil society, it is trans-ethnic organizations in particular that typically have a conflict-decreasing impact in unranked multi-ethnic societies.

This notion is confirmed when we test the effects of these two variables separately. An otherwise identical model including only the trans-ethnic variable performs better than a model with only the general variable. This finding is in line with evidence from earlier case studies on the topic (Sisk and Stefes 2005, 295, 308-9; Straus 2012; Varshney 2001). While Varshney (2001), for example, emphasized the role of trans-ethnic civil society organizations in preventing local-level ethnic violence in India, Straus (2012) argued that both the strength of civil society organizations and their characteristics regarding ideology, agenda, and membership may have an important impact on the processes that lead to, or prevent, large-scale ethnic violence in a country. All other variables behave exactly the same in this smaller sample as in Model 4.2, including the ethnic party indicator.

In order to test the behavior of the civil society variables in an extended sample, Model 4.6 drops the ethnic party indicator from the analysis. While the latter is only available from 1990 on, the civil society data covers the whole period from independence to 2009, as explained above. Thus, the omission of the ethnic party variable, which by itself did not show a significant effect, allows us to examine the effect of ethnic and trans-ethnic civil society organizations over the whole course of the countries’ histories.

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1. As explained above, the ethnic and trans-ethnic civil society variables are coded as missing in countries without any linguistic divisions (Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Madagascar). Nevertheless, most of these observations would be excluded from the analysis anyways for different reasons. In Lesotho, Swaziland, Somalia, and Madagascar (from 2002) on ethnicity is coded as politically irrelevant in EPR-ETH. Rwanda did not have multi-party elections before 2003. Burundi did have elections as early as 1993, yet all but two of these observations are lost because of ongoing ethnic conflicts. As a result the number of lost observations due to the ethnic and trans-ethnic civil society variables is limited to 20.

2. I used the Akaike information criterion (AIC) as an indicator of the quality of the models. The one with the trans-ethnic civil society variable exhibits a lower AIC value than the general civil society model.
Model 4.6 reports the results for the trans-ethnic variant.\textsuperscript{181} We see that the effect of the variable remains positive and significant. Although the significance does not reach the standard 95% confidence level, the result is nevertheless very meaningful. First, it indicates that the relationship between high trans-ethnic cooperation within civil society and a lower ethnic conflict risk holds over the whole period since independence. Secondly, the results confirm that the conflict-decreasing effect of trans-ethnic organizations is stronger and more robust than that of civil society strength in general. This leads to the conclusion that when it comes to the role of civil society, trans-ethnic organizations linking elites and members of different politically relevant groups together are crucial to avoid large-scale ethnic violence in unranked systems.\textsuperscript{182}

In short, the quantitative analyses of Sub-Saharan Africa have shown that the ethno-political dynamics in this region generally follow the patterns detected in the global sample of unranked systems. First, ethnic parties correlate positively and significantly with the incidence of ethnic dominance at the group level – with negative effects for ethnic equality, as this naturally implies the exclusion of other groups from access to power. Second, ethnic parties increase the risk of ethnic conflict at the country level under conditions of simultaneous ethnic exclusion.

Moreover, the results from this regional analysis highlight the importance of political alliances and collective action in the non-electoral spheres of politics. Although their impact seems to be less immediate than that of political parties, civil society organizations do shape outcomes of ethnic peace and conflict in unranked ethnic systems in the long run. In particular, trans-ethnic organizations composed of elites and members of different politically relevant groups decrease the risk of ethnic conflict. The next section will examine these patterns of ethnic mobilization, exclusion, and conflict in Africa’s unranked societies in a more detailed fashion.

4.2. Qualitative Validation

Chapter 2 of this study has outlined various mechanisms by which ethnic parties can be linked to ethnic violence in unranked ethnic systems. First, according to the exclusion-grievances mechanism, they serve as a tool of political oppression in the hands of specific groups, producing collective grievances which eventually provide the basis for violent revolt. Secondly, through the interest aggregation and propaganda mechanisms they may exacerbate the existing or latent ethno-political competition. Finally, according to the mass mobilization mechanism, ethnic parties also play an instrumental role in the organization of collective action, including

\textsuperscript{181} Again, the trans-ethnic variable performs better than its ethnic counterpart, the effect of which is not statistically significant ($p=0.26$). Testing the trans-ethnic variable against the general civil society indicator, the model with the trans-ethnic variable has again a lower AIC value than the model with the general variable.

\textsuperscript{182} All results presented in Table 4-2 are robust to regression models for rare events data (King and Zeng 2001). If a simple one-year lag of the civil society indicators is used, their effects point in the same direction but are weaker and less robust. This corroborates the notion that the long-term effect of civil society networks and organizations is much stronger than their impact in the short run.
the military mobilization of members of excluded ethnic groups to stage organized ethnic rebellions.

We can discern various examples of all three mechanisms in the set of ethnic conflict onsets in the African sample, as summarized in Table 4-3. In most of the cases more than one of these mechanisms was at work. The results of the quantitative analyses above underscored the great relevance of ethnic exclusion in the contentious environment of Africa’s unranked multi-ethnic societies. And indeed, the table shows that the vast majority of the 24 ethnic conflicts broke out in a context of political exclusion of relevant ethnic groups. Moreover, in over half of the ethnic conflicts that took place in multi-party democracies ethnic parties were present. Hence, the concurrence of ethnic mobilization and exclusion is a particularly potent recipe for violence.

Rwanda and Angola are prototypical examples of the exclusion-grievances mechanism. While the renewed ethnic violence by Hutus in Rwanda in 2009 must be seen as a response to Tutsi political dominance that is electorally based upon the hegemonic Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) (Reyntjens 2004, 2006), the Cabindan conflict in Angola also takes place in the context of an ethnically highly exclusionary regime represented by the dominant MPLA party that has long served as the instrument of Mbundu-Mestico interests (Broadhead 1992; James 2004; Roque 2009). In both of these cases, ethnic parties serve as instruments of political suppression in the hands of dominant groups, marginalizing other ethnic groups, and creating the very ethnic grievances that seem to be at the roots of these conflicts.

In Congo-Brazzaville, democratization at the beginning of the 1990s immediately led to the emergence of ethnically based parties exacerbating tensions and the political competition between various ethnic groups engaged in a struggle over access to the state (Clark 1997, 2008; Sundberg 1999). This is an almost classical example of the interest aggregation and propaganda mechanisms, in which the MCDDI (Lari/Bakongo), UPADS (Nibolek people), PCT (Mbochi), RDD (Kouyou) and RDPS (Vili) ethnic parties, through their recruitment and campaign practices, have aggregated individuals’ interests and structured the conflict lines at the national political level according to ethnic group boundaries, thus institutionalizing ethno-political cleavages (Clark 1997, 18, 288-9; Decalo, Thompson, and Adloff 1996; Englebert and Ron 2004).

Subsequently, we observe a partial power monopolization mechanism at work in which the electoral mobilization of ethnic groups – although not resulting in one-group dominance – first led to the political exclusion of the northern Mbochi group under the presidency of Pascal

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183 Côte d’Ivoire is a particularly interesting case in this regard that will be examined in more detail in the next chapter.

184 Note that conflict onset cases in which the ethnic party strength variable was missing were excluded from the statistical models in Table 4-2. Out of the fourteen cases included, eight are characterized by preceding ethnic party mobilization.

185 See also Chapter 3.3.2 regarding earlier episodes of the conflicts in Angola and Rwanda.

186 “Nibolek” stands for the three regions Niari, Bouenza, and Lekoumou and came to be used as a “virtual ethnonym” in Congo-Brazzaville at the beginning of the 1990s (Clark 2008, 133-4).
Lissouba and his UPADS (Clark 1997; Sundberg 1999), and then, after Sassou-Nguesso from the northern Mbochi group returned to power at the end of 1997, to the marginalization of all southern groups (Lari, Vili, andNibolek people) (Clark 2008, 251, 260-2). In line with the expectations of the exclusion-grievances mechanism, the resulting grievances prepared the ground for the ethnic rebellion of the Lari/Bakongo group in 2002 and a protracted civil war (Commission des recours des réfugiés de la République française (RDC) 2004; Englebert and Ron 2004).187

Table 4-3: Ethnic conflict onsets in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Ethnic group(s) involved</th>
<th>Ethnic party strength</th>
<th>Ethnic exclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>Cabindan Mayombe</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1991-2008</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Yakoma</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Goula</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Lari/Bakongo</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>Northerners, Southern Mande</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>Tutsi-Banyamulenge</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1991-1994</td>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1997-1999</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1998-2009</td>
<td>Oroma</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Tuareg</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Arabs/Moors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>Tuareg</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>Tuareg</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Note that earlier eruptions of violence in 1993 and 1997 are not counted as ethnic conflicts by ACD2EPR because no explicit ethnic claims were advanced in these instances. However, they can also be directly linked to this fierce ethno-political competition promoted by the different ethnic parties and the armed militias around them (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999; Commission des recours des réfugiés de la République française (RDC) 2002; Englebert and Ron 2004; Sundberg 1999).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Ethnic group(s) involved</th>
<th>Ethnic party strength</th>
<th>Ethnic exclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Ijaw</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1990-1994</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997-2002</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1990-2003</td>
<td>Diola</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: List of conflict onsets according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset. Classification as ethnic according to ACD2EPR. Ethnic party strength refers to combined vote share of all ethnic parties in year before conflict outbreak (in percent). If no multi-party legislative elections have taken place prior to conflict outbreak, variable is coded as missing. Ethnic exclusion refers to situation in year of conflict outbreak, based on EPR-ETH. Earlier onsets of the same conflict in Angola during this time period excluded from the analysis due to ongoing conflicts of the state with other ethnic groups.

The cases of Angola and Congo-Brazzaville also illustrate the close connection of ethnic parties to military mobilization and, thus, the importance of the mass mobilization mechanism. The FNLA, for example, can be directly linked to the rebellion of the Bakongo group (Broadhead 1992; James 2004). In this case, the political party emerged out of the rebel group (and earlier liberation guerilla army). Such organic transitions from military to political organizations and vice versa are not uncommon in Africa. In Burundi, particularly the Hutu FRODEBU and CNDD-FDD parties have both played major roles in the country’s long history of ethnic violence (Daley 2006; Uvin 1999).188

A more unidirectional link between political and military mobilization can be observed in the aforementioned case of Congo-Brazzaville where various armed militias – such as the Ninjas, the Cobras, and the Zoulous – arose around the different ethnic parties representing, above all, the Lari/Bakongo, Mbochi, and the groups from the Nibolek region. The Ninjas, for example, were closely linked to the organizational structure of Bernard Kolelas’ MCDDI party which was the political representation of the Lari group (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999; Commission des recours des réfugiés de la République française (RDC) 2002; Englebert and Ron 2004; Sundberg 1999). Thus, in this case, ethno-political party mobilization has paved the way for military mobilization.

188 See also Söderberg Kovacs (2008) for a more general discussion of rebel groups’ transformation into political parties and its consequences for peace building.
Ethiopia’s 1998 conflict appears to have occurred without preceding ethnic mobilization in the spheres of electoral politics. However, a closer analysis of this case reveals that in reality, ethnic parties did exist (among others also of the rebellious Oroma group) but had boycotted the preceding elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1994 and the parliament in 1995 (Hess 2005). Hence, the organizational capacity for collective action was present. In fact, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which also has a long tradition of moving back and forth between the political and military fields, still constitutes the most influential political force among the Oroma population (Hess 2005, 9). Finally, the Casamance conflict in Senegal apparently was neither preceded by ethnic party mobilization nor ethnic exclusion. However, this is a highly localized conflict in which both the political and economic exclusion of the ethnic Diola group and their political and military mobilization exhibited a very local pattern resulting in an ethnic conflict of a delimited regional extent (Vogt 2007).

On the contrary, we can detect various cases in the African sample in which ethnic party mobilization did not result in violent ethnic conflict. In most of these cases, we also observe high levels of ethnic inclusion. Ghana, for example, although not spared from fierce ethno-political competition, has avoided the violent ethnic power struggle of its neighbor Côte d’Ivoire. Notably, Ghanaian governments have (almost) always maintained a careful ethno-regional balance over the course of post-independence history which prevented this competition from turning into a violent ethnic conflict (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Chazan 1982). The same is true for Cameroon, and even more so for Gabon, which will be discussed in more detail below. Despite considerable ethnic mobilization (in the case of Cameroon, mostly by its Anglophone groups represented by John Fru Ndi’s SDF party), both of these countries exhibit both a long history of ethnic peace. Their rulers have achieved high levels of ethnic inclusion through hegemonic parties that are very trans-ethnic, uniting elites from all relevant groups (Gabriel 1999; Gardinier 1997; Gardinier and Yates 2006; Mehler 1993; Ndombet 2009). These two cases in particular illustrate the effect of trans-ethnic political parties.

Also Malawi has maintained political stability since democratization, despite strong ethno-regional electoral mobilization, by including all relevant ethnic groups into government (Ferree and Horowitz 2010; Kaspin 1995). Yet, all these countries – and particularly, Ghana and Malawi – have also seen high levels of political violence during election times. This constitutes further evidence of my argument that while ethnic parties in unranked systems are often directly linked to small-scale violence, such as electoral violence – which will be discussed in the next section –, ethnic civil wars are more likely when ethnic mobilization is accompanied by the

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1 See also Humphreys and Mohamed (2005). It is also plausible to speak of a distinct “sons of the soil” logic (Fearon and Laitin 2011) in this case.
2 Again, it is important to distinguish this trans-ethnic cooperation within political parties from that between different ethnic parties and in society more generally, the latter topic constituting one of the core focuses of consociationalists (Lijphart 1977, 2004). Regarding “consociational parties”, see Bogaards (2005).
3 See the following section 4.3.
(temporary) exclusion of specific ethnic groups from political power. There is only one case in the sample in which ethnic party mobilization is linked to ethnic conflict onset despite ethnic inclusion: the Afar rebellion in Djibouti in 1999. However, this is clearly the resurrection of a previous conflict of the same group (between 1991 and 1994) which erupted in the situation of ethnic exclusion spawned by the dominance of an ethnic party (Schraeder 1993).192

Having discussed the role of ethnic parties in several conflict cases, let us now look more closely at political alliances and activism in the realm of civil society. The quantitative results above suggest that in this case, more than ethnic mobilization itself, it is the strength of its antipode – highly trans-ethnic organizations – which matter most for ethnic peace in unranked systems. Chapter 2 argued that by creating common interests among elites that transcend ethnic boundaries, and by signaling ethnic cooperation to the ordinary population, trans-ethnic organizations mitigate competition. However, in the case of civil society organizations, due to their often more latent nature and their less direct link to the spheres of political power, this effect is typically more noticeable over a longer time span.

Comparing conflict cases with “most similar” control cases in Africa confirms the importance of such trans-ethnic cooperation in the realm of civil society. In the following, I will focus on the seven conflict onsets in the sample (apart from Côte d’Ivoire) which occurred in countries without prior ethnic violence, and compare them to countries which exhibited very similar political and economic conditions before conflict outbreak. Contrasting cases that “differ on the outcome of theoretical interest but are similar on various factors that might have contributed to that outcome” (Gerring 2007, 131) allows me to analyze more closely the impact of trans-ethnic civil society in Africa.193

The following countries experienced their first ethnic conflict within our sample period from 1990 to 2009: Mali, Senegal, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Djibouti, and Eritrea.194 The case of Côte d’Ivoire will be analyzed in comparison to Gabon, a country that features a remarkably similar ethno-political and economic history. For the remaining seven cases, I selected one or more control cases with similar scores on several key variables before conflict outbreak. These key variables are the same factors that were used in the quantitative analyses in the previous section 4.1: ethnic exclusion, level of democracy, population size, and economic development. Table 4-4 displays the seven pairs (or sets) of conflict and control cases, along with their scores on these variables in the year of or before conflict outbreak.

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192 See also Chapter 3.3.2 above.
193 Thus, this can be seen as a series of mini-comparisons in the form of what Gerring (2007, 131-2) calls „Y-centered” most-similar case studies.
194 Note that when examining the effect of trans-ethnic civil society, we have to leave aside the cases of Rwanda and Burundi for which due to their lack of linguistic divisions, the variable is coded as missing. For a detailed analysis of the role of different civil society organizations in Rwanda, see Straus (2012).
Table 4.4: Conflict and control cases in Africa selected for comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ethnic conflict</th>
<th>Polity index</th>
<th>Population size</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
<th>Ethnic exclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1990 -1</td>
<td>8,000,632</td>
<td>1117.14</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>--- -7</td>
<td>4,705,442</td>
<td>1028.86</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>--- -9</td>
<td>7,977,698</td>
<td>1232.61</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1990 -7</td>
<td>8,084,632</td>
<td>686.35</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>--- -6</td>
<td>25,214,284</td>
<td>640.50</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1991 -7</td>
<td>8,085,316</td>
<td>505.88</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>--- -7</td>
<td>6,552,474</td>
<td>860.96</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1991 -8</td>
<td>552,000</td>
<td>3381.95</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>--- -7</td>
<td>12,934,803</td>
<td>3667.58</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1997 -6</td>
<td>3,841,583</td>
<td>747.55</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>--- -6</td>
<td>2,315,223</td>
<td>1344.90</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Rep.</td>
<td>2001 5</td>
<td>4,054,000</td>
<td>634.36</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>--- 6</td>
<td>12,129,000</td>
<td>544.10</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td>2002 -5</td>
<td>3,330,421</td>
<td>2180.81</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>--- -2</td>
<td>5,278,000</td>
<td>780.91</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>--- -4</td>
<td>16,094,435</td>
<td>1718.39</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>--- -2</td>
<td>32,155,316</td>
<td>1116.34</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Conflict cases in bold letters. Value on Polity index and GDP per capita levels measured in year before conflict outbreak. Ethnic exclusion (based on EPR-ETH) and population size measured in year of conflict outbreak. EPR-ETH always takes January 1st as reference point for the coding of the ethno-political situation of each year. See Chapter 3.1 for data sources.

The task of finding appropriate control cases that are similar enough to perform most-similar case studies is of course not an easy one – especially when dealing with such complex objects of study as states. Nevertheless, in this case all units are located on the same continent which already limits the uncontrolled differences between conflict and control cases to a certain extent. And the table also shows that at least with regard to the four key factors, the control cases match the conflict cases quite well. Large discrepancies are only observed regarding the population size in Tanzania (compared to Mali), Mozambique (compared to Djibouti), Malawi (versus Central African Republic), Kenya and Cameroon (compared to Congo-Brazzaville), and regarding economic development in Mauritania (versus Eritrea), and Togo and Kenya (in comparison with Congo-Brazzaville).
However, in all these cases the deviations run counter to the predicted relationships. If we expect larger and poorer countries to be more vulnerable, *ceteris paribus*, as most scholars have claimed (see e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006), my control cases should actually have been more likely to experience ethnic conflict than the conflict cases. Hence, rather than challenging my conclusions regarding the effect of trans-ethnic civil society, they set up a most-difficult (or least-likely) research scenario (Gerring 2007, 133).195

In order to examine the long-term effect of trans-ethnic civil society on ethnic conflict, I compare the development of the variable in the corresponding conflict and control cases over time (see Figure 4-3).196 This allows us to see how in each case trans-ethnic cooperation has flourished and cumulated over time – or, on the contrary, has remained weak throughout the period of observation. Importantly, as explained above, the conflict cases include first-time conflict outbreaks only and the temporal comparison stops in the year of onset. Thus, a situation of reverse causality, in which previous conflicts influence civil society cooperation, is precluded here (at least with regard to ethnic civil conflicts). In accordance with the theoretical argument, we would expect trans-ethnic civil society to be more developed in the control cases than in the conflict cases.

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195 With regard to the level of democracy, Senegal was very different from both Benin and Zambia in 1990. Togo and Kenya, for instance, would have come closer to Senegal’s democracy value. However, both countries deviate from the latter in the crucial ethnic exclusion variable. Overall, considering the scores on all four variables, these were the best control cases among the potential candidates.

196 Thus, the analysis takes the form of longitudinal comparisons. Conflict cases are represented by red lines, and the time series end in the year of conflict outbreak. Note that the scale of the y-axes is adapted to each set of comparison and therefore differs between the sub-figures.
Figure 4-3: The development of trans-ethnic civil society in conflict and control cases in Africa over time

Notes: Trans-ethnic civil society strength measured by density of trans-ethnic organizations, i.e. their number relative to country population (see Chapter 4.1). Conflict cases in red. All conflict cases are the first ethnic conflict outbreaks in the respective countries. Comparisons end in year of onset.
These comparisons are generally in line with our expectation. In six of the seven sets, the control cases were characterized by more trans-ethnic civil society cooperation than the conflict cases in the years leading up to the conflict outbreak. In five cases – Mali, Senegal, Niger, Djibouti, and Congo-Brazzaville – the difference between control and conflict cases is particularly striking, whereas trans-ethnic cooperation in Malawi only becomes more developed than in the Central African Republic in the very last years before the conflict in the latter case broke out. Only in the case of Eritrea, the data contradicts our expectation although even in this case, the country experienced a steady decline in trans-ethnic cooperation after its independence until the outbreak of ethnic conflict. This lends support to hypothesis H3a, which stated that countries with high levels of trans-ethnic cooperation are less likely to experience ethnic conflict.

In addition, we can also find examples of the reverse mechanism of strong ethnic mobilization within civil society leading to ethnic conflict onset. Perhaps the most striking example is the conflict in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger delta that broke out in 2004 after almost four decades without large-scale ethnic violence in the country. Representatives of the local Ijaw ethnic group had long complained about their economic marginalization in the midst of Nigeria’s greatest source of wealth. Already before the conflict broke out, scholars and political observers had pointed at the growing strength of ethnically based non-party organizations, such as the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), the Ijaw National Congress (INC), and the Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), which raised their voices in favor of the group and provided the organizational capacity to transform these grievances into (eventually violent) collective action (Babawale 2001; Bah 2005; Ejobowah 2000).

In summary, this section has focused more closely on the precise role of ethnic organizations in various ethnic conflict cases in Sub-Saharan Africa, finding evidence, in particular, of the exclusion-grievances and mass mobilization mechanisms. The case of Congo-Brazzaville serves particularly well to illustrate the related workings of the different mechanisms, from ethnic parties’ structuring of political cleavages along ethnic lines, via the ethnic exclusion that follows from ruling parties’ use of their power in favor of specific groups, to the mobilizational capacity they provide for the rebellion of excluded groups. In addition, the section has also illustrated the effect of trans-ethnic elite cooperation in the realm of civil society on the occurrence or prevention of ethnic conflict. Before turning to my in-depth case studies, the last part of this chapter will examine how ethnic mobilization affects the occurrence and level of small-scale violence in Africa’s unranked ethnic systems.

Additionally, in order to isolate the specific effect of trans-ethnic organizations from the general effect of civil society strength in these countries, I performed the same time-series comparisons using a relative indicator of the number of trans-ethnic organizations compared to that of all civil society organizations. This changes the picture only in one of the six confirmative cases, namely in the weakest one: the Central African Republic actually seems to have had constantly higher levels of trans-ethnic cooperation within civil society than Malawi, relative to the overall strength of civil society. However, in all other cases the support for the theoretical argument remains equally clear (see Figure A2 of Appendix V).
Chapter 2 has argued that the effect of ethnic mobilization should be different for small-scale ethnic violence than for full-blown civil wars. While the latter are generally less frequent and often occur under conditions of ethnic exclusion, the sheer mobilizational capacity and inflammatory propaganda of ethnic organizations alone are often enough to spur more limited and spontaneous forms of violence in the context of fierce ethno-political competition. As repeatedly stated before, elections constitute the most obvious and relevant focal points of the continuous ethno-political “bargaining game” in democratically governed unranked systems. Given the high stakes of elections, the risk of a violent escalation of this struggle over political hegemony and access to the state is particularly high during election times. Under these circumstances of high ethnic tension, the mobilizational capacity of ethnic parties and their polarizing propaganda – which explicitly pits different ethnic groups against each other – should significantly increase the risk of violence.

A unique dataset on small-scale violence in Sub-Saharan Africa allows me to test these more nuanced parts of the theoretical argument. In contrast to the civil conflict datasets used so far, the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) (version 3.0) (Salehyan et al. 2012) focuses on events of social and political disorder of a smaller dimension, such as protests, riots, strikes, and other social disturbances. It is based on news reports, and includes all African countries with a population greater than one million, beginning in 1990. To measure the level of social violence across countries and over time, I use a count variable indicating the number of violent events that started in each country year during my sample period.198

Since my assumptions are strongest with regard to electoral violence, the analysis first tests the effect of ethnic party strength and trans-ethnic civil society organizations on this type of social violence.199 Hence, the count variable in the following analyses only includes those violence events which SCAD classified as related to elections.200 Figure A 3 in Appendix V reveals that the zeros are clearly overrepresented in this variable. Therefore, Model 4.7 is a hurdle count model, which accounts for two separate processes generating, on the one hand, the zeros, and on the

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198 To identify specifically violent events, I selected those events that were coded as "organized violent riot", "spontaneous violent riot", "pro-government violence", "anti-government violence", "extra-government violence", or "intra-government violence" in the dataset, or for which an escalation to one of these types was coded.

199 I prefer the trans-ethnic indicator over its ethnic counterpart since it has proven to be more important in the foregoing analyses of ethnic civil conflict. This is also the case for all following analyses on small-scale violence. The control variables are identical to those used in the ethnic conflict models in Table 4-2, except for the war history variable and the ethnic peace year splines which are replaced by a "historical" election violence variable indicating the total number of such events in all previous years.

200 That is, for which any of the three “issue” variables was coded as 1. As I am focusing on election years (either parliamentary or presidential multi-party elections), the number of observations drops to 179. With the use of the ethnic party strength and trans-ethnic civil society variables which contain various missing observations, the number is further reduced to 123. The level of election violence within this sample ranges from 0 to 21 events with a mean number of 1.89 events per election year, and a standard deviation of 3.23. Almost 50 per cent of all election years in the sample do not exhibit any event of electoral violence (N=61).
other hand, the positive values. Table 4-5, which summarizes the results of all election violence models, reports the coefficients of both estimations: the logit estimation for the zeros (in the second column of the table) and the Poisson estimation for the positive counts (third column).

It becomes apparent that ethnic parties are indeed linked to more violence during election times. Stronger ethnic parties increase the risk of experiencing violence at all, and among the violent cases, they are also associated with higher levels of it. Not surprisingly, the violence history variable also has a positive and significant effect in both model components. Countries that have experienced high levels of election violence in the past also experience more violence in current elections. Population size also matters, but its effect is more precisely estimated when it comes to the level of election violence. Since this is a count of the number of events, countries with more inhabitants are likely to see higher levels of violence.

The most surprising result is the positive and significant effect of trans-ethnic civil society networks in both model components. This would mean that countries with a high degree of trans-ethnic elite cooperation within civil society experience more electoral violence. In contrast, those with a strong civil society in general are significantly less violence-prone.

The former result is difficult to explain but shows that elite cooperation within civil society certainly does not help prevent violent outbursts of the ethno-political competition during election times. But does it really have the opposite effect of increasing violence? It is still possible that there is some unobserved confounding factor omitted from the model which is responsible for this statistical relationship. One way to examine this without including an infinite number of control variables is to employ a fixed-effects model, focusing exclusively on the variation within the countries over time. This reduces the risk of omitted variables and spurious relationships considerably.

However, since it is not possible to implement a fixed-effects estimation within the hurdle count model, Models 4.8 and 4.9 in Table 4-5 use separate logit and Poisson regression models with a fixed-effects adaptation.

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- The highly skewed distribution of the values speaks against using a simple Poisson regression model. Instead, it suggests two separate questions. First, does ethnic mobilization have an effect on the occurrence of violence? Second, if violence occurs, does ethnic mobilization influence its level? Hurdle count models are two-component models: one is the hurdle component that models the zeros in the data; the other is a zero-truncated count component for the positive values. The latter is only employed if the hurdle for modeling the occurrence of zeros is exceeded. Thus, the binary outcome is seen as a hurdle. Once it is crossed, the outcome must be positive (Cameron and Trivedi 2013, 136-8). If we assume that there is a particular process that makes elections either violent or not, then this is the most appropriate statistical model to use because once there is violence, my violence events count variable is – by definition – above 0.

- While there are potentially dozens of relevant factors that vary between the different countries and might be missing in the models, many basic social and political conditions remain constant within a given country over time.

- This approach seems justifiable here because without the fixed-effects adaptation, the two separate logit and Poisson models produce almost identical results as the hurdle count model. It is thus plausible to assume that this is also the case for the fixed-effects adaptation. Furthermore, a hurdle count model with dummy variables for each country does not converge. Note that in the case of the logit model, fixed-effects leads to a further reduction of the number of observations since some countries did not have any violent elections at all, while others never had peaceful elections. The model can only analyze those countries which exhibit some variation over time. This means that countries which had only violent elections (Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Uganda, Kenya,
Table 4-5: Ethnic mobilization and electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2009. Regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4.7</th>
<th>Model 4.8</th>
<th>Model 4.9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hurdle count</td>
<td>Logit</td>
<td>Poisson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>model</td>
<td>(fixed-effects)</td>
<td>(fixed effects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share ethnic</td>
<td>1.39*</td>
<td>7.84*</td>
<td>2.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parties (lagged)</td>
<td>(.69)</td>
<td>(3.09)</td>
<td>(.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-ethnic civil</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>society strength</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.59)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall strength of</td>
<td>-.13*</td>
<td>-.83</td>
<td>-.27*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil society</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.66)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative size of</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>-2.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>excluded groups</td>
<td>(.88)</td>
<td>(.64)</td>
<td>(.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity index (lagged)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size</td>
<td>.59*</td>
<td>-11.23</td>
<td>-1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(logged)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>(13.28)</td>
<td>(3.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-2.74</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lagged, logged)</td>
<td>(.34)</td>
<td>(2.84)</td>
<td>(.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calendar year</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.49*</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.30)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election violence</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>history</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>117.43</td>
<td>-800.48*</td>
<td>-211.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(77.21)</td>
<td>(460.22)</td>
<td>(139.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-195.27***</td>
<td>-40.58****</td>
<td>-102.62***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors, with clustering on countries, in parentheses.
* $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$, * $p \leq 0.1$

We see that the effect of the trans-ethnic civil society variable is not robust to this more rigorous test. Differences in the degree of trans-ethnic civil society strength within a given country over time do not really correspond to varying degrees of election violence. This may be an indication for the existence of a confounding factor that drives the cross-sectional variation of both Tanzania, and Zambia), and those with only peaceful elections (Niger, Djibouti, Angola, Namibia, and Botswana) are dropped from the analysis. This does not occur in the Poisson regression model because the precise level of the violence (i.e. the number of violence events) always varies between at least two different elections within the same country in this sample.
the civil society indicator and the election violence measure.\textsuperscript{204} In Appendix V, I discuss various sensitivity tests for these results, in which the effects of the trans-ethnic civil society indicator are also less robust than those of the ethnic party strength variable. Nevertheless, this puzzle cannot be definitively solved here.

In contrast to the civil society variables, ethnic party strength remains robustly connected to electoral violence in the fixed-effects models 4.8 and 4.9. This lends very strong support to our expectation that ethnic parties lead to violence during election times in unranked ethnic systems. It means that the positive relationship does not only exist when comparing different countries with each other, but also when examining different elections within the same countries.

The effects of some of the control variables change radically in the fixed-effects models. The signs of the population size and the violence history variables turn negative. However, this seems plausible since the intuitively positive effect of both these variables should mostly apply to the cross-sectional comparison. In contrast, the time trend variable becomes more important in this context. Finally, large excluded population segments are associated with significantly lower levels of election violence. This may be the result of higher levels of ethnic infighting in larger ruling coalitions (cp. Roessler 2009; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).

The relationship between ethnic party strength and election violence is underscored by a look at the concrete cases. Table 4-6 lists the sixteen most violent elections in Sub-Saharan Africa (apart from South Africa) between 1990 and 2009. If we take the median value of ethnic party strength (10%) as the reference value, the great majority of them (twelve) occurred in the context of medium to high degrees of ethnic mobilization, and almost a third of them (Ethiopia 2005, Côte d’Ivoire 2000, Sierra Leone 2007, Ghana 2000, and Malawi 1999) even under conditions of extreme mobilization. The by far most violent election year, the legislative and presidential elections in Kenya 2007, also seems to reflect this tragic consequence of ethnically based party competition (Gutiérrez-Romero 2012).

The most outstanding exceptions are the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe. In the former case, the sheer size of the country and its large population (Sub-Saharan Africa’s third largest) make violence very likely during hotly contested elections even without ethnic parties. In Zimbabwe, long-time president Mugabe has systematically used violence as a strategic tool to break up the opposition and consolidate his authoritarian rule (Laakso 2007; Straus and Taylor 2012, 34-5).

\textsuperscript{204} Note that using a normal Poisson model – both with the full sample and with the restricted sample of violent elections only – produces similar results as the hurdle count Model 4.7 in Table 4-5. Hence, the tendency seems rather clear: while cross-sectional variations in trans-ethnic civil society strength correlate significantly with the degree of election violence, the variation within countries over time is not related to the latter.
In summary, the strength of ethnic parties is robustly and positively related to the degree of electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. This fits neatly into the theoretical argument presented in this study that emphasizes the high stakes of elections in the competitive environment of unranked ethnic systems, and the organizational capacity of ethnic parties to organize small-scale forms of political violence. While the effect of civil society organizations is more dubious (but certainly not connected to more electoral violence), ethnic parties appear to be highly reliable organizers of political violence during election times.

Table 4.6: Africa’s most violent elections, 1990-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>N of violent events</th>
<th>Vote share of ethnic parties (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Listed are the sixteen most violent election years (apart from South Africa). “Vote share of ethnic parties” refers to votes obtained in preceding elections, measuring strength of existing ethnic parties. In two cases – Democratic Republic of the Congo 2006 and Kenya 1992 – no elections had previously taken place within the sample period. Here, the vote share of ethnic parties obtained in the same year was imputed (marked by italics and parentheses). Data on election violence from Salehyan et al. (2012).
Does this effect also hold for small-scale social violence in general? I now come back to the general measure of social violence, described at the beginning of this section, which counts the number of all violent events that started in each country year during my sample period. The analysis and results can be found in Appendix V. The evidence suggests that in the cross-sectional comparison, ethnic parties are not systematically linked to the degree of social violence. However, within a given country, changes in ethnic party strength over time have a significant effect. The stronger ethnic parties are, the higher the level of social violence.

In contrast, it is extremely difficult to assess the effect of trans-ethnic cooperation on the degree of small-scale violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. While in the cross-sectional comparison higher values of the variable are associated with more violence (as in the above analyses on electoral violence), the within-country analysis shows no significant – or even an opposite – effect. Although the results from the fixed-effects estimations might suggest that the cross-sectional correlation is the result of a spurious relationship, driven by an omitted confounding variable, this puzzle cannot be definitively solved here.

We can conclude that the effect of ethnic parties on small-scale violence in unranked systems is indeed strongest with regard to electoral violence. Ethnic party mobilization increases both the risk of its occurrence and its level if it does occur. This result holds in the usual cross-sectional time-series analysis as well as in the more rigorous fixed-effects analysis. Since elections constitute the most relevant focal points of the ethno-political competition in democratically governed unranked systems, the risk of a violent escalation of this struggle over political hegemony is particularly high during election times. Under these circumstances, the mobilizational capacity of ethnic parties and their polarizing propaganda are often enough to spur violence.

4.4. Conclusion

There is a systematic empirical relationship between ethnic parties and outcomes of ethnic violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region that is almost completely comprised of countries that are prototypical for the unranked ethnic system type. As expected in the theoretical argument outlined in Chapter 2, ethnic parties are more directly linked to forms of political violence which are of a smaller scale and a less systematic nature than full-blown ethnic rebellions. While in the latter case, it is often the concurrence of ethnic mobilization and ethnic exclusion that leads to conflict outbreak, the electoral mobilization of ethnic groups seems to have a direct effect on small-scale violence related to elections.

The effect of ethnic parties on ethnic civil conflict is weaker in this subsample than in the global sample of unranked systems. However, from both theoretical and practical perspectives these results are still very powerful. Conflicts in this world region have often been associated with
factors other than ethnic grievances and ethno-nationalist competition in the academic (and journalistic) literature (see e.g. Addison, Le Billon, and Murshed 2003; Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Ellis 1998; Kaplan 1994; Le Billon 2001; McGowan 2005; Reno 1998; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). Hence, if we find the same effect of ethnic mobilization overall in this “least likely” region (while working with a reduced sample size), this constitutes strong support for the theoretical argument advanced in this study.

Ethnic mobilization in the realm of civil society does not have a significant effect on ethnic conflict onset. In contrast, dense trans-ethnic civil society networks seem to decrease ethnic conflict risk, although in a more long-term process. Political parties are clearly more powerful vehicles of ethnic mobilization than civil society organizations. The latter often constitute more latent forms of political collective action and need more time to build up influence than political parties which are more directly connected to the spheres of state power (Gyimah-Boadi 1996; Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Hooghe and Stolle 2003).

Nevertheless, the long-term comparison of various conflict and control cases in Africa has provided additional evidence for the notion that countries with high levels of trans-ethnic cooperation over time are less likely to experience ethnic conflict. In contrast, the effect of such trans-ethnic civil society networks is much harder to decipher when it comes to the types of less systematic political violence addressed in the last section of this chapter. In the cross-sectional comparison of electoral violence in particular, they are even associated with higher degrees of violence. However, this result is not robust to the more rigorous test of within-country variation which may imply the existence of an omitted confounding variable that drives the cross-sectional correlation.

In summary, the empirical analyses of this chapter lend support to hypotheses H2a and H3a about the effects of ethnic parties and ethnic civil society organizations on ethnic conflict, although in a more nuanced way than expressed therein. Different forms and expressions of ethnic mobilization have distinct effects on different types of ethnic conflict and violence. Support for hypothesis H1a about the effect of ethnic mobilization on ethnic dominance in unranked systems is weaker in the African sample than at the global level. Ethnic parties appear to be more strongly connected to the conservation of ethnic dominance than to its achievement.

Furthermore, the qualitative analysis of various conflict cases in the region has highlighted the causal mechanisms between ethnic mobilization, inequality and conflict. We find clear examples of the monopolization, the exclusion-grievances, and the mass mobilization mechanisms. Ethnic parties have served to capture state power in the name of specific ethnic groups, thereby excluding others from access to it. This has often produced widespread ethnic grievances, which were at the roots of subsequent ethnic conflicts. Ethnic parties are also closely linked to the organization of violent collective action. Hence, the cases discussed in this chapter reveal
that ethnic mobilization in unranked systems is related to ethnic violence in more than just a
correlational manner.

The next chapter examines some of these dynamics in more detail based on a comparative case
study of Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon.

Why has Gabon not experienced any large-scale ethnic conflict like Côte d’Ivoire did, despite a similar history and similar socio-economic and ethno-political conditions? And how does this relate to my theoretical argument and the quantitative results presented above? The present chapter relies on a comparative case study to further illuminate the causal mechanisms between ethnic mobilization and conflict. I will first provide a summary of the remarkably similar historical backgrounds of the two countries, before discussing the causal mechanisms linking ethnic mobilization to conflict, and trans-ethnic elite cooperation to peace, in the two cases.

Apart from drawing on a large amount of secondary literature, the findings of this chapter are based on three months of field research in Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon, from July to October 2012, consisting of a total of 63 elite interviews (35 in Côte d’Ivoire, 28 in Gabon) with political party leaders, parliamentarians, media representatives, civil society leaders, and outside observers.205

The analysis reveals that the decisive factor leading to the different outcomes in the two cases was the degree of trans-ethnic elite cooperation in the early post-independence period. Already during the one-party regimes, elite alliances in Côte d’Ivoire were less inclusive than in Gabon. These early fractures within the fabric of the Ivoirian elite resulted in a spiral of ethnic mobilization as soon as the political system opened up, leading to ethnic exclusion and finally to a protracted ethnic conflict. In contrast, the high degree of elite cohesion across ethnic group boundaries in Gabon mitigated the level of inter-group competition, promoting ethnic inclusion and peace. Thus, one of the crucial findings of this case study is the decisive influence of the reach and composition of elite networks on patterns of ethnic mobilization, peace, and violence in unranked ethnic systems.

5.1. One-party Rule, Cooperation with France, and the Rise and Decline of the Export Economy: A Short History of Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon

There are three fundamental similarities between Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon which provide for an excellent basis for comparison: the multi-polar ethno-political landscape, the economic development after independence and, above all, the political history of authoritarian, yet inclusive one-party regimes, democratizing after the Cold War.

Côte d’Ivoire consists of over 60 ethnic groups. The northwestern Mandé (Malinké, and Dioula) groups and the northeastern Voltaic (Senoufo, Lobi, Kulango and other) groups are combined

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205 See Chapter 3.1 regarding the precise methodology. As all interviewees were ensured anonymity, interviews are referred to using the date of their occurrence. A complete list by country and target group can be found in a separate List of Interviews at the end of this study.
into one single ethnic category of “northerners” in EPR-ETH, due to their common Muslim faith and because they have come to be seen this way by the groups from the southern half of the country. In fact, the term “Dioula” is commonly used to refer to northerners in general (Bouquet 2011, 197; Chappell 1989, 681; Skogseth 2006, 11). The southern Mandé peoples (for example, the Yacouba and Gouro) are culturally distinct from the northern groups (Bouquet 2011, 197).

The southeast is generally populated by Akan peoples of which the Baoulé are the most important group in political terms. The country’s “founding father”, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, hails from this group which has long dominated Côte d’Ivoire’s political and social life. Other Akan groups are the Abron, Agni, and the Lagoon peoples (Bouquet 2011, 197; Seibel et al. 1987), which are relevant above all in their distinction to the Baoulé. Therefore, the EPR-ETH dataset combines them into one single ethnic cluster. Finally, the Kru are composed of the Bété, Dida, Guéré and other sub-groups, of which the Bété are the largest and politically most relevant.

In Gabon, likewise, there are about 60 ethnic groups which can be classified into a set of much fewer socio-linguistic macro groups (Midepe 2011, 83). The largest of them is the Fang group with about 26% of the country’s total population, according to EPR-ETH. They have given the country its first president, Léon Mba, and are often suspected by the other groups to hold either hegemonic aspirations due to their demographic weight or, alternatively, to pursue an irredentist aim of unification with their ethnic kin in Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon (Dougueli 2012). However, there has always been a politically relevant divide between the Fang of the province of Estuaire and those of Woleu-Ntem, that reaches back to the rivalry between the two most powerful political leaders during the period immediately before and after independence, both of which were Fang, but one of them from Estuaire (Léon Mba) and the other from Woleu-Ntem (Jean-Hilaire Aubame) (Dougueli 2012; Gardinier and Yates 2006; Midepe 2011, 95).

The second largest group is the Eshira/Bapounou cluster, followed by the Mbede groups who live above all in the province of Haut-Ogooué, and are comprised of the Batéké, Obamba, Nzebi and other groups (Ndombet 2009, 23). Because long-time president Omar Bongo and his son and successor Ali Bongo are Batéké, the small group has become very powerful politically (Gardinier 1997). Finally, the Myene are concentrated in the region around the country’s economic hub Port-Gentil. There are several other ethnic groups in Gabon, such as the Bakota or the Bakele, which are not listed as politically relevant in EPR-ETH (which is one of the reasons for the large white spot on the map below). Hence, although Gabon is a much smaller country

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206 Other sources give a much higher estimate of between 35% and 40% (Dougueli 2012), 30% (Morrison, Mitchell, and Paden 1972), or 30% to 35% (Levinson 1998, 134).
207 Such suspicions were also invoked in some of my interviews with non-Fang individuals (interviews with party representative, 2012-9-3; and journalist, 2012-9-11).
208 The Nzebi are sometimes counted as a sub-group of the Mbede cluster and sometimes as a separate ethnic group (see e.g. Morrison, Mitchell, and Paden 1972, 458; Ndombet 2009, 22-3). The ethnic map of the collection of University of Texas’ Perry-Castañeda Library – on which the spatial coding in GeoEPR-ETH is based on – shows the Nzebi to be part of the Mbede cluster (see: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/gabon_ethnic_1968.jpg (accessed September 6, 2013)).
than Côte d’Ivoire, it features a very similar ethno-political landscape, with various “macro
groups”, none of which come close to constituting a demographic majority (see Figure 5-1). And
in both cases, as we will see below, some groups have come to play a special role in the politics
of their countries.

**Figure 5-1: Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon. The ethno-political landscapes**

![Ethno-political landscape map of Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon]

Notes: Based on GeoEPR-ETH. Only politically relevant groups displayed, according to EPR-ETH. Percentages refer to
groups’ share of the total country population.

While Côte d’Ivoire’s “father of independence” Houphouët-Boigny led his country directly into a
one-party regime, multi-party democracy lasted a few years longer in Gabon. Already during
Léon Mba’s presidency, attempts towards a one-party state were made. But only after his death
in 1967, did his successor Albert Bernard (later Omar) Bongo install a single party regime under
the roof of the *Parti Démocratique Gabonais* (PDG) in March 1968. Both Houphouët-Boigny and
Bongo turned out to be extremely skillful political rulers who were able to hold on to power for
over 30 and 40 years, respectively, and guarantee their countries a high degree of political and
economic stability. In Côte d’Ivoire, Houphouët’s regime rested on three main pillars: his per-
sonal charisma, the political and military support of France, and his astutely managed clien-
telistic system that used the spoils of the export economy to substitute patronage for repres-

While Omar Bongo might not have had the same personal charisma as Houphouët-Boigny, he
was no less of a skillful manager of his neo-patrimonial regime (Gardinier 1997; Gardinier and
Yates 2006; Tshiymbe 2011). As one author stated, Omar Bongo was like “a fruit tree planted in
the middle of the Gabonese village of whose fruits and shades everyone benefitted” [author’s
Moreover, political and military cooperation with – and dependence from – France was as strong as in Côte d’Ivoire (Ndombet 2009, 18, 162, 181). In fact, to this day, France maintains a permanent military base in Gabon’s capital Libreville.

Fuelled by oil (Gabon), cocoa and (to a lesser degree) coffee (Côte d’Ivoire), both countries experienced impressive economic growth after independence (McGovern 2011, 137-49; Nzengue Pegnet 2011). During this time, far larger portions of wealth trickled down to the ordinary population in the authoritarian one-party states of Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon than in the more predatory regimes of other African countries (McGovern 2011, 140, 151). The economic success also attracted large numbers of immigrants from neighboring countries. In Côte d’Ivoire, immigrant workers – mostly from Burkina Faso and Mali, and ethnically related to the northern groups – settled heavily in the traditional territories of the Kru, in the cocoa producing southwest (Bouquet 2011, 198, 201, 203, 212; Langer 2005, 30; Toungara 2001, 65). They were not only granted the right to own land but also to vote – which would eventually result in a severe, ethnicized contention over citizenship (Bouquet 2011; Collett 2006; Skogseth 2006; Woods 2003).

In Gabon, xenophobic attitudes have also become widespread and instrumentalized by politicians (Mboumba Moussavou 2011).

The complete reliance on the export revenues backfired when the world market prices for both oil and cocoa collapsed during the 1980s, resulting in severe debt crises in both countries (Nzengue Pegnet 2011; Skogseth 2006). The “well oiled” clientelistic system of patronage and self-enrichment then became a heavy burden for the national budgets, while large segments of the population in both countries still suffered from poverty, malnutrition, and deficient health services (McGovern 2011, 200; Nzengue Pegnet 2011). It was not surprising then that the economic decline led to mounting popular discontent which eventually ushered in a political opening at the beginning of the 1990s. Both countries held their first multi-party parliamentary elections in the year of 1990. Côte d’Ivoire had already held presidential elections a month earlier, with Gabon following suit three years later. In both countries, the long-time presidents and their ruling parties were confirmed in office.

From this point on, the histories of the two countries diverge. In Gabon, Omar Bongo ruled until his death in June 2009 and was succeeded by his son Ali Bongo, who won the presidential election of October 2009 under controversial circumstances. In contrast, Houphouët-Boigny’s death in Côte d’Ivoire was followed by a fierce, increasingly ethnicized power struggle between his constitutional successor Henri Konan Bédié (Baoulé), long-time oppositionist Laurent Gbag-
bo (Bété), and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara (northerner). Bédié won the 1995 presidential election – which the opposition boycotted – after excluding Ouattara as a candidate based on a new, controversial electoral code that restricted citizenship to Ivorians whose parents were both born in the country. Four years later Côte d’Ivoire experienced its first military coup. Contrary to his initial statements, the putschist General Robert Gueï ran for president in the October 2000 election, in which Ouattara was again barred from running. Refusing to accept his defeat against Gbagbo, Gueï was chased out of office by the latter’s militant followers.

Ethno-political tensions grew, and in September 2002 rebellious soldiers from the north attacked the cities of Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo. The rebellion failed in Abidjan but sparked a civil war that lasted until 2004 and led to the country’s split in two. New presidential elections were held in the fall of 2010. When Gbagbo refused to accept his defeat against Ouattara, the country slid into its second ethnic conflict, which only ended when Gbagbo was finally ousted in April 2011, and Ouattara assumed the presidency.

5.2. From Ethnic Mobilization to Conflict and from Trans-ethnic Cooperation to Peace

The present section analyzes in detail how ethnic organizations and different political elite strategies influenced the degree of ethno-political competition in Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon, leading to violent ethnic conflict in one case, and ongoing peace with only few instances of electoral violence in the other. My analysis follows the causal path displayed in Figure 1-3 and Figure 2-1 in Chapters 1.5 and 2, from which we can deduce the following five causal mechanisms linking (trans-)ethnic organizations to violence and peace:

1) Ethnicity is used as an instrument for political competition in unranked societies.
2) Trans-ethnic elite networks create common interests and are therefore connected with less ethnic mobilization.
3) Ethnic mobilization through political parties or civil society organizations increases the intensity of group competition by structuring and aggregating individuals’ political interests along ethnic lines, and through ethno-nationalist propaganda. In contrast, trans-ethnic elite cooperation has a mitigating effect on the level of group competition in unranked societies.
4) The growing strength of ethnic parties leads to a higher risk of ethnic exclusion, as political power is seized and monopolized in favor of specific ethnic groups. This in turn produces widespread grievances within the excluded ethnic groups.
5) The concurrence of the exclusion-grievances mechanism and the capacity of ethnic organizations for mass mobilization makes ethnic rebellion more likely. In contrast, ethnic mobilization without widespread ethnic grievances may result in
small-scale violence due to high levels of ethnic tension and to the organizations’ mobilizational capacity, but it does not create the conditions for civil conflict.

In the following sub-sections, I will discuss each of the above-mentioned causal mechanisms, focusing in particular on the role of (trans-)ethnic organizations.

5.2.1. Ethnicity as an Instrument for Political Competition

Most of the party representatives in Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon who were asked the question of how party membership is determined in their countries (eleven out of sixteen) stated that individuals’ party choice is usually shaped by ethnicity, i.e. they become members of, or vote for, those parties whose leaders match their own ethnic identity. The link between ethnicity and politics seems to be both a top-down and bottom-up mechanism. On the one hand, the ethnicization of political competition is often induced by the bases, i.e. the rank-and-file population, who want to turn their leaders into ethnic representatives, as one Ivorian party leader noted.211 On the other hand, political leaders use ethnicity as a tool of mobilization.

Moreover, when asked about the key issues for their countries’ future, ethnicity figured prominently in the answers of most interviewees, politicians and non-politicians alike, in both countries. Not surprisingly, in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire, ethnic reconciliation is considered a top priority by almost all relevant social actors (21 out of 29 interviewees who were asked the question). Even in Gabon, ten out of twenty interviewees who were asked about the impact of ethnicity on the country’s political future considered it a source of division or potential violence, while almost all agreed that ethnicity is strategically used by the country’s politicians as an instrument of competition.

In both countries, most of the interviewees accused the rival camp of being the initiator of this manipulation of ethnicity. These mutual accusations are a sign of the mechanism of competition that ethnicity unleashes in unranked ethnic systems. In contrast, as shown below, ethnicity was hardly ever mentioned as a response to the same questions in my interviews in Guatemala and Ecuador.

We can observe early traces of this ethnic competition in both countries in the very first years after independence. While the Bloc Démocratique Gabonais (BDG) of Léon Mba, the party that came to rule Gabon, was composed of a broad alliance of leaders from different groups, its main rivals – the Union Démocratique et Sociale Gabonaise (UDSG), and the Parti de l’Unité Nationale (PUNGA) – were much more ethnically based. The former was mostly based on the Fang population of the northern Woleu-Ntem province, the latter on the Bapounou group (Gardinier and Yates 2006, 255, 317; Ndombet 2009, 61-2, 68, 71, 79-80)

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211 Interview 2012-8-23-II.
In Côte d’Ivoire, we can perceive the contest between Houphouët’s Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) and the Mouvement Socialiste Africain (MSA) as the first round of ethnic competition in which the Kru groups lost against the more powerful alliance between the Baoulé and northern groups. The MSA drew on grievances among the southwestern Kru groups in its political program, thus politicizing ethnicity in the country from early on (Dozon 1985a, 342-3; 1985b, 77-9).

The following paragraphs prove that ethnicity continued to be used as a tool of political competition – to frame political demands and to mobilize people – in both countries, although to varying degrees. Hence, the histories of both Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire confirm that in unranked ethnic systems, from its very outset, ethnicity is almost predestined to play a crucial role in political competition. Nevertheless, in line with the causal mechanisms discussed below, violence is not a necessary consequence of ethnic competition but remains contingent on other factors, such as political elite strategies.

### 5.2.2. Trans-ethnic Cooperation versus Ethnic Mobilization

The one-party regimes in both Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon tried to suppress the expression of ethnicity, yet the careful ethnic balancing, the clientelism and patronage along ethnic lines, and a certain ethnic favoritism had the effect of strengthening people’s ethnic identification, and reinforcing ethno-political group boundaries in the long run (Chappell 1989, 688; Dougueli 2012; Jakobeit 1984, 21; Midepe 2011, 86-9). While building highly inclusive coalitions, both Houphouët-Boigny and Omar Bongo relied on members of their own ethnic groups (and in the case of Bongo, even of his own family) to fill the key positions in the state apparatus, the state-run companies, and the security sector (Chappell 1989, 690; Gardinier 1997; Jakobeit 1984, 31; Kanté 1994, 144; Langer 2005, 39; Ndombet 2009, 146, 154-6). However, the structure of elite alliances was very different in the two countries – a fact that would determine the patterns of ethnic mobilization afterwards.

The BDG was the result of a 1953 fusion of two different political organizations led by Léon Mba, a Fang, and Paul Marie Indjendjet Gondjout, a Myene (Ndombet 2009, 32). Subsequently, the new party relied on old – often pre-colonial – alliances between the different ethno-cultural groupings and its traditional authorities and ruling clans. Influential representatives of all groups were contacted and asked to join the party in order to serve as intermediaries between the party and the local populations of the different ethno-regions, from the “Fang capital” Oyem in Woleu-Ntem to Franceville in Haut-Ogooué (Ndombet 2009, 44).

These local patriarchs served to implant the party and spread its messages among their “entrusted” communities, and recruit and mobilize members (Ndombet 2009, 45-51). Moreover, the BDG’s main rival, the UDSG, was first included into the government coalition with its leader
Jean-Hilaire Aubame serving as foreign minister. It was only when Mba’s regime took a more authoritarian turn – from about 1963 onwards –, that the UDSG became marginalized (Africa Report 1964).

After Mba’s death, his successor Omar Bongo set out to strengthen the trans-ethnic fabric of the Gabonese elite, transforming the BDG into the PDG single-party. Bongo’s style of governance rested on a conscious politics of equilibrium, built around informal ethnic quotas that applied even to certain institutions of higher education, an approach that in the French-speaking literature has been coined “la géopolitique” (cp. e.g. Moundounga Mouity 2011). In this way, he achieved a remarkable ethnic balance in the public sector with elites from all major ethnic groups occupying prominent positions in the government, state bureaucracy, and party apparatus (Gardinier 1997; Moundounga Mouity 2011; Tshiyembe 2011, 9).

While the Kru – and later the northern groups – played a special role in the ethno-political dynamics in Côte d’Ivoire, in Gabon this role has been reserved for the Fang. Historically, they are “latecomers” to the territory of the Gabonese state, having migrated to central Gabon from the north as late as the 19th century, but now constitute the country’s largest ethnic group (Chamberlin 1978). The suspicion of other groups of their political ambitions has increased intra-Fang solidarity over time (Midepe 2011, 85), however, Bongo always paid special attention to their political inclusion. After their fall from the presidency due to the death of Léon Mba, Bongo reserved the second highest office in the regime for a representative of the Fang group – an informal but strictly followed rule that is still applied today (Dougueli 2012; Gardinier and Yates 2006; Midepe 2011, 89; Tshiyembe 2011, 9). Hence, early Gabonese politics during the one-party regime were characterized by high elite cohesion and alliances that encompassed all relevant ethnic groups.

In Côte d’Ivoire, Houphouët-Boigny always portrayed his PDCI as a pan-ethnic party, and he did indeed achieve a high degree of ethnic inclusion and trans-ethnic cooperation (Kanté 1994, 120, 130-2; Langer 2005, 42). However, his ruling coalition represented above all the political-economic alliance between his Baoulé group and northern leaders (Chappell 1989, 686; Collett 2006, 616, 620, 623; Crook 1997, 225; Dozon 1985a, 342-3; 1985b, 58; Skogseth 2006, 24-6; Woods 2003). Cocoa cultivation was largely controlled by Baoulé plantation owners who relied on workforce form the north and cooperated with northern transporters and traders (McGovern 2011, 76; Woods 2003, 647, 650-1).

Although there were token representatives of the group in the government and party leadership, the Kru were standing outside of this ethno-political alliance (Dozon 1985b, 57-8, 80, 83; Woods 2003, 649, 654). Having overwhelmingly supported the MSA in the lead-up to the country’s independence, they were treated with suspicion by the PDCI single-party regime (Dozon 1985b, 59, 83). As a result, they were completely powerless in the face of the internal agricultur-
al colonization of their traditional territories by Baoulé, northerners, and immigrants from other African countries (Bouquet 2011, 211-3; Dozon 1985a, 342-3; 1985b, 56-8, 69-73; Lemarchand 1972, 85; Woods 2003).

It was no coincidence then that the most persistent opponent of Côte d’Ivoire’s long-time president, Laurent Gbagbo, was a Bété from the southwest. Gbagbo, a former university lecturer and historian, embarked on a discourse of ethnic injustice that played on the perceived grievances of his group (McGovern 2011, 87-96). His illegally founded opposition party, the *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI), would later play a key role in the ethnicized political competition of the post-Houphouët era.

However, while the Kru (and particularly, the Bété) were the most mobilized ethnic bloc, competition was to a certain extent a general characteristic of group relations in Côte d’Ivoire’s one-party state. One expression of this was the rise, especially during the 1970s, of ethnic associations – thinly disguised as “home-town” associations – which linked urban elites to their ethnic constituencies. Generally formed by high-ranking party members, bureaucrats or national deputies, these associations did not only serve to channel economic resources to the countryside, but they were also used as a means of building up political strength in the PDCI-internal competition, based on an ethnic clientele base (Woods 1994).

In both Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon, democratization at the beginning of the 1990s was accompanied by a mushrooming of organizations, as can be seen in Figure 5-2 (with regard to non-party organizations). In both countries, this set the stage for the first major surge in ethnic mobilization. During and after the national conference in Gabon in March and April 1990, opposition to Bongo crystallized into two relevant forces: the Fang- and Bapounou-based *Rassemblement National des Bûcherons* (RNB), led by Paul Mba-Abessole (a Fang), and the *Parti Gabonais du Progrès* (PGP) that united leaders of the Myene group. Later, in 1998, the RNB split further along ethnic lines (Gardinier 1997; Gardinier and Yates 2006; Midepe 2011, 103-5).

Nevertheless, Bongo once again was able to co-opt most of the dissidents and to maintain the ethnic balance within the party and the government (Gardinier and Yates 2006; Midepe 2011, 90). Mba-Abessole, for example, the president’s arguably most dangerous rival and an important Fang leader, soon closed ranks again with Bongo and joined the government coalition (Gardinier and Yates 2006). Likewise, most other leaders of one-time opposition parties would sooner or later renew their bonds with the country’s ruler (Ingueza 2011). Hence, the long-

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1 It is probably not an accident that this more sophisticated form of ethno-nationalism, relying on a (pseudo-)scientific reconstruction of the supposedly historical facts, was introduced by Laurent Gbagbo, who is an historian and has published a book titled *Sur les traces des Bété* (“On the Tracks of the Bété”), in which he asserts that his Bété group is the only really autochthonous people of Côte d’Ivoire. Yet, it should also be noted that some of the most toxic anti-Bété stereotypes are likewise promoted by the intellectuals and authors of the other ethno-political camp. In his novel *Les Catapilas, ces ingrâts* of 2009, for instance, the Baoulé journalist and author Venance Konan describes the Bété (without actually naming them) as lazy, uncivilized scalawags who – instead of cultivating their lands – have never done anything else than sleep, drink, and harass girls.
established trans-ethnic alliances withstood the centrifugal forces of democratization. While this may have helped to preserve the political hegemony of the ruling PDG and thwarted the process of democratization, it has certainly also restricted the degree of ethnic mobilization in Gabon.

The cohesion of the Gabonese elite is reflected in my data on civil society strength in Africa. Figure 5-2 graphs the “density” of ethnic and trans-ethnic civil society organizations (i.e. their number relative to the country population) in the two countries over time.\(^{213}\) We can see that mono-ethnic organizations have always outnumbered those composed of elites and members of different linguistic groups in Côte d’Ivoire. The upsurge of civil society organizing during the political opening around 1990 followed this pattern. In contrast, all organizations established in Gabon since the end of the 1980s that are included in my sample are trans-ethnic.

The picture we see in Figure 5-2 is very much in line with the accounts of Ivoirian political actors on the development of civil society in the country. It also points to a more general characteristic of the sociopolitical situation in Africa. Civil society organizations are easily co-opted and instrumentalized by political parties due to the absolute dominance of the state – and the political system surrounding it – over any other part of society.\(^{214}\) Hence, if a country’s elite is divided along ethnic lines, civil society organizations also become ethnicized. This is precisely what occurred in Côte d’Ivoire after democratization, according to my interviewees. Through personal relationships between politicians and the heads of civil society organizations, and through financial co-option, almost all of these organizations were pulled to one or the other of the different ethno-political camps.\(^{215}\)

Nevertheless, the figure also shows that there are, and always have been, truly trans-ethnic civil society organizations in Côte d’Ivoire, such as the chambers of commerce and some of the trade unions, as well as women’s and human rights organizations. But the political weight of these organizations is extremely limited, due to four major reasons. First of all, politicians are still unwilling to accept any alternative source of authority, and organizations often face repression if the government considers their agenda as oppositional.\(^{216}\) Second, there is a general lack of independent and local sources of funding. Civil society organizations in Côte d’Ivoire largely live on resources from foreign donors – limiting their connection to, and influence on, the local society – or they are sponsored by a small clique of leaders who then pursue their own particular

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\(^{213}\) I use a logarithmic transformation of the standard (i.e. non-lagged, non-cumulative) density variables in order to avoid distortions. See Chapter 4.1 for a description of the data and their source.

\(^{214}\) It is important to note that while African states are often (rightly) considered weak, they are still by far the most powerful and – as the major source of material resources – economically dominant institutions in African societies (cp. Bayart 1993; Bratton 1989; Gyimah-Boadi 1996; Lewis 1992b).


political agenda.\textsuperscript{217} Third and related to the second point, there is also a lack of transparency and internal democracy, especially regarding leadership selection. The last two issues cause severe problems of credibility – a point often raised by politicians and outside observers in my interviews.\textsuperscript{218} Finally, instead of working together, the organizations frequently compete with each other over public notoriety and financial resources.\textsuperscript{219}

Figure 5-2: Ethnic and trans-ethnic civil society mobilization in Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire

As a result, these trans-ethnic civil society organizations are unable to mitigate the ethnopolitical competition. Importantly, civil society organizations in Gabon are plagued by the same weaknesses as their Ivoirian counterparts, according to the accounts of my sources.\textsuperscript{220} However, since elite cohesion is higher in Gabon, the centrifugal forces on these organizations are lower.

The fractures in the fabric of the Ivoirian elite – particularly between Kru and others – were also directly translated into the political party system. In 1990, the level of ethnic party strength in Côte d’Ivoire was still only slightly higher than in Gabon (as can be seen in Figure 5-5 below), and exclusively driven by Gbagbo’s FPI that campaigned on a xenophobic and ethno-nationalist

\textsuperscript{217} Interviews with civil society leaders, 2012-7-25-I, 2012-7-27-II, 2012-7-30-II, 2012-8-1-II, 2012-8-3, 2012-8-6, 2012-8-8, 2012-8-10-II; political party leader, 2012-7-31; and outside observers, 2012-8-9-II, 2012-8-17-II. This is also the case for many political parties, especially the smaller ones, in both Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon.

\textsuperscript{218} Interviews with political party leader, 2012-7-31; parliamentarian, 2012-7-29; and outside observers, 2012-8-9-II, 2012-8-17-II.

\textsuperscript{219} Interviews with civil society leaders, 2012-8-1-II, 2012-8-3; and journalist, 2012-7-19-II.

platform decrying Baoulé political dominance, the discrimination of the Kru, and the flooding of the country with foreign workers (Crook 1997, 220-3; Woods 2003, 649). But when Houphouët-Boigny died in December 1993, the (remaining) old alliances between the different elite factions disintegrated rapidly – even the historical alliance between the Baoulé and the north (Crook 1997, 225; Woods 2003, 649). This led to the second surge in ethnic mobilization.

In the forefront of the 1995 presidential and parliamentary elections, all relevant ethnic groups were highly mobilized through ethnic parties. The FPI continued its previous course (Collett 2006, 623; Langer 2005, 33), while the former single party, the PDCI, became an instrument of Baoulé/Akan ethno-nationalism under Henri Konan Bédié (Bouquet 2011, 214; Collett 2006; Crook 1997; Woods 2003). In 1994, PDCI dissidents formed the RDR in support of Alassane Ouattara. It started out as a non-ethnic reformist party, but due to Ouattara’s own northern identity and the PDCI’s aggressive ethno-nationalist course, the party soon developed into the political home of the northerners (Bouquet 2011; Collett 2006; Crook 1997). Voting patterns in the parliamentary, departmental, and municipal elections from 1995 to 2002 closely followed ethnic lines (Bouquet 2011, 77, 99; Crook 1997, 237-40; Toungara 2001, 71).

In contrast, the transition in Gabon after Bongo’s death in June 2009 again went rather smoothly as the ruling PDG decided to nominate Omar Bongo’s son Ali as a candidate for the following presidential election. In Gabonese tradition, Ali Bongo inherited his father’s networks and alliances (Midepe 2011, 92). As one local political observer noted, the cohesion within both the elites and the ordinary population was a key factor for the smooth management of the transition.

Figure 5-3 confirms that still today, elite networks in Gabon are highly trans-ethnic. The figure displays the personal networks of the elites interviewed during my field research, with each color representing a specific ethnic group. The networks were constructed using snowball selection techniques: every interviewee was asked to give me the names of “political allies”, i.e. people who hold similar political opinions. The recorded connections are depicted with network graphing techniques from the statistics program R. The leadership circle of the PDG is marked by a grey square within the network structure.

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1 In fact, four of the RDR’s first nine deputies stemmed from the south and the center (Crook 1997, 226).
2 In the interim period between Bongo’s death in June and the election in October, Rose Rogombé – a Myene and president of the Senate – acted as president.
3 Interview 2012-9-1.
4 I also counted “passive” contacts of every individual, i.e. people by whom individuals were named but that they did not necessarily name themselves, as part of the network. Additionally, I used information about organizations’ and parties’ leadership circles to reconstruct institutional networks. Thus, the networks are composed of each individual’s active, passive, and institutional contacts. In order to determine the ethnic identity of those individuals who were not interviewed, uninvolved natives were asked to identify them based on their family names. In both countries, I relied on three to four different ethnicity coders. By allowing them to identify the ethnic identities of interviewees and comparing their answers to the true identities, I was able to estimate their coding accuracy. The values are quite high, ranging between 72% and 90%, and averaging 82% in Côte d’Ivoire and 81% in Gabon. In addition, the intercoder reliability is high, with reliability rates ranging from 76% to 89%. Based on the answers of the different coders and their accuracy rates, I assigned a certainty measure, ranging from 0 to 1, to each individual’s ethnic identity.
Two points seem particularly noteworthy. First, elite networks are highly trans-ethnic both within and outside of the hegemonic PDG. Second, there is a certain tendency of individuals from both the Fang and Bapounou groups to have more ethnicized networks, but this is partly due to the fact that these are by far the two largest groups in the country. Importantly, there are also members of these groups both within the PDG leadership and – as shown below – in the government. This diagnosis is in line with the point of view of many Gabonese social and political actors themselves, oppositionists and government allies alike. While the quasimonarchic succession in 2009 was definitely a democratic farce, strong trans-ethnic cooperation again prevented a major outburst of ethnic mobilization in Gabon after Omar Bongo’s death.

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Notes: Figures constructed with network graphing techniques from R. Each color symbolizes a different ethnic group: red=Fang; blue=Eshira/Bapounou; green=Mbede; orange=Myene; grey=other group; white=unknown.

If we compare Gabonese elite networks with those in Côte d’Ivoire, we can see that the former are significantly less ethnicized than the latter. To test this, I developed an “ethnic bias indicator” which reflects the difference between the observed and the expected ethnicization of the political network of each individual. The expected ethnicization is equal to the share of his/her ethnic group of the total population, i.e. the expected value based on the “apolitical” demographic proportions. Hence, if the difference is positive, intra-ethnic connections are overrepresented within the individual’s political network, while a negative difference means that the individual has less intra-ethnic connections than what could be expected from sheer demographic probability. The country mean of this ethnic bias indicator is clearly higher in Côte d’Ivoire than in Gabon (0.18 versus 0.11; N=315). This difference is statistically significant (one-tailed t-test, p<0.05). Restricting the analysis to individuals with larger personal networks (i.e. with at least 3 or 5 contacts) or to those whose ethnic identity is reasonably clear (i.e. with a certainty value of at least 0.66), the difference becomes more pronounced and the t-test is more significant. However, this result is not surprising given that the networks reflect the situation after the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.
5.2.3. Ethnic Mobilization and the Level of Group Competition

How have ethnic organizations contributed to the rising level of – ultimately violent – ethno-political competition in Côte d’Ivoire? My interviews and the secondary sources suggest three interrelated ways: first, through the inflammatory electoral campaign propaganda by ethnic parties in conjunction with ethnically based newspapers; second, through their institutionalization of ethnic identity (i.e. by linking specific identities to specific political organizations); and third, by facilitating the mobilization of the masses. Hence, there is evidence for the three causal mechanisms of interest aggregation, propaganda, and mass mobilization discussed in Chapter 2.

The intensity of ethno-political competition in the two countries can be measured by the level of violence stemming from it. Figure 5-4 graphs the number of incidents of electoral and ethnic violence, as well as the total number of deaths of all social conflict events in Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire between 1990 and 2009, based on the SCAD data introduced above.²²⁶

Figure 5-4: Levels of social violence in Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire

Notes: Data from the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) (version 3.0) (Salehyan et al. 2012).

²²⁶ See Chapter 4.3 for a description of the data in general, and these variables in particular.
As shown, the first eruption of violence in Côte d’Ivoire occurred at the beginning of the 1990s, and there was an escalation in both the number of events and the number of deaths in the context of the tumultuous 2000 presidential election. After his militias had forced Gueï out of office, Gbagbo proclaimed himself president, with no intention to repeat the highly questionable election. This prompted the protests of RDR followers – supporting their excluded candidate Ouattara – who then clashed with the security forces and radical FPI followers (Bouquet 2011, 60-1; Collett 2006, 625-7; Woods 2003, 641). After the civil war, ethnic violence has remained a constant feature of Ivoirian politics, culminating in the second ethnic conflict after the 2010 presidential elections.

We have seen above how from the very outset, the FPI used the platform of multi-party democracy to mobilize the people from the country’s southwest, based on a discourse of ethnic injustice. The PDCI soon adopted Gbagbo’s xenophobic propaganda when it saw its electoral fortunes in decline, and portrayed the RDR – its most dangerous rival – as a northern regionalist party with a Muslim agenda. The RDR followed suit, taking up the messages of an anonymous document that was published after Houphouët’s death, called the “Charter of the North”, which demanded, among other things, an ending of “Baoulé nepotism” and the reduction of regional economic inequalities (Crook 1997, 226). Between 1990 and the municipal elections of 1996, all three parties developed a clearly ethnic discourse aimed at an ethnically defined audience.

This pattern has continued over the years and was mirrored in the parties’ campaign strategies for the 2010 elections. According to a high-ranking FPI official and former minister, the party tried to portray Ouattara as the “foreign candidate” whereas Gbagbo was the “candidate of the Ivoirians”. On the other hand, the director of the RDR presidential campaign told me that the party did not make much of an effort in the north – because this is its “natural territory” – but instead focused on mobilizing northern people living in the urban centers of the west.

The recruitment of party members is similarly ethnically based in all three parties, according to the interviewed representatives. Although the FPI has made major advances among the non-Baoulé Akan groups in the country’s east, such as the Agni, the party’s main recruitment “pools” are still the Bété, Guéré, and Dida groups in the southwest. The pattern is even more pronounced in the case of the RDR, according to unofficial membership figures provided to me by a leader of the party. Hence, through ethnically based recruitment patterns, Côte d’Ivoire’s political parties have linked political competition to ethnic identity and thus institutionalized ethno-political cleavages.

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1 Interview 2012-8-17-I. This content of the campaign strategy of the FPI was confirmed by outside observers (interviews 2012-7-27-I, 2012-8-17-II).
2 Interview 2012-7-23.
3 Interviews with political party leaders, 2012-7-23, 2012-8-9-I, 2012-8-9-II.
4 Interview with political party leader, 2012-8-17-I.
5 Interview with political party leader, 2012-8-9-I.
The increasingly consolidated organizational structures of the parties have also facilitated the mobilization of large masses of people making violence more feasible. The erstwhile opposition parties, the FPI and the RDR, played a crucial role in organizing violence in the 1995 and 2000 elections (Crook 1997, 232-5). Moreover, during its stay in power, the FPI systematically targeted its opponents and violently pursued its ethno-political interests in the southwest. McGovern (2011, 95-6, 171-2, 178-94) speaks of a tightly knit network from the upper party hierarchy in Abidjan all the way down to FPI strongmen and their militias in the rural southwest, that was used to orchestrate strategic violence against those perceived as allochthonous, including forcible land expropriation and ethnic cleansing.

Moreover, the party used its historical links to the student movements (especially the Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI)) to establish violent party militias operating in the urban areas, particularly in Abidjan. The FESCI had fought alongside the FPI in the struggle for democratization and was considered a “training place” for future national politicians. In the power struggle from the mid-1990s onwards, it became completely politicized and finally broke up along ethnic lines. During Gbagbo’s presidency, the FESCI served as an instrument to indoctrinate and militarize the Ivorian youth along the lines of the FPI’s ethno-nationalist agenda. At that time, the organization was capable to mobilize tens of thousands of people for any event and was a key instigator of both spontaneous and planned ethnic violence.232

The media have been another very influential force in the country’s violent ethno-political competition. The different outlets – born in the course of democratization – very quickly turned into “instruments of combat”, controlled by individual politicians and/or political parties.233 The newspaper Le Patriote, for example, which published a map of Côte d’Ivoire divided in two almost two years before the conflict broke out (Bouquet 2011, 67), is owned by Hamed Bakayoko, one of the leading figures of the RDR and current minister of the interior in Ouattara’s government, who personally selects the newspaper’s managing director.234 Similar conditions prevail in the FPI’s Notre Voie, according to its own editor-in-chief.235 Although most ordinary Ivorians do not buy or read newspapers, they always read their (sensational) titles at the street booths.236 It is not surprising then that the media have helped exacerbate ethnic divisions and stimulate hatreds with their partisan propaganda, and eventually contributed to the ethnic violence – a point that even media representatives themselves admit today.237

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234 Interview with managing director of Le Patriote, 2012-8-22-I.
235 Interview 2012-8-21.
236 Interviews with journalist, 2012-8-14; and outside observer, 2012-8-17-II. This point was also confirmed by personal observation.
While ethnic mobilization has also existed in Gabon to a certain extent, the generally high degree of trans-ethnic elite cooperation diminishes group competition. The former single party PDG plays a key role in this regard. There are no precise figures available regarding the regional distribution of its members to give an indication of the party’s penetration of each of Gabon’s regions, but the names of the regional advisors of the party’s (and the country’s) president, and those of the members of the regional political bureaus show that these posts are usually composed of “sons of the region”. This is also true for the regions inhabited by ethnic groups with a history of independent mobilization, most importantly the (northern) Fang and the Bapounou. For example, the names we currently find in these positions in the province of Woleu-Ntem are almost all Fang, and those in the provinces of Ngounie and Nyanga are overwhelmingly Bapounou.238

The impact of these “sons of the region” on the ground can hardly be overestimated. One member of the party’s thirteen-member General Secretariat, a Fang from Woleu-Ntem, for example, noted that he is regularly sent to this “region of the opposition”, especially during election times, to make appeals for national unity.239 As a result, the level of social violence in Gabon is relatively low overall, and specifically ethnic violence is almost absent, according to Figure 5-4. However, we do see repeated incidents of electoral violence, most pronouncedly in the succession election of 2009. However, Gabon still experienced less incidents of electoral violence than Côte d’Ivoire over the period from 1990 to 2009 (14 versus 18), according to the SCAD data.

5.2.4. Mobilization and Ethnic Exclusion

The previous paragraphs described how trans-ethnic elite cooperation in Gabon has limited the extent of ethnic mobilization and served as a bulwark to ethnic violence. I argue that this high level of elite cohesion is also the main reason for ethnic inclusion in Gabon, whereas the intense ethno-political competition in Côte d’Ivoire inevitably led to repeated attempts of power monopolization by mobilized ethnic groups, resulting in the political exclusion of rival groups.

The relationship between ethnic party strength and ethnic exclusion is displayed in Figure 5-5. In Côte d’Ivoire, the level of ethnic exclusion increased shortly after the onset of ethnic party mobilization and persisted for a decade. Only the power-sharing Government of National Reconciliation, established after the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords, revived ethnic inclusion. Even

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238 The names are listed in the official agenda of the PDG of 2012.
239 Interview 2012-9-18-I.
in Gabon, ethnic exclusion occurred between 2001 and 2005 as a subgroup of the Myene was shut out from access to state power.240

Figure 5-5: Ethnic party strength and ethnic exclusion in Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire

Notes: Level of ethnic exclusion according to EPR-ETH. Vertical black line in upper graph marks year of ethnic conflict onset in Côte d’Ivoire. See Chapter 3.1 regarding the sources on ethnic party strength.

In the case of Gabon, the PDG as the ruling party is without doubt the central element of the country’s ethno-political equilibrium. But as shown above, trans-ethnic cooperation is also a

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240 EPR-ETH codes the Orungu, a subgroup of the Myene group making up about 1% of the population, as being politically excluded from 2001 to 2005. Before that, there was only one short period of ethnic exclusion, during the more authoritarian second part of Mba’s presidency from about 1963 to 1967 – which, as we have seen above, was also preceded by considerable ethnic mobilization.
characteristic feature of most other organizations in Gabon. Figure 5-6 compares the ethnicization of elite networks with the ethnic composition of the current Gabonese government. The left side reproduces the graphic account of elite networks displayed in Figure 5-3 above. The right side of the figure uses the same color codes to show the ethnic identities of the members of the current government.

Figure 5-6: Elite networks and government composition in Gabon, 2012-2013

Notes: Figures constructed with network graphing techniques from R. Each color symbolizes a different ethnic group: red=Fang; blue=Eshira/Bapounou; green=Mbede; orange=Myene; grey=other group; white=unknown.

The figure reveals the remarkable similarity between Gabonese elite networks in general, and the Gabonese government in particular, with regard to their trans-ethnic make-up. Although it is difficult to assert a unidirectional causal effect of one variable on the other, the comparison suggests a clear, probably mutually reinforcing relationship between the trans-ethnic alliances among Gabonese elites and the level of ethnic inclusion in the sphere of executive state power.

In contrast, the case of Côte d’Ivoire shows an almost direct path from ethnic mobilization to exclusion. When Houphouët-Boigny died in Côte d’Ivoire, his successor Bédié was in a weak political position. Bédié lacked Houphouët’s personal charisma, and while the old trans-ethnic alliances around the former long-time ruler were falling apart, he was also confronted by new, ambitious opposition parties, and was faced to deal with a precarious economic situation. The FPI’s rhetoric appealing to and instrumentalizing growing anti-foreigner and anti-northern sentiments in the south threatened to take away much of Bédié’s support in these regions. Moreover, although he had resigned from the post after Houphouët’s death, Ouattara appeared as a dangerous future rival, and in spite of the party’s non-ethnic beginning, it was clear that the RDR had a great electoral potential in the north.
These two factors pushed Bédié to adopt and appropriate the FPI’s nationalist agenda. Together with a close circle of university intellectuals, he developed the concept of “Ivoirité” (“Ivoirian-ness”) which established new, “scientific” criteria for citizenship based on an Akan – or more specifically, a Baoulé – cultural identity (Bouquet 2011, 26-30, 214; McGovern 2011, 17). Hence, Bédié and his ideologues invented a new vision of who was a “true” Ivoirian – and, by implication, who was not a true Ivoirian. At whom this distinction (or exclusion) was aimed can be seen from the following statement made by a high-ranking PDCI leader in 2012:

We have witnessed the invasion of an ethnic group. (...) You can’t distinguish between an Ivoirian and a Malian Coulibaly. The Malian comes to Côte d’Ivoire and says he is Ivoirian, and the municipality of the RDR in the north gives him the Ivoirian passport. (...) The country is split in two: the Dioula versus the others.241

In practice, the new electoral code introduced in 1994 stipulated that candidates for the Presidency and the National Assembly had to be born in the country, with both parents also being Ivoirians by birth, while foreigners were no longer allowed to vote (Collett 2006, 625; Langer 2005, 33; Woods 2003, 649). In this way, Bédié achieved to block the political aspirations of his most dangerous rival Ouattara – whose precise national origins are somewhat unclear – by barring him from running in the 1995 presidential election242. Moreover, in a major purge of all political institutions, he replaced Ouattara loyalists from the north by Baoulé elites loyal to himself (Crook 1997, 226; Langer 2005, 33, 41; Skogseth 2006, 14).

Yet, besides the ethnic exclusion at the elite level, the concept of Ivoirité also had severe consequences for the ordinary population from the north. Because of the blurry boundaries between “original” Ivoirians from the north, second- or third-generation immigrants from northern neighboring countries and more recent immigrants, and the ethno-linguistic connections between them, northerners had increasingly become equated with foreigners. Being “Dioula”, Muslim, and RDR partisan became completely intermixed in the perception of other Ivoirians (Bouquet 2011, 89-90). As a consequence, with the institutionalization of the concept of Ivoirité, millions of ordinary Ivoirians from the north became excluded from the “national community” and from citizenship (Collett 2006; Langer 2005, 33; Skogseth 2006, 15; Woods 2003, 652).

Both Gueï and Gbagbo continued with the politics of exclusion (Langer 2005, 40-2). Although Gbagbo did form a government of national unity in August 2002, the four ministerial posts (out of 31) for the RDR were clearly too little, too late. Meanwhile, northern civilians – under the general suspicion of being foreigners – increasingly became the victims of systematic harassment

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241 Interview 2012-8-12. Coulibaly is a typical name of the Mandé ethnic macro group, subgroups of which live both in Mali and in Côte d’Ivoire’s north (besides other countries).
242 It has repeatedly been asserted that either Ouattara’s father or his mother was born in Burkina Faso.
by the security forces (IRIN Africa 2005; Langer 2005, 34; McGovern 2011, 91; Skogseth 2006, 17, 23; Woods 2003, 642, 652-4). The violence against northerners became even worse under Gbagbo, culminating in the infamous “Dioula hunts” (pogroms against northerners) (Bouquet 2011, 61-72). It was only logical then that the grievances and the frustration among Ivoirians from the north grew, feeling treated as “second class citizens in their own country” (IRIN Africa 2005), with many of them favoring a radical solution (Bouquet 2011, 100).

In conclusion, institutionalized trans-ethnic elite networks have promoted ethnic inclusion in Gabon. In contrast, a mechanism of radicalization or outbidding led from ethnic mobilization to exclusion in Côte d’Ivoire, in which the forceful ethno-nationalist propaganda of an opposition party pushed a new president without sufficient popular support to adopt and appropriate this exclusionary ethno-nationalist agenda in order to consolidate his shaky political position and exclude potential rivals. The scapegoats in this case were the people from the north who became rhetorically and practically excluded from the Ivoirian nation, from citizenship, and from access to political power.

5.2.5. Ethnic Mobilization, Exclusion, and Ethnic Conflict

In the last part of this section, I discuss how these grievances of the northern population were used by existing ethnic organizations to mobilize people for armed conflict. Hence, in line with the theoretical argument, the mass mobilization function of ethnic organizations turned out to be crucial for the translation of grievances in large-scale ethnic violence.

The rebellion that stood at the beginning of the Ivoirian civil war was carried out mostly by northern soldiers. Subsequently, the rebel group *Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire* (MPCI) emerged, whose leaders, such as Guillaume Soro, a Catholic from the north, claimed to fight against the existing ethnic injustices and for equal rights for the people from the north (Gberie 2004; Langer 2005, 35). After several months of fighting, a cease-fire line was installed which effectively split the country in two. In 2003, the MPCI entered into a strategic alliance with two other rebel movements that had emerged in the country’s west, the MPIGO and MJP, resulting in the umbrella organization *Forces Nouvelles* (New Forces, FN).

The easiness with which the country’s north fell to the rebels and, indeed, the very geography of the split (north versus south) testify to the (at least passive) support of northerners for the rebels’ actions. The conflict encyclopedia of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2013) reports that the MPCI’s original number of 800 fighters increased rapidly through voluntary enlistment by northern youths. Other sources also emphasize the high levels of resentment as the major source of the legitimacy of the MPCI in the north (IRIN Africa 2005; McGovern 2011, 91). As one current RDR parliamentarian and former member of the FN rebel forces expressed to me:
At that time, the rebellion was welcomed since all democratic channels were stalled, and the FPI stuck to the issue of the Ivoirité, of ethnicity, (…), creating fear of the northerners. We couldn’t go on like that. The [university] campuses had become unbearable; the streets had become unbearable; the policemen went too far.²⁴³

Thus, grievances were clearly an important factor providing the necessary popular support for sustained rebellion. At the same time, however, ethnic organizations were critical for military mobilization. As the same RDR parliamentarian stated:

First, I was a member of the FESCI at that time. It’s clear that before the crisis of 2002, there was a severe crisis within the FESCI. There were two tendencies: one which was close to the FPI, and another which could be called the dissidents. That was us, the dissidents. It was clear that we were… I was close to the RDR. (…) [A]nd when the war broke out, we stayed in Bouaké to participate in the best way we could at the time. (…) We created a new civil society organization, of which I was the vice president, in order to promote the adhesion of the population to the causes of the MPCI and the Forces Nouvelles so they could participate in the struggle for democratization. (…) By creating this civil society organization, we [also] wanted to provide another view of the rebellion, because the media were in Abidjan. The others had better access to the media and tended to show the bad side of the rebellion. (…) We organized ourselves to counterbalance the information, (…), to show the true face of the rebellion which did not correspond with the image of atrocities, of crime and violence that they tried to disseminate. And I think if you go to Bouaké, Korhogo, Man, and ask around, you will still find people who will tell you that our civil society organization helped create an objective image of the Forces Nouvelles, of the MPCI, and a bridge between the population and the soldiers. And this helped us get where we are now.²⁴⁴

This account of how the Bouaké section of the FESCI developed into an ally of the rebels reveals above all two things: on the one hand, the close link between political and military mobilization, and on the other hand, the direct participation of ethnic organizations in the set-up of the rebellion. According to these statements, there were two basic functions of ethnic organiza-

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¹ Interview 2012-8-11.  
² Interview 2012-8-11.
tions: the recruitment and indoctrination of fighters, and the creation and maintenance of popular support through political propaganda. This link to the rank and file of the population is the instrumental aspect of the relationship between ethnic organizations and ethnic civil conflict. Above we have already seen how the same organizations helped produce the conditions of intense ethno-political competition and ethnic exclusion necessary for civil war to break out.

In Gabon, limited ethnic mobilization has regularly resulted in incidents of small-scale violence during presidential and parliamentary elections. The most violent of these episodes occurred in the context of Ali Bongo’s hotly contested electoral victory in 2009, which led to popular protests in various cities of the country (Ingueza 2011, 173-4). Already in 1993, after Omar Bongo’s dubious victory in the first democratic presidential election, ethnic animosities led his opponents to systematically identify and attack people from his Haut-Ogooué province based on the license numbers of cars, as one experienced Gabonese journalist remembers.245

However, despite a certain degree of ethnic competition and mobilization, cohesion at the elite level has always been strong enough in Gabon to prevent these tensions from developing into a full-blown civil conflict. The situation during my field research, for example, was generally considered very tense, and one political party leader even noted that the conditions for an insurgency were prevalent.246 The main issue at the time was the opposition’s call for the convocation of a new national conference to reconfigure the institutional set-up of the state and prepare new elections – a demand that divided the whole country, from the elites and the media to the ordinary population.

Among my interviewees, sixteen were in favor of such a conference, and fourteen against it.247 Yet, when examining the ethnic composition of the two camps, we cannot detect any sign of an ethnic schism. Figure 5-7 displays the networks among my interviewees on both sides of the political divide, using the same network graphing techniques as in Figure 5-3 above. We can see that although the Fang are overrepresented among the proponents, there are leaders of all politically relevant ethnic groups in both camps. Hence, even during times of high political confrontation, elite networks in Gabon do not break apart along ethnic lines.248 This ensures that even if no compromise is achieved, all ethnic groups are included in the winning coalition no matter which side gains the upper hand – which prevents ethnic grievances and the onset of large-scale ethnic conflict. Or, in the words of Woods (1994, 479), the “horizontal integration of elites at the national level entail[s] the vertical integration of their respective ethnic communities”.

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245 Interview 2012-9-25.
246 Interview 2012-9-3.
247 Note that two interviews in Gabon were with two individuals each, which raises the number of interviewees from 28 to 30.
248 The same pattern can be observed regarding the issue of immigration which in Côte d’Ivoire constituted a crucial element of the ethno-political confrontation. According to Mboumba Moussavou (2011), xenophobic sentiments among the population are instrumentalized to the same degree and in the same way by the government and the opposition, without a noticeable ethnicization of the issue.
5.3. Conclusion

The analysis of these two cases highlights the causal effect of ethnic and trans-ethnic organizations on outcomes of conflict and peace in unranked ethnic systems, in the way that hypotheses H2a and H3a expected. Concretely, we have found clear evidence of the interest aggregation and propaganda mechanisms increasing ethno-political competition in Côte d’Ivoire. While the recruitment strategies of political parties and other organizations institutionalized the existing ethnic cleavages, the inflammatory propaganda by both parties and newspapers exacerbated divisions and stimulated hatreds. Finally, the ethnic conflict of 2002 showed clear elements of the exclusion-grievances mechanism and of the mobilizational force of ethnic organizations. At the roots of these grievances was the political exclusion of relevant ethnic groups provoked by the spiraling competition between ethnically based parties. This also highlights the causal link from ethnic party mobilization to ethnic exclusion in unranked systems, as stipulated in hypothesis H1a. In contrast, the strong trans-ethnic organizations in Gabon institutionalized political alliances that crossed ethnic boundaries, sustaining trans-ethnic elite cohesion even in the tensest political moments.

The case studies also make clear that the different causal factors mutually reinforce each other. The case of Côte d’Ivoire exposes the vicious cycle of ethnic mobilization that is predicted by the causal path in Figure 2-1 of Chapter 2, and that also became apparent from the quantitative results in 3.3.2. Put simply, mobilization may lead to ethnic conflict which then results in even
more ethnic mobilization. On the eve of the 2010 elections in Côte d’Ivoire, the main parties and other political organizations were still very much organized along ethnic lines (Mark 2010). And again, these actors and their organizational structures would prove crucial for the quick descent into chaos and the onset of the second ethnic conflict within a decade (Bouquet 2011, 169-70; Straus 2011, 482-4). In contrast, it is easy to see from the above account how early trans-ethnic cooperation in Gabon produced a virtuous cycle of limited ethnic mobilization, inclusion, peace, and increased cooperation.

Overall, these case studies clearly highlight the importance of elite cohesion in unranked multi-ethnic societies. While all of these countries are characterized by a certain degree of ethno-political competition, elite alliances transcending ethnic boundaries are crucial to constrain its destructive forces. An elite divided along ethnic lines – with no or little common interests – will usually result in high levels of ethnic mobilization in which – at least, as we have seen, in the African states – ethnic parties are the most powerful actors, able to appropriate and instrumentalize most other social institutions. Ethnic mobilization in turn has led to ethnic exclusion and the outbreak of an ethnic rebellion in Côte d’Ivoire and many other cases that were briefly discussed in previous chapters.

Importantly, the degree of democratization is not the decisive factor in this equation. It is true that the continuing rule of the Bongo clan and the persistence of a dominant party were both stabilizing and anti-democratic forces in Gabon. Yet, the fact that elites in Gabon have closed ranks behind Omar Bongo’s son Ali in the crucial year of 2009, and that the PDG has remained extremely cohesive and a truly multi-ethnic organization can by no means be regarded as an alternative explanation. On the contrary, it is precisely an expression of the high degree of trans-ethnic elite cooperation that characterizes this country, and thus is very much in line with the causal path discussed above. While it is difficult to assess how ethnic competition would have developed in Gabon without a hegemonic party, the evidence presented above suggests that despite the existence of ethnic opposition parties, trans-ethnic elite cooperation in the country is generally high – also outside of the PDG. Meanwhile, the regimes of Henri Konan Bédié, putschist General Guei, and Laurent Gbagbo in Côte d’Ivoire were certainly not more democratic, law-abiding, or respectful towards human rights than the oligarchic system in Gabon. Yet, they were accompanied – and, in fact, begotten – by much more ethnic mobilization; the disastrous consequences of which have been extensively discussed above.

Nevertheless, despite all the similarities, there are two additional issues which might have played a role for the different outcomes in the two cases. On the one hand, although both countries suffered from financial crises due to the fall in commodity prices during the 1980s, the situation was certainly worse in Côte d’Ivoire, which by 1987 was almost bankrupt (Skogseth 2006, 13). What would have happened to Bongo’s well-balanced clientelistic system and to Gabon’s trans-ethnic elite networks in general, had the financial situation been as dra-
matic as in Côte d’Ivoire? While the case study cannot definitively resolve this counterfactual question, it is important to note that the difference in the reach of elite networks between the two countries can be traced back to the period before the financial crises. Hence, the causal chain leading to ethnic conflict in Côte d’Ivoire was already well under way at the moment of the external shock.

On the other hand, differences in country and population size might also matter. It seems plausible that for the small Gabonese political elite – a consequence of the country’s small population – cooperation across ethnic boundaries was easier to achieve.249 It is noteworthy that Wimmer’s (2002) account of the dense trans-ethnic networks in 19th century Switzerland – giving birth to a trans-ethnic nationalism – also applies to a small country. Hence, ethnically bridging elite networks and trans-ethnic alliances might be found more frequently in small countries overall. While the totality of the geographic, economic, and politico-historical forces producing conflict or peace can never be completely disentangled, by reconstructing a clearly specified causal chain, this comparative case study has shown how the reach and nature of elite networks influence patterns of collective action, peace, and violence in unranked multi-ethnic societies.

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Ndombet (2009) writes that in the first decade after independence, Gabon hardly had enough educated leaders to staff the state apparatus.

This last quantitative chapter will examine more closely the patterns and consequences of ethnic mobilization in ranked ethnic systems, focusing on the only world region that is almost completely composed of such societies: Latin America. As we have seen in Chapter 1.3, the region’s history as the hotbed of European colonialism has led to societies that are unique in their racial diversity. Hence, if we want to zoom in on one region to analyze patterns of ethnic mobilization in ranked societies in more depth, Latin America is certainly the most appropriate target.

Again, the regional focus allows me to refine my operationalization of ethnic mobilization, including organizations within the politically oriented civil society. This is particularly important in ranked ethnic systems since, as we have seen in Chapter 3.2, ethnic party mobilization is quite infrequent in these countries. It also provides me with the opportunity to examine the effect of ethnic mobilization on other dependent variables that capture my basic concepts of ethnic equality and peace or conflict in a more nuanced way. Finally, in the case of Latin America, the regional analysis also allows me to extend the sample period back to 1946 due to the longer history of multi-party democracy in the region.

The chapter starts with a short introductory section on the particular history of ethnic mobilization in Latin America. The standard literature on ethnic politics has long described the region as a peculiar exception to the global pattern, in which ethnicity did not seem to become politicized (Gurr et al. 1993; Horowitz 1985; Young 1976). However, the region-wide wave of ethnic mobilization by both indigenous and African-descendant groups has changed this impression dramatically in the last decades (Hooker 2005; Madrid 2012; Stavenhagen 1992; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005). The subsequent section presents empirical evidence that this ethnic mobilization increases the chances of historically marginalized groups to achieve political empowerment, leading to more ethnic equality in Latin America’s ranked societies. The final section shows that while such mobilization is not linked to civil violence or other political-institutional crises in the region, it does increase the level of peaceful protest of ethnic groups.

6.1. Ethnic Politics in Latin America: A Short Introduction

As the result of the colonial conquest, Latin America’s societies are characterized by extreme ethnic inequalities based on historical patterns of racial dominance and subordination. Colonization created the kind of race-based system of ethno-classes typical for these early settler colonies, and for ranked ethnic systems in general. Wagley (1994, 20-5) argues that different sys-

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250 Notable exceptions are Cleary (2000), and Wimmer (2002) who have addressed issues of ethnic exclusion and protest in Latin America.
tems of racial hierarchization evolved in different sub-regions, relying on different criteria for exclusion. While in Brazil and the Caribbean the presence of a significant black population segment made skin color the decisive criterion, in Mexico, Guatemala, and the Andes with their large indigenous populations socio-cultural characteristics and language were more important. However, as other scholars have reminded us, skin color also has also played a decisive role in this latter type of Latin American societies (Edmonds-Poli and Shirk 2012, 19; Pitt-Rivers 1994, 73).

Whatever the precise patterns of boundary-drawing, the subjugated indigenous groups and the imported African slaves (and their free or enslaved descendants) remained politically, economically, and culturally marginalized after the colonies’ independence (Stavenhagen 1992; Wade 2010). Exclusionary citizenship regimes – such as the racially biased property and literacy requirements in Ecuador until 1979 (Becker 2011, 46-8) – effectively disenfranchised these groups by limiting the nation to a racially defined community (cp. Mann 2005). Although the discriminating electoral laws of the past have now given way to a formal system of universal political rights, the extremely unequal distribution of economic and social resources still systemically disadvantages indigenous and African-descendant groups in the political arena, even in countries where they compose a demographic majority (Enloe 1978; Madrid 2005, 2012).

Since the 1970s, however, these groups have embarked on a sustained process of collective mobilization. Ethnic organizations in all countries have advanced explicit ethnic demands for equal participation at the level of the central state, land rights, the right to bilingual/cultural education, and often also for self-determination in specific territories (Lucero 2008; Madrid 2012; Sieder 2002; Stavenhagen 1992; Van Cott 2000, 2007; Yashar 2005). The latter has become particularly critical in the context of indigenous and African-descendant communities’ resistance against potentially harmful economic activities, like mining and hydroelectric projects, which in recent years has come to form the centerpiece of ethnic mobilization in Latin America (Healey 2009; Sawyer and Gomez 2012b; Wade 2010, 127-8).

Whereas earlier instances of indigenous and peasant mobilization often took place within the framework of a leftist class struggle, it has taken a decidedly ethnic turn in the past decades (cp. Yashar 2005). The political pressures created in the process have brought the ethnic question back to center stage in a region where it had long seemed conspicuously absent (cp. e.g. Gurr et al. 1993; Horowitz 1985; Young 1976). While the political struggle of indigenous groups figures more prominently in the academic literature, African-descendant minorities have also achieved remarkable levels of group mobilization in several countries from Honduras to Ecuador (Anderson 2007; Antón Sánchez 2011; Harpelle 1993; Hooker 2005; Paschel and Sawyer 2008; Priestley and Barrow 2008; Van Cott 2000; Vilas 1989).
As mentioned above, there is a large body of literature discussing the relationship between the two concepts of race and ethnicity, especially in the context of Latin America. The latter is sometimes equated with more “superficial” identity features such as culture, dress, language, etc., and used particularly with respect to indigenous people (cp. e.g. Harris 1995; Tilley 2005, 50-9; van den Berghe 1974), while race has been seen in the past as possessing a more fundamental biological anchor and has been conceptually linked to African-descendant identity (Hale 2006, 28-30; Wade 2010, 8-23; Wimmer 2013, 8). But as explained in Chapter 1.1, my study treats race as a subtype of ethnicity. Hence, when speaking of ethnic mobilization in Latin America, I do not imply that these movements privilege cultural identities over racial ones.

To be sure, ethnicity has never been absent from Latin American politics – quite the opposite: it has been used as a determinant for access to political power and public goods distribution. In this sense, Latin America’s state bureaucracies have always been ethnicized (cp. Enloe 1978). However, ethnic mobilization as defined in this study is a rather new phenomenon in the region. It first developed in the realm of civil society, via powerful civic movements. More recently, indigenous ethnic parties have successfully participated in electoral politics. In many cases, mature indigenous movements were crucial for the creation of viable ethnic parties (Van Cott 2005).

Figure 6-1 illustrates this development clearly. The upper part shows the emergence and rise of ethnic mobilization within the realm of civil society, based on a density indicator of ethnic organizations that will be described in more detail in the next section. In the lower part, it displays the electoral strength of ethnic parties in Latin America over time. Both graphs show the average values of the two indicators for all countries by year, between 1946 and 2009. The electoral mobilization graph additionally plots the highest country value observed in the region by year. First of all, we can see that ethnic mobilization within electoral politics is a very recent phenomenon in the region, succeeding civil society mobilization, and impelled to a great extent by the success of Evo Morales’ Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia.

Secondly, we can also discern that the picture projected by the ethnic civil society density indicator regarding the temporal development of ethnic mobilization corresponds very much to the information we have from the qualitative literature (Stavenhagen 1992; Van Cott 2007; Yashar 2005). Ethnic mobilization in Latin America really gained strength in the 1970s, while a second major leap occurred in the 1990s, around the time of the United Nation’s launch of an “International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People”. Interestingly, there is a visible drop in the last decade – precisely when the mobilization in electoral politics took off. This points at a possible substitute effect in which the increased electoral participation of historically oppressed groups makes social movement politics less relevant. However, it might also a reflection of how the

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* A good overview is provided in Wade (2010).
engagement in party politics has weakened civil society mobilization, as some scholars have argued (see e.g. Mijeski and Beck 2011).

Figure 6.1: The rise of ethnic mobilization in Latin America

Notes: Solid lines denote average values for all countries by year in both graphs. Dashed line in lower graph denotes highest country value of ethnic party strength observed in the region by year. Ethnic civil society strength measured as “density” of ethnic organizations, i.e. number of organizations relative to country population. See next section for a more detailed description of the indicator. See Chapter 3.1 for sources of ethnic parties’ vote share.

Figure 6.2 shows under what political conditions ethnic groups in Latin America started to mobilize, by counting the number of mobilization “onsets” of groups – both within civil society and in electoral politics – by power status category, as specified in the EPR-ETH dataset. We can see that the initiation of ethnic mobilization has almost never occurred under conditions of existing empowerment. There is only one instance of ethnic party formation (by the indigenous
peoples in Venezuela in 2000) and one mobilization “onset” in the realm of civil society (by the Kuna group in Panama in 1946) under regimes of regional autonomy, and none under conditions of national inclusion. This is important to keep in mind once we turn to the analysis of the consequences of this ethnic mobilization on empowerment as the temporal sequence of the two variables reduces the possibility of reverse causality.252

Figure 6-2: Political conditions of ethnic mobilization in Latin America

Notes: Bars denote number of instances in which an indigenous or African-descendant group initiated ethnic mobilization within civil society and electoral politics, respectively. Mobilization onset within civil society operationalized here as founding year of first ethnic organization. See next section for sources of ethnic civil society data. Party formation operationalized as first participation of an ethnic party in national-level election.

The success of this ethnic mobilization has been unevenly distributed across the different states of the region. Various authors have emphasized the political benefits of mobilization in terms of collective rights (Anderson 2007; Becker 2011, 57-9, 142-6; Hooker 2005; Sieder 2002; Van Cott 2000), access to land and (bilingual) education (Lucero 2008; Madrid 2012, 176; Pallares 2007; Van Cott 2000; Yashar 2005), recognition of indigenous languages (Becker 2011, 146-9; Van Cott 2000), and control of local spaces of political power (Anderson 2007; Hooker 2005; Lucero 2008; Madrid 2012, 176-7; Ospina, Santillana, and Arboleda 2008; Van Cott 2001). However, there is no systematic empirical evidence so far for a causal link between the strength of ethnic mobilization of indigenous and African-descendant groups and their political achievements. The next section of this chapter analyzes this question with quantitative methods.

252 I will come back to the issues of endogeneity and reverse causality in the group-level analyses below.
Section 6.3 then addresses the issue of the consequences of this ethnic mobilization on the level of conflict and political stability in the region. In the previous chapters of this study, we have seen that in unranked systems ethnic parties are connected to higher levels of social violence and, especially under conditions of ethnic exclusion, also to a higher risk of ethnic civil conflict. These results confirm the claims of a large part of the literature on ethnic politics which has emphasized the destructive potential of ethnic parties (Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2006; Rothchild 2004).

They also seem to justify the more recent critical voices from Latin America which have warned against the dangers of the region’s current ethnic movements. Radu (2005), for example, called Andean indigenous movements “storm troopers”, pursuing an openly racist agenda and provoking democratic breakdown and conflict. Likewise, Peruvian writer and Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa claimed that indigenous movements would sooner or later drag the region to barbarism (Olmos 2003). Sometimes such images are evoked intentionally by the traditional elite to delegitimize the ethnic mobilization of historically marginalized groups, as when opponents to Guatemala’s constitutional referendum in 1999 (that contained various stipulations favorable to the indigenous population) sparked fears of a “balkanization” of the country (Jonas 2000, 196-7). Yet, the results of section 6.3 show clearly that there is no systematic link from ethnic mobilization to any kind of civil conflict or institutional instability in Latin America.

Finally, while the factors obstructing mobilization success are also analyzed in the quantitative framework, they will come to the fore much more clearly in the case studies of Guatemala and Ecuador in the next chapter.

6.2. Ethnic Mobilization, Empowerment, and Ethnic Equality

What is the effect of the political mobilization of historically marginalized groups in Latin America on ethnic equality? The present section analyzes this question in a quantitative framework. As we have seen above, ethnic relations in Latin America are characterized by the historical dominance of an elite of European origin while indigenous and African-descendant groups have long been held off from any meaningful level of political power. This is typical for ranked ethnic systems in general. Moreover, while ethnicity has been used as a tool of oppression in the hands of these elites, only the historically oppressed groups have engaged in ethnically based political mobilization.

However, none of these groups has ever achieved more than an equal participation at the level of the central state. In Ecuador, various indigenous leaders have formed part of the government since the 1990s but indigenous political protagonism was much greater at the regional and local levels (Becker 2011; Gerlach 2003). And not even in Bolivia under its new Aymara president Evo Morales are there any signs of a marginalization of the white and mestizo political elite.
Thus, ethnic mobilization cannot be seen as a root of ethnic dominance (or, for that matter, of less pronounced forms of ethnic inequality) in Latin America – at least not up to the present.

But does the ethnic mobilization of indigenous and African-descendant groups have the reverse effect of enhancing ethnic equality in the region? If groups that have been excluded from access to political power for centuries attain some say in the political sphere of their countries, we could certainly speak of a more equal society. Hypothesis H1b expects the political mobilization of these groups to increase their chances of empowerment. In the following, I test this assumption empirically. After introducing the additional data used in these analyses, the main part of this section examines the connection between ethnic mobilization strength and political empowerment at the group level. I then discuss some more detailed questions about this relationship – such as the development of this effect over time –, before turning to an analysis of de-iure empowerment at the national level.

**Additional Data for the Latin American Analyses**

As in Chapter 3.3.1 above, I look at political power at both the national and the sub-state level. The sample for my statistical analyses includes all Latin American countries apart from the Caribbean Island states. There are a total of 1088 country years between 1946 and 2009. At the group level, I focus on the historically oppressed indigenous and African-descendant groups since they alone have been ethno-politically mobilized while the European(-descendant) groups who have historically controlled state power (Enloe 1978; Wimmer 1997) constitute the target of this mobilization. This leaves us with 2240 group years within the same time period.

Again, ethnic party strength could not be measured in country years without an existing parliament previously elected through multi-party election. Hence, the variable exhibits various missing observations. Because the vast majority of country years are characterized by no ethnic party mobilization at all while a few exhibit very high values of ethnic party strength, I mainly rely on a dummy version of ethnic party mobilization in the following country-level analyses.

In addition, I collected data on the strength of ethnic civil society mobilization in Latin America. They cover all of the above mentioned states from 1946 to 2009, and include a large number of ethnic civil society organizations in each of these countries along with information about the ethnic group(s) an organization represents and its founding year. Because unlike in Sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic claims are usually not outlawed in Latin America, it was possible to identify civil society organizations whose explicit purpose is to promote the political interests of

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253 This includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The former British colony Guyana is excluded from the analysis because it does not fall into my category of ranked ethnic systems, dominated by a European(-descendant) group, as we have seen in Chapter 1.3. Belize is not included in EPR-ETH due to its small size. French Guiana, on the other hand, continues to be a French overseas region.
specific ethnic groups, based on several cross-sectional sources. To the author’s knowledge, this is the first cross-sectional time-series data on ethnic civil society in Latin America.

At the country level, the indicator has the same form as the African civil society indicators. It counts the number of organizations in each country year based on their founding years. By putting this number in relation to the country’s population, we get an ethnic civil society density variable indicating the number of organizations per million people. At the group level, the indicator counts all organizations representing a given ethnic group in each group year and puts this number in relation to the absolute population size of the respective group.

But again, a higher number of ethnic organizations by itself may just reflect a more active civil society in general. Hence, in order to identify the specific effect of ethnic civil society organizations, it is also necessary to control for the general strength of a country’s civil society in my models. For this purpose, I relied on data from the Yearbooks of International Organizations (YIO) to construct an analogous indicator of NGO density which should be able to proxy the strength of civil society across different countries over time. However, since the YIO accounts start in 1960, the indicator only covers the period from 1960 to 2009.

The political impact of ethnic civil society organizations should be less direct than that of ethnic political parties. Through their direct connections to political power and possibly to state resources, the latter often have an immediate effect on the course of politics. In contrast, civil society organizations usually require considerable time to build up political strength and even more to gain influence in the spheres of power (Belloni 2008; Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Hooghe and Stolle 2003; Posner 2004a). Moreover, depending on their resources and other characteristics, some of them have a constant presence in politics while others are more latent vehicles of collective action (Gyimah-Boadi 1996; Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Hooghe and Stolle 2003). Hence, in the case of ethnic mobilization within civil society, we would expect the cumulative long-term effect to be more important than its impact in the short run.

To account for this long-term effect, I additionally use a cumulative version of the density indicator, analogous to the one used in the African analyses, which adds to each country-year value.

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254 As in the case of the African civil society indicators, counting all existing ethnic civil society organizations in the region is simply impossible. Therefore, ensuring the representativeness of the sample was a crucial issue. In order to avoid systematic biases in the covering of the different countries, I relied on several and cross-sectional sources. These include the MAR dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009); the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples (Minority Rights Group International 2007); Van Cott (2005); Yashar (2005); the EPR-ETH dataset; the Georgetown University’s Political Database of the Americas, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Misc/Groups/groups.html (accessed August 20, 2013); and the Civil Society Registry of the Organization of American States (OAS), http://www.oas.org/en/ser/dia/civil_society/registry.shtml (accessed August 20, 2013). As we have seen in the previous section, there is good reason to believe this comprehensive sample to appropriately reflect the empirical reality and therefore to attribute high empirical validity to this indicator.

255 Note that an ethnic organization may also represent two groups simultaneously. In this case, the organization was attributed to both groups. Absolute group sizes were calculated based on total country population sizes and relative group sizes from EPR-ETH.

256 See e.g. Forbis (2008, 2, 34) who shows that this density measure correlates very strongly with World Values Survey data on micro-level civil society engagement, and is also able to capture temporal changes in civil society strength due to political changes.
the cumulated values of all previous years. Instead of just looking at the value of one particular year (and testing the link between that value and the dependent variable), this indicator reflects the complete history of mobilization. It is thus better able to capture this long-term effect of ethnic civil society in which political strength is built up slowly over time. In addition, I also use a mobilization duration variable counting the number of consecutive years that groups have been mobilizing already. Both variables are available at the country and the group level.

Finally, hypothesis H3b asserts that intra-ethnic fragmentation of groups along religious and/or linguistic lines decreases their chances of political empowerment. To measure this fragmentation, I draw on Bormann’s new EPR-Cleavages dataset introduced in Chapter 1.3 and Appendix I. As explained before, the dataset reports up to three different linguistic and religious sub-segments for each ethnic group, and their relative sizes. The number of different linguistic and religious sub-segments plus their respective sizes can be used to calculate each group’s linguistic and religious fractionalization, respectively. I use the mean value of linguistic and religious fractionalization as a measure of the overall internal fragmentation of an ethnic group.

**Mobilization and the Political Empowerment of Marginalized Groups**

The analysis starts at the group level in order to examine the impact of ethnic mobilization on ethnic equality in Latin America. The first four empirical models test whether the former increases the chances of historically discriminated groups of achieving and maintaining political empowerment. Thus, Models 6.1 to 6.4 are analogous to Model 3.7 used in the global analysis of ranked systems in Chapter 3.3.1, with the same empowerment dummy variable as dependent variable, indicating whether the group is either included in the central government or enjoys regional autonomy, as reported in EPR-ETH. The sample includes all group years of politically relevant indigenous and African-descendant groups from 1946 to 2009. About 17% of them were characterized by empowerment according to my operationalization.

Compared to the global analysis of Chapter 3.3.1, three additional explanatory variables are included in these models: the civil society mobilization variable, an “indigenous dummy” denot-

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- See Chapter 4.1 for a more precise description and theoretical justification of this indicator.
- Technically, this is a count of previous country years with a number of ethnic civil society organizations above 0.
- For instance, if an ethnic group is reported to consist of two different linguistic sub-segments, both of them with a relative size of 0.5, this means that approximately half of all members of this group speak one language, and the other half another language.
- I used the common fractionalization formula that in this case indicates the likelihood that two randomly chosen people are from different linguistic or religious sub-segments (cp. e.g. Posner 2004b, 849).
- See Appendix VI for summary statistics of all independent variables – both at the country and the group level – used in this chapter.
- The unit of analysis is again the group year, and the standard errors are clustered on the countries in order to control for unobserved factors at the state level. Due to the missing observations in the ethnic party variable in undemocratic countries, and because some groups only become politically relevant at later points of the time period, the number of observations drops to 1258.
ing whether an ethnic group is of indigenous (as opposed to African-descendant) origin, and the GDP per capita variable because, as we will see, it has a positive impact on ethnic equality. In contrast, the conflict history of groups is dropped from the analysis because no subordinated group with a previous involvement in ethnic conflict has ever achieved political empowerment. We can interpret this result in the sense that previous ethnic conflicts are associated with a higher degree of ethnic repression in Latin America, thereby inhibiting empowerment. We will come back to this issue in the case study of Guatemala. Since Models 6.1 to 6.4 are empowerment “incidence” models, as usual I include a lagged version of my dependent variable to reduce problems of endogeneity. Table 6-1 summarizes the results.

Model 6.1 shows that political mobilization of historically marginalized groups yields fruits. Both the ethnic party dummy variable and the ethnic civil society indicator have a significant positive effect on the probability of these groups’ political empowerment. Ethnic parties seem to be particularly important for their political fate. The variable is not only highly significant ($p=0.002$) but also very strong in substantial terms. Holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode, previously un-empowered groups have a 10% higher probability of achieving either political inclusion at the level of the central state or some sort of regional autonomy or sub-state power if they are politically represented by their own ethnic party. In contrast, the lagged version of the civil society indicator used in Model 6.1 is only weakly significant. This confirms that electoral mobilization usually has a more immediate impact on the political system than civil society activism which requires more time to build up political strength.

However, this model has not yet accounted for the general strength of countries’ civil society. Thus, Model 6.2 adds the NGO density indicator based on the YIO data. The results summarized in the third column of the table show that the effect of electoral mobilization becomes even stronger in this model while that of ethnic civil society mobilization remains stable. Hence, we can conclude that this effect is a particular ethnic mobilization effect rather than the consequence of a strong civil society in general.

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Note that since these data are only available from 1960 on, the sample size is reduced to 1155 observations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empowerment dummy variable</th>
<th>Political power status</th>
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<tr>
<td>Model 6.1</td>
<td>Model 6.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Empowerment (lagged)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.41)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(.82)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic civil society</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>strength (lagged)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic civil society</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>strength (cumulative)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilization years</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall strength of civil</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group size</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.54)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity index (lagged)</td>
<td>.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (lagged,</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>logged)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Calendar year</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indigenous group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(34.54)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In contrast, the effect of the NGO density indicator is not significantly different from zero. Thus, the presence of a well-organized civil society in general does not necessarily promote ethnic equality in ranked societies. Following the arguments outlined in Chapter 2, this cannot come as a surprise. The arena of civil society usually reflects the same power structures and cleavages that characterize the political arena (cp. e.g. Diamond 2000, 200; Rueschemeyer 2004). This means that the ethnic hierarchies that are at the roots of ranked societies are reproduced both within the traditional political parties and the existing civil society organizations. Under these circumstances, it becomes particularly important for these groups to form their own organizations which explicitly advocate their interests (cp. Edwards 2004, 80-2; Rueschemeyer 2004, 86-7).

Although the sign of the coefficient points in the expected direction, my measure of groups’ internal fragmentation is not statistically significant in these models. Nor does group size seem to have an influence on the probability of empowerment. The latter result is certainly due to the broad definition of the term used here, including political power at the sub-state level (necessary because of the very few instances of real inclusion). Hence, small marginalized groups are as likely as large ones to become politically empowered in this sense of the term. The regional autonomy regimes enacted in Panama, Colombia and Venezuela favoring very small indigenous groups, illustrate this observation (González 2010; Van Cott 2000, 2001).

Overall, indigenous groups are slightly more likely than African-descendant communities to attain political empowerment, even controlling for other relevant factors, such as mobilization level, size, and internal fragmentation. This supports the claims of existing qualitative studies...
on the topic (see esp. Hooker 2005). Finally, richer and more democratic countries seem to be more likely to grant inclusion or autonomy to historically marginalized groups in Latin America. In the case of the former, the result may be due to these countries’ greater material resources, which they are able to distribute. In contrast, the effect of democracy is more remarkable given the findings of Chapter 3.2, which revealed that democratic institutions do not necessarily and automatically promote ethnic equality in ranked societies, and that a positive influence can only be plausibly assumed from the early 1990s on. In Appendix VI, I analyze this issue in more detail. I find that in Latin America, a positive influence of formal democracy on ethnic equality set in about a decade earlier than in the global set of ranked ethnic systems.

Table 6-2 summarizes the successful cases of ethnic empowerment in Latin America in chronological order, confirming many of the previous observations. Among the eleven groups that have reached empowerment during my sample period, we only find one African-descendant group (Afro-Brazilians in 2003). This is also one of only two cases of political inclusion at the level of the central state. In almost all instances, political empowerment has been limited to the sub-state level, through regimes of regional autonomy – as in Panama and Colombia – or decentralization programs that brought power and (financial) resources to indigenously dominated departments and/or municipalities, as in Bolivia and Peru (Van Cott 2000). In the case of Bolivia, this local empowerment served as a springboard for the electoral triumph of the indigenously dominated MAS party in the national elections of 2005 which finally led to the political inclusion of the country’s indigenous highland groups in the central government (Lucero 2008; Van Cott 2005). Because local empowerment occurred prior to it, this second case of national-level inclusion is not recorded separately in the table.

We can also see that in almost half of the cases for which the variable could be observed, ethnic parties were present prior to the empowerment of historically marginalized groups. Apart from the aforementioned MAS in Bolivia, Ecuador’s Pachakutik movement is the most notorious (Becker 2011; Lucero 2008; Mijeski and Beck 2011; Van Cott 2005).

In contrast, the impact of civil society organizations on the political system is usually less direct which should make their effect on empowerment less immediate. This notion seems to be confirmed by the last column of the table which counts the number of years of mobilization within the realm of civil society that preceded empowerment in these successful cases. While all of these groups have a history of more than ten years of mobilization, the average duration before achieving empowerment is somewhat higher for those with no ethnic party (37.2 years versus 31.2 years). Hence, by connecting ethnic organizations to the political system traditionally dom-
inated by European-descendant groups, ethnic parties seem to bolster up the work of non-electoral ethnic organizations, and perhaps even multiply their political impact.

Table 6-2: Successful cases of ethnic empowerment in Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type of Empowerment</th>
<th>Ethnic party</th>
<th>Years of civil society mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Quechua</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Autonomy/sub-state power</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Aymara</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Autonomy/sub-state power</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples of the Amazon</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Autonomy/sub-state power</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Choco (Embera-Wounan)</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Autonomy/sub-state power</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Autonomy/sub-state power</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Quechua</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Autonomy/sub-state power</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Aymara</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Autonomy/sub-state power</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Ngobe-Bugle</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Autonomy/sub-state power</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Autonomy/sub-state power</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Autonomy/sub-state power</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Quechua</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Autonomy/sub-state power</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Aymara</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Autonomy/sub-state power</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples of the Amazon</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Autonomy/sub-state power</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Afro-Brazilians</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Only the first instance of empowerment for each group is recorded here. Hence, indigenous inclusion into the Bolivian government after Evo Morales’ election victory in 2005 is not listed separately. Empowerment coding according to the EPR-ETH dataset. Years of civil society mobilization based on author’s own dataset. “Ethnic party” refers to the year before empowerment occurred. See Chapter 3.1 for data sources on this variable.

To examine the factor of mobilization time and duration more closely, Model 6.3 in Table 6-1 relies on the count variable for years of mobilization described earlier in this section. The indicator is used in a quadratic form, taking into account that the effect of mobilization duration might be curvilinear. The two duration terms are jointly highly significant \( (p<0.001) \), indicating that the chances of political empowerment indeed increase with ongoing mobilization time. Furthermore, in this model as well, the presence of an ethnic party is a highly significant predictor of mobilization success. Indeed, looking at the necessary time span confirms that ethnic parties also make civil society mobilization more effective. Figure 6-3 shows the predicted probabilities of empowerment as a function of mobilization years under conditions of an existing ethnic party and without ethnic party. We can see that in the former case, the chances increase considerably after about fifteen years. Without ethnic party, it takes about twice as much time for civil society mobilization to have a noticeable effect. The only remarkable differ-
ence of this time Model 6.3 to the previous models is the effect of the indigenous dummy variable which turns out insignificant.

Figure 6-3: Effect of mobilization time on ethnic empowerment in Latin America

![Figure 6-3](image)

Notes: Based on Model 6.3 of Table 6-1. Predicted probabilities of political empowerment, conditional on duration of civil society mobilization and existence of ethnic party.

While the time variable used here counts all years with any, even the smallest, degree of ethnic civil society mobilization, it omits the question of how strong this mobilization is over the years. Thus, to refine the analysis further, one needs to combine the dimensions of mobilization strength (as in Models 6.1 and 6.2) and duration (Model 6.3). To this end, Model 6.4 of Table 6-1 introduces the cumulative version of the ethnic civil society density indicator which adds to each country-year value the cumulated values of all previous years in the country.

The results in the fifth column of Table 6-1 confirm that the variable is more closely associated with the probability of political empowerment than the simple one-year lag of Models 6.1 and 6.2. In substantial terms, the effect is quite impressive. Moving from the median to the maximum value of cumulative ethnic civil society strength in this sample increases the chances of empowerment by more than 8% without the simultaneous presence of an ethnic party, and more than 36% in the case of simultaneous electoral mobilization (holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode). Although these results suggest that ethnic parties are more critical for successful ethnic mobilization, in reality there are still very few examples of powerful
ethnic parties in the region. Hence, the finding of a positive effect of non-electoral ethnic mobilization on empowerment is of at least equal practical relevance.266

What can we conclude from these analyses about the causal effect of ethnic organizations? The global analyses of Chapter 3.3.1 have already addressed the issue of reverse causality, in this case the possibility that the empowerment of historically marginalized groups stimulates their political mobilization. The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable of empowerment in the statistical models is only a minimal precaution against this possibility. However, there is additional evidence that speaks against reverse causality in this case. First, according to Figure 6-2 in the foregoing section, there is only one instance of ethnic party formation and one mobilization “onset” in the realm of civil society under regimes of regional autonomy, and none under conditions of national inclusion. If we run Models 6.1 and 6.2 of Table 6-1 again without these two groups, the effects of both the ethnic party and ethnic civil society variables become stronger and more significant. This clearly speaks against a case of reverse causality. If mobilization is always initiated before empowerment, the latter cannot cause the former.

However, this still leaves open the possibility of a “spiraling” effect in which empowerment, once achieved, leads to higher levels of mobilization which in turn helps to maintain empowerment causing further mobilization. Thus, the significant effect of ethnic mobilization could also be a statistical artifact of the ongoing correlation of empowerment and high levels of mobilization within single cases over time. But in this case, we would expect to see a systematic correlation in the opposite direction as well, i.e. a significant positive effect of empowerment on ethnic civil society mobilization.267 However, this is not the case. If we estimate the effect of the lagged empowerment variable on the ethnic civil society indicator in a regression model, the coefficient turns out negative and far from statistically significant.268 This is further evidence against the case of reverse causality and supports the notion that ethnic organizations indeed have an independent causal effect on the chances of empowerment for historically marginalized groups in Latin America.

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266 Note that all results from these four models are completely robust to logistic regressions for rare-events data, and to a two-dimensional clustering of the standard errors on both the countries and the ethnic groups. Finally, I also tested an "historical average" version of the ethnic civil society density indicator (instead of the cumulative version) which records for each country year the mean value of ethnic civil society strength of all foregoing years. All results remained essentially the same.

267 Note that in my statistical models, this possibility of a spiraling effect applies in particular to ethnic civil society mobilization since ethnic party mobilization is measured with a simple dummy variable that cannot increase beyond the single value of 1.

268 Since the values of the ethnic civil society density indicator cannot go below zero, I employed a tobit regression model with a lower limit of 0. The explanatory variables were the same as in the models of Table 6-1, including a lagged dependent variable. Besides the lagged empowerment dummy variable, I also tested the effect of the lagged ordinal variable of group statuses from EPR-ETH. The coefficients of both variables are negative and not significantly different from 0. Hence, political empowerment does not promote further ethnic mobilization.

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Additional Group-Level Analyses

The example of Bolivia mentioned above, in which the political inclusion of the Aymara and Quechua groups at the center was preceded by local and regional gains, suggests that the process of empowerment might often follow a stepwise course. Similarly, the political situation of Ecuador’s indigenous people also improved incrementally from discrimination to the capture of significant political power at the local and regional levels, as we will see in the next chapter. Measuring empowerment with a simple dummy variable might not do justice to this gradual process. Hence, Model 6.5 in Table 6-1 uses an ordinal scale from discrimination to inclusion as an alternative dependent variable. To estimate the effect of ethnic mobilization on group status, I employ an ordered logit regression model with a lagged dependent variable.

The results of Model 6.5 in Table 6-1 confirm that the presence of an ethnic party is the strongest guarantor of political advancement for historically subordinated groups in Latin America. But political mobilization in the non-electoral sphere is important, too. The two duration terms are jointly highly significant ($p<0.01$). Hence, the longer this mobilization lasts, the greater the political advancement of the mobilizing groups. Interestingly, the effect of the internal fragmentation variable is now statistically significant. Thus, once we “unpack” the empowerment indicator and look more closely at the gradual process of political advancement, intra-ethnic cleavages along linguistic and/or religious lines seem to play a greater role.

Figure 6-4 illustrates the effect of internal fragmentation on each of the four different power statuses separately, by graphing the predicted probability of groups to be in a particular category as a function of their internal fragmentation (while holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode). We see that the predicted probability of being discriminated increases more than twofold when moving from the lowest to the highest fragmentation value in our sample, whereas that of achieving sub-state power simultaneously decreases more than three times. In contrast, the effect on inclusion is negligibly small. Interestingly, in the case of the “powerless” category, we observe a curvilinear effect of linguistic and religious fractionalization with the highest predicted probability of being in this category measured at a fractionalization value of 0.58 (about the 80th percentile of the variable).

See Figure A 8 in Appendix VI regarding the distribution of the variable within my sample.
In sum, this last model reveals that internal fragmentation plays a role for historically oppressed peoples’ chances of empowerment, as stipulated in hypothesis H3b – although in a more nuanced way than expected. There is no linear effect of the variable on the likelihood of empowerment but instead a distinct influence on each of the gradual steps from discrimination towards autonomy or inclusion.²⁷⁰

²⁷⁰ Note that these patterns become more pronounced once we focus exclusively on indigenous groups (excluding African-descendant communities from the analysis). While the effect on discrimination and regional autonomy become even stronger, its curvilinear nature in the case of the “powerless” category becomes also more pronounced (results not reported here). This supports the notion that the ethno-political mobilization processes of these distinct “racial” groups may follow different paths, as discussed in Chapter 1.6.
Has the effect of ethnic mobilization on empowerment changed over time? Remember that according to Figure 6-1 above, the strength of both ethnic parties and ethnic civil society organizations has increased sharply since 1946, and especially from the early 1990s onwards. But how has their influence on the political system changed throughout the sample period? Are ethnic organizations more effective in contemporary Latin America than they were in earlier periods? Or has their impact declined over time? These questions are important if we want to make any assumptions about the future development of ethnic equality in the ranked ethnic systems of Latin America (and possibly beyond). Further political gains for historically marginalized groups are only possible if their organizational representatives have not lost their power over time.

To provide some answers to these questions, I interact the ethnic party variable and the lagged ethnic civil society density indicator with the calendar year in two additional models otherwise identical to Model 6.1 of Table 6-1 above. Interestingly, Figure 6-5 speaks of a contrasting development of the influence of these two organization types over time. While the positive impact of ethnic parties has remained constant and, with their growing electoral strength since the mid-1980s, also more reliable (i.e. significant in statistical terms), the effect of civil society mobilization has actually diminished with increasing mobilization strength.

This suggests two critical conclusions about the present situation and the future prospects of ethnic mobilization in Latin America. For one thing, it tells us that parallel to the growing ethnic demands from non-party organizations, the states in the region have developed a broad repertoire of ever more elaborate and effective counter-strategies to shield themselves from these demands. I will discuss them in the case studies of Guatemala and Ecuador in the next chapter. Secondly, it also means that while civil society mobilization has been a very important instrument of ethno-political change in Latin America, its effect might have worn out over time, and the strategy become ineffective. Therefore, if ethnic equality in the region is to be improved any further, ethnic parties will be even more decisive in the future than in the past as it seems that their political power can be less easily ignored by reluctant state elites.
Having discussed the successful cases of empowerment in terms of the theoretical argument, an additional analysis in Appendix VI looks at the outliers, i.e. those groups which have a high probability of achieving empowerment according to my models, yet remain politically marginalized in their countries. How can we explain their ongoing marginalization? And what does that say about the validity of the theoretical argument? The analysis in Appendix VI interprets these “dogs that didn’t bark” and shows that in many cases ethnic mobilization did result in partial political gains, for example in the abolition of more severe regimes of ethnic discrimination. Hence, these cases do not undermine the overall validity of the theoretical argument.

Nonetheless, before drawing our conclusions about the effect of ethnic mobilization on ethnic equality in Latin America’s ranked societies, we need to address another issue. This concerns the operationalization of empowerment on the basis of the EPR-ETH power status categories.
As explained in Appendix I, the dataset focuses on *de-facto* access to national or sub-state executive power in its measurement of both political inclusion and regional autonomy. This does not necessarily and always correspond to the *de-iure* situation in a country, especially with regard to the latter category. In order to complement the results of the foregoing group-level analyses, the last part of this section focuses on the *de-iure* situation at the country level.

**Mobilization and De-iure Empowerment at the National Level**

The following analysis relies on two different dependent variables to capture the *de-iure* status of historically oppressed ethnic groups in Latin America. The first one codes countries’ ratification of the ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples which is the single most important legal document at the international level protecting the rights of underprivileged ethnic groups worldwide (Sawyer and Gomez 2012a; Van Cott 2000, 262-3).271 The second dependent variable codes country-specific legal provisions for ethnic autonomy in Latin America, based on the assessment by González (2010).272 Although they may or may not be implemented in practice, such legal regimes can also be seen as improvements of ethnic equality in a region long characterized by the neglect and oppression of historically subordinated groups. Table A12 in Appendix VI summarizes the situation regarding “legal” (as opposed to political) ethnic empowerment in Latin America.

Models 6.6 and 6.7 in Table 6.3 below examine the effect of ethnic mobilization at the country level on the likelihood of ratification of the ILO Convention and of the enactment of a *de-iure* ethnic autonomy regime, respectively, using logit regressions.273 To capture the processes of ethnic mobilization at the country level, I use the lagged ethnic party dummy variable (indicating whether any ethnic party is active in the country), and the country-level version of the coun-

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271 ILO Convention No. 169 includes binding legal provisions for signatory states with regard to, for example, non-discrimination, the traditional ways of (communal) land holding, the autonomous economic development of indigenous groups, and the preservation of their languages, cultures, religious practices, and traditional life styles. Most importantly, however, it sets the obligation of signatory states to consult indigenous communities “through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly” (Art. 6, ILO Convention No. 169).

272 Again, it is important to note that this variable is not equivalent to the category of regional autonomy in EPR-ETH since such legal provisions may or may not be implemented and, hence, do not necessarily result in *de-facto* political authority at the sub-state level. A good example of a far-reaching, but in practice very inconsequential legal autonomy regime are Nicaragua’s two autonomous regions at the Atlantic Coast, the legal introduction of which has not led to a real political empowerment of the affected ethnic groups (Dye 2010; González 2010, 52; Van Cott 2001). Similarly, while the progressive Colombian constitution of 1991 provided for far-reaching autonomy rights for both indigenous and Afrocolombian communities, in practice the latter have not derived the same gains from it (Van Cott 2000).

273 Note that both models are designed as “onset” analyses. While ethnic autonomy regimes are not always implemented in practice, to my knowledge no Latin American state has ever reversed *de-iure* autonomy during the sample period. Nor has any Latin American country ever cancelled its ratification of the ILO Convention 169. Hence, country years following the ratification or enactment are coded as missing. In the case of the ILO Convention, all years prior to 1990 also have to be coded as missing as the Convention was not adopted until mid-1989. This reduces the number of observations to 160 in Model 6.6. There are 13 ratification years (8% of all country years). In Model 6.7, the number of observations is reduced by country years in which ethnicity is coded as politically irrelevant in EPR-ETH, and by missing observations of the ethnic party variable in undemocratic countries. Slightly less than 1% of the remaining 582 observations (5 in total) are autonomy-enactment years. In this case, I only report the results from the rare-events data regression model.
ter of mobilization-years. Again, to account for a possible curvilinear effect of time, I use a quadratic form of the variable. All control variables are identical to those used in the country-level analyses of the global sample of ranked systems in Table 3-10 of Chapter 3.3.2.

Table 6-3: Ethnic mobilization and legal empowerment in Latin America. Regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 6.6 Ratification ILO 169</th>
<th>Model 6.7 Legal autonomy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic party dummy (lagged)</td>
<td>2.89*** (0.87)</td>
<td>2.52 (1.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic mobilization years</td>
<td>-0.18 (.12)</td>
<td>-0.02 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic mobilization years (quadratic)</td>
<td>0.00 (.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative size of excluded groups</td>
<td>0.41 (1.73)</td>
<td>-1.16 (1.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity index (lagged)</td>
<td>-0.27* (.14)</td>
<td>-0.07 (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size (logged)</td>
<td>0.38 (.34)</td>
<td>0.09 (.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>1.19 (1.21)</td>
<td>-0.37 (1.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calendar year</td>
<td>0.02 (.07)</td>
<td>0.04 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War history</td>
<td>-0.07 (.36)</td>
<td>-0.22 (.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment dummy (lagged)</td>
<td>-1.44 (1.11)</td>
<td>-0.95 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-42.68 (148.04)</td>
<td>-83.21 (118.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-38.45***</td>
<td>-24.28***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors, with clustering on countries, in parentheses.
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, *p ≤ .1

According to these results, the presence of an ethnic party is the single most important factor explaining the ratification of the ILO Convention 169 in favor of indigenous groups and its timing in Latin America once we control for other factors, such as the level of democracy, economic
development, the size of the excluded population etc. The probability of ratification in the period from 1990 to 2009 was more than 44% higher in country years with an existing ethnic party. In this sense, it is characteristic that of the four remaining states that had not ratified the Convention by 2009, only Nicaragua has done it by now. Nicaragua is the only one of these countries with an active ethnic party (YATAMA), and exhibited the highest predicted probability of ratifying the Convention over the next four years, according to Model 6.6. In contrast, the duration terms of civil society mobilization are jointly insignificant. Thus, ethnic mobilization in the non-electoral sphere seems to have had less effect on the legal empowerment of indigenous and African-descendant groups in Latin America than on their access to *de-facto* political power.\(^{274}\)

The effect of ethnic parties on the enactment of regimes of ethnic autonomy, however, is less clear. The variable does not reach the conventional levels of statistical significance in rare-events logit Model 6.7.\(^{275}\) While the coefficient is about as large as in Model 6.6 and points in the expected direction, the standard errors are too large to draw any conclusions with a reasonable level of certainty. The duration terms of civil society mobilization are jointly insignificant as well.\(^{276}\) The final observation about these analyses concerns the lagged empowerment dummy which indicates whether at least one subordinated group of the country is either included in the central government or enjoys regional autonomy. Interestingly, the sign of the coefficient is negative, implying that *de-facto* access to political power of indigenous and African-descendant groups might actually be associated with a lower probability of legal empowerment. However, this counterintuitive effect is statistically not significantly different from zero.

Summing up this section of the chapter, we can state that hypothesis H1b is clearly supported by the empirical results. Ethnic mobilization does increase historically discriminated groups’ chances of achieving political empowerment. Enabling these groups to actively participate in the government of their countries is an important step towards more ethnic equality in these historically ranked societies.

While overall ethnic parties have a stronger impact than civil society organizations, the results also imply that there are important synergies between the two mobilization strategies. The

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\(^{274}\) Note that using the lagged and cumulative versions of the density indicator produces the same non-result for civil society mobilization, whereas the continuous indicator of ethnic party strength (measuring ethnic parties’ combined vote share) has the same positive and statistically significant effect as the dummy variable. All these results are completely robust to a logistic model for rare-events data.

\(^{275}\) Note that if a normal logit regression model is used, the positive effect of the variable is statistically significant but only weakly \((p=0.08)\). But given the extremely rare occurrence of such “autonomy onsets” in the sample, I do not trust the results of this normal regression model.

\(^{276}\) Using the alternative measures of ethnic civil society strength does not change this non-result but does influence the behavior of the ethnic party dummy. If the cumulative version of ethnic civil society density is employed in the same model, for instance, the ethnic party variable becomes weakly significant \((p=0.08)\). Hence, ethnic party mobilization again tends to be associated with a higher probability of *de-iure* ethnic autonomy, but overall the results are too feeble in this case to be considered supportive of my hypothesis.
effect of civil society organizations is bolstered up by the simultaneous mobilization in the political system through ethnic parties. The latter may transfer the organizations’ ethnic demands to the playing field of conventional politics which has historically been dominated by European-descendant elites. Finally, when it comes to the legal empowerment of indigenous and African-descendant groups in Latin America, the precedence of ethnic parties becomes even more pronounced. In these cases, their presence and active participation in the law-making institutions, like parliaments and constitutional assemblies, are simply decisive.277

One factor inhibiting the political empowerment of historically marginalized groups in Latin America is internal fragmentation along linguistic and/or religious lines. However, this effect is only visible once we separately analyze the different steps within this process of gradual political advancement. Hence, there is moderate support for hypothesis H3b. Importantly, all these statistical results are clearly reflected in the reality of the successful and unsuccessful cases of mobilization discussed so far, and we will also revisit many of these observations in the case studies of Guatemala and Ecuador in the following Chapter 7. But first let us turn to another important question which forms the content of hypothesis H2b. What is the effect of this ethnic mobilization on the level of conflict and on political stability in the region?

6.3. Ethnic Mobilization, Conflict, and Political Stability in Latin America

In the final section of this chapter, I will examine the effect of ethnic organizations on political conflict and stability – but also their relationship with peaceful forms of collective action – in Latin America. Ethnic civil conflicts have been extremely rare in this region in the post-World War II period. There are only three such instances: in Guatemala in 1963 (although the ethnic dimension only became salient in the 1970s), in Nicaragua in 1982 (the Miskito rebellion), and in Mexico in 1994 (the Zapatista insurgency). However, there have been a number of non-ethnic conflicts in the region, including many bloody coups that reached the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths per year. Table A13 in Appendix VI lists all conflict events in Latin America in the post-World War II period, as reported by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset.

The table shows that no civil conflict (ethnic or non-ethnic) has ever occurred in a country in which an ethnic party was active at the national level. This is a highly indicative finding in itself implying that ethnic mobilization in electoral politics can certainly not be linked to a higher risk of civil violence. But what about the much more frequent mobilization in non-electoral spheres of politics? Table 6-4 examines the bivariate relationship between civil society mobilization and ethnic and non-ethnic civil conflicts in Latin America between 1946 and 2009.278 As stated earli-
er, it is important to take other conflicts into consideration because in ranked societies where
class and ethnicity usually overlap, ethnic conflict may take on the form of a class conflict
without explicit ethnic claims being advanced.

It becomes apparent from these numbers that we cannot reject the null hypothesis and have to
assume that there is no systematic relationship between ethnic mobilization and any type of
civil war in Latin America. With regard to all civil conflicts, the conflict risk is even higher in
years without above-average ethnic mobilization. The descriptions of the conflict cases in Table
A 13 in Appendix VI testify to this statistical finding.279

Table 6-4: Ethnic mobilization and civil conflict in Latin America. Table of frequencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic conflicts</th>
<th>Above-average mobilization</th>
<th>Below-average mobilization</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(50%)</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No conflict</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(35.4%)</td>
<td>(64.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(35.4%)</td>
<td>(64.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All conflicts</th>
<th>Above-average mobilization</th>
<th>Below-average mobilization</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(30.8%)</td>
<td>(69.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No conflict</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(36.8%)</td>
<td>(63.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(36.6%)</td>
<td>(63.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Independent variable lagged by one year. Only country years included in which ethnicity is coded as politically
relevant in EPR-ETH. Years of ongoing conflicts coded as missing. Fisher’s exact test provides a value of p=0.58 for the
relationship between ethnic mobilization and ethnic conflict onset. For ethnic mobilization and all civil conflicts, Fisher’s
exact test gives a value of p=0.34.

However, what about the effect of ethnic mobilization on other types of anti-system revolts? In
the global analysis of Chapter 3.3.2, I have examined its effect on incidents of institutional up-
heavals. Model 6.8 in Table 6-5 performs the same analysis for the Latin American sample in
the period from 1960 to 2009, using again Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) indicator of institutional

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Moreover, when testing the effect of ethnic mobilization on civil conflicts in a multivariate logistic regression, the
mobilization year variables remain jointly insignificant. This confirms the bivariate analysis and shows that there is
no systematic relationship between ethnic mobilization and civil conflict in Latin America.
There are 30 instances of institutional instability in our sample (about 5% of all country years). Although the coefficient of the ethnic party variable is positive, the 90% confidence interval includes zero. The two civil society mobilization duration terms are jointly weakly significant ($p=0.09$) but this result is not robust to the use of a logistic regression for rare events data. If the lagged or the cumulative versions of the ethnic civil society indicator are used, the effects are statistically insignificant. Hence, there are no compelling indications that ethnic mobilization – whether in the electoral or non-electoral arena – is connected to any kind of political crises or instability in Latin America.

In contrast, we see that countries with large excluded population segments are more likely to experience institutional instability. The ousting of Ecuador’s former president Jamil Mahuad in January 2000, discussed in the case study of the following Chapter 7, is an admonitory example of the dangerous consequences of high levels of ethnic exclusion even in ranked ethnic systems. All other results are essentially the same as those at the global level presented in Table 3-10 of Chapter 3.3.2 above, including the intuitive negative effect of the level of democracy on instability. Additionally, in Appendix VI, I examine whether the effect of ethnic parties on institutional instability has changed over the post-World War II period. The results indicate that this is not the case.

If ethnic organizations in Latin America are not connected to any type of violence or instability, what is their effect on peaceful collective action? As in the global analysis in Chapter 3.3.2, Model 6.9 in Table 6-5 tests the effect of ethnic mobilization on the level of collective ethnic protest, as measured by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). If ethnic organizations indeed serve to orchestrate collective action, as asserted in my theoretical argument, we would expect strong ethnic mobilization in ranked systems to result in higher levels of non-violent protest.

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280 This is a dummy variable coded as 1 if there is a change on the Polity index of three points or more in a single year. In the following analyses, I rely again on the counter of mobilization-years in a quadratic form to capture the influence of ethnic civil society mobilization, as the long-term effect has proven to be stronger than its short-term influence. Due to the NGO density indicator the sample is reduced to the period from 1960 to 2009. However, the results for the main variables of interest are the same if the NGO density indicator is dropped and the sample period extended.

281 The highest group-level value recorded in MAR is used as the country-level score. I again employ a double tobit regression model to account for the restricted range of the dependent variable (from 0 to 5). However, the results are robust when an OLS Regression model is used instead. Including a lagged dependent variable as a control, the time period covered by the MAR data is reduced by an additional year to 1986-2006. The modal value of ethnic group protest in Latin America in this period is 3.

282 Figure A 9 in Appendix VI shows a scatter plot of the sample with regard to (lagged) ethnic party strength and the level of protest, along with the line of the fitted values from a linear regression of the latter on the former variable. The graph shows a rather clear bivariate relationship between the two variables.
Table 6-5: Ethnic mobilization, conflict, and political stability in Latin America. Regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 6.8</th>
<th>Model 6.9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instability</td>
<td>Protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic party dummy (lagged)</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lagged)</td>
<td>(.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic mobilization years</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(quadratic)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall strength of civil society</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lagged)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative size of excluded groups</td>
<td>2.90*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lagged)</td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity index (lagged)</td>
<td>-.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lagged)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size (logged)</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(logged)</td>
<td>(.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(logged)</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calendar year</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(logged)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years (quadratic)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years (cubic)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War history</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(quadratic)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment dummy (lagged)</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(quadratic)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest (lagged)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lagged)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>116.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(logged)</td>
<td>(76.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-97.35***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors, with clustering on countries, in parentheses.

* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, * p ≤ .1
The results of Model 6.9 confirm this expectation. Even if we control for the previous level of protest and other important factors, ethnic parties are associated with more ethnic group protest. This replicates the finding in the global sample of ranked ethnic systems, and again highlights the great capacity of ethnic parties to mobilize the masses and organize collective action. In contrast, the two duration terms of civil society mobilization are jointly insignificant. This implies that non-electoral ethnic mobilization does not increase the level of collective protest in the region overall.

With regard to the control variables, the overall picture in Latin America differs considerably from that in the global sample of ranked systems. While the effects of population size and economic development are statistically insignificant in Model 6.9, the level of democracy correlates negatively with the dependent variable. Hence, more democratic countries face less collective protest by ethnic groups. Furthermore, grievances seem to be less important to explain protest in this region. The effect of the level of ethnic exclusion is not statistically significant. But again, since the MAR data only range from 1985 to 2006, we need to interpret these results with some caution.

6.4. Conclusion

The second section of this chapter established that ethnic mobilization by both ethnic parties and ethnic civil society organizations contributes to more ethnic equality in Latin America by helping empower historically oppressed groups. This confirms hypothesis H1b and provides support to the arguments of qualitative scholars working on the region who have explained the recent and past political achievements of indigenous and African-descendant groups as a result of their ethnic mobilization (Becker 2011, 142-9; Lucero 2008; Madrid 2012, 165-78; Pallares 2007; Yashar 2005).

If we distinguish specifically between electoral mobilization through ethnic parties, and mobilization in the sphere of civil society through non-party ethnic organizations, the results show that the former has a stronger and more immediate effect. As we have seen in the African analyses, civil society organizations always need a considerable amount of time to build up political strength and be able to influence the political system. Nevertheless, the long-term effect of this civil society mobilization has turned out to be of great importance and often led to tangible political gains for indigenous and African-descendant groups in Latin America – independent of other factors, such as the general strength of civil society, economic development, and the level of democracy. This is an important statement in this context since powerful ethnic parties are still a generally rare phenomenon in ranked ethnic systems.

The results are somewhat ambivalent regarding the effect of intra-ethnic divisions along linguistic and/or religious lines. There is no linear effect of the variable on the likelihood of em-
powerment but instead a distinct influence on each of the gradual steps from discrimination towards autonomy or inclusion. Hence, hypothesis H3b receives moderate support from the quantitative analyses. This issue will be addressed in more depth in the case studies of the next chapter, which will emphasize additional aspects of intra-ethnic cleavages not captured by the quantitative operationalization.

The last section of this chapter revealed that more equality does not come at the cost of increased conflict or instability. In line with hypothesis H2b, there is no systematic link from ethnic mobilization – its strength and duration – to any kind of civil conflict or institutional instability. Moreover, the effect has remained more or less constant over time, implying that ethnic mobilization in Latin America has not become more conflictive or destabilizing in recent years. It has however increased the level of peaceful ethnic protest in the region. Given that only a tiny percentage of country years exhibited the highest level of protest on the MAR scale between 1985 and 2006 (less than 1%), the conflict potential emanating from this type of collective action seems minimal.

The empirical evidence then leads us to a clearly positive balance of the impact of ethnic parties and other ethnic organizations in Latin America – and in ranked ethnic systems in general – and thus contradicts the critical voices inside and outside the region. While other authors have pointed at the failures and contradictions of certain ethnic organizations (see e.g. Mijeski and Beck 2011), and some voices simply decried them as dangerous, divisive or even barbaric (see e.g. Olmos 2003; Radu 2005), my empirical results show that ethnic parties significantly contribute to more ethnic equality in the region without spurring any greater risk of conflict.

This finding also qualifies the common wisdom about ethnic mobilization in the academic literature which has often warned against its dangerous consequences (Bakwesega 2004; Belloni 2008; Horowitz 1985; Huntington 1991; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2006; Rothchild 2004; Varshney 2001; Wimmer 1997). While such warnings seem to be appropriate for unranked societies, in ranked ethnic systems with profound, historically determined ethnic inequalities, the political mobilization of marginalized groups only contributes to a more equal society.

Having examined the general patterns of, and relationships between, ethnic mobilization, political empowerment, and conflict in Latin America as a whole, the last empirical chapter of this book refines and elaborates these results on the basis of two case studies of Guatemala and Ecuador.

Figure 7-1 shows the levels of ethnic mobilization in the two countries over time, and compares them to the mean level of the whole Latin American region, based on the density indicator of ethnic organizations used in the quantitative analyses. We can see that ethnic mobilization in Ecuador has always been not only stronger than in Guatemala but also constantly above the average strength of all other ethnic movements in the region. It also becomes apparent that the temporal development in Ecuador more closely resembles the overall regional pattern, especially the first strong rise in the 1970s, whereas Guatemala is really a “latecomer” in this trend, but experienced above-average ethnic mobilization during the 1990s.

By analyzing in detail these different trajectories of ethnic mobilization and their effects on ethnic equality in the two countries, the chapter supports the validity of the statistical relationships detected in the previous chapter, and connects them more closely to the causal path presented in Chapters 1 and 2. From Figure 1-3 and Figure 2-2, we can deduce the following five causal mechanisms linking ethnic organizations to the occurrence or absence of empowerment:

1) In ranked societies, ethnicity is used as a tool of permanent oppression of racial others by European-stemming groups. The more pronounced this discrimination, the less ethno-political mobilization is possible by marginalized groups.

2) Strong ethnic organizations increase marginalized groups’ political leverage by aggregating and lobbying for ethnic interests; by mobilizing the masses; through propaganda; and by gaining access to bureaucratic and legislative power.

3) Intra-ethnic fragmentation, for example along linguistic and religious lines, decreases the mobilization capacity of historically marginalized groups.

4) Strong ethnic mobilization of historically marginalized groups leads to their political empowerment and more ethnic equality in ranked ethnic systems.

5) Intra-ethnic divisions are exploited and/or promoted by state elites, decreasing marginalized groups’ chances of political empowerment.

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283 Cp. the concurring account of Yashar (2005).
The short historical account in the next section testifies to the role of race as a tool of ethnic hierarchization in both Guatemala and Ecuador, and thus refers to the first of these mechanisms. The subsequent three sections analyze the forces of and counterforces to the political empowerment of historically discriminated groups in the two countries (mechanisms two to five), focusing again on the role of ethnic organizations. The final section examines the effects of ethnic mobilization on the level of conflict and political stability in Ecuador.

Figure 7.1: Ethnic mobilization in Guatemala and Ecuador over time

Notes: Ethnic civil society strength measured by the “density” of ethnic organizations at country level, i.e. number of organizations relative to country population. See Chapter 6.2 for a precise description of the data.

The analysis is based on three months of field research in Guatemala, conducted from April to July 2011, and six weeks of field research in Ecuador, from March to May 2013. The research resulted in a total of 91 interviews (60 in Guatemala, 31 in Ecuador) with leaders of indigenous organizations, state officials, political party leaders, parliamentarians, media representatives, and outside experts.284

The sample of indigenous organizations whose leaders were interviewed stemmed from the same sources of ethnic civil society organizations in Latin America, that formed the basis of the density indicator used in the quantitative analyses.285 Interviewees from the state administra-
tion were chosen from those areas that were considered key areas of activity by the organizations, according to their own statements (agriculture, education, natural resources and environment), plus from state entities established specifically for discriminated ethnic groups, such as the Corporación de Desarrollo Afroecuatoriano (Afro-Ecuadorian Development Corporation, CODAE), or the Academia de Lenguas Mayas de Guatemala (Academy of Maya Languages in Guatemala, ALMG). This resulted in a sample of 29, mostly top-level bureaucrats, including five Guatemalan state ministers.

7.1. From Genocide to Official Multiculturalism in Guatemala, and from Discrimination to Empowerment in Ecuador

Almost all of Guatemala’s indigenous groups are usually assembled under a common identity category of Maya descendants. Together they constitute the demographic majority in Guatemala with about 52% of the country’s total population, according to EPR-ETH. There are about twenty different Maya language groups, of which the four largest – K’iche’, Mam, Kaqchikel, and Q’eqchii’ – make up almost 80% of the total Maya-speaking population (Warren 1998, 13). Although many Maya have come to live in Guatemala City, mostly as urban poor, historically they have been tied to the rural habitat due to the segregationist colonial system and the taxes imposed on them by the Spanish crown (Martínez Peláez 1998; Taracena et al. 2009). While a small, economically privileged indigenous elite has always existed, particularly in and around Quetzaltenango, their social and political status largely depends on their adhesion to the dominant Spanish culture (Grandin 2000).

Whereas the immediate post-independence years were still dominated by a small white criollo elite – descendants of the Hispanic conquerors –, the so-called Liberal Revolution of 1871 represented the rise of the ladino group, originally the people of mixed European and Amerindian descent, to political power. It was their nation-building project that introduced the sharp ethnic dichotomy between a broad category of ladinos – now understood as the non-indigenous Guatemalans – and the indigenous people, which we still find today (Smith 1990b; Taracena et al. 2009). Under the new rulers, the state continued to be an instrument of the thin economic elite, especially the owners of the large coffee plantations. While Guatemala’s liberal ideologues envisioned the cultural assimilation and national integration of the indigenous people, the actual policies implemented promoted ethnic segregation in the education sector, the labor market and the military, and the exclusion from citizenship. The economic success of the coffee elites was directly based on these policies of ethnic discrimination, as without a flourishing mining sector, the expropriation of communal indigenous lands and the forced recruitment of

Pueblos Indígenas, Fundación Rigoberta Menchú Tum, Oxlajuy Tz’ikin. In Ecuador, I conducted interviews with leaders of CONAIE, ECUARUNARI, CONFENIAE, FEINE, FENOCIN, Centro Cultural Afroecuatoriano, and two other leaders of the Afro-Ecuadorian movement.
indigenous labor constituted the main sources of wealth (Martínez Peláez 1998; Pérez-Brignoli 1989; Taracena et al. 2009).

After a 10-year “democratic spring”, the military coup of 1954 ushered in more than 30 years of increasingly institutionalized military dictatorship, backed by the economic oligarchy. Continuing racial discrimination led to the birth of the Maya movement in the 1970s, as a loose collective of politico-intellectual leaders and semi-clandestine organizations (Cojtí 2010, 102; Hale 2006, 62-5, 89-93), yet the increasing repression during the civil war kept Maya mobilization within the confines of the guerrilla movements. While the war erupted within a purely classist, Cold-War framework, it soon took on an explicitly ethnic characteristic, as the rebels recruited heavily from the indigenous population during the 1970s, and indigenous leaders in turn began to use the armed struggle for their own purposes (Jonas 2000, 21-3). The military’s “scorched earth” strategy, that systematically targeted the indigenous population, was later classified as a genocide by the official Truth Commission in 1999 (Ball, Korbak, and Spirer 1999; Falla 1994; Jonas 2000, 24; Lunsford 2007; Smith 1990a, 271-2; Schirmer 1998).

In 1996, after 36 years of civil war, the Guatemalan peace accords were finally signed, including the 1995 accord on indigenous rights which recognized Guatemala as a multiethnic and multilingual country. Warren (2004, 149) refers to this moment as the actual “transition to democracy” where “the Maya could finally participate openly in national politics”. Indigenous organizations – some newly created, some emerging from their semi-clandestine existence of before – became one of the main political forces (Azpuru 1999, 111, 117-8; Hale 2006; Jonas 1995, 2000; Warren 2004, 150-2, 159).

It was also during this time that the Coordinadora de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya (Coordinator of Organizations of the Maya People of Guatemala, COPMAGUA) was founded to unify the different Maya organizations under a common political roof. However, due to internal divisions and problems of leadership, the organization lasted only six years.286 Even more harmful was the defeat of the constitutional referendum in 1999 that contained various stipulations favorable to the indigenous population (Warren 2004). Since then, the Maya mobilization has clearly lost much of its earlier vigor (Bastos and Brett 2010).

Some prominent Maya leaders have been appointed to governmental posts but never of major importance (Warren 2004, 174-5). During the last legislature from 2008 to 2011, only seventeen out of 158 parliamentarians were of indigenous origin (Misión indígena de observación electoral 2008, 160). It is not surprising then, that the stark ethnic inequalities in socioeconomic terms persist. According to government figures from 2006, the poverty rate among indigenous people is more than twice as high as that among ladinos. Indigenous people are

286 Interviews with Maya leaders, 6-22-2011-I, 6-22-2011-II.
also the group most affected by malnutrition in Guatemala (Congreso de la República de Guatemala 2009, 2-3).

Figure 7-2 reflects this historical account of Maya mobilization in Guatemala. It reveals the first tentative attempts at ethnic mobilization in the 1970s, which were crushed during the worst years of state violence and the abrupt rise in the course of the political opening from the late 1980s onwards. We can also see that this political struggle has resulted in an improvement of the political status of the Maya population, expressed in the EPR-ETH dataset by a change from the category of “discriminated” to “powerless”. Yet, since then, the Maya mobilization has reached a political impasse.

Figure 7-2: Ethnic mobilization and the political status of the Maya in Guatemala

Notes: Ethnic civil society strength measured by the density of ethnic organizations at group level, i.e. number of organizations relative to absolute group population. Power status according to EPR-ETH.

Ecuador’s indigenous peoples, which in EPR-ETH are combined into a single umbrella category, can be divided into two main cultural groupings. Highland peoples are generally Kichwa who form part of the larger Quechua ethno-linguistic group, the largest surviving indigenous language in the Americas. The indigenous population in the eastern Amazonian lowlands is smaller and more fragmented, consisting of about ten different language groups (e.g. lowland Kichwa, Shuar, Huaorani, Achuar etc.) (Becker 2011, 4; Lucero 2008, 10).

Due to the geographic and historical differences, the ethnic mobilization processes have developed quite differently in these two regions. In the highlands, ethnic mobilization started within
a classist (or unionist) framework, directed against the injustices of the *hacienda* system – a feudal agricultural system based on large estates owned by wealthy landlords –, and only took on an ethnic character in the 1980s (Gerlach 2003, 61; Lucero 2008, 96-9). In contrast, the lowland groups can be considered pioneers of ethnic mobilization in Ecuador and in Latin America as a whole. Faced by the increasing agricultural colonization of the Amazon region and the impact of oil production, they successfully linked ecological grievances to a discourse of ethnic group survival (Becker 2011, 6-7; Gerlach 2003, 57-60; Lucero 2008, 100-110). Indigenous people at the coast, despite a certain “ethnic reawakening” in the last decades, are politically largely irrelevant (Becker 2011, 4, 9; Lucero 2008, 10).

According to the EPR-ETH dataset, the total indigenous population constitutes 40% of the country’s population, although ethnic group sizes in Ecuador are highly controversial and the national census provides a much lower figure (Becker 2011, 3; Mijeski and Beck 2011, 44-5). Apart from the indigenous people, Ecuador comprises a sizeable African-desendant population (5% of the total population, according to EPR-ETH). They live above all at the northwestern coast around Esmeraldas, in the northern Imbabura province, and in the country’s major cities, such as the capital Quito and Guayaquil (Antón Sánchez 2011, 77; Gerlach 2003, 13).

After independence, Ecuador was a politically and economically divided state. The highlands and the coast constituted largely self-sufficient economies, which from the outset were involved in constant political rivalries (Gerlach 2003, 25-6). Through property and literacy requirements large sectors of the population remained excluded from the right to vote – in particular the indigenous people, most of whom were illiterate in Spanish (Becker 2011, 46-8; Gerlach 2003, 26, 30). At the same time, however, the disenfranchised indigenous population continued to finance the state with their taxes. Although the tribute and slavery were abolished in the second half of the 19th century, indigenous farm laborers (called *huasipungueros*) remained trapped within the system of forced labor, which remained in place until the early 20th century (Gerlach 2003, 26-9).

Ecuador’s economic development has been marked by three successive resource booms: the export of cocoa (in the 19th century) and later bananas (from the late 1940s) stimulated the coastal economy, while the oil boom that began in 1972 was based in the Amazon region. While the *hacienda* system in the highlands resembled the economic and political conditions in Guatemala, the early and strong counterweight of the predominantly non-indigenous coastal region allowed for the abolition of the worst elements of the discriminatory labor regime (Gerlach 2003, 27, 63-5). Moreover, Ecuador’s military played a more progressive role than its counterpart in Guatemala. The military regime that took over power in a coup in 1972 progressively increased state ownership of the oil industry, and used the revenues to build infrastruc-

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287 The first provincial indigenous union in the highlands (“El Inca”), demanding land and labor reforms, was already founded in 1927 (Gerlach 2003, 29).
ture and invest heavily in agricultural development, industrialization, and the state bureaucracy. This led to the rise of a new urban middle class and a decline of the power of the traditional oligarchy (Gerlach 2003, 33-8).

The return to civilian rule in 1979 was accompanied by a new constitution that finally abolished the exclusionary literacy requirement (Becker 2011, 47). As a consequence, voter turnout among indigenous people rose from 19% to 45% between 1979 and 1986 (Van Cott 2005, 113). Economically, however, the country had to deal with the sharp decline in oil prices and a high foreign debt that increased rapidly from the mid-1980s onwards. The neoliberal austerity programs imposed by the international donors led to increased inequality and poverty. In 1995, the general poverty rate stood at 56%. Among indigenous people, the rate reached 80%, while at the same time, they produced 75% of the country’s basic foods (Gerlach 2003, 70).

These conditions formed the background for Ecuador’s impressive surge in ethnic mobilization in the last quarter of the 20th century. In the lowlands, numerous provincial and local organizations, founded mostly in the 1970s, joined forces in 1980, forming the regional umbrella organization Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon, CONFINIAE) (Becker 2011, 6-7; Gerlach 2003, 51-60; Lucero 2008, 100-6). In the highlands, the regional organization Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador (Confederation of Peoples of the Kichwa Nationality, ECUARUNARI) was founded in 1972.

The peak of this pyramidal structure of ethnic mobilization was erected in 1986 with the national umbrella organization Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, CONAIE) which vociferously advanced indigenous demands for land reform, territorial rights, bilingual education, official recognition of the indigenous identity and of the multi-ethnic nature of the state (Becker 2011, 9; Gerlach 2003, 70). Finally (and above all, at the instigation of lowland leaders), indigenous activists founded their own electoral vehicle Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (Pachakutik Movement for Plurinational Unity) in 1995, which despite the many non-indigenous allies, would cooperate closely with CONAIE (Becker 2011, 43-6).

Motivated by, but in the shadow of, the indigenous movement, Afro-Ecuadorian organizations became more dynamic political actors in the 1990s. Just as the indigenous highland organizations, the rural Afro-Ecuadorian mobilization had first followed a classist approach of mobilization in the 1960s and 1970s, before gradually taking on an ethnic character, focusing on issues of racial discrimination and collective rights to ancestral territories (Antón Sánchez 2011, 88-116, 182-95).

In June 1990, an indigenous levantamiento (uprising) paralyzed the country as lowland and highland groups united themselves to march on Quito and several regional capitals, blocked
roads, and withheld their agricultural produce from the market (Gerlach 2003, 73-4). This and further protest actions led to significant political gains for the indigenous movement, as Figure 7-3 illustrates. In the EPR-ETH dataset, the group advanced from discrimination to the status of “powerless” in 1979 and to regional autonomy in 2000.

Yet, at the same time, Ecuador underwent major political turmoil. In February 1997, president Abdalá Bucaram was ousted by popular pressure. In January 2000, president Jamil Mahuad was replaced in a bloodless coup by a tripartite junta that lasted for less than a day and was composed of military colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, CONAIE leader Antonio Vargas, and former Supreme Court justice Carlos Solórzano. Finally, in April 2005, Lucio Gutiérrez, then elected president, was chased out of office by a mostly urban uprising. Political stability has only come back with the election of Rafael Correa in November 2006, who has been reelected twice since then.

Figure 7-3: Ethnic mobilization and the political status of the indigenous people in Ecuador

Notes: Ethnic civil society strength measured by the density of ethnic organizations at group level, i.e. number of organizations relative to absolute group population. Power status according to EPR-ETH.

The historical accounts of the two countries confirm elements of the theoretical argument in general while highlighting the consequences of within-category differences for the trajectory of ethnic mobilization in ranked societies. Guatemala is an extreme example of how ethnicity – in the form of race – serves as a tool of oppression in the hands of European(-descendant) elites. In this sense, the country also constitutes what could be called a “least likely case” for the political empowerment of marginalized ethnic groups (Gerring 2007; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).
In contrast, the less severe forms of ethnic discrimination permitted an earlier and stronger ethnic mobilization in Ecuador. This reflects the relationship between the degree of inter-ethnic inequality and the level of ethnic mobilization, stipulated in the theoretical argument. At the same time, the Ecuadorian case also shows how formal democracy can smoothly coexist with ethnic discrimination in ranked societies. In both cases, ethnic conflict does not loom large in the imaginations of the key political and social actors. In Guatemala, despite the country’s violent history, only one out of 23 non-indigenous interviewees who were asked the question (outside experts, journalists, political party leaders, parliamentarians, and state bureaucrats) mentioned ethnic polarization as a potential threat to political stability; in Ecuador – where ethnic mobilization has been much stronger – the ratio is not much higher (sixteen out of nineteen interviewees).

7.2. Maya Mobilization in Guatemala: Ethnic Interest Representation, Internal Divisions, and Opposition from the Non-indigenous Elite

Figure 7-2 above confirms that the strategies of Maya civil society organizations have worked very well during the 1990s, when the cultural and political rights of the indigenous population were significantly improved. An example of this is the ratification of the ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of June 1996. We will see that the mechanisms of the struggle for Maya empowerment are still at work today but that Guatemalan state elites have used the internal divisions of the movement to block any further changes.

7.2.1. The Maya Agenda and Organizational Strategies

Maya organizations’ agenda involves many of the long-standing grievances of Latin America’s historically discriminated ethnic groups. Almost all interviewed Maya leaders named the issue of natural resource extraction in indigenous territories as one of the main areas of activity of their organizations. Clearly, the opposition to the extractive economy, and demands for self-determination, in the form of popular referendums based on the ILO Convention 169, have become the centerpiece of Maya mobilization in recent years. Also very important are the struggles for political and cultural rights and access to land, which is the country’s main economic resource and is still extremely unequally distributed.

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288 Interviews with outside observers confirm that the mobilization related to resource extraction in indigenous territories has become a major point of activity of Maya organizations, partly because it refers to very immediate and practical concerns of the communities (interviews 2011-6-6-I, 2011-6-13, 2011-11-24).

289 According to the fourth agricultural census in the country of 2003, the Gini coefficient of farmland distribution in Guatemala equals 0.84 (Barry 2012, 1).
Maya civil society organizations use four main strategies of political mobilization: street protest and popular mobilization, lobbying vis-à-vis the executive and legislative institutions, agenda setting through the media, and inter-/transnational alliance building. Almost all of the interviewed organizations have some strategy of political lobbying towards state institutions. Within the executive, the main targets are the State Secretariat for Agriculture, Fondo de Tierras (State Fund for Land), the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Environment and Natural Resources, and Energy and Mining, and the Maya entities within the state bureaucracy. Lobbying in the Congress usually works through the only leftist party and former guerrilla organization Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, URNG), or the congressional committees which are open to inputs from diverse actors of civil society.

The strategy of popular mobilization is employed in a more selective way but remains a common organizational strategy (cp. McNeish 2008). In addition, three fourths of the interviewed organizations confirm having regular contact to inter- or transnational organizations and institutions (the international human rights system, foreign ambassadors, development aid agencies and churches, transnational social movements etc.). Based on Maya leaders’ own assessments and the perceptions of state bureaucrats, parliamentarians and media representatives, the following sub-sections analyze the effectiveness of each of these strategies. This allows us to examine the stipulated causal mechanisms linking ethnic organizations to political empowerment.

7.2.2. Protest and the Mobilization of the Masses

The strategy of popular mobilization – consisting of demonstrations and rallies, the blockade of roads or the occupation of public buildings – is most often employed in relation to demands for access to land or in protests against resource extraction projects when more conventional forms of resistance are ignored by the political system. During 2009, for example, there were 34 events of social protest against natural resource exploitation in Guatemala, almost all of them (97%) demonstrations or rallies (Schubiger and Vogt 2012, 24).

By mobilizing a great number of people, organizations are able to force the state (back) to the negotiating table. Hence, this strategy of protest and contestation usually goes hand in hand with direct negotiations with the executive. According to the self-assessments of the inter-
viewed organization leaders, of all organizational strategies, popular mobilization correlates most strongly with political influence and the achievement of political goals.

7.2.3. The Impact of Lobbying

In my interviews, 21 out of 23 state bureaucrats, and five out of six parliamentarians, mentioned having regular contact to Maya organizations. However, the latter’s influence varies considerably between the different policy fields. In the area of education, Maya demands have achieved considerable weight. The following statement from a high-level ladino bureaucrat from the Ministry of Education serves to illustrate this:

> In the past, the mentality was: ‘We have to go and hispanicise them!’ What did that mean? To erase the languages. (...) They thought that an indigenous person speaking Spanish would be a better person – but no, this is an enormous mistake. Step by step the direction has changed from hispanisation to a bilingual intercultural education. (...) [We need to] create the best learning conditions for the students. It’s a struggle.292

This level of acceptance of one of the historical Maya demands is remarkable given that the issues of official multilingualism and bilingual education were used by the opponents of the 1999 constitutional referendum to spark fears of a “balkanization” of Guatemala (Jonas 2000, 189-213). Hence, the lobbying of Maya organizations seems to have yielded tangible fruits here.293 In the field of agricultural politics, it is the strategic combination of street pressure and targeted lobbying that has a certain impact on the political system. One state bureaucrat specializing in political negotiations described the influence of Maya organizations at the negotiating table in the following terms:

> The social organizations handle the issues with more knowledge. They have data, they have information, they have more experience because they have been working on these issues for years. (...) They know the problems better than the government officials, they have gotten to know different officials as interlocutors and already know them well, and therefore their negotiating skills are much better from my point of view. (...) In this sense, at the negotiating table the pressure comes more

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292 Interview 2011-5-27.
293 In the area of education, Maya demands are additionally bolstered by allies from other sectors of civil society, such as the teachers union or the public university in the Consejo Nacional de Educación where by themselves, Maya organisations are not influential enough (interview with top-level bureaucrat from Ministry of Education, 2011-7-7-III).
from the social sector. (...) They know that the [economic] resources are in the hands of the opponents, but the social power is theirs.294

In contrast, with respect to the management of natural resources in indigenous territories, Maya influence is very limited. As the economic stakes are high, state reactions are stout and highly antagonistic, and (partial) successes are only achieved through enormous mobilizational pressure and under the constant risk of violent repression. The following statement by a former member of government clearly expresses this finding:

It’s not the decision of a community whether or not we build a hydroelectric power plant or a mine. For we would lose our state vision and fall into chaos. (...) And these indigenous groups would not develop in the next thousand years. (...) I really believe that if self-determination is given to the indigenous groups this country ends up in chaos and ends up like an African country where they kill each other. I don’t want us to turn into a guinea pig.295

Likewise, lobbying vis-à-vis the Congress does not seem to be very successful. When it comes to the enactment of laws, the interests of the country’s economic elite are omnipotent. “The majority of the Deputies are patronized by the economic elite”, is how one parliamentarian tellingly expressed it.296

7.2.4. The Agenda Setting Mechanism

While lobbying vis-à-vis the executive has born fruits in certain institutions and policy fields, agenda setting via the media is much less effective. Although the interviewed media representatives do give legitimacy to the demands raised by Maya organizations, these issues are not considered important topics. Moreover, they perceive the Maya movement generally as being quite weak. Correspondingly, Maya leaders themselves also express high skepticism regarding the coverage they receive from the media, which they see as natural allies of their antagonists: the powerful economic elite. This is mirrored by the following assessment of a Maya organization leader:

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294 Interview 2011-6-15-II.
295 Interview 2011-6-4.
296 Interview 2011-6-15-I.

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In some way, we have a good relationship. (...) When there is an issue of national interest, the media want to hear our opinion. (...) They come here and I think they do a very good job, the journalists. But when they’re over there, the message is changed. We have to remember that the media in Guatemala are also manipulated.297

Indeed, Guatemala’s media system is characterized by a very high concentration of ownership, reflecting the general oligarchic nature of the country’s economy, with about a dozen families and two business groups controlling almost all television and radio stations, and newspapers (Rockwell and Janus 2003). The market interests of these owners are usually in line with maintaining the existing political order (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 93-4). Apart from a few prominent columnists and the financially weak TV Maya, autonomous Maya voices are sparse in Guatemala’s media system. Overall, it seems highly unlikely that Guatemala’s political decision makers are pressured by Maya organizations’ media propaganda.

7.2.5. The Effect of Transnational Alliances

In contrast, the strategy of transnational alliance building seems to be quite effective. Already during the peace negotiations in the 1990s, indigenous organizations took advantage of the international attention given to Guatemala (Azpuru 1999, 111; Hale 2006; Jonas 1995). In the eyes of the interviewed Maya leaders, international alliances are still one of their most fruitful tools of political pressuring. Synchronously, several top-level bureaucrats in different policy fields recognized that there is international pressure to take Maya demands into account.298

Indeed, in recent years several international organizations, such as the ILO and the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples of the UN Commission on Human Rights, have become involved in Guatemala’s indigenous struggle. On the diplomatic stage, the Scandinavian embassies in particular advocate indigenous rights vis-à-vis the Guatemalan government. The constant references made by the interviewed organization leaders to international regimes, such as the ILO Convention 169, or the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, testify to the overwhelming importance of these instruments for the struggle of indigenous peoples at the national level (cp. Sawyer and Gomez 2012a).

In summary, we find evidence of the interest aggregation function of ethnic organizations, in the form of lobbying for ethnic group interests vis-à-vis the state, and of the mechanism of popular mobilization. The propaganda or agenda-setting mechanism seems to work exclusively

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297 Interview 2011-5-6.
at the supranational level where Maya organizations achieve to rally influential allies to their cause. In these ways, Maya civil society organizations are still able to advance certain demands within the political system. Yet, the last sub-section shows how Guatemalan state elites use the internal divisions within the movement to hold off Maya demands for political change.

7.2.6. Internal Divisions and the Counter-strategies of State Elites

The quantitative analyses above have revealed a certain inhibiting influence of intra-ethnic fragmentation on political empowerment – particularly on the chances of regional autonomy –, as stipulated by hypothesis H3b. Table A11 in Appendix VI has also shown that Guatemala’s Maya group is characterized by a very high degree of linguistic and religious fragmentation, according to the EPR-Cleavages dataset (Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt 2013). And indeed, according to both Maya leaders themselves and numerous non-Maya decision-makers, these divisions significantly weaken the movement’s political weight.299

A closer look at the data reveals that it is above all linguistic fractionalization that matters in this case. The mean values of religious and linguistic fractionalization in the whole Latin American sample equal 0.49 and 0.21 respectively, while Guatemala’s Maya group exhibits values of 0.38 and 0.94. As mentioned in section 7.1, there are about twenty different Maya language groups. Since the birth (or the resurgence) of the movement, it has been one of the paramount objectives of the pan-Mayanist intellectual elite to construct a unifying ethnic (and ethno-political) identity around these different groups (Warren 1998).

The lion’s share of this elite hails from the Kaqchikel and K’ichee’ groups whose settlement areas are located closer to urban centers (Warren 1998, 16). The Maya Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú, who in 2007 founded the ethnic electoral vehicle Winaq, is K’ichee’ as well.300 However, underlying this linguistic division, there are historical rivalries between the different Maya groups that stretch back to the pre-colonial period and still play out in today’s politics.301 A high-ranking official of Winaq’s ally in the 2007 election, Encuentro por Guatemala (EG), for instance, referred to these intra-Maya cleavages as one of the reasons why Menchú received very little electoral support, even among indigenous people; her indigenous support seems to be mainly confined to her own K’ichee’ group.302 The subsequent 2011 presidential

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300 Winaq is a K’ichee’ word and means something like “complete human being”.
301 Interview with member of government, 2011-6-14; political party leader, 2011-5-23-II; and parliamentarian, 2011-6-15-III. The historical (at times violent) rivalries are described, for instance, in both of the two most important Maya historical texts: the Popol Vuh (Recinos 1979), and the Annals of the Kaqchikel (Brinton 2007).
302 Interview 2011-5-23-II. As Winaq was not yet registered as a political party in 2007, it allied itself with the small EG party which endorsed Menchú as a presidential candidate.
election confirmed that Menchú does not only lack support among indigenous voters but also within the Maya political movement.303

Religion has sometimes been an additional divisive force. Religious disagreements, for instance, led the president of the Congressional Committee for Indigenous Peoples to refuse to sign the 2008 legislative initiative about indigenous sacred sites that was backed by Maya organizations.304 Overall however, old intra-ethnic rivalries between different Maya sub-groups seem to be more important than religious differences.

Building a strong ethnic party based on a fragmented ethnic group is not an easy task. As will be discussed below, the temporarily highly successful Pachakutik party in Ecuador also had to grapple with linguistic and religious divisions within the indigenous population. In Guatemala, the absence of a consolidated, autonomous ethnic party, means that both at the elite and the mass level, Maya political participation occurs on an individual – as opposed to a collective – basis, co-opted by a multiplicity of different parties. As a consequence, Maya forces are diffused in the political arena and, thus, rendered ineffective.305

In the case of Maya civil society organizations, this results in profound disagreements over the right choice of political alliances. Even within the traditional leftist wing, there were disagreements during the 2011 electoral campaign about whether or not to formally support Winaq, which was allied with the leftist URNG.306 On the other side of the political spectrum, we find a rather new, although not yet powerful faction that seeks an alliance with the political Right and the institutional representatives of the country’s powerful economic elite, such as the Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations, CACIF).307 Somewhere in between these two poles are those leaders who currently occupy posts within the state apparatus and who are generally inclined to work with political parties and governments, independent of their ideological program, as long as indigenous demands can somehow be put on the agenda.308

Yet, so far the leading political parties have not shown much genuine interest in taking up these demands. Although all of them have embraced the discourse of “multicultural Guatemala”, indigenous inclusion remains largely based on clientelistic and paternalistic forms. Politicians from both the Left and the Right proclaim themselves as the true leaders and advocates of the indigenous population. In this sense, the following statement by a non-indigenous URNG parliamentarian is revealing: “The perspective of the indigenous people lies in unifying and

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303 Interviews with Maya leaders, 2011-5-17, 2011-6-22-III; and indigenous parliamentarian, 2011-6-1.
304 Interview with non-indigenous parliamentarian, member of the Committee, 2011-6-16-I.
306 Interviews with Maya leaders, 2011-4-29, 2011-5-6, 2011-5-17, 2011-5-24-II.
307 Interview with Maya leader, 2011-6-22-II.
308 Interviews with Maya leaders, 2011-5-18-II, 2011-6-17, 2011-6-22-III.
strengthening themselves and fighting within the political project of the Guatemalan Left. That’s the perspective of the indigenous people. There is no other.”

Maya ascendancy in Guatemala also faces stiff resistance by the conservative sectors of the political class (politicians and state officials) and the non-indigenous economic elite behind them. On the one hand, there is the small, oligarchic “white” elite – perhaps making up about 5% of the country’s total population – that traces its ancestry back to the original Hispanic conquerors and sees itself above the dominant divide between ladinos and indigenous people (Casaús Arzú 1995). Represented today above all by the CACIF, it has dominated political power in Guatemala for centuries and continues to openly or secretly determine political decisions, for example by funding all relevant political parties.

While the individual mobility of certain Maya elites is accepted within the officially maintained multicultural rhetoric, this dominant class is reluctant to concede any further changes to the ethnic group hierarchy. On the one hand, this is due to the still prevalent racist ideologies; but on the other hand also because the extremely unequal land distribution and the cheap labor pool of poor indigenous peasants still constitutes an important source of wealth for this ethno-class (cp. Velásquez Nimatuj 2008). On the other hand, ladino peasants and middle and upper classes – both at the national and local levels – resent the political ascendancy of and fear the economic competition by a historically subordinated people (Hale 2006; Warren 1998, 51, 64-6).

This fear by the non-indigenous population of a change in the historical ethnic hierarchy reaches up to the highest circles of power. One conservative member of government was very frank about it in my interview: “If the indigenous groups were to become unified, they would rule this country.” Accordingly, economic and state elites have adopted various strategies to counter Maya empowerment.

One has been the co-option of specific leaders of the movement. Endowing these elites with relatively unimportant posts in the bureaucracy, often in the entities created especially for Maya issues, has both the effect of politically neutralizing them and of depriving the organizations of many talented, recognized leaders. The existing intra-Maya divisions described above have made it easier for state elites to counter Maya mobilization by pitting different sectors against each other. The following statement made by a member of government aptly reflects this strategy:

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309 Interview 2011-6-16-I. Regarding leftist paternalism in the revolutionary movement, see e.g. Velásquez Nimatuj (2008).
311 Regarding the prevalence of racist ideologies in Guatemala, see Casaús Arzú (1995).
312 Interview 2011-6-14.
313 Interviews with Maya leaders, 2011-5-12-II, 2011-6-27. See also Bastos and Brett (2010).
To begin with, these organisations are not Maya organisations. CUC, CONIC, CNOC, CODECA, (...) CONAVIGUA are not Maya organisations. They call themselves Maya organisations because there are about five persons who run them. But they do not represent the Maya. The real indigenous representatives are: the 48 Cantons of Totonicapán, the auxiliary mayors of Sololá and Chichicastenango, Kab’awil (...). These are the real and legitimate representatives. (...) The other organisations that you mention spend all their time opposing everything. (...) They make politics all the time. What the others do is development.314

There have also been constant allusions to the danger of reverse racism as a rhetorical means to oppose further change (Hale 2006).315 Finally, another way of delegitimizing Maya demands is resorting to a crude legalism referring to the constitution imposed by the army in 1985.316 Thereby, state elites limit the spectrum of political possibilities to the horizon of the existing legal framework, without considering any questions of legitimacy – what Velásquez Nimatuj (2008, 271) called the “omission of history”.317

In summary, the dominant non-indigenous elite have adjusted to the new situation by adopting new strategies to preserve the historical ethnic hierarchy. In particular, they have been very adept at exploiting existing divisions within the Maya movement.

7.3. Ethnic Mobilization and the Bittersweet Flavor of Success: Organizational Strength, Empowerment, and the Co-option of the Indigenous Movement in Ecuador

The present section focuses on Ecuador’s indigenous people, showing how their strong ethnic mobilization resulted in considerable political gains before growing intra-ethnic divisions led to a backlash under the current government. The following section reveals how the much weaker mobilization efforts of Afro-Ecuadorians have been effectively contained by the state system.

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314 Interview 2011-6-4.
315 Cp. also the quote of the former Guatemalan government member in Chapter 3.2.
316 Guatemala’s 1985 Constitution was essentially a strategic project of the military rulers that perpetuated their position above the law and legalized basic counterinsurgency institutions, such as the civil self-defense patrols or the army-controlled “model villages” (Jonas 1995; Schirmer 1998). The inviolable guarantee of private property also implicitly sanctions the historical land expropriations in favor of the plantation economy and the forced displacements in the course of the military’s “scorched earth” strategy during the civil war. Thus, injustices and (war) crimes of the past were legally sanctioned through the constitution.
317 This crude legalism is also the argumentative strategy of the conservative sector of Guatemala’s media to dismiss many Maya demands (interview with media representative, 2011-6-21).
7.3.1. Protest, Electoral Successes, and Political Empowerment

The political agenda of Ecuador’s indigenous organizations has changed relatively little over time, and among the main issues, we find many that we have already seen in the Guatemalan case: agrarian reform, bilingual education, health, and self-determination over the use of natural resources in indigenous territories. The latter is clearly the most conflictive political issue in present-day Ecuador. The political agenda of Ecuador’s indigenous organizations has changed relatively little over time, and among the main issues, we find many that we have already seen in the Guatemalan case: agrarian reform, bilingual education, health, and self-determination over the use of natural resources in indigenous territories. The latter is clearly the most conflictive political issue in present-day Ecuador.318

An analysis of the strategies used by indigenous civil society organizations to influence politics in Ecuador also reflects the picture from Guatemala. Pressure through popular mobilization, protest and demonstrations have been linked to targeted lobbying vis-à-vis state institutions. Yet, because of its stronger ethnic organizations, such as CONAIE, CONFENIAE, and EC-UARUNARI, which command large pools of followers in the countryside, Ecuador’s indigenous movement has been able to mount much more powerful actions of protest, signaling more political strength to the non-indigenous elite, and therefore has gained more leverage in negotiations. There is no doubt that CONAIE and its affiliated organizations constituted the most powerful social force in the country during the 1990s. This has also led to more access to the mainstream media, which have become relatively open to address such issues as the externalities of natural resource extraction and ethnic demands in general.320

Moreover, the creation of Pachakutik as the electoral complement to CONAIE provided three additional strategic advantages. First, the party has always constituted a natural access point to the Ecuadorian legislative. Secondly, it has also served as an instrument of unification of indigenous actors in the electoral arena, preventing the diffusion of forces – of both the indigenous leaders and masses – into other political parties. And finally, by relying on indigenous voter bases already mobilized by ethnic civil society organizations, electoral participation through Pachakutik has allowed the indigenous movement to capture political power at the sub-state level. Hence, there have been clear and strong synergies between civil society and electoral mobilization in Ecuador which has been missing in Guatemala. Accordingly, the political gains obtained by indigenous people are much greater in Ecuador than in Guatemala. Indigenous organizations exerted considerable influence on the constituent assemblies that drafted the progressive constitutions of 1998 and 2008. The latter declared Ecuador to be plurinational, and elevated Kichwa and Shuar (besides Spanish) to “official languages for intercultural relationships” (Becker 2011, 57-9, 130-51; Mijeski and Beck 2011, 120). In 1998, Ecuador also ratified the ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. The

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318 Interviews with indigenous leaders, 2013-4-11-II, 2013-4-15, 2013-4-17, 2013-5-1, 2013-5-8-II.
319 Interviews with Ariruma Kowii, 2013-4-11; Pablo Dávalos, 2013-4-10; Alberto Acosta, 2013-4-18; Pablo Ospina, 2013-5-2; indigenous parliamentarian, 2013-4-23-II; state bureaucrats, 2013-4-19, 2013-5-2-I; and outside expert, 2013-4-25.
320 Interviews with Pablo Dávalos, 2013-4-10; Alberto Acosta, 2013-4-18; and journalists, 2013-4-9, 2013-4-12.
321 Interviews with indigenous leader, 2013-4-11-II; and indigenous parliamentarians, 2013-4-23-I, 2013-4-23-II.
322 Interview with Pablo Ospina, 2013-5-2.
creation of state agencies for indigenous peoples under the control of indigenous organizations, such as the Dirección Nacional de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe (Directorate of Bilingual Education, DINEIB) provided real power in specific domains, a number of bureaucratic posts, and considerable financial resources (Lucero 2008, 128; Pallares 2007, 146-7).

The ephemeral ascent to the highest executive power in the course of the January 2000 coup was followed by a short-lived participation in Lucio Gutiérrez' government in 2003. As a reward for its support, Gutiérrez appointed three figureheads of the indigenous movement to important posts: Luis Macas as Minister for Agriculture, Nina Pacari as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Lourdes Tibán as undersecretary in the Ministry for Social Welfare. However, the alliance broke apart after only six months (Becker 2011, 84, 87). Gutiérrez then appointed CONAIE's ex-president and his former companion in the three-man junta of 2000, Antonio Vargas, to the post of Minister for Social Welfare (Becker 2011, 91).

Besides (and even more important than) indigenous political participation at the national level, Pachakutik’s electoral success has resulted in the capture of local and regional power by indigenous leaders who have created novel forms of participatory democracy directly influenced by indigenous organizations, thus carving out spaces of autonomous political power (Ospina, Santillana, and Arboleda 2008; Van Cott 2005, 231; 2008). In the 2000 regional and local elections, Pachakutik won five provincial prefectures and nineteen municipal governments (Becker 2011, 71). In the central highland province of Cotopaxi, for instance, which has a high indigenous population share, Pachakutik candidate César Umajinga, backed by the regional CONAIE affiliate, was the first indigenous politician to be elected prefect of the region (Ospina 2006). The link between strong ethnic mobilization and a more equal (or less unequal) distribution of political power was nicely summarized by Alberto Acosta in my interview: “The current situation would be unthinkable without the indigenous movement. The indigenous people have changed from being objects to political subjects.”

In short, besides the mechanisms of popular mobilization and of ethnic interest aggregation and representation vis-à-vis the state, which we have already seen in the case of Guatemala, the capture of political power through an ethnic party has been particularly important for the indigenous people in Ecuador.

7.3.2. Intra-ethnic Divisions, State Responses, and the Political Backlash of the 2000s

On the linguistic fractionalization index used in the quantitative analyses above, indigenous people in Ecuador exhibit a value that is almost as high as that of the Maya in Guatemala (0.93). Although in a less profound way than in Guatemala, cultural-linguistic differences be-
tween highland and lowland groups and among the different lowland groups have directly translated into tangible disagreements in the political arena. One issue among the lowland groups has been the dominance of the two largest language groups, the Kichwa and Shuar, within CONFENIAE on the one hand, and rivalries between these two groups on the other hand (Becker 2011, 9; Lucero 2008, 103).

The regional cleavage between the lowland and highland groups has also complicated processes of political unification and collective action. At the outset, the paramount issue referred to the difference between the traditional classist approach of mobilization in the highlands versus the ethnically based stance of the lowland groups and, consequently, the relationship of the indigenous movement to leftist ideologies and organizations (Becker 2011, 9, 49-50). While electoral mobilization brought many benefits to Ecuador’s indigenous movement, it also deepened these regional divisions over time. Most importantly, CONFENIAE’s continuing alliance with Gutiérrez, and Vargas’ participation in his government after the rupture of the coalition with Pachakutik, drove a wedge between the two factions (Becker 2011, 87, 91-2; Lucero 2008, 182; Mijeski and Beck 2011, 92-6, 117). Although more united in their opposition to Correa’s government, today there continue to be difficulties in unifying the specific issues of the lowland and highland indigenous groups within CONAIE, as one lowland indigenous leader explained to me.324

Ecuador’s indigenous people also exhibit a relatively high degree of religious fragmentation (0.44 on the religious fractionalization index). Evangelical churches founded an alternative national organization of indigenous communities of evangelical faith, the Consejo de Pueblos y Organizaciones Indígenas Evangélicas del Ecuador (Council of Indigenous Evangelical Peoples and Organizations of Ecuador, FEINE) as a counterweight to the leftist ideologies within the indigenous movement (Becker 2011, 17). FEINE has often come into political competition with CONAIE, most fiercely so when the organization supported Gutiérrez’ government after the collapsed alliance with Pachakutik and CONAIE (Becker 2011, 91, 94; Mijeski and Beck 2011, 95, 99). Already before that, FEINE had launched its own electoral vehicle, Amauta Jatari, which however never garnered much support and soon disappeared from the electoral list (Becker 2011, 78, 97; Lucero 2008, 170; Mijeski and Beck 2011, 69). Growing influence of evangelical churches in areas such as Chimborazo have further contributed to this intra-ethnic religious division (Becker 2011, 111).

Furthermore, much of the competition between Ecuador’s indigenous organizations in Ecuador has centered around the spoils that came with the political empowerment, such as bureaucratic posts and resources, for example in relation with the bilingual education program.325 The

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324 Interview 2013-5-1.
325 Interviews with Ariruma Kowii, 2013-4-11; and indigenous leaders 2013-4-15, 2013-4-17. See also Becker (2011, 17), and Lucero (2008, 163-4).
dominant role of CONAIE as a recipient of these spoils has provoked certain resentment by other organizations of the movement.\textsuperscript{326} In this sense, the political empowerment has also taken a heavy toll on the project of indigenous mobilization in Ecuador by fuelling distribution battles. Nevertheless, the Ecuadorian movement has often been able to maintain unity and achieve cooperation around common demands (Becker 2011, 17; Lucero 2008, 163-4). Currently, for example, the discussions around the planned law about the use of water resources serve as a unifying force among the different indigenous organizations.\textsuperscript{327} For a long time, CONAIE also achieved to include very diverse social interests alongside indigenous demands, which was an important reason for its political success (Becker 2011, 11; Gerlach 2003, 47, 75). Moreover, without the historical experience of violent revolution and militant leftist mobilization, the electoral alliance with the Left has been more natural in Ecuador than in Guatemala, and for a long time, there was a fruitful compromise between class-based and ethnic mobilization (Becker 2011, 10, 50).

Yet, as in Guatemala, Ecuadorian state elites from all political camps have attempted to block further changes to the historical ethnic hierarchy. Political leaders, such as former presidents Abdalá Bucaram and Lucio Gutiérrez, have often successfully exploited the intra-ethnic divisions described above. Through his bureaucratic appointments and clientelistic programs, and the restructuring of state agencies dedicated to the ethnic minorities, Gutiérrez pitted both highland and lowland groups, and the leftist, predominantly Catholic CONAIE and the evangelical FEINE against each other (Becker 2011, 85-96; Lucero 2008, 129, 179, 182; Mijeski and Beck 2011, 92-6).

However, the strongest backlash to ethnic mobilization in Ecuador has occurred under the current government of Rafael Correa, who has shut the door on indigenous organizations.\textsuperscript{328} Correa – who comes from a traditional leftist background – favors the well-being of the non-indigenous majority over the promotion of ethnic group rights.\textsuperscript{329} At the roots of his political effectiveness stands the return of the Ecuadorian state after the long period of neoliberal politics. While the economic model is still completely based on the revenues from oil and other natural resource exports, the state collects more taxes and invests heavily in infrastructure, health, and education (Acosta 2012; Becker 2011, 203, 213). Hence, a growing and increasingly

\textsuperscript{326} Interview with indigenous leader, 2013-4-17.
\textsuperscript{327} Interviews with indigenous leaders, 2013-4-11-II, 2013-4-17. See also Becker (2011, 188).
\textsuperscript{328} Interviews with indigenous leaders, 2013-4-11-II, 2013-4-17, 2013-5-1, 2013-5-8-II; state bureaucrats, 2013-4-19, 2013-4-22-II; and political party leader, 2013-5-9. The decreasing access of indigenous organizations to the state administration under the current government is exemplified by the reorganization of the DINEIB which in 2008 moved under the direct control of the Ministry for Education.
\textsuperscript{329} Interviews with Pablo Dávalos, 2013-4-10; Pablo Ospina, 2013-5-2; Pablo Minda, 2013-5-10. See also Becker (2011, 189-90, 214). Based on Correa’s slogan of the “revolución ciudadana” (“citizens’ revolution”), one indigenous parliamentarian spoke to me of the danger of a “ciudadanización de lo colectivo” (which could be translated as “transforming the collectivity into individual citizens”) (interview 2013-4-23-I). This tension between ethnic group rights and the politics of majoritarianism was also expressed to me by a state bureaucrat from the Secretaría Nacional de Pueblos, Movimientos Sociales y Participación Ciudadana (State Secretariat of Peoples, Social Movements and Citizen Participation) (interview 2013-5-7-II).
authoritarian state, unified behind a strong and popular leader, is forcefully expanding its influence over society. This reduces the political space and, therefore, significantly decreases the weight of ethnic (and other autonomous) civil society organizations.\textsuperscript{330}

Moreover, the indigenous movement has become “infiltrated” by the disciplinary forces of the state, through the integration of indigenous communities in clientelistic social programs, the systematic co-option of indigenous elites who are given posts within the state apparatus, and even the capture of specific organizations by government-allied elites. This has severely restrained the mobilizational strength of the organizations.\textsuperscript{331} Correa and others who are now in power also know the indigenous movement very well from inside and use this knowledge to weaken it.\textsuperscript{332} For instance, he has appropriated the discourse and (to a lesser extent) the agenda of CONAIE and Pachakutik, thus depriving them of their main source of political appeal.\textsuperscript{333}

Together with the economic recovery and the massive social and infrastructural investments, this has decreased the legitimacy of the demands of indigenous organizations in the eyes of large parts of the public and even the indigenous population itself.\textsuperscript{334} Finally, in the few instances in which indigenous organizations are still able to mobilize their ethnic constituencies against government policies, both organizers and participants risk harsh consequences, either in the form of physical repression or judicial persecution.\textsuperscript{335}

In summary, challenged by a strong ethnic movement that has been as politically successful as few others in Latin America, Ecuador’s non-indigenous political elite have once again regained their hegemony. As a consequence – and despite greater unity – the indigenous movement in Ecuador has not avoided the trend of declining influence disclosed in Figure 6-5 of 6.2. As Pablo Dávalos expressed to me: “The Ecuadorian state has raised antibodies against ethnic mobilization”.\textsuperscript{336}

\textsuperscript{330} Interviews with Pablo Dávalos, 2013-4-10; Pablo Ospina, 2013-5-2; indigenous leaders, 2013-5-1, 2013-5-8-II; and journalists, 2013-4-9, 2013-4-12.

\textsuperscript{331} Interviews with Pablo Dávalos, 2013-4-10; Alberto Acosta, 2013-4-18; indigenous leaders 2013-4-11-II, 2013-4-15, 2013-5-1, 2013-5-8-II; indigenous parliamentarians, 2013-4-23-I, 2013-4-23-II; state bureaucrats, 2013-4-19, 2013-5-2-I; and journalists, 2013-4-9, 2013-4-12, 2013-4-18-II. The case of the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negros (National Confederation of Peasant, Indigenous and Black Organizations, FENOCIN) is exemplary in this regard. During my stay in the country, the organization was just undergoing a contentious change of leadership with the old, well-known leaders (like Pedro de la Cruz) being replaced by a group of more government-friendly “newcomers” which has led to a split within the organization (interview with indigenous leader, 2013-4-15).

\textsuperscript{332} Interviews with indigenous leader, 2013-5-1; indigenous parliamentarian, 2013-4-23-I; and outside expert, 2013-4-25.

\textsuperscript{333} Interviews with Ariruma Kowii, 2013-4-11; Alberto Acosta, 2013-4-18; indigenous leaders, 2013-4-11-II, 2013-4-15, 2013-4-17, 2013-5-1; political party leader, 2013-4-22-I; state bureaucrat, 2013-5-7-I; and journalists, 2013-4-5, 2013-4-9, 2013-4-12. Generally, the (at least nominally) leftist identity of the current government has complicated matters for the indigenous movement that has traditionally been allied with the Left. The rightist, neoliberal governments of the past were much easier targets for mobilization, as one outside expert and former parliamentarian explained to me (interview 2013-4-25).

\textsuperscript{334} Interviews with Ariruma Kowii, 2013-4-11; state bureaucrats, 2013-4-22-II, 2013-5-7-I; and journalists, 2013-4-5, 2013-4-9, 2013-4-12.

\textsuperscript{335} Interviews with Pablo Dávalos, 2013-4-10; Alberto Acosta, 2013-4-18; indigenous leaders 2013-4-11-II, 2013-4-17, 2013-5-1; indigenous parliamentarians, 2013-4-23-I, 2013-4-23-II; other parliamentarians or political party leaders, 2013-4-22-I, 2013-4-24, 2013-5-2-II; and journalists, 2013-4-5, 2013-4-9, 2013-4-12, 2013-4-18-II. See also Becker (2011, 219, 233).

\textsuperscript{336} Interview 2013-4-10.
7.4. In the Shadows of Success: Afro-Ecuadorian Mobilization Attempts

While indigenous people have achieved a high level of political protagonism and, consequently, an improved political status, Afro-Ecuadorian mobilization has been of less importance to Ecuadorian politics. The demands of the organizations which in the 1990s became more audible have focused on the issues of ethno-culturally sensitive education, the right to ancestral territories (especially in the province of Esmeraldas), discrimination in the labor market and the health care system, equal participation in the political system, and the struggle against racial discrimination, poverty and urban segregation.\footnote{Interviews with Nieves Méndez, 2013-5-6; Jhon Antón Sánchez, 2013-5-7; José Chalá Cruz, 2013-5-8; and Pablo Minda, 2013-5-10. See also Antón Sánchez (2011, 182-95).}

The 2008 constitution gives many of the same rights to Afro-Ecuadorians that it provides to indigenous people. Moreover, the Executive Decree 60 of 2009 put into force the “Plurinational Plan to Eliminate Racial Discrimination and Ethnic and Cultural Exclusion” obligating the Ecuadorian state to combat discrimination and promote inclusive citizenship. Together with the 2006 Law for the Collective Rights of the Afro-Ecuadorian People, these provisions constitute the main political achievements of the Afro-Ecuadorian movement (Antón Sánchez 2011, 17, 151-2, 235-40).

Despite the similar agenda (for example, regarding education, health, and territorial rights), Afro-Ecuadorian organizations have followed a mobilization strategy that is very different from that of the indigenous movement. Instead of the politics of pressure, protest, and large-scale demonstrations, the focus has been on gaining access to the state apparatus through specific individuals.\footnote{Interviews with Nieves Méndez, 2013-5-6; José Chalá Cruz, 2013-5-8; Pablo Minda, 2013-5-10; and state bureaucrat, 2013-5-7-II. See also Antón Sánchez (2011, 163-74).} The scarce public protest events are usually sponsored and co-organized by state institutions (Antón Sánchez 2011, 173-4). There is also little in the way of a concerted strategy of agenda setting through the media, which – if at all – show little openness towards the concerns of black Ecuadorians.\footnote{Interviews with Nieves Méndez, 2013-5-6; Jhon Antón Sánchez, 2013-5-7; and José Chalá Cruz, 2013-5-8.} Overall, the movement is still very weakly institutionalized, guided much more by specific individuals (mostly operating within the state apparatus) than consolidated organizations.\footnote{Interview with Nieves Méndez, 2013-5-6.}

Compared to the indigenous organizations, the Afro-Ecuadorian movement also has a less hierarchical organization structure which complicates internal decision-making processes and lobbying activities vis-à-vis the state.\footnote{Interview with state bureaucrat, 2013-5-7-II.} As a result, Afro-Ecuadorian mobilization today is still regarded as marginal by most outside observers.\footnote{Interview with Nieves Méndez, 2013-5-6; Jhon Antón Sánchez, 2013-5-7; and José Chalá Cruz, 2013-5-8.} In addition, the movement is plagued by internal disagreements about the appropriate strategies, and leadership disputes over bureaucratic posts, often resulting from sheer economic necessities but also from personal ambi-
The resources of CODAE, especially, have often been used by leaders as a means to create clientelistic networks rather than as an instrument for Afro-Ecuadorian advancement (Antón Sánchez 2011, 258). Finally, due to the differences in mobilizational strategies, but also because of latent inter-ethnic prejudices between the two blocs, there is little cooperation between indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian organizations.

In view of the still feeble challenge that these organizations pose, most of the time state elites have reacted by simply ignoring their demands. The few relevant leaders (much fewer than from the indigenous sector) are easily co-opted through bureaucratic posts and material incentives, to the extent that today it is difficult to discern any autonomous Afro-Ecuadorian mobilization. Most recently, the ruling party Movimiento Alianza PAIS (Movement PAIS Alliance) has promoted the election of some Afro-Ecuadorian ex-footballers to the national parliament, which has been interpreted by movement activists as just another attempt by the government to depoliticize and thus dismantle Afro-Ecuadorian mobilization.

In short, the within-country comparison of the Afro-Ecuadorian and indigenous movements in Ecuador demonstrates the importance of strong, autonomous ethnic organizations for the prospects of marginalized groups’ political empowerment in ranked ethnic systems. Within the same political-institutional framework, strong indigenous organizations have (at least temporarily) achieved much more far-reaching political gains for their ethnic constituency than their weaker Afro-Ecuadorian counterparts.

### 7.5. Indigenous “Uprisings” and Political Stability in Ecuador: About the Innocuousness of Ethnic Mobilization in Ranked Societies

Ecuador’s indigenous movement has been one of the most militant in Latin America. Civil society organizations have mobilized tens of thousands of their constituency to fight for their rights as indigenous people, while a political party has advanced ethnic interests in the conventional political system. The high political protagonism of a historically discriminated group and the significant political gains it achieved make Ecuador an excellent case to analyze the effect of ethnic mobilization on conflict and stability in Latin America, but also beyond this region, in ranked ethnic systems in general. Figure 7-4 shows the strength of ethnic civil society mobilization and the level of ethnic group protest in Ecuador over time. As in the quantitative analyses above, the latter variable is taken from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009), and therefore only covers the time period from 1985 to 2006.

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344 Interviews with Nieves Méndez, 2013-5-6; José Chalá Cruz, 2013-5-8; and Pablo Minda, 2013-5-10.
345 Interviews with Nieves Méndez, 2013-5-6; Jhon Antón Sánchez, 2013-5-7; Pablo Minda, 2013-5-10; and state bureaucrat, 2013-5-7-II. See also Antón Sánchez (2011).
346 Interview with Pablo Minda, 2013-5-10.
We can see a rather close relationship between organizational strength of the indigenous movement and the level of collective ethnic protest observed in the country over this period. Remember that the global and regional quantitative analyses found a positive relationship between ethnic parties and collective protest. In contrast, in the Latin American region as a whole, ethnic civil society mobilization did not reveal a significant effect. The fact that in Ecuador, the strength of the movement does correlate with the level of collective protest highlights again the effectiveness of these organizations in the case of Ecuador. In one year only, the level of ethnic protest in Ecuador was below the value of 2, which according to the MAR codebook equals “symbolic resistance” in the form of “sabotage, symbolic destruction of property or political organizing activity on a substantial scale (e.g. sit-ins, blockage of traffic)” [emphasis in the original] (Minorities at Risk Project 2007, 22). The highest level of ethnic protest reached during this time period equals 4, which the MAR codebook describes as “demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, the largest of which has total participation between 10,000 and 100,000” people (Minorities at Risk Project 2007, 22).

Figure 7-4: Ethnic mobilization and group protest in Ecuador, 1985-2006

Notes: Ethnic civil society strength measured by “density” of ethnic organizations at country level, i.e. number of organizations relative to country population (see Chapter 6.2), lagged by one year. Data on ethnic group protest from Minorities at Risk dataset, using the highest group-level value as the country-level score in each year.

Importantly, as mentioned in Chapter 3.3.2, the MAR variable records non-violent forms of protest. Hence, while these findings highlight ethnic organizations’ capacity to mobilize the mass-
es, they do not imply any kind of violent conflict. According to the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012), there was only one incident of communal violence in Ecuador during the period from 1989 to 2009, which was an inter-ethnic conflict between two Amazonian groups in 2003. Hence, there is no indication at all that the strong ethnic mobilization and the (partial) empowerment of a historically discriminated group have raised the level of ethnic conflict in Ecuador.

Accordingly, as we have seen above, most of the political and social actors who were interviewed do not consider ethnic relations to be a potential threat to the country’s political stability. Neither do any of the interviewed indigenous leaders envision a radicalization of the movement or the use of violent measures. One conservative parliamentarian expressed his fear that “once the indigenous people lose their fear, blood could flow” – especially if, as currently under Correa, they are not treated well. 348 However, this statement is clearly an exception to the general trend.

Another conservative politician from the same party maintained that although ethnic polarization has not increased in the country, indigenous mobilization did contribute to institutional instability. 349 However, the empirical record clearly contradicts this assessment. Figure 7.5 examines political instability in Ecuador and its potential relation to ethnic mobilization from an historical perspective. It shows all incidents of institutional instability, measured with the same indicator that was used in the statistical analyses in Chapters 3.3.2 and 6.3, and all incidents of irregular removals of a president between 1946 and 2009. The latter variable stems from the Archigos Dataset of Political Leaders, and indicates whether an acting president was removed by irregular means, i.e. “in contravention of explicit rules and established conventions (...) at the hands of domestic opponents”, for example through a coup, popular revolt or assassination (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009, 273). 351

The figure reveals that political instability in Ecuador was actually more pronounced before ethnic mobilization became really powerful. There were both more instances of institutional instability and more irregular removals of acting presidents in the period until 1980 than from 1980 to 2009. Hence, although indigenous empowerment in Ecuador has coincided with the ousting of three presidents in the last twenty years, a more systematic analysis shows that such instability has always been a characteristic feature of Ecuadorian politics – with or without ethnic mobilization.

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348 Interview 2013-5-2-II.
349 Interview 2013-4-24.
350 Based on Fearon and Laitin (2003) who operationalize political instability as a change on the Polity index of three points or more in a single year.
351 Note that the Archigos dataset covers the period from 1875 to 2004. I completed the coding of Ecuador for the remaining years up to 2009 myself.
Moreover, most Ecuadorian politicians and outside observers agree that the real causes of the most recent instances of political instability do not lie in the indigenous mobilization.\textsuperscript{352} First, the political institutions were already weak before indigenous people entered the political arena. Secondly, the opposition to the ousted presidents did not only come from the indigenous groups but from the population as a whole.\textsuperscript{353} Indeed, there was no ethnically based support of the removals of both Bucaram in 1997 and Mahuad in 2000. In both occasions, over 90% of the country’s population wanted them sacked (Gerlach 2003, xiv). This stands in stark contrast to the case of Côte d’Ivoire discussed above, in which political support of all relevant leaders has been highly ethnicized since at least 1995, and in which the rebellion of 2002 was clearly impelled by the leaders and the masses from the country’s north. As one current Ecuadorian state official expressed to me: “Those presidents fell because they had completely lost their representativeness for the people.”\textsuperscript{354} Thirdly, although indigenous mobilization served as a trigger for the January 2000 coup, in the end it was the (non-indigenous) military command that played the decisive role by withdrawing its support for Mahuad. The same is true for the events in 1997 and 2005.\textsuperscript{355}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure7-5.png}
\caption{Ethnic mobilization and institutional instability in Ecuador, 1946-2009}
\end{figure}

Notes: Ethnic civil society strength measured by the density of ethnic organizations. Data on irregular exits of presidents from Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009), extended to 2009 by the author. Institutional instability operationalized as a change on the Polity IV index of three points or more in a single year (see Fearon and Laitin 2003).

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item Interviews Alberto Acosta, 2013-4-18; political party leader, 2013-4-22-I; state bureaucrat, 2013-4-19; and outside observer, 2013-4-25.
\item Interview with political party leader, 2013-5-9.
\item Interview 2013-4-19.
\item Interviews with Lucio Gutiérrez, 2013-5-2; Pablo Minda, 2013-5-10; and outside observer, 2013-4-25.
\end{itemize}
Why has ethnic mobilization not seriously affected peace and stability in Ecuador (and elsewhere in Latin America)? The targeted co-option of indigenous (and Afro-Ecuadorian) leaders and the related practices of clientelism have mitigated the impact of ethnic mobilization on the stability of the Ecuadorian political system. At the same time, the persisting socio-economic inequalities, the high degree of geographic intermixture of ethnic groups and their economic interdependence militate against the possibility of violent ethnic conflict. For instance, the basic food products consumed in the mestizo-dominated cities are overwhelmingly produced in the countryside by indigenous labor.

Moreover, even if there was a serious intention on the part of Ecuador’s historically marginalized groups, they would simply lack the resources necessary for sustained violent rebellion.\footnote{Interviews with Ariruma Kowii, 2013-4-11; Pablo Ospina, 2013-5-2; and Pablo Minda, 2013-5-10.} Related to the issue of the socio-economic inequalities and the historical process of colonization in general is the lack of a strong, culturally self-conscious and financially autonomous indigenous bourgeoisie.\footnote{Interview Pablo Ospina, 2013-5-2.} Historically, the European bourgeoisie and cultural elite have been the driving forces of ethno-nationalism (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983). In Ecuador, indigenous leaders often do not hold on to their own language and culture, implying that the ideological colonization continues to be effective today.\footnote{Interview with Ariruma Kowii, 2013-4-11. Afro-Ecuadorians for their part do not possess their own language anymore.} As a result, ethno-nationalism in the historical European form – at the roots of many ethnic conflicts in unranked multi-ethnic societies – is almost completely absent in Ecuador.\footnote{In my interview, Pablo Ospina referred to the Aymara in Bolivia as the only potential exception to this general lack of nationally minded bourgeoisies among indigenous groups in Latin America. Interestingly, certain Aymara leaders, such as Felipe Quispe, have also been the only vocal advocates of indigenous “homelands” (Madrid 2012, 44).}

7.6. Conclusion

In summary, the two case studies confirm the effect of strong ethnic organizations on empowerment in ranked ethnic systems, as expressed by hypothesis H1b. Besides the capture of political power by an ethnic party in Ecuador, the two main mechanisms, by which ethnic organizations have achieved their goals, are the aggregation of the interests of discriminated individuals into ethno-political movements that represent these interests vis-à-vis the state, and the power of mass mobilization.

However, the case studies also lead us back to two important results of the quantitative analyses in Chapter 6.2. On the one hand, ethnic mobilization in the realm of civil society has lost much of its force in the last decade. On the other hand, the Guatemalan case seems to confirm that overall, the chances of historically marginalized groups to achieve political empowerment are significantly lower – and increasingly so – without a strong ethnic party.
The case studies also illustrate the debilitating effect of intra-ethnic fractionalization, as stipulated by hypothesis H3b, although religious and linguistic divisions are only one of several potential fault lines within Latin American ethnic movements. Partisan and ideological divisions, and – in the case of Ecuador – distribution battles over the spoils of empowerment have also caused much damage to marginalized groups’ mobilization efforts.

Finally, the analysis of the Ecuadorian case has confirmed the assumption, expressed in hypothesis H2b, that in ranked ethnic systems, ethnic mobilization does not increase the risk of ethnic conflict. The absence of ethno-nationalism and the large gap of political and socioeconomic power between dominant and subordinated groups, which facilitates the selective co-option of the latter’s leaders, operates against violent conflict. Clearly, these are factors that equally apply to most ranked societies, both in Latin America and beyond. Hence, while such claims have sometimes been made by reluctant elites as a rhetorical strategy to delegitimize the ethnic mobilization of historically marginalized groups (cp. Hale 2006, 51, 70-1; Jonas 2000, 189-213; Olmos 2003), the case study of Ecuador confirms that this mobilization does not fuel ethnic conflict in ranked societies.
PART III: CONCLUSION
8. Conclusions: Two Different Faces of Ethnic Politics

This study has addressed a fundamental political challenge for multi-ethnic countries: the equal and peaceful co-existence of different ethnic groups. Concretely, it has analyzed the effects of ethnic mobilization on ethnic equality and civil conflict in different parts of the world, and under different configurations of inter-ethnic relations. Most of today’s states are multi-ethnic, resulting in what has been termed a “state-to-nation imbalance” that creates political instability (Miller 2007, 2). Indeed, the vast majority of armed conflicts since World War II have been intra-state wars, often along ethnic lines (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 1994, 347; Harbom and Wallensteen 2010, 503; Wimmer 2004, 1-2).

While recent research has highlighted the connection between ethnic inequalities and conflict (Birnir 2007; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 2000b; Østby 2008), we know much less about the important processes of collective action and group mobilization that lie in between these two variables. In particular, systematic empirical evidence about the effect of ethnic organizations is scarce.\footnote{Exceptions are Basedau et al. (2011); Birnir (2007); Chandra (2012); Straus (2012); and Varshney (2001).}

In this study, I have argued that the effects of ethnic mobilization depend on the type of multi-ethnic society at hand. Racial hierarchies created during centuries of colonization and mass slavery remain highly relevant today and continue to shape ethnic group relations, wherever the former colonizers live together with groups that are perceived to be racially distinct. Such differences between European or European-descendant groups and “racial others” are connected to the most profound ethnic inequalities and the most stable group hierarchies, as the historical outcome of dominance and subordination is maintained by persisting racist ideologies and tangible material interests. In the words of Horowitz (1985) we can call these societies “ranked ethnic systems”, distinguished from “unranked systems” which are composed of a priori equal groups, without any historically determined political hierarchy between them. The latter result from other types of ethnic cleavages, most importantly linguistic differences, and are often characterized by pervasive ethnic competition.

Hence, ethnicity is highly relevant for politics in both systems. Yet, while in ranked systems it serves as an instrument of permanent oppression, in unranked societies it forms the basis of intense group competition. This is not to say that ethnic exclusion or even discrimination does not occur in the latter type of multi-ethnic societies. However, the crucial point here is that generally, the patterns of inclusion and exclusion in unranked systems are more fluid over time.

These different ethno-political constellations influence the goals of ethnic mobilization, and the capacity of groups to engage in violent collective action. Ethno-nationalism, and ethno-political competition – the two main factors linking ethnicity to conflict – can frequently be
found in unranked ethnic systems but are usually absent in ranked systems. At the same time, the profound inter-group inequalities in ranked systems have deprived the subordinated groups of the very means to violently challenge their marginalization—a situation that I have labeled an “equilibrium of inequality”—, while the capacities for violent action are relatively evenly distributed between different groups in unranked systems.

I have argued that these systematic differences, with respect to the motivations of mobilization and the capacity for rebellion, condition the effect of ethnic mobilization in the two types of multi-ethnic societies. Strong ethnic organizations have a negative effect on both ethnic equality and the prospects of peace in unranked systems, while the ethnic mobilization of historically marginalized groups in ranked systems helps to empower these groups and enhance ethnic equality, without increasing the risk of conflict. In addition to this structural argument, this study has also advanced an actor-centered argument, focusing on the causal role of ethnic organizations as instruments of organizational power, which help to advance ethnic claims, mobilize people, and orchestrate collective action.

The methodological approach used in this study combined the power of abstraction and generalization of quantitative research with the contextual precision and analytical depth of qualitative studies. Its global coverage has allowed to observe recurring mechanisms and to arrive at generalizable conclusions about the work that ethnicity does, and the consequences of its political invocation, across manifold regions. In the following, I will systematically summarize all empirical results of the previous chapters for each step of my theoretical argument. I start with the structural relationships before turning specifically to the role of ethnic organizations and the precise causal mechanisms underlying these relationships.

Ranked versus Unranked Societies: A Binary Classification of Multi-ethnic States

The first element in the argument refers to the role of different ethnic markers in the structuring of multi-ethnic societies. The empirical results of Chapter 1.3, at both the country and the group level, have confirmed that the type of ethnic cleavages is a highly important determinant for the degree and persistence of inter-group inequalities. Racially divided states with European(-descendant) groups indeed experience the longest average periods of one-group ethnic dominance. At the same time, they exhibit the lowest frequency of ethnic power shifts, meaning that redistributions of political power between ethnic groups are extremely rare.

In contrast, linguistically divided countries, and racially divided countries without any European groups, experience on average the shortest periods of one-group dominance and the highest frequency of power shifts, which means that there is a more regular change in the set of included groups. Religion is somewhat in between these two poles regarding ethnic hierarchization but overall comes closer to the effect of linguistic cleavages. Importantly, these differences
between the cleavage types are independent of the demographic structure. This shows that the ongoing political effect of European racism goes beyond the sheer ethno-demographic tyranny that Mann (2005) referred to as the result of the conjunction of nationalism and democracy. Clearly, there is a particularly powerful force inherent in this European racial paradigm that has made it possible even for minority groups to rule tyrannically.

The evidence at the group level confirms these patterns. Controlling for group size, there is a statistically significant link between European racial identity and long periods of political dominance. At the same time, the results prove that it is only European racial identity that matters. While other racial groups – as an umbrella category – are generally more likely to be politically discriminated for long periods of time, there are no systematic differences between them with regard to the political power distribution.

In sum, these findings support my notion of ranked systems as countries characterized by the dominance of a European(-descendant) group over other groups which are perceived to be racially distinct. The subsequent dichotomized comparison in Chapter 3.2 has confirmed the argument that there are systematic differences between ranked and unranked systems regarding the degree of ethnic inequalities and the stability of ethno-political hierarchies. Comparing historical patterns of ethnic exclusion at the group level, we have seen that ethnic groups in unranked societies are politically excluded for just about half of their “life time”, i.e. of the years they are listed in the EPR-ETH dataset. In contrast, European(-descendant) groups in ranked systems almost never become politically excluded, while the historically marginalized “racial others” have a very high exclusion rate.

Moreover, there are two additional results that point to the structural difference between ranked and unranked systems. First, regional autonomy is much more widespread in unranked systems than in ranked societies. Hence, excluded groups in the former type possess an escape hatch that is often unavailable for the historically subordinated groups in ranked societies. Secondly, formal democracy has a different effect on ethnic inclusion and exclusion in the two types of multi-ethnic societies. In unranked systems, higher levels of democracy strongly correlate with less exclusion. In contrast, although this seems to have changed in the last two decades of the 20th century, the profound ethnic inequalities of ranked systems have long been comfortably embedded into (formally) well-functioning democratic regimes. In fact, ranked systems actually have a higher average level of democracy than unranked systems in the period from 1946 to 2009. This is particularly important because it shows that in contrast to unranked systems, the ethno-political inequalities in ranked societies are not only immune to the demographic conditions but also to the context of democratic institutions.

It is not surprising then that ranked systems have often been able to project an image of order compared to the sometimes chaotic worlds of unranked societies. Their significantly lower risk
of civil conflict in general, and of ethnic conflict in particular – despite very high levels of ethnic exclusion – is a direct consequence of the “equilibrium of inequality” mentioned before. The very different – yet equally fundamental – role of ethnicity in the two types of multi-ethnic societies was clearly exposed in the four case studies. In Guatemala and Ecuador, indigenous and African-descendant people have been effectively subordinated by a European-stemming elite – which contrasts starkly with the dynamics of competition between the different clusters of linguistically (and, in the case of Côte d’Ivoire also religiously) defined groups in Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon.

The second step of my theoretical argument asserted that this systematic variation of inter-ethnic relations influences the patterns, and aims of ethnic mobilization. Chapter 3.2 has revealed, first, that the average strength of ethnic parties is much higher in unranked systems overall, and that, second, politically included and excluded groups are equally likely to mobilize in these countries, while in ranked ethnic systems it is above all the excluded groups that engage in ethnically based electoral mobilization. These results were confirmed by the two regional analyses of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America in Chapters 4 and 6. Finally, the evidence from the multivariate statistical analyses of ethnic party formation at the global level points at fundamental differences between ranked and unranked systems in what are regarded as the motives of ethnic mobilization. In unranked ethnic systems, groups’ mobilization is fuelled by ethno-nationalist competition over hegemony: the presence of other ethnic parties and previous ethnic conflicts, while also depending on mobilization capacity in the form of geographic concentration and group size. In contrast, in ranked societies ethnic party formation is mainly driven by grievances stemming from a low political status, suggesting that emancipation from marginalization constitutes the main motive of mobilization.

**Conflict versus Emancipation: On the Differential Effect of Ethnic Mobilization**

The third, and most important, part of the theoretical argument referred to the consequences of ethnic mobilization under these different structural conditions. What is the empirical evidence we have received in the previous chapters regarding the effect of ethnic mobilization in unranked ethnic systems? First of all, ethnic mobilization in unranked societies seems to carry with it a self-reinforcing power. The establishment of ethnically based parties by some groups as a result of the competitive environment impels other groups to do the same, as mentioned above. This also points to the independent causal role of ethnic organizations which harden group boundaries and increase competition. The case study of Côte d’Ivoire in Chapter 5 has reconstructed this mechanism in a particularly instructive example, showing how the ethnic mobilization of one group has led to a spiral of competition and mobilization.
Secondly, the statistical results of the global Chapter 3.3.1 and the African analyses in Chapter 4.1 have demonstrated that ethnic parties increase the probability of groups to achieve and maintain ethnic dominance, leading to situations of ethnic inequality. This lends support to hypothesis H1a. Nevertheless, the analysis also revealed that this relationship reflects a combined effect of ethnic parties on both the achievement and conservation of political dominance, indicating that the variable does a better job in explaining the incidence of ethnic dominance than its initiation. Clearly, further research and additional empirical instruments are needed to more closely analyze the exact causal sequence between ethnic party formation and the installation and conservation of one-group ethnic dominance.

Regarding ethnic violence and conflict, the statistical results presented in Chapter 4.3 show a strong and direct effect of ethnic parties on electoral violence. Since elections are the main focal points of the power struggle in democratically governed unranked countries, this result is revealing. It does not only highlight ethnic parties’ potential to organize violence but it also shows how they increase the intensity of inter-group competition. The relationship to other forms of small-scale violence is less pronounced although in the within-country comparison over time, the variation in ethnic party strength correlates positively with the degree of social violence.

Moreover, the statistical results of Chapters 3.3.2 and 4.1 indicate that under conditions of ethnic exclusion, this mobilizational capacity increases the risk of full-blown ethnic conflict. While the direct link between the strength of ethnic parties and ethnic conflict risk is weaker at the global level, and absent in Sub-Saharan Africa, the statistical analyses at both levels have revealed a statistically significant interaction effect of ethnic party mobilization and ethnic exclusion on the risk of ethnic conflict. The conflict cases discussed in Chapter 4.2 testify to the notion that the combination of ethnic mobilization and exclusion forms a particularly potent recipe for violence. In sum, there is good evidence for hypothesis H2a about the conflict-fuelling effect of ethnic parties in unranked systems, although in a more nuanced way than expressed therein. Different forms of ethnic mobilization have distinct effects on different types of ethnic conflict and violence. Moreover, ethnic exclusion works as a magnifier of the destructive forces of ethnic mobilization.

In contrast, trans-ethnic cooperation seems to have a conflict-reducing effect in Sub-Saharan Africa, in line with hypothesis H3a, although only in the long term and with regard to civil conflicts. This result was confirmed by a series of comparisons of most-similar conflict and control cases in Chapter 4.2, in which the peaceful cases had generally experienced clearly higher levels of trans-ethnic civil society cooperation over time. The example of Gabon in Chapter 5 has served to analyze this stabilizing effect of trans-ethnic cooperation both within political parties and civil society organizations in more detail – although the evidence from both countries (Ga-
bon and Côte d’Ivoire) also clearly indicates that in the socio-political context of Sub-Saharan Africa, political parties are the main actors in the ethnic competition game.

Furthermore, the comparative case study of Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon revealed (or underlined) two additional insights. First, the historical evolution of elite networks – their reach and composition – decisively influences patterns of collective action, peace, and violence in unranked ethnic systems. Secondly, processes of ethnic mobilization or, reversely, trans-ethnic cooperation often follow a vicious or virtuous cycle. Mobilization may result in ethnic exclusion, conflict, increased mobilization, and renewed ethnic conflict as in Côte d’Ivoire, whereas early trans-ethnic elite alliances limit ethnic mobilization, and promote inclusion and peace, which in turn lead to increased cooperation, as observed in the case of Gabon. Hence, the individual factors identified in my causal model mutually reinforce each other. The statistical results obtained in the global analyses in Chapter 3.3.2 also point to this direction.

Regarding the effect of ethnic mobilization in ranked systems, the statistical results in the global Chapter 3.3.1 and the Latin American analyses in Chapter 6.2 show that ethnic parties significantly increase the chances of historically marginalized groups of attaining political power either at the national or (more frequently) at the regional level. Again, the temporal sequence is important here. Ethnic parties (and, for that matter, ethnic civil society organizations in Latin America) are almost never established by empowered groups, yet they are robustly linked to a higher probability of achieving and maintaining political empowerment. Importantly, none of these mobilizing historically discriminated groups has ever achieved a position of political dominance. Hence, their empowerment implies a clear improvement of ethnic equality in these notoriously unequal societies, as hypothesis H1b proposed.

The regional analysis of Latin America in Chapter 6.2, in particular, has provided us with two additional crucial insights. First, ethnic parties do not only increase the chances of such de-facto political empowerment but are also linked to de-iure improvements of ethnic equality, in particular to states’ ratification of the ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples which protects the political and cultural rights of historically marginalized groups. Secondly, ethnic civil society organizations in Latin America exert the same positive effect on the chances of empowerment as ethnic parties, although it is somewhat weaker and less immediate, paralleling the evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa.

Furthermore, while ethnic parties have become more influential since the mid-1980s, the effect of ethnic civil society organizations has significantly diminished over time. This implies that the dominant elites in Latin America’s ranked societies have been able to adjust to the challenge of popular ethnic movements, developing a repertoire of counter-strategies to shield themselves from their demands, many of which I have discussed in the case studies of Guatemala and Ecuador in Chapter 7. They include “divide-and-rule” strategies, the targeted co-option of leaders
of mobilizing groups, exploiting intra-ethnic divisions, the use of clientelism to buy off re-
sistance, appropriation of ethnic organizations’ discourse, and also heavy-handed repression as
a means of deterrence.

Finally, the quantitative results are somewhat ambivalent regarding the effect of intra-ethnic
divisions. There is no linear effect of my variable of linguistic and religious group fragmentation
on the occurrence of empowerment but instead a distinct influence on each of the gradual
steps from discrimination towards autonomy or inclusion. The subsequent qualitative analyses
have shown that although linguistic and (to a lesser extent) religious divisions – often express-
ing historical rivalries between sub-groups – have been important factors in both Guatemala
and Ecuador, they are only one of several intra-ethnic fault lines debilitating ethnic mobiliza-
tion besides, for instance, ideological divisions or – in the case of Ecuador – the fissures pro-
voked by distribution battles. Hence, the empirical results lend moderate support to hypothesis
H3b, in the sense that the concept of intra-ethnic cleavages goes clearly beyond the operation-
alization used in the quantitative analyses of this study.

Ethnic mobilization and increased equality in ranked ethnic systems do not come at the cost of
heightened conflict or instability. According to the quantitative analyses of Chapters 3.3.2 and
6.3, there is no systematic connection between ethnic parties (and ethnic civil society organiza-
tions in Latin America) and any kind of civil conflict or institutional upheavals. This clearly con-
firms hypothesis H2b. Analyzing the trajectory of Latin America’s strongest and most militant
ethnic movement, the indigenous movement in Ecuador, that coincided with the ousting of
three elected presidents, Chapter 7.5 has shown that on the one hand, such political instability
has always been a characterizing feature of this country – with or without ethnic mobilization –
, and that on the other hand, there is no clear causal link between ethnic organizations and the
fall of these political leaders. While the opposition to them came from all ethnic groups, the
decisive force in their ousting was the non-indigenous military command.

There is however a systematic link between ethnic mobilization and the level of peaceful ethnic
protest, as we have seen in both Chapters 3.3.2 and 6.3, as well as in the case of Ecuador in par-
ticular. While this points at the capacity of ethnic organizations to organize political collective
action, it reaffirms the notion that this collective action is most likely to be of peaceful nature in
ranked systems. The clientelistic co-option of both the (historically thin) elite and the ordinary
population of marginalized groups, and the usually high degree of economic interdependence –
factors that we have observed in the case studies of Chapter 7 – are clear symptoms of the
“equilibrium of inequality” that militates against ethnic violence. Moreover, the lack of an eth-
no-nationalistically minded bourgeoisie within the colonized (or historically oppressed) groups
has also given ethnic mobilization in ranked ethnic systems a different face.
Based on these results, we are now ready to give a condensed answer to the core research question of this study about the consequences of ethnic mobilization. Ethnic mobilization in ranked ethnic systems – multi-ethnic societies divided between a dominant European(-descendant) group and subordinated “racial others” – does not increase the risk of conflict but rather reduces historical inequalities. In contrast, in unranked ethnic systems – multi-ethnic societies divided by different ethnic cleavages, such as language or religion – ethnic mobilization exacerbates the existing competition, compromising ethnic equality, and increasing the risk of violent conflict. These are the two faces of ethnic mobilization. But how does the effect of ethnic organizations play out concretely?

**Agents of Collective Action: The Role of Ethnic Parties and other Ethnic Organizations**

Moving from the structural relationships to the actor-centered part of the argument and the causal mechanisms underlying these relationships brings us to the question: what have we learnt about the causal effects of ethnic organizations? The short analyses of selected cases, accompanying the statistical results, and the four in-depth case studies, have provided ample evidence for the critical role that ethnic organizations assume by fulfilling their four basic functions listed in Chapter 2.

First, ethnic organizations powerfully shape individuals’ identities and interests along ethnic lines and, by aggregating them, structure political conflicts along ethnic group boundaries, eclipsing other potentially relevant cleavages. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, the recruitment strategies of all three ethnic parties (and certain ethnic youth movements) institutionalized the existing ethno-political cleavages, making them both more salient at the political macro level and less easy to transcend at the level of individuals. Likewise, particularly during the 1990s in both Ecuador and Guatemala, ethnic organizations have transformed ethnicity into the most relevant political cleavage, by aggregating the identities and interests of discriminated individuals and melding them into powerful ethnic group movements, which have advanced these ethnic demands through targeted lobbying vis-à-vis the state institutions. Particularly in Ecuador, the indigenous movement has achieved to determine the political agenda of the country since the 1990s, forcing state institutions and other political parties to at least rhetorically adapt to their demands.361 Hence, the interest aggregation function of ethnic organizations has played a crucial role in these three cases.

Related to this first point is the propaganda and agenda setting power of these organizations which also contributes to the hardening of ethnic group boundaries. This mechanism has been of less relevance in the Latin American cases than in Côte d’Ivoire. In modern mass politics, the public agenda is driven by the media, which in ranked societies are usually controlled by the

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361 Interviews with political party leader, 2013-4-22-I; and indigenous parliamentarian, 2013-4-23-II.
traditional elite and which often suppress, or at least select and manipulate, the voices of the marginalized groups. This is the case, above all, in Guatemala. In Ecuador, where ethnic mobilization has been stronger and discrimination less severe, access to the mainstream media has been somewhat greater. In Côte d’Ivoire, the inflammatory propaganda of ethnic organizations – both political parties and partisan newspapers – has had a particularly powerful effect, exacerbating ethnic divisions and stimulating hatreds.

Third, we have received clear evidence for the capacity of ethnic organizations to orchestrate collective action through mass mobilization in both ranked and unranked ethnic systems. Strong ethnic organizations provide the necessary link between elites and the rank and file of the population that allows the organization of marches, protests or even military mobilization. While such actions of mass mobilization, and the political pressure created thereby, have played an important role in both Guatemala and Ecuador, the comparison between the two cases – and especially within Ecuador between the indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian movements – has clearly revealed that the force of this mobilization crucially depends on the strength of the organizations.

While for the reasons discussed above this collective action is usually peaceful in ranked societies, it often provokes violent outcomes in the competitive environment of unranked systems – whether these be incidents of low-level violence during election times, or outright civil conflict under conditions of widespread popular grievances. I have discussed various glaring examples of how ethnic parties have stirred violent mass mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa, in such bloody conflicts as in Congo-Brazzaville, Angola, Burundi, and Ethiopia. In Côte d’Ivoire, ethnic parties and militant youth movements did not only spur a spiral of political and communal violence, but they were also crucial actors in the set-up of the ethnic rebellion by recruiting and indoctrinating fighters, and upholding popular support through propaganda.

Fourth and finally, ethnic parties in particular are decisive when it comes to ethnic groups’ access to political power, serving as instruments to capture and defend state power. This is by itself of course not a particularly innovative insight but it does have somewhat more far-reaching implications. In the case of ranked ethnic systems, the Guatemalan example confirms the finding of the statistical analyses that although ethnic civil society organizations have been important drivers of emancipation, overall the chances of historically marginalized groups of achieving political empowerment are significantly lower – and increasingly so – without a strong, autonomous ethnic party. Ecuador’s indigenous movement has clearly benefitted from Pachakutik’s electoral successes at the local and regional levels, from the access to the legislative process provided by the party, and also from a certain unifying effect, as Pachakutik achieved to unite most relevant indigenous forces within a single electoral vehicle. Hence, indigenous achievements have been greater in Ecuador, leading to a more equal (or less unequal) distribution of political power than in Guatemala.
In the competitive environment of unranked systems, ethnic parties provide a comparative advantage in the struggle over political hegemony. Ethnic groups that are represented by strong ethnic parties may attain and conserve a tight grip on political power, leading to temporary regimes of one-group dominance. The primary examples mentioned in this study are certainly the FPR-backed Tutsi dominance in post-genocide Rwanda, the rise of the Mende to political dominance in Sierra Leone in 2002, the Isasas-dominated RPP one-party regime in Djibouti during the 1980s, which eventually resulted in the outbreak of the Afar rebellion in 1991, and the restoration of Isasas-dominance in 2003 after winning an absolute electoral victory.

Apart from this monopolization mechanism, ethnic party mobilization may also lead to a process of outbidding initiated by a radical ethnic party, such as the FPI in Côte d’Ivoire from the early 1990s onwards, leading to the political exclusion of other ethnic groups. Importantly, such regimes of ethnic dominance and/or exclusion are often at the roots of ethnic grievances which are critical for the outbreak of full-blown ethnic conflicts, especially when excluded groups also possess the organizational capacity to mobilize.

In contrast, the case study of Gabon illustrated how strong trans-ethnic organizations exert the opposite effect of promoting ethnic inclusion and peace. By integrating elites from different ethnic groups and their political interests, they diminish the degree of group competition in unranked systems. Moreover, their appeals for national unity vis-à-vis the rank-and-file population reduce the potential of communal violence or militant mobilization by specific groups. Finally, the trans-ethnic composition of political organizations guarantees that no matter which side wins the upper hand in a given election or in a particular political dispute, all ethnic groups will be included in the winning coalition, which prevents ethnic grievances and the onset of large-scale ethnic conflict.

The Two Different Faces of Ethnic Politics: Final Reflections

What are the broader implications of these results for the academic research on ethnic mobilization and ethnic conflict? It is worth coming back at this point to the original questions raised at the very beginning of this study. Four issues have been central to the existing literature on ethnic mobilization and its consequences. First, how is ethnicity linked to collective grievances and conflict? Second, how do ethnic groups become collective political actors? Under what circumstances does ethnic collective action become possible? And finally, what are the effects of this ethnic mobilization? The following paragraphs outline how this study has contributed to the knowledge about these central issues.

Most of the standard academic literature on ethnic politics has emphasized the negative consequences of ethnic mobilization on both the functioning of democracy and the prospects of peace (Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2006; Rothchild 2004; Wimmer 1997;
Young 1976). The results of the present study suggest that these assumptions are only partly correct; the effect depends very much on the type of multi-ethnic society at hand. In unranked ethnic systems, characterized by the competitive relations between \textit{a priori} equal groups, ethnic mobilization revealed to have the negative effects generally attributed to it.

In contrast, in ranked ethnic systems, characterized by historically determined patterns of ethnic dominance and subordination, ethnic mobilization does not have the same dangerous consequences, but on the contrary facilitates the reduction of entrenched inter-group inequalities. This finding helps systematize and generalize the evidence from previous works on ethnic mobilization in such countries, which – largely focusing on specific cases or world regions – showed ethnic mobilization of historically marginalized groups to have a positive impact on ethnic equality (Barany 1998; Becker 2011; Hooker 2005; Madrid 2012, 175-8; Marable 2007; Tuck 2010; Van Cott 2000; Vermeersch 2006; Yashar 2005). The results of the present study clearly reveal that there is a more general, globally valid causal pattern underlying these different findings.

At the same time, the study contradicts the critical voices about the alleged dangers of ethnic mobilization in these countries (Huntington 2004; Olmos 2003; Radu 2005; Schlesinger Jr. 1992). In this sense, it also qualifies the claims made in large parts of the standard literature on ethnic politics. As stated above, the effect of ethnic mobilization very much depends on the type of multi-ethnic society.

A multitude of empirical studies has convincingly demonstrated that ethnic inequalities perceived as grievances increase the risk of ethnic conflict (Birnir 2007; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 2000b; Gurr et al. 1993; Østby 2008; Stewart 2008b; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). Yet, this research tells us much less about the mobilizational processes in between these two variables, i.e. how ethnic organizations and their elites translate grievances into violent or peaceful collective action. This brings us to the second major question raised at the beginning of the study – namely, how ethnic groups become collective political actors. This study has provided a more systematic focus on the role of ethnic organizations, and the mechanisms by which they influence the stipulated outcomes, such as peace, conflict, and equality – backed by systematic empirical results from both large-n analyses and case studies –, thus shedding light on what I have called the “mobilizational black box” in between grievances and conflict. By focusing on ethnic parties and civil society organizations as the political representatives of ethnic groups, this approach also avoids the risk of reifying mere social categories (Brubaker 2004).

The empirical results again help to generalize existing evidence from numerous case studies on the role of different ethnic organizations in places as diverse as India, Rwanda, Ecuador, Hunga-
ry, the USA, and Western Europe (Barany 1998; Becker 2011; Gordin 2002; Marable 2007; Mijeski and Beck 2011; Straus 2012; Van Cott 2005; Varshney 2001; Vermeersch 2006). We have seen that in principle, ethnic organizations perform the same functions in both types of multi-ethnic societies identified in this study. However, due to the very distinct ethno-political constellations, the outcomes vary dramatically. Moreover, by treating civil society organizations and political parties as different expressions of the same basic phenomenon, the study has also attempted to bridge existing divides between different disciplines of research which so far have mostly focused on either electoral or non-electoral ethnic mobilization.362

Finally, the results about the conflict-reducing effect of trans-ethnic organizations in unranked ethnic systems add to recent research on what has been termed “consociational parties” (Bogaards 2005). They show that these types of political organizations may assume a very important role for the preservation of peace in unranked multi-ethnic societies. Hence, the trans-ethnic cooperation envisioned by the classic consociationalist literature (Lijphart 1977, 2004) may be even more fruitful if it takes place within parties and other organizations instead of between them.

With regard to the first question raised about the link between ethnicity, collective grievances and ethnic conflict, this study has provided systematic empirical results about the relationship between different types of ethnic identity and the degree and persistence of ethno-political inequalities. As Mann (2005) has pointed out, the conjunction of ethno-nationalism and democracy is often the source of ethnic oppression and violence. This study has identified a particular ethnic cleavage – the racial difference between European(-descendant) groups and “racial others” – that is particularly prone to create profound and enduring ethnic inequalities. Hence, the European racial paradigm (Whitten 1999) constitutes the ideological fundament of what I have defined, in the terms of Horowitz (1985), as ranked ethnic systems. After two World Wars and the great “waves of democratization” (Huntington 1991), racist ideologies continue to simmer below the surface of many democratically organized political systems, and to shape the existing political and socio-economic hierarchies.

The distinction between ranked and unranked systems is certainly not new (Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001; Hechter 1978; Horowitz 1985, 21-36; Mason 2003). However, while previous works on the topic have described the theoretical characteristics of ranked systems (often focusing on the overlap of class and ethnic boundaries) and applied them to specific cases or world regions, this study has come up with a globally applicable typology of the two types of ethnic systems, based on an explicit, theoretically grounded definition, focusing on political inequalities, and backed by systematic empirical evidence. In this sense, the study has also made a step forward towards overcoming the regional divides in the existing literature on eth-

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362 Again, there are exceptions to this general trend as, for example, Van Cott (2005) and Vermeersch (2006). However, they are again restricted to specific geographical areas.
nic politics. While there are certainly other important typologies of multi-ethnic societies, the empirical results of this study confirm that the distinction between hierarchically ordered and competitive societies is highly relevant from both theoretical and practical perspectives.

If we envision ethnic politics as playing out in a dyadic relationship between the government and its challengers (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Tilly 1978), this distinction has implications for the understanding of both sides. On the one hand, certain types of ethnic cleavages present in society are more likely to result in ethnic oppression by a historically exclusionary state power than other types, which result in a more equal participation of different ethnic groups in government. At the same time, the higher equality often carries with it an element of competition. Hence, the challenges to the state are different in unranked multi-ethnic societies than in their ranked counterparts. The competition leads to a higher risk of violent conflict while historical oppression is challenged by the more peaceful attempts of emancipation.

Hence, these findings about enduring ethnic inequalities are also of high relevance to the literature on grievances and ethnic conflict (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 2000b; Østby 2008; Stewart 2008a) which has usually not distinguished between ranked and unranked ethnic systems. While inequalities between ethnic groups are generally associated with a higher risk of ethnic conflict, as these works have shown, the present study has identified ranked societies as a subset of cases which, due to what I have called an equilibrium of inequality, constitute an exception to this relationship between exclusion and conflict.

Finally, regarding the roots of mobilization, this study has shown that ethnic mobilization is driven by different factors in ranked and unranked systems. However, it has paid less attention to the institutional context and other political factors, such as the party system, which facilitate or curtail this mobilization. Does this omission affect our conclusions about the differential effect of ethnic mobilization?

Two factors speak against that possibility. First, there is no reason to believe that the ethnic raw material in a country – i.e. the type of ethnic cleavage(s) present – has a causal effect on, say, the electoral system – and even less likely is a reverse causal influence. Second, while the institutional context may well affect the degree of ethnic mobilization, especially in the realm of electoral politics (Bogaards 2003, 2007; Horowitz 2002; Huber 2012; Lijphart 2004; Reilly 2001; Reynolds 1995a; Rice and Van Cott 2006), the main focus of this study has been the effect of ethnic mobilization on equality and peace when mobilization occurs. Hence, even if the different levels of ethnic mobilization in the two types of multi-ethnic countries were partly a function of systematic differences in the institutional context, this does not change our conclusions about the relationship between mobilization and our outcomes of interest within each type of
multi-ethnic society. Nevertheless, a more systematic look at differences in the institutional context constitutes a promising route for future research.

What are the implications of the results of this study for policy makers? The political prescriptions we can deduce are different for the two types of multi-ethnic societies, according to the distinct diagnoses of their fundamental problems made above. In the competitive unranked systems, prone to violent ethnic conflict, the focus must be on how to mitigate the ethnopolitical competition and guarantee peace. In contrast, in the highly unequal ranked societies, our main concern should be the rectification of these historical inequalities. This means that the autonomous and peaceful political mobilization – or interest representation – of historically discriminated groups in the latter type of countries should be promoted or, at least, permitted, whereas in unranked systems, ethnic mobilization should be prevented and instead conditions should be provided that stimulate strong trans-ethnic organizations.

Processes of ethnic mobilization are dynamic and can be influenced in many ways. One instrument is certainly the institutional framework that forms an important part of the “political opportunity structures” for mobilization (Kriesi and Giugni 1995; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004). If we focus on ethnic mobilization in electoral politics – which has turned out to be a more powerful tool in this study – then the electoral system is the key. As Bogaards (2007) has pointed out, the choice of the latter depends on its desired function. Following his typology (Bogaards 2007, 172), this would mean that in ranked ethnic systems, policy makers concerned with institutional designs should allow for (or even encourage) the “translation” of ethnic interests into political cleavages, for example through reserved seats for minorities.

Indeed, existing empirical evidence indicates that certain institutional measures, such as the elimination of spatial registration rules for political parties (Birnir 2004) or the introduction of majoritarian electoral rules in districts with geographically concentrated minorities (Muñoz-Pogossian 2008, 191; Van Cott 2005, 29), have promoted the autonomous electoral participation of historically marginalized ethnic groups. Equally, the very liberal provisions regarding political associations in the new South African constitution allowed for the political representation and inclusion of all relevant forces during the transition from racial oppression to multi-ethnic democracy (Kemmerzell 2010). In summary, the results of this study suggest that the political “visibilization” (Pallares 2007) of historically oppressed groups is a necessary condition for the rectification of the historical inequalities in ranked ethnic systems.

In unranked systems, the preferred strategy should be the “aggregation” of ethnic cleavages. Importantly, the mere prohibition of ethnic parties will in most cases not be enough (or even problematic) (Basedau and Moroff 2011). As we have seen, for example, such bans are employed...
almost everywhere in Sub-Saharan Africa (Moroff 2010), yet this does not prevent the emergence of parties that represent specific ethnic groups in a more implicit manner. What are really needed are institutional provisions that promote the emergence of truly trans-ethnic political organizations. However, while different mechanisms have been proposed in the literature, such as the Alternative Vote (AV) system (Horowitz 2003; Reilly 2001), two-round majoritarian systems (Reilly 2001, 28), distribution requirements (Bogaards 2010, 735-7; Horowitz 1985, 635-8; Reilly 2006, 820-1), or even constituency pooling (Bogaards 2003), there is still no clear consensus among scholars on which electoral rules are most effective for this purpose. Hence, the issue of the appropriate institutional design in unranked ethnic systems continues to be a highly relevant topic and an important route for future research.

Another issue that will need to be examined more closely is the existing within-category variation, especially with regard to unranked systems. For instance, religious and linguistic cleavages were lumped together in a single category in this study. However, although the effect of religion on ethno-political inequality is closer to that of language than to the consequences of European racism, it seems that considerable differences still exist between the two first types of cleavages. Examining the precise reasons for and implications of these differences will help us to further improve our knowledge about ethnic mobilization in different types of multi-ethnic countries.

A final open question concerns the dynamics of transformation of ranked societies into unranked systems. The developments in countries such as the USA, Brazil and Bolivia suggest that any such transformation constitutes a slow, long-term process. Due to the extreme demographic situation in South Africa, the transition – once it was initiated – proceeded more quickly in this country, although the marked ethnic inequalities in the socio-economic spheres have not yet disappeared. Liberia and Zimbabwe, for their part, can probably be considered unranked ethnic systems by now.

What do such transformations mean for the effect of ethnic mobilization? The quantitative results in this study show that even if a time-constant classification is used, the statistically significant negative link between ranked systems and ethnic conflict risk persists. However, this is just the overall effect during the whole time period from 1946 to 2009. In Liberia, for instance, we have seen extremely bloody ethnic conflicts after the abolition of the old hierarchy (Ballah and Abrokwaa 2003; Bøås 2001; Harris 2006; Outram 1999). And there is also the case of Israel with its seemingly endless civil conflict. However, it could be argued that Liberia and Israel have always been the least typical ranked systems. Americo-Liberians, although arriving at Liberia as settler colonists and, due to their exposure to American culture, seeing themselves as culturally superior, are essentially an African group. In Israel, religion has become much more influential over the past decades and has given ethnic relations a more competitive, unranked character, as discussed in Chapter 1.6.
I would dare to predict that in most other ranked systems – the USA, Australia, Hungary, and the Latin American states – the ethno-political dynamics do not change significantly if historically marginalized groups become empowered and group relations become more equal. The historical conditions – especially the absence of ethno-nationalism – simply weigh too much.

In the end, no ranked ethnic system is set in stone forever. The Civil Rights Movement in the USA helped abolish the segregation in the south. Civic mobilization by the ANC and other forces brought down the Apartheid state of South Africa. The results of this study suggest that for other historically marginalized ethnic groups in the world, a new political dawn is possible, too. At the same time, we have also seen in this study that the more equal unranked systems are not exempt from the menace of at least temporary ethnic dominance. Oftentimes, this results in bloody civil conflict. Hence, ethnic equality must be the principal aim in both ranked and unranked ethnic systems. Yet, as the examples of Ecuador and Côte d’Ivoire have illustrated, while in the former, ethnic organizations may constitute the instruments to achieve this aim, in the latter they often produce the opposite result of hegemony and ethnic exclusion.
Appendix I. The EPR-ETH Dataset in Detail

The EPR-ETH dataset was introduced by scholars from ETH Zurich and the University of California in Los Angeles (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Based on the inputs from students of ethnic politics and country experts, it provides information about politically relevant ethnic groups, and their access to executive state power, in all countries of the world with a population, in 1990, of at least 500,000, and where ethnicity has been politically relevant. The latter depends on whether politically relevant ethnic groups are present in a given country.

Ethnic groups are considered politically relevant if at least one political organization claims to represent it in national politics or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination. Discrimination is defined as political exclusion directly targeted at an ethnic community. This study uses the updated version of the data which is available from ETH’s GROWup website and covers all years from 1946 to 2009.364

Ethnic groups’ access to state power is assessed based on the position of the political leaders representing these groups. State power here refers to executive power: the presidency, the cabinet, and senior posts in the administration and/or the army, depending on where political power is effectively exercised (for example, in a military dictatorship, the army command etc.). According to the original source (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 100-1), an ethnic group may find itself in the following positions:

- **Monopoly**: Elite members hold monopoly power in the executive to the exclusion of members of other ethnic groups.
- **Dominance**: Elite members of the group hold dominant power in the executive but there is some limited inclusion of “token” members of other groups.
- **Senior Partner**: Representatives of the group participate as senior partners in a formal or informal power-sharing arrangement.
- **Junior Partner**: Representatives participate as junior partners in a power-sharing arrangement.
- **Regional Autonomy**: Elite members of the group have no central power but some influence at the sub-state level. This may be the provincial or the district (though not the local) level, depending on the vertical organization of the state.
- **Separatist Autonomy**: A related case is when local governments controlled by representatives of an ethnic category have declared their territory to be independent from the central government. This category differs fundamentally from “regional autonomy” in that group representatives have often excluded themselves from central state power.

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• *Powerless*: Elite representatives hold no political power at either the national or the regional level without being explicitly discriminated against.

• *Discrimination*: Group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination, with the intent of excluding them from both regional and national power. Such active discrimination can be either formal or informal, although indirect discrimination – i.e. disadvantages in the economic or educational spheres – is not included in this definition.\(^{365}\)

Besides these power statuses, for each ethnic group included in the dataset its relative size is indicated as a share of the total country population. Importantly, both the list of the politically relevant ethnic groups of a country and their power statuses may change over time. To capture such temporal changes, the time period from 1946 to 2009 is divided into different sub-periods with separate codings. This means that during a given sub-period, the ethno-political situation of a country (i.e. the list of relevant groups and their power statuses) is deemed to be constant.

\(^{365}\) The political exclusion of non-citizens is not included in this definition as long as these non-citizens hold passports of other states.
Appendix II. Determining Countries’ Main Ethnic Cleavages

The following paragraphs explain how, on the basis of the EPR-Cleavages dataset (Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt 2013), each country’s main ethnic cleavage was determined. By “main ethnic cleavage” I mean the one ethnic dimension along which a given country’s ethnic groups differ the most. EPR-Cleavages is a direct appendage to the EPR-ETH dataset, described in the previous Appendix section. It identifies the precise “cultural content” of all ethnic groups included in the latter by indicating the languages group members speak, the religions they practice, and their “bio-geographic” origins (as a proxy for the concept of race). Table A 1 uses the case of Mexico as an example to show how the data are structured.

Table A 1: The structure of the EPR-Cleavages dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Religion1</th>
<th>Rel2</th>
<th>Rel3</th>
<th>Language1</th>
<th>Lang2</th>
<th>Lang3</th>
<th>Phenotype1</th>
<th>Phen2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Mestizos</td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>European</td>
<td>Amerindian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples</td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Maya</td>
<td>Nahuatl</td>
<td>Amerindian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Afromexicans</td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-Saharan</td>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A maximum of three different linguistic, religious and bio-geographic (or phenotypical) sub-segments are reported for each group, along with their relative sizes (as a share of the total group population), denoting the different languages spoken and the different religious faiths practiced by its members. In the case of race/phenotype, the sub-segments indicate miscegenation by denoting up to three different bio-geographic origins of a given ethnic group.

Step 1: The estimation process starts at the group level by comparing each ethnic group to all other groups in the same country regarding each of the three ethnic identity dimensions in the dataset (language, religion, and race). Since each group can be composed of a maximum of three sub-segments on all dimensions, this means that the segments of each group are compared to the segments of all other groups. Two groups can either match or be different on a given dimension (e.g. speak the same or different languages). Based on that, they receive a “value of difference” for each ethnic dimension which is either 0 or 1. If they match on a given dimension, their difference value on that dimension is 0. If they differ, the value is 1.

Importantly, in the case of language and religion, partial congruencies between groups are counted as matches. Hence, if one group speaks three different languages (or practices three

---

To identify languages and religious denominations of groups, the EPR-Cleavages dataset relies on the Ethnologue and the Joshua Project, respectively, as main sources.
different religious faiths) and one of them corresponds to the language (or religion) of another group, the two groups are counted as matching (difference value of 0). We can expect this partial overlap of language or religion to be a unifying factor. However, this is not the case for race. Since racist ideologies consider “mixed bloods as degenerate” (or, reversely, mixed people from subordinated groups as an improved racial type) (Wade 2010, 31), racially mixed groups are treated as different from each other and from other groups (for example, whites from mestizos, and mestizos from indigenous people).367

Step 2: For each group, I add the difference values for all three dimensions, and divide the sums by the number of other ethnic groups in the country. This gives me a standardized “average value of difference” which indicates how much a given ethnic group differs from all other groups in the same country on a given dimension. If the value is 1, the group in question is different from all other groups on that dimension. A value of 0 means that the ethnic group does not differ from any other group in the country on that dimension. If, for instance, the average difference value of a given group on the linguistic dimension is 0.5, this means that one of two other groups (or two of four other groups, etc.) in the country speaks the same language.

Figure A 1 provides a concrete example of this estimation process using Lithuania as a model case. The country is composed of three different politically relevant ethnic groups, according to EPR-ETH: Lithuanians, Russians, and Poles. Let us have a look at the Lithuanians, and focus on the linguistic dimension first. If we compare the Lithuanians with the Russians on the linguistic dimension, we see that they speak different languages (Lithuanian, and Russian). The same is true for the comparison between Lithuanians and Poles. Hence, the sum of Lithuanians’ linguistic difference to the other groups is 2. This sum is divided by the number of other ethnic groups in Lithuania which gives us an average value of difference of 1 for the Lithuanians on the linguistic dimension. Note that this value is only 0.5 on the religious dimension since the Lithuanians and Poles both practice Roman Catholicism, so that the Lithuanians only differ from the Russians on this dimension.

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367 In Latin America, the more liberal notions of racial mixture (mestizaje) saw the “mestizo race” as equally valuable as the European white race. To some extent, this was also a conscious ideological project of nationalist self-assertion against visions of Anglo-Saxon superiority in an era dominated by ideas of racial-cultural competition (see e.g. Gould 2004, 53-4; Tilley 2005, 189-203). Nevertheless, even in this view, the mestizo still constituted a clearly distinct, improved racial type in comparison with the indigenous and black races (see e.g. Gotkowitz 2011, 18-23; Wade 2010, 31; Whitten 1999, 57). Ultimately, mestizaje meant nothing else than a “de-indianization” of the population (Gould 2004, 53).
Step 3: Now we can move to the country level by aggregating the group values to total country values. This is done by adding the average values of difference of all groups in a country for all three ethnic dimensions. In the example of Lithuania, the average value of difference in the linguistic dimension is 1 for all three groups since all groups differ from all other groups regarding language. Hence, the total country value of difference in the linguistic dimension is 3. Table A 2 shows the complete construction of the average difference values for all groups in Lithuania as well as the total country values on all ethnic dimensions.

As mentioned above, both the Lithuanians and the Polish only differ from one out of two other groups on the religious dimension since they are both Roman Catholics. Hence, their religious average difference is 0.5. In contrast, that of the Russians, who are of Russian Orthodox faith, is 1 because they differ from both other groups. This gives Lithuania a total difference value of 2 in the religious dimension (1 + 0.5 + 0.5). Note that all groups are of European bio-geographic origin and thus, Lithuania’s total difference value in this dimension is 0. We can now compare the three total values and see that Lithuania is a mainly linguistically divided country: the difference value is highest in the linguistic dimension.

A more nuanced example is provided by the second case summarized in Table A 2, Mexico, which is also composed of three different politically relevant ethnic groups: mestizos, indigenous peoples, and Afromexicans. Note that while some indigenous people still use an indigenous language (Nahuatl, Zapotecan etc.), for many of them Spanish is now their first language. As a consequence, mestizos and indigenous peoples are counted as matching on the linguistic dimension. Also, Afromexicans usually speak Spanish as their first language. Hence, for all three
groups the average difference value in the linguistic dimension is 0 and, as a result, the total country value in that dimension equals 0, too.

Regarding religion, all three groups practice Roman Catholicism. This means that no group is different from any other, and the total country value of difference is 0 as well. However, there are clear phenotypical (or bio-geographic) differences between the three groups. While the mestizos are the result of European and Amerindian miscegenation, the other two groups represent the Amerindian and African heritage. As explained above, these are distinct “racial types” in the eyes of those who invented and nurtured the concept of race. Thus, the average difference value is 1 for each group, leading to a total of 3 on the bio-geographic dimension. Therefore, Mexico is classified as a mainly racially divided country.

Table A 2: The estimation of the main ethnic cleavages. Two examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linguistically divided country: Lithuania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Groups</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racially divided country: Mexico</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Groups</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afromexicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Δ means difference.*

In most cases it was possible to identify one single ethnic dimension along which a country’s ethnic groups differ the most. Table A 3 lists all countries with their main ethnic cleavage. As we can see, in a few countries, religion and language seem to be equally important. As noted in the main text, in three states (Liberia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa) the main cleavage changed over time, due to changes in the EPR-ETH list of politically relevant groups.
Table A 3: Coding of main ethnic cleavages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Main ethnic cleavage</th>
<th>Largest group (relative size)</th>
<th>Max. length of one-group dominance, in years (group)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Pashtuns (.41)</td>
<td>33 (Pashtuns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Eastern Europe &amp; Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>Language &amp; religion</td>
<td>Albanians (.95)</td>
<td>64 (Albanians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Arabs (.72)</td>
<td>48 (Arabs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Ovimbundu-Ovambo (.38)</td>
<td>35 (Mbundu-Mestico)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Argentinians (.91)</td>
<td>64 (Argentinians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Eastern Europe &amp; FSU</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Armenians (.98)</td>
<td>19 (Armenians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Whites (.84)</td>
<td>64 (Whites)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Austrians (.93)</td>
<td>55 (Austrians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Eastern Europe &amp; FSU</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Azeri (.90)</td>
<td>19 (Azeri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Shi’a Arabs (.70)</td>
<td>39 (Sunni Arabs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>Lang. &amp; rel.</td>
<td>Bengali Muslims (.90)</td>
<td>38 (Bengali Muslims)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Eastern Europe &amp; FSU</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Byelorussians (.78)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Flemings (.59)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Fon (.33)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>Lang. &amp; rel.</td>
<td>Bhutanese (.50)</td>
<td>39 (Bhutanese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Main ethnic cleavage</td>
<td>Largest group (relative size) (^4)</td>
<td>Max. length of one-group dominance, in years (group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Bolivians (.41)</td>
<td>60 (Bolivians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Eastern Europe &amp; FSU</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Bosniaks/Muslims (.47)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Tswana (.57)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Whites (.54)</td>
<td>25 (Whites)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Eastern Europe &amp; FSU</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Bulgarians (.83)</td>
<td>56 (Bulgarians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>--- 1(^{\text{a}})</td>
<td>Hutu (.85)</td>
<td>23 (Tutsi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Khmer (.90)</td>
<td>4 (Khmer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Bamileke (.25)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>English speakers (.59)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Northern groups (.83)</td>
<td>12 (Riverine groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Muslim Sahel groups (.27)</td>
<td>16 (Sara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Chileans (.92)</td>
<td>64 (Chileans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Chinese (Han) (.57)</td>
<td>64 (Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Columbians (.73)</td>
<td>64 (Columbians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Nibolek (.35)</td>
<td>5 (Mbochi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Costa Ricans (.96)</td>
<td>64 (Costa Ricans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Main ethnic cleavage</td>
<td>Largest group (relative size)</td>
<td>Max. length of one-group dominance, in years (group)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Northerners (.34)</td>
<td>0 (Northerners)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>Language</td>
<td>Croats (.90)</td>
<td>19 (Croats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Whites (.65)</td>
<td>14 (Whites)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>Lang. &amp; rel.</td>
<td>Greeks (.80)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Ethn. irrelevant 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. Congo</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Mongo (.16)</td>
<td>0 (Mongo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Ethn. irrelevant 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Isaas (Somali) (.55)</td>
<td>11 (Isaas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Ethn. irrelevant 2)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>Ethn. irrelevant 2)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Ecuadorians (.55)</td>
<td>64 (Ecuadorians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Arab Muslims (.90)</td>
<td>64 (Arab Muslims)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Salvadorans (.90)</td>
<td>64 (Salvadorans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Christians (.48)</td>
<td>0 (Christians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>Language</td>
<td>Estonians (.68)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Language</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Main ethnic cleavage</td>
<td>Largest group (relative size) 4)</td>
<td>Max. length of one-group dominance, in years (group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
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<td>Race ^27</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Language</td>
<td>French</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(98)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
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<td>Language</td>
<td>Fang</td>
<td>5 (Fang)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(26)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
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<td>Language</td>
<td>Mandinka</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(40)</td>
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<td>Eastern Europe &amp; FSU</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td>19 (Georgians)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(81)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Ethnicity irrelevant ^2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Other Akans</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>64 (Greeks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(96)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Maya</td>
<td>64 (Guatemalans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Peul</td>
<td>23 (Susu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Balanta</td>
<td>7 (Cape Verdean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Race ^29</td>
<td>Indo-Guyanese</td>
<td>26 (Afro-Guyanese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Ethnicity irrelevant ^2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Hondurans</td>
<td>64 (Hondurans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(91)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Eastern Europe &amp; FSU</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>64 (Hungarians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(90)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Main ethnic cleavage</td>
<td>Largest group (relative size)</td>
<td>Max. length of one-group dominance, in years (group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Hindi (.26)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Javanese (.45)</td>
<td>61 (Javenese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Persians (.51)</td>
<td>1 (Persians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
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Notes: Listed are all current states included in EPR-ETH.

1) Ethnic differentiation not based on any of the three dimensions bio-geographic origin, religion, or language.
2) Ethnicity coded as politically irrelevant in EPR-ETH. These countries are excluded from all statistical analyses.
3) Racial cleavage without European(-descendant) group. Thus classified as unranked system.
4) If group sizes change over time, maximum value is recorded.
5) EPR-ETH denominates white/mestizo groups in Latin American countries as titular groups (e.g. Argentinians, Guatemalans etc.).
## Appendix III. List of Ethnic Parties

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               | FF (1994-2009)  
               | IFP (1994-2009)  
               | MF (1994-2009) | Afrikaners  
               | Afrikaners  
               | Zulu  
               | Asians  |
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               | Catalan Republican Party (1993-1995);  
               | Herri Batasuna (1990-1999);  
               | Basque Solidarity (1990-1995);  
               | PNV / EAJ-PNV (1990-2009);  
               | Na-Bai (2008-2009) | Basques  
| Sri Lanka | JVP (2000-2003);  
               | Sinhala Urumaya (2000);  
               | National Sinhala Heritage (2004-2009) | Sinhalese  
               | TULF (1990-2003);  
               | EPDP (1994-2009);  
               | DPLF (1994-1999; 2001-2003);  
               | Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (2000);  
               | Up-Country People’s Front (2004-2009) | Indian Tamils  
               | SLMC (1990-1999; 2001-2009);  
               | Muslim National Unity Alliance (2000) | Moors (Muslims)  |
| Taiwan    | People First Party (2001-2009);  
               | Taiwan Solidarity Union (2004-2009) | Taiwanese  
               | Labor Party (1992-1994);  
| Togo      | RPT (1994-2009) | Kabré (and related groups)  
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Notes: Ethnic groups according to EPR-ETH. Years in parentheses after party name indicate legislative periods corresponding to the parliamentary elections in which the party has participated and won any number of votes above 0, during period of 1990 to 2009.
### Summary Statistics for Global-level Analyses

Table A 4: Summary statistics, country level, global

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Table A 6: Summary statistics, country level, Sub-Saharan Africa

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Table A 7: Summary statistics, group level, Sub-Saharan Africa

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<td>.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ethnic parties and Electoral Violence. Additional Robustness Tests

I subjected the results of Table 4-5 in Chapter 4.3 to a variety of robustness tests using both the hurdle count model (Model 4.7 in Table 4-5) and the separate logit and Poisson fixed-effects models (Models 4.8 and 4.9). First, I expanded the sample of election years by replacing the missing values of the lagged ethnic party strength variable – which affected all first elections in the sample – by the non-lagged values. Secondly, I used a revised count variable that also includes those electoral violence events which started in the calendar year before and after a given election. Since elections often take place at the beginning or the end of a calendar year, events of electoral violence of previous or subsequent years might be connected to these elections as well.

Finally, an additional model controlled for the election experience of a country, and the competitiveness of the election. The former counts the number of elections held in the country, including the current one. The latter was measured as the difference between the vote share of the largest government party minus the vote share of the second largest government party or the largest opposition party (whatever difference was smaller). These data stem from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001).

Using the hurdle count model, the effect of the ethnic party variable remains positive and significant with regard to the risk of violence occurrence. The effect is also positive but generally less precisely estimated with regard to the level of electoral violence. In the fixed-effects models, the effect of ethnic party strength is highly significant in all models. The effect of the trans-ethnic civil society indicator remains positive and statistically significant in the hurdle count model but disappears in the fixed-effects estimations. This lends further support to the notion that in contrast to ethnic party strength, trans-ethnic civil society strength is not related to within-country variation in election violence.

Ethnic Parties and Small-Scale Violence in Africa. Additional Analyses

The following analysis is based on the count variable of social violence events in Sub-Saharan Africa, constructed from the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) (version 3.0) (Salehyan et al. 2012), which indicates the number of violent events that started in each country year. To identify violent events in the dataset, I selected those events that were coded as “organized violent riot”, “spontaneous violent riot”, “pro-government violence”, “anti-government violence”, “extra-government violence”, or “intra-government violence”, or for which an escalation to one of these types was coded. The count variable ranges from 0 to 63 with a mean number of 4.34 events of social violence per year from 1990 to 2009.

The distribution of the variable is similar to that of the election violence variable (see Figure A 4 in this Appendix). Thus, the analysis proceeds as in the election violence analysis in Table 4-5 of
Chapter 4.3, running a hurdle count model first. However, when it comes to social violence in general, ethnic party mobilization does not seem to play any role. Its effect is not statistically significant in either model component. In contrast, the trans-ethnic civil society indicator shows a significant positive effect again (results not reported here).

What is the relationship between ethnic mobilization and social violence within countries over time? Models A-1 and A-2 in Table A 8 use again separate logit and Poisson regression models with a fixed-effects adaptation. The results are ambivalent for both the ethnic party and the trans-ethnic civil society variables. The latter now shows a negative effect on the degree of social violence in Africa, although it is only statistically significant in the logit model. In contrast, while ethnic parties seem to be unrelated to the risk of violence occurrence, they exert a strong and highly significant positive effect on the level of this violence when it does occur.

Finally, Models A-3 and A-4 of Table A 8 focus on a different sub-type of social violence recorded in the SCAD dataset: ethnic violence. These are all events of social violence for which any of the three “issue” variables was coded as 5 (“ethnic discrimination, ethnic issues”). Since the dataset as a whole focuses on events of social and political disorder of a smaller dimension than ethnic civil conflicts, these recorded events refer to ethnic violence of a less systematic nature, usually at the communal level. Therefore, they serve as an important robustness test of my theoretical argument which distinguishes between organized ethnic rebellions and small-scale violence.

Overall, SCAD records 842 events of ethnic violence between 1990 and 2009. The count variable of ethnic violence events ranges from 0 to 17 with a mean of 0.59 events per country year. Over 80% of all country years included in the sample are characterized by no ethnic violence at all. Figure A 5 in this Appendix shows the distribution of these events to be even more highly skewed than that of electoral violence and all social violence events.

In the hurdle count model, neither of the two main independent variables shows a significant effect (results not reported here). This changes once we use separate logit and Poisson regression models with a fixed-effects adaptation to examine the relationships within the countries over time. The results are reported in Models A-3 and A-4 in Table A 8. Like in the social violence Models A-1 and A-2, the effect of the trans-ethnic civil society variable is negative, and statistically significant again in the logit model.

The effect of the ethnic party variable is positive and statistically significant in both of these ethnic violence models. Thus, within a given country, an increase in the strength of ethnic parties results in both a higher risk of ethnic violence occurrence and a higher level of such vio-

---

All following models include the same independent variables that were used in the election violence analysis in Chapter 4.3, except for the election violence history variable, which is replaced by a lagged dependent variable controlling for the level of social violence or ethnic violence in the previous country year. In principle, all country years between 1990 and 2009 are included here. However, the number of observations is reduced due to missing values on the ethnic party strength and trans-ethnic civil society variables and, in the fixed-effects estimations, because some countries did not experience any variation in violence over time.
lence if it occurs. In sum, ethnic parties are not systematically linked to social violence in general or ethnic violence in particular in the cross-sectional comparison. However, within a given country, changes in ethnic party strength over time have a significant influence on the degree of both types of violence.

Table A 8: Ethnic mobilization and social violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2009. Regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model A-1</th>
<th>Model A-2</th>
<th>Model A-3</th>
<th>Model A-4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All social violence</td>
<td>All social violence</td>
<td>Ethnic violence</td>
<td>Ethnic violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logit (fixed-effects)</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>1.05***</td>
<td>1.54*</td>
<td>2.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poisson (fixed effects)</td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
<td>(.77)</td>
<td>(.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-ethnic civil society strength</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.83***</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.26)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall strength of civil society</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative size of excluded groups</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>2.69*</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.57)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
<td>(1.55)</td>
<td>(7.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity index (lagged)</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size (logged)</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>-.51</td>
<td>-.39</td>
<td>-2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.48)</td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
<td>(3.29)</td>
<td>(5.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (lagged, logged)</td>
<td>-3.04***</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-2.14*</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.90)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
<td>(.93)</td>
<td>(.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calendar year</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N events of social violence (lagged)</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>.02***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N events of ethnic violence (lagged)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>157.94</td>
<td>-72.90</td>
<td>-209.72</td>
<td>-145.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(199.68)</td>
<td>(6358)</td>
<td>(194.07)</td>
<td>(193.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-198.35***</td>
<td>-982.85***</td>
<td>-146.62***</td>
<td>-177.15***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors, with clustering on countries, in parentheses. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001, *p ≤ .1
Figure A 2: The relative strength of trans-ethnic civil society in conflict and control cases in Africa over time

Notes: Relative strength of trans-ethnic civil society measured by the ratio of trans-ethnic organizations to all civil society organizations, with 1 meaning that all civil society organizations recorded in the dataset for a given country are trans-ethnic.
Figure A 3: Distribution of number of electoral violence events in African election years, 1990-2009

Figure A 4: Distribution of number of all social violence events in Africa, 1990-2009

Figure A 5: Distribution of number of ethnic violence events in Africa, 1990-2009
### Appendix VI. Summary Statistics and Additional Analyses for Latin America

Table A 9: Summary statistics, country level, Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic party strength</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic party dummy variable</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic civil society density</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic mobilization years</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>15.64</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16.86</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General civil society density</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>7.39</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>40.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative size of excluded groups</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity index</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>4947.43</td>
<td>4494.33</td>
<td>2378.31</td>
<td>1277.17</td>
<td>12,751</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population size</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>18,910,450</td>
<td>6,071,045</td>
<td>32,294,110</td>
<td>721,000</td>
<td>198,739,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War history</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment dummy</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
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<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic party dummy</td>
<td>1520</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<td>.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic civil society density</td>
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<td>2.45</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>68.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of mobilization</td>
<td>2240</td>
<td>12.19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group size</td>
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<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous dummy</td>
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<td>.69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall internal fractionali-</td>
<td>2240</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Additional Analysis of Effect of Democracy on Ethnic Equality in Latin America**

What has the effect of democracy on ethnic equality been in Latin America over time? To answer this question, I interact the democracy variable with the calendar year in an additional model that is otherwise identical to Model 6.1 in Table 6.1 of Chapter 6.2.

Figure A 6 in this Appendix shows that in Latin America, a positive influence of formal democracy on ethnic equality already set in in the early 1980s – about a decade earlier than in the global set of ranked ethnic systems. This finding is very much in line with Yashar’s (2005) argument that the political opening of the late 1970s gave way to the rise of ethnic movements in Latin America.

This is not to downplay the autonomous achievements of these movements in standing up against hostile political systems, and in the democratization of the region. Indeed, in many countries indigenous and to a lesser extent African-descendant movements have played a crucial role in strengthening and deepening democracy (see e.g. Becker 2011; Jonas 1995, 2000; Madrid 2012; Selverston-Scher 2001; Sieder 2002). At the same time, in many of the region’s role model democracies (such as Chile or Costa Rica), the historical inequalities have been carried on under liberal political institutions. Nevertheless, my results confirm that at least in some countries the return to formal democracy has been an important impetus for these ongoing struggles.

**Additional Analysis of Statistical Outliers**

While Chapter 6.2 has extensively discussed the successful cases of empowerment in terms of the theoretical argument, the present analysis looks more closely at the outliers, i.e. those groups which have a high probability of achieving empowerment according to my models, yet remain politically marginalized in their countries. How can we explain their ongoing marginalization? And what does that say about the validity of the theoretical argument?

Table A 11 in this Appendix lists the “dogs that didn’t bark”: the ten un-empowered indigenous and African-descendant groups with the highest predicted probabilities of empowerment at the end of my sample period in 2009. These probabilities are the mean values of the three unique probability values resulting from Models 6.2 to 6.4 in Table 6.1 of Chapter 6.2 (i.e. those controlling for general civil society strength). Hence, considering all circumstances examined in the previous analyses, these groups are the most likely candidates for empowerment in the present, yet remain politically marginalized.

At the top of the list, with by far the highest predicted probability, are Guatemala’s indigenous Maya people. We will discuss this case in depth in the case study of Chapter 7. Suffice it for now to say that the group exhibits a very high level of internal fragmentation along linguistic and religious lines. This is also true for indigenous groups in Chile and Costa Rica. Yet, at the same
time, all these groups experienced an improvement in their political situation during the 1990s, as more severe regimes of ethnic discrimination were abolished, according to EPR-ETH.

The cases of Nicaragua and Colombia are also interesting. While the Afro- columbians, and the Miskito and Sumu groups in Nicaragua have not achieved de-facto empowerment, these countries have enacted de-iure systems of regional autonomy which in principle should benefit these groups, too, but have not brought a tangible improvement of their political fate. In the country-level analyses of Chapter 6.2, I explicitly focus on such instances of de-iure empowerment.

The high probabilities of groups in Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay are likely to stem from these countries’ high values on the Polity index which exhibited a strong and significant positive effect in all statistical models of Table 6-1 in Chapter 6.2. In this sense, these cases remind us that ethnic exclusion may very well co-exist with high levels of formal democracy. Finally, while indigenous groups in Mexico’s Chiapas region have unilaterally created zones of autonomous political authority in the context of the 1994 uprising (Mattia 2007, 205), El Salvador’s indigenous groups have made significant political gains during the 1990s as the country’s official policy towards its indigenous population moved from a complete denial of existence to a rhetorical recognition (Tilley 2005) – reflected in the EPR-ETH data by the advancement from the “discriminated” to the “powerless” category. Thus, in these cases – just like in Guatemala, Chile, and Costa Rica – ethnic mobilization did result in partial political gains. In sum, the ongoing marginalization of these statistical outliers does not undermine the overall validity of the theoretical argument.

Additional Analysis of Effect of Ethnic Parties on Institutional Instability in Latin America over time

The results of Model 6.8 in Table 6-5 of Chapter 6.3 revealed that ethnic parties are unrelated to the type of institutional crises operationalized by Fearon and Laitin (2003) as a change on the Polity IV index of three points or more in a single year. However, the question arises: has ethnic parties’ effect on instability changed over the post-World War II period? Examples such as the January 2000 coup in Ecuador, and the generally growing activism and strength of ethnic parties in Latin America today compared to earlier decades make it appear plausible that their potential for political interference has increased. Hence, I interact the ethnic party variable with the calendar year in an additional control model otherwise identical to Model 6.8 in Table 6-5.\footnote{I dropped the NGO density indicator to be able to work with the full sample period from 1946 to 2009.} Figure A 7 in this Appendix shows that there is no relevant change in the effect of ethnic parties
in Latin America during the whole sample period. Although the effect does increase somewhat over time, it never comes close to be statistically significant.\(^\text{371}\)

\(^{371}\) The same is true for the effect of ethnic civil society mobilization over time. \(^3\)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>( P(\text{empowerment}) )</th>
<th>Ethnic party</th>
<th>Fractionalization value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Mayas</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>Yes (since 2007)</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Miskitos</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>Yes (since 2001)</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Afrocolombians</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>Yes (since 1998)</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Mapuche</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Other indigenous peoples</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Afro-Uruguayans</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Sumus</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Probability of empowerment denotes the average values of the predicted probability values from Models 6.2 to 6.4 in Table 6-1 of Chapter 6.2 (always referring to the probability in the year of 2009). "Ethnic party" refers to the situation in 2009. Fractionalization value based on the EPR-Cleavages dataset (Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt 2013).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ILO 169 ratification</th>
<th>Legal ethnic autonomy regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Yes (since 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Yes (since 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Yes (since 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1995</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Yes (since 1987)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Yes (since 1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Yes (since 1999)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table A 13: Conflict events in Latin America, 1946-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Ethnic group(s) involved</th>
<th>Coup</th>
<th>Ethnic party</th>
<th>Years of (above-average) ethnic civil society mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Non-ethnic</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Non-ethnic</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Non-ethnic</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952</td>
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<td>Costa Rica</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>Ethnic (from 1975 on)</td>
<td>Mayas</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>1982</td>
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<td>Miskitos, Sumus</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>---</td>
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Notes: List of conflict onsets follows the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset. Classification as ethnic according to ACD2EPR. Data on coups from the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall and Marshall 2010), and Nohlen (2005a, 2005b). “Ethnic party” refers to the year before conflict outbreak. If no multi-party democracy existed, variable is coded as missing. “Years of (above-average) ethnic civil society mobilization” indicates number of consecutive years of civil society mobilization (and in parentheses of above-average mobilization) prior to conflict outbreak.
Figure A 6: The effect of democracy in Latin America over time

Notes: Based on Model 1 of Table 6-1. Interaction of calendar year variable with Polity index variable.

Figure A 7: The effect of ethnic parties on institutional instability in Latin America over time

Notes: Based on Model 6.8 of Table 6-5, without NGO density indicator. Interaction of calendar year variable with ethnic party dummy.
Figure A8: Distribution of EPR-ETH group statuses for subordinated groups in Latin America

Figure A9: Ethnic party strength and group protest in Latin America. Scatter plot
References

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List of Interviews

Interviews Conducted in Guatemala (in Guatemala City, unless otherwise noted)

Political party leaders
2011-5-3 (Unión del Cambio Nacionalista, UCN)
2011-5-16 (Unidad Nacional de Esperanza, UNE)
2011-5-23-I (Partido de Avanzada Nacional, PAN)
2011-5-23-II (Encuentro por Guatemala, EG)
2011-5-24-I (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG)

Parliamentarians
2011-5-25-I (Gran Alianza Nacional, GANA)
2011-6-1 (Partido Patriota, PP)
2011-6-15-I (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco, FRG)
2011-6-15-III (UCN)
2011-6-16-I (URNG)
2011-6-22-I (GANA)

State bureaucrats
2011-5-12-I (Ministry of Education)
2011-5-13-I (State Secretariat for Agriculture)
2011-5-13-II (State Secretariat for Agriculture)
2011-5-18-I (State Secretariat for Agriculture)
2011-5-20-I (Ministry of Education)
2011-5-20-II (State Fund for Land)
2011-5-27 (Ministry of Education)
2011-6-2-II (State Secretariat for Agriculture)
2011-6-4 (Ministry of Economy)
2011-6-8 (Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance)
2011-6-14 (Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare)
2011-6-15-II (National System of Permanent Dialogue)
2011-6-16-II (Academy of Maya Languages in Guatemala)
2011-6-16-IV (Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare)
2011-6-17 (State Fund for Indigenous Development)
2011-6-20-I (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food)
2011-6-20-II (State Secretariat for Peace)
2011-6-30 (Ministry of Energy and Mining)
2011-7-5 (Ombudsman’s Office for Indigenous Women)
2011-7-7-I (Ministry of Education)
2011-7-7-II (Ministry of Education)
2011-7-7-III (Ministry of Education)
2011-7-26 (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources)

Maya organization leaders
2011-4-29
2011-5-6
2011-5-11
2011-5-12-II
2011-5-17
2011-5-18-II
2011-5-24-II
2011-5-30
2011-6-22-II
2011-6-22-III
2011-6-27
2011-7-4 (in Quetzaltenango)
Media representatives
2011-5-25-II
2011-5-31
2011-6-6-II
2011-6-7
2011-6-9-I
2011-6-16-III
2011-6-21
2011-6-22-IV

Outside experts
2011-5-13-III
2011-6-2-I
2011-6-6-I
2011-6-9-II
2011-6-13
2011-11-24 (in Zurich, Switzerland)

Interviews Conducted in Côte d’Ivoire (in Abidjan)

Political party leaders
2012-7-20 (Rassemblement des Républicains, RDR)
2012-7-23 (RDR)
2012-7-31 (RDR)
2012-8-1-I (RDR)
2012-8-9-I (RDR)
2012-8-12 (Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire, PDCI)
2012-8-17-I (Front Populaire Ivoirien, FPI)
2012-8-23-II (FPI)

Parliamentarians
2012-7-24 (RDR)
2012-7-29 (PDCI)
2012-7-30-I (PDCI)
2012-8-11 (RDR)
2012-8-15-I (RDR)

Civil society leaders
2012-7-25-I
2012-7-25-II
2012-7-27-II
2012-7-30-II
2012-8-1-II
2012-8-2
2012-8-3
2012-8-6
2012-8-8
2012-8-10-I
2012-8-10-II
2012-8-22-II

Media representatives
2012-7-19-I
2012-7-19-II
2012-8-14
Interviews Conducted in Gabon (in Libreville)

Political party leaders
2012-9-3 (Union du Peuple Gabonais, UPG)
2012-9-4-I (Union Nationale, UN)
2012-9-5-I (MORENA Unioniste)
2012-9-5-II (Rassemblement National des Bûcherons, RNB)
2012-9-14 (Congrès pour la Démocratie et la Justice, CDJ)
2012-9-16 (Union pour une nouvelle république, UPNR)
2012-9-17 (Parti social-démocrate, PSD)
2012-9-18-I (Parti démocratique Gabonais, PDG)
2012-9-19-I (UN)
2012-9-21 (PDG)
2012-10-1 (PDG)

Civil society leaders
2012-8-29
2012-8-30
2012-8-31
2012-9-4-II
2012-9-6-I
2012-9-6-II
2012-9-10-I
2012-9-10-II
2012-9-13-I
2012-9-13-II
2012-9-19-II

Media representatives
2012-9-4-I
2012-9-11
2012-9-18-II
2012-9-25
2012-9-28

Outside experts
2012-9-1

Interviews Conducted in Ecuador (in Quito)

Political party leaders
2013-4-22-I (Unidad Plurinacional de las Izquierdas)
2013-4-24 (Creando Oportunidades, CREO)
Lucio Gutiérrez, 2013-5-2 & 2013-5-3 (*Partido Sociedad Patriótica, PSP*)
2013-5-7-IV (*Movimiento Alianza PAIS*)
2013-5-9 (*Movimiento Alianza PAIS*)

*Parliamentarians*
2013-4-23-I (*Pachakutik*)
2013-4-23-II (*Pachakutik*)
2013-5-2-II (*CREO*)

*State bureaucrats*
2013-4-19 (*Ministry of Non-Renewable Natural Resources*)
2013-4-22-II (*Ministry of Education*)
2013-5-2-I (*Ecuador Estratégico*)
2013-5-7-I (*State Secretariat for Planning and Development*)
2013-5-7-II (*State Secretariat of Peoples, Social Movements and Citizen Participation*)

*Indigenous organization leaders*
2013-4-11-II
2013-4-15
2013-4-17
2013-5-1
2013-5-8-II

*Afro-Ecuadorian leaders*
Nieves Méndez, 2013-5-6 (*Centro Cultural Afroecuatoriano, CCA*)
José Chalá Cruz, 2013-5-8 (*Afro-Ecuadorian Development Corporation, CODAE*)
Pablo Minda, 2013-5-10

*Media representatives*
2013-4-5
2013-4-9
2013-4-12
2013-4-18-II

*Outside experts*
Pablo Dávalos, 2013-4-10
Ariruma Kowii, 2013-4-11
Alberto Acosta, 2013-4-18
2013-4-25
Pablo Ospina, 2013-5-2
Jhon Antón Sánchez, 2013-5-7