Eurasian Union

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More Stick, Less Carrot: Russia’s Policy Towards Ukraine Following Recent Events

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It was widely believed in Western analytical circles that Ukraine’s choice about whether or not to accede to the Russia-led Customs Union (CU) would be a key factor defining the success or failure of Eurasian integration, in both economic and geopolitical terms. The current crisis in Russian–Ukrainian relations will soon reveal whether this assumption was right or wrong.

Admittedly, at the moment, one can hardly predict in what direction Moscow’s thinking concerning the future of the CU will evolve, and whether the Kremlin will still treat it as a priority or not. After the annexation of Crimea, a substantial change in approach cannot be ruled out. The goal of post-Soviet reintegration (i.e. a restoration of ties between at least several former Soviet republics, allegedly beneficial to everyone), could be replaced, in the long-term, with a “gathering of (ethnic) Russian lands”. If this were to happen, Moscow’s willingness to push further and financially support Eurasian integration would probably diminish, while the concerns and hesitations among Russia’s partners would increase.

The Customs Union will not disappear. The reality on the ground is that Russian–Belarusian–Kazakhstani economic relations have been transformed since the CU entered into force in 2010, and there is no way back. The trilateral economic union will most likely be created in some form in 2015. Yet, further progress in moving towards the four economic freedoms or in enlarging the union is not guaranteed.

However, not counter-intuitively, for Ukraine and Russian–Ukrainian relations this new uncertainty about the future of the CU does not change much. Moscow’s objective vis-à-vis Ukraine was, and remains, keeping the latter in its sphere of dominant influence. Eurasian integration was an instrument, not an end in itself. If this instrument has not worked, others will be employed, and there are plenty to choose from.

The difference is that when offering Ukraine membership in the CU, Moscow was demonstrating its willingness to emphasize carrots rather than sticks, and essentially pay for Ukraine’s geopolitical loyalty. Now, and for the foreseeable future, the balance in its approach will move towards sticks.

Russian economic leverage over Ukraine is enormous by definition—let alone the risk of a military invasion in Eastern Ukraine—and the resolve to use it seems to have grown in recent months. Moscow has already announced that it will discontinue the discounted price for gas that Ukraine used to receive in return for leasing a naval base in Sevastopol to Russia. As a result, the gas price is expected to rise to 500 USD per one thousand cubic meters, which would be approximately 60 percent higher than what Germany pays for the same gas.1 If Ukraine leaves the CIS, it will no longer enjoy the free trade regime of the Commonwealth. In addition, Russia can simply stop Ukrainian exports on the border at will.

In relation to this earlier calculus, however, it should be pointed out that in the case of Ukraine’s economic collapse, those Russian businesses which invested heavily in Ukraine would suffer as well, and that for this reason Moscow might show restraint. But, at the moment, it may be easier for Moscow to compensate Russian businesses for their losses directly.

Unfortunately, the ability of the new Ukrainian authorities to face this challenge remains in doubt. The internal unity, transparency, professionalism of and, above all, popular support for the new government are not guaranteed. At this moment, it is difficult to understand how Moscow and Kyiv will conduct negotiations at all, as the Kremlin does not recognize the current Ukrainian government, while the former private channels of communication have been largely broken.

The signing of a political association between Ukraine and the EU will—in the short term—serve more as an irritant for Russia, than as a resource for Kyiv. Europe is extremely reluctant to go into real, non-rhetorical clashes with Russia. It is ready to spend some cash, but will hardly make substantial sacrifices unless the annexation of Crimea is followed with similar actions in other parts of Ukraine—or Moldova, for that matter.

The struggle for the future of Ukraine is intensifying. Since independence, Russia has been ready to respect or at least tolerate Ukraine’s balancing act between Russia and the EU, which explained the acquiescence to Ukraine’s refusal to accede to the Customs Union under Viktor Yanukovych. This postulate does not seem to hold any longer.

See overleaf for information about the author and further reading.

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1 On 3 April 2014, Gazprom raised the price of gas for Ukraine by US$ 100 to 485,50 US$ per 1000 cubic meters.
About the Author
Dr Arkady Moshes is Programme Director for the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia research programme at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, and an associate member of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House. Before moving to Finland in 2002, he worked at the Institute of Europe in Moscow. His areas of expertise include Russian–European relations, Russia’s policy towards the Western CIS and Baltic States, as well as the internal and foreign policy of Ukraine and Belarus. He has been a guest lecturer at several universities and institutes, has authored over 130 academic and analytical publications and is a frequent commentator in European and Russian media. He holds a the PhD in history of international relations from the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Further Reading

ANALYSIS
Eurasian Integration: A Viable New Regionalism?
By David Lane, Cambridge

Abstract
The project of a Eurasian Union can be considered as a response to the consequences of neo-liberal globalisation, which led to economic and moral decline in the countries forming the Commonwealth of Independent States. It is part of a more general movement in world politics towards regionalisation. Possible developments are discussed in terms of three scenarios: isolation from the world economy; a ‘stepping stone’ to further integration in the world economy; and a more autonomous ‘counter-point’ within the world economy. The third variety would only be possible with concurrent stronger linkages to the BRICS countries and the Shanghai Cooperative Organisation.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, COMECON and the Warsaw Pact, the Central European societies and, later, the former Baltic republics of the USSR returned to their European home by entry into the European Union. The remaining states of the USSR adopted market economies and became exposed to the world economic system. They remained in a loose association, the Commonwealth of Independent States, which regulated a number of common activities (such as air traffic control) and weakly promoted symbolic forms of attachment, but had no effective economic and political powers.

A belief that the backwardness of the state-socialist societies was due to their separation from the international economic system drove policy makers across central and eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space to enter global markets. The neo-liberal globalised system has led to the greater porousness of state borders to allow the market to flourish and, consequently, the nation-state has lost powers. The central European, post-socialist, New Member States of the European Union are bound to the European Union by its comprehensive conditions for membership, though they are to some extent shielded by its social provisions and have free movement of people within its borders.

The CIS countries, however, were unable to compete in the open world system of competitive capitalism and were confronted economically and politically by Western powers, successfully pursuing their own geopolitical interests through market mechanisms. Consequently, the former republics of the USSR experienced economic decline, rising levels of inequality and poverty.
Russia lost the USSR’s status as a major world power and its peoples suffered an identity crisis. A process of decay and industrial de-development accompanied by disenchanted with free market mechanisms occurred.

This decline of the CIS states and a degeneration of their societies into chaos have precipitated the ideas of Eurasianism, and the proposed Eurasian Union. Post-Soviet political leaders have sought to find the illusive ‘alternative’ to the neo-liberal ideology learned from the West, which to them legitimates the political and economic hegemony of the USA. In this quest, they seek forms of association which would bring them into the world economy on a more equal and, optimistically, more beneficial terms than hitherto.

There is no single version of ‘Eurasianism’ (Evraziystvo). It is an ambiguous and controversial term. The proposed Eurasian Union has to be interpreted as a movement in-progress. This is to be expected and follows other comparable movements; for example, the evolving notions of the European Union or, with a much longer history, the changing understanding of the (British) Commonwealth of Nations.

The Eurasian Background

Eurasianism can be addressed at different levels—as a philosophy of a civilisation, or at a policy level in terms of an economic customs’ union. At a philosophical and historical level, it is associated with writers ranging from Nikolay Berdyaev to contemporary Russian sociologists, such as Ovsi Shkaratan. As a set of values and beliefs, it is derived from the space, history, institutions and practices of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. The content is sufficiently vague to present a repertoire of concepts.

Eurasia, as a geographical space, is the area occupied by Genghis Khan, the Imperial Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Socially, the area is composed of heterogeneous peoples, with Russians being predominant. Eurasianism is composed of the values, mores and institutions which developed historically in this area. This gave rise to a Russian civilisation that is distinguished by the conservative religious teaching of the Orthodox Church, the collective role of a state legitimated by a strong leader, and the responsibility of institutions to ‘serve the people’. The social order has also arisen in opposition to ‘the Other’; the West. It has no formalised social basis analogous to class (as in Marxist theory). In the cultural formation of Eurasianism, there is no dynamic for, or aspiration to, territorial expansion and differences are essentially cultural. Eurasianism, therefore, has and can coexist with other civilisations, such as Islam, and can be expressed in different economic forms of production, such as feudalism, capitalism and socialism.

Eurasian Union

From this amalgam of ideas and orientations, political leaders, such as Presidents Putin, Lukashenko and Nazarbayev, devise and legitimate policies. The idea of a Eurasian Union was first formulated by President Nazarbayev in 1994, but only in November 2011 did the three presidents agree to establish a union by 2015. Currently, it involves, institutionally, a form of collaboration between three states: Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan, though others have shown interest in joining. Clearly, as in the European Union, these states have different predispositions and priorities, reflecting their endowments and relative strengths. The leadership of Kazakhstan (analogous to the UK’s disposition to the EU) rather favours an economic association, whereas Belarus (similar to Germany) supports a stronger and more comprehensive political and economic union.

The proposed Eurasian Union conforms to a capitalist form of economy with a place in the world economic system. But the thrust of policy is to reverse the effects of globalisation, particularly to ensure the sovereignty of the nation state. The objective is to achieve these goals by forming a regional bloc. Such an association is open to different courses of action and could be a positive movement similar to other regional developments in world politics. Other more sceptical views are prominent, and are considered below.

The Vitality of Regionalism

The dissolution of the Soviet Union, initially led to a fragmentation of the world political system around a unipolar USA. Later developments enabled the rise of regional blocs and a move to a more multi-polar system. Whereas international borderless trade and the de-territorialisation of politics are assumed to be a dynamic feature of ‘globalisation’, regional forms of association have become major components of international political and economic organisation. As of 31 January 2014, 377 regional trade agreements were in force and they covered over half of world trade.


3 See WTO Regional trade agreements data base. <http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx> These include 18 cus-
The New Regionalism approach, developed in Western political studies, regards regions as the successors to nation states. The European Union is the model to be emulated. To be successful, regions require not only an economic basis (in which the EU has been strong), but also forms of cultural identification (which has been a stumbling block in the EU) and political and social linkages (which have proved problematic in the EU). The proposed Eurasian Union would combine cultural, political and social components and fit comfortably into this framework.

For example, from an economic point of view, there is a large domestic internal market. Russia has considerable currency reserves, and all the countries have a low transnationality index (low value-added by foreign companies). Politically, all the countries share common Tsarist and Soviet legacies, with a presumption that strong state leaders will provide public welfare. The failure of neo-liberal policy to secure prosperity has weakened the identification of significant parts of the elite with neo-liberal economic outlooks and individualism. Ideologically, there is a strong national identity linked to Russia as a civilisation with a common language and shared history. Culturally, Orthodoxy gives rise to a mutual religious history for the Slavic peoples of the countries, though it has coexisted with other religions (such as Islam). There is also a perceived common ‘Other’—the hegemonic United States and its Western allies.

However, many commentators express doubts. The current dialogue on Eurasianism involves conflicting roles for state and market, different positions on religious and secular norms and diverse standpoints on allies and ‘others’. Some commentators point out that many of these views are contradictory and they have reservations about the model’s viability. Whilst others, erroneously I believe, regard Eurasianism as an ideology that underpins a military and political threat to the West.

Three Possible Scenarios
I would single out three contrasting positions for the evolution of the Eurasian Union:

The first opinion is that the Eurasian Union would follow a route down an economic cul-de-sac. Most Western critics take this point of view—particularly those from the European Union—and contend that a state-led economic union will lead to isolation, protectionism and consequently to economic decline and political weakness. They claim that it would cut off the Eurasian member states from innovation and progress. The argument here is a familiar one, articulated by Margaret Thatcher during the time of Gorbachev: ‘there is no alternative to the neo-liberal model’. Others in this school emphasise the mischievous intentions of the Russian leadership: Eurasianism is a legitimation of opposition to the West and its values. They contend that it not only legitimates a false economic alternative, but it seeks to enlarge the Russian state and reconstitute the former Soviet Union.

This in my view is an erroneous understanding of the position of its political advocates in Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The assertions have no foundation in the philosophy of Eurasianism; political actions, moreover, have to be interpreted also in the light of geo-political interests and policies.

The European Union Model
Second, is the idea that the envisaged regional association would emerge as a ‘stepping stone’ to the current world system, dominated by a core of hegemonic Western states. The argument here is that regions are complementary components of the world system. According to Bjorn Hettne, the core states seek to control the world outside the core and, to this end, they exercise ‘ideological hegemony’—predominantly neo-liberalism. Other writers in this vein emphasise the adoption of regionalism as part of American soft power. Such commentators define the regions within the ‘core’ as Europe (the EU), North America (NAFTA) and East Asia—‘the Triad’. These regions have all moved in the direction of neo-liberalism.

Outside of the ‘core’ are the intermediate regions, of which the post-Soviet states are a part. States in the intermediate zone are linked to the core regions and gradually become incorporated into the core. Such writers point out that the core can use regional arrangements to set up, or widen free trade and, hence, extend neo-liberal influence on others. Such regions then may become ‘stepping stones’. An example here is the southern European and the east European New Member states of the European Union, who on joining become enmeshed in the neo-liberal democratic world order. Alternatively, should the regions in the intermediate zone fail to meet the conditions for joining the core, they will ‘sink into the periphery’.

6 Hettne (2001), p. 6
Some sponsors of the Eurasian Union advocate the institutions of the European Union as a model to be copied. The implication of this position is that if markets are to predominate in the economic union, they would exert their own logic and would drive the Eurasian Union to the neo-liberal world system, which they would welcome. So the development of an alternative social system would not arise. The Eurasian Union would become another economic region in the neo-liberal world system driven by global markets, rather than by states set in regional blocs. The cultural and social components of Eurasianism would be incorporated by the economic market. In this variant, Eurasianism is no threat to the West; indeed, it is one way to contain the states in a reformulated Commonwealth of Independent States.

Another advantage of a Eurasian grouping based on the model of the European Union is that it would be far less heterogeneous than the latter’s present membership. Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan have more in common culturally, politically and socially than those of the current EU members. While there are groups with other religious values (such as Muslims), the societies have a common language and have been members of a common state for over a century before the breakup of the USSR. The dominant values and norms as well as institutions have the same background. These states endorse state welfare and collective, rather than individual, responsibility. Unlike the EU members, they have never been at war with one another. They are not divided by some members having a dual commitment (such as the transatlanticist UK). Hence, one can understand why some Eurasianists contemplate the EU as a model. Despite its current severe problems and dislocations, it is widely admired as an example of positive economic achievement furthering integration of nation states.

However, it is mistaken to advocate this model for a Eurasian Union. The EU is premised on uniting its members into a common ideological and political framework with complementary political and economic institutions and a common foreign policy. In 2014, there are thirty-five chapters of its Acquis Communautaire, which define institutional arrangements and acceptable procedures over a comprehensive range of activities. The first ten chapters include: free movement of goods; freedom of movement for employees; the establishment and provision of services; free movement of capital; public procurement; company law; intellectual property rights; competition policy; financial services; information and media; agriculture and rural development; other chapters include: social policy and employment; enterprise and industrial policy; regional policy and coordination of structural instruments; judiciary and fundamental rights; justice, freedom and security; education and culture; customs union; foreign, security and defence policy; financial control; financial and budgetary provisions. The European Union obliges commitment of its member states to common political values and institutions, and to the virtues of electoral competitive democracy.

The outcome of free movement of capital, labour, goods and services has undermined the social and economic fabric of the member states. In fulfilling the conditions of the Acquis, the member states have lost sovereign powers. This is in contradiction to a major component in the thinking of Eurasianists, particularly President Putin; notably, to maintain the sovereignty of the nation state components of the proposed Union. That is just not possible in a European Union type of political and economic association.

**Eurasia as a Regional Counterpoint**

There is also a third option: that of a political and economic counterpoint. The Eurasian Union might well secure a polity based on more collectivist and conservative religious values, with state economic coordination and a form of democracy different from electoral democracy (or not based at all on Western conceptions of pluralist democracy). It would exchange with the dominant world system, but would not be embedded in the neo-liberal order. Economically, it would be a national form of capitalism. In this sense, it would be a competing formation to neo-liberal capitalism.

I would suggest that an alternative looser organizational structure is appropriate for the Eurasian Union, which would maintain the sovereignty and individual identity of the three states. Other models would be the European Economic Community (which preceded the EU) or even the British Commonwealth (before the UK joined the EEC). Both these formations included a customs union within which individual states maintained their political sovereignty. The political institutions and ideology were also shared though there was considerable divergence of views and interests. The Commonwealth members also had strong cultural identification and recognized common enemies and friends.

Predispositions of the political elites in the post-Soviet states are shaped by similar developments. Eurasianism provides an alternative predicated on a practical regional association. A move to economic autarchy (as previously in the USSR) can be ruled out for many reasons. As Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal put it: ‘The neo-liberal warning that the new regionalism is a revival of protectionism … seems to be an ideological construction.’

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The Eurasian community has the possibility of exercising a form of autonomy within a regional setting.

In my view, for countries in the semi-core of the world system, regionalism need not entail adopting the principles of neo-liberal globalisation. China, Russia, India, Brazil and Venezuela and constituents of regional groups (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Eurasian Economic Community, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN) can strengthen their position against hegemonic powers.

A serious problem here is whether a Eurasian Union of only three countries would make an effective economic base. To take just one measure: Forbes’s Top 2000 world corporations—in 2013 Belarus had not one company; Kazakhstan had two (one gas company and a bank); Russia 30 (10 in minerals, 7 in oil and gas and three banks). Whereas Brazil had 41 corporations in the list, India 66 and China outstrips all these countries with 136 corporations occupying the first, second and eighth ranks in the Forbes list.

To make a viable alternative economic regional bloc, cooperation with China and other BRICS countries would be essential. By 2011, the BRICS accounted for 23 per cent of global GDP as measured by PPP. These countries are quite compatible to the values of the Eurasian Union. To quote Zaki Laidi, they ‘form a coalition of sovereign state defenders. While they do not seek to form an anti-Western political coalition based on a counter-proposal or radically different vision of the world, they are concerned with maintaining their independence of judgment and national action in a world that is increasingly economically and socially interdependent’. When combined, Russia, India and China have considerable manufacturing and military capacity, as well as enormous internal markets. By 2009, China had displaced the USA as the major world trading nation. They already have extensive capacity for research and development. Strengthening regional associations would minimise contagion from global financial crises. They promote economic integration and preserve the nation state without confronting the hegemonic members of the current world economic order.

Conclusions

The dynamics of the world system—particularly the rise of semi-core countries and the relative decline of the still dominant USA—leads to a longer term scenario, which will see the developments of counterpoints, of which a Eurasian Union might become an important constituent. But a Eurasian Union alone could not mount a very serious challenge to the hegemonic core. To build any significant alternative to the neo-liberal global order would need combination with other regions in semi-core countries—particularly the BRICS or members of the Shanghai Cooperative Organisation. Such economic alternatives could prioritise economic development, channel investment and provide employment through administrative forms of collective economic coordination. The ideology is conducive to policies requiring companies to exercise greater social responsibility—to employees, consumers, suppliers and to the environment.

A Eurasian Union could legitimate a different state system and more collectivist traditional values, including those developed in Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in the past. Such developments would provide the basis for a more pluralist and multi-polar world. It would have as an economic base a capitalist alternative—a type of organised national capitalism.

About the Author

David Lane is a Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge and was previously Professor of Sociology at the University of Birmingham. He is an Academician of the Academy of Social Sciences (UK). His recent work includes: the Capitalist Transformation of State Socialism (2014); Elites and Classes in the Transformation of state Socialism (2011); (with Stephen White); Rethinking the ‘Coloured Revolutions’ (2010); (with Andrew Gamble) The European Union and World Politics (2009). Recent articles have been published in: The Political Quarterly, Mir Rossii, New Political Economy, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, European Societies and POLIS (Moscow).

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8 Figure cited by Zaki Laidi, BRICS: Sovereignty power and weakness. International Politics, 49 (5): 2012: p. 616.
Gross National Income (PPP) and Population of Selected Countries in Comparison

Figure 1: Gross National Income (PPP) and Population of Selected Countries in Comparison

Source: <http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1#>, accessed on 6 April 2014

Figure 2: Purchasing Power Parity Gross National Income Per Capita of Selected Countries in Comparison, US$

Source: <http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1#>, accessed on 6 April 2014
### Table 1: Gross National Income (PPP) and Population of Selected Countries in Comparison

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*Member states of the Eurasian Economic Community customs union*

*BRICS states*

**Source:** [http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1#](http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1#), accessed on 6 April 2014
Belarusian Perspectives on Eurasian Economic Integration

By Matthew Frear, Leiden

Abstract
Belarus has been a consistent, although not uncritical, participant in Russia’s latest wave of Eurasian integration projects. Usually described as a loyal vassal of Moscow, in reality Minsk has pursued its own agenda, which is often at odds with Russian expectations. Belarus has increasingly questioned the economic benefits of participating in Eurasian integration structures. It, however, remains heavily dependent on Russian support, which leaves the country with limited geopolitical room for manoeuvre. This has only been exacerbated by the ongoing crisis in Crimea and Ukraine.

The View from Minsk on Eurasian Integration
Belarus, alongside Kazakhstan, has been in the vanguard of the recent wave of Russia-led regional economic integration. It is a member of the tripartite Customs Union (CU) launched in 2010, joined the Single Economic Space (SES) in 2012 and is part of the negotiations to create a proposed Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015. In addition, it is a founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Furthermore, Moscow and Minsk have, on paper at least, pursued their own integration project since the late 1990s to establish a Union State of Russia and Belarus (USRB).

President Alexander Lukashenko is therefore usually portrayed as the most dependable pro-Russian leader in the post-Soviet space. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Minsk simply blindly follows Russia’s lead. Personal relations between Lukashenko and Putin are poor. Belarus takes primarily an instrumental approach to Russian-led integration projects, supporting the rhetoric in return for specific economic benefits, which help secure Lukashenko’s hold on power. In doing so, Minsk seeks in effect to monetise its geopolitical loyalty.

What Does Belarus Want from it?
The Eurasian Development Bank has made optimistic forecasts of up to 15% GDP annual growth for Belarus by 2030 through participation in the SES, which would appear to make the project an attractive proposition. Indeed, the authorities in Minsk have emphasised a number of potential benefits from integration.

Firstly, there is the prospect of an expanded market for Belarusian goods in Russia and Kazakhstan. Secondly, there is the promise of improved deals for the supply of energy commodities from Russia. These include a) the lifting of export duties on oil products refined in Belarus from Russian oil and sold to third countries, b) the supply of hydrocarbons at the same prices as the internal Russian market, and c) the delivery of oil from Kazakhstan via Russian pipelines. Thirdly, there is hope of increased foreign direct investment (FDI), with Belarus serving as a gateway to the Eurasian market. Minsk highlights its rise to 63rd place in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings, some thirty places above Russia. Finally, there is the prestige that comes from having a de jure equal voice alongside Russia in the supranational bodies of the integration projects, such as the Eurasian Economic Commission.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development noted the apparent success of the CU in its 2012 Transition Report, although the project was still in its early stages. In spite of these positive perspectives, over the past year criticisms of the negative costs of participation in Eurasian economic integration for Belarus have grown more vocal, not just from independent analysts, but also members of the government and even Lukashenko himself.

What Does Belarus Get Out of It?
Belarus has continued to enjoy subsidies and preferential economic treatment from Moscow, including several tranches of loans from the Eurasian Development Bank’s Anti-Crisis Fund in 2011, when Belarus faced a severe balance of payments crisis, devaluation of the national currency and hyperinflation. These subsidies are not as extensive as Minsk hoped for though and now only come in return for commitment to further integration in Russia-led projects.

In the case of the common market, joining the CU and SES became a condition for maintaining Belarus’ existing access to Russian markets, rather than necessarily opening up new ones to Belarusian products. Kazakhstan remains a relatively minor trade partner, accounting for just 1% of trade turnover. Meanwhile, Belarusian goods now have to deal with more competition. Minsk is no longer allowed to employ the protectionist measures it used to have in place for its domestic market. Furthermore, with Russia finally joining the WTO in 2012, Belarusian products now face increased competition in the common market from goods imported from other WTO member states. However, as a non-member...
of the WTO itself, exports from Belarus do not enjoy the advantage of lower customs rates for WTO member states in return.

The high hopes on the energy front have also failed to materialise. Belarus has been keen to pursue the proposed joint energy market of the SES, however, Moscow has prevaricated. Export duties on refined oil and petroleum from Belarus which have to be paid to Russia, which are said to cost the Belarusian economy approximately US$ 4 billion a year, remain in place. This comes in spite of Lukashenko’s threats in 2013 to withdraw from the CU if Moscow did not lift them. In reality, the Belarusian economy remains too heavily dependent on energy subsidies from Russia, which are now only forthcoming if Minsk participates in Moscow’s integration projects. The Kremlin strives to keep Lukashenko on a short leash, negotiating the price of energy commodities on a six-monthly timeframe, maintaining export duties which pay into Russia’s coffers, and continuing to delay any progress on the supply of oil direct from Kazakhstan.

There is no indication that membership of the CU and SES has resulted in a significant increase in FDI yet. Hopes that Belarus could serve as a back door to the Russian market, and attract Chinese investment by doing so, have met with limited success. Belarus ranks only 150th on the Index of Economic Freedom and its image as ‘the last dictatorship in Europe’ deters many Western investors, who prefer to do business with Russia or Kazakhstan. Belarus still attracts most of its FDI from Russia, and with that comes pressure to privatise the crown jewels of the state-owned economy. These include the Belaruskali potash producer, oil refineries in Mozyr and Novopolotsk, the MAZ automobile factory and gas pipelines. In the case of the latter, it was with great reluctance and after many delays that the remaining stake in Beltransgaz was finally sold to Gazprom in 2011.

Finally with the government’s emphasis on securing subsidised energy, there appears to have been little thought given to a cost-benefit analysis of what joining the CU and SES would mean for other sectors of the Belarusian economy. For many of them, the negatives of membership currently seem to outweigh the positives. These include measures designed to protect the Russian automobile industry which are detrimental to Belarus, pressure to reduce state subsidies for Belarusian agriculture, onerous new procedures for businesses to certify their goods, and compulsory trade liberalisation as the agreements reached by Russia to join the WTO have to be enforced in the other members of the CU and SES, even though they are not members of the WTO themselves. Eurasian integration has not brought an end to trade skirmishes with Russia either, which have included a variety of so-called meat and dairy wars, the brief suspension of flights between Minsk and Moscow over the allocation of airline slots, and accusations that Belarus dumps sugar and other agriculture products on the Russian market.

What Does Belarus Bring to It?
In reality, Belarus has been a somewhat reluctant partner in regional integration. It is a fair-weather friend, participating in Eurasian bodies in the hope of securing short-term economic gain. It cannot be considered a reliable, whole-hearted member of these organisations. As was the case in the USRB before it, Minsk will seek to exploit loopholes, ignore obligations, selectively implement agreements, and avoid ceding power in practice for as long as possible. This has been demonstrated in Lukashenko’s failed attempts to hold up the launch of the CU in 2010 in order to secure a better deal on energy supplies, the refusal of Belarus to carry out the privatisations which were pre-conditions for receiving crisis loans, the detention of the head of Russia’s Uralkali in Minsk, and the sale of refined oil products to third countries under the guise of solvents and lubricants to avoid paying export revenues to Moscow. Furthermore, as Belarus’ economic crisis in 2011 showed, the country brings its own problems in terms of genuine economic integration. Minsk has been unwilling to undertake structural reforms to address the underlying problems which precipitated the crisis in the first place.

Moscow may view Belarus as an increasingly unreliable economic burden, this is trumped, however, by the fact that from the Kremlin’s perspective the CU and SES cannot be seen to fail. Minsk is counting on Russia—despite all its frustrations—ultimately not being willing to allow the Belarusian economy to collapse. In addition, Belarus could potentially serve as a shop window to other possible members, such as Ukraine, to demonstrate that there are real practical advantages to cooperating with Russia within the framework of Eurasian integration. Lukashenko himself, however, has not been especially active in supporting Moscow’s attempts to widen the CU or SES, making it clear to Ukrainian officials during 2013 that he had no objection in principle to their country signing an Association Agreement with the EU.

Future Opportunities, Threats and Alternatives for Minsk
Lukashenko has engaged in political brinkmanship within the Eurasian integration process, seeking to extract maximum economic and financial benefits from Russia, while making the minimum genuine concessions in return. Minsk has hoped that Russia will see the embarrassment of losing support for Putin’s integration projects from traditionally its closest ally as a reason to
continue to prop up the Belarusian economy. Russia’s willingness to intervene in Ukraine to secure its influence will have worried Minsk, however, which has been noticeable in its reluctance to back Russia’s actions in Crimea. Bilateral relations have reached acrimonious lows before, as witnessed in 2010 (see RAD 87). At its most extreme, impatience with Lukashenko’s machinations could now potentially see attempts by Moscow to destabilise the country for its own ends. There are many differences between Belarus and Ukraine, nevertheless one scenario could be an attempt at ‘passportisation’, making it easier for the many temporary migrant workers from Belarus to get Russian passports and seeking to exploit the increase in Russian citizens and their families back in Belarus as leverage.

Putin’s willingness to flex Russia’s military muscle in its zone of interest may also deter Belarus from its attempts over the past year to normalise relations with the Europe. Reorientation towards the EU to diversify its economic ties would bring expectations of democratisation from Brussels, however, which is not in Lukashenko’s personal political interests. Nonetheless, Russia’s conflict with Georgia in 2008 was one of the catalysts for the thaw in EU–Belarus relations then, so Minsk may in fact redouble its efforts to improve ties. Alternatively, relying solely on Russia’s economic support through closer Eurasian integration could also undermine Lukashenko’s ability to rule, as Moscow demands a greater role for Russian business in the Belarusian economy in return.

It remains to be seen what the state of Eurasian integration will be after the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation. On the one hand, uneasiness in Minsk and Almaty over Putin’s actions and the likely unwillingness of a future Ukrainian government to join any Russia-led regional projects may see the dream of creating an EEU quietly fade away. Minsk could revert to bilateral negotiations for further backing from Moscow. On the other hand, new member states may flock to join such organisations for fear of severe consequences if they do not, particularly if Ukraine is partitioned further. More members could see Minsk’s influence diminished, and Moscow’s financial largess decrease. Belarus continues to face a delicate balancing act managing expectations for any further regional integration.

About the Author

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DOCUMENTATION

Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in International Economy-Related Rankings: Economic System and Business Environment

Index of Economic Freedom

Prepared by: The Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal (USA)  
Established: 1995  
Frequency: Annual  
The data refer to the previous respective year.  
Covered countries: at present 186  
URL: <http://www.heritage.org/Index/Ranking.aspx>

Brief description:  
The methodology was revised in 2007 to provide an even clearer picture of economic freedom. The index measures 10 specific factors, and averages them equally into a total score. Each one of the 10 freedoms is graded using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum freedom. A score of 100 signifies an economic environment or set of policies that is most conducive to economic freedom. The ten component freedoms are: Business, Trade and Fiscal Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary, Investment and Financial Freedom, Property rights, Freedom from Corruption, Labor Freedom.
Figure 1: Index of Economic Freedom: Score and Ranking 2014

Table 1: Index of Economic Freedom: Component Scores 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Azerbaijan</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
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<tr>
<td>Business Freedom</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>70.4</td>
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<td>95.2</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>90.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade Freedom</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>78.2</td>
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<td>79.2</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>66.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiscal Freedom</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>88.1</td>
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<td>68.8</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>87.3</td>
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<td>95.2</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>90.3</td>
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<td>Government Spending</td>
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<td>61.2</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>82.9</td>
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<td>85.0</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>70.4</td>
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<td>33.9</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>78.4</td>
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<td>77.8</td>
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<td>30.0</td>
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<td>30.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
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<td>20.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
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<td>Financial Freedom</td>
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<td>10.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
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<td>60.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Property Rights</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
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<td>30.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom from Corruption</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>13.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labor Freedom</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>60.8</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Score</strong></td>
<td><strong>68.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>61.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>50.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>56.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>52.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>72.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>73.4</strong></td>
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<td><strong>51.9</strong></td>
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<td><strong>42.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>49.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>75.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>46.5</strong></td>
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Ease of Doing Business

Prepared by: Worldbank
Established: 2003
Frequency: Annual
The data refer to the respective previous year.
Covered countries: at present 189
URL: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/economyrankings/>

Brief description:
The ease of doing business index ranks economies from 1 to 189. The index is calculated as the ranking on the simple average of country percentile rankings on each of the 10 topics covered. The survey uses a simple business case to ensure comparability across countries and over time—with assumptions about the legal form of the business, its size, its location and the nature of its operations. Surveys are administered through more than 10,200 local experts, including lawyers, business consultants, accountants, government officials and other professionals routinely administering or advising on legal and regulatory requirements. As new information is available, data points may be revisited. To ensure consistency of data the revision is also applied to the time series.

Figure 2: Ease of Doing Business. Overall Ranking 2014
Kazakhstan and Its Practices of Integration: (Re)Considering the Case of the Eurasian Economic Union

By Aida Abzhaparova, Bristol

Abstract
This paper discusses and analyses Kazakhstan’s integration practices in the post-Soviet space. It is argued that Astana’s active participation in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is linked to the significance placed on being “Eurasian” within Kazakh state identity. As such, the EEU should not be seen as solely driven by Russia as is often assumed. Kazakhstan is playing an essential function within the formation and development of this organisation.

Eurasian Integration—the Power of Identity
On 29 January 2014, the official ‘Concept of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2014–2020’ was adopted. This document was developed in relation to the new ‘Strategy—2050’ outlined by Nursultan Nazarbayev in his annual address to the nation in 2012. This new foreign policy concept lays out a number of principles that are said to be in line with national interests. Among these are: preservation of national security; strengthening of peace in the international and regional arenas; and diversifying Kazakhstan’s economic development. Interestingly, the official document also places a great emphasis on the socio-cultural dimension of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. Therefore, promoting Kazakh culture, language and tradition within the many Kazakh-speaking communities abroad has become an inherent part of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy direction. The document also attaches great importance to the role of Kazakhstan within the broader Central Asian region, which is deemed as of great importance and worthy of protection from transnational threats, such as organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and religious extremism.

In outlining these priorities, it positions Eurasian economic integration as priority number two for Kazakhstan’s external politics. This shows that the official political elite consider the Eurasian integration as at the core of Kazakh foreign policy. In the light of this, the political elite are determined to support deeper integration between Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia within the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space. Both integration efforts are viewed as building blocks of the larger and deeper union of the EEU. Twenty years ago at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Nazarbayev gave a speech outlining his vision of an Eurasian Union as a union of equal sovereign states with integrated and coordinated economic and political structures. This speech laid the foundation not only for Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, but also for the way in which Kazakhstan sees itself and locates itself within the broader geopolitical order.

Being firmly and deeply interlinked with southern Siberia, Kazakhstan, in traditional Soviet classifications, was never considered part of what was known before the collapse of the USSR as ‘Middle Asia’, which consisted of the Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics. It was not until 1993, when the Central Asian Summit took place and the region was renamed ‘Central Asia’ that representations of this region began to include Kazakhstan. Following the summit, Nazarbayev expressed uncertainty about how to locate Kazakhstan on the international map. Indeed, in the early years of Kazakhstan’s development as a newly independent state, the political elite struggled to outline a state identity for Kazakhstan that would appeal to its multi-ethnic society. Drawing on a discourse about ‘Eurasia’, Nazarbayev has made every practical effort possible to explicitly situate Kazakhstan as between Europe and Asia, and represent it as one of the bridges linking the two continents. Nazarbayev’s understanding of Kazakhstan as a ‘Eurasian state’ was reflected in his proposal for the creation of the ‘Eurasian Union’ in 1994.

The concepts of ‘Eurasia’, ‘Eurasian State’, ‘Eurasian Bridge’, and ‘Eurasian Space’, are inherently open and flexible, since they mix two spaces—Europe and Asia—that are both contested in their nature. When asked where Kazakhstan is, one might give one of several answers: Kazakhstan is in Asia; it is located to the south of Russia; it borders both China and Russia. Using a classical or neo-realist approach, it would be common to respond that the country is locked between Asia (north), China (east), the Caspian Sea (west) and Islamic states (south), and that this location is inherently dangerous and disadvantageous, and, thus, that the newly independent Kazakhstani state should seek to protect itself. It is, however, rare to hear that Kazakhstan is located in Eurasia. Yet, in spite of this, the official representation of Kazakhstan’s location—since 1994 and the introduction of the concept of ‘Eurasian Union’—is that it is the core state, and centre, of the geopolitical imaginary that is ‘Eurasia’. The construction of Kazakh
identity as being a Eurasian state is vital. It is interesting to observe that in a 2013 document outlining the current structures and mechanisms of the Eurasian Economic Community, Kazakhstan is hailed as a state not only located in Central Asia, but also at the very heart of the Eurasian continent. Indeed, positioning Kazakhstan within a specific socio-political space of ‘Eurasia’ is appealing to and supported by the overwhelming majority of the population.

**Eurasian Integration and the Cautionary Tale of Ukraine 2014**

Even in the light of the current crisis in Ukraine, and the process that has seen Crimea join the Russian Federation, polls conducted in March 2014 show that 85% of Kazakhstani support the creation and development of the EEU. Furthermore, whilst the entire Western hemisphere regards the Crimean referendum of 16 March 2014 as an illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory by Russia, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister, Erlan Idrissov, officially stated that the referendum was, in fact, the result of the free expression and choice of the Crimean population.

It would be a mistake to claim that Kazakhstan observed these events without caution, as there were, and still are, concerns about the crisis in Ukraine. But importantly, analysts and political pundits have been warning Kazakhstan against following the Ukrainian example. Official statements about the events in Crimea have mainly revolved around the economic weaknesses of Ukraine. Idrissov offered the view that the Ukrainian scenario is impossible in Kazakhstan, basing his arguments mainly on Kazakhstan’s economic development and internal socio-political stability. Furthermore, on 19 March, 2014, it was reported that according to the head of Secretariat at the Eurasian Economic Commission, Askar Kishkembaye, the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia are scheduled to sign an agreement on the EEU this May in Astana. Kishkembaye also observed that the agreement will enhance conditions for the further development of the economies of the three states, and increase the free flow of goods, services, and labour between them.

But as soon as the argument turns towards the economic benefits of Eurasian integration, the Eurasian Economic Integration stops making much sense from a Kazakh perspective. It has already been claimed by several political, economic and business representatives that Kazakhstan—in comparison to Russia and Belarus—is not experiencing great economic gains from the Common Economic Space. For example, due to the changes within the Customs Union agreement, some exporters and importers in Kazakhstan have suffered substantial losses and disadvantages. Meanwhile, the adoption of Russian tariffs has led to price increases for various goods, such as textiles, electrical appliances and vehicles. Furthermore, there are a number of economic disputes between Kazakhstan and Russia centred on the energy sector. In addition to the economic asymmetries within the EEU, there are also political asymmetries. Nazarbayev, the political elite and other significant figures in Kazakhstan have expressed concern about Russian pressure to turn the EEU into a supranational organisation. Russia’s political demands and aspirations regarding the EEU are not particularly welcomed by Kazakhstan, as official statements make clear that any affiliations that might threaten the political sovereignty and independence of Kazakhstan should be avoided.

Various political leaders within Kazakhstan have additionally voiced severe reservations about the EEU, considering it a direct threat to state sovereignty. In the light of events unfolding in Ukraine, Gaini Kasyymov, the leader of the ‘Party of Patriots’, has called for a stop to the process of Eurasian integration and warned of the possible detrimental effects of signing the EEU agreements. This is despite the fact that, according to Nazarbayev, the EEU is a purely economic integration mechanism. He is against political integration within the framework of the EEU, as this process will necessarily threaten the sovereignty of Kazakhstan. In January this year, Nazarbayev clearly tabled his view on the limits to EEU integration, stating that the agreement will be orientated solely towards economic—and not political—integration. He, furthermore, stated that questioning the primacy of state sovereignty was not even being considered and that Kazakhstan would abandon any integration or organisation that threatened its sovereignty.

Azat party members have also expressed their dissatisfaction, asserting that economic integration needs to be realised without having detrimental effects on the national interests of Kazakhstan. Economic practices of integration are seen by them as a direct loss of Kazakhstan’s ability to make independent decisions regarding its economic policy. Even Kazakhstani communist leaders have started expressing concern regarding EEU integration. Gaziz Aldemzharov, leader of Communist Party, argues that the EEU must be a union of equal partners. In August 2013, ninety-five representatives of various social, political, economic communities also expressed their concern about the EEU, claiming that beneath the guise of economic integration, it is possible to clearly see the hidden neo-imperial ambitions of Moscow.

Given this scepticism about the EEU, one might start to ask what other options are open to Kazakhstan to advance its economic interests, as alternatives to closer integration with Russia and Belarus. There are certainly
other possible integration scenarios that might be considered. For example, closer integration within 'Central Asia'; integration of Kazakhstan as part of the so-called 'New Silk Road' with the support of the United States; pursuit of a free-trade zone within the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, under the leadership of China; or joining in the formation of a 'New Pan-Turkism' led by Turkey. It is easy to outline various possibilities for Kazakhstan. However, as suggested above, one must also seriously consider the inherent link between the construction of state identity and its pursuit of the foreign policy.

**Eurasian Economic Integration and the Power of Identity**

For the time being, Kazakhstan is embracing an identity as a 'Eurasian State' and this identity needs to be considered seriously if one wants to understand Kazakhstan’s active participation within the integration practices of the EEU. Such integration initially appears to be economic in nature, with a specific political dimension. However, what one needs to further consider is another dimension that is underexplored and almost unnoticed—the socio-cultural dimension of Eurasian integration. Eurasian integration has multi-layered socio-economic and politico-cultural dimensions. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, deep integration processes have taken place, and it is fruitless, if not counter-productive, to call for, or even instigate, a process of disintegration. What is necessary is for Kazakhstan to negotiate beneficial terms of integration on various levels, including the economic, political and cultural. Currently, the political elite of Kazakhstan might view the EEU as a comfortable institutional and operational framework. Yet, the comfort may be only limited and temporary, if the example of Ukraine is considered.

Just as the ever-deepening integration process that has been actively occurring over the last several years cannot be easily undone, the identity of Kazakhstan cannot be changed overnight. Identities are flexible and constantly changing, but a process of identity reconstruction is not an easy, unproblematic and always violence-free process. Furthermore, the various geopolitical and rhetorical ‘manoeuvrings’ of Kazakhstan to the end of balancing the interests of powerful neighbours and other states, namely the US, will always raise questions about Kazakhstan’s course towards deeper Eurasian integration. Yet, the geo-economic and geo-political existence of the Eurasian Economic Union is undeniable. Furthermore, this organisational setting has also acquired important representation meanings for Kazakhstan’s state identity in the years since independence, which in turn constitutes Kazakhstan’s decision to participate in Eurasian integrationist practices.

**About the Author**

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The Russian Analytical Digest is a bi-weekly electronic publication jointly produced by the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen (www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de), the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich), the Resource Security Institute, the Institute of History at the University of Zurich (http://www.hist.uzh.ch/), the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at The George Washington University, and the German Association for East European Studies (DGÖ). The Digest draws on contributions to the German-language Russland-Analysen (www.laenderanalysen.de/russland-), the CSS analytical network on Russia and Eurasia (www.css.ethz.ch/rad2), and the Russian Regional Report. The Russian Analytical Digest covers political, economic, and social developments in Russia and its regions, and looks at Russia’s role in international relations.

To subscribe or unsubscribe to the Russian Analytical Digest, please visit our web page at <www.css.ethz.ch/rad>

Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen

Founded in 1982, the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen is dedicated to the interdisciplinary analysis of socialist and post-socialist developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The major focus is on the role of dissent, opposition and civil society in their historic, political, sociological and cultural dimensions. With a unique archive on dissident culture under socialism and with an extensive collection of publications on Central and Eastern Europe, the Research Centre regularly hosts visiting scholars from all over the world.

One of the core missions of the institute is the dissemination of academic knowledge to the interested public. This includes regular e-mail newsletters covering current developments in Central and Eastern Europe.

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich is a Swiss academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and information services in the fields of international and Swiss security studies. The CSS also acts as a consultant to various political bodies and the general public. The CSS is engaged in research projects with a number of Swiss and international partners. The Center’s research focus is on new risks, European and transatlantic security, strategy and doctrine, area studies, state failure and state building, and Swiss foreign and security policy. In its teaching capacity, the CSS contributes to the ETH Zurich-based Bachelor of Arts (BA) in public policy degree course for prospective professional military officers in the Swiss army and the ETH and University of Zurich-based MA program in Comparative and International Studies (MAGIC); offers and develops specialized courses and study programs to all ETH Zurich and University of Zurich students; and has the lead in the Executive Masters degree program in Security Policy and Crisis Management (MAS ETH SPCM), which is offered by ETH Zurich. The program is tailored to the needs of experienced senior executives and managers from the private and public sectors, the policy community, and the armed forces.

The CSS runs the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), and in cooperation with partner institutes manages the Crisis and Risk Network (CRN), the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP), the Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SSN), and the Russian and Eurasian Security (RES) Network.

The Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, The Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University

The Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies is home to a Master’s program in European and Eurasian Studies, faculty members from political science, history, economics, sociology, anthropology, language and literature, and other fields, visiting scholars from around the world, research associates, graduate student fellows, and a rich assortment of brown bag lunches, seminars, public lectures, and conferences.

The Institute of History at the University of Zurich

The University of Zurich, founded in 1833, is one of the leading research universities in Europe and offers the widest range of study courses in Switzerland. With some 24,000 students and 1,900 graduates every year, Zurich is also Switzerland’s largest university. Within the Faculty of Arts, the Institute of History consists of currently 17 professors and employs around a 100 researchers, teaching assistants and administrative staff. Research and teaching relate to the period from late antiquity to contemporary history. The Institute offers its 2,600 students a Bachelor’s and Master’s Degree in general history and various specialized subjects, including a comprehensive Master’s Program in Eastern European History. Since 2009, the Institute also offers a structured PhD-program. For further information, visit at <http://www.hist.uzh.ch/>

Resource Security Institute

The Resource Security Institute (RSI) is a non-profit organization devoted to improving understanding about global energy security, particularly as it relates to Eurasia. We do this through collaborating on the publication of electronic newsletters, articles, books and public presentations.