ABSTRACT
The concept of controlling access to mutable shared data via
permissions is at the heart of permission logics such as sepa-
ration logic and implicit dynamic frames, and is also used
in type systems, for instance, to give a semantics to “read-
only” annotations. Existing permission models have differ-
ent strengths in terms of expressiveness. Fractional permis-
sions, for example, enable unbounded (recursive) splitting,
whereas counting permissions enable unbounded subtraction
of the same permission amount. Combining these strengths
in a single permission model appeared to increase the com-
plexity for the user and tools. In this paper we extend our
previous work on abstract read permissions by providing
them with a novel constraint semantics, which retains the
use of the domain of rational numbers but enables unboun-
ded subtraction of identical amounts. Thus we can keep
an intuitive model conducive to SMT solvers while enabling
“counting.”

1. INTRODUCTION
Access permissions enable sound, modular reasoning about
shared mutable state. Program logics based on permissions,
such as separation logic [12] and implicit dynamic frames
[13], associate a permission with each memory location. A
thread may access a shared location only if it has the cor-
responding permission. This rule prevents data races since
at most one thread can hold permission to any location,
and enables framing since no thread can modify a location
while another thread holds permission to it. Many permis-
sion systems distinguish between read and write permis-
sions to enable concurrent reads while enforcing exclusive
writes. These systems allow a write (or full) permission to
be split into several read permissions, which can later be
re-combined into a write permission.

To be useful for automatic program verification, a permis-

sion system must have three key properties. First, the un-
derlying permission model must be sufficiently expressive.
Second, the permission system should require low annota-
tion overhead, both in terms of complexity and verbosity
of the permission assertions. Third, the permission model
should be amenable to automatic provers, especially SMT
solvers.

Bornat and others [1] identify two criteria for expressive per-
mission models: Some programs require unbounded divis-
ibility (or “infinite splitting”), for instance, when threads are
forked recursively, and all sub-threads need read permission
to a shared location. Other programs require unbounded
counting, for instance, when one thread forks off an unboun-
ded number of threads each with an identical permission and
then waits for them to finish, in arbitrary order. Specific-
ation techniques that express data abstraction via abstract
predicates [11] also require support for multiplication if one
wishes to scale arbitrary predicates by fractions.

To our knowledge, no existing implementation of a permis-
sion system satisfies all of these requirements. For instance,
fractional permissions [2] support unbounded divisibility and
multiplication since one can use rational numbers (or real
numbers) as a model, which also leads to low annotation
overhead and good support from SMT solvers. However, un-
bounded counting seems impossible since if one starts with a
write permission (fraction 1), then however small a positive
fraction \( q > 0 \) one chooses to give to each sub-thread, there
always is a point \( n \) after which \( 1 - \frac{nq}{\text{positive}} \) is no longer positive.

Counting permissions [1] support unbounded counting by
splitting a permission into an unbounded number of units
and the remainder. The system then tracks how many units
a thread holds (or how many it lacks for a full permission).
However, counting permissions support neither unbounded
divisibility (because units cannot be divided further), nor
multiplication.

It is possible to compound fractional and counting mod-
elses [1], for example, by representing permissions as a fraction
plus a positive or negative number of units [10]. Dockins et
al. [4] achieve this combination with a tree model for per-
missions, but multiplication is not supported, and the encod-
ing of counting imposes additional structure (each counting
permission is represented differently), which we believe is
challenging for an implementation. The implemented de-
cision procedures by Le et al. based on this model [8] do not
support counting. In our experience, an implementation of a compound model can lead to many disjunctions in proof obligations (since a thread may read a location if the fraction or the unit count is positive), which slows down SMT solving. Boyland [3] proposes \( \mathbb{Z}[\epsilon]^+ \) (positive polynomials over an infinitesimal) which satisfies all three criteria, but we are unaware of any implementation using this complex and subtle model.

In this paper, we present a permission system that supports unbounded divisibility, unbounded counting, and multiplication. Since its model is based on rational numbers, it is well suited for SMT solvers and offers a simple notation for permission assertions. However, as in our previous work on abstract read permissions (ARPs) [5], most permission assertions do not even have to indicate concrete fractions. It is typically sufficient to specify whether read or write permission is required. The actual fraction for a read permission is neither specified by the programmer nor determined by the verifier. Instead, when a read permission is transferred from a thread \( T_1 \) to a thread \( T_2 \), its fraction is suitably constrained to ensure that it is positive (to ensure that it permits read access) and that it is strictly less than the permission currently held by \( T_1 \) (to ensure that \( T_1 \) can still read). Appropriate proof obligations ensure that the constraints generated for an abstract read permission are satisfiable, that is, that there are fractions that could be chosen, although that never actually happens.

Like our earlier work on abstract read permissions, the proposed system supports unbounded divisibility and multiplication (since it is based on rational numbers), but unlike the previous work it also supports unbounded counting. The additional expressiveness is achieved by extending abstract read permissions with a more expressive constraint generation. Intuitively, if we have forked off \( n \) threads, each with an identical, not yet specified, fraction \( k \), we have the constraint that \( k < \frac{1}{n} \). If we fork off further threads, \( k \) is further constrained. But at all times, there are (an infinite number of) possible values for \( k \) that satisfy the constraints. In this work, we explain how this idea works in the context of a few illustrative examples, formalize the intuition, and discuss how to implement it in a program verifier.

2. MOTIVATION

The key idea of abstract read permissions (as presented in [5]) is to introduce symbolic names to represent read permission amounts (that is, strictly positive amounts of permission which are otherwise unspecified). When introducing a fresh symbolic amount, no information is known about its value, other than these bounds. The intuitive idea is that this amount may now be used when giving away permissions (e.g., when forging a new thread) and, whatever amount of permission is currently held (provided it is not already zero), the symbolic amount given away can be assumed to be strictly smaller than what is held, leaving both the caller and the callee with some permission left-over. Thus, constraints can be added on-the-fly to these symbolic amounts, which are never concretely chosen, neither at the source level, nor in an implementation such as Chalice; the symbolic amounts (abstract read permissions) can be seen as a kind of prophecy variable, always denoting a judiciously-chosen fraction.

Our and others’ earlier work [5] employs this idea in a limited sense; extra constraints can be added only for method calls, for which a fresh symbolic amount is introduced and constrained only locally, that is, in the encoding of the call. The reasons for this restriction are elaborated in Sec. 5, but are essentially due to the difficulty of designing an encoding that yields constraints which are guaranteed to be satisfiable. Lifting these restrictions was difficult, since the essential property for soundness was not explained independently of the restrictions in [5]. We improve on this work by cleanly pulling out a property characterising sound constraint systems (Sec. 3), and by showing how this property can be used to lift previously necessary restrictions, which enables further examples to be verified, as shown in the following subsections.

2.1 Language

We use a Java-like language enriched with specification constructs such as method pre- and postconditions and permissions. The ghost keyword is used to declare fields, arguments or local variables that are needed only for verification and can be erased at run-time. We use \( \text{acc}(x.g, f) \) (or just \( \text{acc}(x.g) \)) to denote full permissions to field \( x.g \) and \( \text{acc}(x.g,f) \) to denote read access (with \( f \) permissions). The semantics of \( \text{acc}(x.g,f) \) are such that \( 0 < f \) is assumed whenever permissions are gained, respectively, asserted when given away. The ghost-type \( \text{ARP} \) is used to declare permission-typed variables that can be constrained on-the-fly, as mentioned above, and \( \text{fresh()} \) is used to assign a fresh symbolic value to such a variable. For brevity, we ignore orthogonal issues such as exceptions, starvation and numerical overflows. Another simplification we allow ourselves is reading final fields without having the corresponding permissions, since such fields are immutable. This assumption ignores issues related to the initialisation of immutable data, but we regard these as orthogonal as well.

2.2 Example 1: Counting

Figure 1 shows a simple multiple-reader single-writer mutual exclusion class (an “RW controller”) protecting a mutable cell. One can create an RW controller for a given cell by calling the constructor and transferring write permission to the cell that the controller is meant to protect. Any thread may request reads or writes to the controlled data; these requests block until access is granted and then proceed. Concurrent reads are supported by (temporarily) giving each reader a read permission to the protected data. This intuition is captured in the controller’s invariant, which says that the controller holds all permissions to the shared data, minus what has been given to the currently active readers.

The RW controller extends a Java-like non-reentrant Lock class, instances of which can be acquired (locked) and released (unlocked). The lock is exclusive and does thus not permit concurrent reads per se, which is therefore provided by the controller. Each lock has a lock invariant that, for simplicity, we require to be established at the end of the lock’s constructor. A thread that acquires the lock gets to assume the invariant, and consequently, has to ensure it when it releases the lock.

Method \texttt{doWrite} is straightforward: The thread busily waits for the lock to be available in a state where no reader is
**2.1 Example 1: The Reader/Writer Lock**

A reader is more interesting: After locking the controller, and thus gaining the permissions stored in the invariant, the controller increases the number of currently active readers, followed by releasing the lock again. Afterwards, the reader’s read operation is performed. The permission-related challenge in this situation is to ensure that the lock invariant can be re-established while still holding on to frac of the permission to the shared data data.val, which must be passed to \texttt{r.read}. This entails checking that we are actually able to subtract yet another frac of the permission from the amount stored in the invariant, which we achieve by constraining frac accordingly. Intuitively, this constraint is satisfiable because we never require any lower bound for frac other than zero, and thus, any arbitrarily small value for frac would suffice (we never actually have to make this choice, as will be explained in Sec. 3). When the reader is done, it returns the permissions to the shared data, which are placed back into the lock invariant after having acquired the lock again.\footnote{Note that \texttt{rds} cannot go negative before the release, because this would imply holding more than 1 permissions to \texttt{data.val}, which is impossible.}

Note that the verification of this example requires unbounded permission counting because we want to give each reader the same amount of permissions, which simplifies permission bookkeeping and yields a simpler lock invariant. An alternative based on unbounded splitting would be to give each reader half of the remaining permission. This, however, would require the invariant to include a sum over a (ghost) list of permission amounts, which is less intuitive, and causes additional work both in the specifications and for the SMT solver [9].

**2.3 Example 2: Splitting and Counting**

The example in Fig. 2 sketches a tree-based concurrent work division framework that parallelises a computation over a tree structure by recursively forking off a new task thread for each node in the tree. In order to perform its computation, each task requires read access to a shared resource. Eventually, the individual results are combined in order to yield the result of the overall computation. The example exercises unbounded permission splitting when recursively going from one level in the tree to the next deeper level, and unbounded permission counting when iterating over the direct children of a node.

We use a Java-like \texttt{Thread} class whose instances can be forked (\texttt{start}) and later on joined (\texttt{join}) again. Method \texttt{run} must be implemented by clients and is invoked when the thread starts. Hence, \texttt{start} requires \texttt{run}'s precondition, and \texttt{join} ensures \texttt{run}'s postcondition. We regard issues related to joining an already joined thread as orthogonal to our work.

The constructor is unremarkable, except that it already starts the new thread, and thus has to establish the precondition of \texttt{run}.

Method \texttt{run} performs its own computation—here trivial, but the important aspect is that it requires read access to the shared data \texttt{data.val} and it also forks subtasks, joins them again and aggregates the results (again trivial). We assume that it is not possible, or efficient, to compute the number of subtasks upfront; Java’s iterators, for example, don’t even provide a way of querying the number of elements to come.
interface Node {
    public Iterator<Node> children();
}

class TreeTask extends Thread {
    private final ghost ARP frac;
    private int result;
    private final Node node;
    private final Cell data;

    public TreeTask(Node n, Cell c, ghost ARP f) {
        node = n; data = c; frac = f;
        start(); // Requires run()'s precondition
    }

    public void run() {
        requires acc(data.val, frac) & acc(result)
        ensures acc(data.val, frac) & acc(result)
    }
}

Figure 2: A Recursive Tree Worker.

For simplicity, we ignore the permissions required to use the
list and the iterator in the loop invariant.

As done in the first example, we make use of unbounded per-
mission counting to yield straight-forward assertions (here, loop invariants). That is, each subtask receives the same
amount f of permissions to the shared data. Since we do not
compute the number of subtasks upfront, we again need
to constrain f on-the-fly. At the end of run, all permissions
have been collected back again, and the task can itself return
its frac permission.

3. CONSTRAINT SYSTEM

In this section, we introduce a notion of constraint system
that can be used to explicitly explain (and justify) the assump-
tions made by techniques such as abstract read permissions.
Recall that explicit values for these read permissions are not chosen in our approach [5], but rather con-
strained via assumptions at various points in the encoding.

The constraint system introduced in this section is designed
to reflect the accumulation of these constraints as upper
bounds on symbolic permission amounts (we model these as
permission-typed variables), such that the satisfiability of
the constraints can be reduced to requiring an ordering
on these symbolic amounts; we explain the role of this ordering
in Sec. 3.1.

DEFINITION 1. A positive fractional constraint system con-
ists of a partially ordered countable set of variables (V, ≺)
(we use v to range over V), and a finite set C of inequalities
of the form v ≺ E where E is an expression formed from
the following grammar (in which q is a positive rational con-
stant, an element of $\mathbb{Q}^+$).

$$E ::= q \mid v \mid E + E \mid E \ast E \mid E - E \mid E / E$$

A constraint system is satisfiable if there exists a mapping
$\sigma : v \rightarrow \mathbb{Q}^+$ such that for all $(v, E) \in C$, we have that
$\sigma(v) < \sigma(E)$ is true, where $\sigma$ is lifted from variables to
expressions in the obvious way, except that if an intermediate
result of a subtraction were to be non-positive, the entire
result is undefined, and the enclosing constraint is considered
not satisfied.\(^2\)

3.1 Layered Fractional Constraint Systems

It is easy to define constraint systems that are unsatisfiable,
for example $C = \{ v < v - \frac{1}{2} \}$. In this section, we define
a sufficient condition for satisfiability: the constraints must
be “layered”. Figure 3 extends ≺ to expressions. A layered
constraint system $C$ is one in which for every constraint
$v < E \in C$, the expression must be ordered correctly with
$v < E$. In short, variables can be constrained only by
previous (according to the partial order ≺) variables and
constants. The rule for subtraction expressions in Fig. 3 is a
little subtle; the premises check whether a constraint of the
form $(v' < E)$ could be added to the existing constraints,
preserving layering. Such a constraint would guarantee that
the result of the subtraction term is non-negative. In the
\(^2\)Since we do not permit 0 as a constant, or as a binding of a variable, then as long as the results of subtractions are always positive, we do not need to worry about division by zero.
proof sketch below, we add these hypothetical constraints explicitly.

**Theorem 1.** If a positive fractional constraint system is layered then it is satisfiable.

**Proof.** (Sketch) First we augment the set of constraints with \( v < E \) for every subterm \( E \) that exists in an existing constraint. We also add the constraint \( v < 1 \) for every variable, to make sure every variable is constrained. Since this process creates no new subtraction subterms, it will terminate. Furthermore, by the definition of layering, the resulting constraint system is also layered. Let \( C^* \) be this augmented set of constraints.

Then we extend the partial order of variables to a total order and assign concrete values to the variables in descending order: For each variable, we collect its constraints, evaluate all the constraining expressions, and assign the variable half of the minimum of these values.

\[
s'(v) = \frac{1}{2} \min \{\sigma(E) \mid (v < E) \in C^*\}
\]

Layering ensures we never try to use the value of a variable before it is defined. The only danger is subtraction but by augmentation, every subtraction is reflected in a constraint that ensures that the result is positive. \( \square \)

### 3.2 Extending Layered Constraint Systems

Given an existing layered constraint system, one can add a fresh symbolic constant to the system, by extending the original set of variables \( V \) with an additional variable \( v' \). The resulting constraint system is still layered, since none of the constraints in \( C \) will mention \( v' \). More usefully, one can also extend the partial order \( \prec \), such that \( v' \prec v \) for all \( v \in V \); this is guaranteed to produce a partial order, since \( v' \) was not previously mentioned. In particular, the resulting layered constraint system can now be extended further by adding additional constraints to \( C \) of the form \( v' < E \) where \( E \) is an expression of the original constraint system (i.e., \( v' \) does not occur in \( E \)). The resulting constraint system will still be layered; routine inductive arguments can show that this property is preserved by all of the above steps.

So long as one always moves from one layered system of constraints to another layered system of constraints then the set of constraints will always be satisfiable. Concrete values for the symbolic permission amounts need never actually be chosen, even in an implementation (see Sec. 4), but in a soundness argument one can argue that, at any given program point, one could assign a suitable value to every variable and evaluate all symbolic expressions to positive rational numbers. The critical property that an implementation must therefore satisfy, is that layering of the constraints generated must always be guaranteed.

## 4. IMPLEMENTATION

It may seem that a model of permissions based around symbolic permission amounts (and expressions over them), along with a constraint system of assumptions, is much more complex to implement than some more direct mathematical structure (such as rationals). However, the very fact that these values need not be fixed at any point, along with the argument that such constraints can be constructed to be satisfiable, means that the symbolic amounts themselves can be treated by a verification tool just like any other symbolic value (e.g., a program variable), about which limited information is known. In other words, a symbolic permission amount \( v \) can be simply encoded as a program variable \( v \) with a particular unknown rational value. This would not be the case if we used a more complex explicit mathematical domain, such as \( \mathbb{Z}[\epsilon]^+ \) as the domain. As a result, we retain the simplicity of rational numbers and arithmetic, while achieving the expressive power of a much more powerful domain.

On the other hand, the constraint system can still exploit the staging differences; the value of an expression that does not depend on a constraint variable can be considered a constant for the purposes of the constraint system. Thus for example, the expression \( 1 / (\text{rds} + 1) \) in our first example, which is used as a bound for \( \text{frac} \), is a constant at the (dynamic) program point where the constraint is (notionally) added to the constraint system. Furthermore, since the monitor invariant ensures \( \text{rds} \gg 0 \), it can be considered a positive constant, thus meeting the requirements for layering. Similar reasoning applies to our second example with the result returned by the \text{size} method.

The fact that permission expressions must have a specific shape in order to be layered, and thus, that certain expressions such as \( v < 1 - v \) have to be rewritten in order to be layered (as discussed in the previous subsection), does not impede additional complexity in an actual implementation. This is because the rewriting is purely conceptual: as long as it is guaranteed that an appropriate rewriting always exists – which needs to be established in the soundness proof of the verifier – it is sound to add any constraints which are semantically equivalent to those permitted by our definition of layering.

It is also worth noting that constraints of the form “\( v \) is less than the current amount of permission held” can be soundly added even though a static verifier will in general not be able to track the precise amount of permissions held, for example, because of unknown aliasing relations, or incompleteness in the underlying prover. In such cases, a sound verifier is forced to work with weaker assumptions about the permissions currently held; provided that it knows that strictly positive amounts are held, this results only in stronger, but nonetheless satisfiable constraints.

We implemented the constraint permission system in our intermediate verification language Silver, which is part of our Viper verification infrastructure [7]. Silver provides a built-in permission type that can be used to declare permission-typed variables, a construct to assign fresh symbolic values to such variables, and a construct that instructs the verifiers to generate appropriate constraints when giving away read permissions. Following the argumentation above, we make it the responsibility of front-ends, that is, of tools that generate Silver code, to ensure that these constructs are used in a way such that all generated constraints are layered.

## 5. RELATED WORK
We discussed several permissions models in the introduction. In this section, we focus on the permission models supported by our own verifier Chalice and by VeriFast.

5.1 Abstract Read Permissions in Chalice

Chalice implements our previous model of abstract read permissions [5]. This model is a special case of the model presented in this paper. The basic idea of ARPs in Chalice is as explained in Sec. 2. The restriction that constraints on a symbolic permission amount can be added only together with the symbolic variable being constrained (in the encoding of method calls) is, as already explained, a consequence of the fact that our previous work did not precisely work out a property that guarantees that a permission constraint system is satisfiable.

An interesting aspect of ARPs in Chalice is the treatment of symbolic variables that occur negatively in permission expressions, as in \( 1 - v \). Taking a fresh symbolic read permission \( v \) and then giving away \( 1 - v \) permission (leaving exactly \( v \) behind), followed by giving away a further \( v \) amount of permission, would, in a naïve encoding, generate the unsound assumption \( v < v \) (to guarantee that some permission is left after the last transfer). To avoid such unsound constraints, without making the constraints overly weak, Chalice rearranges method preconditions to handle all permission expressions in which the constrained variable \( v \) occurs negatively last. Constraints are only added while handling permission expressions with positive occurrences of \( v \). Consequently, while introducing the constraints for the positive occurrences of \( v \), the current permission amount remains expressible by expressions of the form \( E - n \cdot v \), where \( v \) does not occur in \( E \). Every time \( v \) is given away from such an expression, the assumption generated is effectively \( v < E - n \cdot v \). This assumption is equivalent to \( v < \frac{E}{1-n} \), which matches our definition of a layered constraint system.

5.2 VeriFast

Another automated verifier that supports fractional permissions is the separation-logic-based verifier VeriFast [6]; fractions are encoded as real numbers. This allows unbounded splitting, but not unbounded counting. However, VeriFast’s standard library contains an encoding of counting permissions as tickets, supported by ghost methods operating on auxiliary separation logic predicates. The idea is as follows: counting starts by calling a ghost method \( \text{start\_counting}(r, f) \) that consumes \( f \) permissions to a field \( r \). Intuitively, the initially consumed permission amount \( f \) is used as a “pool” from which an unbounded number of tickets can be taken by calling a ghost method \( \text{create\_ticket}(r) \), which requires a predicate provided by \( \text{start\_counting} \). Unlike counting permissions however, the tickets cannot be “summed up” easily (e.g. to represent holding \( n \) such tickets), because they are encoded as predicate instances. To sum up ticket predicates, ones needs additional recursive predicates that essentially encode a list of tickets.

Extending VeriFast with abstract read permissions as presented in this paper could potentially simplify bookkeeping in situations where tickets are currently used. Our constraint system could also be used to prove the soundness of ticket permissions, because the constraint implicitly generated for each call to \( \text{create\_ticket}(r) \) is that the fraction associated with the new ticket is strictly less than the permission currently in the “pool” and, thus, satisfies our rules for layering.

6. CONCLUSIONS

We have presented a permission model based on the novel concept of layered constraints that supports unbounded divisibility and counting, as well as unrestricted multiplication. The formal model of constraints over symbolic rational variables is actually quite complex; however, it is possible to treat it as if it were the rational numbers with their usual arithmetic laws, which makes it intuitive to understand by users and straightforward to implement. We have shown two non-trivial examples that illustrate the expressiveness of our model, and we have argued how it can be used in a proof of soundness of the permission models used in Chalice and VeriFast. Moreover, we have implemented support for it in the intermediate verification language Silver [7].

7. REFERENCES


