



Report

## **Lockdown Dynamic Control-Flow Integrity**

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# Lockdown: Dynamic Control-Flow Integrity

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## ABSTRACT

Applications written in low-level languages without type or memory safety are especially prone to memory corruption. Attackers gain code execution capabilities through such applications despite all currently deployed defenses by exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is a promising defense mechanism that restricts open control-flow transfers to a static set of well-known locations.

We present Lockdown, an approach to dynamic CFI that protects legacy, binary-only executables and libraries. Lockdown adaptively learns the control-flow graph of a running process using information from a trusted dynamic loader. The sandbox component of Lockdown restricts interactions between different shared objects to imported and exported functions by enforcing fine-grained CFI checks. Our prototype implementation shows that dynamic CFI results in low performance overhead.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Memory corruption is a well-known problem for applications written in low-level languages that do not support memory safety or type safety (e.g., C, or C++). The core of many applications running on current systems is written in C or C++, and it is simply impossible to rewrite all these applications in a safe language due to the large amount of existing code. In addition, the problem of memory corruption is not restricted to low-level languages as safe languages are often implemented using low-level languages (e.g., the HotSpot Java virtual machine is implemented in C++) or use low-level runtime libraries like the `libc`. Since 2006, a number of defense mechanisms like Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [24], Data Execution Prevention (DEP) [32], stack canaries [13], and safe exception handlers have been deployed in practice to limit the power of attacker-controlled memory corruption. Unfortunately, all commonly deployed defense mechanisms can be circumvented. The list of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) shows that (i) memory corruption is common and (ii) many of these mem-

ory corruption vulnerabilities can be used to redirect the control-flow of the application to execute attacker-controlled code (either by injecting new code or by reusing existing code sequences in an unintended way).

Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) [1, 11, 27, 4, 33, 35, 37, 36, 38, 8, 23] is a promising defense mechanism that, by design, restricts the set of targets that can be reached by any control-flow transfer according to the statically determined control-flow graph. Unfortunately, current implementations share one or more of the following drawbacks: (i) some imprecision in the protection by allowing a larger set of targets than originally possible with different levels of imprecision (this imprecision can be exploited by new attacks [3, 6, 12]), (ii) the need to recompile applications [1, 11, 27, 4, 33, 35], (iii) no support (or protection) for shared libraries [1, 11, 27, 4, 33], or (iv) relying on precise relocation information that is only available in Windows binaries [37, 36].

This paper presents Lockdown, a dynamic protection mechanism for legacy, binary-only code that recovers fine-grained control-flow graph information at runtime. Lockdown enforces a strict CFI policy for function calls and indirect branches and adds a shadow stack to protect the integrity of return instructions at all times. Compared to other CFI mechanisms, Lockdown (i) relies on a dynamic, on-the-fly analysis (compared to a-priori static analysis), (ii) enforces a module-aware dynamic CFI policy that adapts according to the currently loaded libraries (function calls are restricted to valid functions inside the same module or correctly imported functions from other libraries), and (iii) restricts jump instructions to valid instructions inside the same function. Lockdown is more precise than existing binary-only CFI protections as CFI is enforced on a per-library granularity. When available, Lockdown uses non-stripped libraries to infer information about internal symbols. In addition, Lockdown uses a set of simple heuristics to detect callback functions that are not exported but passed between modules, to protect exceptions, and to support tail recursion implementations. Lockdown relies on a trusted loader [26] to extract runtime information about loaded libraries and possible interactions between those libraries and uses a sandbox based on dynamic binary translation [25] to enforce the integrity of individual control-flow transfers. Figure 1 shows an overview of Lockdown.

Our open-source prototype implementation of Lockdown for x86 Linux protects arbitrary applications from control-flow




Figure 1: Overview of the Lockdown approach.

hijack attacks by implementing our dynamic CFI policy. An evaluation of the performance of the prototype implementation based on the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark shows reasonable performance overhead. In addition, we introduce the concept of “dynamic average indirect target reduction” to allow an empirical evaluation of the resilience of Lockdown-protected applications against control-flow hijack attacks.

This paper makes the following contributions:

1. Design of Lockdown, a security mechanism that enforces dynamic precise control-flow integrity by reconstructing a runtime control-flow graph using auxiliary data available through the dynamic loader;
2. A security evaluation of the increased protection that Lockdown offers using Dynamic Average Indirect target Reduction (DAIR), a dynamic metric that evaluates the possible targets for a given library at any given time;
3. A case study and performance evaluation of Lockdown and our prototype implementation using a set of common applications.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 discusses the attack model followed by related work in section 3; section 4 presents the design of Lockdown, section 5 discusses the implementation, and section 6 evaluates the prototype implementation; and section 7 concludes.

## 2. ATTACK MODEL

For Lockdown we assume a powerful yet very realistic attack model: the attacker has read and write capabilities of the program’s data regions and read capabilities for the program’s code regions. This attack model reflects common efforts to circumvent the deployed defenses on current systems. The attacker uses memory corruption vulnerabilities present in the application or any of the loaded libraries to modify the program’s data, thereby affecting the control-flow and execution of the program. The attacker leverages either out-of-bounds pointers or dangling pointers to read/write data in the program’s address space, with the result of forcing behavior undefined in the source programming language.

We assume that the attacker can neither modify the code region of the program nor inject additional code into the program. This assumption is fulfilled by current systems that enforce an  $W \oplus X$  [32] strategy, where any memory area is either writable or executable (and never both at the same time). To achieve code execution capabilities the attacker must therefore reuse existing code sequences available in some code region of the program or its libraries. In code reuse attacks [30, 20, 28, 5, 28, 3, 6] the attacker prepares a set of invocation frames that point to code sequences (so called “gadgets”) that end with an indirect control-flow transfer whose target is again controlled by the attacker.

Using these given (practical) capabilities an attacker will try to (i) overwrite a code pointer, (ii) prepare a set of invocation frames for a code reuse attack, and (iii) force the program to dereference and follow the compromised code pointer.

## 3. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

A variety of defense mechanisms exist that protect against control-flow hijack attacks by protecting the integrity of code pointers (see Szekeres et al. [31] for a systematization of attacks and defense mechanisms). Existing defense mechanisms stop the control-flow hijack attack at different stages by: (i) retrofitting type safety and/or memory safety onto existing languages [19, 15], (ii) protecting the integrity of code pointers (i.e., allowing only valid code locations to change the memory area of a code pointer) [17, 18, 2], (iii) randomizing the location of code regions or code blocks (ASLR or code diversification are examples of this probabilistic protection) [24, 13], or (iv) verifying the correctness of code pointers when they are used. E.g., Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) [1] is a defense mechanism that stops the attack in the fourth stage, by preventing the use of a corrupted code pointer. Unfortunately, the implementation of CFI is challenging and consequently, CFI has not yet seen widespread use.

Software-based fault isolation (SFI) protects from faults in the application and enforces a given security policy on an unaware program. SFI can be implemented using a dynamic binary translation system.

Lockdown combines a dynamic binary translation system with a trusted loader to enforce a dynamic, per-module CFI policy on unaware, binary-only programs using the information about available modules and functions from the trusted loader.

### 3.1 Control-Flow Integrity

Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) [1] and its extension XFI [11] restrict the control-flow of an application at runtime to a statically determined control-flow graph. Each indirect control-flow transfer (an indirect call, indirect jump, or function return) is allowed to transfer control at runtime only to the set of statically determined targets of this code location.

CFI relies on code integrity (i.e., an attacker cannot change the executed code of the application). As explained in section 2, the only way an attacker can achieve code execution is by controlling code pointers. CFI checks the integrity of code pointers at the location where they are used in the code. Using memory corruption vulnerabilities an attacker

may change the values of code pointers (or any other data). The attack is detected (and stopped) when the program tries to follow a compromised code pointer.

The effectiveness of CFI relies on two components: (i) the (static) precision of the control-flow graph that determines the upper bound of precision and (ii) the (dynamic) precision of the runtime checks.

First, CFI can only be as precise as the control-flow graph that is enforced. If the control-flow graph is too permissive, it may allow an illegal control transfer. All existing CFI approaches rely on two phases: an explicit static analysis phase and an enforcement phase that executes additional checks. Most compiler-based implementations of CFI [1, 11, 4, 33, 27, 2, 35, 22] rely on a points-to analysis for code pointers at locations in the code that execute indirect control-flow transfers. A severe limitation of these approaches is that all the protected code must be present during compilation as they do not support modularity or shared libraries. Implementations based on static binary analysis [37, 9, 34, 36] either rely on relocation information (e.g., in the Windows PE executable format) or reconstruct that information using static analysis [38]. Modular CFI [23] is a recent compiler-based CFI tool that stores type information and dynamically merges points-to sets when new libraries are loaded (but does not support library unloading).

Second, the initial upper bound for precision is possibly limited through the implementation of the control-flow checks (Goektas et al. [12] list common limitations in CFI implementations). Practical implementations often maintain three global sets of possible targets instead of one set per control-flow transfer: one target set each for indirect jumps, indirect calls, and function returns. The control-flow checks limit the transfers to addresses in this set. This policy is an improvement compared to unchecked control-flow transfers but overly permissive as an attacker can hijack control-flow to any entry in the set.

Lockdown is a dynamic approach that enforces a stricter, dynamically constructed control-flow graph on top of a dynamic sandbox for binaries. The sandbox ensures code integrity, adds a safe shadow stack that protects against return-oriented programming attacks [30], and enforces dynamic control-flow checks. The secure loader protects the GOT and GOT.PLT data structures from malicious modifications.

## 3.2 Dynamic binary translation

Software-based Fault Isolation (SFI) protects the integrity of the system and/or data by executing additional guards that are not part of the original code. Dynamic Binary Translation (DBT) allows the implementation of SFI guards on applications without prior compiler involvement by adding a thin virtualization layer between the original code and the code that is actually executed. The DBT system dynamically enforces security policies by collecting runtime information and restricting capabilities of the executed code.

Several DBT systems exist with different performance characteristics. Valgrind [21] and PIN [16] offer a high-level runtime interface resulting in higher performance costs while DynamoRIO [7] and libdetox [25] support a more direct

translation mechanism with low overhead translating application code on the granularity of basic blocks. We build on libdetox which has already been used to implement several security policies.

A security policy can only be enforced if the translation system itself is secure. Libdetox splits the user-space address space into two domains: the application domain and the trusted binary translator domain. This design protects the binary translation system against an attacker that can modify the address space of the running application as the attacker cannot reach the trusted DBT domain. Libdetox uses a separate translator stack and separate memory regions from the running application. Libdetox enforces the following properties: (i) no untranslated code is ever executed; (ii) translated code is executed in the application domain; (iii) no pointer to the trusted domain is ever stored in attacker-accessible memory. The application triggers a trap into the trusted domain when (i) it executes a system call, (ii) executes untranslated code, or (iii) a heavy-weight security check is triggered. Libdetox can be extended by the addition of a trusted loader to the trusted computing domain [26] thereby protecting the SFI system from attacks against the loader when loading or unloading shared libraries.

The combination of trusted loader and dynamic binary translation system implements the following security guarantees: a *shadow stack* protects the integrity of return instruction pointers on the stack at all times; the *trusted loader* protects the data structures that are used to execute functions in other loaded libraries at runtime; and the *integrity* of the security mechanism is guaranteed by the binary translation system. The shadow stack is implemented by translating call and return instructions [25]. Translated call instructions push the return instruction pointer on both the application stack and the shadow stack in the trusted domain. Translated return instructions check the equivalence between the return instruction pointer on the application stack and the shadow stack; if the pointers are equivalent then control is transferred to the translated code block identified by the code pointer on the shadow stack.

The existing version of libdetox supports and allows the application to execute the full x86 instruction set (including any SSE extensions). The trusted computing base of the architecture (trusted loader and binary translation system) is small, with less than 20,600 lines of code.

## 3.3 Dynamic loading in a nutshell

Modern Unix operating systems and the Linux kernel use the Executable and Linkable Format [29, 10] (ELF) to specify the on-disk layout of applications, libraries, and compiled objects. A file that uses the ELF format to define its internal layout is called Dynamic Shared Object (DSO). The ELF format defines two views for each DSO. The first view is the program header that contains information about segments; the program header controls how the segments must be mapped from disk into the process image. The second view is the section header table; this table contains the more detailed section definitions.

The dynamic loader and the linker both use the section header table. Depending on the linker flags the section header table of a linked executable or shared library contains information about all functions and symbols, or it contains only information about exported symbols.

The `dynsym` section contains the location information of all exported symbols and is available in all dynamically linked libraries and applications. This section is used by the dynamic loader to resolve references. The `symtab` section on the other hand is not needed by the dynamic loader and can be stripped from the final library or application (but is available for most ELF files on current systems). This section contains detailed information at the highest possible level of granularity and includes details of all available symbols, even static and weak variables or functions, hidden symbols, and individual object files. The granularity of the `dynsym` and `symtab` information is no longer on the section level but on the level of individual compiled objects (usually individual source files) and functions. If available this information is used, e.g., in the debugger.

Lockdown uses the `dynsym` information to establish an information baseline. This base is extended with the more detailed `symtab` information to form the complete picture using as many details as possible. If the `symtab` information is not available, e.g., because the binary is stripped, then Lockdown falls back to the information baseline.

## 4. LOCKDOWN DESIGN

Lockdown enforces a strict, practicable CFI policy at the level of shared libraries by restricting control-flow transfers between loaded shared libraries. The high-level policy restricts (i) inter-module calls to functions that are exported from one library and imported in the other library, (ii) intra-module calls to valid functions, (iii) jump instructions to valid instructions in the same function and valid call targets for tail calls, and (iv) return instructions to the precise return address (with a special handler for exceptions). Figure 2 shows an example of the call restrictions for three loaded libraries. The call restrictions are adapted dynamically whenever libraries are loaded or unloaded. The integrity of return instructions is enforced at all times using a shadow stack. Indirect call instructions and indirect jump instructions execute a runtime check that validates the current target according to the currently loaded libraries.

Lockdown relies on a trusted loader that prepares information about all visible symbols relative to each code location. The loader uses the available symbol tables and information about imported and exported symbols to provide this information. If a shared library is stripped then only information about imported and exported symbols is available, resulting in a coarser-grained protection.

### 4.1 Rules for control transfers

Three different forms of control transfers exist, `call`, `jump`, and `return` instructions. Call instructions are used to transfer control to a different function. Jump instructions (conditional and unconditional), on the other hand, are used to transfer control inside a function. Return instructions are used to transfer control back to the calling function. The rules for different control transfers are as follows:

1. Call instructions must always target valid functions. The set of valid functions is always specific for every protected call instruction. Only functions that are defined or imported in the current module are allowed. Static functions or local functions that are called in the same module are only verifiable if the binary is not stripped.
2. The target of a jump instruction must stay within the same function or must go to a valid function target (due to tail call implementation). If the binary is stripped then jumps can only be verified to the granularity of individual sections and exported symbols.
3. Return instructions must always transfer control back to the caller. The DBT system keeps a shadow stack data structure in the trusted domain to verify return addresses on the stack before they are dereferenced. The shadow stack verifies the equivalence of the return address on the application stack and removes it from the application stack. It then removes the return address from the shadow stack and transfers control to the translated counterpart of that code pointer (protecting from time of check to time of use attacks).
4. All control transfers must target valid instructions that are reachable from the beginning of a symbol. This rule prohibits control transfers into instructions.


These rules hold for correctly compiled programs under the assumption that an attacker cannot modify code pointers in memory. Under our attack model in section 2 the attacker can freely modify any code pointer in writable memory. Lockdown inserts additional guards that protect control-flow transfers and detects code pointers that were modified by an attacker when that code pointer is used. If an individual control transfer breaks one of the rules above then the application is terminated with a security exception.

### 4.2 Control transfer categories

Most instruction sets (including x86) allow two types of control transfers, namely static control transfers that redirect control-flow to a target that is encoded in the instruction itself and indirect control-flow transfers that transfer control indirectly through a memory address (the code pointer) that contains the target. An indirect control-flow transfer encodes the memory address or register that contains the target in its instruction.

All static control-flow transfers are verified during the translation of the instruction. Because all information is static this translation-time check is safe and holds as long as only new code is added to the cache of translated code. If library code is removed (e.g., a shared library is unloaded), then the bindings to the removed code are revoked, and the code is revalidated (at the cost of a new translation).

Indirect control-flow transfers on the other hand are highly dynamic. The instruction points to a memory address (which is under the control of the attacker) that contains the real target of the control-flow transfer. The contents of the memory address can change every time the instruction is executed (e.g., think of a function pointer that is changed every time before it is executed). A static check during the



**Figure 2: Call restrictions for an executable and two libraries. Executables and libraries are only allowed to call imported function symbols. Local function calls may only transfer to local function symbols.**

translation of the instruction does not suffice to verify these indirect transfers. The binary translator must emit an additional guard that executes a dynamic check every time the dynamic control-flow is dispatched.

Return instructions mark the end of a function and return control from the called function back to the caller. This control transfer is also a form of indirect control transfer. The target of the return instruction is usually (i.e., if no exception is thrown) determined by the last call instruction in the instruction stream. The call instruction pushes the current instruction pointer onto the stack and transfers control to the called function. The return instruction on the other hand pops the topmost location from the stack and transfers control back to the caller. Return instructions are translated into a special sequence of instructions. The added guard verifies that the current return address on the application stack is the same as the address that was pushed by the last call instruction.

### 4.3 Control transfer lookup table

Both dynamic guards and static checks use a *control transfer lookup table* to verify that the actual target is allowed for the current control-flow transfer. This dynamic data structure maps target locations to a set of possible source locations. The source locations are either based at the granularity of a dynamically shared object (e.g., a shared library or the application itself), an (dynamic) object, or section inside the shared library, a function in a section, or a specific memory location.

The trusted loader constructs the control transfer lookup table on the fly. The table is updated whenever the dynamic loader resolves a new dynamically shared object. This table keeps information about all loaded symbols and functions and possible regions that can access this function. If the compiled ELF DSO contains the full symbol table then it is possible to determine the locations of all objects and all functions. If the binary is stripped and there is only dynamic loader information available then only the locations of exported symbols are known, and there is no information about the location of individual static functions and objects.

For most executables and libraries the full symbol table is available (or can be installed using a separate package). If (e.g., legacy) objects are stripped then the precision of Lock-down is limited to the set of exported functions.

## 5. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION

The prototype implementation builds on libdetox and securoader [26, 25]. We implement the control-flow checks in the DBT during the translation of individual basic blocks. All static control-flow transfers are verified during the translation and indirect (dynamic) control-flow transfers are instrumented to execute an inlined reference monitor that executes a dynamic guard depending on the type of control-flow transfer.

Our current prototype does not support self-modifying code. Given our attack model we cannot decide if new code was produced by the attacker or a just-in-time compiler that is a part of the application. We therefore terminate the application if we detect code generation or self-modifying code. (It would be possible to allow self-modifying code if the JIT compiler is part of the trusted computing base)

For all DBT systems one of the biggest performance overheads is the translation of indirect control-flow transfers. These indirect control-flow transfers cannot be translated ahead of time and always incur a runtime lookup to consult the mapping between the original code and the translated code blocks, and only then control-flow is transferred to the translated code block. These additionally executed instructions lead to performance overhead and we use a lookup cache to reduce this overhead. Caching is an optimization that locally stores the last successful pair of original code pointer and translated code pointer. If the control-flow check was successful and the current target is still the same then there is no need to execute the control-flow check again.

The prototype implementation is released as open-source and was implemented using 22,000 lines of C code mixed with a small amount of inline assembler instructions.



## 5.1 Runtime optimizations

Achieving low overhead when running binary-only applications is a challenging problem: to support dynamic CFI policies Lockdown needs to run the binary analysis alongside the executing application. For our prototype implementation we have implemented a set of optimizations to achieve low overhead without loss of precision or security. The libdetox DBT engine already implements a set of optimizations like local inline caches for indirect control-flow transfers. We extend the indirect control-flow transfer lookups by a control-flow transfer check. The validation is split into a fast path and a slow path. The fast path uses a lookup table for already verified `{sourcedso, destination}` pairs. The slow path recovers if this fast check fails (e.g., if there is a hash miss in the lookup table). Lockdown handles C++ exceptions by unwinding and resynchronizing the shadow stack with the application stack. The stack handling routine removes frames from the shadow stack until the frames match again. Shadow stack frames can only be removed by exceptions (they are never added), resulting in sound behavior.

ELF implements calls to other libraries as a call to the PLT section of the current module and an indirect jump to the real function. The DBT replaces such calls with a direct call to the loaded function, removing the indirect jump and needed CFI guard. In addition, the trusted loader protects the PLT and PLT.GOT data structures from adversarial access.

An optimization that we have left for future work replaces the global cache of translated code with a per-module cache. This allows to statically encode and protect inter-module transfers, removing the need to execute an expensive CFI guard if the function pointer points into the same module.

## 5.2 Control-flow particularities

Control-flow transfers in off-the-shelf binaries do not always adhere to the rules listed in subsection 4.1 and Lockdown catches this behavior and recovers using a set of handlers. These special cases are specific to low level libraries like the libc run-time support functions, e.g., inter-module calls to symbols that were not imported, intra-module cross function jumptables, inter-module callback functions or even inter-module calls targeting PLT entries which would bypass our PLT inlining if not handled correctly. Lockdown also allows indirect jumps as tail calls to the beginning of other functions in the set of currently allowed call targets. Although a variety of these special cases exist they can all be handled by a small set of handlers without compromising the CFI security properties.

High-level application code (i.e., all code that is not the libc or other low-level functionality like the loader) adheres to the rules listed in subsection 4.1 and therefore does not require special handling. The only exception that needs global special handling are callback functions which are discussed in the next section.

## 5.3 Implementation heuristics

Binaries have little information about the types that are used at runtime and it is not always possible to recover information precisely. To support callback functions (i.e., a function in a library returns a function pointer which is

later called from a different library; if this function is not exported/imported then the CFI guard would fail) Lockdown implements a dynamic scanning technique that is similar in design to the static analysis of Zhang and Sekar proposed in [38]. Their system statically checks for instruction sequences that are used to calculate function pointers.

Lockdown uses the following patterns to detect callback pointers to callback functions on the fly (i) `push imm32` where a function pointer is pushed onto the stack, (ii) `movl imm32, rel(%esp)` where `rel` references a local variable on the stack, and (iii) `leal imm32(%ebx), %e?x` where a function pointer is moved from memory into a general purpose register relative to `.got.plt`, or (iv) relocations that are used to define pointers for many callbacks (e.g., `R_386_RELATIVE`). An advantage of Lockdown’s dynamic analysis compared to static analysis is that Lockdown uses the actual (precise) values at runtime and checks whether the pointer actually references a valid instruction. Lockdown is therefore potentially more precise than a static analysis as static analysis is limited if there are cross-module control-flow transfers that are rely on complicated (dynamic) control-flow patterns and computation that spans across several basic blocks that are connected through indirect control-flow transfers (and maybe even across shared libraries). In addition, Lockdown scans the `.data` region for relocations pointing into the code segment to detect static code pointers.

The trusted loader protects all runtime loader data structures from adversarial access and implements both the `dlopen` class of functions and direct data structure access that libc uses. The trusted loader component allows an interesting way to deploy our dynamic CFI system: in the ELF file any executable may specify the default loader that is used to execute it. Lockdown is deployed on a per-application basis by replacing this default loader with the Lockdown executable, thereby replacing the standard loader with Lockdown.

## 6. EVALUATION

We evaluate Lockdown in the following areas: (i) performance using the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks, (ii) real-world performance using Apache 2.2, (iii) a theoretical discussion of the security guarantees according to the implemented security policy, and (iv) an evaluation of the remaining attack surface.

We run the experiments in the following sections on an Intel Core i7 CPU 920@2.67GHz with 12GiB memory on Ubuntu 12.04.4. Lockdown and the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks are compiled with gcc version 4.6.3. Apache 2.2.22 is installed from the default package. The full set of security features of Ubuntu 12.04.4 is enabled (ASLR, DEP, stack canaries, and safe exception frames).

### 6.1 Performance

We use the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks to measure raw CPU performance and to evaluate the performance impact of Lockdown with full indirect control-flow protection compared to native execution and binary translation (with shadow stack) only execution.

Table 1 shows the performance results for SPEC CPU2006 for native, binary translation only and Lockdown runs. Due

to issues with the trusted loader we were unable to run `onetpp` and `dealII`. The binary translation column already includes the shadow stack from `libdetox` [25] and overhead from the trusted loader. The additional average overhead introduced by Lockdown for CFI enforcement (compared to binary translation) is 17.37%, and the average overhead including binary translation is 32.49%. Only five benchmarks have a total overhead of more than 45% if run in Lockdown. The majority of benchmarks face a performance overhead of around 20% or below. Overall the overhead for dynamic CFI enforcement is reasonable. In future work we are looking into reducing the overhead by more aggressive caching and inlining.

## 6.2 Apache case study

In this section we evaluate the performance of a full Apache 2.2 setup running under the dynamic CFI protection of Lockdown (including ROP protection using the shadow stack). Apache is set up in the default configuration and we use the `ab` Apache benchmark to measure performance.

To test the performance of the web server we use an `html` file (56 KB) and a `jpg` image (1054 KB) that are served by Apache. The file sizes were chosen according to the average `html` and image sizes reported by [14]. We used `ab` to send 5,000,000 requests and measured the overall time required to respond to these requests.

The average overhead of Apache 2.2 running inside Lockdown is 33% with an overhead of 57% for the small `html` file and 10% for the larger `jpg` file. The additional context switches between translator domain and application domain for file and network I/O operations become more dominant for smaller files. Apache sends files using as few I/O operations as possible and with small files there is not enough computation that is executed to recover from the performance hit of the context switch.

## 6.3 Security evaluation

Evaluating the effectiveness of a CFI implementation in terms of security is not trivial. Running a vulnerable program with a CFI implementation and preventing a specific exploitation attempt does not mean that the vulnerability is not exploitable under other circumstances or by hijacking control-flow along other paths that actually might be allowed within the control-flow graph of the CFI implementation.

We therefore make the following observations: (i) in our attack model a successful attacker needs to hijack the control-flow to already executable code within the process, (ii) the probability of success for an attacker depends on the ability to find a sequence of reusable code (gadgets) that executed in the right order accomplishes the intended malicious behaviour (e.g. running a shell).

The effectiveness of a CFI implementation therefore depends on how effectively an attacker is restrained in the ability to find and reuse already available code. This directly translates to the quantity and quality of the still reachable indirect-control flow (ICF) targets of the enforced CFG.

Zhang and Sekar [38] propose a metric for measuring CFI strength called Average Indirect target Reduction (AIR).

Based on AIR we define the Dynamic Average Indirect target Reduction (DAIR):

**Definition: Dynamic Average Indirect target Reduction** Let  $t$  be a specific point in time during a program’s execution and  $i_1, \dots, i_n$  be all the ICF transfers in a program executed before and at time  $t$ . A CFI technique limits possible targets of ICF transfer  $i_j$  to the set  $T_j$ . We define  $DAIR(t)$  as:

$$DAIR(t) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^n \left(1 - \frac{|T_j|}{S}\right)$$

where  $S$  is the number of possible ICF targets in an unprotected program.

This definition of DAIR is almost identical to AIR defined by Zhang and Sekar except that it is dynamic and takes into account only ICFs that were executed during and up to a certain point in time  $t$  of a program’s execution. Therefore the DAIR metric is not static and varies during program execution. DAIR allows us to quantify the effectiveness of Lockdown’s CFI implementation despite its dynamic nature.

In addition to the quantity of ICF targets that are still valid, it is also necessary to consider the “quality” of the remaining ICF targets (with regard to the target’s ability to attack successfully). Unfortunately, there is not one unique type of instruction sequence that might be used by an attacker – depending on what an attacker wants to achieve, the criteria to assess a target’s quality vary depending on the attacker’s gadget’s needs. It is therefore difficult to measure CFI effectiveness based on a quality metric for ICF targets and their usefulness to an attacker. We therefore consider DAIR as the sole metric for CFI strength.

Table 2 shows the DAIR values for Apache, the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks, and a set of common applications. Comparing the final DAIR value at program termination (i.e., the most open value that includes all values discovered by Lockdown) with the AIR values presented by Zhang and Sekar we show an improvement of several percent. In addition, the return instruction pointers on the stack can only be redirected to one (of the few) pointers further down on the stack, stopping ROP attacks.

Table 2 shows the DAIR values for a set of UNIX applications at  $t = \text{“program termination”}$ . The DAIR values reflect how much, on average, the executed ICF instructions’ set of valid targets is reduced. We see that Lockdown is very effective for `ret` instructions as the shadow stack allows us to restrict potential `ret` targets to their exact value. As expected Lockdown is slightly more effective for indirect calls than for indirect `jumps` as the CFG is more granular at inter-module boundaries. In general, Lockdown achieves very high DAIR values as the set of valid targets is specific per loaded code module. In comparison, static CFI implementations have AIR values of 99.13% (CFI `reloc`) or 98.86% (CFI `bin`) as reported by Zhang and Sekar [38]. Directly comparing raw AIR with DAIR values is not feasible as the DAIR view changes over time. We compare the final (most permissive) DAIR numbers at program termination



benchmark	native	BT only	overhead	Lockdown	overhead
400.perlbench	408	848	107.84%	1522	273.04%
401.bzip2	693	741	6.93%	740	6.78%
403.gcc	360	511	41.94%	666	85%
429.mcf	300	309	3%	307	2.33%
445.gobmk	535	736	37.57%	767	43.36%
456.hmmer	617	636	3.08%	633	2.59%
458.sjeng	643	1014	57.7%	1454	126.13%
462.libquantum	562	579	3.02%	580	3.2%
464.h264ref	828	1055	27.42%	1738	109.9%
473.astar	548	601	9.67%	739	34.85%
483.xalanbmk	289	570	97.23%	962	232.87%
410.bwaves	589	587	-0.34%	599	1.7%
416.gamess	1104	1212	9.78%	1333	20.74%
433.milc	518	545	5.21%	558	7.72%
434.zeusmp	627	626	-0.16%	626	-0.16%
435.gromacs	1002	1025	2.3%	1026	2.4%
436.cactusADM	1207	1244	3.07%	1249	3.48%
437.leslie3d	586	588	0.34%	591	0.85%
444.namd	578	588	1.73%	586	1.38%
450.soplex	303	339	11.88%	367	21.12%
453.povray	273	411	50.55%	621	127.47%
454.calculix	1124	1152	2.49%	1168	3.91%
459.GemsFDTD	551	576	4.54%	578	4.9%
465.tonto	712	858	20.51%	869	22.05%
470.lbm	382	388	1.57%	383	0.26%
481.wrf	970	1086	11.96%	1084	11.75%
482.sphinx3	558	592	6.09%	601	7.71%
average			15.12%		32.49%

**Table 1: SPEC CPU2006 results for native, binary translation only, and Lockdown.**

with the AIR number to give an idea of how Lockdown’s CFI strength compares to other static CFI approaches.

Table 3 shows the DAIR values when only stripped libraries are used. Lockdown still achieves reasonable CFI strength despite the lack of extended symbol information. Fortunately, almost all Linux distributions provide a way to install symbol file packages. For the values in Table 2 we used the symbol file packages of Ubuntu 12.04.4 for common libraries.

As mentioned before the quantity of the ICF target reduction covers only one aspect. Lockdown’s advantage to other CFI approaches is that valid targets are specific to individual ICF instructions. This is especially relevant considering powerful functions like `mprotect()` or `system()`. These libc functions are interesting for attackers because of their high misuse potential. Lockdown will deny calls to these functions from DSOs that do not explicitly import these symbols. Therefore even if one module in a process is allowed to call them other modules will still be restrained in using them.

## 6.4 Security guarantees

Lockdown enforces strict (modular) security guarantees for executed code: (i) the DBT always maintains control of the control-flow, (ii) only valid, intended instructions are executed, (iii) function returns cannot be redirected, mitigating ROP attacks, (iv) jump instructions can target only valid instructions in the same function or symbols in the same

module, (v) call instructions can target only valid functions in the same module or imported functions, (vi) all signals are caught by the DBT system, protecting from signal oriented programming, (vii) all system calls go through a system call policy check. Due to the modular realisation, individual guarantees build on each other: the binary translator ensures the SFI properties that only valid instructions can be targeted, the shadow stack protects return instructions at all times, the trusted loader provides information about allowed targets for call and jmp instructions, and the dynamic control-flow transfer checks enforce dynamic CFI.

The remaining attack surface is vastly reduced: the GOT.PLT sections are never writeable, return instruction pointers on the stack are always protected using the shadow stack, and each remaining indirect control-flow transfer has a restricted, individual (on a per-module level) set of allowed targets.

## 7. CONCLUSION

This paper presents Lockdown, a strong dynamic control-flow integrity policy for binaries. Using the symbol tables available in shared libraries and executables we build a control-flow graph on the granularity of shared objects. A dynamic binary translation based system enforces the integrity of control-flow transfers at all times according to this model. In addition, Lockdown uses a shadow stack that protects from all ROP attacks.

DAIR	total	ind. call	ind. jump	return
ls	99.90%	99.71%	99.05%	99.99%
hostname	99.95%	99.81%	99.91%	99.99%
netstat	99.67%	98.13%	99.28%	99.99%
nano	99.96%	99.78%	99.70%	99.99%
vim	99.21%	94.39%	97.29%	99.99%
nmap	99.70%	99.08%	93.04%	99.99%
xmessage	99.67%	97.41%	99.60%	99.99%
xcalc	99.72%	97.69%	99.71%	99.99%
xterm	99.77%	98.48%	98.08%	99.99%
apache	99.58%	97.65%	96.90%	99.99%
average	<b>99.71%</b>	98.21%	98.26%	99.99%
SPEC CPU 2006	<b>99.93%</b>	99.81%	99.33%	99.99%

**Table 2: DAIR of a small set of UNIX applications, Apache and the SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks, at time  $t$  = program termination time. Where available, debug symbol files of libraries were used.**

DAIR	total	ind. call	ind. jump	return
UNIX average	<b>95.21%</b>	72.75%	83.52%	99.99%
SPEC CPU 2006	<b>95.39%</b>	74.07%	86.42%	99.99%

**Table 3: DAIR average of a small set of UNIX applications and the SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks, at time  $t$  = program termination time. All libraries are stripped.**

Our prototype implementation shows reasonable performance overhead of 32.49% on average for SPEC CPU2006. In addition, we have reasoned about CFI effectiveness and the strength of Lockdown’s dynamic CFI approach which is more precise than other CFI solutions that rely on static binary rewriting.

Lockdown enforces strong security guarantees for current systems in a practical environment that allows dynamic code loading (of shared libraries), supports threads, and results in low overhead.

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