European Economic Review

Journal: European Economic Review

Abbreviation

Eur. econ. rev.

Publisher

Elsevier

ISSN

0014-2921
1873-572X

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Publications1 - 10 of 73

An Experiment on Referrals in Health Care
Waibel, Christian; Wiesen, Daniel (2021)
European Economic Review
How referral fees affect primary care physicians’ behavior is not well understood. We conduct a behavioral experiment on referral fees in which subjects take on the role of physicians. An illustrative theoretical model guides our experimental design and the formulation of behavioral hypotheses for heterogeneously altruistic physician-types. We exogenously vary the level of referral fees paid by specialists to primary care physicians and study the impact of these fees on primary care physicians’ diagnostic effort and referrals. In a separate experimental task, we evaluate primary care physicians’ altruism. In line with our model, introducing medium-sized referral fees significantly increases referrals made by barely altruistic primary care physicians of patients who need specialist treatment, when compared to the baseline without referral fees. High referral fees significantly increase referrals irrespective of physicians’ level of altruism. Surprisingly, diagnostic effort is not significantly affected by referral fees. Implications for economic efficiency are discussed.
Persistence in power of long-lived parties
Delgado-Vega, Álvaro (2024)
European Economic Review
This paper presents a dynamic model of electoral competition in which parties are long-lived organizations. In each period, the incumbent chooses between two policies. The competitive policy yields a greater reelection probability, but absent electoral effects, the incumbent would prefer the accommodative policy. The analysis reveals that parties’ incentives to win reelection feed on themselves via a dynamic strategic complementarity effect: the incumbent's incentives to prioritize reelection today increase if it expects its rival will prioritize reelection once in power. This complementarity effect is more relevant when competitiveness harms the opposition electorally- and policy-wise. As a result of this effect, checks and balances disincentivize parties’ competitiveness not only under divided governments but also when government is unified. Lastly, competitiveness is disincentivized by political turnover, party discipline, and parties’ impatience. The model applies both to settings of “virtuous” and “perverse” accountability, in which the competitive policy is socially better or worse, respectively.
On the negatives of negative interest rates
Berentsen, Aleksander; van Buggenum, Hugo; Ruprecht, Romina (2025)
European Economic Review
Major European central banks and the Bank of Japan have remunerated reserves at negative rates (NIR) for almost a decade, justifying a theoretical study on the long-run effects of NIR. We do so through the lens of a dynamic general equilibrium model with commercial banks that fund investments by creating retail deposits, which must be backed by reserves. Because depositors can use zero-interest cash as an alternative store of value, the effect of permanent rate cuts qualitatively changes once in NIR territory. Particularly, rate cuts reduce welfare, investment, output, and bank profit, and increase the nominal price level. These effects are attenuated once in NIR territory due to a lack of transmission to depositors. NIR does, however, give rise to an overinvestment distortion.
How malleable is the aversion to stigmatized work?
Schneider, Florian H.; Schonger, Martin; Schurtenberger, Ivo (2025)
European Economic Review
Conflicting narratives about controversial business models are common in the debates surrounding stigmatized companies. We study whether such narratives affect individuals’ willingness to accept stigmatized work. In a laboratory experiment, we show that reservation wages for a job which assists the marketing of tobacco products are substantially higher than for a similar but non-stigmatized job. We then randomly expose participants either to narratives commonly used by the tobacco industry or to narratives used by a civil society opponent of the tobacco industry. Neither set of narratives affects behavior. This finding can be explained by the firm moral views held by participants. Our results suggest that aversion to stigmatized work is a robust feature of preferences, which is necessary for moral concerns to persistently influence labor market outcomes.
Fertility choice, mortality expectations, and interdependent preferences
Canning, David; Günther, Isabel; Linnemayr, Sebastian; et al. (2013)
European Economic Review
The European Commission and the revolving door
Luechinger, Simon; Moser, Christoph (2020)
European Economic Review
Decisions of the EU Commission have important consequences for the corporate sector. Thus, the fact that scores of ex-Commissioners go through the revolving door to work for companies raises concerns. Many suspect companies of profiting from privileged access to information and key decision-makers. We assess whether companies do indeed profit from hiring ex-Commissioners. Based on a unique dataset of all Commissioners who served in the Commissions of Jacques Delors I to José Manuel Barroso II spanning over 29 years, we look at stock market responses to announcements of such hirings. We find positive abnormal returns, which implies that investors anticipate benefits to companies. The reactions are larger for hirings in the first two years after a former Commissioner left office, when connections and insider knowledge are still fresh. © 2020 Elsevier B.V.
The impact of Private Equity on Firms' Activity
Amess, Kevin; Stiebale, Joel; Wright, Mike (2016)
European Economic Review
Do we need a (large) committee?
Gersbach, Hans; Mamageishvili, Akaki; Tejada, Oriol (2025)
European Economic Review
This paper studies committee design when a homogeneous population is uncertain about which alternative is correct, individuals can acquire costly information about the state of the world, and the decision must be taken via voting with the majority rule. We assume verifiability of costs and cost sharing, which are realistic assumptions in many applications, e.g. if the time spent in learning is recorded, or if reports have to be produced. We show that the optimal committee size depends on the properties of the cost function and on the size of the population. If either the marginal cost function satisfies a standard single-crossing condition or the population is sufficiently large, it is optimal to delegate voting to a small committee and often to a single individual, in which case no committee is needed at all. If information acquisition costs increase slowly for small values of information, but the magnitude of such costs is large, the optimal committee might comprise many members. Our results add a rationale for the widespread use of small committees for decision-making.
Corporate taxation, debt financing and foreign-plant ownership
Egger, Peter; Eggert, Wolfgang; Keuschnigg, Christian; et al. (2010)
European Economic Review
Does globalization create superstars? A simple theory of managerial wages
Gersbach, Hans; Schmutzler, Armin (2014)
European Economic Review

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