Journal: Review of Law and Economics

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Abbreviation

Publisher

De Gruyter

Journal Volumes

ISSN

1555-5879

Description

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Publications1 - 5 of 5
  • Filippini, Massimo; Cambini, Carlo; Piacenza, Massimiliano; et al. (2011)
    Review of Law and Economics
  • Frankenreiter, Jens (2018)
    Review of Law and Economics
    The question whether political preferences of EU Member States play a role in the decision-making of the members of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has so far gone largely unanswered in the literature. This paper formally tests the hypothesis that the political preferences of Member State governments are reflected in the decisions of the Advocates General, who are judge-like members of the ECJ. The empirical analysis is motivated by a novel model of the interaction between the Advocate General and the judicial panel. Based on this model, the paper develops a formal test to answer whether there is a relationship between the policy preferences of EU Member State governments with regard to European integration and the decision behavior of Advocates General appointed by these governments. It then tests this hypothesis using a newly assembled dataset combining information on agreements and disagreements between the opinions issued by the Advocates General and the ensuing judgments of the ECJ in preliminary ruling proceedings with information on political preferences of Member State governments obtained from party manifesto data. The results of this test suggest that the votes of Advocates General reflect the political preferences of the appointing governments vis-à-vis European integration.
  • Laudatio: Christoph Engel
    Item type: Other Journal Item
    Stremitzer, Alexander (2025)
    Review of Law and Economics
  • Contractual Democracy
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans (2012)
    Review of Law and Economics
  • On the Behavioral Economics of Crime
    Item type: Journal Article
    van Winden, Frans A.A.M.; Ash, Elliott (2012)
    Review of Law and Economics
    This paper examines the implications of the brain sciences’ mechanistic model of human behavior for our understanding of crime. The standard rational-choice crime model is refined by a behavioral approach, which proposes a decision model comprising cognitive and emotional decision systems. According to the behavioral approach, a criminal is not irrational but rather ‘ecologically rational,’ outfitted with evolutionarily conserved decision modules adapted for survival in the human ancestral environment. Several important cognitive as well as emotional factors for criminal behavior are discussed and formalized, using tax evasion as a running example. The behavioral crime model leads to new perspectives on criminal policy-making.
Publications1 - 5 of 5