Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Journal: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Springer

1386-2820
1572-8447

Publications 1 - 2 of 2

Rule consequentialism and the problem of partial acceptance
Tobia, Kevin P. (2013)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions?
Brun, Georg (2014)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
In moral epistemology, the method of reflective equilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. Reflective equilibrium cannot be adequately characterized in terms of intuitions. Although the method presupposes that we have initially credible commitments, it does not presuppose that they are intuitions. Nonetheless, intuitions can enter the process of developing a reflective equilibrium and, if the process is successful, be justified. Since the method of reflective equilibrium does not essentially involve intuitions, it does not constitute a form of intuitionism in any substantial sense. It may be classified as intuitionist only in the minimal sense of not reducing justification to a matter of inference relations alone.

Publications 1 - 2 of 2