Journal: Social Choice and Welfare

Abbreviation

Soc. choice welf.

Publisher

Springer

Journal Volumes

ISSN

1432-217X
0176-1714

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Publications 1 - 10 of 23
  • On the limits of democracy
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans (2011)
    Social Choice and Welfare
  • Forms of new democracy
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans (2024)
    Social Choice and Welfare
    In the third decade of the 21st century, digitization and artificial intelligence, global events, challenges from authoritarian states, and difficulties of particular democracies to function properly confront democracy with a new series of challenges and opportunities that will force it to reinvent itself. The last decades have produced an accelerating flow of ideas for new forms of democracy. We survey a long period in the quest for such new forms and point to next inventions for such forms. We suggest to experiment with new ways for democracy to extend the choice of democratic processes that can be implemented in real-life situations, with the beneficial side-effect that democracy might remain the only sustainable structure for self-governing societies.
  • Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans (2009)
    Social Choice and Welfare
  • Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker (2008)
    Social Choice and Welfare
  • Bargaining cum voice
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans (2011)
    Social Choice and Welfare
  • Public information and social choice
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans (2000)
    Social Choice and Welfare
  • Size and distributional uncertainty, public information and the information paradox
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans (2000)
    Social Choice and Welfare
  • Reelection threshold contracts in politics
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena (2008)
    Social Choice and Welfare
  • The Banzhaf Value in the Presence of Externalities
    Item type: Journal Article
    Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Tejada, Oriol (2015)
    Social Choice and Welfare
    We propose two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for partition function form games. In both cases our approach is based on probability distributions over the set of coalition structures that may arise for any given set of players. First, we introduce a family of values, one for each collection of these latter probability distributions, defined as the Banzhaf value of a coalitional game obtained as the expectation taken according to the given probability distributions of the original partition function form game. For each value of the family we provide two characterization results within the set of all partition function form games. Both results rely on a property of neutrality with respect to the amalgamation of players. Second, we propose another family of values that differ from the previous ones in that the latter values take into account only the information about the most likely coalition structure that may arise according to the given probability distributions. Each value of the second family is also characterized in two results by means of a collusion neutrality property. Unlike the characterizations of the first approach, these characterizations can be restricted to the set of simple games in partition function form.
  • Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Tejada, Oriol (2024)
    Social Choice and Welfare
    We introduce semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision with private valuations. Such rules take the form of a two-stage, multiple-round voting mechanism where the output of the first stage is the default alternative for the second stage and the vote-share thresholds used in every round of binary voting (a) vary with the alternative on the table for a public-good level and (b) require a qualified majority for approving the alternative on the table by stopping the procedure. We show that these mechanisms implement the ex post utilitarian optimal public-good level, provided valuations can only be high or low. This public-good level is chosen after all potential socially optimal alternatives have been picked for a voting round. We explore ways to reduce the number of voting rounds and develop a compound mechanism when there are three or more valuation types.
Publications 1 - 10 of 23