Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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Publisher

American Economic Association

Journal Volumes

ISSN

1945-7669
1945-7685

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2015 - 201932020 - 20255
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Publications 1 - 8 of 8
  • History-Bound Reelections
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans (2020)
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
    We introduce history-bound reelections. In their simple form, they consist in a "score-replication rule." Under such a rule, an incumbent has to match the highest vote share he or she has obtained in any previous election in order to be reelected. We develop a simple three-period model to examine score-replication rules. We show that suitable variants of such rules can improve welfare, as they reduce the tendency of reelected incumbents to indulge in their own preferences, and they ensure that able officeholders are reelected. Candidates might offer their own score-replication rule in campaigns. We outline how political competition may be affected by such new forms of elections.
  • Collaboration in Bipartite Networks
    Item type: Journal Article
    Hsieh, Chih-Sheng; König, Michael David; Liu, Xiaodong; et al. (2025)
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
    This paper proposes a general framework for studying the impact of collaboration on team production. We build a micro-founded model for team production, where collaboration between agents is represented by a bipartite network. The Nash equilibrium of the game incorporates both the complementarity effect between collaborating agents and the substitutability effect between concurrent projects of the same agent. We propose a Bayesian DMH procedure to estimate the structural parameters and illustrate the empirical and policy relevance of the model by analyzing the collaboration network of inventors in the semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries.
  • Loss Aversion and Consumption Choice: Theory and Experimental Evidence
    Item type: Journal Article
    Karle, Heiko; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Peitz, Martin (2015)
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  • Voter Information and Distributive Politics
    Item type: Journal Article
    Blumenthal, Benjamin (2025)
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
    Does more information benefit voters? I examine this question in a novel setting of distributive politics and electoral accountability. Homogeneously-informed electorates can benefit from less information through improvements in the control or screening of politicians. For heterogeneously-informed electorates, I show that the distribution of resources and voter welfare is affected by the nature of informational heterogeneity and by voters’ ability to communicate with each other, making less-informed voters better off than their more-informed counterparts in some cases.
  • Comparative Risk Aversion in the Presence of Ambiguity
    Item type: Journal Article
    Guetlein, Marie-Charlotte (2016)
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  • Communicating about Confidence: Cheap Talk with an Ambiguity-Averse Receiver
    Item type: Journal Article
    Colo, Philippe (2024)
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
    An expert, who is only informed of the probability of possible states, communicates with a decision maker through cheap talk. The decision maker considers different probability distributions over states as possible and is ambiguity averse. I show that all equilibria of the game are equivalent to partitional ones and that the most informative is interim dominant for the expert. Information transmission regarding probabilities that are bad news for the decision maker is facilitated by ambiguity aversion. However, ambiguity aversion also makes information transmission impossible, whatever the preference misalignment, regarding probabilities that are good news for him.
  • Prediction: The Long and the Short of It
    Item type: Journal Article
    Millner, Antony; Heyen, Daniel (2021)
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
    Commentators often lament forecasters' inability to provide precise predictions of the long-run behavior of complex economic and physical systems. Yet their concerns often conflate the presence of substantial long-run uncertainty with the need for long-run predictability; short-run predictions can partially substitute for long-run predictions if decision-makers can adjust their activities over time. So what is the relative importance of short- and long-run predictability? We study this question in a model of rational dynamic adjustment to a changing environment. Even if adjustment costs, discount factors, and long-run uncertainty are large, short-run predictability can be much more important than long-run predictability.
  • Innovation, Trade, and Finance
    Item type: Journal Article
    Egger, Peter; Keuschnigg, Christian (2015)
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Publications 1 - 8 of 8