Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics

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Abbreviation

J. Math. Econ.

Publisher

Elsevier

Journal Volumes

ISSN

0304-4068
1873-1538

Description

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Publications 1 - 10 of 10
  • Club Theory and Household Formation
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans (2010)
    Journal of Mathematical Economics
  • Britz, Volker; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Predtetchinski, Arkadi (2015)
    Journal of Mathematical Economics
  • Akyildirim, Erdinç; Güney, Ethem; Rochet, Jean-Charles; et al. (2014)
    Journal of Mathematical Economics
  • Ambiguity and Endogenous Discounting
    Item type: Journal Article
    Bommier, Antoine; Kochov, Asen; Le Grand, François Louis (2019)
    Journal of Mathematical Economics
  • A Dual Approach to Ambiguity Aversion
    Item type: Journal Article
    Bommier, Antoine (2017)
    Journal of Mathematical Economics
  • Jarrow, Robert; Larsson, Martin (2018)
    Journal of Mathematical Economics
  • Delbaen, Freddy; Drapeau, Samuel; Kupper, Michael (2011)
    Journal of Mathematical Economics
  • Toda, Alexis Akira; Walsh, Kieran James (2024)
    Journal of Mathematical Economics
    This article reviews the recent advances in the uniqueness and multiplicity of competitive equilibria in models arising in mathematical economics, finance, macroeconomics, and trade.
  • Chazal, Marie; Jouini, Elyès; Tahraoui, Rabah (2008)
    Journal of Mathematical Economics
  • Aziz, Haris; Lam, Alexander; Lee, Barton; et al. (2025)
    Journal of Mathematical Economics
    We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. Our focus is on the Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) axiom—a strengthening of the proportionality axiom (as in Freeman et al., 2021) We characterize the family of strategyproof and UFS mechanisms and also strategyproof and proportional mechanisms. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders the combination of proportionality and unanimity to be equivalent to UFS. Furthermore, there is a unique mechanism that satisfies strategyproofness and UFS (or, equivalently, proportionality and unanimity): the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). This result strengthens known characterizations in the literature. We also provide an alternative characterization of the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) Nash equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy the UFS (and proportionality) axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS (or proportionality).
Publications 1 - 10 of 10