Journal: Journal for General Philosophy of Science

Abbreviation

J Gen Philos Sci

Publisher

Springer

Journal Volumes

ISSN

0925-4560
1572-8587

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2018 - 201942020 - 20211
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Publications1 - 5 of 5
  • Introduction
    Item type: Other Journal Item
    Lampert, David; Hampe, Michael (2018)
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science
  • Which Methods Are Useful to Justify Public Policies? An Analysis of Cost–Benefit Analysis, Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, and Non-Aggregate Indicator Systems
    Item type: Journal Article
    Hirsch Hadorn, Gertrude (2021)
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science
    Science-based methods for assessing the practical rationality of a proposed public policy typically represent assumed future outcomes of policies and values attributed to these outcomes in an idealized, that is, intentionally distorted way and abstracted from aspects that are deemed irrelevant. Different types of methods do so in different ways. As a consequence, they instantiate the properties that result from abstraction and idealization such as conceptual simplicity versus complexity, or comprehensiveness versus selectivity of the values under consideration to different degrees. I hold that none of these methods is best in general. Instead, I opt for the valuation method that is useful for the policy issue in question both in terms of its relevance and in terms of its practicability. Relevance requires that the method can represent and account for what is at stake in the policy issue. Practicability refers to aspects such as easy versus difficult handling of the method. To argue for the claim, I evaluate three types of valuation methods: (1) cost–benefit analysis that rests on unidimensional measurement and ranking, (2) multi-criteria decision analysis that applies multi-dimensional measurement but unidimensional ranking, and (3) non-aggregate indicator systems that operate with multi-dimensional measurement and sometimes also multi-dimensional ranking. Second-order justification indicating whether and how the valuation method chosen is capable of accounting for the substantive value considerations that constitute the real-world policy issue in question renders the conditions on which the results of a proposed policy evaluation rest transparent.
  • Explicating Objectual Understanding: Taking Degrees Seriously
    Item type: Journal Article
    Baumberger, Christoph (2019)
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science
    The paper argues that an account of understanding should take the form of a Carnapian explication and acknowledge that understanding comes in degrees. An explication of objectual understanding is defended, which helps to make sense of the cognitive achievements and goals of science. The explication combines a necessary condition with three evaluative dimensions: an epistemic agent understands a subject matter by means of a theory only if the agent commits herself sufficiently to the theory of the subject matter, and to the degree that the agent grasps the theory (i.e., is able to make use of it), the theory answers to the facts and the agent’s commitment to the theory is justified. The threshold for outright attributions of understanding is determined contextually. The explication has descriptive as well as normative facets and allows for the possibility of understanding by means of non-explanatory (e.g., purely classificatory) theories.
  • Deciding Staged Battles of the Past: On the Rhetorics of Olaf Müller’s Historical Philosophy of Science
    Item type: Journal Article
    Hampe, Michael (2018)
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science
    Since Plato’s massive critique of the Sophists rhetoric’s ill repute runs through the history of western philosophy denunciating methods of rhetoric as in large part dishonest persuasion strategies which are at most marginally interested in dealing with truths. This judgement falls way too short insofar as it distorts the historically grown stock labeled “rhetoric” not only in the Aristotelian work. With reference to Olaf Müller’s philosophical book (Mehr Licht: Goethe mit Newton im Streit um die Farben, S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 2015) addressing the “controversy” between Goethe and Newton about the nature of light, I will study the different rhetorical models and methods used by Newton and Goethe and also Müller himself. It becomes apparent that even works attempting to decide who was right in the long run do far more than trying to evoke true “representations” of facts or truths in the reader. The specific use of language patterns provides deeper insight into an author’s mindset towards the subject area discussed in his work and generally speaking the investigation of the rhetoric of science and philosophy leads to a better understanding of different epistemic cultures both in philosophy and science.
  • On Rationales for Cognitive Values in the Assessment of Scientific Representations
    Item type: Journal Article
    Hirsch Hadorn, Gertrude (2018)
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science
    Cognitive values like simplicity, broad scope, and easy handling are properties of a scientific representation that result from the idealization which is involved in the construction of a representation. These properties may facilitate the application of epistemic values to credibility assessments, which provides a rationale for assigning an auxiliary function to cognitive values. In this paper, I defend a further rationale for cognitive values which consists in the assessment of the usefulness of a representation. Usefulness includes the relevance of a representation regarding the investigation of a given problem and its practicability for the users. This rationale builds on the claim that any evaluation of scientific representations should pursue two aims: providing information about their credibility and providing information about their usefulness. Cognitive values relating to the usefulness of a representation and epistemic values relating to its credibility both perform a first-order function. Cognitive values are abstract, and several values with first-order functions may conflict in their application. Thus, in order for cognitive values to account for the sort of problem that is to be investigated by means of a representation, they need to be appropriately specified and weighed. Comprehensiveness, complexity, high resolution, and easy handling, for instance, may be required in a first-order function for model-based prediction of regional climate impacts but not for explaining how the global climate system works. Specifying and weighing cognitive and epistemic values relative to a given problem is a legitimate second-order function of social values.
Publications1 - 5 of 5