Lamar Crombach
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- The Demographic Window of Opportunity and Economic Growth at Sub-National Level in 91 Developing CountriesItem type: Journal Article
Social Indicators ResearchCrombach, Lamar; Smits, Jeroen (2022)Data for low- and middle- income countries (LMICs) are used to investigate the effect of the demographic transition on economic growth at sub-national level. We introduce a detailed classification of demographic window phases, determine how these phases are distributed among and within LMICs, and analyze the relationship between the demographic window of opportunity (DWO) and economic growth for 1921 urban and rural areas of sub-national regions within 91 LMICs. Many areas in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East have entered the window, but most of Sub-Saharan Africa is still in the traditional or pre-window phase. Our analyses reveal higher growth rates in areas passing through the DWO. Positive growth effects are particularly strong in rural and more educated regions and in countries with lower levels of corruption. Policy measures aimed at effectively using the DW for achieving growth should combine investments in education and rural development with better governance. - The Subnational Corruption Database: Grand and petty corruption in 1,473 regions of 178 countries, 1995-2022Item type: Journal Article
Scientific DataCrombach, Lamar; Smits, Jeroen (2024)This data descriptor presents the Subnational Corruption Database (SCD), which provides data on corruption in 1,473 subnational areas of 178 countries. The SCD includes a comprehensive overall corruption index, the Subnational Corruption Index (SCI), and its two components: the Subnational Grand Corruption Index (SGCI) and Subnational Petty Corruption Index (SPCI). The SCD is constructed by combining data of 807 surveys held in the period 1995-2022 and includes the corruption experiences and perceptions of 1,326,656 respondents along 19 separate dimensions. The data are available for multiple years, allowing longitudinal analyses. At the national level, the SCI correlates strongly with established corruption indices, like the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the World Bank Control of Corruption Index (CCI). We create subnational estimates of the CPI and CCI by superimposing the subnational variation of the SCI around the national averages of these indices. The presentation of subnational data in the SCD and the separation between grand and petty corruption significantly broaden the global knowledge base in the field of corruption. - Life expectancy and length of life inequality in the long runItem type: Book Chapter
How Was Life? Volume II: New Perspectives on Well-being and Global Inequality since 1820Crombach, Lamar; Smits, Jeroen; Monden, Christiaan (2021)This chapter describes trends in adult length of life and its distribution based on 15144 life tables derived from various sources that for some countries cover a period of over 200 years. Since 1800, life expectancy in the most developed countries has increased from around 55 to 81 years for men and from 57 to 87 for women, an increase of about 50%. Concurrently, inequality in length of life in the best-performing countries has been cut by over 2/3 for both men and for women. This decrease, however, is not independent of the change in average life expectancy, as the two are strongly connected. Our data show that, in spite of great improvements in average life expectancy and reductions in length of life inequality since 1800, at each level of life expectancy there is substantial variation in inequality of length of life between different countries. - The ‚Benefits‘ of Being SmallItem type: PresentationCrombach, Lamar; Bohn, Frank; Sturm, Jan-Egbert (2022)
- A Sub-National, Layered and Time-Varying Corruption Perceptions IndexItem type: PresentationCrombach, Lamar (2023)
- The Effects of Social Media Connections on the Indian Fertility TransitionItem type: Other Conference Item
Abstracts Dutch Demography Day 2021Crombach, Lamar; Wildeman, Jet; Schrijner, Sandor; et al. (2021) - Mismatched motives: the economic consequences of distorted incentives in the public sectorItem type: Doctoral ThesisCrombach, Lamar (2024)This dissertation is a collection of four articles focused on the seeking of rents, which are rewards and prizes not earned or not consistent with competitive market returns. Each article explores a different aspect of the topic, focusing on the consequences, determinants or measurement of rent-seeking. The articles also differ in their unit of observation, with some examining country-level dynamics, and others adopting a more refined sub-national approach. Chapter 1 provides an introductory overview to rent seeking in the context of Public Choice Theory. It contextualizes each of the four articles scientifically and highlights their relevance by discussing both (i) the societal costs associated with rent-seeking and (ii) the articles’ contributions to their respective academic literatures. Chapter 2 (co-authored with Frank Bohn) examines Political Budget Cycles (PBCs), i.e., governments trying to improve their re-election chances by using fiscal instruments, like deficits. Governments can do so, as they can shift voters’ expectations of government competence because some voters are impaired by uninformedness. Chapter 2 highlights that uninformed voters may also be impaired in another way which has not been considered in the literature, namely that uninformed voters are uncertain about the precision of that expected competence. The theoretical model shows that PBCs are only produced when there are many uninformed voters and their expected competence of the government is uncertain; or with few uninformed voters and certain expectations. This could explain two empirical puzzles on why the literature sometimes finds and sometimes does not (i) PBCs in developed and democratic countries with strong institutions, and (ii) that press freedom exacerbates PBCs. In a panel of 70 countries (1986–2015), Chapter 2 finds empirical support for these findings. Its results are robust to alternative specifications and explanations like fiscal rules, corruption and expected downturns. Chapter 3 (co-authored with Frank Bohn and Jan-Egbert Sturm) shows, both theoretically and empirically, that the mechanism of central bank deterrence to non-stabilizing fiscal shocks weakens substantially in a monetary union, because the overarching central bank must account for the fiscal policies of all members. The theoretical model highlights that the response of the common central bank is especially weak for small members, given their marginal impact on the union’s aggregate inflation rate. Empirically, Chapter 3 exploits exogenous variation in elections to show that the European Central Bank reacts more vigorously to fiscal shocks from larger countries. Furthermore, the results of Chapter 3 show that small countries take advantage of this; they engage more in fiscal expansions during election years than large countries do. In an extension, Chapter 3 discusses, both theoretically and empirically, why the difference between small and large countries disappears in times of crisis. Chapter 4 (co-authored with Jeroen Smits) introduces a new tool to the corruption literature: the Sub-national Corruption Index (SCI). The SCI is a decomposable index that summarizes the perceptions of grand corruption and the experiences with petty corruption of 1,326,656 respondents along 19 unique dimensions in 1,473 regions of 178 countries between 1995-2022 based on 807 household surveys from 13 different sources. The SCI was built using novel methods while ensuring conceptual consistency between 103 different questions through manual adjustments. Additionally, Chapter 4 offers a balanced descriptive dataset using methods of interpolation and extrapolation as well as a dataset with sub-national versions of established corruption indices. Chapter 5 is a single-authored essay in preparation for an academic article on the sub-national consequences of petty corruption, also known as bribery, on economic growth (in terms of material well-being) in 50 developing countries using information on 905 area-years. Using the corruption index of Chapter 4 combined with a large sub-national socio-economic database developed by the Global Data Lab, it offers the first causal comparative analysis on the effects of corruption on economic growth at the local level. It does so by focusing on within-country variation only, thereby controlling for many national-level confounders that have posed challenges in the existing literature. It also introduces several IVs, including the novel application of institutional-specific sub-national development assistance as an IV. The findings of Chapter 5 indicate that, on average, local petty corruption is a net positive for local economic growth. Further, it offers weak indications that this holds especially for rural sub-national areas in weak democracies with poor institutions.
- Uninformed voters with (im)precise expectations: Explaining political budget cycle puzzlesItem type: Journal Article
Economics & PoliticsCrombach, Lamar; Bohn, Frank (2024)Governments try to improve re-election chances by using fiscal instruments; they can shift voters' expectations of government competence because some voters are impaired by uninformedness. We argue that uninformed voters may also be impaired in another way which has not been considered in the literature, namely that uninformed voters are uncertain about the precision of that expected competence. Analytically, we show that political budget cycles (PBCs) are only produced when we have many uninformed voters and their expected competence of the government is fairly uncertain; or with few uninformed voters and certain expectations. This could explain two empirical puzzles on why we sometimes find and sometimes not (i) PBCs in developed and democratic countries with strong institutions, and (ii) that press freedom exacerbates PBCs. In a panel of 70 countries (1986–2015) we find empirical support for these findings. Results are robust to alternative specifications and explanations like fiscal rules, corruption and expected downturns. - The “Benefits” of being small: Loose fiscal policy in the European Monetary UnionItem type: Journal Article
Journal of Public EconomicsCrombach, Lamar; Bohn, Frank; Sturm, Jan-Egbert (2024)Independent central banks typically counteract positive fiscal shocks that would otherwise increase the inflation rate above the target. In a theoretical model, we show that, in a monetary union, this mechanism implies weaker responses to national fiscal shocks because the overarching central bank must account for the fiscal policies of all members. The model highlights that the response is especially weak for small members, given their marginal impact on the union's aggregate inflation rate. Empirically, we exploit the exogenous variation in elections to show that the European Central Bank reacts more vigorously to fiscal shocks from larger countries. We then provide evidence that small countries take advantage of this; they engage more in fiscal expansions during election years than large countries. In an extension, we discuss, both theoretically and empirically, why the difference between small and large countries disappears in times of crisis. - Are Political Budget Cycles Larger in Monetary Unions?Item type: Conference PosterCrombach, Lamar; Bohn, Frank; Sturm, Jan-Egbert (2022)
Publications 1 - 10 of 14