Lennart Maschmeyer


Last Name

Maschmeyer

First Name

Lennart

ORCID

0000-0003-4666-2387

Organisational unit

Filters

2021 - 202519
Reset filters

Search Results

Publications 1 - 10 of 19
  • Donetsk don’t tell – ‘hybrid war’ in Ukraine and the limits of social media influence operations
    Item type: Journal Article
    Maschmeyer, Lennart; Abrahams, Alexei; Pomerantsev, Peter; et al. (2025)
    Journal of Information Technology & Politics
    The limits of social media influence operations are investigated in this Journal of Information Technology & Politics Article written by CSS’ Lennart Maschmeyer. In collaboration with Alexei Abrahams, Peter Pomerantsev, and Volodymyr Yermolenko, he challenges the widely shared belief of social media enabling more potent influence operations than traditional mass media. By focusing on influence operations targeted at Ukraine, a theoretical framework is developed, showing how and why decentralized and centralized media both offer respective opportunities and challenges for conducting influence operations. Tested against the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the paper does not dismiss the potential effectiveness of social media in spreading disinformation, but rather reminds to not overestimate the threat. In fact, it is an ample reminder of the overall limitations of influence operations.
  • Digitale Desinformation: Erkenntnisse aus der Ukraine
    Item type: Other Publication
    Maschmeyer, Lennart (2021)
    CSS Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik
    Informationstechnologien, so fürchten viele, machen Desinformationskampagnen effektiver und effizienter. Erkenntnisse aus dem Ukraine-Konflikt, dem paradigmatischen Fall des «hybriden Krieges», geben jedoch Anlass zu Zweifeln. Traditionelle Medien bleiben wichtiger. Ein zu enger Fokus auf Technologien verhindert eine klare Analyse und die Entwicklung wirksamer Gegenstrategien.
  • Digital Disinformation: Evidence from Ukraine
    Item type: Other Publication
    Maschmeyer, Lennart (2021)
    CSS Analyses in Security Policy
    There is a pervasive fear that information technology enhances the effectiveness of destabilizing disinformation campaigns. Yet evidence from Ukraine, the paradigmatic case of “hybrid war”, indicates this threat is overstated. Rather, traditional media remain far more influential. The prevailing focus on technology hampers both analysis and the development of effective counterstrategies.
  • The Subversive Trilemma: Why Cyber Operations Fall Short of Expectations
    Item type: Journal Article
    Maschmeyer, Lennart (2021)
    International Security
    Many expect cyber operations to provide independent utility in both warfare and low-intensity competition, but they tend to fall short of their promise, due to the subversive trilemma of cyber operations, whereby speed, intensity, and control are negatively correlated. They thus pose a trilemma for actors because a gain in one variable tends to produce losses across the other two variables. In this International Security article, CSS' Lennart Maschmeyer provides empirical support for this argument using a case study of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.
  • Subversion, cyber operations, and reverse structural power in world politics
    Item type: Journal Article
    Maschmeyer, Lennart (2023)
    European Journal of International Relations
    The Russian-sponsored influence campaign targeting the 2016 US Presidential Elections highlighted a gap in theories of (cyber) power. In this European Journal of International Relations article, CSS’ Lennart Maschmeyer argues that this campaign demonstrated the importance of subversion, a, so far, undertheorized instrument of power. By integrating Intelligence scholarship and International Relations theory, Maschmeyer develops an innovative theory of subversion as reverse structural power. This theory helps explain two unresolved issues in cybersecurity: the capability–vulnerability paradox and the outsize role of non-state actors.
  • Assessing Hybrid War: Separating Facts from Fiction
    Item type: Other Publication
    Maschmeyer, Lennart (2023)
    CSS Analyses in Security Policy
    Fear of “Hybrid War”, a blanket term describing gray zone aggression short of all-out war, remains widespread. Many expect information technology to enable revolutionary gains in this strategic space. Yet, Hybrid War’s track record does not support these expectations. Consequently, it is crucial to conduct a more systematic assessment of the different instruments used under this umbrella term.
  • Subverting Skynet: The Strategic Promise of Lethal Autonomous Weapons and the Perils of Exploitation
    Item type: Conference Paper
    Maschmeyer, Lennart (2022)
    2022 14th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Keep Moving! (CyCon)
    Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) promise a revolution in warfare by increasing the lethality of force while reducing the costs of war Yet these gains come at the cost of significant yet underappreciated perils. LAWS are vulnerable to subversion, allowing adversaries to degrade or disable these systems or even turn them against their makers. Subversion involves exploiting flaws in complex systems to make them behave in unexpected ways. It is possible because, like other computer systems, the behavior of LAWS is determined by logical rules and routines. These rules and routines inevitably contain flaws, creating vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit. This paper identifies three avenues of subversion: (1) manipulating the algorithm itself during the design process, (2) poisoning the data used to train the artificial intelligence operating the LAWS, and (3) manipulating physical objects LAWS are trained to respond to. This potential for subversion creates fundamental uncertainty for strategic planners, military commanders, and soldiers in the field. LAWS are powerful capabilities that may win wars, yet they may also become liabilities that lead to defeat against crafty adversaries. Hence, fulfilling the strategic promise of LAWS requires mitigating their vulnerabilities. Examining possible mitigations, the paper shows that technical fixes are currently unavailable, necessitating strategic solutions. It identifies two possible solutions. The first is employing counterintelligence strategies and tactics to detect, neutralize, and pre-empt attempts at subversion. The second is adopting a force structure model that maintains human superiority to neutralize rogue LAWS if necessary. However, both solutions reduce operational effectiveness and the strategic value of LAWS, thus forfeiting some of the core advantages these new systems promise. Consequently, the paper concludes that the strategic challenges of deploying LAWS currently outweigh the opportunities, necessitating a cautious approach and a greater prioritization of strategy development.
  • Goodbye Cyberwar: Ukraine as Reality Check
    Item type: Other Publication
    Maschmeyer, Lennart; Dunn Cavelty, Myriam (2022)
    CSS Policy Perspectives
    Evidence from Ukraine shows that cyber operations are either too slow, too weak, or too volatile to provide significant strategic value in hybrid conflict and war.
  • Subversion: From Covert Operations to Cyber Conflict
    Item type: Monograph
    Maschmeyer, Lennart (2024)
    In theory, subversion is the perfect weapon, yet in practice it often falters—and the same applies to cyber operations. This book explains why. Lennart Maschmeyer argues that subversion holds great promise as a cheap, easy, and yet effective alternative to war because of its distinct mechanism of action: secretly exploiting and manipulating adversary systems to undermine them and turn them against the adversary. In practice, however, subversion often falls short because this mechanism involves a set of underappreciated operational challenges that confront actors with a trilemma between speed, intensity, and control. Consequently, in most circumstances subversion is either too slow, too weak, or too volatile to produce strategic value. Subversion presents new and original evidence to support this theory from two detailed case studies that examine how the rise of information technology has changed this quality. The first case discusses the Soviet KGB’s use of illegal agents to crush the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. The second case examines Russia’s use of traditional subversion and cyber operations against Ukraine since 2014, both in its “hybrid war” strategy short of war prior to the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and since the latter. Contrary to prevailing expectations of revolutionary change in conflict short of war, findings from these studies demonstrate that traditional subversion likely remains both more versatile and more effective than cyber operations.
  • Désinformation en ligne: le cas de l’Ukraine
    Item type: Other Publication
    Maschmeyer, Lennart (2021)
    Politique de sécurité: analyses du CSS
    Il existe une crainte diffuse que les technologies de l’information renforcent l’efficacité des campagnes de désinformation à visée déstabilisatrice. Or, le cas paradigmatique de l’Ukraine montre que cette menace est exagérée. Les médias traditionnels restent bien plus influents. La focalisation sur les technologies perturbe l’analyse et empêche d’élaborer des contre-stratégies efficaces.
Publications 1 - 10 of 19