Hans Gersbach


Last Name

Gersbach

First Name

Hans

ORCID

0000-0001-8845-272X

Organisational unit

03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans

Search Results

Publications 1 - 10 of 422
  • Collective bargaining, awareness of general equilibrium effects, and unemployment
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Schniewind, Achim (2011)
    International Economic Review
  • Do risk premia protect against banking crises?
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Wenzelburger, Jan (2008)
    Macroeconomic Dynamics
  • How Much Science? The 5 Ws (and 1 H) of Investing in Basic Research
    Item type: Working Paper
    Gersbach, Hans; Schetter, Ulrich; Schneider, Maik T. (2015)
    CEPR Discussion Papers
    The aim of this paper is to identify possibilities for guiding policy in the area of basic research. We provide an extended review of basic research and offer new insights on its linkages to key economic variables and economic growth. After defining what basic research is, we identify and discuss a series of emerging policy issues by asking why we should invest in basic research, who should invest how much in basic research and when, over the course of a country’s development? We finally address the question where investments in basic research should be targeted. Moreover, we explain why many pressing issues regarding basic research policy deserve to be explored further.
  • Permit Markets, Carbon Prices and the Creation of Innovation Clusters
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Riekhof, Marie-Catherine (2021)
    Resource and Energy Economics
    Innovation clusters combining public and private effort to develop breakthrough technologies promise greater technological advances to slow down climate change. We use a multi-country model with an emission trading system to examine whether and how international climate policy can incentivize countries to create such innovation clusters. We find that a minimal carbon price is needed to attract applied research firms, but countries may nevertheless fail to invest in complementary research infrastructure. We construct a mechanism that leads to innovation clusters when emissions targets are set before uncertainty surrounding technological developments is resolved. It is a combination of low permit endowments for the country with the lowest costs to build the needed infrastructure, compensation for this country by profits from permit trade, and maximal possible permit endowments for the remaining countries. We outline how the EU-ETS can be further refined according to this mechanism.
  • Gainers and Losers from Market Integration
    Item type: Working Paper
    Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans (2019)
    CESifo Working Papers
  • Competition of politicians for wages and office
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans (2009)
    Social Choice and Welfare
  • Flexible pensions for politicians
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Mueller, Markus (2010)
    Public Choice
  • Contagious Stablecoins?
    Item type: Other Conference Item
    van Buggenum, Hugo; Gersbach, Hans; Zelzner, Sebastian (2024)
  • Propose or Vote: A simple Democratic Procedure
    Item type: Working Paper
    Gersbach, Hans (2025)
    arXiv
    This paper introduces a simple democratic procedure. In a first stage, all members of a polity decide whether to apply for proposal-making or later vote on proposals made in the second stage. This procedure is called Propose or Vote (PoV). With appropriate default points and majority voting over two randomly selected proposals, the PoV procedure can implement the Condorcet winner with only one round of voting if a Condorcet winner exists. We explore ways to establish uniqueness, alternative voting procedures over the selected alternatives, and the application to elections. In the latter case, agents can decide whether to stand for election to an office or to vote on the set of candidates.
  • A Minting Mold for the eFranc: A Policy Paper
    Item type: Working Paper
    Gersbach, Hans; Wattenhofer, Roger (2020)
    Economics Working Paper Series
    We suggest a blueprint for an eFranc as a possible complement for the Swiss monetary system to ensure the long-term stability of its money. An eFranc is a non-interest-bearing digital form of the legal tender available to the public. The public can convert banknotes or part of its bank deposits into eFrancs, subject to the banks’ ability to obtain the corresponding amount of eFrancs from the central bank.There is free conversion of eFrancs into bank deposits (and into banknotes). For the technical implementation of the eFranc, we suggest a two-layer system combining a permissioned asynchronous blockchain without consensus which provides a secureenvironment for validating transactions (base layer) plus a peer-to-peer paymentnetwork (top layer).
Publications 1 - 10 of 422