Stefan Soesanto

Last Name

Soesanto

First Name

Stefan

ORCID

0000-0003-0681-0453

Organisational unit

03515 - Wenger, Andreas / Wenger, Andreas

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Publications 1 - 10 of 16

A one-sided Affair: Japan and the People's Republic of China in Cyberspace
Soesanto, Stefan (2020)
CSS Cyberdefense Hotspot Analyses
This Hotspot analysis takes a deep dive into the cyber threat landscape between Japan and the People’s Republic of China. In contrast to other reports, this analysis primarily looks at relevant incidents that did – or had the potential to – spill into the political realm. The report describes the historical evolution of cybersecurity and defense policies in both countries and includes a chronological overview of relevant cyber incidents and the teams that were involved in them. In addition, it outlines the social, economic, technical and international effects resulting from the overall cyber threat landscape.
Terra Calling: Defending and Securing the Space Economy
Soesanto, Stefan (2021)
CSS Cyberdefense Reports
This report aims to provide a deeper understanding of the fundamental cybersecurity and -defense challenges pertaining to the space economy. It outlines the broad contours of what constitutes the space economy and takes a closer look at the problems on the terrestrial surface, space-based assets, and the area of up- and downlinks. Furthermore, this report dives into two case studies pertaining to NASA and the European global navigation satellite system Galileo, and disentangles the cyber threat landscape by examining public reporting on the most referenced satellite hacking incidents in terms of its veracity and fact-based representation. Finally, it provides several recommendations for the Swiss government and a brief horizon scan highlighting three future trends.
Cyber Deterrence Revisited
Soesanto, Stefan (2022)
Perspectives on Cyber Power
In this Perspectives on Cyber Power paper CSS' Stefan Soesanto critically reflects on cyber deterrence mechanism outcomes, shortfalls, and misconceptions and explains when cyber deterrence is and is not successful. He furthermore outlines potential research avenues, policies, and access requirements that will help to ascertain the deterrence effects experts so desperately crave to create in cyberspace.
Bulletin 2025 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik
Aebi, Simon; Capaul, Ivo; Dossi, Amos; et al. (2025)
Bulletin zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik
The 2025 Bulletin on Swiss Security Policy provides an overview of Switzerland’s security policy in light of current global security developments. This year’s edition examines, among other topics, the importance of a “drone ecosystem” for Switzerland, the need to further develop the civil protection system, and Switzerland’s upcoming chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Bulletin opens with an interview with Federal Councillor and Head of the DDPS, Martin Pfister.
The Evolution of the IT Army of Ukraine
Soesanto, Stefan (2023)
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy
The IT Army of Ukraine is unlike any other cyber-threat actor. Created by the Ukraine Ministry of Digital Transformation two days after the Russian invasion, it has gathered, trained and directed thousands of people from inside and outside Ukraine to participate in persistent DDoS campaigns against Russian civilian infrastructure. In its current form, the IT Army is neither civilian nor military, neither public nor private, neither local nor international. Notably, whether it is lawful or unlawful remains unclear. Given its apparent adaptability and its continuing ability to recruit participants and mount cyber campaigns, it is positioned to become an advanced persistent threat.
The Limits of Like-mindedness in Cyberspace
Soesanto, Stefan (2021)
Analyses of the Elcano Royal Institute (ARI)
In reaction to the Ghostwriter campaign, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy published a Declaration in September on the ‘respect for the EU’s democratic processes’. Surprisingly, the Declaration inherently failed to rally widespread public support among Western democracies in Europe and beyond. In this article for the Elcano Royal Institute CSS' Stefan Soesanto shows that like-mindedness was not on display and explains that strategic miscalculations, legal inaccuracies and political bargaining failures within the EU’s decision-making process are likely to blame for the Declaration’s poor result.
Mapping of Cyber Doctrines
Soesanto, Stefan (2021)
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Facts and Findings
In light of the discussion on the alignment of cyber doctrines, in this brief for Konrad Adenauer Foundation, CSS’ Stefan Soesanto uses the defense postures of Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States, to exemplify their contrasting evolutionary pathways. By outlining their core guidelines, organizational background and operational conduct, the comparison of these three countries illustrates the spectrum from more defensive to more offensive postures.
A Digital Army: Synergies on the Battlefield and the Development of Cyber-Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA)
Soesanto, Stefan (2021)
CSS Cyberdefense Reports
This report focuses on cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA), which is a doctrinal concept that was introduced by the US Army sometime around 2009/2010 to connect both domains at the hip. The report dives into the origins of CEMA within the US Army by contextualizing geopolitical developments and Army doctrinal changes over time; and explains why and how the US Army and UK MoD adopted CEMA. It then highlights potential CEMA tactics in the field and concludes with final thoughts on whether emulating CEMA is an option that ought to be adopted by other armed forces.
The IT Army of Ukraine
Soesanto, Stefan (2022)
CSS Cyberdefense Reports
For several years prior to the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022, the principal idea of creating a cyber volunteer army has been bouncing around in Ukrainian government circles. In part those discussions were in-formed by the success of the Estonian Defence League's Cyber Unit and other efforts around the globe to organize, incorporate, and surge civilian IT volunteers into existing military structures in times of need. In contrast to these well-established and purely defensive cyber volunteering efforts, the IT Army of Ukraine was stood up in an ad-hoc manner without a clearly structured and proven plan. Similarly, the absence of a Ukrainian military cyber command likely also pushed Kiev to think creatively about how to combine its nascent military and intel cyber capabilities with a massive, willing, and global civilian IT community in the defense of the nation. Born out of necessity, the IT Army subsequently evolved into a hybrid construct that is neither civilian nor military, neither public nor private, neither local nor international, and neither lawful nor unlawful. As of this writing, the IT Army consists of two parts: (1) a continuous global call to action that mobilizes anyone willing to participate in coordinated DDoS attacks against designated – primarily civilian - Russian infrastructure targets; and (2) an in-house team likely consisting of Ukrainian defense and intelligence personnel that have been experimenting with and conducting ever more complex cyber operations against specific Russian tar-gets. Both parts of the IT Army are purely offensive in nature and serve to bring willing amateurs (civilians) and dedicated professionals (civilian, military, intel) into one – most likely – hierarchically organizational structure. In addition, the IT Army has also given rise to an eco-system that includes Ukrainian-owned IT companies and individuals located outside of Ukraine, as well as Ukrainians living in Ukraine working for Western companies. This eco-system has been continuously creating new tools, generating know how, identifying new targets, and fulfilling other intelligence support functions to underpin Ukraine’s offensive efforts in cyberspace.
City Preparedness for Cyber-Enabled Terrorism - Report 2022
Bund, Jakob; Crelier, Alice; Peri, David; et al. (2022)
The increasing threat of terrorist groups eventually acquiring the capacity to launch terrorist attacks through the Internet and thereby causing damage to critical infrastructure, calls upon authorities to enhance preparedness against such an attack. In this regard, the 2022 Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network Report, to which CSS' Jakob Bund and Stefan Soesanto contributed, supports the drive to further protect critical infrastructure from cyber-attacks by providing evidence of the need to continually improve readiness to face these threats.

Publications 1 - 10 of 16

Stefan Soesanto

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