A characterization of cooperation in dynamic network games
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Date
2019
Publication Type
Conference Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
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Abstract
This paper explores conditions under which players cooperate in a dynamic network game. Historically, folk theorems have provided a speckled perspective by showing that there exists equilibria where players cooperate, do not cooperate, as well as a myriad of equilibria between these extremes. Our main contribution is identifying a necessary and sufficient equilibrium refinement such that, for all equilibria, all players cooperate in order to reach a strictly Pareto dominant graph. We base our results on a class of games that subsume forward-looking extensions of exchange economies with indivisible goods.
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Publication status
published
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Book title
Proceedings of the 14th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation, NetEcon '19
Journal / series
Volume
Pages / Article No.
7
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Event
14th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation, NetEcon 2019
Edition / version
Methods
Software
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Date created
Subject
Dynamic games; Exchange economies; Equilibrium refinement; Networks; Stability; Collusiveness; Pareto dominance
Organisational unit
03784 - Helbing, Dirk / Helbing, Dirk
02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.