The European Commission and the revolving door
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Date
2020-08
Publication Type
Journal Article
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yes
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Abstract
Decisions of the EU Commission have important consequences for the corporate sector. Thus, the fact that scores of ex-Commissioners go through the revolving door to work for companies raises concerns. Many suspect companies of profiting from privileged access to information and key decision-makers. We assess whether companies do indeed profit from hiring ex-Commissioners. Based on a unique dataset of all Commissioners who served in the Commissions of Jacques Delors I to José Manuel Barroso II spanning over 29 years, we look at stock market responses to announcements of such hirings. We find positive abnormal returns, which implies that investors anticipate benefits to companies. The reactions are larger for hirings in the first two years after a former Commissioner left office, when connections and insider knowledge are still fresh. © 2020 Elsevier B.V.
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Publication status
published
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Journal / series
Volume
127
Pages / Article No.
103461
Publisher
Elsevier
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Subject
European integration; European Commission; Revolving door; Conflicts of interest; Event study; Stock market