Why Rebels Stop Fighting: Organizational Decline and Desertion in Colombia's Insurgency
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Date
2021-04-20
Publication Type
Journal Article
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yes
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Abstract
The unauthorized exit from an armed organization, what we call “desertion,” is a highly consequential act. If caught, deserters may face drastic punishment, including execution. Why, then, do some members of armed groups nevertheless decide to stop fighting? In this article of the journal International Security, CSS' Enzo Nussio and Juan E. Ugarriza offer a new theoretical argument about the organizational dynamics associated with desertion, drawn from collective action theory.
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Publication status
published
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Book title
Journal / series
Volume
45 (4)
Pages / Article No.
167 - 203
Publisher
MIT Press
Event
Edition / version
Methods
Software
Geographic location
Date collected
Date created
Subject
Insurgency; Rebel groups; Desertion; Colombia
Organisational unit
03515 - Wenger, Andreas / Wenger, Andreas