Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision
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Date
2024-11
Publication Type
Journal Article
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yes
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Abstract
We introduce semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision with private valuations. Such rules take the form of a two-stage, multiple-round voting mechanism where the output of the first stage is the default alternative for the second stage and the vote-share thresholds used in every round of binary voting (a) vary with the alternative on the table for a public-good level and (b) require a qualified majority for approving the alternative on the table by stopping the procedure. We show that these mechanisms implement the ex post utilitarian optimal public-good level, provided valuations can only be high or low. This public-good level is chosen after all potential socially optimal alternatives have been picked for a voting round. We explore ways to reduce the number of voting rounds and develop a compound mechanism when there are three or more valuation types.
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published
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Journal / series
Volume
63 (3)
Pages / Article No.
677 - 715
Publisher
Springer
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Organisational unit
03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
02525 - KOF Konjunkturforschungsstelle / KOF Swiss Economic Institute
06338 - KOF FB KOF Lab / KOF FB KOF Lab
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