Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms
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Author / Producer
Date
2022-02
Publication Type
Working Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
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Abstract
A monopolist data intermediary collects consumer information that it strategically sells to competing firms in a product market for price discrimination purposes. The intermediary charges a price of information and chooses the optimal partition that maximizes the willingness to pay of firms for information. Different selling mechanisms are compared: list prices, sequential bargaining, and auctions. The intermediary optimally sells information through auctions, whereas consumer surplus is maximized with sequential bargaining and list prices. We discuss the regulatory implications of our results.
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Publication status
published
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Book title
Journal / series
Economics Working Paper Series
Volume
22/367
Pages / Article No.
Publisher
CER-ETH – Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich
Event
Edition / version
Methods
Software
Geographic location
Date collected
Date created
Subject
Selling mechanisms; Market for information; Data intermediaries; Competition policy; Regulation of digital markets
Organisational unit
03988 - Köthenbürger, Marko / Köthenbürger, Marko
Notes
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Related publications and datasets
Is new version of: https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000529105