Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions?
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Date
2014-04
Publication Type
Journal Article
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yes
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Abstract
In moral epistemology, the method of reflective equilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. Reflective equilibrium cannot be adequately characterized in terms of intuitions. Although the method presupposes that we have initially credible commitments, it does not presuppose that they are intuitions. Nonetheless, intuitions can enter the process of developing a reflective equilibrium and, if the process is successful, be justified. Since the method of reflective equilibrium does not essentially involve intuitions, it does not constitute a form of intuitionism in any substantial sense. It may be classified as intuitionist only in the minimal sense of not reducing justification to a matter of inference relations alone.
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published
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Journal / series
Volume
17 (2)
Pages / Article No.
237 - 252
Publisher
Springer
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Subject
Reflective equilibrium; Intuition; Intuitionism; Justification; Foundationalism; Coherentism
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It was possible to publish this article open access thanks to a Swiss National Licence with the publisher.