Composite Enclaves: Towards Disaggregated Trusted Execution


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Date

2021-11-19

Publication Type

Journal Article

ETH Bibliography

yes

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Abstract

The ever-rising computation demand is forcing the move from the CPU to heterogeneous specialized hardware, which is readily available across modern datacenters through disaggregated infrastructure. On the other hand, trusted execution environments (TEEs), one of the most promising recent developments in hardware security, can only protect code confined in the CPU, limiting TEEs’ potential and applicability to a handful of applications. We observe that the TEEs’ hardware trusted computing base (TCB) is fixed at design time, which in practice leads to using untrusted software to employ peripherals in TEEs. Based on this observation, we propose composite enclaves with a configurable hardware and software TCB, allowing enclaves access to multiple computing and IO resources. Finally, we present two case studies of composite enclaves: i) an FPGA platform based on RISC-V Keystone connected to emulated peripherals and sensors, and ii) a large-scale accelerator. These case studies showcase a flexible but small TCB (2.5 KLoC for IO peripherals and drivers), with a low-performance overhead (only around 220 additional cycles for a context switch), thus demonstrating the feasibility of our approach and showing that it can work with a wide range of specialized hardware.

Publication status

published

Editor

Book title

Volume

2022 (1)

Pages / Article No.

630 - 656

Publisher

Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Event

Edition / version

Methods

Software

Geographic location

Date collected

Date created

Subject

Trusted execution environments; RISC-V security

Organisational unit

03755 - Capkun, Srdan / Capkun, Srdan check_circle

Notes

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