A formal analysis of 5G authentication
METADATA ONLY
Loading...
Author / Producer
Date
2018-06-27
Publication Type
Working Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
Citations
Altmetric
METADATA ONLY
Data
Rights / License
Abstract
Mobile communication networks connect much of the world's population. The security of users' calls, SMSs, and mobile data depends on the guarantees provided by the Authenticated Key Exchange protocols used. For the next-generation network (5G), the 3GPP group has standardized the 5G AKA protocol for this purpose.
We provide the first comprehensive formal model of a protocol from the AKA family: 5G AKA. We also extract precise requirements from the 3GPP standards defining 5G and we identify missing security goals. Using the security protocol verification tool Tamarin, we conduct a full, systematic, security evaluation of the model with respect to the 5G security goals. Our automated analysis identifies the minimal security assumptions required for each security goal and we find that some critical security goals are not met, except under additional assumptions missing from the standard. Finally, we make explicit recommendations with provably secure fixes for the attacks and weaknesses we found.
Permanent link
Publication status
published
External links
Editor
Book title
Journal / series
Volume
Pages / Article No.
1806.1036
Publisher
Cornell University
Event
Edition / version
Methods
Software
Geographic location
Date collected
Date created
Subject
5G standard; Authentication protocols; AKA protocol; Symbolic verification; Formal analysis
Organisational unit
03634 - Basin, David / Basin, David
Notes
Funding
Related publications and datasets
Is previous version of: