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dc.contributor.author
Canidio, Andrea
dc.contributor.author
Karle, Heiko
dc.date.accessioned
2020-11-03T10:22:28Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-11T19:23:18Z
dc.date.available
2017-10-02T11:47:53Z
dc.date.available
2018-06-20T08:01:17Z
dc.date.available
2020-11-03T10:22:28Z
dc.date.issued
2014-12-11
dc.identifier.other
10.2139/ssrn.2536319
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/104325
dc.description.abstract
Two negotiating parties with preferences distorted by the focusing effect (Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013) may implement an agreement that is inefficient. In particular, an issue will be inefficiently left out of the agreement or inefficiently included in the agreement whenever the importance of the other issues on the table is sufficiently large. In extreme cases, this could lead to an inefficient breakdown of the negotiation. Anticipating this possibility, the negotiating parties may negotiate in stages, by first signing an incomplete agreement and later finalizing the outcome of the negotiation. As in Raiffa (1982), these incomplete agreements may impose bounds on some dimensions of the bargaining solution in order to reduce their salience.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Social Science Research Network
dc.subject
Incomplete Agreements
en_US
dc.subject
Context-dependent Preferences
en_US
dc.subject
Salience
en_US
dc.subject
Focusing Effect
en_US
dc.subject
Bargaining
en_US
dc.subject
Negotiations
en_US
dc.title
The Structure of Negotiations: Incomplete Agreements and the Focusing Effect
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
ethz.journal.title
SSRN
ethz.pages.start
2536319
ethz.size
51 p.
en_US
ethz.code.jel
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory::C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
en_US
ethz.code.jel
D0 - General::D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
en_US
ethz.code.jel
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty::D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
en_US
ethz.code.jel
F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy::F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
en_US
ethz.publication.place
Rochester, NY
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03436 - Hertig, Gérard (emeritus)
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03795 - Bechtold, Stefan / Bechtold, Stefan
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03436 - Hertig, Gérard (emeritus)
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03795 - Bechtold, Stefan / Bechtold, Stefan
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-11T19:23:44Z
ethz.source
ECIT
ethz.identifier.importid
imp5936537b5c2ad99548
ethz.ecitpid
pub:163164
ethz.eth
no
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2018-06-20T08:01:20Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2021-02-15T19:42:23Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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