- Working Paper
Rechte / LizenzIn Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
Often political races are not really competitive, and the path to reelection is smooth for many incumbents. In two-candidate races for office we suggest the introduction of a new re-election rule, which we call the “Score-replication Rule.” This rule requires that, to be reelected, any incumbent has to obtain a percentage of votes that is at least as high as the highest vote-share he/she obtained in any previous election (reduced by some margin). Such a delimiter would restrain negative incumbency advantages,” and render reelection competitive again. It could also reduce polarization in the United States Congress. Moreover, we suggest how history-bound reelections could be used in European-style proportional election systems. Mehr anzeigen
Zeitschrift / SerieEconomics Working Paper Series
VerlagETH Zurich, Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH)
ThemaHistory-bound reelections; Competitive elections; Incumbency advantages; Score-replication rule
Organisationseinheit02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.
03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans