Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author
Gersbach, Hans
dc.contributor.author
Wickramage, Kamali
dc.date.accessioned
2019-05-28T09:14:32Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-11T22:13:52Z
dc.date.available
2018-03-07T15:02:56Z
dc.date.available
2019-05-28T09:14:32Z
dc.date.issued
2015-01
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/108913
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-a-010353196
dc.description.abstract
We introduce ‘Balanced Voting’, a new voting scheme that is particularly suitable for making fundamental societal decisions. Such decisions typically involve subgroups that are strongly in favor of, or against, a new fundamental direction, and others that care much less. In a two-stage procedure, Balanced Voting works as follows: Citizens may abstain from voting on a fundamental direction in a first stage. In a second voting stage, this guarantees them a voting right on the variations of the fundamental direction chosen in the first. All losers from the first stage also obtain voting rights in the second stage, while winners do not. We develop a model with two fundamental directions for which stakes are high for some individuals and with private information about preferences among voters. We demonstrate that Balanced Voting is superior to simple majority voting, Storable Votes and Minority Voting with regard to utilitarian welfare if the voting body is sufficiently large. Moreover,the outcome under Balanced Voting is Pareto-dominant to the outcome under simple majority voting and Minority Voting. We discuss several aspects that need to be considered when Balanced Voting is applied in practice. We also suggest how Balanced Voting could be applied to elections.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
ETH Zurich, Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH)
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-NC/1.0/
dc.subject
Balanced Voting
en_US
dc.subject
Minority protection
en_US
dc.subject
Fundamental decision
en_US
dc.subject
Tyranny of majority
en_US
dc.subject
Minority protection
en_US
dc.title
Balanced Voting
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
dc.rights.license
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
dc.date.published
2015
ethz.journal.title
Economics Working Paper Series
ethz.journal.volume
15/209
en_US
ethz.size
81 p.
en_US
ethz.code.ddc
3 - Social sciences::330 - Economics
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
en_US
ethz.notes
.
en_US
ethz.publication.place
Zurich
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-11T22:14:49Z
ethz.source
ECOL
ethz.source
ECIT
ethz.identifier.importid
imp593653d834e3e84416
ethz.identifier.importid
imp59366b6cef47c70971
ethz.ecolpid
eth:47250
ethz.ecitpid
pub:169940
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-13T01:26:44Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2019-05-28T09:14:53Z
ethz.rosetta.exportRequired
false
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.atitle=Balanced%20Voting&rft.jtitle=Economics%20Working%20Paper%20Series&rft.date=2015-01&rft.volume=15/209&rft.au=Gersbach,%20Hans&Wickramage,%20Kamali&rft.genre=preprint&
 Search via SFX

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Publication type

Show simple item record