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dc.contributor.author
Malisa, Luka
dc.contributor.author
Kostiainen, Kari
dc.contributor.author
Knell, Thomas
dc.contributor.author
Sommer, David
dc.contributor.author
Capkun, Srdjan
dc.date.accessioned
2020-07-13T09:55:19Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-12T13:13:24Z
dc.date.available
2020-05-15T12:31:17Z
dc.date.available
2020-07-13T09:55:19Z
dc.date.issued
2016-04-16
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/120952
dc.description.abstract
Many terminals are used in safety-critical operations in which humans, through terminal user interfaces, become a part of the system control loop (e.g., medical and industrial systems). These terminals are typically embedded, single-purpose devices with restricted functionality, sometimes air-gapped and increasingly hardened. We describe a new way of attacking such terminals in which an adversary has only temporary, non-invasive, physical access to the terminal. In this attack, the adversary attaches a small device to the interface that connects user input peripherals to the terminal. The device executes the attack when the authorized user is performing safety-critical operations, by modifying or blocking user input, or injecting new input events. Given that the attacker has access to user input, the execution of this attack might seem trivial. However, to succeed, the attacker needs to overcome a number of challenges including the inability to directly observe the user interface and avoid being detected by the users. We present techniques that allow user interface state and input tracking. We evaluate these techniques and show that they can be implemented efficiently. We further evaluate the effectiveness of our attack through an online user study and find input modification attacks that are hard for the users to detect and would therefore lead to serious violations of the input integrity.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Cornell University
en_US
dc.title
Hacking in the Blind: (Almost) Invisible Runtime UI Attacks on Safety-Critical Terminals
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
ethz.journal.title
arXiv
ethz.pages.start
1604.04723
en_US
ethz.size
14 p.
en_US
ethz.identifier.arxiv
1604.04723
ethz.publication.place
Ithaca, NY
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02150 - Dep. Informatik / Dep. of Computer Science::02660 - Institut für Informationssicherheit / Institute of Information Security::03755 - Capkun, Srdan / Capkun, Srdan
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02150 - Dep. Informatik / Dep. of Computer Science::02660 - Institut für Informationssicherheit / Institute of Information Security::03755 - Capkun, Srdan / Capkun, Srdan
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-12T13:15:15Z
ethz.source
ECIT
ethz.identifier.importid
imp593654bd7267a55632
ethz.ecitpid
pub:183035
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-14T23:14:44Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2021-02-15T15:26:14Z
ethz.rosetta.exportRequired
true
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.atitle=Hacking%20in%20the%20Blind:%20(Almost)%20Invisible%20Runtime%20UI%20Attacks%20on%20Safety-Critical%20Terminals&rft.jtitle=arXiv&rft.date=2016-04-16&rft.spage=1604.04723&rft.au=Malisa,%20Luka&Kostiainen,%20Kari&Knell,%20Thomas&Sommer,%20David&Capkun,%20Srdjan&rft.genre=preprint&
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