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dc.contributor.author
Axel Dreher
dc.contributor.author
Boockmann, Bernhard
dc.date.accessioned
2017-12-07T13:04:29Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-12T17:17:19Z
dc.date.available
2017-12-07T13:04:29Z
dc.date.issued
2007-04
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/124124
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-a-005390224
dc.description.abstract
We investigate voting behavior on human rights in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Our central question is whether countries with a low human rights record systematically oppose human rights resolutions. An instrumental account of voting would suggest that these countries aim to weaken UN human rights resolutions since they could be future targets of these policies. If reputation aspects and other non-instrumental motives dominate, the influence can go in either direction. We estimate determinants of voting on the basis of 13,000 individual voting decisions from 1980 to 2002. Our results from ordered probit estimation show that a country’s human rights situation is irrelevant to voting behavior if regional dependence of voting is controlled for. This suggests that countries’ voting decisions are not made independently from each other. The results also show that simple rulesfor aggregating voting choices can lead to misleading results.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich
dc.rights.uri
http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-NC/1.0/
dc.subject
Nations Unies
en_US
dc.subject
Instrumental Voting
en_US
dc.subject
Vereinte Nationen
en_US
dc.subject
MENSCHENRECHTE (INTERNATIONALES RECHT)
en_US
dc.subject
HUMAN RIGHTS (INTERNATIONAL LAW)
en_US
dc.subject
United Nations
en_US
dc.subject
Human Rights
en_US
dc.subject
Voting
en_US
dc.title
Do Human Rights Offenders Oppose Human Rights Resolutions in the United Nations?
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
dc.rights.license
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
ethz.journal.title
KOF Working Papers
ethz.journal.volume
163
en_US
ethz.size
27 p.
en_US
ethz.code.ddc
DDC - DDC::3 - Social sciences::340 - Law
en_US
ethz.identifier.nebis
005390224
ethz.publication.place
Zürich
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::02525 - KOF Konjunkturforschungsstelle / KOF Swiss Economic Institute
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::02525 - KOF Konjunkturforschungsstelle / KOF Swiss Economic Institute
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-12T17:17:27Z
ethz.source
ECOL
ethz.source
ECIT
ethz.identifier.importid
imp593654f79577987696
ethz.identifier.importid
imp59366aae6117546930
ethz.ecolpid
eth:29583
ethz.ecitpid
pub:186567
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-18T10:50:38Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2022-03-28T18:35:31Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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