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dc.contributor.author
Gersbach, Hans
dc.date.accessioned
2021-03-10T07:45:09Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-12T17:33:03Z
dc.date.available
2021-03-10T07:45:09Z
dc.date.issued
2016-02
dc.identifier.issn
0265-8003
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/124435
dc.description.abstract
In this paper we introduce history-bound reelections. In their simplest form, they are embodied in a "Score-replication Rule". Under such rules an incumbent has to match the highest vote-share he/she has obtained in any previous election in order to be reelected. We develop a simple three-period model to examine Score-replication Rules. We show that suitable variants of such rules can improve welfare as they reduce the tendency of reelected incumbents to indulge in their own preferences. At the same time, they ensure that able office-holders are reelected. Candidates might offer their own Score-replication Rule in campaigns. We outline how political competition may be affected by such new forms of elections.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Centre for Economic Policy Research
en_US
dc.subject
History-bound reelections
en_US
dc.subject
Incumbency advantage
en_US
dc.subject
Non-competitive elections
en_US
dc.subject
Score-replication Rule
en_US
dc.title
An Appraisal of History-bound Reelections
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
ethz.journal.title
CEPR Discussion Papers
ethz.pages.start
DP11103
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty::D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::H - Public Economics::H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
en_US
ethz.publication.place
London
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
ethz.identifier.url
https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11103
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-12T17:33:54Z
ethz.source
ECIT
ethz.identifier.importid
imp593654fdccc8385859
ethz.ecitpid
pub:186933
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-12T20:31:18Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2020-02-14T17:40:40Z
ethz.rosetta.exportRequired
true
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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