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dc.contributor.author
Föllmi, Reto
dc.contributor.author
Oechslin, Manuel
dc.date.accessioned
2017-06-13T04:07:54Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-13T04:07:54Z
dc.date.issued
2003
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/147238
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-a-004491943
dc.language.iso
en
dc.publisher
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich
dc.rights.uri
http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-NC/1.0/
dc.subject
KORRUPTION + BESTECHLICHKEIT (POLITIK)
dc.subject
CORRUPTION + BRIBERY (POLITICS)
dc.title
Who gains from non-collusive corruption?
dc.type
Working Paper
dc.rights.license
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
ethz.journal.title
Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ethz.journal.volume
142
ethz.size
Online-Datei
ethz.code.ddc
3 - Social sciences::330 - Economics
ethz.identifier.nebis
004491943
ethz.publication.place
Zurich
ethz.publication.status
published
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-13T04:09:30Z
ethz.source
ECOL
ethz.identifier.importid
imp59366a689494b58331
ethz.ecolpid
eth:26232
ethz.eth
yes
ethz.availability
Open access
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-13T15:40:53Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2018-01-11T07:08:38Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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