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dc.contributor.author
Huesmann, Katharina
dc.contributor.author
Mimra, Wanda
dc.date.accessioned
2019-05-29T08:56:57Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-14T02:34:59Z
dc.date.available
2019-05-29T08:56:57Z
dc.date.issued
2015-09
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/155225
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-a-010510487
dc.description.abstract
We model competition for a multi-attribute health service where patients observe attribute quality imprecisely before deciding on a provider. High quality in one attribute, e.g. medical quality, is more important for ex post utility than high quality in the other attribute. Providers can shift resources to increase expected quality in some attribute. Patients rationally focus on attributes depending on signal precision and beliefs about the providers’ resource allocations. When signal precision is such that patients focus on the less important attribute, any Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is inefficient. Increasing signal precision can reduce welfare, as the positive effect of better provider selection is overcompensated by the negative effect that a shift in patient focusing has on provider quality choice. We discuss the providers’ strategic reporting incentives and reporting policies. Under optimal reporting, signals about the important attribute are always published. However, banning reporting on less important attributes might be necessary.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
ETH Zurich, Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH)
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-NC/1.0/
dc.subject
Multi-attribute good
en_US
dc.subject
Quality signals
en_US
dc.subject
Focusing
en_US
dc.subject
Reporting
en_US
dc.title
Quality provision and reporting when health care services are multi-dimensional and quality signals imperfect
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
dc.rights.license
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
dc.date.published
2015
ethz.journal.title
Economics Working Paper Series
ethz.journal.volume
15/221
en_US
ethz.size
48 p.
en_US
ethz.code.ddc
5 - Science::510 - Mathematics
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::I - Health, Education, and Welfare::I1 - Health::I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty::D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::L - Industrial Organization::L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance::L10 - General
en_US
ethz.publication.place
Zurich
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.
en_US
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-14T02:35:23Z
ethz.source
ECOL
ethz.identifier.importid
imp59366b7c8278033587
ethz.ecolpid
eth:48050
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-16T01:54:39Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2019-05-29T08:57:13Z
ethz.rosetta.exportRequired
false
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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