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dc.contributor.author
Berger, Roger
dc.contributor.author
Rauhut, Heiko
dc.contributor.author
Prade, Sandra
dc.contributor.author
Helbing, Dirk
dc.date.accessioned
2019-04-23T06:48:57Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-14T09:41:22Z
dc.date.available
2019-04-23T06:48:57Z
dc.date.issued
2010
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/156450
dc.description.abstract
We report the first ultimatum game experiment with bargaining over waiting time. The experiment was created to avoid effects of windfall gains. In contrast to donated money, time is not endowed by the experimenter and implies a natural loss to the subjects. This allows for a better measurement of the inherent conflict in the ultimatum game.We implemented three anonymity conditions; one baseline condition, one condition with anonymity among the subjects and one double-blind condition in which the experimenter did not know the division of waiting time. While we expected to observe less other-regarding behavior in ultimatum game bargaining over time, our experimental results rather confirm previous ultimatum game experiments, in which people bargained over money. The modal offer was half of the waiting time and only one offer was rejected. Interestingly, anonymity did not change the results significantly. In conclusion, our experiment confirms other-regarding behavior in the ultimatum game.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
ETH Zurich, Coping with Crises in Complex Socio-Economic Systems
en_US
dc.subject
Bargaining over time
en_US
dc.subject
Ultimatum game
en_US
dc.subject
Loss
en_US
dc.subject
Anonymity
en_US
dc.subject
Fairness
en_US
dc.title
Bargaining over time in ultimatum game experiments
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
ethz.journal.title
CCSS Working Paper Series
ethz.journal.volume
CCSS-10-002
en_US
ethz.size
11 p.
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods::C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory::C72 - Noncooperative Games
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods::C9 - Design of Experiments::C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D0 - General::D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
en_US
ethz.publication.place
Zurich
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03784 - Helbing, Dirk / Helbing, Dirk
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03784 - Helbing, Dirk / Helbing, Dirk
ethz.identifier.url
https://www.sg.ethz.ch/wps/CCSS-10-002/
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-14T09:41:26Z
ethz.source
ECIT
ethz.identifier.importid
imp59364cd39656c29741
ethz.ecitpid
pub:34540
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-12T22:07:29Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2019-04-23T06:49:15Z
ethz.rosetta.exportRequired
false
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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