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dc.contributor.author
Gersbach, Hans
dc.contributor.author
Tejada, Oriol
dc.date.accessioned
2017-08-14T06:16:30Z
dc.date.available
2017-08-11T15:27:32Z
dc.date.available
2017-08-14T06:16:30Z
dc.date.issued
2017-06
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/176287
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-b-000176287
dc.description.abstract
We introduce a two-stage, multiple-round voting procedure where the thresholds needed for approval require a qualified majority and vary with the proposal on the table. We apply such a procedure to instances of public-good provision where the citizens’ valuations can take two values and are private. We show that the procedure elicits and aggregates the information about the valuations and implements the utilitarian optimal public good level. This level is chosen after all potential socially optimal policies have been considered. We also develop a compound procedure to ensure utilitarian optimality when there are arbitrarily finitely many types of citizen.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-NC/1.0/
dc.subject
voting
en_US
dc.subject
utilitarianism
en_US
dc.subject
implementation
en_US
dc.title
Semi-Flexible Majority Rules for Public Good Provision
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
dc.rights.license
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
ethz.journal.title
Working paper / CER-ETH
ethz.journal.volume
2017
en_US
ethz.journal.issue
272
en_US
ethz.size
29 p.
en_US
ethz.code.jel
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory::C72 - Noncooperative Games
en_US
ethz.code.jel
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making::D70 - General
en_US
ethz.publication.place
Zurich
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
en_US
ethz.date.deposited
2017-08-11T15:27:34Z
ethz.source
FORM
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-08-14T06:16:36Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2019-02-02T11:23:47Z
ethz.rosetta.exportRequired
true
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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