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dc.contributor.author
Grech, Philip
dc.contributor.author
Nax, Heinrich
dc.date.accessioned
2017-12-22T13:18:19Z
dc.date.available
2017-12-07T13:05:15Z
dc.date.available
2017-12-22T13:18:19Z
dc.date.issued
2017-06-21
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/218948
dc.description.abstract
Situations where one gives up own material payoff in order to increase someone else’s material payoff are ubiquitous. In experimental economics, they are modelled as ‘dictator games’ and have been analyzed in great depth. What has gone unnoticed is that the games studied in the laboratory differ critically with respect to whether the underlying context is such that one player only gives and another player only receives, or whether players give and take at the same time. Across the experimental literature, there has been a shift from the former –‘non-interactive’ – dictator game implementation to the latter – ‘interactive’ – dictator game implementation. In this paper, we therefore compare these two situations with respect to their equilibrium predictions assuming the same underlying other-regarding distributional preferences in both cases. It turns out that the Nash equilibria of interactive dictator games are characterized by more extremal payments than optimal play in non-interactive games. In particular, the Nash equilibrium results in zero giving in the interactive setting when players are sufficiently numerous even if substantially (but not perfectly) altruistic. Our findings have welfare implications and allow for a completely different interpretation of much of the experimental data on dictator games.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Social Science Research Network
dc.subject
Giving
en_US
dc.subject
Charitable giving
en_US
dc.subject
Dictator games
en_US
dc.subject
CES utility functions
en_US
dc.subject
Distributional preferences,
en_US
dc.subject
Social preferences
en_US
dc.title
Nash Equilibria of Dictator Games: a New Perspective
en_US
dc.type
Other Publication
dc.date.published
2017-06-01
ethz.journal.title
SSRN
ethz.size
22 p.
en_US
ethz.code.jel
A1 - General Economics::A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
en_US
ethz.code.jel
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory::C72 - Noncooperative Games
en_US
ethz.code.jel
D0 - General::D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
en_US
ethz.code.jel
D6 - Welfare Economics::D64 - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
en_US
ethz.publication.place
Rochester, NY
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::09460 - Ambühl, Michael / Ambühl, Michael
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03784 - Helbing, Dirk / Helbing, Dirk
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03784 - Helbing, Dirk / Helbing, Dirk
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::09460 - Ambühl, Michael / Ambühl, Michael
en_US
ethz.identifier.url
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2989644
ethz.date.deposited
2017-12-07T13:05:16Z
ethz.source
FORM
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-12-22T13:18:21Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2021-02-14T21:36:08Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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