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dc.contributor.author
Das, Debajyoti
dc.contributor.author
Meiser, Sebastian
dc.contributor.author
Mohammadi, Esfandiar
dc.contributor.author
Kate, Aniket
dc.date.accessioned
2018-08-16T08:21:29Z
dc.date.available
2017-12-25T20:52:00Z
dc.date.available
2018-01-03T10:31:41Z
dc.date.available
2018-08-16T08:21:29Z
dc.date.issued
2017-09-27
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/224583
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-b-000224583
dc.description.abstract
This work investigates the fundamental constraints of anonymous communication (AC) protocols. We analyze the relationship between bandwidth overhead, latency overhead, and sender anonymity or recipient anonymity against the global passive (network-level) adversary. We confirm the trilemma that an AC protocol can only achieve two out of the following three properties: strong anonymity (i.e., anonymity up to a negligible chance), low bandwidth overhead, and low latency overhead. We further study anonymity against a stronger global passive adversary that can additionally passively compromise some of the AC protocol nodes. For a given number of compromised nodes, we derive necessary constraints between bandwidth and latency overhead whose violation make it impossible for an AC protocol to achieve strong anonymity. We analyze prominent AC protocols from the literature and depict to which extend those satisfy our necessary constraints. Our fundamental necessary constraints offer a guideline not only for improving existing AC systems but also for designing novel AC protocols with non-traditional bandwidth and latency overhead choices.
en_US
dc.format
PDF
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Cryptology ePrint Archive
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject
Anonymity
en_US
dc.subject
Impossibility results
en_US
dc.subject
Bandwidth
en_US
dc.subject
Latency
en_US
dc.title
Anonymity Trilemma: Strong Anonymity, Low Bandwidth Overhead, Low Latency—Choose Two
en_US
dc.type
Report
dc.rights.license
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
ethz.journal.title
Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report
ethz.pages.start
954
en_US
ethz.size
23 p.
en_US
ethz.publication.place
S.l.
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02150 - Dep. Informatik / Dep. of Computer Science::02660 - Institut für Informationssicherheit::03634 - Basin, David / Basin, David
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02150 - Dep. Informatik / Dep. of Computer Science::02660 - Institut für Informationssicherheit::03634 - Basin, David / Basin, David
en_US
ethz.identifier.url
https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/954
ethz.date.deposited
2017-12-25T20:52:00Z
ethz.source
FORM
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2018-01-03T10:31:45Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2018-08-16T08:21:32Z
ethz.rosetta.exportRequired
true
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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