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dc.contributor.author
Helbing, Dirk
dc.contributor.author
Szolnoki, Attila
dc.contributor.author
Perc, Matjaž
dc.contributor.author
Szabó, György
dc.date.accessioned
2018-12-20T08:45:28Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-09T06:12:38Z
dc.date.available
2018-12-20T08:45:28Z
dc.date.issued
2010-08
dc.identifier.issn
1367-2630
dc.identifier.other
10.1088/1367-2630/12/8/083005
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/24152
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-b-000024152
dc.description.abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify and identify the consequences of the two punishing strategies. Since punishment is costly, punishing strategies lose the evolutionary competition in case of well-mixed interactions. When spatial interactions are taken into account, however, the outcome can be strikingly different, and cooperation may spread. The underlying mechanism depends on the character of the punishment strategy. In the case of cooperating punishers, increasing the fine results in a rising cooperation level. In contrast, in the presence of the PD strategy, the phase diagram exhibits a reentrant transition as the fine is increased. Accordingly, the level of cooperation shows a non-monotonous dependence on the fine. Remarkably, punishing strategies can spread in both cases, but based on largely different mechanisms, which depend on the cooperativeness (or not) of punishers.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Institute of Physics
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
dc.title
Punish, but not too hard
en_US
dc.type
Journal Article
dc.rights.license
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported
dc.date.published
2010-08-03
ethz.title.subtitle
How costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game
en_US
ethz.journal.title
New Journal of Physics
ethz.journal.volume
12
en_US
ethz.journal.abbreviated
New j. phys.
ethz.pages.start
083005
en_US
ethz.size
14 p.
en_US
ethz.version.deposit
publishedVersion
en_US
ethz.identifier.wos
ethz.identifier.nebis
001997538
ethz.publication.place
London
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03784 - Helbing, Dirk / Helbing, Dirk
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03784 - Helbing, Dirk / Helbing, Dirk
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-09T06:12:57Z
ethz.source
ECIT
ethz.identifier.importid
imp59364d211dd6365036
ethz.ecitpid
pub:39444
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-20T13:48:41Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2018-12-20T08:45:59Z
ethz.rosetta.exportRequired
true
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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